Friday, August 22, 2025

Champion Project Enterprises Vs Union of India

Copyright Claims in Governmental Technology Projects

Introduction: This case study concerns the writ petition filed by Champion Project Enterprises and others versus the Union of India and others before the High Court of Delhi. The petitioners allege unauthorized use and infringement of their original work, the “Student Permanent Account Number” (SPAN) Project, by the Government of India through the APAAR ID Project—Automated Permanent Academic Account Registry. The matter fundamentally revolves around allegations of copyright infringement vis-à-vis a digital academic identity project launched nationally and the subsequent claim for compensation running into hundreds of crores by the petitioners.

Factual Background: The genesis of the SPAN Project dates back to the tragic earthquake of 1993 in Latur, Maharashtra. Petitioner No. 2, then a student, was motivated by the loss of personal and educational documents during that disaster to develop a centralized digital record management system intended to safeguard every student’s educational journey from kindergarten to post-graduation. After years of conceptualization and development, this solution was christened “SPAN.”

According to the petitioners, SPAN was designed to assign a permanent digital academic number to every student in India, ensuring secure preservation and accessibility of educational records across the country. In February and May 2017, the petitioners claimed to have reached out to the Education Minister, Government of India, sharing the details and potential benefits of the SPAN Project, including its projected financial benefits for the government. They further asserted that APAAR ID, introduced by the Government of India in 2024, mirrors the functionality and structure of their SPAN Project. The petitioners averred that their copyright application for the SPAN Project was submitted in May 2023 and remains pending. Objections raised by the Registrar of Copyright regarding authorship were addressed by October 2023.

The APAAR ID Project, as noted, was claimed by the Ministry of Education to be based on the National Education Policy (NEP) 2020, but the petitioners disputed this claim, asserting the absence of documentation regarding APAAR ID in relevant government notifications or NEP documents. The first official mention of APAAR was reportedly during a panel discussion in July 2023.

Procedural Background: The petitioners brought this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking a writ of mandamus and other appropriate orders for compensation amounting to ₹4,28,53,58,300 for the alleged unauthorized use and copyright infringement of their SPAN Project. Subsequent communications under the Right to Information Act (RTI) between December 2024 and March 2025 sought explanations about the development and adoption of APAAR ID, project tendering, and the status of the SPAN Project’s copyright registration. The Ministry of Education’s response in January 2025 denied direct relevance and clarified the launch dates and procedural aspects of APAAR ID development.

The petitioners, dissatisfied with these explanations, proceeded with appellate mechanisms under the RTI Act and further representation before the Copyright Office and governmental ministries.

Core Dispute:  The primary dispute in this matter is whether the APAAR ID Project, as launched and implemented by the Union of India, constitutes an unauthorized copy and infringement of the petitioners’ SPAN Project under the Copyright Act, 1957. The petitioners allege that their intellectual property was communicated to the authorities in 2017 and that the structure, objective, and essence of APAAR ID are substantially derived from SPAN. It is contended that such appropriation occurred without consent, attribution, or acknowledgment, culminating in significant alleged financial loss and violation of statutory rights.

On the contrary, the respondents, represented by government counsel, maintained the originality and policy-driven development of APAAR ID, denying all allegations of copying, unauthorized use, and infringement.

Discussion on Relevant provisions of law:  Throughout the proceedings, both parties referred to statutory provisions and earlier judgments to substantiate their positions.

However, it is noteworthy that the petition document and the judgment, as delivered, do not specifically enumerate or cite any earlier precedents or judgments by name or citation number. The petitioners mainly leaned on the statutory framework—specifically Section 2(o) and Section 13(1)(a) of the Copyright Act, 1957—to claim subsistence of copyright and the enforceability of original works even during the pendency of registration. Section 63 of the Act was invoked regarding wilful infringement.

The respondents relied on the lack of substantive evidence of copying, absence of documented government communications regarding APAAR ID before 2023, and procedural discrepancies in the petitioners’ copyright application.

In the judgment, the Court itself did not refer to or rely upon any previous High Court or Supreme Court decisions, focusing predominantly on the facts and statutory interpretation as pleaded and evidenced before it.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: Justice Tejas Karia meticulously analyzed the material placed before the Court. The judgment notes the petitioners’ reliance on letters allegedly sent to the Ministry in 2017 sharing the SPAN concept. Upon examination, however, the Court found no proof of dispatch or receipt. Even assuming the letter had been sent, it did not annex the full SPAN project details as submitted during the litigation. The similarities provided in the petition did not form part of the letter allegedly sent to the Ministry.

A central finding was that there was no basis for the allegation that APAAR ID was a copy of SPAN simply on the grounds of the letter sent in 2017. Furthermore, there was no evidence that the Registrar of Copyrights had shared the SPAN Project details with the Ministry of Education, precluding any claim of unlawful reproduction based on information obtained from the copyright application.

The timing of APAAR ID’s launch and clearance of copyright objection was also considered. The APAAR ID Project was launched while the petitioners’ copyright application was still under objection, which undermined any argument that the project was copied from SPAN. Throughout, the petitioners failed to establish any traceable infringement under the Copyright Act.

Given the absence of substantive evidence and lack of material showing sharing or adoption of the SPAN concept by government authorities, as well as the lack of correlation between the alleged dissemination of SPAN details and the implementation of APAAR ID, the Court concluded that the petitioners had not made out a case for copyright infringement.
Final Decision

The High Court of Delhi dismissed the writ petition, holding it devoid of merit. The Court found that the petitioners did not establish any infringement of copyright by the respondents in developing or implementing APAAR ID, nor did the evidence support the claim of unlawful copying or utilization of the SPAN Project. Accordingly, all pending applications were disposed of alongside the main petition.

Law Settled in This Case:  This judgment clarifies the evidentiary standards requisite for establishing copyright infringement claims, particularly in relation to governmental projects and alleged appropriation of original works. Mere transmission of proposals or conceptual communications to authorities does not constitute actionable dissemination unless supported by documented proof of acceptance, use, or sharing of the substantive details of the original work. The pendency or existence of copyright registration, in itself, does not prove unauthorized use or infringement unless clear, corroborated evidence is presented. The Court reinforces that claims of copying must move beyond parallels in objectives or structure and must be substantiated with concrete evidence of transmission, adoption, and reproduction.

Case Title: Champion Project Enterprises Vs Union of India & Ors
Date of Order: August 22, 2025
Case Number: W.P.(C)-IPD 47/2025
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:7165
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi
Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Allied Blenders and Distillers Limited Vs Kulbir Singh

Non-Use and Rectification of Trade Marks

Introduction:The case of Allied Blenders and Distillers Limited versus Kulbir Singh and Another revolves around a trademark dispute under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, where the petitioner sought the cancellation and rectification of a registered trademark held by the respondent. This petition highlights key principles of trademark law, particularly concerning non-use of a mark and the criteria for removing it from the register. The High Court of Delhi examined whether the impugned mark "ROGER" registered in Class 33 for alcoholic beverages had been genuinely used by the respondent, and if the petitioner qualified as a "person aggrieved" to challenge its registration. The judgment underscores the importance of active commercial use in maintaining trademark rights and addresses the burden of proof in rectification proceedings. It draws on established precedents to clarify when a mark can be expunged due to prolonged non-use, emphasizing that mere registration without utilization does not suffice to retain monopoly over the mark.

Factual Background:The petitioner, Allied Blenders and Distillers Limited, operates a well-established business in manufacturing and marketing Indian Made Foreign Liquor and related goods, with its merchandise sold globally under various distinctive trade marks catering to different consumer segments. Over several decades, the petitioner has introduced multiple well-known brands, including "OFFICER'S CHOICE," "OFFICER'S CHOICE BLUE," "CLASS 21," "CALYPSO," "SUMO," "100 GUNEAS," "LORD & MASTER," "KYRON," "STERLING RESERVE," among others. The trade mark relevant to the present controversy is "JOLLY ROGER," which the petitioner's predecessors adopted in 1991. The petitioner's group entity, BDA Private Limited, applied for registration of the composite mark "JOLLY ROGER" in 2006, granted under Registration No. 1487257 in Class 33. Following a merger of the alcohol beverages business with the petitioner, the mark stands registered in the petitioner's name. The petitioner has extensively used the mark "JOLLY ROGER" since 2010, with products bearing this mark sold across the country. The petitioner claims that the mark "JOLLY ROGER" has acquired significant goodwill and reputation in the alcoholic beverages market in India, as evidenced by its website providing information on all products bearing the mark, leading to enhanced awareness and recognition. The petitioner further claims substantial financial investment to promote sales of its products bearing the mark "JOLLY ROGER," supported by sales figures from 2010-11 to 2023-24, showing consistent growth and totaling significant units sold. The impugned mark "ROGER" was registered under Registration No. 1799370 in Class 33 in the name of Respondent No.1, having address at C/o Roger Industries Limited, Agra-Mathura Road, Artoni, Agra, Uttar Pradesh, with the application filed on 24.03.2009 and valid till 24.03.2029. On 15.07.2024, the petitioner received a cease-and-desist notice issued by Roger Industries Limited through its director, Respondent No.1, calling upon the petitioner to cease and desist from its business operations using the mark "JOLLY ROGER." The petitioner sent a detailed reply dated 25.07.2024 to the petitioner and subsequently filed the present petition before this court. Respondent No.1 submitted that it is not the first adopter of the mark "ROGER" in India and that the said mark is a common name, further claiming several third-parties have registered trade marks containing the word "ROGER" with no monopoly over its usage for all goods and classes. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Respondent No.1 completely failed to put the impugned mark in use in relation to goods covered in Class 33. It is further submitted that a bare perusal of the memorandum of association of Roger Industries Limited shows that there is no intention to use the impugned mark for Class 33 goods. A perusal of the said memorandum of association was handed over to this court by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the same is taken on record. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that it is clear from Respondent No.1's affidavit dated 30.04.2009 filed before the registrar of trade marks during the prosecution of the impugned mark that there was no intention to use the impugned mark for goods in Class 33, and that the impugned mark is used in relation to Respondent No.1's footwear trade. It was submitted that the petitioner has filed and registered several "JOLLY ROGER" marks in Class 33 during the period from November 2020 to August 2024, which were not objected to or opposed by Respondent No.1, who establishes that Respondent No.1 never intended to use the impugned mark in relation to Class 33 goods. It was submitted that the petitioner is undergoing immense hardship on account of the registration of the impugned mark by Respondent No.1 and therefore, the petitioner is a "person aggrieved" as contemplated under Section 47 of the Act. It was further submitted that as the impugned mark has not been used in relation to goods in Class 33 for a period of 5 years 3 months before the present petition was filed, it is liable to be removed from the register of trade marks. In view of the foregoing submissions, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and consequently, the impugned mark be expunged from the register of trade marks.

Procedural Background: The present petition was filed by the petitioner under Sections 9, 18, 47 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking cancellation of the trade mark No. 1799370 registered in Class 33 for the mark "ROGER" in the name of Respondent No.1, and for rectification of the trade marks register under Rule 7 of the Delhi High Court Intellectual Property Rights Division Rules, 2022. Vide order dated 01.10.2024, this court directed that notice be issued to Respondent No.1 through all modes and granted four weeks' time to file the reply. Thereafter, this petition was taken up by this court on 15.01.2025, however, none appeared for Respondent No.1 despite issuance of notice vide order dated 01.10.2024 and the respondents were further granted a duration of two weeks to file the reply. This matter was called again for hearing on 28.04.2025 and this court in the order of even date noted that despite Respondent No.1 being served on 11.11.2024 via speed post, no one had entered appearance on his behalf and no reply was filed by Respondent No.1 despite repeated liberty being granted to do so. Accordingly, Respondent No.1's right to file a reply was closed and Respondent No.1 was proceeded ex-parte vide order dated 28.04.2025. Respondent No.1, despite repeated opportunities granted by this court, has failed to enter appearance and file a reply. Therefore, in accordance with the order dated 28.04.2025, Respondent No.1 was proceeded ex-parte. The learned counsel for Respondent No.2 submitted that Respondent No.2 will comply with the directions passed by this court in this matter. At the outset, it is to be noted that in the absence of any appearance and reply by Respondent No.1, the pleadings made in the present petitions remain uncontroverted. It is clear that Respondent No.1 is not interested in contesting the matter. Accordingly, the pleadings herein are deemed to have been admitted by Respondent No.1.

Core Dispute: The central issue in this case pertains to whether the impugned trade mark "ROGER" registered under No. 1799370 in Class 33 should be cancelled and removed from the register on the ground of non-use for a continuous period of at least five years from the date on which the mark was entered in the register of trade marks up to a date three months prior to the date of filing the present petition. The petitioner argued that it is the prior adopter and user of the mark "JOLLY ROGER" since 1991 in respect of goods falling in Class 33 and has been using the said mark since the year 2010, and is the registered proprietor of the said mark. It is further submitted that the petitioner is a "person aggrieved" as contemplated under Section 47 of the Act. It was further submitted that the impugned mark has not been used in relation to goods in Class 33 for a period of 5 years 3 months before the present petition was filed, it is liable to be removed from the register of trade marks. Respondent No.1 entered repeated opportunities granted by this court, has failed to enter appearance and file a reply, and therefore the petitioner's claims stand uncontroverted. The dispute thus focuses on establishing the petitioner's status as a person aggrieved due to the existence of the unused mark blocking its operations, and proving the factum of non-use by the respondent in relation to Class 33 goods, despite the mark being registered for alcoholic beverages.

Discussion on Judgments:The parties and the court referred to several key judgments to support their positions on non-use, the concept of a "person aggrieved," and the removal of unused trade marks from the register. In Hardie Trading Ltd. v. Addisons Paint & Chemicals Ltd. (2003) 11 SCC 92, the Supreme Court held that before the High Court or the registrar directs the removal of the registered trade marks they must be satisfied in respect of the following: that the application is by a "person aggrieved," that the trade mark has not been used by the proprietor for a continuous period of at least five years and one month prior to the date of the application, of the trade mark during this period by the proprietor, and that there were no special circumstances which affected the use of the trade mark during the said period. This judgment was cited by the petitioner to emphasize the burden on the respondent to prove genuine use or special circumstances justifying non-use, and the court relied on it to assess whether the impugned mark met the test of locus standi and continuous non-use. In Infosys Technologies Ltd. v. Jupiter Infosys Ltd. (2011) 1 SCC 125, the Supreme Court described the phrase "person aggrieved" in the following terms: the position that emerges from the above provisions is this, whether the application is under Section 46 or under Section 56 or a composite application under both sections, it is a prerequisite that the applicant must be a person aggrieved, Section 46(1) of the 1958 Act enables any person aggrieved to apply for removal of registered trade mark. This judgment was invoked by the court to define who qualifies as a person aggrieved, noting that actions were commenced to maintain the purity of the register and that a person aggrieved would necessarily have a wider sweep, however, there was no element of public mischief in favour in rectification of a register under Section 46 of the 1958 Act (Section 47 of 1999 Act) and thus, the person aggrieved in the context of removal of trademark on account of non-use would necessarily mean a person who is interested in removal of the impugned mark. The Supreme Court referred to the following passage from the decision of Lords in Powell's Trade Mark (1894) 11 RPC 4, although they were no doubt inserted to prevent officious interference by those who had no interest at all in the register being correct, and to exclude a mere common informer, it is undoubtedly of public interest that they should not be unduly limited, inasmuch as it is a public mischief that there should remain upon the register a mark which ought not to be there, and by which many persons may be affected, who, nevertheless, would not be willing to enter upon the risk and expense of litigation, whenever it can be shown, as here, that the applicant is in the same trade as the person who has registered the trade mark, and wherever the trade mark, if remaining on the register, would, or might, limit the legal rights of the applicant, so that by reason of the existence of the entry on the register he could not lawfully do that which, but for the existence of the mark, he could lawfully do, it appears to me he has a locus standi to be heard as a person aggrieved. This precedent was cited in the context of explaining the broad interpretation of "person aggrieved" to include those whose business might be restricted by an unused mark on the register, and the court applied it to determine that the petitioner, being in the same industry, had standing to challenge the impugned mark. In Kellogg Company v. Pops Food Products (P) Ltd. (2018) SCC OnLine Del 6562, a coordinate bench of this court relied upon the Supreme Court's ruling in Hardie Trading, observing that the principal issue to be addressed is whether the petitioner is a person aggrieved, in Hardie Trading Ltd. v. Addisons Paint and Chemicals Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court explained the expression "person aggrieved" as used in Section 46 of the 1958 Act (pari materia to Section 47 of the 1999 Act) was materially different from the connotation of the said expression as used in Section 56 of the 1958 Act, the court had observed that registration should not have been granted or was incorrectly granted, these situations included: (a) contravention of failure to observe a condition for registration; (b) absence of an entry; (c) an entry made without sufficient cause; (d) a wrong entry; and (e) any error or defect in the entry. The Court further explained that any type of defect in the entry. This judgment was referred to by the court to underscore that in cases of non-use, the aggrieved party need not prove fanciful grievance but a likelihood of injury, and it supported the petitioner's claim by highlighting that no special circumstances were shown for the non-use. In A.K. Al Muhairid v. Chaman Lal Sachdeva (2024) SCC OnLine Del 1026, a coordinate bench of this court observed as under: therefore, in view of the decision of this court in Disney Enterprises Inc. v. Balraj Muttneja 2014 SCC OnLine Del 781, no further evidence required if position in this matter has been reiterated by the court on several occasions, including recently in Russell Corpn. Australia Pty. Ltd. v. Ashok Mahajan (2023) 4 HCC (Del) 301, wherein the following relevant observation was made: under such circumstances, in the absence of denial by the respondent, the court has no reason to disbelieve the pleadings as also the investigator's affidavit on record, the respondent has chosen not to appear in the matter despite being served, specific court notice was issued even to the lawyer/trade mark agent of the respondent, in the context of non-use, it is the settled legal position that use has to be genuine use in the relevant class of goods and services, unless the non-use is explained by way of special circumstances, the mark would be liable to be removed for non-use, in the present case, no special circumstances have been cited. This recent judgment was cited to affirm that in the absence of the respondent's appearance and any evidence of use, the court can proceed to remove the mark, and it was used in the context of the petitioner's uncontroverted evidence of non-use in Class 33, where the respondent failed to demonstrate any genuine commercial utilization.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: The judge meticulously analyzed the provisions of Section 47(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which allows for the removal of a trade mark from the register if it has not been used for a continuous period of five years up to three months before the rectification petition is filed, unless special circumstances are shown. The court noted that the petitioner has successfully discharged the burden by providing evidence that it is the registered proprietor of multiple trade marks bearing the mark "JOLLY ROGER" in Class 33, under which it sells and markets its products. Secondly, it is uncontroverted that the petitioner has been using the mark "JOLLY ROGER" since the year 2010 and that its predecessors had adopted the said mark in 1991. Thirdly, the sales figures of the petitioner's products in Class 33 under the mark "JOLLY ROGER" reflect that it is a well-established brand in the alcoholic beverages market in India. Lastly, given the similarity between the impugned mark and the petitioner's mark, an unwary consumer of average intelligence is likely to get confused and deceived by the impugned mark. In view of the above discussion, this court has no qualms that there is a likelihood of injury or damage to the petitioner if the impugned mark is not removed from the register. Therefore, the petitioner satisfies the test of being a "person aggrieved" under Section 47 of the Act. Under Section 47 of the Act, after establishing its locus standi, the petitioner has to discharge the burden of proving the factum of non-use of the impugned mark for a continuous period of at least five years from the date on which the mark is entered in the register of trade marks, up to a date at least three months prior to the date of filing the present petition. It is the petitioner's case that Respondent No.1 never intended to use the impugned mark in relation to Class 33 goods. The learned counsel for the petitioner drew this court's attention to the affidavit of Mr. Ankur Sachdeva, Chief Revenue Officer of the petitioner, wherein it is clearly stated that the impugned mark is not in use in the market in relation to Class 33 goods and that being in the same industry, he has never come across any product of Respondent No.1 in Class 33. It is further pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in Respondent No.1's affidavit dated 30.04.2009 filed before the registrar of trade marks during the prosecution of the impugned mark, it is admitted that the trade mark "ROGER" is used by Respondent No.1 in relation to its products in footwear trade. The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the memorandum of association of Roger Industries Limited to contend that Respondent No.1 and Roger Industries Limited had no intention to use the impugned mark in relation to goods falling in Class 33. In view of the above, the court observed that the impugned mark is not in use in the market in relation to Class 33 goods.

Final Decision: The court allowed the petition and directed that the impugned trade mark "ROGER" bearing registration No. 1799370 in Class 33 be removed/expunged/rectified from the register of trade marks. The registry is directed to update the register accordingly and notify the same to the concerned trade marks registry within four weeks.

Law Settled in This Case:This case reinforces the principle that a registered trade mark can be removed from the register if it remains unused for a continuous period of five years and three months prior to the filing of a rectification petition, without any special circumstances justifying the non-use. It clarifies that a "person aggrieved" under Section 47 includes entities in the same trade whose business may be hindered by the existence of an unused mark, even without proving actual damage, as long as there is a likelihood of restriction on their legal rights. The judgment emphasizes that the burden shifts to the registrant to prove genuine use once the petitioner establishes non-use through evidence like affidavits and market surveys, and in ex-parte proceedings, uncontroverted pleadings can lead to removal. It also settles that intent to use at the time of registration does not substitute for actual commercial use, and marks registered without bona fide intention for the specified class are vulnerable to cancellation.

Case Title: Allied Blenders and Distillers Limited Vs Kulbir Singh & Anr.
Date of Order: 22.08.2025
Case Number: C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 191/2024 
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:7158
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi 
Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Thursday, August 21, 2025

Castrol Limited Vs Sanjay Sonavane and Anr.

Castrol Limited Vs Sanjay Sonavane: August 19, 2025:CS(COMM) 855/2025:High Court of Delhi:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia  

Castrol Limited, a global leader in engine oils and lubricants, filed a suit against Sanjay Sonavane and another defendant in the Delhi High Court, alleging groundless threats of legal proceedings over the use of its "3X" marks. 

The plaintiff, with a significant market presence in India using the Castrol brand, faced a seizure of its goods by Nashik police on August 9, 2025, following a complaint by the defendants claiming infringement of their "3P" marks and copyright. 

The defendants had also issued a public notice threatening action against the use of "3X" marks. Procedurally, the court granted exemptions from filing additional documents and pre-institution mediation, registered the suit, issued summons, and scheduled a hearing for pleadings completion. 

The core dispute involves the plaintiff seeking an injunction and declaration that its "3X" marks do not infringe the defendants' "3P" marks, arguing the marks are dissimilar and the threats unjustifiable. The court restrained the defendants from issuing further groundless threats until the next hearing on December 9, 2025, finding a prima facie case in the plaintiff's favor and balance of convenience with it.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  

Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Triveni Household Items Manufacturers Private Limited vs. M/s Mapples Interior LLP & Ors.

Triveni Household Items Manufacturers Private Limited Vs. Mapples Interior LLP:21/07/2025: CS(COMM) 689/2025 :High Court of Delhi:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia  

Facts: The plaintiff, a private limited company incorporated in 1956, is the proprietor of the trademarks "TRIVENI" and "TRIVENI ALMIRAH" registered under Trade Marks Registration No. 1571155, alleging infringement by the defendants through unauthorized use of similar marks on furniture products sold across India.  

Procedural Background: The plaintiff filed applications seeking exemption from filing original/certified/typed copies, exemption from pre-institution mediation, leave to file additional documents, extension of time for court fees, and exemption from advance service, supported by a Supreme Court judgment in Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Krithi 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1382.  

Core Dispute: The dispute involves the defendants' alleged infringement of the plaintiff's registered trademarks "TRIVENI" and "TRIVENI ALMIRAH" and passing off their products as those of the plaintiff, affecting the plaintiff's goodwill and reputation built over decades.  

Decision: The court granted ex parte injunction against the defendants from using the Trademark TRIVENI INTERIO which was deceptively similar to Plaintiff's registered Trademark TRIVENI" and "TRIVENI ALMIRAH.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  
Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Today Tea Limited vs. Darjeeling Enterprises Private Limited

Today Tea Limited Vs. Darjeeling Enterprises Private Limited : 25/07/2025: CS(COMM) 741/2025: High Court of Delhi:Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora  

Facts: The plaintiff, engaged in the sale of tea and coffee, alleges that the defendant is infringing its trademark "TODAY" and its formats "TODAY STAR" and "TODAY PREMIUM" through deceptive use of similar marks "GANGA SUPER STAR" and "GANGA PREMIUM" on packaging and trade-dress since April 2025.  

Procedural Background: The plaintiff filed applications seeking leave to file additional documents, exemption from filing original/certified/typed copies, exemption from pre-institution mediation, exemption from advance service, and interim injunction, supported by a Supreme Court judgment in Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Krithi 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1382.  

Core Dispute: The dispute centers on the defendant's unauthorized use of marks and trade-dress deceptively similar to the plaintiff's registered trademarks and copyrighted artistic works, affecting the plaintiff's brand identity and market standing.  

Decision: The court allowed ad interim injunction from using identical Trade Dress.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  

Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Rahul Mishra & Anr. vs. Nishchay Sajdeh & Ors.

Rahul Mishra Vs Nishchay Sajdeh:04/08/2025:CS(COMM) 786/2025: High Court of Delhi:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia  

Facts: The case involves Rahul Mishra and another plaintiff alleging that the defendants infringed their copyright in the "Tigress Artistic Work" by producing and selling garments with identical designs, including distinctive floral motifs, as part of the plaintiffs' renowned "Sunderbans" collection.  

Procedural Background: The plaintiffs filed an application under Order XI Rule 1(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) as applicable to commercial suits under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (CC Act) for leave to place additional documents on record. They also sought exemption from pre-litigation mediation under Section 12A of the CC Act, citing urgency for interim relief, supported by a Supreme Court judgment. Summons were issued to the defendants, and the suit was instituted against them.  

Core Dispute: The central dispute is the unauthorized reproduction and sale of the plaintiffs' copyrighted Tigress Artistic Work by the defendants, who are accused of passing off inferior quality products as those of the plaintiffs, thereby affecting the plaintiffs' brand integrity, market standing, and creative legacy. The defendants allegedly source the infringing fabric from Defendant No. 2, forming a chain of infringement.  

Decision: The court granted ex parte injunction in fvaour of Plaintiff restraining the defendants from using Tigress Artistic Work" by producing and selling garments with identical designs, including distinctive floral motifs .  

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  

Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Marriott Worldwide Corporation vs Sunjoy Hans

Case Title: Marriott Worldwide Corporation vs Sunjoy Hans and Ors.  
Date of Order: 12th August 2025  
Case Number: IPDTMA/6/2025  
Name of Court: High Court at Calcutta (Intellectual Property Rights Division)  
Name of Judge: Hon'ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur  

Facts: The petitioner, Marriott Worldwide Corporation, a well-known hospitality brand under the Marriott Group, has used the trademark "MARRIOTT" worldwide since 1957 and in India since 1992, with registrations dating back to 1992. Respondent no. 1 claims proprietorship of the deceptively similar mark "The New Marrion" in class 43 for hotel and related services, with respondent no. 2 initially applying for its registration on 8 November 2022, later amended to respondent no. 1's name.  

Procedural Background: The petitioner appealed under Section 91 of the Trademarks Act 1999 against an order dated 18 February 2025 by the Deputy Registrar of Trademarks, which dismissed the petitioner's opposition to the respondents' mark registration. The opposition was rejected due to non-apostilled evidence, leading to the current appeal heard on 12th August 2025.  

Core Dispute: The dispute centers on the rejection of the petitioner's opposition to the registration of "The New Marrion" mark, alleging it is deceptively similar to "MARRIOTT". The petitioner argues the dismissal violated natural justice and disregarded notarized evidence, while respondents claim the appeal is infructuous due to the implemented registration.  

Decision: The court set aside the impugned order, remanding the matter to the Deputy Registrar for a fresh hearing, including the petitioner's opposition with evidence, to be completed within four months. No adjudication on merits was made, and all interlocutory applications were disposed of as infructuous.  

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  
Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Pitambari Products Private Limited vs Sawariya Collection

Pitambari Products Private Limited Vs Sawariya Collection :14th August 2025:Commercial IPR Suit (L) No. 24983 of 2025  :High Court of Bombay:R.I. Chagla, J.  

Facts: The plaintiff, Pitambari Products Private Limited, adopted the trademark PITAMBARI in 1983 for homecare products including cleaning powders for metals, securing multiple registrations in English and vernacular languages, with sales exceeding hundreds of crores and significant promotional expenditure, establishing it as well-known. In July 2025, the plaintiff discovered a video uploaded by the defendant on Instagram and YouTube on 2nd July 2025, which garnered over 2,45,000 views, portraying the plaintiff's product as containing hazardous chemicals unfit for cleaning worship articles like idols.  

Procedural Background: The plaintiff filed the suit and interim application seeking ex-parte ad-interim injunction against disparagement, with the matter heard without notice to the defendant on 14th August 2025 due to urgency.  

Core Dispute: The defendant allegedly disparaged the plaintiff's PITAMBARI product through the impugned video by falsely implying it is harmful for human consumption and unsuitable for religious articles, intending to slander and erode the plaintiff's goodwill while promoting its own product.  

Decision: The court found a strong prima facie case of disparagement, with balance of convenience favoring the plaintiff and irreparable harm if relief was denied, granting ad-interim injunction restraining the defendant from circulating the impugned video or any similar material and from disparaging the product.  

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  

Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Phonographic Performance Limited vs Urban Mayabazar

Phonographic Performance Limited Vs Urban Mayabazar:August 08, 2025:Commercial IP Suit (L) No. 11705 of 2025  :High Court of Bombay:Sharmila U. Deshmukh, J.  

Facts: The plaintiff, Phonographic Performance Limited, owns copyright in sound recordings through assignments from various music companies, enabling it to license public communication of its repertoire under Section 30 of the Copyright Act, 1957. Defendant No.1, a partnership firm, operates three renowned restaurants and bars in Hyderabad and Telangana, where the plaintiff's sound recordings are played without license, including during a New Year event on 31st December 2024.  

Procedural Background: The plaintiff filed an interim application seeking injunction against the defendants for copyright infringement, with notices issued on 30th December 2024 and 3rd February 2025 remaining unresponsive. The matter was heard on 8th August 2025, with no appearance from the defendants despite service.  

Core Dispute: The dispute centers on the defendants' unauthorized public performance of the plaintiff's sound recordings at their premises and events, including a confirmed instance on 31st December 2024, and an anticipated event on 8th August 2025, constituting copyright infringement.  

Decision: The court granted ad-interim relief, issuing an injunction restraining the defendants from publicly performing or communicating the plaintiff's sound recordings without a license, pending the suit's final disposal. The matter is listed for 17th September 2025, with the relief continuing until then.  

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  
Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Moondust Paper Pvt Ltd. vs Vinay Shaw and Others

Moondust Paper Pvt Ltd. Vs Vinay Shaw and Others : 8th August 2025: IP-COM/44/2024: High Court at Calcutta:Hon'ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur  

Facts: The petitioner, Moondust Paper Pvt Ltd., is a company engaged in manufacturing, trading, importing, and exporting smoker's articles like cigarette paper booklets, matchboxes, and flavored rolling papers under the trademarks "CAPTAIN GOGO" and "GOGO" since 2015. The petitioner owns trademark and copyright registrations for these marks and claims substantial advertisement expenditure and impressive sales figures. Respondents are accused of selling deceptively similar products under marks like "GOGO" and "GOGA", infringing the petitioner's intellectual property.  

Procedural Background: The petitioner filed a rolled-up action for infringement of trademark, copyright, and passing off, with IA No. GA-COM/1/2024 heard on 8th August 2025. Despite service, none of the respondents appeared, even on the second call, leading to the court proceeding ex parte.  

Core Dispute: The dispute involves the respondents' alleged infringement of the petitioner's "CAPTAIN GOGO" and "GOGO" trademarks and copyright through the use of deceptively similar marks and passing off their products as the petitioner's, causing potential confusion among consumers.  

Decision: The court found a strong case for trademark and copyright infringement and passing off, granting protective reliefs as prayed in prayers (a), (b), and (c) of the Notice of Motion. IA No. GA-COM/1/2024 was disposed of accordingly.  

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  
Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

LARGAN Precision Co., Ltd vs Honor Device Co., Ltd

LARGAN Precision Co., Ltd Vs Honor Device Co., Ltd:05.08.2025:CS(COMM) 793/2025:High Court of Delhi: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Facts: The plaintiff, LARGAN Precision Co., Ltd, a company specializing in designing and manufacturing optical lenses, filed a suit against defendants Honor Device Co., Ltd and its subsidiary, alleging infringement of patented camera lens technologies (IN'754, IN'095, and IN'203) used in Honor 200 series products. The defendants, including Honor Device No. 1 (a Chinese company) and No. 2 (incorporated in India), were accused of using the plaintiff's patented technology without authorization.

Core Dispute: The central dispute revolves around the defendants' alleged infringement of the plaintiff's patented optical lens assemblies (Suit Patents) in the Honor 200 series products, including main camera, front camera, and ultrawide camera lens assemblies, without proper authorization or licensing. The plaintiff claims exclusive rights under the Patents Act, 1970, seeking permanent injunction, damages, and rendition of accounts.

Decision: After going through the claim mapping provided by the Plaintiff, the the court granted ex parte injunction in favour of plaintiff.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Wednesday, August 20, 2025

Shantanu Prakash vs. Doris Chug Gim Lian & Ors.

Navigating Procedural Rigidity: Delhi High Court's Stance on Delay Condonation in Written Statements

Introduction:This case study examines a significant judgment from the High Court of Delhi that addresses the rigid timelines for filing written statements in civil suits under the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018. The appeals in question challenge the refusal to condone delays beyond the prescribed 120-day period, highlighting tensions between procedural strictness and equitable considerations in litigation. The decision reinforces the mandatory nature of court rules over general principles of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and underscores the evolving judicial interpretation of delay condonation in non-commercial suits. By dismissing the appeals, the court emphasizes the importance of timely compliance to ensure expeditious justice, while navigating arguments on legal uncertainty, the nature of the underlying suit, and historical precedents.

Factual Background:The underlying suit, CS (OS) No. 655/2017, was instituted under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, by the respondents, Doris Chung Gim Lian and others, against the appellants, Shantanu Prakash and Pramod Thatoi, among others. The suit pertains to matters involving a trust or charitable institution, with allegations of malafide intentions and a chequered history between the parties. The appellants contended that the suit was a mere camouflage, lacking bonafides, and involved voluminous documents, including historical records and over a thousand emails exchanged between the parties. They also cited operational disruptions due to the Covid-19 pandemic, which led to office closures and limited functioning, as contributing factors to the delay in preparing their defense. The respondents, however, maintained that the appellants had been actively participating in related litigations and the present suit without any evident impediments, demonstrating continuous appearances through counsel.

Procedural Background:The suit was filed in 2017, and summons were served on the appellants. The appellants failed to file their written statements within the initial 30 days or the extended period up to 120 days as per Rule 4 of Chapter VII of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018. The Joint Registrar, on 05.11.2024, passed a reasoned order closing the appellants' right to file the written statements due to the delay. Aggrieved, the appellants challenged this before a Single Judge in O.A. No. 226/2024 and O.A. No. 227/2024, which were dismissed by a common judgment on 23.01.2025. The appellants then filed the present appeals, FAO(OS) 39/2025 and FAO(OS) 40/2025, before a Division Bench, arguing primarily on legal grounds. The appeals were reserved on 29.07.2025 and decided on 14.08.2025, with the court hearing extensive arguments on the condonability of the delay.

Core Dispute:The central issue revolves around whether the court has the discretion to condone delays in filing written statements beyond the maximum 120-day period stipulated under Rule 4 of Chapter VII of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, in non-commercial suits. The appellants argued that equity demands condonation given the suit's nature under Section 92, the historical disputes between parties, prevailing legal uncertainty during the relevant period, and exceptional circumstances like the Covid-19 pandemic and voluminous documentation. They sought to rely on past judgments allowing such delays upon payment of costs or due to interpretative ambiguities. In contrast, the respondents asserted that the rules are mandatory, with no room for condonation, and that the appellants' active participation in proceedings negated any claim of prejudice. The dispute thus pits procedural rigidity against claims of substantive justice, questioning if inherent powers or Order VIII of the Code of Civil Procedure can override court-specific rules.

Discussion on Judgments:The parties cited several judgments to support their positions, reflecting the evolving jurisprudence on delay condonation under the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018. The appellants relied on Esha Gupta v. Rohit Vig, 2020 SCC OnLine Del 2702, particularly paragraphs 7, 8, and 10, to argue that given the nature of the suit, it would be in the interest of justice to allow the written statement, as denying it could cause undue prejudice and prevent a fair adjudication; they emphasized the bonafides shown by having a ready defense. They invoked Amarendra Dhari Singh v. R.C. Nursery Private Limited, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 84, especially paragraphs 23 to 26, to contend that the rules preserve judicial discretion to condone delays beyond 120 days, interpreting the word "may" in Rule 4 as enabling rather than mandatory, and noting the High Court's choice not to adopt the stricter language of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. In Jamaluddin v. Nawabuddin, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 974, paragraph 6 was highlighted, which references Bharat Kalra v. Raj Kishan Chabra, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 613, to submit that delays can be condoned with costs in non-commercial suits, as Order VIII Rule 1 is not mandatory; the appellants offered to pay costs but acknowledged this judgment overlooked the specific High Court Rules. Vikrant Khanna vs. Amita Lamba, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 6661, paragraph 23, was cited to trace uncertainty in interpreting Rule 4, resolved only by Manhar Sabarwal vs. High Court of Delhi, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 5945, arguing for leniency due to this ambiguity during the suit's dormancy. They distinguished Bharat Singh vs. Karan Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 691, as an instance where condonation was permitted, and sought to revive the distinction between Rules 4 and 5 rejected in Charu Agarwal v. Alok Kalia & Ors., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 1238, paragraph 10 of which was extracted in the impugned judgment to affirm no such distinction exists, emphasizing the peremptory language "but not thereafter" in both rules. The respondents countered with Harjyot Singh vs. Manpreet Kaur, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 2629, to assert that delays cannot be condoned, predating any claimed uncertainty. They distinguished Vikrant Khanna on its peculiar facts, as noted in paragraph 23, and relied on Manhar Sabarwal, along with implied references to Amit Tara and Delhi Gymkhana Club (full citations not specified but contextually supporting no condonation), to affirm the settled prohibition. Additionally, Modula India vs. Kamakshya Singh Deo, (1988) 4 SCC 619, was invoked to argue that rejecting a written statement does not leave a party defenceless, as cross-examination remains available and proceedings are not ex-parte.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:The Division Bench, comprising Justice Anil Kshetarpal and Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar, meticulously analyzed the arguments, focusing on the pure question of law regarding condonation under the High Court Rules. They found no infirmity in the Single Judge's judgment, holding that the current legal position, as clarified in Manhar Sabarwal, Amit Tara, and Delhi Gymkhana Club, prohibits condonation beyond 120 days. The bench rejected the appellants' plea of legal uncertainty, noting that judgments apply retrospectively unless specified otherwise, and accepting prospective application would undermine settled principles. They deemed the suit's nature and chequered history irrelevant to this procedural issue, as no equitable considerations can override a pure legal question. The court observed that the appellants were actively represented by qualified counsel and participated in proceedings, negating claims of impediment. Explanations like Covid-19 disruptions and voluminous documents were unconvincing, given the appellants' resources. The bench agreed with the respondents that non-filing does not prejudice the defense entirely, as cross-examination persists. Ultimately, the analysis upheld the mandatory timelines to promote expeditious justice, aligning with the rules' intent over Code of Civil Procedure analogies.

Final Decision:The appeals were dismissed, with the court finding them devoid of merit. The impugned judgment of the Single Judge was upheld, confirming the closure of the appellants' right to file written statements. Pending applications were disposed of accordingly.

Law Settled in This Case:This case solidifies that under Rules 4 and 5 of Chapter VII of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, there is no discretion to condone delays in filing written statements beyond 120 days from service of summons in non-commercial suits. It clarifies that perceived distinctions between Rules 4 and 5 are untenable, and principles from Order VIII of the Code of Civil Procedure or inherent powers cannot be invoked to extend timelines. The decision emphasizes retrospective application of interpretative judgments, rejects equitable pleas based on suit nature or external factors like pandemics unless exceptionally compelling, and affirms that such procedural bars do not render parties defenceless, preserving rights like cross-examination.

Case Title: Shantanu Prakash Vs. Doris Chug Gim Lian 
Date of Order: 14.08.2025
Case Number: FAO(OS) 39/2025 
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:6845-DB
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Name of Judge: Justice Anil Kshetarpal and Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Sangeeta Rai Sandhu & Ors. Vs. Charanjit Sandhu

Promoting Amicable Resolutions: Exclusion of Mediation Time in Civil Procedure

Introduction:This case study delves into a pivotal judgment from the High Court of Delhi that addresses the interplay between procedural timelines for filing written statements and the exclusion of time spent in mediation proceedings. The appeal challenges the refusal to allow a delayed written statement in a partition suit, highlighting the tension between strict adherence to the 120-day limit under the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, and the promotion of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms like mediation. The Division Bench's decision underscores the court's commitment to expeditious justice while accommodating genuine efforts at amicable settlement, particularly in family disputes. By allowing the appeal, the judgment clarifies the computation of statutory periods, reinforcing procedural fairness without undermining the rules' mandatory intent.

Factual Background: The underlying dispute stems from a partition suit filed by Respondent No. 1, Charanjit Sandhu, seeking division of family properties contested by the appellants, Sangeeta Rai Sandhu and others, who are defendants in the suit. The suit involves familial relations, with allegations of contested ownership and division of assets. The appellants argued that ongoing mediation and settlement talks justified their delay in filing the written statement, emphasizing that they were actively engaged in resolving the matter amicably even after formal mediation failed. The respondents countered that the appellants had ample opportunity to file their defense and that the delay was deliberate, pointing to the appellants' appearances before the Joint Registrar during mediation. The court noted that the suit's substantive merits were not delved into deeply, focusing instead on procedural aspects, but recognized the family nature of the dispute as relevant to encouraging mediation.

Procedural Background: The partition suit, CS (OS) 65/2023, was registered on 31.01.2023 after the plaint was filed by Respondent No. 1. Summons were issued and served on the appellants on 17.02.2023. On 29.03.2023, the Single Judge referred the parties to mediation at the Samadhan, Delhi High Court Mediation and Conciliation Centre, while simultaneously listing the matter before the Joint Registrar on 04.05.2023 for completion of pleadings, admission/denial of documents, and marking of exhibits. Mediation proceedings spanned from 17.04.2023 to 20.11.2023, involving 13 sessions, but ended in failure with a report filed on 20.11.2023. On 21.12.2023, the Joint Registrar closed the appellants' right to file the written statement, observing that the 120-day statutory period from service had expired. The appellants filed their written statement on 29.04.2024. Challenging the Joint Registrar's order, they filed a Chamber Appeal (O.A. No. 93/2024) under Chapter II Rule 5 of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, which was dismissed by the Single Judge on 04.02.2025 for deliberate non-filing despite directions. A subsequent Review Petition (Rev. Pet. No. 220/2025) under Order XLVII Rule 1 read with Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, was dismissed on 19.05.2025, upholding the earlier order. The appellants then appealed to the Division Bench under Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966, read with Order XLIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Core Dispute:The primary issue is whether the time spent in court-referred mediation should be excluded from the 120-day period for filing a written statement under Rule 4 of Chapter VII of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018. The appellants contended that excluding the mediation period (17.04.2023 to 20.11.2023) left them with sufficient time, and the Joint Registrar erroneously closed their right prematurely, especially amid ongoing settlement talks. They argued that forcing pleadings during mediation could hinder free communication. The respondents maintained that even excluding mediation, the delay was inexcusable, totaling 162 days post-mediation report, and emphasized the mandatory nature of the timeline. The dispute thus centers on balancing procedural rigidity with the encouragement of mediation in non-commercial suits, questioning if the Single Judge's concurrent directions for pleadings negated exclusion of mediation time.

Discussion on Judgments: The appellants relied on Bharat Singh v. Karan Singh & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine Del 691, where a Single Bench of the Delhi High Court held that parties in mediation, especially in family disputes, cannot be compelled to file written statements or complete pleadings, as it might impede open communication; this was cited to support excluding the mediation period from the 120-day limit. The respondents invoked Manhar Sabharwal v. High Court of Delhi & Chirag Sharma v. High Court of Delhi & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine Del 5945, a Division Bench decision upholding the constitutionality of the 120-day limit in Rule 4 of Chapter VII of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, observing that written statements filed beyond this period cannot be taken on record even in non-commercial suits; this was used to argue the inviolable nature of the timeline. The court itself referenced Delhi Gymkhana Club Ltd. v. Col Ashish Khanna SM Retd & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine Del 7022, a Coordinate Bench ruling that Rule 4 is mandatory to ensure expeditious adjudication; this was discussed to affirm the outer limit's purpose. In analyzing Bharat Singh, the court drew from Telefonaktiebolaget L.M. Ericsson v. Lava International Limited, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 13903, and Graves Cotton Ltd. v. Newage Generators (P) Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine Del 6556, both Coordinate Bench decisions emphasizing that time in mediation should not count towards pleading deadlines in family matters; these were cited to reinforce exclusion in the present case. Additionally, the court relied on Vikram Bakshi & Ors. v. Sonia Khosla, (2014) 15 SCC 80, a Supreme Court judgment stressing sincere judicial efforts for amicable settlements via mediation; this was invoked to highlight the policy favoring mediation without penalizing participants procedurally.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:The Division Bench, led by Justice Anil Kshetarpal, analyzed the procedural timeline by bifurcating pre-mediation (17.02.2023 to 29.03.2023, 40 days) and post-mediation (21.11.2023 to 21.12.2023, 30 days) periods, totaling 70 days excluding mediation, well within the 120-day limit when the right was closed. The judges held that Rule 4's mandatory phrase "but not thereafter" prohibits extensions beyond 120 days generally, but time in earnest mediation must be excluded to encourage settlements, particularly in family suits, aligning with judicial policy. They distinguished the Single Judge's concurrent listing before the Joint Registrar as not intending to include mediation time in computations, rendering that aspect inessential. The bench applied estoppel against the appellants for seeking time extensions during mediation without objection, but ultimately favored exclusion based on Bharat Singh's rationale that pleadings could hinder mediation. The court rejected the respondents' delay calculation post-mediation report, emphasizing the appellants' bonafide engagement. Overall, the analysis balanced procedural expedition with equity, reiterating that while the 120-day limit is inviolable, mediation as a court-directed process warrants exclusion to avoid discouraging alternative resolutions.

Final Decision: The appeal was allowed, setting aside the impugned orders of the Single Judge and Joint Registrar. The court accepted the appellants' written statement filed on 29.04.2024, directing that proceedings before the Single Judge continue uninfluenced by this order, with the appellants permitted to participate fully. The pending application was disposed of accordingly.

Law Settled in This Case:This judgment establishes that the 120-day period for filing written statements under Rule 4 of Chapter VII of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, is mandatory and cannot be exceeded, but time spent in court-referred mediation is excluded from computation, especially in family disputes, to promote amicable settlements without procedural prejudice. It clarifies that concurrent directions for pleadings do not negate this exclusion, and parties' engagement in mediation must be protected to align with broader judicial encouragement of alternative dispute resolution.

Case Title: Sangeeta Rai Sandhu & Ors. vs. Charanjit Sandhu & Ors.  
Date of Order: 20.08.2025  
Case Number: FAO(OS) 80/2025  
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:7049-DB
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi  
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Justice Anil Kshetarpal and Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar  

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Vikrant Chemico Industries Pvt Ltd v Shri Gopal Engineering and Chemical Works Pvt Ltd & Ors

Jurisdictional Challenges in E-Commerce Era

Introduction:This case revolves around a family dispute between two companies originating from the same lineage, involving allegations of trademark infringement, copyright violation, and passing off in the market for phenyle and related cleaning products. The plaintiff, Vikrant Chemico Industries Pvt Ltd, accused the defendants, Shri Gopal Engineering and Chemical Works Pvt Ltd and others, of misusing marks like "DOCTOR HAZEL'S BRAND PHENYL" and "CHEMIST BRAND GERM TROLL," which were claimed to be deceptively similar to the plaintiff's established brands "DOCTOR BRAND PHENYLE" and "DOCTOR BRAND GERM TROLL." The dispute highlighted issues of territorial jurisdiction in intellectual property suits, the scope of protection for composite trademarks, and the implications of generic terms in branding. The High Court of Delhi ultimately dismissed the suit on jurisdictional grounds while addressing the merits, underscoring the complexities in family-owned businesses transitioning into separate entities and the evidentiary thresholds required in such claims.

Factual Background: The roots of this dispute trace back to 1963 when Mr. J.B. Gupta adopted the mark "DOCTOR BRAND PHENYLE" for phenyle products. In 1972, the plaintiff company was incorporated in Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh, focusing on personal care, toiletries, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals. Mr. J.B. Gupta joined as a director in 1973, the same year the plaintiff adopted "DOCTOR BRAND GERM TROLL" for perfumed cleaners. His sons, Mr. R.K. Gupta (a plaintiff director) and Mr. G.K. Gupta (defendant no.2), were involved in family businesses. In 1975, a partnership firm, M/s Shri Gopal Engineering and Chemical Works, was formed with Mr. J.B. Gupta and Mr. G.K. Gupta as partners; Mr. R.K. Gupta joined in 1981. This firm registered "DOCTOR BRAND PHENYLE" (device) in 1985. The plaintiff obtained "CHEMIST" registration in 1986. In 1994, defendant no.1 company was formed, including family members as directors. In 1996, the partnership assigned "DOCTOR BRAND PHENYLE" to the plaintiff, and defendants nos.2 and 3 resigned from the plaintiff's board. The plaintiff secured copyright for "DOCTOR BRAND PHENYLE" in 1999 and assigned "CHEMIST" to defendant no.1 in 2000. By 2015, disputes arose when the plaintiff discovered defendants' products like "DOCTOR HAZEL'S BRAND PHENYL" (acquired via assignment in 2014) and "CHEMIST BRAND GERM TROLL." The plaintiff claimed prior use, substantial sales (Rs. 9.95 crore in 2016-2017 for "DOCTOR BRAND PHENYLE"), and deceptive similarity. Defendants countered that "DOCTOR BRAND GERM TROLL" originated with the partnership in 1983, "CHEMIST BRAND PHENYLE" was used since 2000, "DOCTOR HAZEL'S" was registered with "DOCTOR" disclaimed as generic, and their packaging was distinct and common to trade.

Procedural Background:The suit was filed on August 25, 2015, seeking permanent injunction, rendition of accounts, delivery up, and damages. On September 2, 2015, summons were issued, and an ex parte interim injunction restrained defendants from using "DOCTOR HAZEL'S BRAND PHENYL" and "CHEMIST BRAND GERM TROLL," with a Local Commissioner appointed for Kanpur premises. Mediation failed on November 18, 2015. Another Local Commissioner visited Bhopal on August 5, 2016. On August 25, 2017, during Order XXXIX Rule 2A proceedings, a Local Commissioner checked Delhi shops. On January 24, 2018, the rejection application under Order VII Rule 11 was dismissed, injunction confirmed (clarifying liberty for "CHEMIST BRAND GERM TROLL"), and the suit converted to commercial as CS(COMM) 85/2018. Issues were framed on July 9, 2018. Defendants' appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench on July 3, 2018, but the Supreme Court stayed it on February 8, 2019, urging disposal within six months. Evidence was recorded by a Local Commissioner from November 28, 2019. Judgment was reserved on May 30, 2025, and pronounced on August 20, 2025.

Core Dispute: The central conflict centered on whether defendants infringed the plaintiff's trademarks and copyrights in "DOCTOR BRAND PHENYLE" and "DOCTOR BRAND GERM TROLL," and passed off their goods as the plaintiff's through deceptively similar marks like "DOCTOR HAZEL'S BRAND PHENYL" and "CHEMIST BRAND GERM TROLL." Key sub-issues included the plaintiff's prior adoption and registration, the generic nature of "DOCTOR" and "GERM TROLL," distinctiveness of composite marks, and fabricated packaging claims. Territorial jurisdiction was pivotal, with the plaintiff asserting Delhi sales via websites, e-commerce, and Local Commissioner reports, while defendants argued passive online presence, no proven sales, and Kanpur-based operations. The suit also touched on family assignments, disclaimers in registrations, and common trade practices in phenyle branding.

Discussion on Judgments:The parties and court referenced several precedents to substantiate their positions on jurisdiction, trademark principles, and infringement. On territorial jurisdiction, the defendants relied on Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi, 2006 (9) SCC 41, in the context that filing a trademark application or executing an assignment in Delhi does not confer jurisdiction, as cause of action arises from use, not registration processes. The court agreed, noting this barred claims based on the defendants' Delhi-based assignment of "DOCTOR HAZEL'S." Banyan Tree Holding v. A Murali Krishna Reddy, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3780, was cited by defendants to argue passive websites do not create jurisdiction unless targeted commercial activity is shown; the court applied this to rule the defendants' site was passive, lacking evidence of Delhi-targeted sales. Indovax v. Merck Animal Health, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 9393, was referenced in the judgment to support rejecting jurisdiction claims without documentary evidence of sales, mirroring the plaintiff's failure to prove Delhi sales at filing. Kohinoor Seed Fields India Private Limited v. Veda Seed Sciences Private Limited, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 2404, was used by the court to dismiss IndiaMart listings as jurisdictional hooks, since they were third-party actions without proven communication or orders. On trademark infringement, Vardhman Buildtech Pvt. Ltd. v. Vardhman Properties Ltd., 2016 SCC OnLine Del 4738, was invoked by defendants to argue no exclusivity over parts of composite marks like "DOCTOR" without separate registration; the court applied this to limit the plaintiff's claims. Vasundhra Jewellers Pvt. Ltd. v. Kirat Vinodbhai Jadvani, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 3370, reinforced the anti-dissection rule, citing South India Beverages India Private Limited v. General Mills Marketing Inc, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 1953, to emphasize comparing marks as wholes; the court used this to find no deceptive similarity. VIP Industries v. Carlton Shoes, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 4620, was cited in the judgment to hold no infringement between registered proprietors under Section 28(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Finally, Sathyanath v. Sarojamani, 2022 7 SCC 644, was referenced by the court to justify adjudicating all issues despite jurisdictional dismissal, ensuring comprehensive resolution.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:Justice Amit Bansal meticulously analyzed the jurisdictional issue first, concluding Delhi courts lacked authority under Section 20(c) of the CPC, as no substantial evidence showed defendants' infringing sales in Delhi at suit filing. He dismissed website claims as passive, IndiaMart listings as non-commercial, and Local Commissioner reports as post-filing or hearsay, emphasizing cause of action must exist at institution. On merits, despite returning the plaint, he examined infringement claims. For "DOCTOR BRAND PHENYLE," he held no trademark infringement due to mutual registrations and anti-dissection principles, noting "DOCTOR" was generic, disclaimed in defendants' registration, and common to trade. He found labels distinct, accusing the plaintiff of fabricating red-yellow packaging to mimic defendants', contrasting it with the plaintiff's registered blue-white scheme. For "DOCTOR BRAND GERM TROLL," he ruled the mark originated with the partnership transferred to defendants, was descriptive (implying germ control), and lacked plaintiff exclusivity. Packaging comparisons showed no visual similarity, with defendants' red-white scheme used since 2000. He rejected passing off for insufficient deception likelihood and copyright claims for non-originality in plaintiff's asserted labels. Overall, the judge prioritized evidentiary rigor, family business histories, and statutory interpretations, balancing IP protection with fair competition.

Final Decision:The suit was returned to the plaintiff for lack of territorial jurisdiction, with no findings of trademark infringement, copyright violation, or passing off. The plaintiff was denied injunctions, accounts rendition, delivery up, damages, and costs. Issues on misjoinder favored the plaintiff, but all substantive claims were resolved against it. Pending applications were disposed of accordingly.

Law Settled in This Case:This judgment reinforces that territorial jurisdiction in IP suits requires concrete evidence of cause of action, such as proven sales or targeted online activity, at the time of filing, not post-suit discoveries or passive websites. It clarifies that composite trademarks grant protection only to the whole, not parts, unless separately registered, and generic/laudatory terms like "DOCTOR" for disinfectants cannot be monopolized. Descriptive marks like "GERM TROLL" lack distinctiveness without secondary meaning proof. Family assignments must be explicitly documented for rights transfer. Courts must adjudicate all issues even if dismissing on jurisdiction to avoid multiplicity, per Order XIV Rule 2 CPC. Fabricated evidence, like altered packaging, undermines claims, and common trade dresses preclude passing off.

Case Title: Vikrant Chemico Industries Pvt Ltd Vs Shri Gopal Engineering and Chemical Works Pvt Ltd & Ors
Date of Order: August 20, 2025
Case Number: CS(COMM) 85/2018
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:6457
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Amit Bansal

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Sunil S/o Darshan Saberwal Vs Star India Private Limited

No Copyright in Film Titles

Introduction: This case involves a dispute over the use of the title "LOOTERE" in the entertainment industry, pitting a film producer against a media company producing a web series. The plaintiff, who produced a 1993 Hindi film titled "LOOTERE," sought to prevent the defendants from using the same title for their web series, claiming ownership through copyright and registrations with film producers' associations. The Bombay High Court examined whether copyright subsists in a mere title and if such registrations confer enforceable rights against non-members. The judgment underscores the limitations of intellectual property protection in titles under Indian law, emphasizing statutory requirements over industry practices.

Factual Background: The plaintiff, Sunil Saberwal, operating as Shree Krishna International, produced the Hindi film "LOOTERE" in 1993, starring actors like Sunny Deol and Juhi Chawla. The film received a censor certificate and was registered with the Western India Film Producers Association, with renewals extending to categories like web series. The plaintiff also held a copyright certificate for the cinematograph film. In September 2022, the plaintiff discovered a trailer for a web series titled "LOOTERE" on Disney+ Hotstar, produced by the first defendant (originally Novi Digital Entertainment Pvt. Ltd., later amalgamated into Star India Pvt. Ltd., and subsequently JioStar India Pvt. Ltd.) with production services from the second defendant. The web series depicted Somali piracy, unrelated to the plaintiff's love story film. The plaintiff issued notices demanding cessation, but the defendants proceeded, releasing the series on March 22, 2024. The defendants claimed no copyright in titles and obtained a no-objection from another entity believing it held the title.

Procedural Background : The plaintiff filed a Commercial Intellectual Property Rights Suit No. 236 of 2024 in the Bombay High Court, seeking declarations and perpetual injunctions against the defendants' use of "LOOTERE." Concurrently, Interim Application No. 3347 of 2024 was filed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure for temporary injunction. 

Core Dispute : The central issue was whether the plaintiff could restrain the defendants from using "LOOTERE" based on copyright in the 1993 film or registrations with film associations. The plaintiff argued ownership of the title through copyright and associations' registrations, asserting no other entity could use it without permission. The defendants contended no copyright exists in mere titles, citing Supreme Court precedent, and that associations' registrations lack statutory force, especially against non-members. Additional disputes included delay in filing, the series' release rendering injunction infructuous, and the absence of similarity in underlying works.

Discussion on Judgments: The plaintiff relied on Karan Johar Versus India Pride Advisory Private Ltd. and Others (Interim Application (L) No. 17865 of 2024, decided on March 7, 2025, by the Bombay High Court), where a single judge recognized enforceable rights in a title involving personality rights, as the defendant's film used the plaintiff's name "Karan Johar" in its title and story, leading to an injunction for unauthorized exploitation of publicity rights. This was upheld in Sanjay S/o Girish Kumar Singh Versus Karan Johar also known as Rahul Johar and Others (Commercial Appeal (L) No. 9786 of 2025, decided on May 7, 2025, by the Bombay High Court Division Bench), which affirmed personality and publicity rights protection but clarified it did not extend to mere titles without such elements. The defendants cited Krishika Lulla and Others Versus Shyam Vithalrao Devkatta and Another ((2016) 2 SCC 521, Supreme Court of India), where the court held no copyright subsists in titles like "Desi Boys," as they are not literary works under Section 13 of the Copyright Act, 1957, quashing a criminal complaint for infringement. They also referenced M/s. Lyca Productions and Another Versus J. Manimaran and Others (2018 SCC OnLine Mad 597, Madras High Court Division Bench), ruling that title registrations with associations are contractual and not enforceable against non-members, lacking statutory basis. Additional foreign and Indian precedents included Maxwell v. Hogg ((1867) LR 2 Ch App 307, English Court), Francis Day & Hunter Ltd. v. Twentieth Century Fox Corpn. Ltd. (1939 SCC OnLine PC 50 : AIR 1940 PC 55, Privy Council), E.M. Forster v. A.N. Parasuram (1964 SCC OnLine Mad 23 : AIR 1964 Mad 331, Madras High Court), Kanungo Media (P) Ltd. v. RGV Film Factory (2007 SCC OnLine Del 314 : ILR (2007) 1 Del 1122, Delhi High Court), R. Radha Krishnan v. A.R. Murugadoss (2013 SCC OnLine Mad 2968 : (2013) 5 LW 429, Madras High Court), Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited Versus Ameya Vinod Khopkar Entertainment and Others ((2020) 83 PTC 309, Bombay High Court), and Fish Eye Network Pvt. Ltd. Versus Association of Motion Pictures and T.V. Programme Producers and Others (Notice of Motion in Suit (L) No. 901 of 2011, dated April 5, 2011, Bombay High Court), all reinforcing no copyright in titles and non-statutory nature of associations' registrations.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: Justice Sandeep V. Marne meticulously analyzed the plaintiff's claims, distinguishing between copyright in the cinematograph film and its title. He noted the plaintiff's undisputed copyright in the 1993 film but clarified it does not extend to the title, as titles are not "works" under Section 2(y) of the Copyright Act, 1957. Relying on Krishika Lulla, he emphasized titles like "LOOTERE" (meaning robbers) lack originality and substantiality for protection. He dismissed the relevance of Karan Johar judgments, as they pertained to personality rights, not mere titles. On associations' registrations, he held they are internal contractual arrangements without statutory force, enforceable only among members, and inapplicable to the non-member first defendant, citing Lyca Productions. He addressed the defendants' inquiry with another association as irrelevant, since the producer (first defendant) did not seek permission and was unbound. The judge highlighted industry practices allowing multiple films with identical titles if stories differ, noting no similarity here. He criticized the plaintiff's delay, from noticing the trailer in September 2022 to filing in March 2024, post-release, rendering the injunction infructuous and indicating lack of urgency. Balance of convenience favored the defendants, with the series already streaming, and any loss compensable by damages, absent in the plaint.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the interim application, refusing temporary injunction. It held the plaintiff failed the triple test of prima facie case, irreparable injury, and balance of convenience. The suit's prayers for restraining production and release were infructuous, as the web series was already streaming.

Law Settled in This Case: This judgment reaffirms that no copyright subsists in mere titles of films or web series under the Copyright Act, 1957, as they do not qualify as original literary works. Registrations with film producers' associations are contractual and lack statutory enforceability, binding only members and ineffective against outsiders. Delays in seeking injunctions, especially post-release, can bar relief, emphasizing the need for prompt action. Personality rights protections do not extend to generic titles without personal elements. Industry customs allowing similar titles persist if underlying stories differ, prioritizing substantive content over nomenclature.

Case Title: Sunil S/o Darshan Saberwal Vs Star India Private Limited And Ors., 
Date of Order: 18 August 2025, 
Case Number: Commercial Intellectual Property Rights Suit No. 236 of 2024
Neutral Citation: 2025:BHC-OS:13777
Name of Court: Bombay High Court
Name of  Hon'ble Judge: Sandeep V. Marne.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Friday, August 15, 2025

Shemaroo Entertainment Ltd. vs Saregama India Limited

Copyright ownership and digital exploitation of musical works

Introduction: The case of Shemaroo Entertainment Ltd. vs Saregama India Limited And 2 Ors., adjudicated by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay on August 12, 2025, involves a copyright dispute within the Indian entertainment industry concerning the digital exploitation of musical works. The plaintiff, Shemaroo Entertainment Ltd., sought an interim injunction to restrain the defendants, Saregama India Limited and others, from unauthorized use of certain sound recordings and underlying works. This interim application, decided within Commercial IP Suit No. 557 of 2022, delves into the complexities of copyright ownership, licensing agreements, and the scope of digital rights, providing a critical examination of intellectual property law in the context of evolving media platforms.

Factual Background: Shemaroo Entertainment Ltd., a well-established entity in the media and entertainment sector, claims ownership or exclusive rights to a substantial catalog of sound recordings and underlying musical works, acquired through assignments and licensing agreements over decades. The plaintiff alleges that Saregama India Limited, a competitor with a vast music library, along with Gravity Zero Entertainment LLP and another defendant, has been exploiting certain of Shemaroo’s copyrighted works on digital platforms without authorization. The dispute centers on a specific set of songs, where Shemaroo asserts that its rights, including digital streaming and downloading rights, were violated following the expiration of a prior licensing arrangement with Saregama in 2021. The defendants contend that their use is based on independent rights or lapsed agreements, denying any infringement.

Procedural Background:The plaintiff initiated Commercial IP Suit No. 557 of 2022 before the Bombay High Court, filing Interim Application No. 5236 of 2022 under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, to seek an interim injunction against the defendants. The application was grounded in Sections 51 and 55 of the Copyright Act, 1957, alleging infringement of its exclusive rights. 

Core Dispute:The central issue is whether the defendants’ exploitation of the disputed sound recordings and underlying works on digital platforms constitutes copyright infringement, warranting an interim injunction. The dispute revolves around the interpretation of past licensing agreements, the transfer of rights, and the extent of digital rights retained by Shemaroo post-2021. The plaintiff argues that its exclusive rights were violated, supported by assignment deeds and the absence of a valid license, while the defendants assert that their actions are lawful, based on either their own copyright ownership or the expiration of Shemaroo’s rights, challenging the necessity of an injunction.

Discussion on Judgments: The parties and court relied on several judicial precedents to support their positions. The plaintiff cited Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Eastern India Motion Pictures Association, AIR 1977 SC 1443, to argue that exclusive rights under the Copyright Act, 1957, justify interim relief when infringement is prima facie evident. They also referenced Gramophone Company of India Ltd. v. Super Cassette Industries Ltd., 2002 (25) PTC 510 (Del), to assert that unauthorized digital exploitation breaches copyright, supporting their claim. The defendants relied on Entertainment Network (India) Ltd. v. Super Cassette Industries Ltd., (2008) 13 SCC 30, to contend that licensing agreements can limit exclusive rights, challenging the plaintiff’s scope of control. The court drew on Urmi Juvekar Chiang v. Global Broadcast News Ltd., 2007 (35) PTC 679 (Bom), to balance creator rights with public access, and referenced Saregama India Ltd. v. Next Radio Ltd., 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 9735, to emphasize the need for clear evidence of infringement, influencing the judicial analysis.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:The court, presided over by an unnamed judge, conducted a detailed examination of the licensing agreements and assignment deeds presented by the plaintiff, focusing on the transfer of digital rights. The judge found that Shemaroo had established a prima facie case of ownership over the disputed works, supported by documentary evidence of assignments post-2021. However, the defendants’ contention that certain rights reverted to them or were never transferred was noted as requiring further scrutiny. The court recognized the potential for consumer confusion and economic harm to Shemaroo due to unauthorized digital exploitation, tipping the balance of convenience in the plaintiff’s favor. The public interest in accessing music was considered, but the judge concluded that it did not outweigh the need to protect Shemaroo’s prima facie rights pending trial, justifying interim relief.

Final Decision:The High Court allowed Interim Application No. 5236 of 2022, granting an interim injunction in favor of Shemaroo Entertainment Ltd. The defendants, Saregama India Limited and the other respondents, were restrained from exploiting the disputed sound recordings and underlying works on digital platforms until the final disposal of Commercial IP Suit No. 557 of 2022. However for other relief, the Court indicated that the Plaintiff has to amend the pleadings,

Law Settled in This Case: This judgment clarifies that a plaintiff with prima facie evidence of copyright ownership and exclusive digital rights can secure an interim injunction against unauthorized exploitation, even in the presence of competing claims. It establishes that the balance of convenience and potential irreparable harm to the copyright holder outweigh public access considerations at the interim stage, provided the plaintiff demonstrates a reasonable likelihood of success. The decision reinforces the protective scope of the Copyright Act, 1957, in the digital era, emphasizing the importance of clear contractual documentation in determining rights.

Case Title: Shemaroo Entertainment Ltd. vs Saregama India Limited And 2 Ors.
Date of Order: 12 August, 2025
Case Number: Commercial IP Suit No. 557 of 2022
Neutral Citation: 2025:BHC-OS:13267
Name of Court: High Court of Bombay
Name of Judge: Hon'ble  Sharmila U. Deshmukh, H.J.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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