Zydus Lifesciences Limited Vs. E. R. Squibb and Sons

Zydus Lifesciences Limited appealed a single judge's order restraining its anti-cancer biosimilar drug ZRC 3276 (claimed 70% cheaper than respondent's 5C4/Nivolumab/Opdivo under IN 340060) as allegedly infringing the respondent's patent for an isolated monoclonal antibody binding specifically to PD-1 with specified amino acid sequences in a quia timet suit filed before commercial launch. 

No direct product-to-claim mapping existed; single judge relied on indirect biosimilar-to-reference biologic comparison assuming identical sequences and non-exclusive "specifically," overlooking appellant's evidence of statistically significant binding. 

Division bench found flawed reasoning on biosimilar identity, "specifically" per prosecution history requiring no significant cross-binding, and mapping standards under Patents Act.

Absent conclusive mapping or irrefutable prima facie infringement amid technical triability, public interest in life-saving cancer therapy outweighed absolute injunction despite patent protection needs, especially with patent expiry on 2 May 2026.

Modifying order to vacate injunction conditioned on appellant filing audited sales accounts till expiry.

Law Point:

In patent infringement suits, product-to-claim mapping is indispensable to establish prima facie case under S.48 Patents Act; its absence requires overwhelming, unbroken circumstantial evidence sans presumption.

For life-saving drugs like anti-cancer therapies, public interest paramount in interlocutory injunctions alongside prima facie case/balance of convenience; absolute restraint unjustified if triable issues/expert evidence needed—secure via accounts instead.

Case Detail:Zydus Lifesciences Limited Vs E.R. Squibb and Sons:12.01.2026:FAO(OS) (COMM) 120/2025:2026:DHC:178:DB: Justice C. Hari Shankar, Justice Om Prakash Shukla

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Colgate Palmolive Company Vs Dabur India Ltd.

In this commercial suit filed by Colgate Palmolive in October 2019, the plaintiffs initially sought permanent injunction against Dabur India for disparaging Colgate Strong Teeth toothpaste by showing its red-blue packaging in advertisements and making statements discouraging use of fluoride-containing toothpastes. An ex-parte interim injunction was granted on 10.10.2019. After modification of the advertisement by Dabur, further proceedings continued. In March-April 2025, Dabur published fresh print advertisements highlighting health risks of excessive fluoride intake. Colgate filed I.A. 10040/2025 under Order VI Rule 17 CPC seeking amendment of the plaint to specifically challenge these 2025 advertisements. The Court held that the issue of generic/ingredient disparagement of fluoride toothpastes was already pleaded in the original plaint (paras 21-33 & prayer 63(v)), hence no amendment of plaint was necessary; the 2025 advertisements are merely a continuation/variation of the same fluoride awareness campaign started in 2019 and are covered within existing pleadings. The amendment application was rejected as it was not required, belated (after 6 years), procedurally deficient, and contrary to the objective of expeditious trial under Commercial Courts Act, 2015. However, the Court directed the 2025 advertisements to be taken on record as additional documents supporting the existing cause of action.

Crisp points of law settled in the case

Where the issue of ingredient/class disparagement is already pleaded in the original plaint and forms part of the existing cause of action, there is no legal necessity to amend the plaint to challenge subsequent variations/advertisements on the same theme; such advertisements can be taken on record as additional documents. (Para 18, 18.1, 26-28)

Amendment of plaint after significant delay (6 years) which is not necessary for adjudication, lacks sufficient reasoning, and is procedurally deficient, is liable to be rejected. (Para 20, 20.4, 24-25)

Liberal approach to amendment under Order VI Rule 17 CPC does not mean amendment should be allowed when it serves no purpose and defeats the object of expeditious disposal under Commercial Courts Act, 2015. (Para 22-23)

Withdrawal of certain interim applications without prejudice to rights in pending applications does not create estoppel against raising the same substantive issue which remains sub-judice in the main pleadings. (Para 17, 17.1-17.5)

Case Details

Case Title : Colgate Palmolive Company  Vs Dabur India Ltd.

Order Date : 12th January, 2026

Case Number : CS(COMM) 567/2019 (I.A. No.10040/2025 & connected I.As.)

Neutral Citation : 2026:DHC:0242

Court : High Court of Delhi

Judge : Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Accor Vs. Novotel Holidays Inn

In this commercial suit filed by Accor (a global hospitality giant owning the well-known trademark NOVOTEL since 1967, with extensive worldwide and Indian presence including 28 hotels in India and multiple valid registrations since 1990), the plaintiff sought injunction against Novotel Holidays Inn Private Limited for adopting and using the identical/near-identical mark 'NOVOTEL' as part of its corporate/trade name, domain, logo, and website for similar hospitality and travel-related services, thereby infringing the plaintiff's trademark, committing passing off, and attempting to ride on the plaintiff's long-established goodwill and reputation. The plaintiff had earlier sent cease and desist notices in 2022, pursued pre-litigation mediation (which the defendant did not attend), and successfully obtained transfer of the defendant's domain novotelholidaysinn.com through WIPO in 2023, yet the defendant continued the impugned use even after changing logos multiple times. In the interim application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC, the Delhi High Court, after noting the defendant's counsel appeared via VC but made no submissions, found the plaintiff prima facie established prior adoption, registration, global/Indian goodwill, and identical/near-identical use in the same field likely to cause confusion and false association; balance of convenience favoured the plaintiff and irreparable injury was shown due to dilution of reputation in the hospitality sector. The Court accordingly granted ex-parte ad-interim injunction restraining the defendant from using 'NOVOTEL' or any deceptively similar mark (including variants with smile device, golden scheme, or bird logo) as trade/corporate name, on website nhi.ind.in, or in any manner in relation to hospitality/travel services, till the next date of hearing.

Crisp bullet points of law settled in the case

Prior global and Indian adoption, long continuous use, extensive goodwill/reputation, and valid statutory registrations of a trademark (especially in hospitality services) confer strong prima facie rights entitling the proprietor to interim protection against identical/near-identical adoption by another in the same field (Paras 15–17)

Adoption and use of an identical/near-identical mark as part of corporate/trade name, domain, logo, and website for identical/similar services (hospitality and travel) constitutes prima facie trademark infringement under the Trade Marks Act and passing off, particularly when it creates likelihood of confusion, false association, or affiliation with the prior user (Paras 16–17, 13.15–13.17)

Dishonest intention is inferred from defendant's knowledge of plaintiff's mark (evident from field of activity and prior correspondence/WIPO proceedings), repeated changes in logo only after notices, and continued use despite domain transfer and settlement attempts (Paras 13.7–13.14, 16)

In cases of identical/near-identical marks in the same services, the test of confusion is satisfied even without actual confusion evidence, as continued unauthorized use causes irreparable injury to goodwill/reputation that cannot be compensated by damages (Paras 17, 13.19–13.20)

Balance of convenience tilts heavily in favour of the prior user with decades of reputation when the defendant is a recent adopter (2022) and has not invested in building independent goodwill (Paras 17, 13.11–13.13)

Case Details

Case Title : Accor Vs. Novotel Holidays Inn Private Limited

Order Date : 22nd December 2025

Case Number : CS(COMM) 1383/2025

Neutral Citation : 2025:DHC:XXXXX (exact neutral citation to be assigned)

Court : High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Judge : Tejas Karia, J.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

IPCA Laboratories Limited Vs Anrose Pharma

In this commercial IP suit, IPCA Laboratories Limited (Plaintiff) sued Anrose Pharma (Defendant) for infringement of its registered trademark ZERODOL (used since 2003 for pain-relief pharmaceutical preparations) and for passing off by the Defendant’s adoption of the virtually identical mark ZEROVOL-P for similar medicinal products. The suit remained undefended after due service; the Defendant never appeared nor filed any written statement. The Bombay High Court, after considering uncontroverted evidence of the Plaintiff’s long prior use, substantial goodwill, sales, and registration, held that the marks are deceptively similar both visually and phonetically, especially in the pharmaceutical field where a stricter test of confusion applies, and that the Defendant’s adoption was dishonest and in bad faith. The Court decreed the suit granting permanent injunction against infringement and passing off, directed delivery-up and destruction of infringing material, but declined damages for want of proof of actual loss; instead, it awarded costs of ₹15,00,000/- (with 8% interest if not paid within 8 weeks) in view of the Defendant’s contumacious conduct and the public health implications involved.

Crisp points of law settled in the case

Phonetic and visual near-identity between ZERODOL and ZEROVOL-P, particularly in pharmaceutical products, creates high likelihood of confusion and deception warranting injunction (Paras 9–11, 15(D)–(F))

In medicinal preparations, the test of deceptive similarity is stricter because of inevitable risk to public health and interest (Paras 9, 13, 15(F))

Marks are to be compared as a whole; overall similarity (phonetic + structural + idea) is decisive rather than microscopic differences, and test is from the viewpoint of average consumer with imperfect recollection (reliance on catena of Supreme Court and Bombay High Court judgments – Paras 10–11)

Dishonest/bad faith adoption + non-appearance/non-defence of suit is a relevant factor for grant of exemplary costs under Section 35 CPC as amended by Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (Paras 12–13, 15(I))

In absence of proof of actual loss/damage, claim for damages/punitive damages can be declined, but substantial costs can still be awarded considering conduct and nature of goods (Paras 15(H)–(I))

Case Details

Case Title : IPCA Laboratories Limited Vs Anrose Pharma

Order Date : 5th January 2026

Case Number : Commercial IP Suit No. 77 of 2013

Neutral Citation : 2026:BHC-AS:XXXXX (exact neutral citation to be assigned)

Court : High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction – Commercial Division)

Judge : Arif S. Doctor, J.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

T.Rangaraj Vs. Ms.Joy Crizildaa

In this case, celebrity chef and businessman T. Rangaraj (plaintiff/applicant), a director in a hospitality company and public figure known from TV shows and films, filed a commercial suit claiming that costume designer Joy Crizildaa (defendant) posted false, defamatory, and malicious content on Instagram and other platforms from July to August 2025, falsely portraying a marital relationship with him, which severely damaged his personal reputation, family life, and commercial interests in the hospitality and entertainment sectors, causing revenue loss and viral media trial. 

He sought interim injunction to restrain further defamatory publications and mandatory removal/deletion of the posts. 

The defendant countered that she had a genuine intimate relationship and marriage with the plaintiff (as per Hindu rites on 24.12.2023) after he represented himself as judicially separated and encouraged her to divorce her husband, and she provided prima facie evidence like chats and photos, alleging deception, forced abortions, and abuse by him when she refused further termination. 

The Madras High Court, after hearing both sides and considering the materials, held that the plaintiff failed to prima facie establish his case for interim relief, as a physical relationship was evident, the dispute involved contested facts requiring full trial, no clear commercial exploitation of personality rights was shown for a gag order, and the balance of convenience and irreparable injury tilted in favour of the defendant, resulting in dismissal of both interim applications.

Crisp bullet points of law settled in the case:

A celebrity’s personality rights cannot be invoked to secure a blanket gag order or takedown of social media posts at the interim stage without prima facie material establishing commercial exploitation of such rights. 

In cases involving disputed factual relationship allegations with supporting evidence (such as chats, photographs), the veracity cannot be determined at the interlocutory stage and requires full trial; interim injunction to suppress speech is not warranted merely on denial by one party. 

Case Title: T.Rangaraj Vs. Ms.Joy Crizildaa:07.01.2026: C.S. (Comm. Div.) No.250 of 2025:MadHC:The Honourable Mr. Justice N.Senthilkumar

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

PepsiCo INC Vs Jagdamba Fods

PepsiCo, Inc., a global manufacturer of snack foods including the well-known brand LAY'S (used since 1938, registered in India since 1992, and sold in India since 1965), filed an application under Sections 47 and 57 of the Trademarks Act, 1999 seeking cancellation of the respondent's registered mark "JAY'S" (No. 2921580 in Class 30) on the ground of phonetic identity and deceptive similarity with its prior mark LAY'S. The respondent remained unrepresented. The Court found the rival marks phonetically identical and deceptively similar, the goods identical (snack foods), and held that the impugned mark was dishonestly adopted with mala fide intent to ride on the goodwill and reputation of LAY'S, creating every likelihood of confusion and deception, thereby violating Sections 9 and 11 of the Act.

**Crisp bullet points of law settled in the case**  

- Phonetic identity and deceptive similarity between marks is sufficient to establish likelihood of confusion/deception, even without evidence of actual confusion, particularly when the goods are identical (relied on Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories, AIR 1965 SC 980 – Para 7).  

- The test of similarity must be considered both visually and phonetically (with reference to the ear as well as the eye), and the essential/distinguishing feature of the mark is decisive; minor additions or pictorial devices do not eliminate deceptive similarity (relied on K.R. Chinna Krishna Chettiar v. Shri Ambal & Co., (1969) 2 SCC 131 – Para 8).  

- Adoption of even one or more essential features of a registered mark constitutes infringement; get-up, packaging differences or additional elements are immaterial if essential features are copied (relied on De Cordova & Ors. v. Vick Chemical Co. – referred in Para 9).  

- Dishonest adoption of a deceptively similar mark with intent to trade upon the goodwill/reputation of a prior well-known/registered mark justifies cancellation of registration under Section 57 read with Section 11 of the Trademarks Act, 1999 (relied on Dabur India Ltd. v. Usha Proprietor of RS Industries, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 9440 – Para 9).

**Case Title** : PEPSICO, INC Vs JAGDAMBA FOODS PVT. LTD. AND ANR.  

**Order date** : 10.11.2025  

**Case Number** : IPDATM/210/2023  

**Neutral Citation** : Not available  

**Name of Court** : High Court at Calcutta (Original Side – Intellectual Property Rights Division)  

**Name of Judge** : Hon'ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Kalyani Baskar (Mrs.) Vs M.S. Sampoornaam

**A complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was filed against Mrs. Kalyani Baskar and her husband alleging that they jointly issued a cheque which was dishonoured for insufficient funds. The accused appeared and filed an application under Section 243(2) CrPC seeking to send the cheque for examination by a handwriting expert to prove that the signature was not hers. The Magistrate rejected the prayer. The High Court upheld the rejection. In appeal, the Supreme Court held that the cheque itself being the foundation of the complaint constituted good material for rebuttal, and denial of opportunity to examine it by handwriting expert deprived the accused of her valuable right to adduce defence evidence, resulting in unfair trial and violation of Article 21. The Magistrate should have allowed the request unless it was intended solely for vexation or delay. The impugned orders were set aside and the Magistrate was directed to send the cheque for expert opinion.**

- The power of the Magistrate under Section 243(2) CrPC to send documents for expert opinion in a cheque dishonour case must be exercised unless the request is vexatious or intended only to delay proceedings; denial deprives the accused of rebuttal opportunity and fair trial: Kalyani Baskar v. M.S. Sampoornaam, (2007) 2 SCC 258, Paras relevant to Section 243(2) and fair trial.

- Adducing defence evidence including expert examination is a valuable right under Article 21; its denial amounts to unfair trial: Kalyani Baskar v. M.S. Sampoornaam, (2007) 2 SCC 258.

- Rules of procedure are designed to secure justice and must be scrupulously followed to prevent breach of fair trial principles: Kalyani Baskar v. M.S. Sampoornaam, (2007) 2 SCC 258.

Kalyani Baskar (Mrs.) Vs M.S. Sampoornaam (Mrs.), Order date: 11 December 2006, Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 1293 of 2006, Neutral Citation: (2007) 2 Supreme Court Cases 258, Name of court: Supreme Court of India, Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice G.P. Mathur and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Lokeshwar Singh Panta.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

G. Someshwar Rao Vs Samineni Nageshwar Rao

G. Someshwar Rao filed a suit for eviction against Samineni Nageshwar Rao claiming title and seeking possession of the suit property. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff. The appellate court reversed the decree holding the plaintiff not entitled to possession. The High Court dismissed the second appeal. In appeal before the Supreme Court, the Court considered subsequent events including renovation of the building by the respondent-plaintiff and held that courts can take notice of subsequent events to do complete justice, especially when the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. The Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment, allowed the appeal, restored the plaintiff's entitlement to possession, permitted the respondent to file an application for recovery of renovation expenses (to be considered on merits), and directed determination of mesne profits with adjustment of amounts payable between parties.**

- Courts may take judicial notice of subsequent events to impart complete justice and mould relief accordingly, even in rare cases, if the goal is justice: G. Someshwar Rao v. Samineni Nageshwar Rao, (2009) 14 SCC 677, Para 37.

- The right of an accused to lead defence evidence including expert examination is not absolute and must be exercised bona fide to further justice, not to delay proceedings; successive applications for the same purpose indicate dilatory intent: G. Someshwar Rao v. Samineni Nageshwar Rao, (2009) 14 SCC 677, Paras 11-15 (also referring to cheque bounce context in connected appeals).

G. Someshwar Rao Vs Samineni Nageshwar Rao and Another, Order date: 29 July 2009, Case Number: Criminal Appeals No. 1353 of 2009 with No. 1354 of 2009, Neutral Citation: (2009) 14 SCC 677, Name of court: Supreme Court of India, Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.B. Sinha and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Cyriac Joseph.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Palanisamy @ Uthayarpalayanthan Vs Apparsamy

**The document contains excerpts from two separate Madras High Court judgments. In the first (related to Forest Act proceedings), the court held that failure to issue notice to the financier in confiscation proceedings is a curable defect; the appellate court erred in allowing the appeal entirely without remanding for fresh notice and enquiry to both purchaser and financier. The writ petition was allowed directing the Authorised Officer to issue notice to both and proceed afresh. In the second case (Palanisamy @ Uthayarpalayanthan v. Apparsamy), the trial court dismissed a suit for permanent injunction for want of declaration of title without considering the Advocate Commissioner's report. The appellate court remanded the matter for non-consideration of the report and need for plaint amendment. The High Court set aside the remand order reasoning that the appellate court itself has power under Order 41 CPC to consider factual material including the Commissioner's report and amendment application without remanding, as remand is not justified when necessary material is already on record.**

- In confiscation proceedings under the Forest Act, omission to issue notice to the financier is a procedural defect curable by remand and fresh notice rather than outright reversal of the order: [Relevant judgment excerpt, Para 9].

- An appellate court under Order 41 Rules 23 and 28 CPC should not remand a matter when the necessary material (including Advocate Commissioner's report) and amendment application are already before it; the appellate court has full jurisdiction to decide factual and legal issues itself: Palanisamy @ Uthayarpalayanthan v. Apparsamy, 2002 (4) CTC 232, Paras 8 & 9.

Palanisamy @ Uthayarpalayanthan Vs  Apparsamy, Order date: 26 September 2002, Case Number: Civil Miscellaneous Appeal (P.d) No.3 of 2002, Neutral Citation: 2002 (4) CTC 232, Name of court: High Court of Madras, Name of Judge: N.V. Balasubramanian and C. Nagappan, JJ.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Mohd. Akram Ansari Vs Chief Election Officer

**Mohd. Akram Ansari challenged the 2003 Delhi Legislative Assembly election of Haroon Yusuf (respondent), alleging disqualification on the ground that Yusuf held an office of profit as Chairman of the Delhi Wakf Board at the time of election. The High Court dismissed the election petition. In appeal, the Supreme Court held that the subsequent insertion of Section 31-A in the Wakf Act, 1995 by the Wakf (Delhi Amendment) Act, 2006, which provides that the Chairman of the Delhi Wakf Board shall not be deemed to hold an office of profit and shall be deemed never to have been disqualified, is retrospective in nature due to the deeming clause. Even if disqualification existed in 2003, the legal fiction created by the amendment deems no disqualification to have occurred. The Court also clarified that there is a rebuttable presumption that the High Court dealt with all points actually pressed before it, and unaddressed points in the judgment are presumed not to have been pressed. The appeals were dismissed upholding the election of Haroon Yusuf.**

- A statutory provision containing the words “and shall be deemed never to have been disqualified” creates a retrospective legal fiction that must be given full effect, even if the amending Act does not expressly declare it to be retrospective: Mohd. Akram Ansari v. Chief Election Officer, (2008) 2 SCC 95, Paras 6, 7.

- There is a rebuttable presumption in law that a judge deals with all points actually pressed before him; if a point is not dealt with in the judgment, it is presumed not to have been pressed unless rebutted by approaching the same court: Mohd. Akram Ansari v. Chief Election Officer, (2008) 2 SCC 95, Para 10.

Mohd. Akram Ansari Vs Chief Election Officer and Others (with connected appeal Naved Yar Khan v. Haroon Yusuf and Another), Order date: 4 December 2007, Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 4981 of 2006 with Civil Appeal No. 5828 of 2006, Neutral Citation: (2008) 2 SCC 95, Name of court: Supreme Court of India, Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.K. Mathur and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Markandey Katju.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Michael Meiresonne Vs. Google, Inc

Michael Meiresonne, sole inventor and owner of U.S. Patent No. 8,156,096 titled "Supplier Identification and Locator System and Method" directed to a directory website displaying supplier links with nearby descriptive text portions and a rollover window showing additional supplier information, appealed the PTAB's final written decision in IPR2014-01188 instituted on Google's petition holding claims 16, 17, 19, and 20 obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 over prior art references Hill (teaching links with text descriptions) and Finseth (teaching links with rollover viewing areas). Meiresonne argued the references taught away from combining descriptive text with rollover viewing area by disparaging and criticizing text descriptions as cursory unreliable or gibberish advocating graphical previews instead. The Federal Circuit reasoned that teaching away requires prior art to criticize discredit discourage or imply the combination would not work or be inoperable but Hill and Finseth did not disparage text to the extent of mutual exclusivity nor advocate wholesale abandonment of text descriptions with words like replace or unreliable absent from Finseth and the Board correctly found no teaching away supported by substantial evidence. The court affirmed the Board's decision of unpatentability.

- Prior art teaches away from a claimed invention only if it criticizes discredits discourages the combination or indicates it would be inoperable or not work: Meiresonne v. Google, Inc., 849 F.3d 1379, 1382-1383 (Fed. Cir. 2017).

- Mere preference for an alternative solution such as graphical previews over text descriptions without implying mutual exclusivity or abandonment does not constitute teaching away: Meiresonne v. Google, Inc., 849 F.3d 1379, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2017).

- Substantial evidence review applies to PTAB's factual finding on whether prior art teaches away in obviousness determinations: Meiresonne v. Google, Inc., 849 F.3d 1379, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2017).

Michael Meiresonne Vs. Google, Inc., Order date: March 7, 2017, Case Number: 2016-1755, Neutral Citation: 849 F.3d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2017), Name of court: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Name of Judge: Circuit Judge Kimberly A. Moore (opinion), with Chief Judge Sharon Prost and Circuit Judge Alan D. Lourie.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company Vs. Synvina

E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company and Archer Daniels Midland Company (collectively DuPont) petitioned for inter partes review of Synvina C.V.'s U.S. Patent 8,865,921 directed to oxidizing 5-hydroxymethylfurfural or derivatives under specific temperature pressure catalyst and solvent conditions to produce 2,5-furan dicarboxylic acid FDCA a green chemical precursor with DuPont challenging claims 1-5 and 7-9 as obvious over prior art disclosing overlapping reaction ranges. The PTAB in IPR2015-01838 held on 3 March 2017 that DuPont failed to prove obviousness by preponderant evidence reasoning no reference expressly taught the exact claimed combination and refusing burden-shifting for overlapping ranges. DuPont appealed arguing the Board applied incorrect legal standards. The Federal Circuit reasoned that prior art disclosed overlapping ranges for result-effective variables like temperature and oxygen partial pressure creating a prima facie case of obviousness shifting production burden to Synvina to rebut with evidence of teaching away unexpected results criticality or lack of routine optimization but Synvina failed to do so with weak evidence of nonobviousness. The court reversed the Board's decision holding claims 1-5 and 7-9 obvious and affirmed DuPont's standing due to competitive injury from operating a demonstration plant capable of infringing.

- When prior art discloses ranges overlapping with claimed ranges for result-effective variables a prima facie case of obviousness arises shifting production burden to patentee to rebut with evidence of teaching away unexpected results criticality or that broad ranges do not invite routine optimization: E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1006-1008 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

- This burden-shifting framework for overlapping ranges applies in inter partes review proceedings as in examination and district court litigation: E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1007-1008 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

- Standing to appeal PTAB decision exists where petitioner demonstrates concrete injury-in-fact from operating a plant capable of practicing claimed method and competitor refuses covenant not to sue: E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Synvina C.V., 904 F.3d 996, 1004-1005 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company Vs. Synvina C.V., Order date: 17 September 2018, Case Number: 2017-1977, Neutral Citation: 904 F.3d 996 (Fed. Cir. 2018), Name of court: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Name of Judge: Circuit Judge Alan D. Lourie (opinion), with Circuit Judges Kathleen M. O'Malley and Raymond C. Chen.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Limited Vs Meghmani Lifesciences Limited

Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Limited filed a suit for trademark infringement and passing off against Meghmani Lifesciences Limited and its manufacturer alleging that the defendant's mark EsiRaft for an oral suspension treating heartburn and indigestion containing identical active ingredients infringed its registered trademark RACIRAFT adopted in January 2022 with substantial sales turnover. 

An ex parte ad-interim injunction was granted on 7 April 2025 restraining the defendant, which was challenged by the defendant leading to hearing and arguments on vacation of injunction. 

The court reasoned that marks must be compared holistically as a whole without dissection, the common suffix RAFT is generic/descriptive denoting raft-like foam from sodium alginate common in such formulations and widely used in pharma trade, prefixes RACI and ESI are visually phonetically structurally distinct creating no likelihood of confusion among average consumers of medicinal preparations who exercise caution, 

No prima facie case of infringement under Section 29 or passing off established, and balance of convenience against injunction given defendant's ongoing use since July 2024. The interim application was dismissed vacating the ad-interim injunction but extended for one week from order upload to enable plaintiff further steps.

Law Point:

Trademarks must be compared holistically as a whole without anti-dissection rule applying to isolate elements, focusing on overall visual phonetic structural impression and likelihood of confusion.

Generic or descriptive suffixes like RAFT common to pharmaceutical trade for raft-forming formulations cannot confer monopoly or exclusivity preventing use by others.

In pharmaceutical cases higher threshold for confusion applies as average consumers exercise greater care caution in purchasing medicinal products reducing likelihood of deception: 

Case Detail:Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Limited Vs Meghmani Lifesciences Limited:23.12.2025: Commercial IP (L) No.353 of 2025, 2025:BHC-OS:26097: Sharmila U. Deshmukh,H.J.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Steigerwald Arzneimittelwerk GmbH Vs Assistant Controller of Patents

Steigerwald Arzneimittelwerk GmbH filed patent application for a pharmaceutical invention which was refused by the Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs on 25 July 2017 on grounds of lack of novelty and inventive step under Section 2(1)(j) of the Patents Act 1970. 

The appellant challenged the refusal order in appeal under Section 117A before the Delhi High Court. 

The court reasoned that the impugned order suffered from lack of adequate reasoning and proper appreciation of the applicant's submissions technical distinctions from prior art and evidence on novelty inventive step thereby violating principles of natural justice and reasoned decision-making. 

The appeal was allowed setting aside the refusal order and remanding the matter to the Controller for fresh consideration with directions to pass a detailed speaking order after affording full opportunity of hearing.

Law Point:

Refusal orders in patent applications must be detailed speaking orders demonstrating proper application of mind to submissions prior art distinctions technical advantages and evidence on novelty inventive step under Section 2(1)(j): 

Cryptic or unreasoned orders violating natural justice warrant setting aside and remand for reconsideration: Para [corresponding]; 

Case Detail:Steigerwald Arzneimittelwerk GmbH Vs Assistant Controller of Patents:09.01.2026:C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 423/2022:2026:DHC:147: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Steer Engineering Private Limited Vs Joint Controller of Patents

Steer Engineering Private Limited filed a divisional patent application No.202142059972 from parent No.201741044221 for a fiber reinforced thermoplastic composition and process using uPVC, ABS, and wetted continuous fibers in a twin-screw extruder with wave elements. 

The Controller issued FER on 07.03.2022, appellant responded with amended claims on 05.09.2022, hearing held post notice on 10.10.2023 and submissions on 18.12.2023, then refused patent on 31.07.2024 under Sections 2(1)(ja), 59(1), and 16(2) citing lack of inventive step over D1-D7, overlap with parent, and obviousness of wetting fibers and uPVC-ABS blend. 

Appellant appealed under Section 117A to Madras High Court, arguing permissible narrowing amendments, no hindsight, and technical advances shown in superior pipe properties. Court noted Rhodia principles on inventive step analysis but upheld Controller's detailed prior art comparison finding amended claims lack novelty/inventiveness, overlap parent features, and no evidence of unexpected effects, dismissing appeal on 05.01.2026.

Law Point:

Amended claims narrowing scope by incorporating specification features (e.g., "wetted" fibers) permissible under Section 59(1) if within original disclosure (Para 5).

Inventive step under Section 2(1)(ja) assessed via 5-step inquiry: identify skilled person (good skill > average), common knowledge, inventive concept, prior art differences, obviousness without hindsight (Para 7, citing Rhodia paras 21).

Divisional claims (Section 16) invalid if scope covered by ungranted parent without distinct invention (Para 11).

Case Details:Steer Engineering Private Limited Vs Joint Controller of Patents:05.01.2026: CMA(PT) No. 54 of 2024: Madras HC: Hon'ble Mr. Justice N. Senthilkumar.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Sana Herbals Private Limited Vs Mohsin Dehlvi

Sana Herbals Private Limited filed CS(Comm) 1776/2020 against Mohsin Dehlvi and Dehlvi Remedies Pvt Ltd alleging infringement of its registered trademark NOKUFSYRUP (registered 15 May 2015) and passing off by defendants' use of NOKUF for cough syrups, claiming rights via assignment deed dated 19 September 1999 and prior use, seeking interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1&2 CPC which was dismissed by Commercial Court on 21 December 2024 finding no prima facie case due to defendants' prior use since 1994 and registration of NOKUF in 1996. 

Appellant appealed in FAO(COMM) 77/2025 arguing defendants' use discontinuous post-1999 fire and no evidence of continuous use till 2024 while appellant built goodwill. 

The Division Bench reasoned that under Section 28(3) Trade Marks Act 1999 concurrent registrations grant equal rights to use without infringement action against each other per S. Syed Mohideen v. P. Sulochana Bai, prior continuous user from 1994 defeats passing off claim as appellant failed to challenge use during 1994-1999 gap implying acquiescence or abandonment of goodwill, equity favoring appellant but law prevailing. Appeal dismissed upholding refusal of interim injunction.

Law Point:

Concurrent registration under Section 28(3) Trade Marks Act 1999 confers equal rights to use the mark on registered proprietors against each other, barring infringement action:

 Prior continuous user of trademark defeats claim of passing off even against later registered proprietor if no challenge raised during initial period implying acquiescence or abandonment of goodwill: 

Mere registration without continuous use does not entitle proprietor to injunction against prior user, but prior user must prove continuity:

Case Detail:Sana Herbals Private Limited Vs Mohsin Dehlvi : 05.01.2026: FAO (COMM) 77/2025:2026:DHC:17:DB:Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Radhakrishna Productions Pvt. Ltd. Vs Ikkon Films Pvt. Ltd

Radhakrishna Productions Pvt. Ltd. entered into a term sheet on 1 April 2010 with Ikkon Films Pvt. Ltd. for assigning worldwide rights in film Will You Marry Me for Rs 5.5 crore executing copyright assignment on 17 May 2010 and film finance agreement on 9 September 2010 with defendant no.2 advancing Rs 3.85 crore .

Defendants breached by not completing film by stipulated date failing to refund and creating third party rights via MOU dated 9 February 2012 and sixteen agreements with defendants 3 and 5-21 prompting suit in 2012 seeking declarations of validity infringement invalidity injunctions refund damages and costs with plaintiff leading unchallenged evidence via PW-1. 

The court reasoned that unchallenged evidence and lack of cross-examination or defense establishes agreements' validity breaches infringement and invalidity of subsequent deals drawing adverse inference under Section 114 Evidence Act rejecting emotional damages as plaintiff is company but awarding compensatory costs for defendants' negligent conduct. Suit decreed declaring assignments valid breaches infringement subsequent deals invalid granting permanent injunctions ordering refund Rs 3.85 crore with 12% interest till suit and 8% thereafter plus Rs 10 lakh costs.

Law Point:

Unchallenged facts in pleadings or cross-examination deemed admitted: Maroti Bansi Teli v. Radhabai w/o Tukaram Kuni & Ors., (2011) 15 SCC 330,.

Adverse inference drawable under Section 114 Evidence Act for failure to lead evidence or cross-examine: Iswar Bhai C. Patel v. Harihar Behera, (1999) 3 SCC 457,.

Uncontroverted deposition on oath accepted as true: Anita Sharma & Ors. v. New India Assurance Company Ltd. & Anr., (2021) 8 SCC 783,.

 Compensatory costs awardable considering parties' conduct under amended Section 35 CPC in commercial suits: .

Case Detail:Radhakrishna Productions Pvt. Ltd. Vs Ikkon Films Pvt. Ltd.:05.01.2026: Commercial IP Suit No. 98 of 2026:BHC-OS:373: Arif S. Doctor, H.J.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Phonographic Performance Limited Vs Pass Code Hospitalit

Phonographic Performance Limited a copyright owner in sound recordings filed CS(COMM) 267/2024 against Pass Code Hospitality Private Limited operating pubs alleging infringement by unauthorized public performance of repertoire without license seeking injunction damages with interim application I.A. 7255/2024 for restraint and ad hoc fees arrangement directed 10.04.2024 extended quarterly till 04.05.2025 amid defendant filing I.A. 20757/2025 for refund post Azure Hospitality judgment holding PPL disentitled to license without registration under Section 33 Copyright Act 1957 and subsequent AL Hamd following it prompting I.A. 8596/2024 for clarification. The court reasoned that Azure Hospitality ratio on PPL's inability to issue licenses absent registration or RMPL membership remains binding as Supreme Court SLP stay limited to specific direction in para 27 for inter se parties not entire judgment thus change in circumstances under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC warrants review but since core issue sub judice continue ad hoc to protect both till disposal without prejudice. Applications disposed directing further ₹15 lakhs deposit allowing ₹8 lakhs withdrawal balance in FD listing suit 15.01.2026.

- Limited stay in SLP does not suspend entire precedent's ratio unless expressly covering observations; applicable inter se parties absent third-party extension: Azure Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. v. Phonographic Performance Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine Del 4040, Para 31; Para 33.

- Subsequent judgments constitute change in circumstances justifying variation of interim orders under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC if pertinent to injunction: Gurmeet Singh v. Hardev Singh, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 2962, Para 14.7; Bepin Krishna Sur v. Gautam Kumar Sur, 1981 (85) CWN 393, Para 14.7.

- Ad hoc license fee arrangements may continue pending final adjudication if core licensing entitlement sub judice before apex court: Para 34.

Phonographic Performance Limited Vs Pass Code Hospitality Private Limited & Ors., Order date: 09.01.2026, Case Number: CS(COMM) 267/2024 & I.A. 20757/2024, Neutral Citation: N/A, Name of court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Nadeem Majid Oomerbhoy Vs Sh. Gautam Tank

Nadeem Majid Oomerbhoy as court receiver for partnership firm M/s Ahmed Oomerbhoy established in 1930s using registered trademark POSTMAN since 1950s for edible groundnut oil with extensive goodwill filed CS(COMM) 361/2018 against Gautam Tank and Jagdamba Vegetable Products alleging infringement by using SUPER POSTMAN since 2004 with similar blue-yellow packaging color scheme and bottle shape causing confusion ex parte injunction granted 30.05.2005 confirmed 20.12.2007.

Suit dismissed 24.12.2010 for lack of evidence restored 27.07.2012 on appeal with costs evidence recorded arguments heard in 2023. 

Court suo moto examined defendants' 2023 registration validity under Section 57 Trade Marks Act 1999 amid IAs for stay rectification clarification injunction revival. 

The court reasoned plaintiff retained proprietorship despite non-use since 2000 due to internal partner disputes not abandonment as pursued protection no acquiescence or delay 

Defendants' mark deceptively similar adopted dishonestly registration invalid contrary to Sections 9 11 Act interim injunction revived upon suit restoration suit maintainable under Section 124 not applicable rendition of accounts necessary for damages quantification. 

Suit preliminarily decreed granting permanent injunction cancelling defendants' registration ordering accounts rendition passing off and damages quantification pending further hearing IAs disposed with clarifications.

Law Point:

Registered trademark not abandoned if non-use due to special circumstances like internal disputes, intention to resume inferred from protective actions: 

Deceptive similarity assessed holistically, adding prefix like 'SUPER' insufficient to distinguish if essential feature copied: 

Stray third-party use no defense for deliberate infringer: 

Interim injunction revives upon suit restoration unless expressly excluded: 

Case Detail:Nadeem Majid Oomerbhoy Vs Sh. Gautam Tank & Ors., Order date: 09 January 2026, Case Number: CS(COMM) 361/2018:2026:DHC: 154:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Mr. Sumit Vijay Vs Major League Baseball Properties

Mr. Sumit Vijay and Anr, proprietors using BLUE-JAY trademark since August 1998 for readymade garments in Class 25 with registration from 2004, faced cancellation petition CO (Comm IPD-TM) 279/2025 under Section 57 Trade Marks Act 1999 by Major League Baseball Properties Inc claiming BLUE JAYS mark for Toronto Blue Jays team merchandise since 1977 with trans-border reputation in India prior user bad faith adoption by appellants and deceptive similarity, leading to Single Judge allowing petition on 1 July 2025 finding trans-border goodwill bad faith and prior adoption despite no Indian registration or proven use. 

Appellants filed LPA 475/2025 arguing no evidence of respondent's Indian use or reputation before 1998 abandonment of applications no bad faith as mark unknown in India. Division Bench reasoned no material showed respondent's BLUE JAYS mark use or spillover reputation in India pre-1998 mere international fame websites magazines insufficient under Toyota Prius principles abandonment negated earlier mark status inconsistent adoption explanations inadequate for bad faith absent motive to copy obscure mark Single Judge conflated use with reputation and erred in findings. Appeal allowed quashing Single Judge judgment restoring appellants' registration.

Law Point:

 Trans-border reputation for passing off requires concrete evidence of goodwill spillover into India prior to defendant's adoption, not mere global fame or accessible websites/magazines: Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Prius Auto Industries Ltd., (2018) 2 SCC 1, Para 12.8.9; Milmet Oftho Industries v. Allergan Inc., (2004) 12 SCC 624, Para 12.8.8.4.

Bad faith under Section 11(10)(ii) Trade Marks Act 1999 necessitates intent to unfairly capitalize on or damage another's reputation, not inferred from minor explanatory inconsistencies without proven awareness or motive: Harrison v. Teton Valley Trading Co. Ltd., [2004] EWCA Civ 1028, Para 59; BPI Sports LLC v. Vinayak Aggarwal, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 5802, Para 13.

Abandoned trademark applications do not confer "earlier trade mark" status or exclusivity, precluding monopoly claims over relinquished marks: Para 11.1 to 11.6.

Cancellation under Section 57 requires entry contrary to Act provisions like Section 11(3)(a), but absent Indian use/goodwill, international priority insufficient: Para 12.26.

Case Detail: Mr. Sumit Vijay Vs Major League Baseball Properties :05.02.2026:, Case Number: LPA 475/2025: 2026:DHC:6-DB: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]