Friday, August 22, 2025

Court on Its Own Motion Vs Obsession Naaz

### Introduction
This case revolves around a criminal contempt proceeding initiated by the High Court of Delhi on its own motion following a violent attack on court-appointed Advocate Commissioners in Kolkata. The incident stemmed from a trademark infringement suit filed by Samsung Electronics Company Limited against vendors selling counterfeit products bearing its marks. The court's intervention highlighted the critical need to protect the administration of justice from interference, particularly when judicial officers or commissioners are obstructed in executing court orders. The judgment underscores the judiciary's role in upholding its authority against premeditated disruptions, balancing the principles of wilful disobedience with the requirement for proof beyond reasonable doubt.


### Factual Background
Samsung Electronics Company Limited, a global leader in electronics with operations in over 67 countries including India, discovered in November 2014 that several vendors in the Khidderpore area of Kolkata were selling counterfeit mobile phones, tablets, and accessories under its trademark "Samsung" and oval slanted logo. The company identified five main markets and 15 vendors involved in this activity. On December 23, 2014, the Delhi High Court, in the suit CS(OS) No. 4024/2014, restrained these vendors from dealing in counterfeit goods and appointed 11 Advocate Commissioners to inspect specific shops, prepare inventories of infringing products, seize them, seal them, and release them on superdari for production in court as needed. The commissioners were authorized to seek assistance from Samsung representatives and local police.


The commissioners coordinated with Samsung's counsel and informed the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Enforcement), Kolkata, in advance. On January 13, 2015, they arrived at the markets with 21 police personnel. Upon reaching the sites, they encountered resistance: shops were shut, lights turned off, and mobs gathered, armed with rods, hockey sticks, and lathis. Several commissioners were assaulted; for instance, Mr. Shravan Sahary suffered blows to his face, losing two teeth, while Mr. Ankur Mittal received multiple injuries. The mobs manhandled police personnel and forced the teams to flee without completing the inspections. Injured commissioners and police were treated at hospitals, and a FIR was registered by Kolkata Police under various IPC sections. The attack appeared premeditated, as news of the raid had spread, leading to the removal of counterfeit goods beforehand.


### Procedural Background
The underlying suit, CS(OS) No. 4024/2014, was filed by Samsung against 15 defendants for trademark infringement. The court issued an ex-parte injunction and appointed commissioners on December 23, 2014. Following the January 13, 2015 incident, Mr. Shravan Sahary mentioned the matter before the Delhi High Court on January 22, 2015, leading to suo motu criminal contempt proceedings. Notices were issued to the original 16 defendants and the DCP, Kolkata, for explanations. The matter was transferred to a Division Bench. Based on police investigations, additional respondents (Nos. 17-30) were impleaded between March 2015 and April 2024. Affidavits were filed by respondents denying involvement, claiming alibis, or tendering apologies. Kolkata Police submitted charge-sheets and additional affidavits identifying attackers. The court appointed an Amicus Curiae and heard arguments, culminating in the judgment on August 22, 2025.


### Core Dispute
The central issue was whether the respondents committed criminal contempt by wilfully interfering with the administration of justice through their actions in obstructing and assaulting the court-appointed Advocate Commissioners. The court examined if the respondents' conduct demonstrated knowledge of the court order and intent to disrupt its execution, constituting contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Respondents argued lack of awareness, alibis, or mere bystander status, while the Amicus Curiae contended it was a concerted effort to thwart judicial process. The dispute hinged on proving "wilful" interference beyond reasonable doubt, balancing apologies with the gravity of the assault on court officers.


### Discussion on Judgments
The court relied on several Supreme Court judgments to define the scope of criminal contempt, emphasizing wilful disobedience and interference in justice. In Jhareswar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly, (2002) 5 SCC 352, cited in the context of upholding judicial majesty, the Apex Court observed that contempt jurisdiction protects the dignity of courts as a guarantee for citizens' rights, underscoring that undermining respect for the judiciary erodes democratic fabric—this was referred to establish the purpose of contempt proceedings in the present case. Ram Kishan v. Tarun Bajaj, (2014) 16 SCC 204, was extensively quoted to explain that contempt requires "wilful" disobedience, excluding accidental or negligent acts, and demands proof beyond reasonable doubt; it was used to delineate that proceedings are quasi-criminal and must be exercised cautiously, applying this to assess if respondents' actions were intentional. U.N. Bora v. Assam Roller Flour Mills Association, (2022) 1 SCC 101, was invoked to reiterate principles from prior cases, noting that two interpretations of an action favor non-contumacious views if possible, and was referenced to affirm the need for mental intent in interference. Hukum Chand Deswal v. Satish Raj Deswal, (2021) 13 SCC 166, was cited alongside Ram Kishan to emphasize the "wilful" element as knowingly intentional, excluding bona fide inability, and was applied to evaluate respondents' claims of unawareness. S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman, (1985) 1 SCC 591, was mentioned in the context of excluding compelling circumstances from contempt, used to reject alibis lacking proof. Rakapalli Raja Ram Gopala Rao v. Naragani Govinda Sehararao, (1989) 4 SCC 255, Niaz Mohammad v. State of Haryana, (1994) 6 SCC 332, Chordia Automobiles v. S. Moosa, (2000) 3 SCC 282, Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh, (2002) 4 SCC 21, Bank of Baroda v. Sadruddin Hasan Daya, (2004) 1 SCC 360, State of Orissa v. Mohd. Illiyas, (2006) 1 SCC 275, Sahdeo v. State of U.P., (2010) 3 SCC 705, National Fertilizers Ltd. v. Tuncay Alankus, (2013) 9 SCC 600, Sushila Raje Holkar v. Anil Kak, (2008) 14 SCC 392, and Three Cheers Entertainment (P) Ltd. v. CESC Ltd., (2008) 16 SCC 592, were collectively referenced as precedents on standards of proof, wilfulness, and caution in contempt, invoked to support the finding that only deliberate interference qualifies as contempt in this mob attack scenario. R.N. Dey v. Bhagyabati Pramanik, (2000) 4 SCC 400, was quoted approvingly in U.N. Bora to reinforce contempt's contours, applied here to limit proceedings to proven wilful acts.


The judges reasoned that criminal contempt under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, requires wilful interference in justice administration, proven beyond reasonable doubt, as established in precedents like Ram Kishan v. Tarun Bajaj. They analyzed affidavits and police reports, finding the attack premeditated: shops were preemptively cleared, shutters downed, and mobs mobilized upon commissioners' arrival. This demonstrated intent to obstruct court orders, as respondents knew of the raid's purpose from interactions. Alibis by shop owners (e.g., Respondents 1, 4, 13) were rejected, as their absence did not negate orchestration or knowledge, evidenced by on-site resistance. Mere bystanders (e.g., cycle repairers, bus conductors) lacked intent or knowledge, discharging them. However, identified attackers and shop affiliates showed wilfulness by inciting violence to prevent seizures, undermining judicial authority. Apologies were insufficient given injuries to commissioners and police, emphasizing deterrence to uphold rule of law. The analysis balanced evidence with contempt's quasi-criminal nature, confining punishment to those with proven interference.

The court held Respondents Nos. 1, 2, 4, 10, 11, 13, 17, 18, 21, 22, 24, and 27 guilty of criminal contempt for wilfully interfering in justice administration. Each was fined Rs. 2,000 and sentenced to one day of simple imprisonment, with medical examination in Tihar Jail. Notices against other respondents were discharged. The petition was disposed of, with observations limited to contempt proceedings, not affecting parallel criminal cases.
 
This case reaffirms that criminal contempt requires wilful interference in justice administration, proven beyond reasonable doubt, excluding accidental or unaware acts. Obstructing court-appointed commissioners constitutes contempt if intentional, as it undermines judicial majesty and citizens' rights protection. Unconditional apologies do not absolve grave interferences like violent assaults on court officers. Courts must exercise contempt powers sparingly but firmly to deter premeditated disruptions, ensuring rule of law prevails without affecting parallel criminal trials.

Court on Its Own Motion Vs Obsession Naaz & Ors.: August 22, 2025:CONT.CAS.(CRL) 3/2015:2025:DHC:7206-DB:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Subramonium Prasad and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Yatra Online Limited Vs Mach Conferences and Events Limited


Introduction
The dispute between Yatra Online Limited (Plaintiff) and Mach Conferences and Events Limited (Defendant) arose in connection with alleged infringement, passing off, misrepresentation, dilution, and unfair competition pertaining to the trademark ‘YATRA’, including device marks and formative domain names. This case study delves into the complexities surrounding claims for exclusivity over generic and descriptive marks in the travel services industry, the nuances of prima facie rights, and the scope of injunctive relief in trademark cases before the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi.
Factual Background

Yatra Online Limited asserted its status as the registered proprietor of multiple trade marks such as 'YATRA.COM', 'YATRA WITH DEVICE', 'YATRA FREIGHT', and related device marks. The plaintiff highlighted the adoption of ‘YATRA’ as its trade name in 2005 and its business operations commencing in 2006 through the website www.yatra.com and associated platforms. The brand ‘YATRA’ was presented as a dominant market player in online travel bookings and related services, boasting a large customer base and multi-channel presence. In fiscal year 2024-2025, the plaintiff acquired Globe All India Services Limited, further solidifying its corporate clientele to over 1,200 clients.

Upon discovering the defendant’s intent to launch www.bookmyyatra.com, the plaintiff observed Mach Conferences and Events Limited attempting to register and use confusingly similar marks for identical travel-related services. This included trade mark applications for ‘BookMyYatra’ and ‘BookMyYatra.com’, domain registration, and evidence from an Analyst/Investor meeting transcript. The plaintiff considered the defendant’s actions a deliberate attempt to capitalize on the reputation and goodwill established by Yatra’s longstanding use.

Conversely, the defendant argued that ‘YATRA’ is a generic, descriptive word meaning ‘journey’ in Hindi, and is widely used in the travel industry by various businesses. The defendant claimed no exclusive rights accrue to the plaintiff, especially in Class 39, as the Registrar had issued device mark registrations with a disclaimer expressly denying exclusivity over the word ‘YATRA’.
Procedural Background

The plaintiff filed a suit seeking injunction against the defendant from using the marks ‘BOOKMYYATRA’ and ‘BOOKMYYATRA.COM’, and requested delivery of the defendant’s domain name. The plaintiff further sought withdrawal of the defendant’s trade mark applications and damages. By an ex-parte interim order dated 09.12.2024, the defendant was restrained from using the impugned marks pending further hearing. The defendant filed a detailed reply opposing interim relief, followed by a rejoinder from the plaintiff. The application was finally heard and reserved for order on 27.07.2025.

During arguments, the plaintiff emphasized its statutory and common law rights, asserting ‘YATRA’ as having acquired a secondary meaning due to long and exclusive market use. The defendant countered, highlighting multiple instances of third-party use, registration refusals, disclaimers, and the generic nature of 'YATRA' and '.com', arguing that no confusion or exclusive rights could be claimed.
Core Dispute

The crux of the dispute rested on whether the plaintiff could claim exclusive statutory and common law rights over the mark ‘YATRA’, considering its registration status, disclaimers, evidence of goodwill, and the prevailing use of the word within the industry. The court was to decide the validity and enforceability of trade marks containing generic elements, the implications of disclaimers on exclusivity, and whether the defendant’s marks ‘BookMyYatra’ and ‘BookMyYatra.com’ constituted infringement, passing off, or justified remedial injunction.
Discussion on Judgments – Complete Citations and Context

Both parties heavily relied on precedent to support their positions. The plaintiff’s counsel cited the following authorities:


Registrar of Trade Marks v. Ashok Chandra Rakhit Limited, 1955 SCC OnLine SC 12 (regarding the effect of disclaimers).


Pidilite Industries Limited v. Riya Chemy, 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 5077 (impact of disclaimers and common law rights).


Ramdev Food Products (P) Ltd. v. Arvindbhai Rambhai Patel & Others, (2006) 8 SCC 726 (common law rights and secondary meaning).


Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satyadeo Gupta, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 13; Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Limited, 1959 SCC OnLine SC 11 (similarity and confusion).


Sky Enterprise Private Ltd. v. Abaad Masala & Co., 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 750; British School Society v. Sanjay Gandhi Educational Society and Another, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1165; British School Society v. British International School, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 5210.


Frank Reddaway & Co. Ltd. v. Banham & Co. Ltd., AC 1999; Godfrey Philips India Ltd. v. Girnar Food & Bevarages (P) Ltd., (2004) 5 SCC 257 (secondary meaning and household reputation).


K.R. Chinna Krishna Chettiar v. Shri Ambal & Co., (1969) 2 SCC 131; Parle Products (P) Ltd. v. J.P. and Co., Mysore, (1972) 1 SCC 618; Mex Switchgears Pvt. Ltd. v. Omex Cables Industries, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 10412; Pidilite Industries Ltd. v. S.M. Associates, 2003 SCC OnLine Bom 143 (deceptive similarity).


Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah, (2002) 3 SCC 65 (honest business practices).


Bal Pharma Ltd. v. Centaur Laboratories Pvt. Ltd., 2001 SCC OnLine Bom 1176; S. Syed Mohideen v. P. Sulochana Bai, (2016) 2 SCC 683 (bad faith/adoption).


M/s Info Edge (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Shailesh Gupta, 2002 SCC OnLine Del 239; Satyam Infoway Ltd. v. Siffynet Solutions (P) Ltd., (2004) 6 SCC 145; Ruston & Hornsby Ltd. v. Zamindara Engineering Co., (1969) 2 SCC 727; Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 73; Century Traders v. Roshan Lal Duggar & Co., 1977 SCC OnLine Del 50 (domain name and passing off).


M/s. Jawahar Engineering Co. v. M/s. Jawahar Engineers Pvt. Ltd., 1983 SCC OnLine Del 41; Intel Corporation v. Harpreet Singh, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 7264; Mars Inc. v. Kumar Krishna Mukerjee, 2002 SCC OnLine Del 1218 (quia timet injunctions).


National Bell Co. v. Metal Goods Mfg. Co. (P) Ltd., (1970) 3 SCC 665; Pankaj Goel v. Dabur India Ltd., 2008 SCC OnLine Del 1744; Glaxosmithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Horizon Bioceuticals Pvt. Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2065; Rajesh Chugh v. Chhavi Poplai, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 6717; Goenka Institute v. Anjani Kumar, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 1691; Dr. Reddy's Labs Ltd. v. Reddy Pharmaceuticals Ltd., 2004 SCC OnLine Del 668; Lupin Limited v. Eris Lifesciences Pvt. Ltd., 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 6807; Shree Nath Heritage Liquor Pvt. Ltd. v. Allied Blender & Distiller Pvt. Ltd., 2015 SCC OnLine Del 10164 (third-party use).

The defendant’s counsel referenced:


Parakh Vanijya Pvt. Ltd. v. Baroma Agro Product, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 686 (effect of disclaimers).


Nilkamal Crates & Containers v. Ms. Reena Rajpal, 2023:DHC:8087 (whole mark policy under Section 17 of Trade Marks Act).


BigTree Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. v. Brain Seek Sportainment Pvt. Ltd., 2017:DHC:7767; People Interactive (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Vivek Pahwa, 2016 SCC Online Bom 7351; Juice Generation Inc. v. GS Enters LLC, 2015 U.S App. LEXIS 12456; Office Cleaning Services LD. V. Westminster Window and General Cleaners LD., (1946) 63 RPC 39; Radio Taxicabs (London) Ltd. v. Owner Driver Radio Taxi Services Ltd., RPC 351.


Kamdhenu Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 2023 SCC Online Del 3913; J.R Kapoor v. Micronix India, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 215; Pernod Ricard India Pvt. Ltd. v. A.B Sugars Limited, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 6966; PhonePe Pvt. Ltd. v. EZY Services, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 2635; Ayushakti Ayurved Pvt. Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Limited, 2003 SCC OnLine Bom 404; Vijay Kumar Ahuja v. Lalita Ahuja, 2001 SCC OnLine Del 1215.

The context for these precedents included the market effect of disclaimers, what constitutes generic and descriptive marks, standards for secondary meaning, the principle of anti-dissection and dominant marks, and the prerequisites for injunctive relief.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

Justice Tejas Karia provided a detailed rationale examining whether the plaintiff’s marks had acquired distinctiveness or secondary meaning. The court recognized the plaintiff's longstanding market use and device mark registrations but underscored that the Registrar of Trade Marks expressly issued a disclaimer, denying exclusive rights over ‘YATRA’.

It was reasoned that ‘YATRA’, being a synonym for ‘travel’ in Hindi, is a generic and descriptive term commonly employed in the travel industry. The market was replete with various businesses and registered marks containing ‘YATRA’, undermining the plaintiff’s claim for exclusivity or secondary meaning. The court scrutinized evidence of market adoption, business operations, reputational claims, and differences in marks, emphasizing that generic and descriptive marks, even with significant market reputation, cannot be monopolized absent distinctiveness.

Further, the court adopted the whole mark policy, stating that the defendant’s marks 'BookMyYatra' and 'BookMyYatra.com', viewed in their entirety and with their prefixes, were distinguishable from the plaintiff’s device marks and did not create likelihood of confusion. The use of ‘BookMy’ was deemed to be a common prefix in online businesses (e.g., BookMyShow, BookMyTrip), and '.com' was held to be generic and incapable of conferring distinctiveness.

The court found no prima facie case of infringement, deception, or passing off, nor did the plaintiff satisfy requirements for declaring ‘YATRA’ a well-known mark under Section 2(zg) of the Trade Marks Act or Rule 124 of the Trade Mark Rules.

Based on the above reasoning, the court dismissed the application for interim injunction. No permanent relief was granted. The ex-parte restraint against the defendant using 'BookMyYatra' and 'BookMyYatra.com' or the domain name www.bookmyyatra.com was vacated, finding no prima facie case for infringement or passing off. The court held that generic and descriptive marks such as 'YATRA' and '.com', absent secondary meaning, do not qualify for legal protection from third-party use in the context of the travel services industry.

The judgment clarified that generic or descriptive words—especially those commonly used in the relevant industry—cannot be monopolized or protected as trade marks in the absence of distinctiveness or secondary meaning. Disclaimers attached to device mark registrations restrict the proprietor from claiming exclusivity over the disclaimed element. Moreover, the presence of widespread industry use and registration of similar marks by different proprietors precludes the grant of exclusivity or injunctive relief. When marks are to be compared, courts must examine them as wholes, not merely by their constituent parts, and generic website suffixes like '.com' have no distinctiveness.

Yatra Online Limited Vs Mach Conferences and Events Limited: August 22, 2025: CS(COMM) 1099/2024: 2025:DHC:7167:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Sushil Kumar Vs The Polo/Lauren Company

Introduction

The dispute between Sushil Kumar T/A Da Polo & Anr. and The Polo/Lauren Company L.P. pivots on crucial questions of territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction in the realm of trademark and copyright enforcement, especially in the digital era. The matter came before the High Court of Delhi, challenging the decision of the Commercial Court (South District, Saket Court, New Delhi) to entertain a suit for permanent injunction based on alleged infringement, passing off, and copyright violation due to the use of trade marks similar to those of the respondent. The petitioners sought judicial intervention under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, raising fundamental issues about the interplay between internet-based commerce and forum conveniens in intellectual property litigation.

Factual Background

The Respondent, The Polo/Lauren Company L.P., holds registrations for multiple formative variants of the mark "POLO," including "POLO RALPH LAUREN," and other associated device marks, with registered protection over goods and services in their class. The Petitioners, Sushil Kumar T/A Da Polo and another, were accused of adopting and using the impugned trade mark "DA POLO" on identical goods, marketing these through their own website (www.dapolo.in) and e-commerce platforms such as www.indiamart.com. The Respondent contended that such acts constituted infringement, passing off, and copyright violation, seeking permanent injunction restraining those acts. The core factual assertion by the Respondent was that these infringing products were networked and made accessible to customers within the territorial jurisdiction of the South Delhi Commercial Court.

Procedural Background

The suit was filed by the Respondent before the Commercial Court seeking permanent injunction, damages, and other reliefs. The Petitioners, acting as Defendants in that suit, moved an application under Order VII Rules 10 and 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, together with Sections 35, 35A, and 151, to dismiss or return the plaint for lack of jurisdiction and inadequate valuation. The Commercial Court rejected the application, considering the objections 'by way of demurrer', leading the Petitioners to file the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before the High Court of Delhi.

Core Dispute

At the heart of this litigation were three intertwined issues. First, whether the Commercial Court in South Delhi had territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction in light of the Petitioners’ principal places of business being in Sonipat (Haryana) and Rohini (New Delhi), and the absence of specific evidence of commercial transactions within its jurisdiction. Second, whether mere accessibility or interactivity of the Petitioners’ website constituted purposeful availment of the jurisdiction of the Commercial Court, especially for internet-based disputes in trademark infringement and passing off actions. Third, whether the provisions of Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 enabled forum shopping, or should be harmonized with Section 20 of CPC in accordance with Supreme Court interpretations to prevent abuse of process.

Discussion on Judgments

The parties cited and relied upon an array of precedents, which the judge meticulously discussed:

St. Ives Laboratories Inc. v. Arif Perfumers & Anr. (2009) 40 PTC 104 (Delhi) was referenced by the Petitioners to suggest that mere assertions of clandestine sales do not confer jurisdiction and that such suits could be a device for harassment.

Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanushali (Gajra) Dead through Legal Representatives & Ors. (2020) 7 SCC 366 (Supreme Court of India) as cited by the Petitioners, underscored that a plaint which is manifestly vexatious and does not disclose a clear right to sue must be nipped at the threshold.

Coromandel Indag Products India Ltd. v. Sumitomo Chemical Company Ltd. & Anr. 2025 SCC OnLine Del 4647 (Delhi High Court) reaffirmed the principle that courts must look for meaningful pleadings rather than clever drafting creating an illusion of cause of action.

Banyan Tree Holding Limited v. M. Murali Krishna Reddy & Anr. 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3780 (Delhi High Court, Division Bench) established crucial tests for asserting jurisdiction in internet-based disputes. The judgment held that jurisdiction is not attracted by mere interactivity or accessibility of a website; the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the forum court and specifically targeted customers within the jurisdiction, resulting in injury or harm. This authority was heavily relied on by the Petitioners, with its multi-factor test reaffirmed in subsequent cases.

Impresario Entertainment & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. v. S&D Hospitality 2018 SCC OnLine Del 6392 (Delhi High Court) interpreted Banyan Tree’s tests and held that plaintiffs must prima facie show commercial transactions targeting the forum state, supported by material evidence. Trap transactions, if relied upon, must be fair and transparently pleaded.

Karans Gurukul Classes & Ors. v. Gurukul Classes IIT Division & Ors. 2019 SCC OnLine Del 8444 (Delhi High Court) echoed the earlier judgments, holding that mere website interactivity does not suffice for jurisdiction unless targeted commercial activity is established.

Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia & Anr. (2015) 10 SCC 161 (Supreme Court) was referenced to clarify that Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act provides an additional forum but does not allow forum shopping; suits should be filed at a place where plaintiff carries on business and where the cause of action arises.

Ultra Home Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Purushottam Kumar Chaubey & Ors. 2016 SCC OnLine Del 376 and 2023:DHC:9093 (Delhi High Court) analyzed forum conveniens and the meaning of "carries on business", harmonizing Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act with Section 20 of CPC, favoring the plaintiff’s convenience, yet restricting forum shopping.

World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. v. Reshma Collection & Ors. (2014) 60 PTC 452 (Del) applied similar reasoning to internet-based business models, holding that transactions executed over interactive websites where orders, payments, and deliveries occur within a forum state are akin to having a shop in that state, thus satisfying the "carrying on business" criterion.

Further supporting authorities included Corona Remedies Pvt. Ltd. v. UMAC Pharmaceuticals & Ors.:2023:DHC:5718; Diamond Modular Pvt. Ltd. v. Vikash Kumar & Anr.: 2025:DHC:3619-DB; Shree Girirajji & Co. v. Gagan Pagrani Proprietor of Plastica Industries: 2024:DHC:2230-DB; Marrico Ltd.v. Mr. Mukesh Kumar & Ors. (2018) 253 DLT 8; M/s Allied Blenders & Distillers Pvt. Ltd. v. R.K. Distillers Pvt. Ltd. (2017) 69 PTC 493 all of which contributed to contours of jurisdiction in commercial disputes, especially where business is transacted via interactive websites accessible within the forum state.

On maintainability, Black Diamond Trackparts Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. v. Black Diamond Motors Pvt. Ltd. (2021) 87 PTC 480 (DB), Ashok Kumar Puri & Anr. v. S. Suncon Realtors Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. (2021) 4 HCC (Del) 201, and Deep Industries Limited v. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (2020) 15 SCC 706 were cited to clarify the limited, cautious exercise of Article 227 jurisdiction over Commercial Court orders.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

Justice Tejas Karia conducted a thorough analysis of the pleadings, rival submissions, and the array of precedents. At the outset, he clarified that petitions under Article 227, while maintainable, should only be entertained in exceptional circumstances involving patent lack of inherent jurisdiction. The threshold for interference with Commercial Court orders was set high, favoring expeditious resolution over piecemeal challenges.

The judge recognized that the Respondent had sufficiently pleaded facts demonstrating the causes of action within the territorial jurisdiction of the Commercial Court. Screenshots showed the petitioners marketing allegedly infringing products online, with accessibility to customers within South Delhi. The plaint included credible apprehensions that the petitioners' activities were likely to expand further into that market, thus justifying jurisdiction for preventive relief.

On the pivotal issue of internet-based jurisdiction, Justice Karia harmonized the reasoning from Banyan Tree Holding and World Wrestling Entertainment. He acknowledged the nuanced requirement for purposeful availment — more than mere accessibility or interactivity — insisting that the defendant must target customers within the forum state. However, upon reviewing the documents and pleadings, he concluded that the petitioners’ website, coupled with the presence on multiple e-commerce platforms, established purposeful availment, as customers in the territorial jurisdiction could place orders and receive deliveries of the impugned goods.

Additionally, referencing Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. and Ultra Home Construction Pvt. Ltd., Justice Karia asserted that Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act provides an additional forum only if the plaintiff carries on business in a jurisdiction where a cause of action arises, but does not endorse forum shopping solely on the basis of branch offices or online presence at distant locations. The Respondent’s assertion of active business and sales within South Delhi, recognized by their own averments and online transactions, satisfied this requirement.

Notably, the judge held that objections as to valuation and pecuniary jurisdiction had been abandoned before the Commercial Court and required no further adjudication.

Final Decision

Justice Tejas Karia dismissed the petition under Article 227, upholding the order of the Commercial Court that refused to return or reject the plaint. He determined that the Respondent had properly invoked the jurisdiction by evidencing business activity and potential expansion of the allegedly infringing mark within South Delhi through interactive online platforms. The Commercial Court’s finding was neither perverse nor lacking inherent jurisdiction, and thus did not merit interference through supervisory jurisdiction.

Law Settled in This Case

This case settles several significant legal principles in the context of intellectual property disputes over online commerce. First, it reaffirms that territorial jurisdiction in trademark and copyright suits arising from internet commerce is not triggered merely by the accessibility of a defendant’s website in the forum state; rather, the plaintiff must show that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the forum by targeting customers and conducting actual commercial transactions, resulting in injury within the jurisdiction. Second, it confirms the cautious approach courts must take under Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act to balance the plaintiff’s convenience with prevention of forum shopping, requiring a real nexus between business activities and the forum. Third, it underscores the limited scope of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 in commercial suits, emphasizing prompt resolution and restricting review to cases of patent lack of inherent jurisdiction.

Sushil Kumar Vs The Polo/Lauren Company L.P.: 22 August 2025:CM(M)-IPD 31/2025 :2025:DHC:7159: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.


Vasundhra Jewellers Pvt. Ltd. Vs Vasundhara Fashion Jewellery


Introduction

This case study examines the detailed legal controversy between Vasundhra Jewellers Pvt. Ltd. and M/S Vasundhara Fashion Jewellery LLP & Anr., adjudicated by the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi on August 18, 2025. The dispute pivots around the alleged infringement and passing off of the trademarks "VASUNDHRA" and "VASUNDHARA" in connection with jewellery, precious stones, gems, and other allied goods. The matter delves deep into the nuanced application of trademark law in India, particularly the interpretation and scope of Section 35 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 concerning the bona fide use of one’s own name, and principles impacting both infringement and passing off actions.

Factual Background

Vasundhra Jewellers Pvt. Ltd., the appellant, was established on October 28, 1999, claiming to be the prior user and registered proprietor of the marks "VASUNDHRA" and "VASUNDHRA JEWELLERS" for jewellery and related goods in Class 14. The appellant asserts continuous user and substantial promotional activities, presenting figures of turnover and advertisement expenses from its inception. Contrastingly, the respondents—M/S Vasundhara Fashion Jewellery LLP and its predecessor entities—trace their use of the mark "VASUNDHARA" to 2001, originally as the trading name of Ms. Vasundhara Mantri. The respondents support their bona fide adoption of the mark, claiming registration of trademark and copyright over the stylized "VASUNDHARA" and a history of business activities and publicity.

The appellant accused the respondents of using marks identical or deceptively similar to its own, particularly upon discovering the use of “VASUNDHARA” in 2019 and associated domain names and social media handles. Importantly, the respondents emphasize that "VASUNDHARA" is the first name of the proprietor and highlight their own trademark registrations, asserting honest and concurrent use.
Procedural Background

The dispute began with the appellant filing a suit (CS (COMM) 161/2022) seeking a permanent injunction against the respondents’ use of the allegedly infringing marks. The suit was accompanied by an interlocutory application (IA 4154/2022) for interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC. The Single Judge in the High Court dismissed the interim application, primarily on the grounds that both parties held registrations, the use was bona fide, and that there was no sufficient similarity or risk of confusion. Aggrieved by this, the appellant instituted the present appeal (FAO(OS) (COMM) 232/2023) before the Division Bench, contesting the findings and seeking interlocutory relief.
Core Dispute

The central dispute revolves around whether the respondents’ use of the mark "VASUNDHARA" constitutes passing off or infringement of the appellant’s trademarks "VASUNDHRA" and "VASUNDHRA JEWELLERS." This extends into the sub-issues of (a) prior use and accrual of goodwill by the appellant, (b) bona fide use of personal name by the respondents, (c) similarity and likelihood of confusion between the respective marks, and (d) whether Section 35 of the Trade Marks Act, which protects bona fide use of one’s own name, applies to cases of passing off as well as infringement, specifically when the mark used is only a part of the full name and by a corporate entity as an assignee of an individual.
Discussion on Judgments

A diverse set of judgments and authorities shaped the arguments and reasoning in this case. The following cases were cited, along with the context of their reference:

Precious Jewels v Varun Gems, (2015) 1 SCC 160: Cited to underscore the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 35, holding that bona fide use of one’s surname by a business entity, where connected to ownership, cannot be restrained through an injunction—even where confusion may arise.

Goenka Institute of Education and Research v Anjani Kumar Goenka, 2009 SCC Online Del 1691: The Division Bench had previously commented that Section 35 applies to full names and only to natural persons, not legal entities. However, this was interpreted as obiter and not followed strictly in the present matter.

Vasundhra Jewellers (P) Ltd v Kirat Vinodbhai Jadvani, 2022 SCC Online Del 3370: Used by the respondents to posit that "Vasundhara" is a generic and common name, and exclusivity cannot be claimed. The appellant attempted to distinguish this judgment, noting that it addressed infringement and not passing off.

S. Syed Mohideen v P. Sulochana Bai, (2016) 2 SCC 683: Referenced for the legal position that where two marks are both registered, actions for infringement may not sustain between them, shifting focus to passing off.

Wander Ltd v Antox India Pvt Ltd, 1990 Supp SCC 727: Cited for the appellate standard in reviewing interlocutory orders—namely, that appeals are “on principle” and should not substitute judicial discretion without error of law or perversity.

Printers (Mysore) Private Ltd. v Pothan Joseph, AIR 1960 SC 1156: Enunciated standards on intervention in appeals against discretionary orders, cited for reinforcing the narrow scope of appellate interference.

Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v Prius Auto Industries Ltd, (2018) 2 SCC 1: Set out the principles of passing off, requiring proof of prior and substantial goodwill.

Satyam Infoway Ltd v Siffynet Solutions (P) Ltd, (2004) 6 SCC 145 and Cadila Healthcare Ltd v Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd, (2001) 5 SCC 73: Both cited in context of sustaining actions for passing off based on primacy of goodwill.

Brihan Karan Sugar Syndicate (P) Ltd v Yashwantrao Mohite Krushna Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana, (2024) 2 SCC 577: The Supreme Court clarified the need for actual proof of sales, promotion and advertising for establishing goodwill.

Raman Kwatra v KEI Industries Ltd., (2023) 93 PTC 485: Cited for the principle of estoppel—where a party has previously asserted dissimilarity between marks before the Trade Marks Registry, they cannot take the contrary stand for interim relief.

Midas Hygiene Industries (P) Ltd v Sudhir Bhatia, (2004) 3 SCC 90 and Laxmikant V. Patel v Chetanbhai Shah (2002) 3 SCC 65: Cited for the inappropriateness of denying interlocutory relief solely on the basis of longevity of the defendant’s use when a prima facie case is made out.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

The Division Bench proceeded to dissect the arguments methodically. The Court unequivocally rejected the appellant’s submission that Section 35 applied only to infringement and not passing off cases. By examining the statute, particularly Section 135 of the Trade Marks Act, the Bench held that both infringement and passing off suits are covered, and Section 35’s protection extends to all reliefs including injunctions in passing off actions.

On the question of applicability to corporate entities and use of part versus full name, the Court found that as Respondent 1 had succeeded to the rights of an individual—Ms. Vasundhara Mantri—through assignment, the benefit of Section 35 extended to the LLP as assignee-in-interest. The Bench refused to read any limitation into the statute confining the protection to the use of a full name, thereby recognizing that “VASUNDHARA” as a first name qualifies for protection under Section 35 if used bona fide.

The judges also evaluated whether the appellant had established sufficient goodwill in the mark “VASUNDHRA” prior to the respondents’ use beginning in June 2001. The evidence of turnover and promotional expenses was found insufficient for establishing perceptible goodwill within the short prior period, mainly 1999-2001. Further, the respondents had used the mark openly for at least 17 years before litigation was initiated, militating against the appellant’s claim of irreparable harm or exclusive rights.

The Court additionally addressed the principle of estoppel, holding that because the appellant had previously claimed before the Trade Marks Registry that the marks in contention were not similar, it was precluded from asserting otherwise in subsequent judicial proceedings. The Division Bench agreed with the reasoning of the Single Judge, noting no error of law or arbitrary exercise of discretion.

Finally, regarding balance of convenience and irreparable harm, the Bench was satisfied that no interim injunction could be justified where the respondents’ user substantially preceded the challenge and the appellant failed to demonstrate risk of irreparable loss.

Final Decision

The Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi dismissed the appeal. It affirmed the Single Judge’s order, upholding the respondents’ right to use the mark “VASUNDHARA” based on the protections of Section 35 of the Trade Marks Act and upon finding no sufficient basis for interlocutory injunction, either on the ground of infringement or passing off. The Court held that the appellant did not establish sufficient goodwill in the mark prior to the respondents’ adoption and rejected all grounds of challenge.
Law Settled in This Case

This judgment makes several critical contributions to the law:

It clarifies that Section 35 of the Trade Marks Act operates as a bar to injunctions not only in infringement actions but also for passing off, provided bona fide use of a personal name, whether in full or part, is established.

The protection under Section 35 is not strictly limited to use by natural persons but extends to corporate entities who inherit the rights by assignment from individuals.

For passing off actions, the plaintiff must establish substantial prior goodwill before the defendant’s adoption of the mark.

Statements made before authorities like the Trade Marks Registry regarding similarity of marks can estop parties from contradicting those assertions in subsequent judicial proceedings, even if the application did not lead to registration.

Priority of use is insufficient without proven goodwill, and longevity of defendant’s use can be an important factor in denying interlocutory relief.

Vasundhra Jewellers Pvt. Ltd. Vs Vasundhara Fashion Jewellery :August 18, 2025: FAO(OS) (COMM) 232/2023 : 2025:DHC:7193-DB: High Court of Delhi:Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi


Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Mensa Brand Technologies Private Limited Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks


Distinctiveness in Composite Trade Marks

Introduction: This legal case study examines the Delhi High Court’s decision in Mensa Brand Technologies Private Limited v. Registrar of Trade Marks, delivered on August 22, 2025, concerning the registrability of the trademark “PRO.FITNESS” in Class 30. The dispute centered on whether the mark lacked distinctiveness under Section 9(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and touched upon broader principles relating to coined marks, the anti-dissection rule, consistency in trademark examination, and the burden of proof in the application process.

Factual Background:Mensa Brand Technologies Private Limited is a company engaged in selling rice-based snack foods, rice cakes, crackers, cookies, filled cookies, chocolate products, frosting mixes, oats, and processed cereals for human consumption. On November 8, 2024, the company’s predecessor-in-interest filed application number 6701235 for registration of the trademark “PRO.FITNESS” in Class 30 on a ‘proposed to be used’ basis. An expedited request was filed shortly after to streamline the registration process.

The Applicant highlighted that “PRO.FITNESS” was not a commonly used phrase, nor listed in the dictionary, and claimed that its stylized presentation, especially the dot between “PRO” and “FITNESS”, rendered the mark visually and phonetically distinctive.

Procedural Background:The Trade Mark Registry issued a First Examination Report (FER) on November 12, 2024, objecting under Section 9(1)(a) of the Act, which requires that a trademark be capable of distinguishing the goods or services of one person from those of others. The FER asserted “PRO.FITNESS” lacked distinctiveness and could not act as a source identifier. The Applicant filed a detailed reply with supporting case law on December 12, 2024.

A hearing notice was issued for January 16, 2025, and the Applicant’s counsel appeared to argue in support of registration. Nonetheless, the application was rejected the next day, January 17, 2025, through an impugned order on the same ground of lacking distinctiveness. Mensa Brand Technologies appealed the rejection, contending that the impugned order was legally flawed and contrary to the settled principles of trademark examination.

Core Dispute:The core dispute was whether “PRO.FITNESS,” as stylized and used by the Applicant, meets the standard of distinctiveness under Section 9(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The Applicant argued that the mark is unique and non-descriptive, and that the Registry had applied an incorrect legal standard by dissecting the mark into its components. Additionally, the Applicant highlighted the inconsistency exhibited by the Registry, which had accepted 15 other applications for similar or identical “PRO.FITNESS” and “PROFITNESS” marks for related goods. The Respondent maintained that the phrase consisted solely of generic elements incapable of functioning as a trademark.

Discussion on Judgments:The Applicant relied on a range of judgments to assert the mark’s distinctiveness and registrability:

Ticona Polymers Inc. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 1234: The Delhi High Court in this case affirmed that a composite trademark must be assessed in its entirety, rather than by separating its constituent elements—a principle often referred to as the anti-dissection rule, also statutorily recognized under Section 17(1) of the Act.

Muneer Ahmad v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 7345: The Court reiterated that the Registrar cannot mechanistically dissect composite marks into generic parts when the whole exhibits distinctiveness.

Grey Matters Educational Trust v. Examiner of Trade Marks, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 7390: This case reaffirmed the anti-dissection principle and held that the Registrar must recognize distinctiveness when the combined mark as a whole is novel or arbitrary.

Under Armour Inc. v. Anish Agarawal & Another, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 3784: The Court underscored that the similarity between competing marks should not be decided by dissecting and comparing their parts, but by looking at the totality of the mark.

Sky Enterprise Pvt. Ltd. v. Abaad Masala & Co., 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 750: The Bombay High Court held that phonetic and visual distinctiveness may render a mark registrable even if its components are otherwise descriptive.

Hindustan Unilever Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 2020 SCC OnLine IPAB 69: The Intellectual Property Appellate Board emphasized the importance of consistency and non-arbitrariness in trademark examination by the Registry.

Griffiths Hughes Ltd. v. Vick Chemical Co., AIR 1951 Cal 386 and A.R. Khaleel and Sons v. Registrar of Trade Marks, AIR 1960 Mad 251: These cases recognized that coined marks or invented combinations, even of common elements, can function as distinctive badges of origin.

F. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. Ltd. v. Geoffrey Manners & Co. Pvt. Ltd., (1969) 2 SCC 716: The Supreme Court affirmed the principle that invented marks can acquire distinctiveness and be registered, even if comprised of familiar words.

Disruptive Health Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 2002 and Abu Dhabi Global Market v. Registrar of Trademarks, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2947: The Delhi High Court affirmed that arbitrary or structurally novel marks can function as source identifiers and qualify for registration.

The judgments were cited in support of the proposition that PRO.FITNESS is an invented and distinctive mark, not a generic or descriptive term.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:Justice Tejas Karia carefully analyzed whether the impugned order was based on a proper application of Section 9(1)(a) and the established jurisprudence. The Court held that the Registry erred by dissecting “PRO.FITNESS” into “PRO” and “FITNESS” and treating each as generic, rather than evaluating the full mark in line with the anti-dissection rule found in both legislation and precedent, as reiterated in Under Armour Inc. v. Anish Agarawal & Another and Ticona Polymers Inc. v. Registrar of Trade Marks.

The Court also emphasized the novel configuration and stylization of the mark, particularly the use of the dot, which added visual and phonetic distinctiveness and differentiated the mark from both dictionary terms and trade expressions. Importantly, the Registry failed to demonstrate that “PRO.FITNESS” is a commonly used phrase in the relevant trade or lacks sourcing identity.

Justice Karia noted the inconsistency of the Registry’s actions in refusing the subject mark while granting acceptance and advertisement to 15 similar or identical applications from the same Applicant for the same types of goods. The Judge clarified that there is no statutory duty on the Applicant to alert the Registry about related pending applications; instead, the responsibility for fair and thorough examination rests squarely with the Registry itself.

The Court found the impugned order to be devoid of sound reasoning, failing to address substantive contentions and neglecting a meaningful analysis of distinctiveness. The Registrar’s power under Section 9(1)(a) cannot be exercised mechanically, especially when the mark, taken as a whole, is arbitrary or coined and capable of functioning as a source identifier.

Final Decision:In conclusion, the High Court set aside the impugned order of January 17, 2025, and directed the Registrar of Trade Marks to advertise “PRO.FITNESS” under Application No. 6701235 in the Trade Marks Journal within two months, allowing the registration process to continue in accordance with law. The appeal was allowed and the pending application ordered to be disposed of.

Law Settled in This Case:The Judgment solidifies several important legal principles in Indian trademark law:

Composite marks must be assessed in their entirety (anti-dissection rule), not by mechanically separating elements and evaluating genericity or descriptiveness. Invented and arbitrary combinations, even of familiar words, can acquire distinctiveness and be registrable. Stylization, configuration, and punctuation in a mark can contribute to its distinctiveness. There is no statutory duty on an applicant to inform the Registry of related applications; the onus of fair examination is solely on the Registry. Reasoned decision-making and consistency are mandated in trademark administration, and arbitrary refusals contravene the settled judicial position.

Case Title: Mensa Brand Technologies Private Limited Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks
Date of Order: August 22, 2025
Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 17/2025 
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:7143
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi
Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Mankind Pharma Limited Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks


Introduction

This case study examines the Delhi High Court’s judgment in Mankind Pharma Limited v. Registrar of Trade Marks, delivered by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia on August 22, 2025. The appeal was filed by Mankind Pharma Limited challenging an order of the Trade Marks Examiner that refused registration of the trademark "PETKIND" in Class 5. The central issue revolved around whether the refusal under Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 was justified in light of Mankind Pharma's extensive use and ownership of the KIND Family of Marks and the existence of a prior filed application for the mark "PETKIND PHARMA."

Factual Background

Mankind Pharma Limited is a major pharmaceutical company in India, marketing an extensive range of medicinal, pharmaceutical, and veterinary preparations under various well-known trademarks. On October 1, 2021, the Appellant applied for registration of the mark "PETKIND" under Application No. 5157441 for medicinal, pharmaceutical, veterinary preparations, including dietary supplements. The Trade Marks Registry raised objections under Section 11(1), noting a prior application for a similar mark: "PETKIND PHARMA" (Application No. 4794368) by Wellford Pharmaceutical Pvt. Ltd. for similar goods in the same class. It was contended that registration of "PETKIND" would result in public confusion given the phonetic and visual similarity of the marks.
Procedural Background

The Examining report dated November 5, 2021, set forth objections to registration of "PETKIND" under Section 11 of the Act due to the existence of the similar "PETKIND PHARMA" application by Wellford Pharmaceutical Pvt. Ltd. The Appellant was afforded an opportunity to respond and a hearing was scheduled for March 11, 2024. The case was reviewed by the Examiner of Trade Marks, who refused the registration on March 15, 2024, holding that "PETKIND" was not registrable in light of the existing similar mark in the same class, applying Section 11(1). Aggrieved, Mankind Pharma Limited appealed to the Delhi High Court, challenging the refusal as arbitrary and contrary to trademark registration principles.

Core Dispute

The main dispute centered on whether the refusal to register "PETKIND" by the Trade Mark Examiner was legally sustainable under Section 11(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The parties debated whether the similarity between "PETKIND" and "PETKIND PHARMA" for similar goods in Class 5 was likely to cause confusion, and whether Mankind Pharma’s extensive use and ownership of KIND Family of Marks should grant it prior proprietorship and distinctive association in the relevant market.

Discussion on Judgments

The Appellant invoked several judgments to support its assertion of prior use and proprietary rights:

Mankind Pharma v. Lemford Biotech Pvt. Ltd. and Registrar of Trade Marks, Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:1232, Mankind Pharma Ltd v. Arvind Kumar Trading and Anr., Neutral Citation: 2023:DHC:2700, Mankind Pharma Ltd. v. Manoj Kumar M/s Novakind Biosciences, Neutral Citation: 2024:DHC:7590, Mankind Pharma Ltd. v. Gurinder Singh, C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 257/2022, and Mankind Pharma Ltd. v. Dr. Kind Formulation Pvt. Ltd. and Registrar of Trade Marks, C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 282/2022.

All judgments above were cited to demonstrate that Mankind Pharma is the prior, recognised, and exclusive user of the KIND Family of Marks in the pharmaceutical field, that the public associates the suffix "KIND" with Mankind Pharma’s products, and that the doctrine of family of marks extends heightened protection against confusingly similar subsequent marks within the same sector.

Further, the Court referenced Manu Garg & Ratan Behari Agrawal v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 581, which clarifies the proper construction of Section 11(1): mere existence of similar marks within the same class is not sufficient for refusal; there must be actual likelihood of confusion among the public resulting from the similarity of the marks and the goods/services to which they pertain.

The main judgment providing doctrinal context was Mankind Pharma Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., 2015 SCC OnLine Del 6914, in which it was held that the word "KIND" bears no direct relation to pharmaceutical products, but through extensive and uninterrupted usage by Mankind Pharma, it has earned distinctiveness and heightened protection in law.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

Justice Tejas Karia began by analyzing Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which serves as grounds for refusing registration based on relative similarity to existing or pending trademarks. The Court clarified that Section 11(1) does not categorically bar registration upon mere similarity between marks; rather, it requires that such similarity create a likelihood of public confusion or association with the prior mark.

The Judge observed that Mankind Pharma had demonstrated extensive use of KIND-based marks since 1986, boasting over 210 registered KIND marks in Class 5 alone. It was found that the KIND Family of Marks has acquired distinctiveness, and through consistent judicial recognition, the public at large, particularly in the trade of pharmaceuticals and veterinary products, associates the KIND suffix exclusively with Mankind Pharma.

While the Cited Mark, “PETKIND PHARMA,” was flagged as a proposed-to-be-used mark without evidence of actual market presence, the Appellant had documented substantial turnover and market usage under various KIND marks, thereby asserting prior right and goodwill.

The Judge distinguished the requirement for public confusion, emphasizing that the likelihood of confusion must be established through the facts and circumstances, not presumed based on mere existence of similar marks in the same class. The Judgment found no active use of the Cited Mark and acknowledged Mankind Pharma’s market dominance and associative strength in KIND-marked products.

Accordingly, the Court held that the refusal of registration was unwarranted and arbitrary, given Mankind Pharma’s established brand equity and rights. The Judge directed that the matter proceed to advertisement, subject to resolution of any subsequent filed opposition under due legal process.
Final Decision

The Delhi High Court, on August 22, 2025, set aside the Impugned Order that refused registration of "PETKIND." The Court directed the Registrar of Trade Marks to proceed with the advertisement of "PETKIND" within two months, in accordance with the Act. The Judgment further clarified that any opposition proceedings lodged against "PETKIND" would be considered independently and uninfluenced by the present order.

Law Settled in This Case

The Judgment reinforces interpretation of Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, holding that refusal of registration on grounds of similarity is not automatic and must be supported by evidence of likely confusion among the public. The doctrine of “Family of Marks” receives further reinforcement; where a party has established distinctiveness and broad market association with a shared word or suffix, such as "KIND," prior user rights are paramount. Also, proposed-to-be-used marks must demonstrate actual use or intent for use before serving as a valid ground for refusal against established marks with overwhelming market presence.

Case Title: Mankind Pharma Limited v. Registrar of Trade Marks
Date of Order: August 22, 2025
Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 54/2024
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:7141
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi
Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Mankind Pharma Ltd. Vs. Ram Kumar


Protection of the "Family of Marks

Introduction: This case study analyses the judgment delivered by the Delhi High Court in the matter of Mankind Pharma Ltd. v. Ram Kumar M/S Dr. Kumars Pharmaceuticals. The petition was instituted under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 seeking rectification by way of cancellation of the trademark "UNKIND" registered in Class 35. The judgment, delivered on August 22, 2025, by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia, provides significant insight into the proprietary rights associated with the KIND Family of Marks in the pharmaceutical sector and sets considerable precedent in the interpretation of prior use, family of marks doctrine, non-use, and the concept of confusion in trademark law.

Factual Background: Mankind Pharma Ltd., incorporated in 1991 and backed by its predecessor-in-interest’s adoption of "MANKIND" since 1986, is a prominent entity engaged in manufacturing and marketing medicinal, pharmaceutical, and veterinary preparations. The Petitioner claims a robust portfolio of over 300 trademarks, with "MANKIND" and the word "KIND" being integral elements—the so-called KIND Family of Marks. Notably, Petitioner holds registrations in all 45 classes and has established goodwill and reputation through its extensive usage of these marks, including "MANKIND".

Respondent No. 1, Ram Kumar M/S Dr. Kumars Pharmaceuticals, purportedly adopted the impugned trademark "UNKIND" on July 17, 2008, claiming usage since June 30, 2006. The Petitioner, upon learning of this registration, issued a Cease and Desist Notice which remained unanswered. The Petitioner further asserts that there are no goods evidenced to have been sold under the "UNKIND" mark by Respondent No. 1, raising grounds for rectification on the basis of non-use.

Procedural Background:The Rectification Petition was initially filed before the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB). After the abolition of IPAB and transfer of such matters to the High Courts pursuant to the Tribunals Reforms (Rationalization and Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 2021, the present petition was listed before Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia. Despite several attempts, Respondent No. 1 remained unserved; ultimately, service was effected through WhatsApp on November 19, 2024, as per the directions of the Court. However, Respondent No. 1 failed to appear and was proceeded ex parte. Respondent No. 2—Registrar of Trade Marks—was represented as a formal party, submitting that they would abide by the Court’s directions.

Core Dispute:The core question before the Court was whether the registration of the trademark "UNKIND" (Application No. 1711563, Class 35) in favour of Respondent No. 1 should be cancelled on grounds of prior use, confusing similarity, dishonesty, and non-use, considering the Petitioner’s claim of proprietary rights over its KIND Family of Marks. The dispute examined whether "UNKIND" is deceptively or confusingly similar to "MANKIND" and other marks in the KIND Family, whether the registration was bona fide, and whether Respondent No. 1 had ever used the mark in commerce.

Discussion on Judgments:Numerous judicial precedents were cited by the Petitioner, each providing different context:

Mankind Pharma Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2015 SCC OnLine Del 6914): Cited to substantiate the claim that "KIND" has no direct relation to pharmaceutical products and that Mankind Pharma, having established the first use of "KIND" in the pharmaceutical sector, is entitled to heightened protection. The judgment also contextualizes the distinctiveness of the mark and the associated goodwill.

Mankind Pharma v. Lemford Biotech Pvt. Ltd. and Registrar of Trade Marks (Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:1232): This precedent affirms Petitioner’s status as the prior and recognized user of the KIND Family of Marks.

Mankind Pharma Ltd v. Arvind Kumar Trading and Anr. (Neutral Citation: 2023:DHC:2700): Referred in context of prior use and the legal standing conferred to Mankind Pharma’s family of marks.

Mankind Pharma Ltd. v. Manoj Kumar M/s Novakind Biosciences (Neutral Citation: 2024:DHC:7590): Contextually relevant to show judicial consistency in recognizing the Petitioner’s rights over KIND Family of Marks.

Mankind Pharma Ltd. v. Gurinder Singh (C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 257/2022): Referred to establish repeat judicial recognition of rights over marks bearing the KIND suffix.

Mankind Pharma Ltd. v. Dr. Kind Formulation Pvt. Ltd. and the Registrar of Trade Marks (C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 282/2022): Cited regarding the confusion likely to arise in the market from use of similar marks and extended protection to the KIND Family of Marks.

In all these references, the context was to establish the Petitioner as the prior adopter, significant proprietor, and exclusive user of ‘KIND’ marks, thus entitling it to heightened legal protection under trademark law.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: Justice Tejas Karia's analysis is noteworthy for its legal clarity and focus on established principles. The judgment begins by observing that in the absence of any defence or reply by Respondent No. 1, the pleadings made by the Petitioner remain uncontroverted, and for all practical purposes, stand admitted.

The Court notes the Petitioner’s substantial number of registrations for marks using "KIND" as a suffix and acknowledges the development of a Family of Marks, a concept protecting marks with common essential features. Relying on Mankind Pharma Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., the Judge observed that "KIND" has no generic or descriptive connection to pharmaceutical products, but through long-standing, exclusive use, the mark enjoys unique status and recognition in the public mind associated with the Petitioner.

Justice Karia finds clear evidence of prior use and registration, distinguishing the Petitioner’s mark as earlier in time and established in goodwill. On non-use, the Court finds that Respondent No. 1 did not offer evidence of use of the "UNKIND" mark since its registration—a precondition for maintaining registration under Section 47(1)(a) and (b) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Furthermore, it is reasoned that “UNKIND” is confusingly similar and deceptively akin to "MANKIND" and other marks in the KIND Family—likely to cause confusion or deception in trade and among consumers. The adoption of the "UNKIND" mark by Respondent No. 1 is found to be without bonafides and was likely intended to capitalize on the Petitioner’s goodwill, reputation, and business presence.

The Judge notes particularly that distinguishing only the prefix while retaining the essential family characteristic "KIND" is insufficient to avoid confusion, and constitutes violation of the rights of the Petitioner under Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act.

Final Decision:The Court allowed the petition for rectification, directing the Trade Marks Registry to remove "UNKIND" (Application No. 1711563, Class 35) from the Register of Trade Marks. Instructions were issued for compliance, with a copy to be sent to the Trade Marks Registry by the Registrar.

Law Settled in This Case: This case clarifies and reinforces several legal principles:

The doctrine of "Family of Marks" receives judicial reinforcement, particularly where an essential word or feature is accorded distinctiveness by the proprietor through substantial usage and market reputation, even if such word is not inherently distinctive vis-à-vis the product category.

Prior user and goodwill associated with a series of marks can be pivotal in claiming exclusive rights and opposing later registrations.

Registration without bona fide use coupled with a lack of evidence of commercial use is a ground for rectification under Sections 47 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

The adoption of deceptively or confusingly similar marks, particularly where the essential character of a prior registered mark is retained by a subsequent entrant, merits cancellation in the interest of preventing confusion and preserving the integrity of the Register.

Case Title: Mankind Pharma Ltd. Vs. Ram Kumar
Date of Order: August 22, 2025
Case Number: C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 566/2022
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:7142
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi
Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Condor Footwear (India) Limited & Anr. Vs. Nexgen Footwear Private Limited


Filing of additional documents along with Replication in response to written statement in a commercial dispute

Introduction: This case study explores the judicial determination of Condor Footwear (India) Limited & Anr. v. Nexgen Footwear Private Limited & Ors., adjudicated by the High Court of Delhi. The dispute centers on the permissibility of plaintiffs filing additional documents alongside their replication in a commercial suit, and the procedural requirements under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) as amended for such production. The case uniquely probes the intersection between specific Delhi High Court Rules and national procedural laws, especially when responsive pleadings produce new documentary evidence relevant to the controversy.

Factual Background: The plaintiffs, Condor Footwear (India) Limited and another, instituted a commercial suit against Nexgen Footwear Private Limited and others for alleged trademark infringement, specifically relating to use of the mark 'ENBLUE'. The plaintiffs initially filed the suit accompanied by an affidavit and several documents. In response, the defendants maintained in their written statement that at no point had they manufactured, marketed, or sold goods using the impugned trademark. They categorically disclaimed any present or future intent to use the mark, asserting that the lawsuit lacked any real cause of action.

Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a replication to the written statement and, importantly, annexed additional documents, including invoices and export documents purportedly evidencing the defendants’ use of the trademark ‘ENBLUE’ through exports from India to Somalia. These documents were central to refuting the defendants’ categorical denials regarding use of the impugned trademark.

Procedural Background: The defendants objected to the plaintiffs’ filing of additional documents with the replication, asserting violations of procedural requirements under the Commercial Courts Act and the amended CPC. They contended that such documents could only be introduced with express leave of the Court and upon showing reasonable cause for late disclosure. The defendants argued that the documents, undisputedly in existence prior to filing the suit, should have been annexed to the original plaint under Order XI of CPC as amended for commercial suits and that Rule 1(4) and (5) imposed strict timelines and leave requirements. They characterized the plaintiffs’ actions as an abuse of process intended to plug gaps in the case and remedy insufficient evidence initially presented.

The impugned order of the Joint Registrar overruled the defendants’ objections, holding that since the documents were responsive and did not cause prejudice at that stage, they could be taken on record. The defendants then filed an appeal, challenging the order for contravention of procedural safeguards and seeking to strike the additional documents from the record.

Core Dispute: The principal dispute is whether the plaintiffs were entitled to file additional documents alongside their replication in response to averments made by the defendants in their written statement. The inquiry revolves around interpretation and application of Order XI of CPC, as amended by the Commercial Courts Act, and Rule 5 of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018. The defendants maintain that all documents in the plaintiffs’ power, possession, or control, which existed at the time of filing, should have been disclosed with the plaint, and further disclosure at the replication stage is permissible only upon satisfying statutory cause and obtaining leave. The plaintiffs contend that the documents were responsive, served alongside replication as required by DHC Rules, and were in direct rebuttal to new contentions made by defendants.

Discussion on Judgments: The defendants relied on two principal decisions of the Delhi High Court:

CEC-CICI JV & Ors. v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2797. Here, the Court emphasized that in commercial suits, parties must strictly adhere to Order XI CPC as amended by the Commercial Courts Act, which necessitates filing all documents with the plaint, and additional documents after the prescribed thirty-day period can only be filed on establishing reasonable cause with leave of Court.

Saregama India Ltd. v. ZEE Entertainment Enterprises Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2437. This decision reaffirmed strict construction of Order XI Rule 1(5), holding that the plaintiff cannot rely on original documents not disclosed in the plaint except upon showing reasonable cause and securing leave. Even in response to issues raised by the defendant, late filing is not permitted unless procedural requirements are met. The Court specifically cautioned against leniency in procedural compliance, noting that such practices risk undermining the objectives of the Commercial Courts Act.

The plaintiffs, on the other hand, relied upon Rule 5 of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, highlighting that replication must be served along with any documents in the plaintiff’s possession that they seek to file with replication. The Rule provides for endorsement of service and does not bar filing responsive documents at that stage when serving replication.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:Justice Tejas Karia carefully reviewed both the national procedural law and the specialized Delhi High Court Rules governing pleadings and document production in commercial suits. The Court noted that the defendants’ written statement expressly denied any use of the impugned trademark and asserted that the suit lacked cause of action—a factual assertion central to the controversy. In direct response, the plaintiffs’ replication not only contested these denials but furnished Bills of Lading and Commercial Invoices showing that the defendants did indeed export ENBLUE-branded goods overseas.

Justice Karia found that the documents annexed to replication were not belated filings or attempts at remedying prior deficiency in pleadings, but rather responsive documents relevant to refuting new averments in the defendants’ statement. The Judge highlighted Rule 5 of the DHC Rules, which specifically authorizes plaintiffs to serve documents with the replication when responding to contentions. Unlike documents which remained undisclosed despite being in possession, responsive documents plausibly accrue out of pleadings and are allowed at the stage of replication.

The Court acknowledged the principles outlined in CEC-CICI JV and Saregama India Ltd. but distinguished the facts, noting that the present case involved documents directly responsive to a categorical assertion introduced by the defendants. Permitting such documents ensures a full accounting of the dispute and does not prejudice the defendants, who are also given the opportunity to respond with further evidence. The Court thus found no infirmity with the Registrar’s order admitting the documents.

Final Decision: The High Court of Delhi dismissed the appeal, upholding the impugned order of the Joint Registrar. The plaintiffs’ additional documents annexed to the replication were lawfully taken on record, as they were responsive to contentions first introduced in the written statement. The defendants were given liberty to file any further responding documents within four weeks. The matter was directed to proceed before the Joint Registrar on the scheduled date.

Law Settled in This Case: This judgment reaffirms that in commercial suits before the Delhi High Court, the procedural regime governing filing of additional documents must be interpreted in context with specialized court rules. Responsive documents annexed to replication are permissible when they directly rebut new factual assertions raised in the written statement, provided they are served as required. However, the regime of strict timelines and leave of Court for belated filings under Order XI CPC, as amended, continues to apply for all other documents not directly responsive in nature. The judgment balances robust compliance with procedural discipline and the need for thorough adjudication on merits, ensuring neither party is prejudiced.

Case Title: Condor Footwear (India) Limited & Anr. Vs. Nexgen Footwear Private Limited & Ors.
Date of Order: August 22, 2025
Case Number: CS(COMM) 605/2024 
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:7140
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi
Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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