Oswaal Books and Learnings Pvt.Ltd. Vs The Registrar of Trade Marks

Introduction: Delhi High Court has allowed the registration of the mark “ONE FOR ALL” for educational books and related publications. The decision highlights how courts should evaluate everyday suggestive marks when they are used as trademarks. Rather than treating common words as automatically unprotectable, the court examined whether the suggestive marks truly describes the product or merely suggests an idea in the minds of buyers. This judgment is particularly important for businesses in the education sector, where creative slogans help publishers stand out in a crowded market. It reassures companies that a well-chosen tagline can function as a source identifier even if the words themselves are simple and familiar.

Factual Background: Oswaal Books and Learnings Private Limited, a well-known publisher of educational materials, started using the expression “ONE FOR ALL” for its books and academic resources from August 2020. The company chose the phrase to convey that its publications serve as a complete solution for students preparing for various school boards and competitive examinations. In October 2020, Oswaal filed an application to register “ONE FOR ALL” as a trademark in Class 16, which covers printed books and paper goods. The company believed the mark would help customers instantly recognise its products and distinguish them from those of other publishers.

Procedural Background: The Trade Marks Registry examined the application and refused registration, stating that the mark lacked distinctiveness and was a common phrase that anyone should be free to use. Oswaal challenged this refusal before the Delhi High Court through a statutory appeal. A single judge heard the matter and upheld the refusal, observing that “ONE FOR ALL” was a laudatory expression suggesting the books were a universal solution and that the company had not proved the mark had acquired a special meaning among buyers. Feeling aggrieved, Oswaal filed an intra-court appeal before a division bench of the High Court. After hearing detailed arguments from senior counsel, the division bench delivered its judgment on 10 February 2026.

Reasoning and Decision of Court: The division bench carefully studied the mark in the specific context of educational books. The judges noted that “ONE FOR ALL” does not immediately tell a buyer anything about the physical nature, quality, or content of a book. A book is a tangible printed item, and the phrase simply suggests broad coverage or completeness rather than describing any particular feature of the book itself. The court observed that the connection between the mark and the goods is not direct; it requires a moment of thought. Therefore, the mark is suggestive rather than descriptive.

The bench respectfully differed from the single judge’s view that the phrase was laudatory and descriptive in the education field. It emphasised that the test is not whether the words are common in English but whether they describe the goods in question. Since no similar mark existed on the register in the relevant class and the Registry itself had raised no objection about other traders using the same expression, the court found no reason to deny protection. The judges also clarified that the mark need not be proved to have acquired secondary meaning because it already possessed enough distinctiveness on its own in the context of books.

Ultimately, the division bench set aside both the Registrar’s order and the single judge’s judgment. It restored the trademark application to its original position and directed the Registry to proceed with that stage . The appeal was allowed without any order on costs.

Point of Law Settled in the Case: This judgment settles an important principle: when deciding whether a common phrase or slogan can be registered as a trademark, courts must assess it in relation to the specific goods or services and not in isolation. A phrase that appears ordinary may still be protectable if it does not directly describe the character or quality of the product and only suggests an idea. The ruling reinforces that the imagination test remains key — if linking the mark to the goods requires even a slight mental effort, the mark is suggestive and eligible for registration. It also confirms that slogans and taglines can function as independent source identifiers in today’s market, especially in creative industries like publishing. Businesses can now take greater comfort that thoughtful, non-descriptive slogans will receive trademark protection without needing to prove long years of exclusive use.

Case Title: Oswaal Books and Learnings Private Limited Vs The Registrar of Trade Marks Date of Order: 10 February 2026 Case Number: LPA 571/2025 Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:1249-DB Name of Court: High Court of Delhi Name of Hon'ble Judges: Justice C. Hari Shankar and Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles for the Article

1. Delhi High Court Opens Door for “One For All” Trademark in Education Sector
2. Suggestive Slogans Win Protection: Key Takeaways from Oswaal Books Trademark Case
3. When Common Words Become Trademarks – Delhi High Court Explains the Law
4. Victory for Publishers: “One For All” Allowed as Registrable Trademark

Suitable Tags Trademark Registration, Delhi High Court Judgment, Suggestive Marks, Distinctiveness in Trademarks, Educational Publishing, Trade Marks Act, Slogan Trademark, One For All Case, IP Law India, Trademark Appeal

Headnote of Article In a landmark ruling, the Delhi High Court allowed registration of the trademark “ONE FOR ALL” for educational books, holding that the phrase is suggestive rather than descriptive when used in Class 16. The division bench clarified that common expressions can be protected if they do not directly describe the goods and possess sufficient distinctiveness in context, thereby providing valuable guidance for businesses seeking trademark protection for creative slogans.

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Oswaal Books adopted the mark “ONE FOR ALL” for its educational publications and sought its registration for printed books. The Registrar refused registration calling the phrase common and non-distinctive. The single judge upheld the refusal holding it descriptive and lacking secondary meaning.

In appeal, the division bench ruled that the mark has no direct or immediate connection with books, merely suggests completeness, and is suggestive rather than descriptive. It is therefore inherently distinctive and registrable without proof of acquired distinctiveness. The court set aside both the Registrar’s order and the single judge’s judgment and directed the application to proceed for registration.

Law settled in the case

Common English phrases and slogans can be registered as trademarks if they are suggestive and do not directly describe the character or quality of the goods. Paras 31-36.

Distinctiveness of a mark must be judged in the specific context of the goods or services and not in isolation.

If any mental effort or imagination is required to connect the mark with the goods, the mark is suggestive and eligible for registration.

Case Title: Oswaal Books and Learnings Vs The Registrar of Trade Marks: 10.02.2026:LPA 571/2025:

2026:DHC:1249-DB:Justice C. Hari Shankar and Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

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Chacha Saree Bazar Pvt. Ltd.Vs Chacha Cloth House

Introduction: In the bustling world of Indian retail, where family-style names often appear in shop signs, a recent ruling from the Delhi High Court brings welcome clarity to how trademarks work for everyday words. The case involved two businesses selling sarees and garments under names that both featured the word "Chacha". While one side had official registration, the other did not. The lower court had refused protection, calling the word too common. The High Court stepped in and reversed that view, explaining why even familiar words can deserve legal shield when used cleverly in a specific business. This decision reminds traders that brand identity matters and courts will step up to prevent customer confusion in competitive markets like clothing.

Factual Background: A Delhi-based company ran a well-known store in Sarojini Nagar Market, offering sarees, lehengas, and similar garments under registered brand names that prominently included "Chacha". These marks had been officially registered years earlier for textiles and clothing. Across the border in Haryana, another trader operated a similar shop in Yamuna Nagar, using the name "Chacha Cloth House" for exactly the same type of goods. The Haryana trader had no registration but had applied for one. The Delhi company noticed the similarity and felt customers might mix up the two shops, especially since both used "Chacha" as the eye-catching part of their branding. They approached the court seeking to stop the Haryana trader from using any version of "Chacha" that could create confusion.

Procedural Background: The Delhi company filed a regular suit for trademark infringement and also asked for an immediate temporary order to halt the rival's use while the case continued. The commercial court first granted a short-term stop order without hearing the other side. Later, after full arguments, the same court changed its mind and removed the stop order. It reasoned that "Chacha" simply means "uncle" in common speech, so no one could claim it as their own, and there was no proof that the word had become specially linked only to the Delhi shop in customers' minds. The court also noted the shops were in different cities and saw no immediate risk of mix-up. Feeling this was unfair, the Delhi company appealed to the High Court, where senior lawyers presented detailed arguments on both sides through oral hearings and written notes.

Reasoning and Decision of Court: The High Court carefully reviewed the entire matter and found the lower court's approach mistaken on basic principles. Judges explained that whether a word like "Chacha" can be protected depends on the kind of goods it is used for, not on its meaning in daily life. Here, "Chacha" has nothing to do with sarees or clothes – it is not a description of fabric, style, or quality. When attached to garments, the word stands out and helps customers remember one particular shop. The court noted that people shopping for sarees do not think deeply about every part of a shop name; they remember the striking or main word. In both brands, "Chacha" was that main word, while the rest simply described the business (Saree Bazar or Cloth House).

Even though the full names looked somewhat different and the shops were far apart, the judges said this does not remove the risk of confusion. Customers with ordinary memory might recall only the "Chacha" part and assume the Haryana shop was connected to the famous Delhi one, especially when both sold identical items. The court added that businesses often grow and open new outlets, so distance today does not guarantee safety tomorrow. The Haryana trader's own attempt to register a similar name was seen as an admission that the word had value and could be protected.

On the visual style of the logos, the court held that differences in design or colour do not save the situation if the spoken or remembered part sounds alike and creates the same impression. After weighing everything, the High Court set aside the lower court's order, restored the protection, and directed the Haryana trader to stop using "Chacha" or "Chacha Cloth House" for garments until the main suit is decided. The appeal was allowed in favour of the Delhi company.

Point of Law Settled in the Case: This judgment settles an important everyday question in trademark law: common spoken words are not automatically free for anyone to use in business if they have no natural link to the product and help identify one seller. Courts must look at the word in the actual context of the trade. The ruling also clarifies that when comparing two similar brand names, the most noticeable or "dominant" part can be given special attention without breaking the rule that full names must be seen as a whole. Further, simply showing other shops somewhere use the same word is not enough to call it "common property"; there must be real, widespread use that actually affects customers' understanding. At the early stage of a case, official registration itself gives strong initial support for protection. Overall, the decision strengthens the message that honest traders who build a name deserve court help to prevent copycats, even when the name uses an ordinary word in a fresh way.

Case Title: Chacha Saree Bazar Pvt. Ltd.Vs Chacha Cloth House Date of Order: 12 February 2026 Case Number: FAO (COMM) 217/2025 Neutral Citation: 2026 DHC 1296 DB Name of Court: High Court of Delhi Name of Hon'ble Judges: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles for the Article:

1. Delhi High Court Shields "Chacha" Brand Name for Sarees – Common Word Gets Trademark Protection
2. Why "Chacha" Cannot Be Freely Copied in Garment Business: Key Takeaways from Delhi High Court Ruling
3. From Uncle to Brand Icon: How Delhi High Court Gave "Chacha" Distinct Identity in Retail Trade
4. Trademark Lesson for Retailers: Delhi High Court Says Context Matters More Than Dictionary Meaning

Suitable Tags: TrademarkLaw , BrandProtection, Commonword , DelhiHighCourt, SareeBusiness , IntellectualProperty, TrademarkInfringement, ChachaTrademark, RetailLaw, IndianCourts, DistinctiveMarks. common to trade,

Headnote of Article:

Delhi High Court rules that the word "Chacha", though common in daily speech, becomes distinctive when used for sarees and garments. Reversing the lower court, it grants interim injunction against similar use by another trader, clarifying that dominant features drive customer recall and registration presumes protection even for ordinary words in unrelated trades.

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The Delhi High Court Division Bench, in its oral judgment dated February 12, 2026, allowed the appeal FAO(COMM) 217/2025 filed by Chacha Saree Bazar Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., setting aside the order of the learned District Judge (Commercial Court)-01 which had dismissed the appellants' application for interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC in their pending suit alleging trademark infringement and passing off against the respondent using the unregistered mark “CHACHA CLOTH HOUSE” for identical goods like sarees, lehengas, suits, and garments. 

The appellants hold prior registrations since 1988/2010/2013 for marks including “CHACHA SAREE BAZAR PVT LTD” (word) and “CHACHE DI HATTI” (device) in Classes 24 and 25, operating from a single outlet in Sarojini Nagar Market, New Delhi. The respondent operates in Yamuna Nagar, Haryana, using “CHACHA CLOTH HOUSE” with labels/logos incorporating “CHACHA”.

The Commercial Court dismissed interim relief on the sole ground that “Chacha” (Hindi for uncle) is a generic/commonplace expression over which no monopoly can be claimed. The Division Bench  reversed this, holding that distinctiveness must be assessed vis-à-vis the specific goods/services and not in the abstract or based on etymological meaning; while “Chacha” is an everyday word, it has no natural, descriptive, or etymological link to textiles/clothing/garments, rendering its use arbitrary and inherently distinctive in that trade context, capable of distinguishing the appellants' goods. 

Given prior registrations under Section 23 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, long user, identical goods, market perception overlap, and prima facie confusion likelihood, the Court found balance of convenience and irreparable injury favouring the registered proprietors, granting interim injunction restraining the respondent from using “CHACHA CLOTH HOUSE” or any “CHACHA”-incorporating/deceptively similar marks for such goods pending suit, subject to exceptions if honest concurrent use is later proved.

Law Point:

Distinctiveness of a trademark must be evaluated in relation to the specific goods or services for which it is used, not in the abstract or based on general/commonplace/etymological meaning. 

Commonplace words of ordinary language, when arbitrarily adopted as marks in trades lacking etymological nexus, qualify for protection against infringement/passing off, entitling registered proprietors to prima facie interim restraint on identical/similar marks for identical goods where goodwill, prior registration, and confusion elements are established.

Case Title:Chacha Saree Bazar Pvt. Ltd.Vs  Chacha Cloth House:February 12, 2026:FAO(COMM) 217/2025:2026:DHC:1296-DB: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar & Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla  

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

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Lotus Herbals Pvt.Ltd. Vs DPKA Universal Consumer Ventures Pvt.Ltd.

Introduction: The beauty and skincare market is crowded, and brand names often borrow from nature. When a new face cleanser named “Lotus Splash” entered the market, Lotus Herbals saw it as a direct threat to their long-established “Lotus” identity. The single judge allowed the use, calling it descriptive. On appeal, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court took a closer look and reversed that view. This ruling shows how courts protect famous marks even when rivals claim their name is just describing an ingredient.

Factual Background: Lotus Herbals has built a strong reputation over many years selling herbal skincare and beauty products under the “Lotus” name and its variations. The company holds several registrations for the word “Lotus” and logos in classes covering cosmetics. Their products are widely known, heavily advertised, and associated with natural ingredients.

DPKA Universal Consumer Ventures, linked to actress Deepika Padukone, launched a face cleanser under the main brand “82°E”. The product was prominently named “Lotus Splash” and highlighted lotus flower extracts as a key ingredient. Lotus Herbals objected, arguing that the name would confuse customers into thinking the product came from them or was connected to their range.

Procedural Background: Lotus Herbals filed a commercial suit seeking a permanent ban on the use of “Lotus Splash” or any similar name. They also asked for an immediate temporary order to stop sales while the case continued. The single judge heard both sides and refused the temporary order. He held that “Lotus Splash” was merely descriptive because the product actually contains lotus extract, so it fell under legal exceptions allowing honest descriptive use. Feeling this was wrong, Lotus Herbals appealed to the Division Bench. Senior lawyers argued at length on both sides. After detailed consideration, the Division Bench delivered its judgment on 16 February 2026.

Reasoning and Decision of Court: The Division Bench found the single judge’s approach mistaken on key points. They agreed there was clear similarity because “Lotus” is the striking and dominant part of both names. An ordinary shopper seeing “Lotus Splash” could easily link it to the well-known “Lotus” products, especially in the same category of face care items. Initial confusion was likely even if later differences became clear.

The court rejected the claim that “Lotus Splash” was purely descriptive. While lotus extract is an ingredient, the full name was used prominently on bottles, packaging, websites, and advertisements – exactly like a brand name. It was not hidden in small print as a mere description. The respondents were treating “Lotus Splash” as their product identifier, not just explaining contents. The presence of “82°E” at the bottom did not remove the risk of mix-up.

The judges stressed that descriptive use defences apply only when the words are used honestly to describe the product without trying to create a brand impression. Here, the overall commercial impression pointed to trademark use. The court also noted Lotus Herbals’ long prior use and strong reputation, making passing off likely as well.

The Division Bench set aside the single judge’s order. It granted the temporary injunction, stopping the respondents from making, selling, or promoting any product under “Lotus Splash” or any deceptively similar name until the main suit is finally decided. The appeal succeeded in favour of Lotus Herbals.

Point of Law Settled in the Case: This judgment clarifies that Prominent display turns a potentially descriptive phrase into infringing trademark use. Courts will examine the full commercial impression created by how the name is actually used on packaging, marketing, and sales – not just the dictionary meaning. Descriptive defences protect genuine explanations of contents but do not allow a rival to build a brand around a word that belongs to someone else. Established brands with proven goodwill receive strong interim protection to prevent customer confusion and dilution of their reputation.

Case Title: Lotus Herbals Pvt.Ltd. Vs DPKA Universal Consumer Ventures Pvt.Ltd.

Date of Order: 16 February 2026

Case Number: FAO(OS) (COMM) 45/2024

Neutral Citation: 2026 DHC 1300 DB

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judges: Hon'ble Mr. Justice V. Kameswar Rao and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vinod Kumar

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles for this Article:

1. Delhi High Court Stops Deepika Padukone’s Brand from Using ‘Lotus Splash’ – Victory for Lotus Herbals
2. ‘Lotus’ Name Protected: Division Bench Overturns Single Judge in Major Cosmetics Trademark Battle
3. Why Ingredient Names Cannot Become Rival Brands – Lessons from Lotus Herbals Ruling
4. Delhi High Court Draws Line on Descriptive Use Defence in Beauty Industry Trademark Dispute

Suitable Tags: #TrademarkInfringement #DelhiHighCourt #LotusHerbals #DeepikaPadukone #BrandProtection #CosmeticsLaw #DescriptiveMarks #IndianIPLaw #CelebrityBrands #IPUpdate

Headnote of Article:

Delhi High Court Division Bench grants interim injunction restraining use of “Lotus Splash” by DPKA Ventures (Deepika Padukone’s brand), holding the mark deceptively similar to Lotus Herbals’ registered “Lotus” family and not saved by descriptive use defence, thereby protecting long-established goodwill in the skincare market.

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Lotus Herbals, a long-established company known for herbal skincare and beauty products under the mark “Lotus”, sued DPKA Universal Consumer Ventures (linked to Deepika Padukone) for launching a face cleanser prominently named “Lotus Splash” under its main brand “82°E”. Lotus Herbals claimed the name would confuse customers and infringe its registered trademarks. The single judge refused interim injunction, holding that “Lotus Splash” was merely descriptive because the product contains lotus extract. On appeal, the Division Bench reversed the order. It found “Lotus” the dominant and memorable part of both names, creating clear likelihood of confusion. The respondents were using the name as a brand identifier on packaging, website and advertisements, not merely describing contents. The descriptive defence did not apply when the term functions as a trademark. The appeal was allowed and interim injunction granted restraining the respondents from using “Lotus Splash” or any deceptively similar name till final decision of the suit.

Law settled in the case

• When a common word forming the dominant part of a registered trademark is used prominently as a product name, it constitutes trademark use and can cause deceptive similarity even if an ingredient is present. (Paras 34-35)
• The descriptive use defence under Section 30(2)(a) is available only for honest description and does not protect use of the term as a source identifier or brand name. (Para 13 & 33)

Case Title: Lotus Herbals Pvt.Ltd. Vs DPKA Universal Consumer Ventures Pvt.Ltd.: 16.02.2026:FAO(OS) (COMM) 45/2024:2026 DHC 1300 DB: Hon’ble Mr. Justice V. Kameswar Rao and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vinod Kumar

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

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Fornnax Technology Pvt.Ltd. Vs. The Registrar of Copyrights

The Delhi High Court, in a significant ruling delivered on **February 11, 2026**, set aside a common order passed by the Registrar of Copyrights dated January 28, 2026, and remanded multiple connected copyright registration applications back to the Registrar for fresh de novo consideration. The decision addresses critical procedural and substantive issues in the pre-registration scrutiny of artistic works under the Copyright Act, 1957, particularly where opposition arises from competitors in the industrial machinery sector. The appellant, Fornnax Technology Private Limited, sought copyright registration for artistic works consisting of technical drawings or views of components of its secondary shredder machines (notably the "Cutting Chamber Part of Secondary Shredder R-4000 Front View" and related models). The Registrar rejected these applications after entertaining oppositions from respondents (including competitors represented through counsel for R-2 to R-4), primarily on the ground that the works had been industrially applied to more than fifty articles, triggering the bar under Section 15(2) of the Act, and thus could not qualify for copyright protection.

The factual matrix revolves around Fornnax's claim to copyright in original artistic works embodied in engineering drawings or visual representations of shredder components designed for waste processing and recycling machinery. The company asserted that these were pure artistic expressions not intended solely for industrial application beyond limited production. The opposing parties, apparently competitors in the shredder or recycling equipment market, challenged the registrability, producing materials such as PR articles, website "success stories" claiming over 100 installations, and even YouTube/social media videos allegedly showing widespread commercial exploitation of the designs.

Procedurally, the appellant filed applications under Section 45 of the Copyright Act for entry in the Register of Copyrights. The Registrar, invoking powers under Section 45(2) to conduct such inquiry as deemed fit, entertained written oppositions and documents from the respondents, conducted a personal hearing on January 21, 2026, and passed the impugned common rejection order. Aggrieved, Fornnax preferred multiple connected appeals under Section 72 of the Act before the Delhi High Court, which were heard together.

The Court, speaking through Justice Tushar Rao Gedela in an oral judgment, identified two primary infirmities warranting remand. First, the Registrar failed to properly address the appellant's specific objection that the opposing respondents were not "persons interested" as contemplated under Rule 70(9) and (10) of the Copyright Rules, 2013, which govern pre-registration scrutiny and opposition at the application stage. Instead, the Registrar erroneously equated or imported the concept of "person aggrieved" (who can seek rectification or cancellation post-registration under Section 50) into the pre-grant phase, thereby allowing competitors to participate and oppose when their locus standi may be limited to post-grant proceedings. The Court emphasized that these are distinct statutory stages with different standing requirements, and the failure to deal with this objection vitiated the order. Reliance was placed on the appellant's submissions citing the Allahabad High Court in Pramod Sharma vs. State of U.P. (2023 SCC OnLine All 1904) to define "person interested," which remained unaddressed.

Second, the Court found a serious breach of natural justice in the Registrar's reliance on electronic evidence (website claims of over 100 installations, PR materials, YouTube videos, and social media content) to invoke the Section 15(2) bar without furnishing copies to the appellant prior to or during the hearing, and without granting any effective opportunity to rebut the same with counter-evidence. The appellant had specifically asserted production of only 29–34 units for certain models and challenged the admissibility of such electronic material under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act (or equivalent provisions under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam), pointing out lack of certification/affidavit. These contentions, raised in detailed post-hearing written submissions (particularly paras 16–17), found no engagement in the impugned order. The Court held that assertions and counter-assertions on the quantum of industrial application required adjudication on tangible, admissible evidence, which was absent here.

While noting the appellant's reliance on the Supreme Court's recent pronouncement in Cryogas Equipment (P) Ltd. vs. Inox India Ltd. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 780, para 66) — which clarified that an original artistic work does not lose copyright protection merely because a design derived from it is industrially applied — the High Court did not decide the merits. It clarified that no opinion was expressed on whether the works qualified as artistic works retaining copyright or whether the Section 15(2) bar applied, leaving these for fresh examination.

The Court accordingly quashed the impugned order, remitted the applications for de novo consideration by a different officer, directed that the appellant be permitted to rebut any documents relied upon by the respondents, allowed the respondents to file further materials in support of opposition, and explicitly required the Registrar to record a specific finding on whether opposition by the respondents could be maintained at the pre-registration stage. No costs were imposed.

This decision settles important points of law in copyright registration practice. It reinforces the strict separation between pre-grant inquiry/opposition under Section 45 read with Rule 70 (limited to "persons interested") and post-grant rectification/expungement under Section 50 (available to "persons aggrieved"). Conflating the two concepts is impermissible. It also establishes that any reliance on electronic or documentary evidence adverse to the applicant during inquiry must comply with natural justice — copies must be supplied and rebuttal opportunity afforded — failing which the order becomes unsustainable. Finally, it underscores that the Section 15(2) industrial application bar (loss of copyright after more than fifty reproductions without design registration) requires concrete, rebuttable evidence rather than untested website claims or media content, aligning with the Supreme Court's emphasis in Cryogas on preserving underlying artistic copyright despite industrial derivation.

**Case Details**  

**Title**: Fornnax Technology Private Limited vs. The Registrar of Copyrights & Ors. (and connected matters)  

**Date of Order**: February 11, 2026  

**Case Number**: CA (COMM.IPD-CR) 5/2026, 6/2026, 7/2026 & 8/2026 (with connected I.As.)  

**Neutral Citation**: Not available in the provided judgment text (awaiting publication)  

**Name of Court**: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi  

**Name of Hon'ble Judge**: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela  

**Disclaimer**: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.  

**Written By**: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  

**Suggested Titles for the Article**  

1. Delhi High Court Remands Copyright Applications: Strict Adherence to Locus Standi and Natural Justice in Pre-Registration Oppositions  

2. Fornnax Technology vs Registrar of Copyrights: High Court Quashes Rejection Order Over Procedural Lapses and Evidence Irregularities  

3. Pre-Grant Opposition in Copyright Registration: Delhi High Court Draws Clear Line Between "Person Interested" and "Person Aggrieved"  

4. Section 15(2) Bar and Electronic Evidence: Delhi High Court Mandates Fair Opportunity in Copyright Registration Proceedings  

**Suggested Tags**  

Copyright Registration, Registrar of Copyrights, Section 45 Copyright Act, Section 50 Copyright Act, Section 15(2) Copyright Act, Rule 70 Copyright Rules 2013, Natural Justice in IP Proceedings, Person Interested vs Person Aggrieved, Industrial Application of Artistic Works, Delhi High Court IP Judgment, Fornnax Technology Copyright Case, Cryogas Equipment Precedent  

**Headnote**  

Delhi High Court sets aside Registrar of Copyrights' rejection of artistic work registration applications on grounds of improper conflation of "person interested" (pre-grant) with "person aggrieved" (post-grant), failure to address locus objections, and violation of natural justice by relying on unshared electronic evidence to invoke Section 15(2) bar; matter remanded for de novo consideration by different officer with directions to permit rebuttal and record finding on maintainability of opposition.

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The appellant sought copyright registration under Section 45 of the Copyright Act, 1957 for artistic works comprising technical drawings/views of components (such as the "Cutting Chamber Part of Secondary Shredder R-4000 Front View") of its secondary shredder machines used in waste processing/recycling. The Registrar entertained oppositions from respondents (competitors), considered their documents including website PR articles claiming over 100 installations, YouTube/social media videos, and rejected the applications on February 28, 2026 (impugned common order), primarily invoking the Section 15(2) bar that copyright ceases after industrial application to more than fifty articles without design registration. Aggrieved, the appellant filed connected appeals under Section 72 before the Delhi High Court.

The Court, in its oral judgment dated February 11, 2026, quashed the impugned order and remanded the applications for de novo consideration by a different officer. It held that the Registrar failed to address the appellant's objection that respondents were not "persons interested" under Rule 70(9) & (10) of the Copyright Rules, 2013 (governing pre-registration inquiry/opposition) and wrongly equated them with "persons aggrieved" under Section 50 (post-registration rectification), conflating distinct statutory stages and allowing impermissible pre-grant participation by competitors. 

Law Point:

Pre-registration inquiry under Section 45 read with Rule 70 of Copyright Rules, 2013 permits opposition only by "persons interested"; post-registration rectification/expungement under Section 50 is available to "persons aggrieved" these are distinct stages and concepts that cannot be conflated or substituted (paras 4-7, 15).

Case Title: Fornnax Technology Pvt.Ltd. Vs. The Registrar of Copyrights:11.02.2026:CA (COMM.IPD-CR) 5/2026:2026:DHC:1295: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela  

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

ADS Agro Industries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. The Registrar of Trade Marks

Introduction : The case revolves around the trademark registration battle for the mark 'TAJPURIYA' in Class 33 for alcoholic beverages, highlighting critical procedural safeguards in trademark examination and adjudication under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The Delhi High Court's decision in this appeal underscores the imperative that the Registrar of Trade Marks must confine refusals to objections explicitly raised in the Examination Report, thereby upholding principles of natural justice and preventing arbitrary shifts in grounds for refusal. This ruling reinforces that applicants deserve a full and fair opportunity to address all objections, and any deviation renders the order unsustainable, especially when the mark is asserted to be arbitrary and devoid of direct descriptive or geographical linkage to the goods.

Factual Background :ADS Agro Industries Pvt. Ltd., a rapidly expanding liquor conglomerate in India's alcohol beverage sector, is involved in manufacturing, marketing, trading, and selling liquor products. The company honestly and bona fide adopted the trademark 'TAJPURIYA' for alcoholic beverages and preparations for making such beverages, claiming the mark to be arbitrary in relation to the goods and inherently distinctive, with no natural or direct connection to alcohol or the industry.

Procedural Background : On 08.06.2021, the Appellant filed Trademark Application No. 4997781 in Class 33 on a 'proposed to be used' basis for the mark 'TAJPURIYA'. The Registrar issued an Examination Report dated 24.06.2021, raising an objection solely under Section 9(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, on the ground that the mark constituted a geographical name and was thus incapable of distinguishing the goods or services of one person from those of another. The Appellant promptly filed a detailed reply dated 26.06.2021, asserting the mark's arbitrariness, inherent distinctiveness, absence of any geographical connection, and entitlement to registration even if hypothetically treated as having geographical origin, relying inter alia on the Gujarat High Court precedent in Sahkar Seeds Corporation v. Dharti Seeds, 2017 SCC OnLine Guj 2577. Following this, the Registrar issued a hearing notice, conducted a hearing on 03.01.2024, and passed the impugned order dated 29.01.2024 refusing registration under Section 9, but on an entirely new and extraneous ground—that 'Tajpuriya' refers to an indigenous tribe of Nepal (also residing in parts of India such as Bihar, West Bengal, Sikkim, and Darjeeling), where alcohol forms an essential part of religious rituals, rendering the mark devoid of distinctive character.

Reasoning and Decision of Court: The Delhi High Court, presided over by Hon'ble Ms. Justice Jyoti Singh, found substantial merit in the Appellant's challenge under Section 91 of the Act. The Court observed that the impugned order suffered from two fundamental defects. First, the refusal was predicated on a fresh ground (tribal name linked to ritualistic alcohol use) never raised in the Examination Report, thereby denying the Appellant any opportunity to contest or reply to it, which violated procedural requirements under the Act and breached principles of natural justice. Second, the original geographical name objection from the Examination Report was neither reiterated nor addressed in the impugned order, and the Registrar failed to engage with the detailed submissions in the Appellant's reply regarding the mark's arbitrariness, inherent distinctiveness, and high degree of protection for arbitrary marks (even those with alleged geographical connotations). The Court noted that shifting to an extraneous ground without prior notice or consideration of the reply rendered the order wholly illegal and unsustainable. Consequently, the impugned order dated 29.01.2024 was set aside, and the matter was remanded to the Registrar for re-examination of the application from the hearing stage, mandating due consideration of the reply to the Examination Report, grant of a fresh hearing opportunity to the Appellant, and completion of the entire process within two months from the date of the judgment.

Point of Law Settled in the Case :The judgment firmly establishes that the Registrar of Trade Marks is bound to restrict refusal grounds to those explicitly articulated in the Examination Report issued under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Introducing new or extraneous grounds in the final order without affording the applicant prior notice and an opportunity to respond constitutes a serious procedural irregularity, infringing natural justice principles and statutory procedure. Furthermore, where specific objections are raised and a detailed reply is filed addressing distinctiveness, arbitrariness, or exceptions for arbitrary use, the Registrar is duty-bound to deal with and consider those submissions; failure to do so, coupled with reliance on unheralded grounds, vitiates the refusal order. This ruling strengthens applicant protections in opposition and refusal proceedings by mandating transparency, consistency, and fairness throughout the examination and hearing stages.

Case Title: ADS Agro Industries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. The Registrar of Trade Marks 

Date of Order: 3rd February, 2026 

Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 33/2024 

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:1134 

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi 

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Jyoti Singh

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles for the Article:

Delhi High Court Sets Aside Trademark Refusal for 'TAJPURIYA': Procedural Fairness Prevails in Registrar's Examination

Arbitrary Marks and Natural Justice: Delhi HC Remands 'TAJPURIYA' Application, Bars Extraneous Refusal Grounds

No New Grounds Without Opportunity: Procedural Fairness Trademark Examination Landmark Delhi HC Ruling on Trademark Refusal Procedure

Suggested Tags: TrademarkLaw, DelhiHighCourt, IPLaw, TradeMarksAct1999, NaturalJustice, TrademarkRefusal, ArbitraryMarks, IPIndia, TrademarkRegistration, RegistrarOfTradeMarks, IndianIP,  IPUpdate, TrademarkCaseLaw,

Headnote Delhi High Court holds that Registrar cannot refuse trademark registration on grounds not raised in Examination Report; impugned refusal for 'TAJPURIYA' set aside for violating natural justice and failing to address applicant's reply on arbitrariness and distinctiveness; matter remanded for fresh consideration within two months (2026:DHC:1134).

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ADS Agro Industries Pvt. Ltd., engaged in manufacturing and selling liquor products, adopted the arbitrary and inherently distinctive mark 'TAJPURIYA' for alcoholic beverages in Class 33 and filed Trademark Application No. 4997781 on 08.06.2021 on proposed-to-be-used basis. The Registrar raised objection under Section 9(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 vide Examination Report dated 24.06.2021 treating it as a geographical name incapable of distinguishing goods; Appellant filed detailed reply dated 26.06.2021 asserting arbitrariness, inherent distinctiveness, lack of geographical connection and reliance on Gujarat HC precedent. After hearing on 03.01.2024, Registrar refused registration vide impugned order dated 29.01.2024 on new ground that 'Tajpuriya' is name of an indigenous tribe of Nepal (also in parts of India) where alcohol is essential in religious rituals, thus lacking distinctive character under Section 9. Appellant challenged this under Section 91 before Delhi High Court, which found the order unsustainable as the refusal relied on a fresh ground not raised in Examination Report (violating natural justice and procedure, denying Appellant opportunity to respond) and failed to address points in Appellant's reply on arbitrariness and protection even for arbitrary geographical-origin marks; accordingly, impugned order was set aside and matter remanded to Registrar for re-examination from hearing stage after considering reply, with fresh hearing and decision within two months.

Law settled: Registrar cannot refuse trademark registration on a ground not raised in the Examination Report, as it deprives applicant of opportunity to respond, violating principles of natural justice and procedural fairness under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. (Para 4, 8)

Law settled: Where Examination Report raises specific objection (e.g., geographical name under Section 9(1)(a)), Registrar must deal with applicant's detailed reply addressing distinctiveness/arbitrariness and cannot shift to extraneous or new grounds without opportunity; failure to consider reply renders order unsustainable. (Para 5, 8)

Law settled: Impugned refusal order must be confined to objections raised in Examination Report and cannot be sustained if it introduces new grounds or ignores applicant's submissions on inherent distinctiveness of arbitrary marks. (Para 8)

Case Title: M/s. ADS Agro Industries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. The Registrar of Trade Marks Order Date: 3rd February, 2026 Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 33/2024 Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:1134 Name of Court: High Court of Delhi Name of Judge: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Jyoti Singh

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

7-Eleven International LLC Vs The Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks

Brief Note: The Madras High Court, in a detailed judgment on February 11, 2026, dismissed the appeals filed by 7-Eleven International LLC, a global convenience store chain based in the USA, thereby upholding the 2014 order of the Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks. The ruling affirmed the registration of the trademark "Big Bite" in Class 30 in favor of the Indian company Ravi Foods Private Limited (the substituted third respondent, following assignments from the original applicant Dukes Consumer Care Limited), while rejecting 7-Eleven's competing application and opposition. This decision reinforces the territorial nature of trademark rights under Indian law and clarifies the limited role of international reputation and prior filing dates when no actual use or goodwill has been established in the Indian market.

Introduction: Trademark disputes involving identical or highly similar marks often hinge on the fundamental principles of priority, goodwill, and territoriality. In cross-border conflicts, foreign entities frequently invoke their global reputation, extensive international use, and early filing dates to claim superior rights, especially when a local entity enters the scene later. The present case exemplifies such a clash between a multinational giant and an Indian food products company over the mark "Big Bite" for goods in Class 30, encompassing confectionery, biscuits, bakery items, savoury snacks, and related food products. The Madras High Court delved deeply into whether mere international fame, prior adoption abroad, or an earlier application date in India can override the established prior user status of a domestic party that has continuously used the mark in trade within India. The judgment underscores that Indian trademark law, while recognizing trans-border reputation in exceptional cases, predominantly adheres to the principle of territoriality, requiring concrete evidence of goodwill and reputation spilling over into or being cultivated in the Indian jurisdiction for protection against local prior users.

Factual Background: 7-Eleven International LLC, renowned for operating nearly 80,000 convenience stores worldwide under the "7-Eleven" brand (including some presence in India), claimed to have adopted and continuously used the formative mark "Big Bite" since August 1988, primarily for savoury food items such as hot dogs, pizzas, and potato chips sold in its stores. The company asserted that through extensive global use, promotion, and registrations in multiple jurisdictions (including Classes 29, 30, and 43), the mark had acquired a trans-border reputation that extended to India. To secure statutory rights in India, 7-Eleven filed its earliest application for "Big Bite" on August 16, 1994 (Application No. 636986 in Class 30), which was advertised in the Trade Marks Journal on September 16, 2007.  

On the other side, the original applicant (M/s. Dukes Consumer Care Limited, later renamed SWG Consumer Care Limited and eventually assigned to Ravi Foods Private Limited effective January 21, 2025) filed Application No. 1297871 in Class 30 on July 19, 2004, seeking registration of "Big Bite" for chocolates, biscuits, bread, pastry, confectionery, ice creams, spices, and other goods in the class. The mark was advertised on May 15, 2005. Ravi Foods (and its predecessors) claimed continuous, open, and extensive use of the mark in India since October 5, 2004, for various food products. 7-Eleven opposed the Indian application, while the Indian side opposed 7-Eleven's earlier-filed but later-advertised application.

Procedural Background: The oppositions were adjudicated together by the Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks, Chennai, who passed a common order on July 18, 2014. In that order, the Deputy Registrar rejected 7-Eleven's Application No. 636986 (opposed by the Indian side under Opposition No. MAS-720132) and accepted the Indian company's Application No. 1297871 (opposing 7-Eleven's opposition under No. MAS-211161). The Registrar primarily relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Milmet Oftho Industries v. Allergan Inc. (2004) to prioritize the first actual user in India, noting that 7-Eleven had not demonstrated any use or business presence in India under the mark, while the Indian party had established prior and continuous local use.  

Aggrieved, 7-Eleven filed two appeals under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999: (T)CMA(TM) No. 110 of 2023 challenging the acceptance of the Indian application and (T)CMA(TM) No. 157 of 2023 challenging the rejection of its own application. During the pendency of these appeals, there were substitutions of parties due to corporate changes and assignments, culminating in Ravi Foods Private Limited being arrayed as the third respondent. The appeals were heard and reserved on January 22, 2026, and decided on February 11, 2026.

Reasoning and Decision of Court:  The High Court meticulously examined the arguments advanced by both sides. 7-Eleven contended that the Registrar erred by applying a narrow "prior user in India" test, ignoring its prior international adoption since 1988, global registrations, trans-border reputation, and earlier filing date in 1994. It argued that the Indian adoption in 2004 was mala fide, aimed at riding on its international goodwill, and that allowing identical use would cause confusion and association. Reliance was placed on numerous precedents, including N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool Corporation (emphasizing trans-border reputation), S. Syed Mohideen v. P. Sulochana Bai, Milmet Oftho, and various High Court decisions supporting protection of well-known or spill-over reputation.  

The Court, however, rejected these contentions after a thorough analysis. It held that Indian trademark law is fundamentally territorial, and rights are acquired primarily through use in India. Mere availability of the mark on a foreign website or international reputation does not automatically confer goodwill or reputation in India absent evidence of actual spillover or substantial business activity on Indian soil. The Court observed that 7-Eleven had not placed any material showing sales, business, or reputation-building efforts in India under "Big Bite" either at the time of its 1994 application or during opposition proceedings commencing in 2007. The mere filing date, while relevant under Section 11, could not override the established prior use by the Indian party since 2004.  

Distinguishing the Milmet Oftho line of cases, the Court clarified that trans-border reputation protection is exceptional and requires clear proof of reputation in India, which was absent here. The mark was not shown to qualify as "well-known" under Section 2(1)(zg) or to warrant protection under Section 11(2) or 11(3) without local goodwill. The Court found no error in the Registrar's reliance on territorial prior use and upheld the impugned order in its entirety, dismissing both appeals without costs.

Point of Law Settled in the Case:  This judgment reaffirms and strengthens the territoriality principle in Indian trademark jurisprudence, holding that international reputation and prior foreign use, without corresponding goodwill, reputation, or actual business presence in India, cannot defeat the rights of a prior bona fide user who has continuously used the mark in the Indian market. A foreign applicant's earlier application date alone is insufficient to prevail over a local prior user's established trade use, particularly when no spillover of reputation is proved. The decision clarifies the narrow scope for invoking trans-border reputation under Sections 11(2) and 11(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, emphasizing that concrete evidence of Indian goodwill is essential, and mere global fame or website presence does not suffice.

Case Title: 7 – Eleven International LLC Vs The Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks.  

Date of Order: 11.02.2026  

Case Number: (T)CMA(TM) Nos.110 & 157 of 2023  

Neutral Citation: 2026:MHC:542  

Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras  

Name of Hon'ble Judge: The Hon'ble Mr. Justice N. Anand Venkatesh  

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.  

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  

**Suggested Titles for the Article**  

- Madras High Court Upholds Territoriality: Indian Company Wins "Big Bite" Trademark Battle Against Global Giant 7-Eleven  

- International Reputation Insufficient Without Indian Goodwill: Madras HC Rejects 7-Eleven's "Big Bite" Claim in Favour of Local Prior User  

- Territorial Principle Prevails: Madras High Court Dismisses 7-Eleven's Appeals Over "Big Bite" Trademark Registration  

- "Big Bite" Trademark Dispute: Madras HC Affirms Prior Use in India Over Global Fame and Early Filing  

**Suggested Tags**  

TrademarkLaw, BigBiteTrademark, 7Eleven, RaviFoods, MadrasHighCourt , TerritorialityPrinciple, TransBorderReputation, PriorUser, Section11, TradeMarksAct, IntellectualProperty, IPLitigation, JusticeNAnandVenkatesh, Class30Trademarks, IndianTrademarkDispute,  

**Headnote of Article**  

Madras High Court dismisses appeals by 7-Eleven International LLC, upholds Deputy Registrar's 2014 order granting "Big Bite" trademark registration in Class 30 to Ravi Foods Private Limited as prior user in India; holds that international reputation and prior foreign adoption/early filing date cannot override local prior use absent proof of goodwill or spillover reputation in India, reinforcing strict application of territoriality under the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

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In this trademark dispute over the mark "Big Bite" in Class 30 for food products like confectionery, biscuits, savouries and allied items, the appellant 7-Eleven International LLC, a US-based global convenience store chain, claimed prior adoption since 1988 internationally, global registrations, trans-border reputation extending to India, and an earlier Indian application filed on 16.8.1994 (No.636986), while the contesting respondent (originally Dukes Consumer Care Ltd, later assigned to Ravi Foods Private Limited) filed its application on 19.7.2004 (No.1297871) and claimed continuous use in India since 5.10.2004. The Deputy Registrar, vide common order dated 18.7.2014, rejected 7-Eleven's application and opposition, accepting the respondent's application on the ground of prior actual use in India, relying on territoriality and Supreme Court precedent in Milmet Oftho Industries v. Allergan Inc. Aggrieved, 7-Eleven filed appeals under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 before the Madras High Court, which were heard and decided on 11.2.2026, dismissing both appeals and upholding the Registrar's order in toto.

Law settled: 

Trademark rights in India are primarily territorial; international reputation and prior foreign use/adoption do not automatically confer goodwill or protection in India absent concrete evidence of actual business, sales, spillover reputation or goodwill generated on Indian soil — mere website presence, global fame or prior application date (without use) cannot override a bona fide prior local user's continuous and extensive trade use in India .

In opposition/registration proceedings, the test of prior user in India prevails over international reputation unless trans-border reputation is clearly proved to have permeated the Indian market with substantial evidence; a foreign applicant's earlier filing date is relevant but not decisive when no use is shown in India by the date of application or opposition commencement .

Case Title: 7 Eleven International LLC Vs. The Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks:11.02.2026:(T)CMA(TM) Nos.110 of 2023 : 2026:MHC:542 : Madras HC:Hon’ble Mr. Justice N. Anand Venkatesh  

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

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Manu Chaudhary Vs Controller of Patents

The Delhi High Court in a significant ruling has set aside the refusal of a patent application involving an oral herbal pain killer composition derived from Indian biological materials, primarily on the ground of non-submission of approval from the National Biodiversity Authority (NBA) at the time of refusal. The Court emphasized procedural fairness, discretion under Section 15 of the Patents Act, 1970, and the mandatory but timing-flexible requirement of NBA permission under the interplay of the Patents Act and the Biological Diversity Act, 2002.

Introduction: This appeal before the Delhi High Court  addresses a recurring challenge in patent prosecution involving traditional knowledge and biological resources from India: the mandatory requirement of prior or pre-grant approval from the National Biodiversity Authority (NBA) when inventions utilize biological material sourced from India. The case highlights the tension between strict compliance with biodiversity access regulations and the practical realities of administrative timelines in government bodies. It also touches upon procedural aspects like representation in hearings and the scope of Controller's discretion to refuse or defer decisions. The ruling promotes a balanced approach, ensuring applicants are not unduly penalized for delays beyond their control while upholding the protective intent of biodiversity laws. This decision is particularly relevant for inventors working in herbal, pharmaceutical, and traditional medicine sectors, where Indian biodiversity forms the basis of many innovations.

Factual Background: The Appellant, Manu Chaudhary, an experienced pharmaceutical researcher with over three decades in antimicrobial resistance, natural products, and drug revival technologies, filed Indian Patent Application No. IN 201711047431  (originally titled under related application 2545/DEL/2010 as "Oral herbal Pain Killer Formulations"). The invention pertains to an oral herbal pain killer composition for peripheral pains, comprising effective amounts of selected herbal components (specific plant parts with defined chemical constituents) in predefined ratios to achieve synergistic pharmacodynamic effects. It also includes a simplified, reproducible process for preparing these compositions while preserving safety, efficacy, and stability. The objective was to offer herbal alternatives to existing pain relief medications with reduced side effects, suitable even for patients with ulcers or other vulnerabilities. The application disclosed use of biological materials from India, triggering NBA approval requirements.

Procedural Background: 

The application was filed and First Examination Report (FER) issued observing  the claims novel and industrially applicable but raised objections on lack of inventive step (citing prior arts D1-D7), non-patentability under Sections 3(d), 3(e), and 3(p) of the Patents Act, and absence of NBA permission under Section 10(4)(ii)(D). The Appellant responded , amending claims from 1-10 to 1-7 to address issues. A hearing notice  limited objections to NBA approval and Section 3(p) (implying other grounds were waived). The Appellant attended the hearing  via an authorized representative, filed written submissions explaining technical glitches in Form 3 filing and pending NBA approval (evidenced by an email on intimating NBA acknowledgment). Despite this, the Controller refused the application under Section 15 . NBA approval was eventually granted , post-refusal. The Appellant challenged this refusal via appeal under Section 117A(2), seeking revival.

Reasoning and Decision of Court: The Court identified three refusal grounds: (i) lack of timely NBA approval; (ii) non-patentability under  Section 3(p)  (mere new use of known herbal medicines without technical advancement); and (iii) improper representation by an unauthorized person at the hearing (contrary to Sections 128 and 132). The Court focused primarily on the NBA issue, holding that while Section 10(4)(ii)(D) mandates disclosure and permission for biological material from India, neither the Patents Act nor the Biological Diversity Act, 2002 (Section 6(1A)) prescribes outright rejection for delayed submission. The relevant provision requires registration/approval before grant, not at filing or hearing stages. Guidelines for Processing Patent Applications relating to Traditional Knowledge and Biological Material (paragraphs 19 and 22) reinforce that patents "should not be granted" without NBA permission, but do not compel refusal if approval is pending and the applicant has applied diligently. The Appellant had applied to NBA, informed the Controller via email with acknowledgment proof before the refusal order, and could not control NBA's processing timeline. The Court found the Controller erred by not deferring the order under discretionary powers in Section 15, which allows requiring amendments/documents and refusing only on failure to comply. Non-submission due to pending approval was not a "failure" attributable to the Applicant. On representation, the Court noted the Controller should have objected and deferred rather than proceeding ex parte. Merits under Section 3(p) were not examined, leaving them open. The appeal was disposed of by setting aside the refusal, remanding for re-examination post-hearing (with proper Patent Agent/Advocate representation), considering NBA approval (no new material except this), and deciding within two months.

Point of Law Settled in the Case: The judgment clarifies that while NBA approval is mandatory for patent grant in cases involving Indian biological resources, absence of approval at examination/hearing stages does not automatically warrant refusal if the applicant has applied timely and informed the Controller of pendency. The Controller must exercise discretion under  Section 15  to defer proceedings awaiting approval, rather than refusing mechanically, especially when novelty is acknowledged. This prevents hyper-technical rejections and aligns with the proviso in Section 6 of the Biological Diversity Act allowing post-filing but pre-grant approval. It reinforces procedural fairness in patent prosecution involving biodiversity access obligations.

Case Title:Manu Chaudhary Vs Controller of Patents and Designs  

Date of Order:07.02.2026  

Case Number:C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 36/2024  

Neutral Citation:2026:DHC:1095   

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi  

Name of Hon'ble Judge:Hon'ble Ms. Justice Jyoti Singh  

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation  

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  

**Suggested Titles:**  

1. Delhi High Court Sets Aside Patent Refusal: NBA Approval Pendency Not Ground for Immediate Rejection in Biological Material Cases  

2. Balancing Biodiversity Compliance and Patent Prosecution: Delhi HC Remands Herbal Painkiller Application for Re-Examination  

3. No Automatic Refusal for Delayed NBA Approval – Landmark Clarity from Delhi High Court in Patents Involving Indian Biological Resources  

4. Procedural Fairness in Patent Appeals: Delhi HC Emphasizes Controller's Discretion Under Section 15 When NBA Permission is Awaited  

**Suggested Tags:** DelhiHighCourt , PatentsAct1970 , NBAApproval , BiologicalDiversityAct,  Section104iiD, Section15 , PatentsAct, HerbalPharmaceuticals, TraditionalKnowledge, PatentAppeal , IPLitigation, BiodiversityAccess, Section3p, InventiveStep, PatentProsecutionIndia,   

**Headnote:** Delhi High Court sets aside Controller's refusal of patent application for oral herbal pain killer composition under Section 15 of Patents Act, 1970, holding that pending NBA approval (applied for and acknowledged before refusal) warranted deferral rather than outright rejection; Controller must exercise discretion to await pre-grant NBA permission in biological material cases; matter remanded for fresh examination within two months post-hearing with proper representation; merits under Section 3(p) left open.

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In this appeal under Section 117A(2) of the Patents Act, 1970, Manu Chaudhary challenged the Controller's refusal dated 22.02.2024 of patent application IN 201711047431, which claimed an oral herbal pain killer composition using specific Indian herbal components in predefined ratios for synergistic pharmacodynamic effect along with a reproducible preparation process aimed at reducing side effects compared to conventional analgesics. 

The application was filed on 30.12.2017, published in 2019, examined after request in 2021, and FER issued on 22.12.2021 raising objections on inventive step, Sections 3(d), (e), (p), and lack of NBA approval under Section 10(4)(ii)(D). The applicant responded by amending claims, but the hearing notice in 2023 restricted objections to NBA approval and Section 3(p). Despite the applicant informing the Controller via email on 28.12.2023 of pending NBA application (acknowledgement received) and attending hearing through authorized representative, the application was refused under Section 15. NBA approval was eventually granted on 04.07.2024 post-refusal. 

The Delhi High Court held that the Controller erred in not deferring the refusal order despite proof of NBA application pendency, as neither the Patents Act nor the Biological Diversity Act, 2002 mandates rejection for delayed submission when the applicant has diligently applied and cannot control NBA timelines; Section 6(1A) requires approval only before grant, and relevant Guidelines (paras 19 & 22) prohibit grant without permission but do not compel pre-hearing rejection. 

The Court further found that Section 15 confers discretion to await compliance rather than refuse mechanically, especially when novelty was accepted. Representation by authorized representative was also not fatal without prior objection. Merits under Section 3(p) were not examined. The refusal was set aside, the matter remanded for fresh examination within two months after hearing (with proper Patent Agent/Advocate representation), considering NBA approval (no other new material permitted).

Points of Law Settled:

Absence of NBA approval at the time of examination/hearing does not warrant automatic refusal of a patent application if the applicant has applied for approval in time and informed the Controller of its pendency; the requirement under Section 6(1A) of the Biological Diversity Act, 2002 is mandatory only before grant of patent. (Para 14, 16; read with Paras 9, 10)

The Controller must exercise discretion under Section 15 of the Patents Act, 1970 to defer the final order and await submission of NBA permission when the applicant has taken diligent steps and delay is attributable to NBA processing, rather than mechanically refusing the application. (Para 15, 14)

Guidelines for Processing of Patent Applications relating to Traditional Knowledge and Biological Material (paras 19 & 22) prohibit grant of patent without NBA permission but do not provide for rejection of the application merely because approval is awaited despite proof of application having been made. (Para 14, 7)

Where an applicant attends hearing through an authorized representative instead of a registered Patent Agent/Advocate, the Controller should raise objection and defer hearing to allow compliance rather than proceed and refuse on that ground. (Para 11, implied in 16)

Case Title:Manu Chaudhary Vs Controller of Patents:07.02.2026:C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 36/2024 :2026:DHC:1095:Hon'ble Ms. Justice Jyoti Singh  

Disclaimer:Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation  

Written By:Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

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Operation Mercy India Foundation Vs. Meta Platforms Inc

Introduction: In the evolving landscape of digital defamation, where anonymous online actors can disseminate harmful content across borders with ease, the question of territorial jurisdiction becomes paramount. The case of Operation Mercy India Foundation and Others versus Meta Platforms Inc. and Others, decided by the Delhi High Court, delves into this complex interplay between traditional civil procedure principles and modern cyber wrongs. 

At its core, the judgment addresses whether a defamation suit initially filed against unknown "John Doe" defendants can be returned to another court once the identities of the alleged wrongdoers are revealed, particularly when the revealed residence coincides with a place where the alleged wrong also occurred. This ruling not only reinforces the foundational tenets of Section 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), which governs suits for compensation for wrongs to person or movables, but also highlights the protections afforded to plaintiffs facing anonymous harassment. By emphasizing that jurisdiction must be assessed based on circumstances at the time of filing, the court safeguards bona fide litigants from procedural manipulations that could arise from defendants' deliberate anonymity. The decision draws on precedents like Tejpal Singh Sisodia and Sameer Wankhede, refining the "Merger Rule" in the context of online defamation, and underscores the need to prevent forum shopping while ensuring access to justice. 

Factual Background: The plaintiffs in this case consist of Operation Mercy India Foundation and O.M. Books Foundation, both non-profit companies registered under Section 25 of the Companies Act, 1956, with their registered offices in Telangana, along with their director, Joseph Gregory Dsouza, who resides in Secunderabad. These entities form part of the O.M. Group, engaged in charitable activities such as operating over 100 schools across India that provide subsidized education to underprivileged children, employing around 2,000 staff, and running 17 bookstores selling religious and educational books at affordable rates. 

Defendant No. 1 is Meta Platforms Inc., the owner of the social media platform Facebook, based in the United States. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are individuals, Jeypauljesudasan and Panigrahi, both residents of Telangana, who operated a Facebook page titled "OM Justice Seekers" using the email address omjusticeseekers@gmail.com. 

The dispute originated from posts on this page alleging serious misconduct by the plaintiffs, including benami transactions, misappropriation of donations, exorbitant fees in their institutions, and poor working conditions. The plaintiffs claimed these allegations were false, malicious, and intended to damage their reputation, goodwill, and charitable operations. They pointed to ongoing disputes with former employees in Telangana courts, including criminal complaints for financial irregularities and FEMA violations, which Defendant No. 3 allegedly exploited to publish misleading content referencing these litigations. 

The posts were widely viewed, shared, and commented upon in India and abroad, leading to a drastic reduction in donations—from Rs. 40.65 crore in 2018-2019 to Rs. 25.38 crore subsequently—and affecting operations, including a bookstore in Delhi. Specifically, the plaintiffs highlighted their purchase of land in Delhi in 2015 for a vocational training center, for which donations dried up due to the negative publicity, halting construction. 

They also received communications from foreign donors in June 2020 expressing concerns over the posts, and emails from Delhi residents in July 2020 voicing worries about the defamatory content. Asserting irreparable harm to their global reputation, the plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction to remove the page and its content.

Procedural Background: The suit was instituted in 2020 before the Delhi High Court as CS(OS) 262/2020, initially against Meta and an unknown "John Doe" defendant representing the anonymous operators of the Facebook page, given that their identities were masked. The plaintiffs invoked Section 19 of the CPC, claiming the wrong (defamatory publication and its consequences) occurred in Delhi, including reduced donations for the proposed vocational center, declining bookstore sales, and local access to the content. 

On September 15, 2020, the court granted an ex parte interim injunction against the email address associated with the page, restraining further defamatory posts. Subsequently, through discovery, the identities of Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were revealed, and they were impleaded. 

In 2022, these defendants filed I.A. 13894/2022 under Order VII Rules 10 and 11 of the CPC, seeking rejection or return of the plaint on grounds of lack of territorial jurisdiction, arguing all parties were based in Hyderabad (Telangana) and no genuine cause of action arose in Delhi. They contended the plaintiffs' documents—letters from donors and emails from Delhi residents—were fabricated to manufacture jurisdiction.  During hearings, on March 19, 2024, the defendants confined their prayer to return under Rule 10, withdrawing the rejection plea under Rule 11. Arguments were advanced by counsel for both sides.

Reasoning and Decision of Court: The court's reasoning commenced with an affirmation that the application was confined to return under Order VII Rule 10 CPC, and proceeded on that basis. It reiterated that defamation suits fall under Section 19 CPC, which allows filing where the wrong is done or where the defendant resides/carries on business, interpreting "wrong done" to include both the act and its consequences, as established in precedents like Frank Finn Management Consultants. 

The plaintiffs' pleadings detailed wrongs in Delhi: reduced donations halting the vocational center's construction, declining bookstore sales, and publication/access of content locally, supported by annexed letters and emails. The defendants challenged these documents as fabricated, but the court held that such veracity determinations require evidence and cannot be made at the demurrer stage under Rule 10, where plaint averments are deemed true, citing Exphar v. Eupharma Laboratories and RSPL Ltd. v. Mukesh Sharma. Thus, the plaintiffs established "wrong done" in Delhi for jurisdictional purposes. 

The court then examined the "Merger Rule" from Tejpal Singh Sisodia, which mandates suing at the defendant's residence if it coincides with a place of wrong, to avoid options under Section 19. Acknowledging the plaintiffs' averments of global harm, including in Telangana (where plaintiffs are based and operate schools/bookstores), the court found a merger there. However, it distinguished the case due to the initial John Doe proceedings: jurisdiction is assessed at filing, when defendants' identities and residences were unknown, making Delhi a valid forum based on local wrongs. 

Returning the plaint post-revelation would penalize plaintiffs for defendants' anonymity, undermine bona fide suits against unknown infringers, and lead to de novo trials vacating prior orders, as per Exl Careers. The court rejected applying the Merger Rule retrospectively, noting defendants could raise jurisdiction during trial via evidence. It also affirmed Tejpal's consistency with prior cases like Frank Finn and Indian Potash, and its statutory basis in Section 19, not forum non conveniens (rendering Horlicks inapplicable). Ultimately, the court dismissed I.A. 13894/2022, allowing the suit to proceed in Delhi, with observations not prejudicing merits.

Point of Law Settled in the Case: The judgment clarifies that when a suit is validly instituted against "John Doe" entities due to unknown identities, the assessment of jurisdiction—particularly the application of the "Merger Rule" (requiring suit at the defendant's residence if it merges with a place of wrong)—must be based solely on circumstances at the time of filing, not subsequent revelations. This prevents defendants from exploiting their initial anonymity to force plaint return, ensuring plaintiffs are not disadvantaged and interim protections remain intact. The ruling reinforces the demurrer principle for Order VII Rule 10 applications, prohibiting threshold inquiries into document veracity that necessitate evidence, and distinguishes cyber defamation's global reach from traditional wrongs, while affirming that jurisdiction can still be contested at trial. 

Case Title: Operation Mercy India Foundation & Ors. Vs. Meta Platforms Inc. & Ors.

Date of Order: 07.02.2026

Case Number: CS(OS) 262/2020

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:10222 

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

-Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

### Suggested Titles

1. "Navigating Territorial Jurisdiction in Online Defamation: Insights from the Delhi High Court's Ruling in Operation Mercy India Foundation v. Meta Platforms"

2. "John Doe Defendants and the Merger Rule: A Deep Dive into Section 19 CPC in Digital Defamation Cases"

3. "Preserving Jurisdiction in Anonymous Cyber Wrongs: Analysis of the High Court Judgment on Plaint Return under CPC"

### Suggested Tags

Defamation Law, Territorial Jurisdiction, Section 19 CPC, John Doe Suits, Online Anonymity, Merger Rule, Delhi High Court, Cyber Defamation, Order VII Rule 10 CPC, Forum Shopping, Procedural Fairness,

### Headnote of Article

Delhi High Court holds that in defamation suits filed against anonymous "John Doe" defendants under Section 19 CPC, territorial jurisdiction is determined based on circumstances at the time of institution, and subsequent revelation of defendants' identities does not warrant return of plaint under Order VII Rule 10, even if it reveals a merger of wrong and residence; demurrer principle applies, barring evidentiary inquiries into plaint documents at threshold stage.

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The plaintiffs, Operation Mercy India Foundation and O.M. Books Foundation (non-profit entities based in Telangana engaged in running subsidized schools and bookstores across India) along with their director Joseph Gregory Dsouza, filed a defamation suit against Meta Platforms Inc. (owner of Facebook) and two individuals (Defendants 2 and 3, residents of Telangana) who anonymously operated a Facebook page titled "OM Justice Seekers." The page posted allegedly false and malicious content accusing the plaintiffs of benami transactions, misappropriation of donations, exorbitant fees, and poor conditions in their institutions, exploiting pending disputes with former employees in Telangana. 

The plaintiffs claimed irreparable harm including drastic reduction in donations (from over Rs. 40 crore to Rs. 25 crore), inability to construct a vocational training center on Delhi-purchased land, declining sales at their Delhi bookstore, and receipt of concerned emails from Delhi residents, asserting the wrong occurred in Delhi under Section 19 CPC. The suit was initially filed in 2020 against Meta and a John Doe defendant due to anonymity, with an ex parte interim injunction granted on September 15, 2020. 

Defendants 2 and 3 were later impleaded after identity revelation. In 2022, they sought return/rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rules 10 and 11 CPC, confining to return under Rule 10, arguing no cause of action in Delhi, all parties Hyderabad-based, and documents fabricated for forum shopping. 

The court, applying demurrer principle, accepted plaint averments as true at threshold, finding "wrong done" (including consequences like donation loss and local access) established in Delhi. While noting the "Merger Rule" from Tejpal (where wrong coincides with defendant's residence in Telangana, limiting suit there), it held jurisdiction fixed at filing when defendants were unknown John Doe, making Delhi valid; returning plaint post-revelation would unfairly penalize plaintiffs for defendants' anonymity, vacate interim orders, and require de novo trial. Jurisdiction could be re-agitated at trial via evidence. Thus, I.A. 13894/2022 was dismissed, allowing the suit to proceed in Delhi.

Law settled: 

In defamation suits filed against anonymous/John Doe defendants, territorial jurisdiction under Section 19 CPC is determined based on circumstances and plaint averments at the time of institution/filing; subsequent revelation of defendants' identities and residence (even triggering Merger Rule where wrong coincides with residence) does not warrant return of plaint under Order VII Rule 10 CPC, as it would disadvantage bona fide plaintiffs and undermine interim protections (paras 27-33).

Applications under Order VII Rule 10 CPC are decided on demurrer, deeming plaint averments true; veracity of annexed documents (e.g., donor letters, emails proving local harm/publication) cannot be adjudicated at threshold without evidence, precluding return on fabrication grounds (paras 17-19).

 The "Merger Rule" in Tejpal (para 46) — requiring suit only at place of merger (wrong done + defendant residence) when wrong occurs in multiple jurisdictions including defendant's residence — is good law, statutorily rooted in Section 19 CPC text, not forum non conveniens, and consistent with prior Delhi HC precedents (paras 20-24, relying on Sameer Dnyandev Wankhede v. Red Chillies Entertainments Pvt. Ltd.).

Case Title: Operation Mercy India Foundation  Vs. Meta Platforms Inc.:07.02.2026: CS(OS) 262/2020: 2026:DHC:10222  : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw  #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor

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