Saturday, January 17, 2026

Karan Rathore Vs Registrar of Trade Marks

Karan Rathore, assignee of the registered trademark 'JBR' (device mark) in Class 12 for motor parts since 2010 with claimed use from 2000 via predecessor Jagdish Joshi who assigned it in May 2023.

Opposed Respondent No. 2's application No. 5854000 for 'JBR' (word mark) in Class 12 for car/bike/vehicle covers claiming use from July 2020, advertised in May 2023; opposition filed in May 2023, countered in July 2023, evidences exchanged, hearing in March 2024 led to Registrar dismissing opposition on March 14, 2024 holding goods dissimilar and Appellant not prior user for covers, issuing certificate; Appellant appealed under S.91. 

Respondent No. 2, Appellant's cousin, had obtained authorization in July 2020 for six months to sell covers under 'JBR' on e-commerce, admitting Appellant's rights. 

Court reasoned that marks are identical in essential feature 'JBR', goods similar as automotive accessories with same consumers, trade channels, and potential confusion per factors in FDC Limited (nature, use, users, channels, competition); authorization implies similarity acknowledgment; no monopoly over class but similarity triggers S.11 prohibition.

Appeal allowed, impugned order set aside, registration removed under S.57.

Law Point:

Factors for determining similarity of goods/services include nature and composition, uses, users, physical nature, trade channels, competition, and complementarity:  (Para 17-18).

 It is well-established in law that an owner of a Mark is always entitled to expand its goods and services, as a natural consequence in expansion of its business. (Para 20)

Registration liable to refusal under S.11 if identical/similar marks for similar goods likely to cause confusion: Trade Marks Act, 1999, S.11 (Para 21).

Case Title: Karan Rathore Vs Registrar of Trade Marks:17.01.2026:C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 23/2024:2026:DHC:422: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

GM Modular Pvt. Ltd. Vs Mumtaz Ahmed

Introduction: Delhi High Court's judgment in GM Modular Pvt. Ltd. versus Mumtaz Ahmed and Another exemplifies the judiciary's commitment to upholding the rights of prior users and maintainers of goodwill in trademark disputes, particularly when subsequent registrations appear to exploit established brands without justification.

This case revolves around a rectification petition under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, where the petitioner sought the cancellation or removal of the respondent's trademark 'GMW' in Class 11, arguing it was deceptively similar to their own 'GM' marks used since 1999 in the electrical goods sector. The court, presiding over an ex-parte proceeding due to the respondent's non-appearance, emphasized the overriding principle that prior adoption and continuous use, backed by substantial goodwill evidenced through sales and registrations, prevail over later registrations that could lead to confusion or passing off.

By directing the removal of the impugned mark, the judgment reinforces the sanctity of the trademark register, preventing entries that undermine bona fide proprietors' rights and highlighting the importance of honest adoption in competitive industries like electrical appliances. This decision not only builds on precedents but also serves as a cautionary tale for entities attempting to capitalize on similar marks in allied goods, underscoring the balance between registration benefits and common law protections in Indian trademark law.

Factual Background: The petitioner, GM Modular Pvt. Ltd., is a prominent player in the manufacturing and trading of a diverse array of electrical goods, including switches, accessories, appliances, electronic components, and related services, collectively referred to as the petitioner's goods and services. They adopted the trademark 'GM' in 1999 with bona fide intent and have since used it honestly, continuously, commercially, openly, exclusively, and uninterruptedly as the proprietor thereof, building substantial trade value, goodwill, and reputation.

This mark has been incorporated into various forms such as 'GM INDIA' and device marks, extensively traded across major parts of India. To protect their interests, the petitioner secured multiple registrations across classes, including Class 6 , 7 for 'GM INDIA' and 'GM' in Class 9, 11 etc .Additionally, the artistic work in the 'GM' mark is an original creation owned by the petitioner under the Copyright Act, 1957, registered as No. A-64280/2003, and actively used in trade. Significant investments in promotion and marketing have made 'GM' synonymous with the petitioner's identity, generating exclusive goodwill as demonstrated by escalating sales figures. In contrast, Respondent No. 1, operating as Grand Metal Works, engages in selling electric fans, blowers, heaters, and accessories. During a routine online survey of the Trade Marks Registry in the third week of August 2024, the petitioner's attorney discovered the impugned trademark 'GMW' registered under No. 1978669 in Class 11 on 11.06.2010, claiming use since 01.04.2007 for identical or similar goods. The petitioner alleged dishonest adoption by the respondent, citing deceptive similarity in phonetic, visual, structural, conceptual, and essential features, with goods being allied and cognate, potentially causing confusion. Reference was made to a prior Delhi High Court decision in GM Modular Pvt. Ltd. v. Mayur Electromeck Pvt. Ltd. (Neutral Citation: 2024:DHC:2411), where a similar 'GMW' mark in Class 9 was ordered removed, strengthening the case for cancellation here as the impugned mark wrongly remained on the register.

Procedural Background:The rectification petition was filed under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking cancellation or removal of the impugned 'GMW' mark. Notice was issued on 11.09.2024, granting respondents four weeks to file replies. On 06.12.2024, the court noted the petitioner's affidavit of service indicating Respondent No. 1 had been served, yet no appearance was made. Subsequently, on 16.04.2025, service was directed through the trademark agent who filed the impugned application. Despite this, Respondent No. 1 failed to appear on 13.08.2025, leading to an ex-parte order against them. The petitioner's counsel presented submissions on 26.11.2025, after which judgment was reserved, culminating in the final decision on 17.01.2026. Respondent No. 2, the Registrar of Trade Marks, appeared through counsel and agreed to comply with court directions as a formal party.

Reasoning and Decision of Court: The court's analysis commenced by noting the absence of any reply or appearance from Respondent No. 1, deeming the petition's averments uncontroverted and admitted. It scrutinized the evidence establishing the petitioner as the prior adopter and user of the 'GM' marks since 1999, coined honestly and integrated into their business for electrical goods and services, supported by registrations and invoices predating the respondent's claimed use from 2007.

The substantial goodwill was affirmed through impressive sales data, reaching over ₹1372 crores in FY 2020-21, indicating strong market association with the petitioner. The impugned 'GMW' mark, registered in 2010 for similar Class 11 goods like fans and heaters, was found to be an attempt to freeride on this goodwill without explanation, violating principles of honest adoption.

Relying on settled law that prior users' rights supersede subsequent registrations, even if registered, the court highlighted the petitioner's categorical proof of earlier use via documents, contrasting with the respondent's later claim. Continuous, uninterrupted use further solidified the 'GM' marks' association exclusively with the petitioner. The marks were deemed identical or deceptively similar for identical goods, undermining the register's integrity and necessitating protection for bona fide owners. Citing the prior rectification in a related case for 'GMW' in Class 9, the court found the entry wrongful, warranting removal under Section 57 to prevent confusion and maintain purity. In conclusion, considering prior use, mark identity, goods similarity, confusion likelihood, and lack of bona fide intent by the respondent, the petition was allowed, directing Respondent No. 2 to remove 'GMW' under No. 1978669 from the register, disposing of the petition and application, with a copy sent to the registry for compliance.

Point of Law Settled in the Case: This judgment reaffirms that in trademark rectification proceedings under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the rights of a prior adopter and continuous user, substantiated by registrations, invoices, and escalating sales figures demonstrating goodwill, will prevail over a subsequent registered mark that is deceptively similar and adopted without bona fide intent, even in ex-parte scenarios where averments remain uncontroverted. It underscores that prior use overrides registration, as established in precedents, emphasizing that dishonest adoption for identical or allied goods in sectors like electrical appliances warrants cancellation to preserve the register's sanctity and prevent confusion or passing off. Furthermore, it highlights the evidential weight of financial data and prior judicial decisions in related marks to prove freeriding on reputation, ensuring protection for established brands against later entrants lacking justification.

Title: GM Modular Pvt. Ltd. vs Mumtaz Ahmed & Anr. Date of Order: 17.01.2026 Case Number: C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 176/2024 Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:408 Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi



Alkem Laboratories Limited Vs Prevego Healthcare and Research Pvt Ltd

Alkem Laboratories Limited, established in 1973 and a major player in pharmaceuticals and nutraceuticals, adopted the coined marks 'A TO Z' in 1998 and 'A TO Z-NS' in 2008 for multivitamin supplements, claiming extensive use, sales over Rs. 34,000 lakhs in 2023-24, and registrations in Classes 5, 29, and 30, along with copyright in the stylized 'AZ' logo and trade dresses. 

In December 2024, it discovered Prevego Healthcare and Research Pvt Ltd, founded in 2018 with over 1,500 products, using 'MULTIVEIN AZ' since August 2020 for similar nutraceuticals, prompting a cease-and-desist notice met with denial of similarity. 

Plaintiff filed suit for trademark infringement, copyright violation, and passing off, securing ex parte interim injunction on January 30, 2025, restraining Defendant's use; Defendant sought vacation via IA 6055/2025.

 Court reasoned that 'A TO Z' is descriptive and generic for multivitamins symbolizing completeness without secondary meaning, no monopoly on 'A' and 'Z'.

Marks not deceptively similar when viewed holistically under anti-dissection rule due to differences in structure, phonetics, colors, and addition of 'MULTIVEIN', no copyright infringement as styles distinct, and Plaintiff concealed material facts like opposed and abandoned applications disentitling equitable relief. Consequently, interim injunction application dismissed and ex parte order vacated.

Law Point:

Generic, descriptive, and commonly used expressions like 'A TO Z' are publici juris, incapable of distinctiveness or monopoly without secondary meaning:  (Para 13-15).

Rival marks must be compared as a whole without dissection, considering overall impression including appearance, structure, and commercial impact: Pernod Ricard India (supra) (Para 17,22).

Device marks protect specific visual representation, not underlying words or letters in isolation: (Para 21).

Concealment of material facts, such as opposed trademark applications, disentitles plaintiff to equitable relief like interim injunction: (Para 26).

No copyright infringement where common elements like letters 'A' and 'Z' are stylized differently and overall impression distinct: (Para 27).

Case Title: Alkem Laboratories Vs Prevego Healthcare:17.01.2026:CS(COMM) 84/2025:2026:DHC:411: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Friday, January 16, 2026

Vishal Choudhary Vs. SNPC Machines-DB

SNPC Machines Private Limited, holding four patents for innovative mobile brick-making machines that automate the process by eliminating manual labor through a mechanism where the machine moves on the ground, fills dies on a roller with raw material from a hopper, molds bricks, and lays them automatically, filed a suit for permanent injunction against Vishal Chaudhary for infringing these patents by manufacturing and selling similar machines under the name 'Padma'.

Along with the suit, SNPC sought temporary injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC, which the Single Judge granted on 05.03.2024, restraining Chaudhary from using, making, or selling the machines.

Chaudhary appealed, arguing lack of territorial jurisdiction in Delhi High Court (as his operations are in Haridwar and the alleged sale was a trap), significant differences in design (e.g., his machine requires attachment to a tractor for mobility via kinetic energy, lacks a cabin and steered wheels, and needs manual control), improper application of pith and marrow doctrine instead of all elements rule, failure to apply doctrine of equivalents' FWR test, and imbalance in prima facie case, convenience, and irreparable harm.

The Division Bench rejected the jurisdiction challenge, holding that an offer for sale in Delhi suffices for injunction suits, even if not fructified.

On merits, it reasoned that the pith and marrow of SNPC's invention is the mobility-integrated assembly for automated brick-making without manual handling, and Chaudhary's variations (e.g., using a tractor instead of integrated cabin/motor) are non-essential, amounting to infringement under pith and marrow, though it deferred detailed analysis of doctrines like all elements rule or equivalents to trial to avoid prejudicing the suit.

It found the Single Judge's view reasonable and not perverse, with balance of convenience favoring SNPC to protect patent rights and goodwill, as Chaudhary's losses could be compensated monetarily if the suit fails. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the injunction.

Law Point:

  • For maintaining a suit for injunction in patent infringement cases, an offer for sale or quotation within the court's territorial jurisdiction, even if not resulting in an actual transaction, is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction, as injunction is prohibitive relief not requiring a concluded sale: Para 47-49.
  • The essence or pith and marrow of a patented invention (here, mobility in brick-making machines to automate processes and reduce labor) must be assessed for infringement; non-essential variations like replacing integrated mobility (cabin, steered wheels, motor) with attachment to a tractor do not avoid infringement: Para 37-41, 54-57.
  • Third-party infringements are irrelevant in determining a defendant's liability in patent disputes: Vishal Choudhary vs. SNPC Machines Private Limited & Ors., FAO(OS) (COMM) 64/2024, Para 39.

Case Title: Vishal Choudhary Vs. SNPC Machines Private Limited:16.01.2025:FAO(OS) (COMM) 64/2024: 2026:DHC:399-DB:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dinesh Mehta and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vimal Kumar Yadav

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

People Interactive India Pvt.Ltd. Vs Ammanamanchi Lalitha Rani

People Interactive India Private Limited, proprietor of the well-known trademark "Shaadi.com" for matrimonial and matchmaking services since 1996, filed a suit in 2015 against defendants for infringement and passing off by using the deceptively similar domain and mark "getshaadi.com" for identical services, including embedding "Shaadi.com" as meta-tags to divert over 73% of internet traffic. Despite service, defendants did not appear, leading to an ex-parte proceeding; interim injunction was granted in 2014 and confirmed in 2019.

The court reasoned that the marks are deceptively similar with "Shaadi.com" subsumed in the impugned mark, causing confusion, and defendants' dishonest adoption, bad faith use of meta-tags, and traffic diversion amounted to infringement under Sections 28-29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, passing off, and dilution, while "Shaadi.com" qualifies as a well-known mark under Section 2(1)(zg) due to extensive use, reputation, and awards.

The suit was decreed with permanent injunction restraining use, directing domain deregistration, ordering delivery up of infringing materials, and awarding costs of Rs. 25 lakhs to plaintiff, with 8% interest if unpaid within 12 weeks.

  • Domain names function as business identifiers and are protectable under passing off laws even without specific legislation, as they can lead to consumer confusion: Satyam Infoway Ltd. v. Siffynet Solutions (P) Ltd., (2004) 6 SCC 145 (Para 24).
  • Dishonest adoption of a mark warrants injunction regardless of delay, as mala fides vitiates the defendant's claim: Midas Hygiene Industries Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Sudhir Bhatia & Ors., (2004) 3 SCC 90 (Para 26).
  • Use of another's trademark as meta-tags or keywords constitutes infringement and passing off by diverting traffic and hijacking goodwill: Observations from prior order in Suit (I) No. 622 of 2014 (Para 21-22).
  • A mark qualifies as well-known under Section 2(1)(zg) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, if it has long, exclusive use, high reputation, substantial advertising, and public association transcending its field: Applied criteria from Sections 11(6)-(7) (Para 33F-G).
  • In commercial suits under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, courts must award realistic, compensatory costs considering parties' conduct, including exemplary costs for dishonesty: Section 35 CPC as amended (Para 33H).

Case Title: People Interactive India Private Limited Vs Ammanamanchi Lalitha Rani:06.01.2026:Commercial IP Suit No. 225 of 2015:: 2026:BHC-OS:685: Arif S. Doctor, H. J.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Merck Sharp and Dohme Corporation Vs Glenmark Pharmaceuticals

Introduction

In the realm of intellectual property law, patent disputes often serve as battlegrounds where innovation meets commercial interests. The case of Merck Sharp & Dohme Corporation (MSD) versus Glenmark Pharmaceuticals, adjudicated by the Delhi High Court, stands as a pivotal example of such a conflict. This case, centered on the alleged infringement of MSD’s patent for Sitagliptin, a drug used to manage Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus (T2DM), encapsulates the intricate interplay between patent rights, public interest, and equitable principles. It raises critical questions about the scope of patent claims, the necessity of full disclosure, and the balance between protecting innovation and ensuring access to essential medicines. This case study delves into the factual and procedural intricacies, the legal issues, the parties’ submissions, the judicial reasoning, and the final decision, offering a comprehensive analysis of a landmark ruling that shaped India’s patent jurisprudence.

Detailed Factual Background

Merck Sharp & Dohme Corporation, a New Jersey-based pharmaceutical giant, held Indian Patent No. 209816 for Sitagliptin, a Dipeptidyl Peptidase-IV (DPP-IV) inhibitor used to lower blood sugar levels in T2DM patients. Marketed under the trademarks Januvia and Janumet, and licensed to Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. for sale as Istavel and Istamet, Sitagliptin was a cornerstone of MSD’s diabetes treatment portfolio. The patent, granted on September 6, 2007, covered Sitagliptin and its pharmaceutically acceptable salts, with Claim No. 19 specifically addressing Sitagliptin and its salts, including the phosphate monohydrate form. MSD claimed that Sitagliptin was a groundbreaking innovation, developed after nine years of research and significant investment, offering a novel mechanism to manage T2DM without the risk of hypoglycemia associated with older drugs like Metformin.

Glenmark Pharmaceuticals, a global pharmaceutical company, entered the Indian market with its products Zita (Sitagliptin Phosphate Monohydrate) and Zitamet (a combination of Sitagliptin Phosphate Monohydrate and Metformin Hydrochloride). MSD alleged that these products infringed its patent, as the production of Sitagliptin Phosphate Monohydrate necessarily involved the use of the patented Sitagliptin molecule. MSD highlighted that its patent was granted in 102 countries and was unopposed in India, underscoring its validity and commercial success. The company also emphasized its efforts to make Januvia affordable in India, pricing it at one-fifth of its U.S. price, and investing in patient education and access programs.

Glenmark, however, contended that its products did not infringe MSD’s patent. It argued that Sitagliptin Phosphate Monohydrate was a distinct compound, not covered by MSD’s patent, and pointed to MSD’s abandoned patent applications for the phosphate salt as evidence of its novelty. Glenmark further challenged the validity of MSD’s patent, alleging non-disclosure of related patent applications and insufficient specification, and claimed that Sitagliptin and its hydrochloride salt were unstable and industrially inapplicable.

Detailed Procedural Background

The dispute commenced when MSD filed a suit in the Delhi High Court on April 1, 2013, seeking a permanent injunction to restrain Glenmark from manufacturing, selling, or distributing Zita and Zitamet, along with damages, rendition of accounts, and delivery up. Concurrently, MSD applied for an ad interim injunction (IA 5167/2013) to immediately halt Glenmark’s activities. Glenmark, on caveat, appeared at the first hearing on April 2, 2013, before a Single Judge. MSD relied on its patent claims and judicial precedents, while Glenmark opposed the injunction, alleging suppression of material facts by MSD, particularly the abandonment of patent applications for Sitagliptin Phosphate Monohydrate. Glenmark also submitted documents to support its claim that its products were distinct from MSD’s patented compound.

On April 5, 2013, the Single Judge dismissed MSD’s application for an interim injunction. The judge acknowledged that minor variations in Glenmark’s product did not necessarily negate infringement but found that MSD failed to plead how Sitagliptin Phosphate Monohydrate was medically equivalent to Sitagliptin or merely a new form without enhanced efficacy. The judge also noted MSD’s abandoned patent applications, suggesting that MSD itself treated the phosphate salt as a distinct invention.

MSD appealed the decision (FAO (OS) 190/2013) before a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, comprising Justices S. Ravindra Bhat and Najmi Waziri. On April 12, 2013, the court allowed Glenmark to file a substantive reply and additional documents, with MSD permitted to respond. The appeal was heard extensively, with arguments concluded on January 6, 2014, and the judgment reserved on January 9, 2015, pronounced on March 20, 2015. The Division Bench conducted a detailed examination of the patent claims, infringement allegations, and equitable considerations, ultimately overturning the Single Judge’s order.

Issues Involved in the Case

The case presented several critical legal and technical issues:

  1. Whether Glenmark’s products, Zita and Zitamet, infringed MSD’s patent for Sitagliptin by using the patented molecule or its salts.

  2. Whether MSD’s patent was valid, or if it was liable for revocation due to non-disclosure of related patent applications, insufficient specification, lack of inventive step, or industrial inapplicability.

  3. Whether MSD’s non-disclosure of abandoned patent applications for Sitagliptin Phosphate Monohydrate and other compounds constituted suppression of material facts, warranting denial of interim relief.

  4. Whether the balance of convenience and public interest favored granting an interim injunction to MSD, considering the accessibility of diabetes treatment.

  5. Whether the court should mandate disclosure of X-ray Diffraction (XRD) data to compare the compounds, and if its absence affected MSD’s case.

Detailed Submission of Parties

MSD’s Submissions

MSD argued that its patent (IN 209816) comprehensively covered Sitagliptin and its pharmaceutically acceptable salts, including the phosphate monohydrate form used by Glenmark. The company emphasized that Sitagliptin was the active ingredient in both its and Glenmark’s products, and producing Sitagliptin Phosphate Monohydrate required using the patented Sitagliptin molecule, thus constituting infringement under Section 48 of the Patents Act, 1970. MSD cited Glenmark’s U.S. Patent No. 8334385, which acknowledged Sitagliptin as the active free base, as evidence of infringement.

MSD contested Glenmark’s claim that the patent was limited to Sitagliptin Hydrochloride, arguing that Example 7 in the patent specification was merely illustrative, not exhaustive. The company relied on legal precedents such as Edward H. Phillips v. AWH Corporation (415 F.3d 1303) and F.H and B Corporation v. Unichem Laboratories (AIR 1969 Bom 255) to assert that patent claims define the invention’s scope, not specific examples. MSD also argued that its abandoned applications for Sitagliptin Phosphate Monohydrate were inessential details, abandoned due to Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, which restricts patents for new forms without enhanced efficacy. The company cited Novartis AG v. Union of India (2013 (6) SCC 1) to support its position that non-disclosure of such applications did not invalidate the patent.

MSD underscored the public interest in protecting its patent rights, noting its efforts to make Januvia affordable and its investment in patient education. It argued that allowing Glenmark to operate would lead to irreparable market harm, as price reductions by an infringer could permanently depress prices, citing SmithKline Beecham v. Generics ((2002) 25(1) IPD 25005) and SmithKline Beecham Plc v. Apotex ([2003] EWCA Civ L37).

Glenmark’s Submissions

Glenmark vehemently opposed MSD’s claims, asserting that its products did not infringe the patent because Sitagliptin Phosphate Monohydrate was a distinct compound, not covered by MSD’s patent. It pointed to MSD’s abandoned application (5948/DELNP/2005) for the phosphate salt, where MSD described it as a “newly discovered” invention with superior stability, as evidence that it was not subsumed under the suit patent. Glenmark argued that accepting MSD’s broad claims would nullify Section 3(d), allowing patent protection for unpatentable derivatives.

Glenmark challenged the patent’s validity on multiple grounds: non-disclosure of foreign and Indian patent applications under Section 8, insufficient specification under Section 10(4), lack of inventive step, and industrial inapplicability due to the instability of Sitagliptin and its hydrochloride salt. It cited cases like Teva Canada v. Pfizer Canada (2012 SCC 60) and Abraham Esau’s & C. Lorenz Application (1932 (49) RPC 85) to argue that inadequate disclosure invalidated the patent. Glenmark also relied on F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla (2009 (40) PTC 125) to underscore the mandatory nature of Section 8 disclosures.

Glenmark further contended that MSD failed to provide XRD data to prove that its products used the patented compound, citing Hoffmann-La Roche (2012 (52) PTC 1) for the necessity of such data in pharmaceutical patent cases. It argued that public interest favored denying the injunction, as diabetes treatment accessibility should not be curtailed, and highlighted that MSD’s high prices limited access compared to its lower-priced generics.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by Parties

The parties cited numerous judicial precedents to bolster their arguments, each serving a specific context in the case:

  1. Edward H. Phillips v. AWH Corporation, 415 F.3d 1303 (Federal Circuit, 2005): MSD cited this U.S. case to emphasize that patent claims define the invention’s scope. The court held that claims are interpreted based on their plain meaning as understood by a person skilled in the art, supporting MSD’s argument that its patent covered all pharmaceutically acceptable salts, not just the hydrochloride salt in Example 7.

  2. F.H and B Corporation v. Unichem Laboratories, AIR 1969 Bom 255: MSD relied on this Indian case to reinforce that the claims, not illustrative examples, determine a patent’s scope. The Bombay High Court held that the patent’s protection extends to the claimed invention, aligning with MSD’s contention that Glenmark’s use of Sitagliptin infringed its patent.

  3. Novartis AG v. Union of India, 2013 (6) SCC 1: MSD cited this Supreme Court decision to argue that non-disclosure of abandoned applications was not fatal. The court clarified that patent coverage can exceed disclosure and upheld Section 3(d)’s restriction on new forms without enhanced efficacy, explaining MSD’s abandonment of the phosphate salt application.

  4. CFMT Inc. v. YieDup International Corporation, 349 F.3d 1333 (Federal Circuit, 2003): MSD referenced this case to argue that improvement patents (like the phosphate salt) do not negate the validity of a basic patent. The court recognized that subsequent improvements could be patented separately without undermining the original patent’s scope.

  5. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla, 2009 (40) PTC 125 (Delhi High Court, Division Bench): Glenmark cited this case to argue that non-disclosure of patent applications violated Section 8, warranting revocation. The court held that Section 8 mandates disclosure of foreign applications, but the Division Bench’s view that Indian applications must also be disclosed was contested by the court in this case.

  6. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla, 2012 (52) PTC 1 (Delhi High Court, Single Judge): Glenmark relied on this decision to assert that non-disclosure of related applications justified denying an injunction. The Single Judge emphasized the mandatory nature of Section 8 disclosures, but the Division Bench clarified that revocation is discretionary.

  7. Teva Canada v. Pfizer Canada, 2012 SCC 60 (Supreme Court of Canada): Glenmark cited this case to argue that insufficient disclosure invalidated the patent. The Canadian court held that patents must enable a skilled person to practice the invention, supporting Glenmark’s claim that MSD’s patent lacked details on Sitagliptin’s isolation.

  8. Abraham Esau’s & C. Lorenz Application, 1932 (49) RPC 85: Glenmark referenced this UK case to argue that inadequate disclosure rendered a patent invalid. The court held that patents must provide clear instructions for practicing the invention, aligning with Glenmark’s challenge to MSD’s specification.

  9. SmithKline Beecham v. Generics, (2002) 25(1) IPD 25005 (UK High Court): MSD cited this case to argue that allowing an infringer to operate could cause irreparable market harm. The court granted an injunction, noting that price reductions by infringers could permanently depress prices, a concern echoed in MSD’s submissions.

  10. SmithKline Beecham Plc v. Apotex, [2003] EWCA Civ L37 (UK Court of Appeal): MSD relied on this case to reinforce the market harm argument. The court upheld an injunction, emphasizing that the patentee’s sole supplier status warranted protection against price erosion.

  11. Maj. (Retd.) Sukesh Behl v. Koninklijke Phillips Electronics, FAO 16/2014 (Delhi High Court, decided on 07-11-2014): The court cited this recent Division Bench ruling to clarify that Section 8 violations do not automatically lead to revocation, as Section 64(1) grants discretionary power, supporting MSD’s position on non-disclosure.

  12. Anand Prasad Agarwalla v. Takeshwar Prasad and Ors., (2001) 5 SCC 568: The court referenced this Supreme Court decision to caution against conducting a mini-trial at the interim stage, emphasizing that detailed factual inquiries should await the full trial.

  13. American Cyanamid v. Ethicon Ltd., [1975] AC 396 (UK House of Lords): The court cited this seminal case to outline the triple test for interim injunctions: prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury, guiding its equitable analysis.

  14. Bayer Corporation v. Cipla, 162 (2009) DLT 371 (Delhi High Court): The court relied on this case to underscore the public interest in maintaining patent integrity, noting that allowing unauthorized use undermines the Patents Act’s objectives.

  15. K. Ramu v. Adayar Ananda Bhavan, 2007 (34) PTC 689 (Madras High Court): The court cited this case to support granting an injunction when the patentee is already in the market, a factor favoring MSD.

  16. Bajaj Auto Ltd. v. TVS Motor Company Ltd., 2008 (36) PTC 417 (Madras High Court): This case reinforced the relevance of the patentee’s market presence in granting interim relief.

  17. National Research Development Corporation of India v. The Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1980 Del 132: The court cited this decision to emphasize that the patentee’s established market operations weigh in favor of an injunction.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge

The Division Bench, comprising Justices S. Ravindra Bhat and Najmi Waziri, conducted a meticulous analysis, overturning the Single Judge’s dismissal of the interim injunction. The court’s reasoning focused on three pillars: the prima facie case of infringement, the balance of convenience, and the potential for irreparable injury.

The court found that MSD established a strong prima facie case for patent validity and infringement. It held that MSD’s patent covered Sitagliptin and its pharmaceutically acceptable salts, including the phosphate monohydrate form, as evidenced by Claim No. 19 and the patent specification. The court rejected Glenmark’s argument that the patent was limited to Sitagliptin Hydrochloride, citing Edward H. Phillips and F.H and B Corporation to affirm that claims, not examples, define the patent’s scope. Glenmark’s U.S. Patent No. 8334385, which acknowledged Sitagliptin as the active component, further supported MSD’s infringement claim. The court dismissed Glenmark’s contention that it produced Sitagliptin Phosphate Monohydrate without using Sitagliptin, noting the absence of evidence and the logical necessity of using the patented molecule.

On patent validity, the court addressed Glenmark’s challenges under Sections 8, 10(4), and 64 of the Patents Act. It clarified that Section 8 mandates disclosure of foreign, not Indian, patent applications, aligning with the Single Judge’s interpretation in Hoffmann-La Roche (2012 (52) PTC 1) and the Justice Ayyangar report. The court found that MSD’s Form 3 disclosures and subsequent updates satisfied Section 8, and the non-disclosure of Indian applications (e.g., 5948/DELNP/2005) was not fatal. Citing Maj. Sukesh Behl, the court emphasized that Section 64(1)(m) revocation is discretionary, and non-disclosure alone did not justify denying interim relief at this stage.

The court also rejected Glenmark’s argument on insufficient specification, finding that the patent provided detailed instructions for producing Sitagliptin, as confirmed by Glenmark’s own U.S. patent claims. Allegations of obviousness and industrial inapplicability were deemed premature without a full trial, per Anand Prasad Agarwalla. Regarding XRD data, the court clarified that Hoffmann-La Roche did not mandate its disclosure in all cases, as it depends on the drug’s nature, and no polymorph differentiation was at issue here.

On equitable considerations, the court applied the triple test from American Cyanamid. It found the balance of convenience favoring MSD, as Glenmark’s operation could lead to irreversible price erosion, citing SmithKline Beecham cases. The court noted that MSD’s price reduction to one-fifth of the U.S. price and the absence of a significant price differential with Glenmark’s products mitigated public interest concerns about access. Unlike Hoffmann-La Roche, where a 300% price difference for a life-saving drug justified denying an injunction, diabetes was deemed a manageable condition, not life-threatening, and WHO’s essential medicines list excluded Sitagliptin combinations.

The court also considered Glenmark’s failure to challenge the patent before launching Zita, citing SmithKline Beecham and Pharmacia Italia to highlight that such conduct weighs against the infringer at the interim stage. To mitigate harm to Glenmark, the court imposed conditions, including MSD’s undertaking to compensate Glenmark if the suit failed and Glenmark’s obligation to account for earnings.

Final Decision

The Division Bench allowed MSD’s appeal, set aside the Single Judge’s order, and granted the interim injunction (IA 5167/2013) on March 20, 2015. The court issued the following directions:

  1. MSD to file an affidavit undertaking to compensate Glenmark for losses if the suit is dismissed, within two weeks.

  2. Glenmark to undertake compliance with the injunction within two weeks.

  3. Glenmark to file a detailed account of earnings from Zita and Zitamet since the suit’s filing, verified by a chartered accountant, within four weeks.

  4. Glenmark permitted to sell existing stock in the market but prohibited from further production or distribution of Zita and Zitamet.

  5. Parties to appear before the Single Judge on April 10, 2015, with directions to expedite the trial using limited expert evidence and a technical expert under Section 115 of the Patents Act.

Law Settled in This Case

This case clarified several aspects of Indian patent law:

  1. Scope of Patent Claims: Patent claims, not illustrative examples, define the invention’s scope, and broad claims covering pharmaceutically acceptable salts are enforceable if supported by the specification.

  2. Section 8 Disclosure: Section 8 mandates disclosure of foreign, not Indian, patent applications. Non-disclosure of Indian applications does not automatically invalidate a patent or deny interim relief, and revocation under Section 64(1)(m) is discretionary.

  3. Public Interest in Pharmaceuticals: Accessibility concerns are significant but not absolute. For non-life-threatening conditions like diabetes, patent enforcement may take precedence if price differentials are not substantial.

Case Title:Merck Sharp and Dohme Corporation Vs Glenmark Pharmaceuticals
Date of Order:March 20, 2015
Case No.FAO (OS) 190/2013
Citation:MANU/DE/0852/2015
Name of Court:High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Name of Judges:Hon’ble Mr. Justice S. Ravindra Bhat and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Najmi Waziri

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Thursday, January 15, 2026

Laboratoires Griffon Vs. Rajiv Mukul

In this interim application in a commercial IP suit filed by Laboratoires Griffon Private Limited & Anr against Rajiv Mukul & Ors, the plaintiffs, registered proprietors of GLIMET and GLIMET DS trademarks for anti-diabetic pharmaceuticals, sought injunction alleging defendants breached a 2021 court undertaking to cease using similar mark GLYNET by continuing its use and adopting deceptively similar GLYZET. In the prior 2021 suit, disposed via consent order, defendants agreed to stop GLYNET, withdraw registrations, and dispose stock. Plaintiffs presented evidence of post-2021 manufacture/sale under GLYNET and GLYZET on defendants' website. Defendants denied infringement, claimed no post-2021 GLYNET use, justified GLYZET as derived from Glimepiride (GLY) and company name (ZET), and argued no similarity or confusion risk. 

The court reasoned that defendants' GLYZET adoption was dishonest, inconsistent with own explanation, and calculated to circumvent prior order; marks GLIMET and GLYZET were deceptively similar structurally (six letters, GL_ ET), visually, phonetically (GLI/GLY), warranting stricter pharma test due to public health risks and potential confusion/deception; defendants perjured via false affidavits denying continued use, as evidence showed breach; lacked clean hands by violating undertakings and making false statements; superficial "read as GLYZET" endorsement was subterfuge; balance of convenience favored plaintiffs to prevent irreparable harm. Court granted interim injunction restraining use of GLYNET/GLYZET or similars, initiated perjury proceedings against defendants 1,2,4, imposed Rs 50 lakh costs payable within 12 weeks with 12% interest if delayed, and stayed order for 4 weeks.

Law Point:

A party breaching solemn undertakings to the court and making false statements on oath lacks clean hands and is disentitled to any equitable consideration or relief, as such conduct sullies the process of law. 

In cases involving medicinal/pharmaceutical trademarks, a stricter test for deceptive similarity applies due to overriding public health considerations; even a reasonable possibility of confusion or deception is sufficient for injunctive relief, irrespective of packaging differences or prescription sales. 

Trademarks must be compared as a whole from the standpoint of an average consumer with imperfect recollection, considering overall structural, visual, and phonetic similarity rather than microscopic side-by-side dissection. 

Superficial or cosmetic alterations to an infringing mark, such as endorsements like "read as", do not obviate liability and would encourage repeated litigation, amounting to a premium on dishonesty. 

In commercial suits under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, costs must ordinarily follow the event with due regard to parties' conduct; unscrupulous litigants polluting justice through falsehoods warrant exemplary costs. 

Breach of court undertakings and false evidence on oath constitutes an offence under Section 227 BNS, empowering the court to take cognizance and initiate proceedings under Sections 215 and 379 BNSS. 

Case Title: Laboratoires Griffon Vs. Rajiv Mukul :13.01.2026:Comm IP Suit No. 213 of 2022: 2026:BHC:1038  : Hon’ble Mr. Justice Arif S. Doctor

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Siyaram Silk Mills Limited Vs Stanford Siyaram Fashion

In this commercial IP suit filed in 2008 by Siyaram Silk Mills Limited against Stanford Siyaram Fashion Private Limited & Ors., the plaintiff sought injunction against defendants' use of "Siyaram" in their corporate name and marks for textiles, alleging trademark infringement and passing off based on plaintiff's prior use since 1977, registrations from 1984, extensive sales, promotion and goodwill.

Plaintiff discovered defendants' incorporation and use in 2007, sent cease-desist notice, and filed notice of motion for interim relief in 2013. Defendants defended claiming prior use by their father since 1992 under "Siyaram Fashion Store", adoption as Hindu god name, mandatory company name disclosure under Weights Act, registration of composite label "Apricott – a Product of Stanford Siyaram Fashions Pvt. Ltd.", and plaintiff's delay/acquiescence. 

The court reasoned that defendants failed to prove assignment of goodwill from father, making prior use claim untenable; plaintiff's registrations crystallized before defendants' incorporation in 2006; defendants' adoption was dishonest with knowledge of plaintiff's mark; composite registration confers no exclusivity over "Siyaram" per Sections 17 and 28(3) of Trade Marks Act; honesty of adoption irrelevant once infringement/passing off established; likelihood of confusion imminent given identical trade; defense of god name rejected as mark acquired distinctiveness and no statutory bar; no acquiescence without positive encouragement, and delay insignificant in dishonest adoption cases. Balancing factors, court found strong prima facie case for plaintiff, balance of convenience favoring injunction to prevent irreparable harm, and granted interim relief restraining infringement and passing off.

Law Point:

Prior use of a mark by a predecessor cannot be claimed by a company without pleading and proving assignment or transfer of the mark along with associated goodwill. 

Honesty of adoption is irrelevant if trademark infringement or passing off is otherwise established, and a defendant cannot use a deceptively similar corporate/trading name to a registered mark. (Para F, citing F. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Geoffrey Manners, Kirloskar Diesel Recon Pvt. Ltd. v. Kirloskar Proprietary Ltd., Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah)

-Acquiescence requires positive acts encouraging the defendant's use, and delay does not bar relief in cases of dishonest adoption. (Para J, citing Charak Pharma v. Ajanta Pharma, Sun Pharma v. Anglo French Drugs, Midas Hygiene v. Sudhir Bhatia)

Marks comprising names of deities are not barred if they acquire distinctiveness and have no descriptive nexus to goods. 

Case Title: Siyaram Silk Mills Limited Vs  Stanford Siyaram Fashion Pvt. Ltd: 13.01.2026:Commercial IP Suit No. 23 of 2008:2026:BHC:1037:Hon’ble Mr. Justice Arif S. Doctor

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

SM Motorenteile GmbH Vs. A.A. Automobiles

In this trademark infringement suit filed by German company SM Motorenteile GmbH against A.A. Automobiles & Ors., the Plaintiff claimed exclusive rights over SM Logo-1 and SM Logo-2 in India and sought permanent injunction alleging that Defendants were selling counterfeit gaskets bearing identical SM Logos. Plaintiff relied on Indian registrations and history of ownership changes between Schoettle Motorenteile GmbH and itself. Defendants contended they were authorized distributors of SM branded products since 1997 through Schoettle Motorenteile GmbH and its successor NPR of Europe GmbH, placing on record a 2022 confirmation letter from NPR and import documents. 

The Court found that SM Logo-2 registration in India still stands in the name of Schoettle Motorenteile GmbH (not Plaintiff), SM Logo-1 is registered in India in Plaintiff's name but acknowledged as jointly owned with Schoettle in foreign jurisdictions, and Defendants produced a prima facie credible authorization document from joint owner NPR of Europe GmbH. Holding that triable issues exist regarding ownership, authorization and genuineness of Defendants' documents, the Court rejected Plaintiff's prayer for pre-trial final judgment granting permanent injunction and directed the matter to proceed to framing of issues.

Law Point:

A pre-trial final judgment granting permanent injunction cannot be passed when credible disputed questions of fact exist regarding title/ownership of trademark and authority to use the mark, even if defence is weak or documents are challenged only by way of bald assertions in written submissions. (Para 31)

Mere assertion in written submissions that a document produced by defendant appears forged/fabricated is not sufficient to disregard it at pre-trial stage without supporting evidence such as affidavit disputing its genuineness from concerned authority. (Para 28)

When joint ownership of trademark is acknowledged (especially in foreign jurisdictions) and one co-owner has apparently authorized the defendant to use the mark, the plaintiff cannot obtain final injunction without impleading the co-owner and proving exclusive rights in trial. (Para 29–30)

Case Title: SM Motorenteile GmbH Vs. A.A. Automobiles:15.01.2026:2026:DHC:360: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Wednesday, January 14, 2026

Flipkart Internet Private Ltd Vs. The Joint Controller of Patents

Flipkart Internet Private Limited filed an appeal under Section 117-A of the Patents Act, 1970 challenging the order dated 09.10.2023 passed by the Joint Controller of Patents dismissing Flipkart's post-grant opposition against Indian Patent No. 312437 granted to Voicemonk Inc. titled “Systems and Methods for Virtual Agents to Help Customers and Business”. 

The patent, granted on 08.05.2019 after multiple amendments, relates to a virtual agent system that receives audio input, identifies desired user actions (search, sort, select, submit, compare), stores and uses correlations (sequential, hierarchical or lateral) between these actions, executes them in a combined manner, and displays a single consolidated output page instead of multiple sequential pages. 

Flipkart primarily contended lack of novelty, inventive step, patentability under Section 3(k), insufficiency of disclosure, and violation of natural justice principles. 

After detailed claim-wise comparison of the cited prior arts (D1 to D7), analysis of characterizing features, and following the legal principles on novelty and inventive step laid down in Lava International Limited vs. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (2024 SCC OnLine Del 2497), the Madras High Court held that the impugned order was well-reasoned, considered all relevant materials, and did not suffer from any perversity or violation of natural justice. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed.

Law Point:

While deciding questions of novelty and inventive step, the principles and the systematic “Seven Stambhas Approach” for assessment of novelty laid down by the Delhi High Court in *Lava International Limited vs. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson* (2024 SCC OnLine Del 2497) should be taken as guiding principles. (Para 9 in)

The test of novelty requires that the prior publication must contain the whole of the invention impugned i.e. all the features by which the particular claim is limited; anticipation must describe or amount to an infringement of the attacked claim. (Para 11)

Prior art must provide clear and unmistakable directions which, when carried out, would inevitably result in something falling within the claims of the patent; mere suggestion or putting on the road is not sufficient. 

Case Title: Flipkart Internet Private Ltd Vs. The Joint Controller of Patents: 05.01.2026  :CMA(PT) No. 9 of 2024  : Madras  HC:The Honourable Mr. Justice N. Senthilkumar  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Tuesday, January 13, 2026

Zydus Lifesciences Limited Vs. E. R. Squibb and Sons

Zydus Lifesciences Limited appealed a single judge's order restraining its anti-cancer biosimilar drug ZRC 3276 (claimed 70% cheaper than respondent's 5C4/Nivolumab/Opdivo under IN 340060) as allegedly infringing the respondent's patent for an isolated monoclonal antibody binding specifically to PD-1 with specified amino acid sequences in a quia timet suit filed before commercial launch. 

No direct product-to-claim mapping existed; single judge relied on indirect biosimilar-to-reference biologic comparison assuming identical sequences and non-exclusive "specifically," overlooking appellant's evidence of statistically significant binding. 

Division bench found flawed reasoning on biosimilar identity, "specifically" per prosecution history requiring no significant cross-binding, and mapping standards under Patents Act.

Absent conclusive mapping or irrefutable prima facie infringement amid technical triability, public interest in life-saving cancer therapy outweighed absolute injunction despite patent protection needs, especially with patent expiry on 2 May 2026.

Modifying order to vacate injunction conditioned on appellant filing audited sales accounts till expiry.

Law Point:

In patent infringement suits, product-to-claim mapping is indispensable to establish prima facie case under S.48 Patents Act; its absence requires overwhelming, unbroken circumstantial evidence sans presumption.

For life-saving drugs like anti-cancer therapies, public interest paramount in interlocutory injunctions alongside prima facie case/balance of convenience; absolute restraint unjustified if triable issues/expert evidence needed—secure via accounts instead.

Case Detail:Zydus Lifesciences Limited Vs E.R. Squibb and Sons:12.01.2026:FAO(OS) (COMM) 120/2025:2026:DHC:178:DB: Justice C. Hari Shankar, Justice Om Prakash Shukla

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Colgate Palmolive Company Vs Dabur India Ltd.

In this commercial suit filed by Colgate Palmolive in October 2019, the plaintiffs initially sought permanent injunction against Dabur India for disparaging Colgate Strong Teeth toothpaste by showing its red-blue packaging in advertisements and making statements discouraging use of fluoride-containing toothpastes. An ex-parte interim injunction was granted on 10.10.2019. After modification of the advertisement by Dabur, further proceedings continued. In March-April 2025, Dabur published fresh print advertisements highlighting health risks of excessive fluoride intake. Colgate filed I.A. 10040/2025 under Order VI Rule 17 CPC seeking amendment of the plaint to specifically challenge these 2025 advertisements. The Court held that the issue of generic/ingredient disparagement of fluoride toothpastes was already pleaded in the original plaint (paras 21-33 & prayer 63(v)), hence no amendment of plaint was necessary; the 2025 advertisements are merely a continuation/variation of the same fluoride awareness campaign started in 2019 and are covered within existing pleadings. The amendment application was rejected as it was not required, belated (after 6 years), procedurally deficient, and contrary to the objective of expeditious trial under Commercial Courts Act, 2015. However, the Court directed the 2025 advertisements to be taken on record as additional documents supporting the existing cause of action.
Crisp points of law settled in the case
Where the issue of ingredient/class disparagement is already pleaded in the original plaint and forms part of the existing cause of action, there is no legal necessity to amend the plaint to challenge subsequent variations/advertisements on the same theme; such advertisements can be taken on record as additional documents. (Para 18, 18.1, 26-28)
Amendment of plaint after significant delay (6 years) which is not necessary for adjudication, lacks sufficient reasoning, and is procedurally deficient, is liable to be rejected. (Para 20, 20.4, 24-25)
Liberal approach to amendment under Order VI Rule 17 CPC does not mean amendment should be allowed when it serves no purpose and defeats the object of expeditious disposal under Commercial Courts Act, 2015. (Para 22-23)
Withdrawal of certain interim applications without prejudice to rights in pending applications does not create estoppel against raising the same substantive issue which remains sub-judice in the main pleadings. (Para 17, 17.1-17.5)
Case Details
Case Title : Colgate Palmolive Company  Vs Dabur India Ltd.
Order Date : 12th January, 2026
Case Number : CS(COMM) 567/2019 (I.A. No.10040/2025 & connected I.As.)
Neutral Citation : 2026:DHC:0242
Court : High Court of Delhi
Judge : Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora
[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]
[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Monday, January 12, 2026

Accor Vs. Novotel Holidays Inn

In this commercial suit filed by Accor (a global hospitality giant owning the well-known trademark NOVOTEL since 1967, with extensive worldwide and Indian presence including 28 hotels in India and multiple valid registrations since 1990), the plaintiff sought injunction against Novotel Holidays Inn Private Limited for adopting and using the identical/near-identical mark 'NOVOTEL' as part of its corporate/trade name, domain, logo, and website for similar hospitality and travel-related services, thereby infringing the plaintiff's trademark, committing passing off, and attempting to ride on the plaintiff's long-established goodwill and reputation. The plaintiff had earlier sent cease and desist notices in 2022, pursued pre-litigation mediation (which the defendant did not attend), and successfully obtained transfer of the defendant's domain novotelholidaysinn.com through WIPO in 2023, yet the defendant continued the impugned use even after changing logos multiple times. In the interim application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC, the Delhi High Court, after noting the defendant's counsel appeared via VC but made no submissions, found the plaintiff prima facie established prior adoption, registration, global/Indian goodwill, and identical/near-identical use in the same field likely to cause confusion and false association; balance of convenience favoured the plaintiff and irreparable injury was shown due to dilution of reputation in the hospitality sector. The Court accordingly granted ex-parte ad-interim injunction restraining the defendant from using 'NOVOTEL' or any deceptively similar mark (including variants with smile device, golden scheme, or bird logo) as trade/corporate name, on website nhi.ind.in, or in any manner in relation to hospitality/travel services, till the next date of hearing.

Crisp bullet points of law settled in the case

Prior global and Indian adoption, long continuous use, extensive goodwill/reputation, and valid statutory registrations of a trademark (especially in hospitality services) confer strong prima facie rights entitling the proprietor to interim protection against identical/near-identical adoption by another in the same field (Paras 15–17)
Adoption and use of an identical/near-identical mark as part of corporate/trade name, domain, logo, and website for identical/similar services (hospitality and travel) constitutes prima facie trademark infringement under the Trade Marks Act and passing off, particularly when it creates likelihood of confusion, false association, or affiliation with the prior user (Paras 16–17, 13.15–13.17)
Dishonest intention is inferred from defendant's knowledge of plaintiff's mark (evident from field of activity and prior correspondence/WIPO proceedings), repeated changes in logo only after notices, and continued use despite domain transfer and settlement attempts (Paras 13.7–13.14, 16)
In cases of identical/near-identical marks in the same services, the test of confusion is satisfied even without actual confusion evidence, as continued unauthorized use causes irreparable injury to goodwill/reputation that cannot be compensated by damages (Paras 17, 13.19–13.20)
Balance of convenience tilts heavily in favour of the prior user with decades of reputation when the defendant is a recent adopter (2022) and has not invested in building independent goodwill (Paras 17, 13.11–13.13)
Case Details
Case Title : Accor Vs. Novotel Holidays Inn Private Limited
Order Date : 22nd December 2025
Case Number : CS(COMM) 1383/2025
Neutral Citation : 2025:DHC:XXXXX (exact neutral citation to be assigned)
Court : High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Judge : Tejas Karia, J.
[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]
[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

IPCA Laboratories Limited Vs Anrose Pharma

In this commercial IP suit, IPCA Laboratories Limited (Plaintiff) sued Anrose Pharma (Defendant) for infringement of its registered trademark ZERODOL (used since 2003 for pain-relief pharmaceutical preparations) and for passing off by the Defendant’s adoption of the virtually identical mark ZEROVOL-P for similar medicinal products. The suit remained undefended after due service; the Defendant never appeared nor filed any written statement. The Bombay High Court, after considering uncontroverted evidence of the Plaintiff’s long prior use, substantial goodwill, sales, and registration, held that the marks are deceptively similar both visually and phonetically, especially in the pharmaceutical field where a stricter test of confusion applies, and that the Defendant’s adoption was dishonest and in bad faith. The Court decreed the suit granting permanent injunction against infringement and passing off, directed delivery-up and destruction of infringing material, but declined damages for want of proof of actual loss; instead, it awarded costs of ₹15,00,000/- (with 8% interest if not paid within 8 weeks) in view of the Defendant’s contumacious conduct and the public health implications involved.
Crisp points of law settled in the case
Phonetic and visual near-identity between ZERODOL and ZEROVOL-P, particularly in pharmaceutical products, creates high likelihood of confusion and deception warranting injunction (Paras 9–11, 15(D)–(F))
In medicinal preparations, the test of deceptive similarity is stricter because of inevitable risk to public health and interest (Paras 9, 13, 15(F))
Marks are to be compared as a whole; overall similarity (phonetic + structural + idea) is decisive rather than microscopic differences, and test is from the viewpoint of average consumer with imperfect recollection (reliance on catena of Supreme Court and Bombay High Court judgments – Paras 10–11)
Dishonest/bad faith adoption + non-appearance/non-defence of suit is a relevant factor for grant of exemplary costs under Section 35 CPC as amended by Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (Paras 12–13, 15(I))
In absence of proof of actual loss/damage, claim for damages/punitive damages can be declined, but substantial costs can still be awarded considering conduct and nature of goods (Paras 15(H)–(I))
Case Details
Case Title : IPCA Laboratories Limited Vs Anrose Pharma
Order Date : 5th January 2026
Case Number : Commercial IP Suit No. 77 of 2013
Neutral Citation : 2026:BHC-AS:XXXXX (exact neutral citation to be assigned)
Court : High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction – Commercial Division)
Judge : Arif S. Doctor, J.
[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]
[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Sunday, January 11, 2026

T.Rangaraj Vs. Ms.Joy Crizildaa

In this case, celebrity chef and businessman T. Rangaraj (plaintiff/applicant), a director in a hospitality company and public figure known from TV shows and films, filed a commercial suit claiming that costume designer Joy Crizildaa (defendant) posted false, defamatory, and malicious content on Instagram and other platforms from July to August 2025, falsely portraying a marital relationship with him, which severely damaged his personal reputation, family life, and commercial interests in the hospitality and entertainment sectors, causing revenue loss and viral media trial. 

He sought interim injunction to restrain further defamatory publications and mandatory removal/deletion of the posts. 

The defendant countered that she had a genuine intimate relationship and marriage with the plaintiff (as per Hindu rites on 24.12.2023) after he represented himself as judicially separated and encouraged her to divorce her husband, and she provided prima facie evidence like chats and photos, alleging deception, forced abortions, and abuse by him when she refused further termination. 

The Madras High Court, after hearing both sides and considering the materials, held that the plaintiff failed to prima facie establish his case for interim relief, as a physical relationship was evident, the dispute involved contested facts requiring full trial, no clear commercial exploitation of personality rights was shown for a gag order, and the balance of convenience and irreparable injury tilted in favour of the defendant, resulting in dismissal of both interim applications.

Crisp bullet points of law settled in the case:

A celebrity’s personality rights cannot be invoked to secure a blanket gag order or takedown of social media posts at the interim stage without prima facie material establishing commercial exploitation of such rights. 

In cases involving disputed factual relationship allegations with supporting evidence (such as chats, photographs), the veracity cannot be determined at the interlocutory stage and requires full trial; interim injunction to suppress speech is not warranted merely on denial by one party. 

Case Title: T.Rangaraj Vs. Ms.Joy Crizildaa:07.01.2026: C.S. (Comm. Div.) No.250 of 2025:MadHC:The Honourable Mr. Justice N.Senthilkumar

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

PepsiCo INC Vs Jagdamba Fods


PepsiCo, Inc., a global manufacturer of snack foods including the well-known brand LAY'S (used since 1938, registered in India since 1992, and sold in India since 1965), filed an application under Sections 47 and 57 of the Trademarks Act, 1999 seeking cancellation of the respondent's registered mark "JAY'S" (No. 2921580 in Class 30) on the ground of phonetic identity and deceptive similarity with its prior mark LAY'S. The respondent remained unrepresented. The Court found the rival marks phonetically identical and deceptively similar, the goods identical (snack foods), and held that the impugned mark was dishonestly adopted with mala fide intent to ride on the goodwill and reputation of LAY'S, creating every likelihood of confusion and deception, thereby violating Sections 9 and 11 of the Act.

**Crisp bullet points of law settled in the case**  
- Phonetic identity and deceptive similarity between marks is sufficient to establish likelihood of confusion/deception, even without evidence of actual confusion, particularly when the goods are identical (relied on Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories, AIR 1965 SC 980 – Para 7).  
- The test of similarity must be considered both visually and phonetically (with reference to the ear as well as the eye), and the essential/distinguishing feature of the mark is decisive; minor additions or pictorial devices do not eliminate deceptive similarity (relied on K.R. Chinna Krishna Chettiar v. Shri Ambal & Co., (1969) 2 SCC 131 – Para 8).  
- Adoption of even one or more essential features of a registered mark constitutes infringement; get-up, packaging differences or additional elements are immaterial if essential features are copied (relied on De Cordova & Ors. v. Vick Chemical Co. – referred in Para 9).  
- Dishonest adoption of a deceptively similar mark with intent to trade upon the goodwill/reputation of a prior well-known/registered mark justifies cancellation of registration under Section 57 read with Section 11 of the Trademarks Act, 1999 (relied on Dabur India Ltd. v. Usha Proprietor of RS Industries, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 9440 – Para 9).

**Case Title** : PEPSICO, INC Vs JAGDAMBA FOODS PVT. LTD. AND ANR.  
**Order date** : 10.11.2025  
**Case Number** : IPDATM/210/2023  
**Neutral Citation** : Not available  
**Name of Court** : High Court at Calcutta (Original Side – Intellectual Property Rights Division)  
**Name of Judge** : Hon'ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Saturday, January 10, 2026

Kalyani Baskar (Mrs.) Vs M.S. Sampoornaam

**A complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was filed against Mrs. Kalyani Baskar and her husband alleging that they jointly issued a cheque which was dishonoured for insufficient funds. The accused appeared and filed an application under Section 243(2) CrPC seeking to send the cheque for examination by a handwriting expert to prove that the signature was not hers. The Magistrate rejected the prayer. The High Court upheld the rejection. In appeal, the Supreme Court held that the cheque itself being the foundation of the complaint constituted good material for rebuttal, and denial of opportunity to examine it by handwriting expert deprived the accused of her valuable right to adduce defence evidence, resulting in unfair trial and violation of Article 21. The Magistrate should have allowed the request unless it was intended solely for vexation or delay. The impugned orders were set aside and the Magistrate was directed to send the cheque for expert opinion.**

- The power of the Magistrate under Section 243(2) CrPC to send documents for expert opinion in a cheque dishonour case must be exercised unless the request is vexatious or intended only to delay proceedings; denial deprives the accused of rebuttal opportunity and fair trial: Kalyani Baskar v. M.S. Sampoornaam, (2007) 2 SCC 258, Paras relevant to Section 243(2) and fair trial.
- Adducing defence evidence including expert examination is a valuable right under Article 21; its denial amounts to unfair trial: Kalyani Baskar v. M.S. Sampoornaam, (2007) 2 SCC 258.
- Rules of procedure are designed to secure justice and must be scrupulously followed to prevent breach of fair trial principles: Kalyani Baskar v. M.S. Sampoornaam, (2007) 2 SCC 258.

Kalyani Baskar (Mrs.) Vs M.S. Sampoornaam (Mrs.), Order date: 11 December 2006, Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 1293 of 2006, Neutral Citation: (2007) 2 Supreme Court Cases 258, Name of court: Supreme Court of India, Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice G.P. Mathur and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Lokeshwar Singh Panta.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

G. Someshwar Rao Vs Samineni Nageshwar Rao

G. Someshwar Rao filed a suit for eviction against Samineni Nageshwar Rao claiming title and seeking possession of the suit property. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff. The appellate court reversed the decree holding the plaintiff not entitled to possession. The High Court dismissed the second appeal. In appeal before the Supreme Court, the Court considered subsequent events including renovation of the building by the respondent-plaintiff and held that courts can take notice of subsequent events to do complete justice, especially when the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. The Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgment, allowed the appeal, restored the plaintiff's entitlement to possession, permitted the respondent to file an application for recovery of renovation expenses (to be considered on merits), and directed determination of mesne profits with adjustment of amounts payable between parties.**

- Courts may take judicial notice of subsequent events to impart complete justice and mould relief accordingly, even in rare cases, if the goal is justice: G. Someshwar Rao v. Samineni Nageshwar Rao, (2009) 14 SCC 677, Para 37.
- The right of an accused to lead defence evidence including expert examination is not absolute and must be exercised bona fide to further justice, not to delay proceedings; successive applications for the same purpose indicate dilatory intent: G. Someshwar Rao v. Samineni Nageshwar Rao, (2009) 14 SCC 677, Paras 11-15 (also referring to cheque bounce context in connected appeals).

G. Someshwar Rao Vs Samineni Nageshwar Rao and Another, Order date: 29 July 2009, Case Number: Criminal Appeals No. 1353 of 2009 with No. 1354 of 2009, Neutral Citation: (2009) 14 SCC 677, Name of court: Supreme Court of India, Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.B. Sinha and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Cyriac Joseph.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Palanisamy @ Uthayarpalayanthan Vs Apparsamy

**The document contains excerpts from two separate Madras High Court judgments. In the first (related to Forest Act proceedings), the court held that failure to issue notice to the financier in confiscation proceedings is a curable defect; the appellate court erred in allowing the appeal entirely without remanding for fresh notice and enquiry to both purchaser and financier. The writ petition was allowed directing the Authorised Officer to issue notice to both and proceed afresh. In the second case (Palanisamy @ Uthayarpalayanthan v. Apparsamy), the trial court dismissed a suit for permanent injunction for want of declaration of title without considering the Advocate Commissioner's report. The appellate court remanded the matter for non-consideration of the report and need for plaint amendment. The High Court set aside the remand order reasoning that the appellate court itself has power under Order 41 CPC to consider factual material including the Commissioner's report and amendment application without remanding, as remand is not justified when necessary material is already on record.**

- In confiscation proceedings under the Forest Act, omission to issue notice to the financier is a procedural defect curable by remand and fresh notice rather than outright reversal of the order: [Relevant judgment excerpt, Para 9].
- An appellate court under Order 41 Rules 23 and 28 CPC should not remand a matter when the necessary material (including Advocate Commissioner's report) and amendment application are already before it; the appellate court has full jurisdiction to decide factual and legal issues itself: Palanisamy @ Uthayarpalayanthan v. Apparsamy, 2002 (4) CTC 232, Paras 8 & 9.

Palanisamy @ Uthayarpalayanthan Vs  Apparsamy, Order date: 26 September 2002, Case Number: Civil Miscellaneous Appeal (P.d) No.3 of 2002, Neutral Citation: 2002 (4) CTC 232, Name of court: High Court of Madras, Name of Judge: N.V. Balasubramanian and C. Nagappan, JJ.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Mohd. Akram Ansari Vs Chief Election Officer

**Mohd. Akram Ansari challenged the 2003 Delhi Legislative Assembly election of Haroon Yusuf (respondent), alleging disqualification on the ground that Yusuf held an office of profit as Chairman of the Delhi Wakf Board at the time of election. The High Court dismissed the election petition. In appeal, the Supreme Court held that the subsequent insertion of Section 31-A in the Wakf Act, 1995 by the Wakf (Delhi Amendment) Act, 2006, which provides that the Chairman of the Delhi Wakf Board shall not be deemed to hold an office of profit and shall be deemed never to have been disqualified, is retrospective in nature due to the deeming clause. Even if disqualification existed in 2003, the legal fiction created by the amendment deems no disqualification to have occurred. The Court also clarified that there is a rebuttable presumption that the High Court dealt with all points actually pressed before it, and unaddressed points in the judgment are presumed not to have been pressed. The appeals were dismissed upholding the election of Haroon Yusuf.**

- A statutory provision containing the words “and shall be deemed never to have been disqualified” creates a retrospective legal fiction that must be given full effect, even if the amending Act does not expressly declare it to be retrospective: Mohd. Akram Ansari v. Chief Election Officer, (2008) 2 SCC 95, Paras 6, 7.
- There is a rebuttable presumption in law that a judge deals with all points actually pressed before him; if a point is not dealt with in the judgment, it is presumed not to have been pressed unless rebutted by approaching the same court: Mohd. Akram Ansari v. Chief Election Officer, (2008) 2 SCC 95, Para 10.

Mohd. Akram Ansari Vs Chief Election Officer and Others (with connected appeal Naved Yar Khan v. Haroon Yusuf and Another), Order date: 4 December 2007, Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 4981 of 2006 with Civil Appeal No. 5828 of 2006, Neutral Citation: (2008) 2 SCC 95, Name of court: Supreme Court of India, Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.K. Mathur and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Markandey Katju.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

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