Asociacion De Productores De Pisco A.G. Vs. Union of India

Geographical Indications, Identity, and International Obligations

Introduction:This case revolves around the conflict between Chile and Peru over the exclusive right to use the term "PISCO" as a Geographical Indication (GI) for alcoholic beverages. The petitioner, Asociacion de Productores de Pisco A.G., an association of Chilean producers, contested the registration of the GI "PISCO" granted in favor of Peru by the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB). The petitioner asserted that Chile also has a historical and cultural claim to the term and sought to establish "Chilean PISCO" as a homonymous GI.

Factual Background:The petitioner represents Chilean producers of PISCO, primarily based in the river valleys of Elqui, Limari, Huasco, Copiapo, and Choapa. Chile claims a history of producing PISCO since at least 1733. The term "PISCO" is associated with both Chile and Peru, each claiming unique regional and production methods.

The Peruvian Embassy in India filed GI Application No. 43 in 2005 for "PISCO" under Class 33. The petitioner opposed it in 2007. The Assistant Registrar initially registered the GI as "Peruvian PISCO" to avoid confusion, but IPAB overturned this decision in 2018, allowing registration of the term "PISCO" without any geographical qualifier exclusively in favor of Peru.

Procedural Background: Following the IPAB's order dated 29 November 2018, which overturned the Registrar's 2009 order, the petitioner filed W.P.(C)-IPD 17/2021 before the Delhi High Court. The petitioner also submitted a fresh GI application for “Chilean PISCO” (Application No. 689) on 3 June 2020. The High Court passed interim orders restraining final adjudication on this application pending disposal of the writ petition.

Core Dispute: The central issue was whether the term "PISCO" can be granted exclusively as a GI to Peru or whether Chile has coexisting rights over it?" The case posed a broader question about whether Chilean and Peruvian PISCOs are homonymous GIs and whether the IPAB's decision ignored the provisions of the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999 (GI Act) and international principles under the TRIPS Agreement.

Discussion on Judgments: The petitioner cited:Article 22.3 and 22.4 of TRIPS Agreement: To argue that homonymous GIs from different countries can coexist if consumer confusion is avoided.Tea Board, India v. ITC Ltd., 2011 SCC OnLine Cal 1083: To highlight the difference between GI and trademark principles.Scotch Whisky Association v. J.K. Enterprises, 2023 SCC OnLine MP 5352: To emphasize India's obligation to recognize foreign GIs under the TRIPS framework.These judgments and legal standards were invoked to argue that the IPAB wrongly applied trademark law principles such as prior use and misappropriation, rather than examining whether both countries’ products qualify for GI protection under the GI Act.

The respondents, on the other hand, argued that:PISCO is exclusively associated with Peru.The Chilean claim lacks historical and geographical legitimacy.International treaties recognizing Chilean PISCO are commercial/political and do not amount to legal recognition.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: The Court emphasized that the principles of GI law are fundamentally different from trademark law. GI registration is based on whether the goods originate from a particular region and have characteristics attributable to that region. The Court noted that both Chile and Peru have a long-standing, recognized history of producing PISCO. The evidence included:Chile’s use of the term since at least 1733.International Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) and GI recognitions acknowledging Chilean PISCO.Awards and recognitions for Chilean PISCO globally.Legislative actions in Chile recognizing PISCO as a national appellation.The Court held that the IPAB had erred by labeling Chile’s use as “dishonest” and by failing to recognize the existence of Chilean PISCO despite overwhelming evidence.It found that the GI Act permits the registration of homonymous GIs under Section 10, provided adequate safeguards against consumer confusion exist. The Court compared the case with the Indian example of “Banglar Rasogolla” and “Odisha Rasagola,” both of which coexist as GIs.The Judge also dismissed the respondent's argument that the application filed by the Embassy of Peru was invalid, holding that such procedural arguments could not override the substantive merits of GI claims when viewed through the lens of international obligations and Section 10 of the GI Act.

Final Decision:The Delhi High Court allowed the writ petition. It set aside the IPAB’s order dated 29 November 2018 and restored the Registrar's 2009 decision that had granted registration of the GI as "Peruvian PISCO" rather than the generic "PISCO".The Court directed that the Registrar reconsider the petitioner’s application for “Chilean PISCO” in accordance with Section 10 of the GI Act, which deals with homonymous GIs. It also clarified that the GI "PISCO" could not be granted exclusively to one country where another country’s use is long-standing, legally recognized, and distinctly characterized.

Law Settled in This Case:This judgment affirms that:GI protection is a community right and not an individual monopoly.The GI Act allows homonymous GIs under Section 10, subject to consumer protection mechanisms.Trademark law concepts like prior use, misappropriation, or goodwill have no role in GI adjudication.Courts must focus on the identification of goods with a specific geographical origin and characteristics, and not political or historical controversies.International recognition through treaties and FTAs can support a claim of homonymous GI, though not conclusively determine statutory rights in India.

Case Title: Asociacion De Productores De Pisco A.G. Vs. Union of India & Ors.:Date of Order: 07 July 2025:Case Number: W.P.(C)-IPD 17/2021:Neutral Citation:2025:DHC:5339:Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi:Judge: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Mini Pushkarna

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Rajasthan Aushdhalaya Private Limited Vs. Himalaya Global Holdings Ltd.

Dominant Component and Initial Interest Confusion in Indian Trademark Law

Introduction: The present case, Rajasthan Aushdhalaya Private Limited Vs. Himalaya Global Holdings Ltd. & Anr., decided by the Delhi High Court on 4th July 2025, presents a significant development in Indian trademark jurisprudence concerning the protection of well-known marks in the pharmaceutical sector. The Court adjudicated upon the alleged infringement of the well-known registered trademark ‘Liv.52’ by the appellant’s mark ‘Liv-333’. Through this decision, the Court not only reinforced the doctrine of initial interest confusion in trademark law but also stressed the sanctity of judicial orders, particularly in the context of medicinal products and consumer safety.

Factual Background:Himalaya Global Holdings Ltd., the respondent, is a globally recognized pharmaceutical entity, renowned for its ayurvedic liver formulation sold under the trademark ‘Liv.52’. The mark ‘Liv.52’ has been in continuous use since 1955 and was formally registered in India under Class 5 in 1957. The company holds several registrations for formative marks such as ‘Liv.52 PROTEC’, ‘Liv.52 HB’, and ‘Liv.52 HAEMOTEC’, all of which enjoy substantial goodwill and consumer recognition.

In January 2024, the respondents became aware that Rajasthan Aushdhalaya Pvt. Ltd., the appellant, was manufacturing and selling liver-related medicinal products under the mark ‘Liv-333’. Despite the issuance of a cease-and-desist notice dated 17 January 2024, the appellant continued the use of the impugned mark. A commercial invoice from 2015 indicated that the use of ‘Liv-333’ had persisted for some time. Subsequently, the respondents instituted CS (Comm) 433/2024 seeking a permanent injunction and other reliefs.

Procedural Background:The learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court issued summons in the suit on 24 May 2024 and granted an ex parte ad interim injunction restraining the appellant from using the mark ‘Liv-333’. Despite this, the appellant continued its infringing activities, leading to the initiation of contempt proceedings. The appellant failed to file a written statement within the statutorily prescribed time. The Court, by its order dated 23 January 2025, closed the right of the appellant to file the written statement. The appellant did not challenge this order, thereby allowing it to attain finality.

Invoking Order VIII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the learned Single Judge decreed the suit in favor of the respondents, awarded ₹20 lakhs in damages (₹10 lakhs each from the two defendants), and ₹10,91,567 as litigation costs. The appellant then filed the present appeal under Section 13A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 read with Section 96 CPC, challenging the decree.

Core Dispute:The core dispute was whether the appellant’s use of the trademark ‘Liv-333’ constituted infringement of the respondents’ registered mark ‘Liv.52’, and if so, whether the learned Single Judge rightly exercised his discretion under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC to decree the suit without trial? An ancillary issue was whether damages and costs awarded by the Single Judge were legally justified.

Discussion on Judgments:In support of their respective positions, both parties relied on precedent. The appellant’s counsel cited S.B.L. Ltd. v. The Himalaya Drug Co., (1997) 67 DLT 803 (DB), to argue that the term “Liv” was generic and commonly used in trademarks for liver-related pharmaceutical preparations. However, the Division Bench clarified that the said judgment arose from an appeal against an interim order under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC and held only a prima facie view.

The Court instead relied heavily on the binding precedent in Himalaya Drug Co. v. S.B.L. Ltd., 2012 SCC OnLine Del 5701, where it was held that “Liv” constituted the essential and dominant feature of the mark ‘Liv.52’, and that even the use of “LIV” in isolation by another party could result in confusion and amount to infringement.

The Court also referred to Cadila Healthcare Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 73, which emphasized that in the context of medicinal products, courts must exercise heightened caution to prevent consumer confusion, as such confusion could adversely impact public health.

Additionally, the Court applied the “initial interest confusion” doctrine, drawing from Under Armour Inc. v. Anish Agrawal, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 3784, and Under Armour Inc. v. Aditya Birla Fashion & Retail Ltd., (2023) 300 DLT 573, to conclude that even initial confusion at the point of consumer attention, regardless of clarity at purchase, is sufficient to prove infringement under Section 29(2)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:The Court noted that the appellant had no legitimate justification for adopting the mark ‘Liv-333’, particularly when the respondents' mark ‘Liv.52’ had a long-standing and well-documented reputation. The judgment highlighted that the addition of numerical suffixes like “333” did not mitigate the likelihood of confusion arising from the identical prefix “Liv”, which was the dominant and distinctive element of the respondents’ trademark.

The Division Bench categorically rejected the appellant’s claim that ‘Liv’ was generic or publici juris. Relying on the reasoning from South India Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. General Mills Marketing Inc., (2015) 61 PTC 231 (Del) (DB), the Court held that even under the anti-dissection rule enshrined in Section 17 of the Trade Marks Act, the dominant feature of a composite mark can be protected. The court emphasized that the mark must be considered as a whole, but consumer perception is guided by the most memorable part — in this case, “Liv”.

The Court also dismissed the appellant’s contention that differences in packaging, price, and form (capsule vs tablet) ruled out any confusion. Citing Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories, AIR 1965 SC 980, the Bench reiterated that infringement analysis is concerned with mark-to-mark comparison, not the manner of trade dress or marketing.

With respect to procedural compliance, the Court found no fault in the invocation of Order VIII Rule 10 CPC by the Single Judge, particularly in light of the appellant’s failure to file a written statement despite several opportunities.

Final Decision:The Delhi High Court upheld the learned Single Judge’s decision granting a permanent injunction restraining the appellant from using the infringing mark ‘Liv-333’. However, considering that the decree also involved a money component, the Division Bench issued notice only on the aspect of costs and damages. The operation of that part of the order was stayed, subject to the appellant depositing the awarded amount with the Registry within eight weeks. The injunction against the use of ‘Liv-333’ remained intact and was not interfered with.

Law Settled in This Case:This case reinforces the principle that in pharmaceutical trademarks, even a partial imitation involving a dominant component of a registered mark can amount to infringement under Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act. The Court affirmed the relevance of the initial interest confusion doctrine in Indian trademark law. It also clarified that the procedural discretion granted under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC can be validly exercised in the absence of a written statement, particularly when the party in default has flagrantly disregarded judicial orders. Additionally, it reiterated that even coined or semi-descriptive terms, once associated with a brand and registered, enjoy trademark protection against deceptively similar imitations, especially when consumer health and safety are at stake.

Case Title: Rajasthan Aushdhalaya Private Limited Vs. Himalaya Global Holdings Ltd. & Anr.:  Date of Order: 04 July 2025: Case Number: RFA(OS) (COMM) 18/2025: Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:5307:Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi:Judges: Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ajay Digpaul

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Albemarle Corporation Vs Controller of Patents

Case Title: Albemarle Corporation Vs Controller of Patents:Date of Order: July 07, 2025:Case Number: C.A. (COMM.IPD-PAT) 19/2022:Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:5338:Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi:Judge: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Mini Pushkarna

In this patent appeal under Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970, Albemarle Corporation, a U.S.-based chemical company, challenged the order dated May 12, 2021, by the Controller of Patents, which refused its Indian Patent Application No. 2897/DELNP/2012 titled “Solvent Systems Having No Flash Point and Methods Using Such Solvent Systems for Dissolving Rigid Polyurethane Foams.” The refusal was primarily based on lack of novelty, lack of inventive step, and non-fulfilment of enablement requirements under Sections 15 and 10(4) of the Patents Act, referencing prior art documents D1–D4.

Procedurally, Albemarle had filed the application in April 2012 and responded to the First Examination Report issued in October 2017. Several hearings and written submissions followed through 2020 and early 2021. After the refusal, the company appealed before the Delhi High Court and, during the pendency of the appeal, filed I.A. 35045/2024, seeking to introduce an auxiliary claim set limited solely to the process aspect of cleaning polyurethane foam.

The core dispute focused on whether such amended claims could be introduced at the appellate stage. The respondent-Controller opposed the application, arguing that amendments at this stage were impermissible. However, the Court observed that neither the Patents Act nor its procedural framework expressly bars such amendments during appeals. Referring to precedents including Societe Des Produits Nestle SA v. Controller of Patents, the Court held that amendments narrowing claim scope are permissible provided they fall within the original disclosure and satisfy Section 59 conditions.

After examining both the original and amended claims, the Court concluded that Albemarle had merely narrowed its claims without introducing new subject matter, thereby remaining consistent with the original specification. The Court also emphasized that amendments aimed at overcoming objections and facilitating grant of patent are permissible, especially when they do not expand the scope beyond what was initially disclosed.

Accordingly, the Court allowed I.A. 35045/2024, directed the auxiliary claim set to be taken on record, and revived the original patent application for fresh examination limited to the amended claims. The matter was remanded to the Patent Office with instructions to conclude the re-examination within six months. The appeal was disposed of in these terms, with no interference in the merits of the original refusal order since the challenge to it had not been pressed.

Bhalla Sports Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Ashutosh Bhalla M/s Vinex Enterprises Pvt. Ltd

Case Title: Bhalla Sports Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Ashutosh Bhalla Vinex Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.:Date of Order: July 3, 2025:Case Number: C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 327/2022:Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:5309

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi:Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Banerjee

In a rectification petition filed by Bhalla Sports Pvt. Ltd., the Delhi High Court ordered the cancellation of a registered trademark held by Ashutosh Bhalla of Vinex Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. The dispute revolved around the mark “SOFT TOUCH” used for sports goods under Class 28 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The petitioner, a manufacturer and seller of sports equipment since 1988, claimed prior use of the “SOFT TOUCH” trademark since August 7, 2001, and registered it on April 17, 2009. Meanwhile, the respondent secured a conflicting trademark registration on March 17, 2009, alleging usage since January 9, 2003.

The matter originally filed before the Intellectual Property Appellate Board was transferred to the High Court following the IPAB’s dissolution. The respondents failed to enter appearance or respond despite due service, leading to an ex parte hearing. The petitioner presented ample evidence, including invoices, brochures, and price lists dating back to 2001, establishing continuous and bona fide use of the mark well before the respondent’s claimed date.

The core dispute involved the respondent’s impugned trademark, which the Court found to be visually, phonetically, and deceptively similar to the petitioner’s mark. The Court observed that as a “prior user,” the petitioner had superior rights over a subsequent registrant under settled principles of trademark law, as affirmed in Neon Laboratories Ltd. v. Medical Technologies Ltd. (2016) 2 SCC 672. Additionally, the respondent’s conduct was deemed to reflect bad faith and an unfair commercial practice.

Discussing the legal position, the Court reiterated that the rights of a prior user override those of a registered proprietor if the latter's claim is subsequent and deceptive. Since the impugned registration contravened Sections 9, 11, 47, and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, the Court found it liable to be removed.

Accordingly, the Court allowed the petition and directed the Registrar of Trade Marks to cancel trademark application no. 1796255 registered in favour of the respondent under Class 28. The judgment reinforces the doctrine of “first in the market” and upholds the sanctity of prior user rights in Indian trademark law.

Pawan Kumar Mittal Vs Vinay Gupta

Case Title: Pawan Kumar Mittal Proprietor, Salasar Dev Basmati House V. Vijay Gupta & Ors.:Date of Order: 07 July 2025:Case Number: FAO (COMM) 170/2025:Neutral Citation:2025:DHC:5313:DB: Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi:Judges: Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ajay Digpaul

This appeal arose from an order dated 7 May 2025 passed by the learned District Judge (Commercial Court), Patiala House, in a suit for trademark infringement filed by the appellant, Pawan Kumar Mittal, proprietor of Salasar Dev Basmati House, against Vijay Gupta and others. The suit sought an ex parte ad interim injunction, appointment of a Local Commissioner, and waiver of advance service, citing urgent relief against alleged passing off and trademark misuse.

The procedural background shows that the trial court, without providing any reasons, declined to grant any ex parte relief or act on the plaintiff’s application for appointment of a Local Commissioner. It merely issued summons for settlement of issues and directed the plaintiff to complete service on the defendants via multiple permissible modes, including electronic channels.

The core dispute centered on the plaintiff’s allegations of trademark infringement and passing off, claiming urgent and immediate protection was warranted under established jurisprudence, especially as laid down in Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah (2002) 3 SCC 65. The appellant had emphasized that in such cases, courts are required to act promptly on the first day by issuing notice and appointing a commissioner without advance intimation to prevent destruction of infringing materials.

The Division Bench of the High Court found the trial court’s approach legally unsustainable, observing that even if a court is disinclined to grant interim relief, it must provide reasons for its decision. The impugned order lacked any reasoning and failed to address the appellant’s applications meaningfully.

Accordingly, the High Court quashed the trial court’s order and remitted the applications for ex parte injunction, waiver of advance service, and appointment of Local Commissioner back to the Commercial Court for de novo consideration. The Commercial Court was directed to hear the matter afresh on 10 July 2025 at 11:00 a.m. The appellate court expressly refrained from commenting on the merits of the applications, leaving the decision entirely to the trial court’s fresh assessment. The appeal was disposed of in these terms.

Verizon Trademark Services Vs Verizon Venture Advisors

Case Title: Verizon Trademark Services LLC & Ors. Vs. Verizon Venture Advisors LLP & Anr.:Date of Order: 07 July 2025Case Number: CS(COMM) 659/2025:Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi:Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

The plaintiffs, members of the globally renowned Verizon Group, approached the Delhi High Court seeking permanent injunction and ancillary reliefs against the defendants for trademark infringement and passing off. The plaintiffs, who adopted and registered the trademark ‘VERIZON’ in the year 2000, alleged that Defendant No.1, Verizone Venture Advisors LLP, had registered a deceptively similar name incorporating their well-known mark without any legitimate business activity since its incorporation in 2014.

The procedural background involved multiple interim applications. The Court granted exemptions under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (regarding pre-institution mediation) and Section 80 of the CPC (notice to government body), and allowed submission of documents in electronic form and in non-originals, citing urgency and compliance with Commercial Courts framework. Summons were issued to the defendants, and directions were given regarding pleadings, evidence, and inspection timelines. The matter was scheduled for further proceedings on 9th September 2025 before the Joint Registrar and on 12th November 2025 before the Court.

The core dispute centered on the unauthorized use of the mark "Verizone" by the defendant LLP, which was deceptively similar to the plaintiffs’ trademark "VERIZON", declared well-known by the Court in an earlier 2023 judgment. Despite being inactive for years, the defendant continued to retain the corporate name, leading to confusion and dilution of the plaintiffs' brand. Investigations revealed the entity’s non-compliance with statutory requirements and acknowledgment by one of the partners that they were not actively using the name for business. Repeated cease and desist communications from the plaintiffs received no response.

Upon discussion, the Court observed a prima facie case of trademark infringement and passing off. Given the strength of the plaintiffs’ rights, continued use of the mark by the defendant was held likely to cause irreparable harm and confusion. The balance of convenience favored the plaintiffs.

Accordingly, the Court restrained the defendant and its associates from using the marks “Verizone”, “Verizone Ventures”, or any other name similar to “VERIZON”. The defendants were also directed to take down all infringing materials from both online and offline platforms. Compliance with Order XXXIX Rule 3 CPC was ordered within three days.

Srinivas Jegannathan Vs. The Controller of Patents

Case Title: Srinivas Jegannathan Vs. The Controller of Patents

Date of Order: 1st July 2025

Case Number: (T)CMA(PT)/38/2023 (OA/61/2014/PT/CH)

Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras

Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy

This case arose from the rejection of Patent Application No.122/CHE/2006 filed by the appellant, Srinivas Jegannathan, who sought protection for an invention titled “Formulation of Ceftazidime, Tazobactum and Linezolid for Enhancement of Antibacterial Activity.” After issuance of the First Examination Report (FER), the appellant amended his claims and participated in a hearing before the Controller of Patents. The Controller ultimately rejected the application on 26 March 2014, leading to this appeal under Section 117-A of the Patents Act, 1970.

The dispute centered on whether the claimed combination of a cephalosporin (Ceftazidime), a beta-lactamase inhibitor (Tazobactum), and an oxazolidinone (Linezolid) was obvious in light of prior arts D1 to D3, and whether amendments made by the appellant were beyond the permissible scope of Section 59 of the Patents Act. The appellant argued that none of the cited prior arts disclosed or suggested the claimed three-drug combination and contended that the amendments arose from the hearing process, offering to revert to the original claims if necessary. The respondent maintained that the amended claims were rightly assessed and rejected based on detailed analysis of prior arts, asserting that the combination lacked inventive merit.

The Court examined the impugned order and noted it lacked sufficient reasoning to demonstrate why a person skilled in the art would find the claimed combination obvious based on the cited prior arts, none of which individually disclosed all three ingredients together. It further observed that since the appellant proposed to revert to the original claims, objections under Section 59 and reliance on additional prior arts D4 to D6 lost relevance.

Ultimately, the High Court set aside the rejection order dated 26 March 2014 and remanded the matter for fresh consideration confined to the original claims. It directed reconsideration by a different officer, required a speaking order to be passed within three months, and clarified that the respondent could cite additional prior art after giving notice. The Court made no finding on the merits of the patent application and disposed of the appeal without costs.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Global IEEE Institute for Engineers Vs. IEEE Mumbai Section Welfare Association

Interplay of Trademark Licensing and Public Trust Law

Introduction: This case arises from a contractual and trademark dispute between a corporate entity, Global IEEE Institute for Engineers, and a public charitable trust-cum-society, IEEE Mumbai Section Welfare Association. The dispute centered on the termination of two service agreements and the subsequent unauthorized use of the IEEE trademark by the defendant trust. The case presented a complex interplay between intellectual property rights, private contractual obligations, and statutory requirements under the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950 (MPT Act). The High Court of Karnataka’s decision in this case provides significant legal clarity on the applicability of MPT Act provisions to civil suits arising from private commercial arrangements.

Factual Background:The appellant, Global IEEE Institute for Engineers, is a private limited company registered in India and a second-tier subsidiary of IEEE Asia Pacific Limited and IEEE Worldwide Limited, both of which are not-for-profit entities wholly owned by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc. (IEEE Inc.), a U.S.-based professional body incorporated in 1896. IEEE is known globally for its work in advancing technology and science through publications, standards, and conferences.

The respondent, IEEE Mumbai Section Welfare Association, was initially a geographical unit of IEEE Inc., formed in 1976 to promote IEEE activities in western and central India. In 2012, it was registered as a society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, and later in 2013 as a public trust under the MPT Act.

In 2012 and 2013, the parties entered into two Service Assistance Agreements, under which the plaintiff (appellant) was to provide administrative and governance support services to the defendant (respondent), including coordination with IEEE Inc. and facilitating compliance with IEEE’s brand standards. The defendant was authorized to use the IEEE name, mark, and branding under these agreements. Following allegations of non-cooperation and failure to comply with financial reporting obligations by the defendant, the plaintiff issued a termination notice on 2 May 2024. Despite termination, the defendant allegedly continued to use the IEEE trademark and branding, prompting the plaintiff to initiate a commercial suit seeking declaratory relief, permanent injunction, and damages.

Procedural Background:Upon institution of the commercial suit by the plaintiff before the LXXXIV Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru (Commercial Court), the defendant filed an application under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, contending that the suit lacked cause of action and was barred by law, specifically under Sections 50 and 51 of the MPT Act.

The Commercial Court partly allowed the application. It held that the suit was barred under Order VII Rule 11(d) for want of prior consent from the Charity Commissioner as required under the MPT Act, but declined to reject it under Rule 11(a), observing that the existence of cause of action was a mixed question of law and fact. Aggrieved by the rejection under Rule 11(d), the plaintiff preferred Commercial Appeal No. 181/2025. The defendant cross-appealed under Commercial Appeal CR No. 3/2025 against the rejection of the plea under Rule 11(a).

Core Dispute: The primary legal issues in this case were whether the plaintiff, being a licensee of the IEEE trademark and not the registered proprietor, had the locus to seek injunctive and declaratory relief, and whether the suit was barred for want of prior consent of the Charity Commissioner under Sections 50 and 51 of the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950. The core of the dispute revolved around whether a private contractual claim involving a public trust mandates compliance with procedural bars under the MPT Act, and whether the continued use of a trademark post-termination gives rise to a private actionable claim by a licensee.

Discussion on Judgments: Multiple judgments were cited by both parties to support their claims regarding the bar under the MPT Act and locus standi in trademark law.

The appellant relied heavily on Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Assistant Charity Commissioner, (2004) 3 SCC 137, to emphasize that a suit which does not relate to trust administration, but instead concerns private disputes like tenancy or contractual breach, falls outside the scope of Sections 50 and 51 of the MPT Act.

The appellant also cited Vinayaka Dev Idagunji v. Shivaram, (2005) 6 SCC 641, where the Supreme Court held that a hereditary archak’s suit regarding private rights was outside the ambit of Section 50, which applies only to suits in representative capacity involving public interest.

Further reliance was placed on Trust of Shri Laxmi Narayan Dev Temple v. Ajendraprasadji Narendraprasadji Pande, 2013 SCC OnLine Guj 8716, and Shri Nijanand Jogani Abhiyan Trust v. Parshottam Narsinhbhai Patel, 2024 SCC OnLine Guj 3043, to demonstrate that not all suits involving public trusts require Charity Commissioner’s consent, especially those grounded in private contractual claims.

To address the trademark issue, the appellant referred to Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co., (1995) 5 SCC 545, which held that agreements relating to brand usage form the basis of private enforcement and are distinct from statutory rights.

The respondent, in contrast, invoked Church of North India v. Lavajibhai Ratanjibhai, (2005) 10 SCC 760, to argue that if a trust’s name, identity, or structure is challenged, the matter falls squarely within the trust administration, attracting the bar under Section 50 of the MPT Act.

To contest the plaintiff’s locus standi under trademark law, the respondent cited P.K. Sen v. Exxon Mobile Corporation, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 6393, and Ultratech Cement Ltd. v. Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd., 2015 (2) ABR 496, arguing that only the registered proprietor or registered user under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, can sue for infringement.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:The Court emphasized that only the plaint and accompanying documents are to be considered for Order VII Rule 11 applications, and not the defense or counter-documents. It held that the contractual dispute in question was between a corporate body and a trust regarding obligations under a terminated agreement, and did not relate to the internal affairs or public administration of the trust.

In interpreting Section 2(10) of the MPT Act, the Court noted that the plaintiff was not a trustee, member, or beneficiary of the defendant trust, and thus not a “person having interest.” Moreover, the agreements predated the trust registration and governed only certain aspects of administrative support and branding. The scope of services depended on the defendant’s request, further underscoring the limited nature of the contractual relationship.

The Court rejected the argument that the plaintiff’s action was effectively one for infringement. It observed that the reliefs sought arose from breach of contractual terms concerning trademark use, and thus were private in nature, even if touching upon IP issues. It emphasized that a licensee enforcing a contractual restraint clause is not seeking to enforce statutory rights under the Trade Marks Act, and hence is not barred under Section 53 of that Act.

The trial court’s approach was criticized for drawing an artificial distinction between “individual” and “institutional” private rights and for failing to analyze whether the reliefs sought related to trust administration.

Final Decision:The High Court set aside the Commercial Court’s rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC and restored the suit for trial on merits. The Court held that the plaintiff was not required to obtain prior consent under Sections 50 and 51 of the MPT Act, as the suit pertained to private contractual rights. The defendant’s cross-appeal regarding absence of cause of action was also dismissed.

Law Settled in This Case:  This case reaffirms that private contractual disputes involving a public trust do not attract the procedural bar under Sections 50 and 51 of the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act unless the suit relates to trust administration or involves a “person having interest” as defined under Section 2(10). Further, it clarifies that a licensee under a trademark agreement may sue for relief against unauthorized use post-termination, provided the action is rooted in contract and not based solely on statutory infringement rights. The decision underscores that Order VII Rule 11 applications must be confined to the plaint and its annexures without reference to the defendant's stand.

Case Title: Global IEEE Institute for Engineers v. IEEE Mumbai Section Welfare Association:Date of Order: 2nd July, 2025:Case Number: COMAP No. 181/2025:Name of Court: High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru:Name of Judges: Hon’ble Mr. V. Kameswar Rao (Acting Chief Justice) and Hon’ble Mr. Justice C.M. Joshi

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Conqueror Innovations Pvt. Ltd. Vs Xiaomi Technology India Pvt. Ltd

Testing the Boundaries of Claim Mapping and Patent Enforcement in India

Introduction:This case concerns a patent infringement dispute involving a technological startup and a global electronics giant. Conqueror Innovations Pvt. Ltd., a recognized MSME and startup in India, filed a suit against Xiaomi Technology India Pvt. Ltd. for allegedly infringing Patent No. 244963 titled “A Communication Device Finder System.” The core of the dispute centered on Xiaomi’s pre-installed “Find Device” feature in its smartphones and whether it infringed the claimed patented invention. The case provides judicial clarity on standards of patent infringement, particularly concerning essential features, claim mapping, and working of patents in India.

Factual Background: The plaintiff No. 2, an Indian citizen and inventor, began developing the invention in 2004, addressing shortcomings in anti-theft technologies that failed once a thief removed the SIM or disabled the device. The patent application was filed on 17 October 2006 and granted on 28 December 2010 without opposition. The invention aimed to facilitate the tracking and recovery of lost or stolen mobile devices through embedded non-erasable security elements.

The suit patent, later assigned to plaintiff No. 1, a company recognized under the Indian startup and MSME frameworks, claims features including a flash memory capable of auto-reinstalling data, and a silent auto-answer mode. The plaintiffs claim that between 2015 and 2019, subscriptions to the patented system were sold both online and offline. In January 2023, the plaintiffs discovered that Xiaomi’s devices were using a “Find Device” feature that they believed infringed their patent.

Procedural Background: The plaintiffs filed the suit in May 2023 seeking permanent injunction, damages, and interim relief. Initial summons were issued on 29 May 2023. Mediation was attempted but failed. Subsequently, an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC was filed seeking interim injunction and directions for royalty deposit. Xiaomi filed its written statement and a counterclaim for revocation of the suit patent on 14 August 2023, asserting lack of novelty and inventive step.

Legal Issue:The primary legal issues were whether Xiaomi’s “Find Device” feature infringed the suit patent, whether all essential features of the independent claim were present in Xiaomi’s devices, and whether the plaintiffs were entitled to interim injunction despite alleged non-working of the patent and delay in approaching the court.

Discussion on Judgments: In Biswanath Prasad Radhey Shyam v. Hindustan Metal Industries, (1979) 2 SCC 511, the Supreme Court underscored that in patent infringement suits, the complete specification must be closely analyzed to construe the claims.

The plaintiffs cited Sotefin SA v. Indraprastha Cancer Society & Research Center, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 516, to argue for a holistic interpretation of claims based on the invention’s pith and marrow, not a literal claim-by-claim comparison. However, the court held this case distinguishable since essential features of the claim were absent in Xiaomi’s devices.

In Crystal Crop Protection Ltd. v. Safex Chemicals India Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine Del 2981, the Delhi High Court reaffirmed that essential features of a patent are those that address problems identified in prior art. This principle was relied upon to assess whether Xiaomi’s devices had the essential features of the suit patent.

The court also referred to Guala Closures v. AGI Greenpac Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine Del 3510, to identify that the portion of a claim introduced with “characterized in that” typically includes the novelty.

Regarding dependent claims, the court applied Teledyne McCormick Selph v. United States, MANU/USFD/0071/1977, which held that if independent claims are not infringed, dependent claims cannot be infringed either. This was reinforced by Wahpeton Canvas Co. v. Frontier, Inc., MANU/USFD/0128/1989, and other international judgments.

To assess the effect of non-working of patents on interim relief, the court relied on Franz Xaver Huemer v. New Yash Engineers, 1996 SCC OnLine Del 243, where a Division Bench held that patentees who have not worked their invention in India are not entitled to equitable interim relief.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: The Court methodically analyzed the patent claims and Xiaomi’s “Find Device” feature. The Court began by reviewing the suit patent’s specification and identified that its essential features included a flash memory with data reinstallation, a ROM with non-erasable message center number, and a silent auto-answer mode triggered remotely.

Xiaomi’s “Find Device” could remotely lock, erase data, or play sound, but lacked the ability to silently auto-answer incoming calls or reinstall deleted data. It was also vulnerable to factory resets, whereas the patented invention specifically guarded against such resets through reinstallation from non-erasable memory.

The court found the plaintiffs’ claim mapping deficient as it failed to demonstrate that Xiaomi’s feature included these essential components. Since independent claim 1 was not infringed, dependent claims could not be relied upon either.

The judge also noted that Forms 27 filed by the plaintiffs with the Patent Office indicated minimal use of the patent in India, and only for a limited time in FY 2019–20. The court held that non-working of the patent and absence of evidence of substantial commercial exploitation weighed against the grant of an injunction.

Additionally, the court found the plaintiffs’ explanation of discovering the infringement in 2023 unconvincing, noting that Xiaomi had been selling its phones with the “Find Device” feature since 2014. This unexplained delay further weakened their claim for equitable relief.

Final Decision:  The court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of patent infringement. Since the essential features of the patent were not found in Xiaomi’s devices, interim injunction could not be granted. The balance of convenience and irreparable injury also favored the defendant. The court dismissed the applications for interim injunction but directed Xiaomi to maintain accounts of the impugned devices and file half-yearly statements. Observations made were expressly limited to the interim stage and not to prejudice final adjudication.

Law Settled in This Case: This case reinforces the principle that in patent infringement analysis, the essential features of the independent claim must be shown to be present in the impugned product. A patentee cannot succeed merely by showing partial overlap with dependent claims. Non-working of the patent in India and inordinate delay in asserting patent rights can justify denial of equitable interim relief. Claim mapping must be comprehensive and must demonstrate the presence of all inventive elements, especially those that overcome limitations in prior art. The court also reiterated that a “characterized in that” clause in a claim often defines the novelty and must be carefully considered.

Case Title: Conqueror Innovations Pvt. Ltd. Vs Xiaomi Technology India Pvt. Ltd.:Date of Order: 04 July 2025:Case Number: CS (COMM) 361/2023:Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:5233:name of Court: High Court of Delhi:Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Dabur India Ltd. Vs. Patanjali Ayurved Ltd

The Legal Boundaries of Puffery in Indian Pharmaceutical Advertising

Introduction: The case of Dabur India Ltd. v. Patanjali Ayurved Ltd. represents a significant judicial examination of disparagement in commercial advertising, particularly in the context of Ayurvedic products regulated under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. Dabur, a leading manufacturer of Chyawanprash, sought legal recourse against Patanjali’s advertisements for its product, 'Patanjali Special Chyawanprash,' alleging that they denigrated Dabur’s 'Dabur Chyawanprash' and the entire Chyawanprash product category. The case delves into the delicate balance between permissible comparative advertising and impermissible disparagement, especially when the product in question is a regulated Ayurvedic drug. The Delhi High Court’s ruling provides critical insights into the legal thresholds for advertising claims, the application of statutory regulations, and the protection of commercial speech under the Indian Constitution.

Factual Background: Dabur India Ltd., holding a 61.60% market share in the Chyawanprash category as of October 2024, filed a suit against Patanjali Ayurved Ltd., alleging that Patanjali’s advertisements for 'Patanjali Special Chyawanprash' disparaged Dabur’s product and the broader Chyawanprash market. The disputed advertisements included a Hindi television commercial (TVC) and Hindi and English print advertisements. 

The TVC, narrated by yoga guru Mr. Ramdev, opened with the statement, “Jinko Ayurved aur Vedo ka gyaan nahi, Charak, Sushrut, Dhanvantri aur Chyawanrishi ki parampara ke anuroop, original Chyawanprash kaise bana payenge?” (translated: “Those who lack knowledge of Ayurveda and the Vedas, how can they prepare original Chyawanprash in accordance with the traditions of Charak, Sushrut, Dhanvantri, and Chyawanrishi?”). It further claimed that Patanjali’s product, made with 51 precious herbs, was superior to “ordinary” Chyawanprash, which the plaintiff argued indirectly targeted Dabur’s product, widely advertised as containing “40+ herbs.” The print advertisements echoed this narrative, questioning, “Why settle for ordinary Chyawanprash made with 40 herbs?” and positioning Patanjali’s product as superior. 

Dabur contended that these claims falsely suggested that other manufacturers, including itself, lacked the requisite Ayurvedic knowledge, thereby misleading consumers and violating regulatory standards. Patanjali defended the advertisements as permissible puffery, arguing that they highlighted their product’s positive attributes without directly referencing Dabur’s product.

Procedural Background:Dabur initiated the suit seeking a permanent and mandatory injunction against Patanjali’s advertisements, along with damages for disparagement. Concurrently, Dabur filed two interim applications: I.A. 49744/2024 to stay the Hindi TVC and print advertisements, and I.A. 419/2025 to stay the English print advertisements. The Delhi High Court, heard arguments from both parties. 

Dabur’s counsel argued that the advertisements constituted specific and generic disparagement by portraying Dabur’s product as inferior and misleading consumers about the authenticity of other Chyawanprash products. Patanjali’s counsel countered that the advertisements were within the bounds of commercial free speech under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, asserting that no specific reference was made to Dabur’s product and that the claims were mere puffery. The court reviewed the advertisements’ content, relevant statutory provisions, and judicial precedents before issuing its interim ruling.

Legal Issue: The central legal issue was whether Patanjali’s advertisements for 'Patanjali Special Chyawanprash' constituted disparagement of Dabur’s 'Dabur Chyawanprash' and the Chyawanprash product category, and whether such advertisements were permissible under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, and the principles governing comparative advertising. The court had to determine if the advertisements’ claims, particularly the use of “ordinary” and the implication that other manufacturers lacked Ayurvedic knowledge, were misleading, untruthful, or disparaging, and whether they warranted interim injunctive relief?

Discussion on Judgments:The court extensively relied on judicial precedents to frame its analysis of disparagement and comparative advertising. Dabur cited Colgate Palmolive Company and Anr. v. Hindustan Unilever Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine Del 4986, where the Delhi High Court held that advertisements must convey a truthful message, particularly when the reputation of a competitor’s product is at stake. In that case, the court found that a claim of “130% better” cavity protection was a serious factual assertion requiring substantiation, not mere puffery, emphasizing that untruthful comparisons are impermissible. Dabur also referenced Gillette India Limited v. Reckitt Benckiser (India) Private Limited, 2018 SCC OnLine Mad 1126, where the Madras High Court underscored that pecuniary compensation is inadequate for disparagement, and interim injunctions are justified when a strong prima facie case is established. This precedent supported Dabur’s plea for injunctive relief over monetary remedies.

Patanjali relied on Havells India Ltd. & Anr. v. Amritanshu Khaitan, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 8112, arguing that advertisements not specifically targeting a competitor’s product are permissible puffery. The court distinguished this case, noting that it involved non-medical products, unlike the regulated Ayurvedic drugs in the present dispute. Patanjali also cited Marico Limited v. Adani Wilmar Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 386, where the Bombay High Court found no disparagement in advertisements for cooking oil that did not claim the plaintiff’s product was inferior. The Delhi High Court again distinguished this case, emphasizing the stricter scrutiny required for medicinal products under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act.

The court further considered Reckitt Benckiser (India) Pvt. Limited and Another v. Wipro Enterprises (P) Limited, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 3376, which clarified that while advertisers may embellish their product’s qualities, they cannot claim competitors’ products are inferior. This case reinforced the distinction between permissible comparative advertising and impermissible disparagement. Additionally, Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Reckitt Benckiser (I) Ltd., 2006 SCC OnLine Del 351, was cited to establish that disparaging an entire product class, even without naming a specific competitor, is actionable. The court also referenced Reckitt & Colman of India Ltd. v. Kiwi T.T.K. Ltd., 1996 SCC OnLine Del 178, to affirm that ridiculing or condemning a competitor’s product constitutes disparagement, even if done indirectly. These judgments collectively guided the court’s assessment of the advertisements’ truthfulness and impact on consumers.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: The court's analysis centered on the legal and regulatory framework governing Ayurvedic drugs and the principles of comparative advertising. The court noted that Chyawanprash, as an Ayurvedic drug under Section 3(a) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, must be manufactured in accordance with formulae in authoritative texts listed in the First Schedule. The Act does not mandate that manufacturers possess specific Ayurvedic knowledge beyond adherence to these formulae, rendering Patanjali’s claim that other manufacturers lack such knowledge false and misleading. 

The court found that the TVC’s narrative, delivered by Mr. Ramdev, a recognized figure in Ayurveda, suggested that competitors’ products were not authentic, constituting generic disparagement of the Chyawanprash category. The print advertisements’ reference to “ordinary Chyawanprash made with 40 herbs” was deemed a direct attack on Dabur’s product, given its well-known marketing as containing “40+ herbs.”

The court distinguished puffery from disparagement, noting that puffery involves exaggerated claims not taken seriously by consumers, whereas disparagement involves false or misleading statements that harm a competitor’s reputation. The use of “ordinary” was held to convey a negative impression of inferiority, unsupported by evidence, especially since all licensed Chyawanprash complies with statutory standards. The court emphasized that advertisements for regulated drugs face stricter scrutiny due to their potential to influence public health and economic behavior. Citing the Ministry of AYUSH’s 2021 notification on misleading advertisements, the court underscored the need to protect consumers from deceptive claims about Ayurvedic drugs.

The court applied the “reasonable man” test from Reckitt Benckiser v. Wipro Enterprises, assessing the advertisements from the perspective of an average consumer who is neither naive nor unduly suspicious. It concluded that the advertisements’ overall effect was to mislead consumers into believing that only Patanjali’s product was authentic, thereby disparaging competitors. The court also considered the balance of convenience and irreparable harm, finding that pecuniary compensation would not suffice for reputational damage caused by disparagement, as supported by Gillette v. Reckitt Benckiser. The interim relief sought was deemed necessary to prevent ongoing harm pending the trial.

Final Decision:The Delhi High Court granted interim relief, restraining Patanjali from publishing the impugned TVC and print advertisements. The court directed Patanjali to remove specific disparaging phrases from the TVC, including “Jinko Ayurved aur Vedo ka gyaan nahi…” and “Toh ordinary Chyawanprash kyu,” and similar references in the print advertisements cautioning against “ordinary Chyawanprash with 40 herbs.” Patanjali was permitted to continue the advertisements after these modifications. The court clarified that issues such as the use of “special,” claims about 51 herbs, and the presence of mercury in Patanjali’s product were reserved for trial. 

Law Settled in This Case: This case reinforces the legal principle that comparative advertising, while permissible under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, must not cross into disparagement by making false or misleading claims about competitors’ products. For regulated products like Ayurvedic drugs under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, advertisements face stricter scrutiny to prevent deception that could affect public health. The court clarified that disparagement includes both specific targeting of a competitor’s product and generic denigration of an entire product class. The use of terms like “ordinary” to imply inferiority, especially when unsupported by evidence, constitutes actionable disparagement. The judgment also underscores that interim injunctions are appropriate in disparagement cases where pecuniary compensation is inadequate, emphasizing the importance of protecting reputational interests pending trial.

Case Title: Dabur India Ltd. Vs. Patanjali Ayurved Ltd.:Date of Order: July 3, 2025:Case Number: CS(COMM) 1195/2024:Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:5232:Name of Court: Delhi High Court:Name of Judge: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Mini Pushkarna

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Emami Limited vs. Dabur India Limited-DB

Emami Limited vs. Dabur India Limited:: 02 July 2025:Case : A.P.O.T. No. 53 of 2025 (IA No. GA-COM 1 of 2025) arising out of IP-COM No. 18 of 2024: 2025:CHC-OS:102-DB:Court: High Court at Calcutta, Hon’ble Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Hon’ble Justice Uday Kumar

Very Brief Facts:

Emami Limited, manufacturer of prickly heat powders “Dermi Cool” and “Navratna”, challenged an advertisement by Dabur India for its product “Cool King”, alleging that the ad disparaged Emami’s products by depicting a bottle allegedly resembling theirs as “Sadharan” (ordinary).

Procedural Background:

Initially, an ad-interim injunction was granted by the Single Judge on 11 July 2024, restraining Dabur from telecasting the advertisement that allegedly showed Emami’s bottle. On 17 January 2025, this was modified to restrain the entire advertisement instead of specific parts. Emami appealed this modification, arguing continued disparagement.

Dispute:

Whether the advertisement by Dabur, showing a generic bottle labeled “Sadharan” and subsequently replaced by Dabur’s product, amounted to disparagement of Emami’s products.

Discussion:

The Court found no direct or indirect reference to Emami’s products in the current version of the advertisement. The bottle shown was visually different in shape and color from Emami’s. The word “Sadharan” was held not to imply inferiority or to disparage specifically. The recall value argument was rejected, as the allegedly offending earlier version had not been aired for over six months. The Court emphasized that permissible comparative advertising allows highlighting one's product as superior without degrading another’s.

Decision:

The Division Bench dismissed the appeal, upheld the modified injunction order restraining the ad as a whole, and vacated interim orders. It held that no disparagement of Emami’s product had occurred and that Dabur’s commercial speech was protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

Sterling Irrigations Vs Bharat Industries

Sterling Irrigations Vs Bharat Industries:Date of Order: July 1, 2025:Case Number: No. 8521 of 2024:Neutral Citation: 2025:AHC:101729:Name of Court: Allahabad High Court:Name of Judge: Hon'ble Neeraj Tiwari

Facts: The petitioners-defendants published a notice on June 18, 2015, in Amar Ujala for the transfer of a registered trademark, prompting the respondent-plaintiff, Bharat Industries, to file Original Suit No. 4 of 2015 under Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking a permanent injunction. The petitioners filed a counterclaim on December 15, 2015, also seeking a prohibitory injunction. Both parties later filed rectification applications under Section 25(a) of the Act before the Registrar of Trademarks in Kolkata and Delhi.

Procedural Background: The suit and counterclaim were filed for injunctions, not trademark infringement. Issues were framed by the Commercial Court No. 2, Agra, on August 22, 2016. The respondent filed an application (No. 196-C) on March 1, 2022, to stay the counterclaim proceedings, which the petitioners opposed. The Commercial Court stayed the counterclaim proceedings on May 6, 2024, leading to the petitioners’ challenge under Article 227.

Dispute: The key issue was whether the Commercial Court’s order to stay the counterclaim proceedings under Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, was valid, given that the suit and counterclaim were for injunctions, not trademark infringement, and whether rectification applications filed before the Registrar, instead of the High Court, justified the stay.

Discussion: The court examined whether the suit qualified as one for trademark infringement to trigger Section 124, which mandates a stay when trademark registration validity is questioned. The petitioners argued the suit and counterclaim sought injunctions, not infringement remedies, and that Section 124 was inapplicable as no validity challenge was raised. They also contended that rectification applications should have been filed before the High Court under Section 125, not the Registrar, and that the Commercial Court failed to frame issues as required under Section 124(1)(b)(ii). The respondent argued that references to “infringement” in the pleadings meant the suit should be treated as one for infringement, making Section 124 applicable, and that prior issue framing in 2016 sufficed.

The court found that the prayers in the plaint and counterclaim sought only injunctions, not validity challenges, and that Order VII Rule 7 of the CPC requires the nature of the suit to be determined by the relief clause, not general pleadings. It held that Section 124 was inapplicable, and even if applicable, the Commercial Court erred by not framing issues before staying proceedings. Additionally, rectification applications filed before the Registrar were deemed non-maintainable under Section 125, as they should have been filed before the High Court, and no referral to the High Court had occurred.

Decision: The Allahabad High Court set aside the Commercial Court’s order dated May 6, 2024, finding it unsustainable. The court ruled that the suit and counterclaim were for injunctions, not trademark infringement, rendering Section 124 inapplicable. It further held that the rectification applications before the Registrar were invalid under Section 125, and the Commercial Court’s failure to frame issues before staying proceedings violated Section 124(1)(b)(ii). The impugned order was quashed, allowing the suit to proceed.

Vivienda Luxury Homes LLP Vs. Gregory & Nicholas

Vivienda Luxury Homes LLP Vs. Gregory & Nicholas:Date of Order: 27 June 2025:Writ Petition No. 237 of 2025(F):2025:BHC-GOA:1048:High Court of Bombay at Goa:Hon’ble Ms. Justice Nivedita P. Mehta:Para 26

Facts: The petitioner, Vivienda Luxury Home, sought to purchase a property from respondents Gregory and Nicholas for Rs. 8.05 crore to develop their business. Negotiations began in November 2003, leading to an oral agreement. The petitioner’s lawyer conducted due diligence, and the petitioner paid Rs. 73.16 lakh for stamp duty, registration, and other fees. Respondent no. 2, the designated partner for the sale, informed the petitioner on May 11, 2024, that respondent no. 3’s presence was needed for registration, which did not occur. The respondents failed to attend rescheduled registration dates on June 4 and 10, 2024, prompting the petitioner to allege a breach of the oral agreement.

Procedural Background: The petitioner filed Commercial Suit No. 20/2024/B, seeking a declaration of a valid oral agreement and specific performance or, alternatively, Rs. 8 crore in damages with 18% interest. The Trial Court granted interim relief on June 13, 2024, maintaining the status quo regarding third-party rights in the property. The respondents filed an application under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for return of the plaint, arguing the dispute was not commercial under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The petitioner responded on October 4, 2024, asserting the dispute’s commercial nature and filed an amendment application on October 5, 2024, to clarify jurisdictional facts. The Trial Court prioritized the return of plaint application over the amendment application, leading to the impugned order.

Dispute: The core issue was whether the Trial Court, a Commercial Court, had subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the suit, given the respondents’ claim that the dispute over the property sale was not commercial as the property was not “actually used” for trade or commerce, per section 2(1)(c)(vii) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The petitioner argued the suit was commercial and sought to amend the plaint to clarify jurisdiction, while the respondents contended that a court lacking jurisdiction could not entertain an amendment application.

Discussion: The court examined whether the Trial Court’s decision to prioritize the return of plaint application over the amendment application was valid. The petitioner argued that procedural rules should not defeat justice and that amendments to clarify jurisdiction should be allowed. The respondents, citing precedents like Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd., argued that only disputes involving property “actually used” for commerce qualify as commercial, and a court lacking jurisdiction cannot entertain amendments. The court distinguished between territorial and subject-matter jurisdiction, noting that subject-matter jurisdiction is fundamental to a suit’s validity. It held that a court without subject-matter jurisdiction cannot adjudicate or allow amendments to confer jurisdiction, as such orders would be null. The court found no infirmity in the Trial Court’s reasoning, emphasizing that the chronological order of applications and the foundational nature of jurisdictional issues justified prioritizing the return of plaint application.

Decision: The court upheld the Trial Court’s impugned order, finding no error in deciding the return of plaint application before the amendment application. It clarified that subject-matter jurisdiction is critical, and amendments cannot cure its absence if the plaint lacks essential jurisdictional facts.

Coromandel Indag Products India Ltd. Vs. Sumitomo Chemical Company Ltd.

Case Title: Coromandel Indag Products India Ltd. Vs. Sumitomo Chemical Company Ltd. & Anr.:Date of Order: 03 July 2025:Case Number: CS(COMM) 441/2023:2025:DHC:5192:High Court of Delhi at New Delhi:Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Very brief facts: The plaintiff, Coromandel Indag Products India Ltd., part of the Coromandel Group, filed a suit seeking permanent injunction against the defendants to restrain them from using the trademark PADAN and its packaging, claiming proprietary rights and alleging infringement and passing off. The plaintiff contended it had used the mark PADAN continuously since 1988 and created original artistic packaging in 2006.

Procedural background: The defendants filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC seeking rejection of the plaint on grounds that the plaintiff lacked locus standi and had no cause of action. After hearing arguments and considering written submissions, the court reserved judgment.

Dispute: Whether the plaintiff had the locus standi and a valid cause of action to sue the defendants for infringement and passing off concerning the mark PADAN and related packaging, despite not being the licensee, proprietor, or actual user.

Discussion: The court analysed documents and pleadings to establish that the plaintiff was neither the registered proprietor nor licensee of the mark PADAN. The actual license and use belonged to Coromandel Agrico Pvt. Ltd. (CAPL), a separate legal entity undergoing insolvency. The court further observed that any goodwill or sales figures submitted related to CAPL, not the plaintiff, and that the packaging copyright was also assigned to CAPL, with no assignment to the plaintiff.

Decision: The court held that the plaint disclosed no cause of action, and the plaintiff lacked locus standi. The suit was rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, and all pending applications were disposed of.

Communication Components Antenna Inc. Vs. ACE Technologies Corp:DB

Suits by Foreign Plaintiffs and the Mandate of Security for Costs: Law, Limits, and Interpretations

Introduction: This case revolves around the interpretation of the proviso to Order XXV Rule 1(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), particularly in the context of whether courts are mandatorily required to direct a foreign-residing plaintiff without sufficient immovable property in India to furnish security for costs. The issue arose in a commercial suit concerning intellectual property rights, and the matter was referred to a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court to reconcile conflicting decisions by Coordinate Benches on the interpretation of this provision.

Factual Background:The plaintiff, Communication Components Antenna Inc., a company based outside India, filed a suit for protection of intellectual property rights against ACE Technologies Corp. and others. During the course of proceedings, the defendants filed an application under Order XXV Rule 1(1) CPC, seeking a direction for the plaintiff to furnish a security of ₹8 crores towards the costs likely to be incurred by the defendants.

The plaintiff did not possess any immovable property in India apart from the property in suit. This triggered the proviso to Order XXV Rule 1(1) CPC. However, due to diverging judicial interpretations on whether this proviso was mandatory or discretionary, the learned Single Judge referred the matter to a larger bench for authoritative adjudication.

Procedural Background:The Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, upon being confronted with conflicting judgments on the nature of the proviso to Order XXV Rule 1(1) CPC, referred the matter to the Division Bench on 10.01.2023. 

Legal Issue: The primary issues for determination before the Division Bench were: Whether it is mandatory for the court to direct a plaintiff residing outside India and not possessing sufficient immovable property in India to furnish security for costs under the proviso to Order XXV Rule 1(1) CPC.?Whether the proviso to Order XXV Rule 1(1) CPC applies only to suits relating to immovable property?

Discussion on Judgments: The parties referred to a number of judgments in support of their positions:

S.A. Brothers & Co. v. John Bartholomow & Sons Ltd., 2000 SCC OnLine Del 854 Cited by the defendants, this case supported the view that the proviso to Order XXV Rule 1(1) is mandatory where the plaintiff resides outside India and lacks sufficient immovable property.

Kiran Shoes Manufacturers v. Welcome Shoes Pvt. Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine Del 6590 Also relied on by the defendants, the Court held that the proviso is couched in mandatory terms and applicable in cases involving a foreign-residing plaintiff with insufficient property in India.

Alberto-Culver USA Inc. v. Nexus Health & Home Care (P) Ltd., 2009 SCC OnLine Del 2818 Cited by the plaintiff to argue that the proviso is discretionary. The Court in that case had held that the provision does not mandate security for costs in every case involving a foreign plaintiff.

Millennium & Copthorne International Ltd. v. Aryans Plaza Services Pvt. Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine Del 8260 Relied upon to argue that the proviso only applies to suits involving immovable property, as it mentions “immovable property within India other than the property in suit.”

Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., (2005) 2 SCC 145 Used by the plaintiff to argue that High Court rules framed under Section 129 CPC would override CPC provisions if inconsistent. However, the Division Bench found no such inconsistency.

Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla, (2016) 3 SCC 619 Cited to argue that the word “shall” may be construed as “may” in context and does not always indicate a mandatory provision.

Vijay Dhanuka v. Najima Mantaj, (2014) 14 SCC 638 and Deewan Singh v. Rajendra Pd. Ardevi, (2007) 10 SCC 528 Cited by the Bench to affirm the mandatory nature of the term “shall” when used in a statutory provision unless clearly stated otherwise.

Revlon Inc. v. Kemco Chemicals, 1987 SCC OnLine Cal 39, Hearst Corporation v. Dalal Street Communications Ltd., 1995 SCC OnLine Cal 231, and Gotham Entertainment Group LLC v. Diamond Comics (P) Ltd., 2009 SCC OnLine Del 4383 These supported the mandatory reading of the proviso to protect Indian defendants from vexatious litigation by foreign plaintiffs.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:The Division Bench conducted a comprehensive analysis of Order XXV Rule 1(1) and its proviso. It held that the main clause uses the word “may”, granting discretion to the Court. However, the proviso is expressed in mandatory terms using the word “shall”, which indicates that the Court must order security for costs in cases where a foreign-residing plaintiff does not possess sufficient immovable property in India, apart from the property in suit.

The Bench rejected the argument that the proviso became obsolete due to the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018. It held that there was no repugnancy between those Rules and the CPC. It also rejected the argument that the proviso violated obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, noting that the domestic provision continues to apply unless repealed or amended by the legislature.

Importantly, the Court interpreted the phrase “immovable property within India other than the property in suit” to mean that the proviso applies only to suits involving immovable property. Accordingly, the Court clarified that in suits not involving immovable property—such as intellectual property disputes—the proviso does not apply.  Finally, the Court concluded that even when the proviso applies, the quantum of security remains at the Court’s discretion based on the facts and circumstances of the case.

Final Decision: The Division Bench answered the reference as follows: The proviso to Order XXV Rule 1(1) CPC is mandatory where the plaintiff resides outside India and does not possess sufficient immovable property in India other than the property in suit. The proviso applies only to suits involving immovable property.  The court retains discretion regarding the quantum of security for costs. The matter was directed to be listed before the Roster Bench for further proceedings in accordance with this authoritative pronouncement.

Law Settled in This Case:This case authoritatively settles the following propositions:The proviso to Order XXV Rule 1(1) CPC is mandatory in cases involving a foreign-residing plaintiff who lacks sufficient immovable property in India, but only in suits relating to immovable property. The Court retains discretion regarding the amount of security for costs, even when the proviso applies. There is no repugnancy between the CPC and the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018 on this subject. International treaty obligations, such as those under TRIPS, do not override clear statutory provisions unless implemented through legislative amendment.

Case Title: Communication Components Antenna Inc. Vs. ACE Technologies Corp. and Ors.: Date of Order: 01 July 2025:Case Number: CS (COMM) 1222/2018:Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:5139-DB:Name of Court: High Court of Delhi:Name of Judges: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Navin Chawla and Hon’ble Ms. Justice Shalinder Kaur

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhir Kaur

VIP Industries Ltd Vs. Carlton Shoes Ltd

Territorial Goodwill and the Limits of Passing Off

Introduction: The case of VIP Industries Ltd v. Carlton Shoes Ltd & Anr., decided by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, is a significant pronouncement in the domain of trademark law, particularly in determining the parameters of passing off where multiple registered proprietors of an identical mark co-exist. It presents a complex legal conflict involving cross-suits by two entities, each asserting goodwill and prior user rights over the trademark “CARLTON” in respect of goods under Class 18. The judgment settles the essential question of whether goodwill in a mark can be claimed generically or must be tied specifically to the goods/services concerned.

Factual Background: Carlton Shoes Ltd (CSL), a footwear brand, claimed adoption and use of the trademark “CARLTON” in India since 1994 through its registration for various goods under Class 18, including bags and luggage, although its use had been predominantly for footwear and accessories. VIP Industries Ltd (VIP), a reputed manufacturer of luggage products, acquired rights over the CARLTON mark from a UK-based entity (Carlton International PLC) via an Assignment Agreement in 2004. Since then, VIP asserted that it had been using the CARLTON mark exclusively for travel luggage, suitcases, and related goods, accruing considerable goodwill in the Indian market.

The dispute arose when CSL initiated plans to extend its use of the CARLTON mark to travel luggage. VIP objected, claiming exclusive goodwill in the luggage segment under that mark, which led to cross-suits asserting rights and seeking injunctive reliefs against each other’s use of “CARLTON”.

Procedural Background

CSL filed CS (Comm) 730/2019 seeking a permanent injunction against VIP from using “CARLTON” for goods in Class 18, relying on its prior registration and user in India. VIP responded with CS (Comm) 52/2020, requesting a similar injunction to prevent CSL from using “CARLTON” for bags and luggage. Both parties filed applications under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC seeking interim reliefs pending trial.

By the impugned order dated 17 July 2023, the learned Single Judge dismissed VIP’s interim injunction application and granted interim relief to CSL, restraining VIP from using the CARLTON mark for luggage and allied goods. VIP preferred two appeals: FAO(OS)(COMM) 151/2023 and FAO(OS)(COMM) 152/2023 before the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court.

Legal Issue: The central issue before the Court was whether goodwill for the purpose of a passing off action attaches to the mark generally or to the mark as used for particular goods? Additionally, the Court examined whether VIP, as a later user in India, could restrain CSL from using the mark for luggage, when CSL was the first user in India, albeit in a different product category.

Discussion on Judgments:  The parties referred to various precedents to buttress their respective positions on trans-border reputation, territoriality of trademark rights, and the essentials of a passing off claim.

VIP cited Milmet Oftho Industries v. Allergan Inc., (2004) 12 SCC 624, and Neon Laboratories Ltd v. Medical Technologies Ltd, (2016) 2 SCC 672, to emphasize the principle of “first in the market” and to support its claim of prior user through its predecessor internationally, and domestically since 2004.

They also relied on Beiersdorf AG v. Ajay Sukhwani, 2008 SCC OnLine Del 1226, and Mittal Electronics v. Sujata Home Appliances Pvt. Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine Del 2658, to argue that goodwill must be shown in the mark specifically for the goods concerned—in this case, travel luggage.

CSL placed heavy reliance on Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Prius Auto Industries Ltd., (2018) 2 SCC 1, where the Supreme Court clarified that trans-border reputation alone is insufficient to claim passing off; the mark must have goodwill in India at the relevant time. CSL also cited S. Syed Mohideen v. P. Sulochana Bai, (2016) 2 SCC 683, to assert the precedence of territorial use in passing off actions.

The Court further referred to the principles enunciated by Lord Diplock in Erven Warnink BV v. J. Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd., [1979] 2 All ER 927, to define the foundational ingredients of a passing off claim: misrepresentation, damage to goodwill, and likely deception among average consumers.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:  The Division Bench agreed with the learned Single Judge’s core findings. It held that since both parties were registered proprietors of the CARLTON mark under Class 18, neither could claim exclusive rights against the other under Section 28(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The controversy, therefore, was to be resolved purely on the principles of passing off.

On the issue of trans-border reputation, the Court reiterated the territoriality principle as settled in Toyota Jidosha. It concluded that VIP had not placed sufficient material to show spillover of reputation in India before 2004, i.e., before it began domestic use of the CARLTON mark. It found VIP’s evidence of foreign advertising and brand recognition to be weak in demonstrating substantial awareness among Indian consumers.

More crucially, the Court ruled that CSL had substantiated its claim of goodwill in India from as early as 2003, supported by sales invoices, marketing in Indian publications, and a presence on Indian e-commerce platforms. The Bench dismissed VIP’s argument that goodwill must be tied to the specific product (luggage) rather than the mark itself, noting that CSL had, at the very least, established goodwill in the CARLTON mark for accessories falling under Class 18, including handbags, thereby making the likelihood of confusion real and imminent.

The Court emphasized that passing off is a tort rooted in protecting goodwill from misrepresentation, and since CSL had shown prior commercial use of the mark in India, VIP’s use, even if innocent, would amount to misrepresentation likely to cause confusion.

It further rejected VIP’s allegation of CSL’s dishonest intent, noting that CSL had earlier rights and that VIP’s claim of launching “Carlton” luggage in 2004 was not convincingly supported by contemporaneous evidence. On the contrary, VIP’s own annual reports suggested a “soft launch” of Carlton luggage only in 2010-11.

The Bench also declined to grant relief to VIP on the grounds of delay or balance of convenience. It held that the iniquitous consequence VIP complained of—being injuncted despite longer usage for luggage—was a result of its own inability to establish goodwill prior to CSL’s user.

Final Decision:  The Division Bench upheld the decision of the learned Single Judge. It dismissed VIP’s appeals (FAO(OS)(COMM) 151/2023 and FAO(OS)(COMM) 152/2023), thereby maintaining the interim injunction against VIP. Consequently, VIP is restrained from marketing or selling bags and related goods under the CARLTON mark in Class 18, while CSL is permitted to continue its use.

Law Settled in This Case: This judgment reinforces the principle that in a passing off action between proprietors of the same registered mark under Section 28(3), priority of goodwill and actual territorial use in India determines the right to injunctive relief. The Court clarified that goodwill in a mark need not always attach to a specific sub-category of goods if confusion is likely to arise. The territoriality principle remains dominant, and trans-border reputation must be backed by evidence of actual recognition in India. The ruling also underscores that misrepresentation, even if innocent, may support a claim of passing off if confusion is probable and goodwill exists.

Case Title: VIP Industries Ltd Vs. Carlton Shoes Ltd & Anr.:  Date of Order: 1 July 2025:  Case Number: FAO (OS) (COMM) 151/2023 & FAO (OS) (COMM) 152/2023:Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:5042:DB:Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi:Coram: Justice C. Hari Shankar and Justice Ajay Digpaul

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Modi-Mundipharma Pvt. Limited Vs. Speciality Meditech Pvt. Ltd

Modi-Mundipharma Pvt. Limited Vs. Speciality Meditech Pvt. Ltd. : July 01, 2025:RFA(OS)(COMM) 8/2023:2025:DHC:5039-DB:High Court of Delhi:Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ajay Digpaul

The appellant, Modi-Mundipharma Pvt. Ltd., filed a suit alleging that the respondents’ use of the mark FEMICONTIN infringed its registered trademarks FECONTIN-F and CONTIN, part of its “CONTIN family of marks” used for pharmaceutical products, claiming long-standing use and market reputation. The respondents contended that CONTIN was descriptive, that the rival marks were visually and phonetically different, and that FEMICONTIN originated from “FE” denoting iron and “CONTIN” suggesting continuous release, a common industry term.

Procedurally, the appellant had previously filed suits in other forums, withdrawn them due to jurisdictional objections, and finally pursued the present suit, which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge on March 23, 2023. The appellant then filed this appeal under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

The dispute centered on whether the appellant could claim exclusive rights over the mark CONTIN either as a standalone mark or within a family of marks, and whether the respondents’ use of FEMICONTIN infringed FECONTIN-F or amounted to passing off.

In discussion, the Court noted the appellant had not used CONTIN as a standalone mark and that “FE” was a descriptive prefix relating to iron, while “CONTIN” referred to the drug’s continuous release feature. The Court emphasized that descriptive or generic parts of a mark cannot be monopolized, drawing from judgments like Midas Hygiene Industries (P) Ltd. v. Sudhir Bhatia, (2004) 3 SCC 90 and Power Control Appliances v. Sumeet Machines (P) Ltd., (1994) 2 SCC 448. It found that FEMICONTIN and FECONTIN-F differed in composition, packaging, price, and appearance, reducing the likelihood of confusion.

The Court ultimately upheld the learned Single Judge’s dismissal of the suit, holding that the appellant failed to establish infringement or passing off. It noted the mark CONTIN was never used per se by the appellant and the descriptive elements could not be exclusively claimed.