Saint Gobain Glass France Vs. Assistant Controller of Patents

Workshop Tweaks Aren't Inventions

Facts of the Case:This case involves a challenge to the refusal of a patent application by the Indian Patent Office. The appellant, Saint Gobain Glass France, is a French company that makes and researches various glass products used in buildings, cars, airplanes, solar panels, and interior designs. They filed a patent application in India as part of an international process under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT). The application, numbered 201717045317 and titled "Material comprising a stack of thin layers," claimed priority from a French filing dated 9 July 2015. It was filed in India on 18 December 2017, examined on the same day, and published on 19 January 2018.

The invention describes a special coating for glass that uses layers of materials, including a silver-based metal layer, to create a shiny silver look on the outside while keeping good light transmission and solar energy control. The goal is neutral colors when light passes through and a reflective silver appearance without harming energy efficiency.

During the process, the Patent Office issued a First Examination Report (FER) on 25 April 2019, raising issues like lack of newness (novelty), lack of inventive step, non-patentability under Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, 1970 (which bars mere discoveries or new forms of known substances without enhanced efficacy), and unclear claims under Sections 10(4)(c) and 10(5). The appellant responded on 11 October 2019 by amending the claims, making a lower blocking layer optional.

On 20 August 2019, Respondent No. 2 (an opponent) filed a pre-grant opposition under Section 25(1) of the Act. Hearings happened multiple times in 2023, with more prior art documents shared. The appellant filed replies, affidavits from experts, and further amendments. On 5 January 2024, the Assistant Controller refused the application, mainly because it lacked inventive step under Section 2(1)(ja) of the Act and Section 25(1)(e) (obviousness ground for opposition).

The appellant appealed this refusal under Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970, to the High Court. An interim order on 11 April 2024 kept the application status as "pending" during the appeal. Oral arguments were heard over several dates in late 2024 and 2025, and judgment was reserved on 11 July 2025.

The Dispute:The core dispute is whether the invention meets the requirements for patentability under the Patents Act, 1970, especially Section 2(1)(ja), which defines "inventive step" as a feature that makes the invention not obvious to a person skilled in the art (a skilled worker in the field). The Controller said no, because the idea was obvious from existing knowledge (prior art)—just tweaking layer thicknesses in known glass coatings to get the desired silver look and reflection over 30%, without real innovation.

The appellant argued the Controller wrongly mixed bits from different old documents (cherry-picking) using hindsight (judging based on the invention itself, not what was known before). They said their invention provides real technical improvements like better neutral colors and solar performance, supported by data and expert evidence. They also claimed a similar patent was granted in France, so it should be in India.

The respondents (Patent Office and opponent) defended the refusal, saying the prior arts already taught similar layer stacks, and the changes were routine adjustments anyone skilled could make.

Detailed Reasoning: The Court applied a structured approach to check for inventive step, drawing from Supreme Court and High Court precedents. It relied on Bishwanath Prasad Radhey Shyam v. Hindustan Metal Industries (1979) 2 SCC 511, which says an invention must go beyond simple tweaks or combinations of known things—it needs to create something new or better through real creativity, not just obvious steps. The Court also used the five-step test from the Division Bench in F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Cipla Ltd. (2015 SCC OnLine Del 13619) to test obviousness objectively, without hindsight bias.

Step 1: Who is the 'person skilled in the art'? The Court agreed with the Controller: This is someone familiar with glass building and manufacturing basics, like how to layer coatings for light and energy control.

Step 2: What common knowledge existed before the priority date (9 July 2015)? The Court listed key prior arts (old documents):

Document A (WO 2014/164674): Teaches multi-metal layers for glass coatings.

Document B (WO 2014/177798): Shows silver layers between dielectric and blocking layers for better looks and reflection, but with triple silver (not single) and max 23.7% external reflection.

Document D2 (WO 2011/062574 A1): Describes bronze-colored glass with reflection under 28%, blue transmission, and tips on thickness tweaks for colors and solar performance.

Documents 3022/KOLNP/2010 and 3417/KOLNP/2010: The appellant's own earlier filings, showing single silver layers with 30-50% reflection and thin dielectric layers (5-25 nm), but different setups.

These show that stacking silver between protective layers for reflection and color was already known.

Step 3: What is the inventive concept? The Court saw it as: (i) Using one silver layer with specific surrounding layers for neutral transmission colors; (ii) Getting a glossy silver external reflection over 30% without worsening solar factor (energy gain).

Step 4: Differences from prior art?

Vs. A: A has three metals; invention uses one.

Vs. B: Similar stack, but B requires three silvers and lower reflection (23.7%).

Vs. D2: D2 aims for bronze/blue with lower reflection (<28%); invention wants silver over 30%.

Vs. 3022/KOLNP/2010: Similar reflection goal (30-50%), but different features.

Vs. 3417/KOLNP/2010: Single silver between anti-reflective layers, thin dielectrics.

The main difference: Specific thicknesses for silver look and high reflection without a lower blocking layer.

Step 5: Are these differences obvious (no inventive step)? Here, the Court sided with the Controller. The appellant's data (Tables 2-3) and expert affidavit didn't prove big improvements over prior art—no clear gains in solar factor, transmission, or colors without the optional layer. The expert missed key metrics like energy transmission (ET%) and external reflection (ERext%).

Prior arts (A, B, D2) already sandwich silver between dielectric/blocking layers and teach thickness tweaks for reflection, colors, and solar tweaks. D2 specifically says adjust layers for bronze from blue glass—obvious to try for silver. The appellant's own old filings show they knew single-silver stacks could hit 30-50% reflection and <60% transmission.

The Court rejected "cherry-picking": Combining related teachings from the same field isn't hindsight—it's what a skilled person does to solve similar problems. Citing Bishwanath Prasad, tweaks like thickness optimization are "workshop improvements," not inventions, unless they yield unpredictable new results. Here, outcomes were predictable.

On France grant: Patents are territorial (Communication Components Antenna Inc. v. ACE Technologies Corpn., 2019 SCC OnLine Del 9123). India's standards (e.g., who counts as "skilled") differ; foreign grants don't bind.

The Court said the invention fails Section 2(1)(ja)—obvious routine work. Dependent claims (2-13) add nothing new. No need to revisit other objections like Section 3(d) or clarity, as inventive step alone bars grant.

Decision:The High Court dismissed the appeal on 11 September 2025, upholding the Controller's refusal under Section 2(1)(ja). The pending application (I.A. 8216/2024) was disposed of. The interim order (status as "pending") was vacated. The Registry must send a copy to the Patent Office. No costs awarded. This means no patent for the invention in India, emphasizing that obvious tweaks to known tech don't qualify as inventions.

This ruling reinforces strict scrutiny for inventive step in coatings/glass patents, stressing evidence of non-obvious advances and warning against hindsight in prior art combos. It guides applicants to show real, unpredictable benefits over old knowledge.

Case Title: Saint Gobain Glass France Vs. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs & Anr.

Order Date: 11 September 2025

Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 13/2024 

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:7941

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal  

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Nehru Memorial Museum & Library Society Vs Dr. N. Balakrishnan

When Does Media Reporting Become Contempt

Facts: The Nehru Memorial Museum and Library Society (petitioner) filed a contempt petition against Dr. N. Balakrishnan (respondent) under Sections 11 and 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, and Article 215 of the Constitution of India. The petition alleged that the respondent had committed contempt of court by creating an atmosphere of "trial by press." This allegation arose after a news report appeared in "The Hindu" newspaper during the hearing of a writ petition that the respondent was involved in. The news article reportedly gave an impression that the court hearing on a particular date was a standalone event and did not clarify that the hearings were ongoing daily. The petitioner claimed this misrepresentation influenced public opinion and undermined the court’s authority.

Dispute:The main issue was whether the newspaper report that publicized the ongoing case and the respondent’s complaints amounted to contempt of court by creating trial by media. The petitioner argued that the report wrongly suggested the court was delaying justice and unfairly influenced public perception against the petitioner. The respondent countered that the report merely reflected facts that were already presented openly in court and that the media report was based on judicial proceedings and thus protected from contempt under Section 4 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The respondent also argued that there was no attempt to influence the court's decision as the report did not comment on the legitimacy of the charges or the merits of the case.

Legal Discussion & Reasoning:

Trial by Media and Contempt: The court explained that trial by media occurs when the media tries to influence the court by asserting what the court’s decision should be. However, a mere report, which is fair and accurate and based on judicial proceedings, is not contempt.

Section 4 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971: This section excludes fair and accurate reports of judicial proceedings from contempt. Since the report was based on information already in court records and was a part of the judicial proceeding, it did not constitute contempt.

Freedom of Speech and Media Role: The court recognized that freedom of speech includes the right to express opinions through the media. The law and its recent amendments, especially Section 13 of the Contempt Act (with the defense of truth and limitation on imposing sentences for technical contempt), reflect a balance between protecting court authority and upholding freedom of expression.

Precedents: Several earlier cases were cited. Notably, the Bombay High Court in Vijay S. Mallya vs Bennett Coleman held that media reporting based on court pleadings is not contempt. Similar views were echoed in cases where the media reported facts from police charge sheets or judicial proceedings without unfair criticism.

Public Domain and Right to Know: The court observed the public’s right to know about judicial proceedings and that criticism or unfavorable portrayal in the media does not automatically amount to contempt unless it poses a clear and present danger to justice administration.

No Substantial Interference: The court emphasized that contempt requires deliberate or willful interference with the court's authority. A newspaper article expressing grievances or opinions without such interference is insufficient for contempt jurisdiction.

Decision: The Court dismissed the contempt petition, holding that the newspaper report in question did not amount to contempt of court. The reportage was a fair and accurate reflection of judicial proceedings and did not create trial by media. The petitioner failed to prove that the report interfered substantially with the due course of justice. The court reinforced that contempt jurisdiction must be exercised carefully and only if there is clear contempt, not merely on a party’s insistence. No costs were ordered.

Case Title: Nehru Memorial Museum & Library Society Vs  Dr. N. Balakrishnan

Order Date: 25.10.2010

Case Number: CCP No.380/2010 in WP (C) No.13733/2009

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi, New Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Manmohan Singh

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Velji Karamshi Vaid And Anr Vs V3 Fashion

No Clean Hands, No Relief

Facts of the Case: The main parties are two garment businesses: the plaintiffs, Velji Karamshi Vaid & Anr., and the defendants, V3 Fashion and others. Plaintiffs own and run a business selling garments under the brand and trademark “V3” and “Volume 3”. They have trademark registrations for these and related marks (like “VOLUME...3 THE PERFECT FASHION”, “CASUAL”, etc.). The plaintiffs allege that they have been in this business for a long time, using their brand all over India and even exporting abroad.Defendants are also running a similar business and have used brand names like “V3”, “V3 STYLE”, and “V3.S” with or without other words.Plaintiffs state that defendants are using or attempting to register similar trademarks for garments, which are identical goods, and that this is causing confusion. Plaintiffs became aware that Defendant No. 7 (later separated from others) had applied for the “V3” trademark, which was later refused by the registrar.Plaintiffs sought an order (interim relief) stopping defendants from using those marks until a full trial is held.

The Dispute: Plaintiffs accuse the defendants of infringing their registered trademarks by using confusingly similar marks and also of passing off (attempting to make it seem that their goods are from the plaintiffs).Defendants argue that they are the earlier users of the “V3” mark (since 2017), that their marks look and sound different, and that no one can have an exclusive right to the letters “V3” alone because plaintiffs’ registration is for a device mark (a special design, not just letters).Plaintiffs reply that their reputation is attached to “V3” and that defendants’ actions are dishonest and misleading.

Detailed Reasoning by the Court:

Necessity of Clean Hands – Honesty of Both Sides: The Judge notes that both sides have not told the whole truth and have hidden important information or taken changing positions in court. This makes it hard to trust either side completely.

Plaintiffs’ Weaknesses:The plaintiffs did not submit all the relevant trademark registration documents up front, and their own statements about when they started using the mark “V3” varied at different times (2010, 2016, 2018, etc.).Plaintiffs did not back up their claims of business sales with concrete evidence like certified invoices or records.Earlier, when trying to register trademarks, plaintiffs themselves told the authorities that their mark was different from other “V3” marks and not conflicting, which weakens their current claim for exclusivity.

Defendants’ Weaknesses:The main defense from defendants was that they used “V3” first (since 2017), but the invoices they showed as proof used the details (like GST and address) of Defendant No. 7, who had actually left the business. There was no proper explanation for this. The court found that sales invoices produced by the defendants for 2017 and 2018 could not be trusted as they seemed doctored or fabricated. Defendants also made different claims in different forums—sometimes saying “V3” was unique and should not be used by others, and other times saying it was not confusingly similar—making their credibility questionable.

Both Sides Lack Reliable Evidence:The Court found that both sides either withheld or manipulated key facts. Neither side could credibly prove exactly when and how they started using their marks, or that customers specifically identified their goods with the marks in question. The usual straightforward way of proving use—by showing actual sales invoices—was not honestly or consistently presented by either side.

Trademark Law Points:Plaintiffs’ trademarks are device marks (a graphical/design element, not just the word “V3” alone). Law says that registration of a device mark does not give complete monopoly over each individual word or letter in it. For a claim of passing off, a business must show that people recognize its goods due to its reputation and that others’ imitation causes confusion. This too was not clearly shown here.

Final Decision: The Judge ruled that neither side deserves an order stopping the other from using the marks, at least at this interim (temporary) stage. The Court refused to give any interim order (injunction) in favor of the plaintiffs.

Case Title: Velji Karamshi Vaid & Anr. Vs V3 Fashion & Ors.

Order Date: 9 September 2025

Case Number: Commercial IP Suit No. 348 of 2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:BHC-OS:14740

Court: Bombay High Court

Hon’ble Judge: Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Hi Tech Arai Private Limited Vs. Paul Components Private Limited

Legal Insights on Trademark Dishonesty and Document Fabrication

Facts: The plaintiff, Hi Tech Arai Private Limited, is a well-established company engaged in manufacturing and supplying rubber products like oil seals and aluminium die casting products, primarily for the automobile industry. They have used the trademark "HTA" since 1985 and other related marks ("Ars-HTA," logos with concentric circles) since the 1990s. Their products enjoy substantial sales and goodwill among major Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) in India.

The defendant, Paul Components Private Limited, claims to have been using the "HTA" mark since 1977 and is the registered proprietor of that mark based on registrations starting from 2007, though claiming back use to 1977. They are also in the same business of manufacturing oil seals and rubber parts. The defendant had previously sued the plaintiff for trademark infringement and obtained an interim injunction, which was stayed by the Division Bench.

Dispute: The plaintiff filed the current suit to restrain the defendants from using the plaintiff’s trademarks, trade dresses, packaging, and passing off their goods as those of the plaintiff. The main points of dispute were:  Who was the prior user of the "HTA" mark? Whether the defendants' use of the mark and packaging was honest or intended to deceive consumers by copying the plaintiff’s identity. Validity and authenticity of documents and photographs presented by the defendants to show prior use since 1977. Whether the defendants acted in bad faith by adopting marks similar to the plaintiff’s and other third-party well-known trademarks.

Reasoning: The Court carefully examined the documentary evidence provided by both parties. The plaintiff submitted extensive evidence including sales figures, technical drawings, purchase orders, invoices, and packaging samples showing consistent use of "HTA" and related marks since 1985. The defendants' evidence was weaker and included trade mark registrations with claims of prior use starting in 1977. 

However, upon closer scrutiny: The defendants had filed manipulated photographs in a related proceeding, where marks "HTA" were digitally inserted into images that originally bore their "Paul Components" mark. Brochures filed by defendants contained errors in dates (e.g., wrong years for notable industry expos) indicating fabrication. Defendants had changed their user claim in trademark applications only after learning of plaintiff’s use history, suggesting backdating to claim priority. Defendants had also filed trademark applications for well-known third-party marks such as "JCB," "CUMMINS," and others without authorization, showing a pattern of bad faith. Defendants changed their product packaging color schemes to closely resemble the plaintiff’s packaging, indicating intent to confuse consumers. 

The plaintiff’s prior use of "HTA" as a trademark in trade and business papers, packaging, and sales was established under Section 29(6)(d) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which recognizes use on business papers as valid trademark use. The Court referred to established legal principles on passing off, highlighting that even if a mark is registered by one party, an unregistered prior user with goodwill can seek relief. The Court discredited defendants’ evidence, especially in light of documented manipulations and lack of plausible explanations for adopting similar marks and third-party trademarks.Prima facie, the plaintiff had demonstrated significant goodwill and reputation in these marks, while defendants exhibited mala fide intent and dishonesty in adopting marks and packaging similar to the plaintiff’s.

Decision: The Court found a prima facie case in favor of the plaintiff for passing off. The defendants were restrained from using the mark "HTA" and any deceptively similar marks, the logos, and the trade dress of the plaintiff’s packaging until the final decision in the suit. The interim injunction was granted to protect the plaintiff’s reputation and prevent harm to consumers and the plaintiff’s business.

Case Title: Hi Tech Arai Private Limited Vs. Paul Components Private Limited & Ors.

Order Date: September 9, 2025

Case Number: CS(COMM) 891/2023

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:7819

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Hon'ble Judge: Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Stromag Gmbh Vs. The Controller General Of Patents

Stromag Gmbh Vs. The Controller General Of Patents

Stromag Gmbh vs. The Controller General Of Patents,  September 4, 2025  IPDPTA/12/2025  High Court at Calcutta, Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur

Stromag Gmbh, the appellant, filed an application for a patent titled"HYDRAULICALLY ACTUATABLE DISK BRAKE AND AZIMUTH DRIVE" on February 18, 2013. The Controller of Patents, the respondent, issued a First Examination Report (FER) raising objections to the patent application. The objections were that the invention lacked aninventive step under Section 2(1)(j) of the Patents Act, 1970; lacked patentability under Section 3(f) of the Act; and lacked sufficiency of disclosure under Section 10 of the Act.

The primary dispute arose because the Controller rejected the patent application, stating that the invention was not "inventive" because it was merely a combination of seven previously known technologies, or "prior arts". The appellant argued that the order rejecting their patent was passed in violation of theprinciples of natural justice. They pointed out that the Controller's order simply reproduced summaries of the seven prior arts but did not provide any specific analysis of how combining these prior arts would make the appellant's invention obvious. The appellant's argument was that the order had no valid reasons and was just a "rubber-stamp reason".The court noted that a judicial or quasi-judicial order must have reasons to support it. This is a fundamental part of natural justice. The court cited several Supreme Court cases, includingKranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496, which emphasized that orders "must speak" for themselves and not be vague or inscrutable. The court also highlighted the principle fromGurdial Singh Fijji v. State of Punjab [(1979) 2 SCC 368] that "Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions".

The High Court of Calcutta found the impugned order (the order from the Controller) to be sustainable because it did not provide an analysis of how the prior arts made the invention obvious. It ruled that merely stating that the invention is a combination of prior arts is not a sufficient reason for rejection. The court set aside the Controller's order and sent the matter back to a different Hearing Officer to review the patent application from the beginning, within a period of four months. The court made it clear that it was not deciding on the merits of the patent itself, and all questions regarding the patent were left open for the new Hearing Officer to decide.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Ultrahuman Healthcare Pvt Ltd Vs. Oura Health Oy

Ultrahuman Healthcare Pvt Ltd Vs. Oura Health Oy & Anr. Order Date: September 1, 2025 Case Number: CS(COMM) 923/2025 Name of Court: High Court of Delhi Hon'ble Judge: Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

The Plaintiff,Ultrahuman Healthcare Pvt Ltd, filed a lawsuit against the Defendants, Oura Health Oy, seeking a permanent injunction to prevent them from infringing on their Indian Patent No. IN 549915. The patent, titled 'Electronic Ring Including Sensors For Monitoring Health and Fitness Parameters' , was granted to the Plaintiff on September 10, 2024, for a period of 20 years. The Plaintiff claimed they discovered that the Defendants were selling their product, the 'OURA Ring 4', in India through e-commerce channels. The parties were already involved in legal disputes in US Courts.

The main dispute centered on the Plaintiff's allegedsuppression of material facts and documents from the High Court of Delhi. The Defendants argued that the Plaintiff failed to disclose two crucial orders from theUnited States International Trade Commission (ITC) dated April 18, 2025, and August 21, 2025. These orders had granted an injunction against the Plaintiff's products in the US market, finding that they infringed on the Defendants' patent.

The Plaintiffs' counsel argued that the US court orders wereirrelevant because patent law is territorial, meaning a patent in one country does not automatically apply in another. They also claimed that the August 21, 2025 order could not be included because the suit was filed on the same day.

The court, however, was not persuaded. It stated that the Plaintiff had a strict obligation to disclose all relevant documents in a commercial suit under

Order XI Rule 1(1) and Order VI Rule 15A of the CPC. The court found that the US orders were highly relevant because they involved the same parties and the same technology. The court also noted that the Plaintiff had sufficient time between filing the suit and the first hearing to bring the orders to the court's attention, which it willfully failed to do.

The court concluded that the Plaintiff's failure to disclose the US court orders was willful and deliberate. This suppression of material information was in disregard of legal obligations and merited the dismissal of the suit at the very beginning.

The High Court of Delhi, therefore,dismissed the suit. However, it granted the Plaintiff the liberty to file a fresh suit after making a full disclosure of the suppressed orders and providing an explanation for why the findings in those orders are not relevant to the Indian proceedings.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

VGP IPCO LLC Vs. Mr. Suresh Kumar

VGP IPCO LLC & Anr. Vs. Mr. Suresh Kumar Trading :August 22, 2025: CS(COMM) 821/2024  Hon'ble Judge: Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

The Plaintiffs, VGP IPCO LLC and an Indian company, a 50:50 joint venture with Cummins India Ltd. , filed a lawsuit against the Defendants, who are a manufacturer, a wholesaler, and two retailers. The Plaintiffs, known for their

Valvoline lubricant brand, which was established in 1866 and operates in over 150 countries, have a strong brand identity and registered trademarks in India dating back to 1942. The Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants were selling engine oils under the names

Vivoline / V Vivoline / VIVOLINE / VIVOLINE, which they claimed were deceptively similar to their own trademarks. The Defendants' products also allegedly used similar packaging and trade dress, which could confuse consumers.

The court found merit in the Plaintiffs' claims. It noted that the Defendants had not contested the suit, and their failure to file a written statement meant the allegations in the plaint could be taken as admitted. The court concluded that the Defendants' marks were deceptively, visually, and phonetically similar to the Plaintiffs' trademarks, and their use of similar trade dress was likely to cause confusion.

Given the Plaintiffs' high sales volume in India, the court reasoned that the Defendants must have been aware of the Valvoline brand and that their adoption of the similar mark was not an honest one. The court granted a decree of permanent injunction in favor of the Plaintiffs, preventing the Defendants from using the infringing marks or any similar packaging. The interim injunction that had been in place since October 22, 2024, was made permanent. Additionally, the court directed the trademark registry to process the withdrawal application filed by Defendant No. 1 for the VIVOLINE trademark.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Dabur India Limited Vs Real Hindustan Beverages

Dabur India Limited Vs Real Hindustan Beverages & Ors

Order Date: 19 August 2025

Case Number: CS(COMM) 274/2022

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Hon'ble Judge: Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

Dabur India, a leading FMCG company, owns the popular trademark “REAL FRUIT POWER” for fruit juices. In 2022, Dabur discovered that Real Hindustan Beverages was selling fruit drinks using the mark “ULTRA REAL FRUIT ENERGY,” which closely resembled Dabur’s brand name, logo, and packaging.

Dabur argued that the use of “ULTRA REAL FRUIT ENERGY” by Real Hindustan Beverages was a clear case of copying, causing confusion to buyers by making it seem related to Dabur. Dabur sought a permanent injunction to stop this use, claiming infringement and passing off of its trademark.

The Court saw that Real Hindustan Beverages did not defend the case and found the marks and packaging to be very similar. Using Order XIII-A of the Civil Procedure Code, the Court passed a summary judgment—giving Dabur permanent injunction relief as requested, and ordering Real Hindustan Beverages to stop using the disputed marks and logos on its products.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Alkem Laboratories Ltd Vs Lordcent and Torcent Healthcare

Alkem Laboratories Ltd Vs Lordcent and Torcent Healthcare

Order Date: 28 August 2025

Case Number: CS(COMM) 905/2025

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Hon'ble Judge: Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Alkem Laboratories claimed exclusive rights over its ‘A TO Z’ trademark, logo, and product design for medicines, used since 1997 and registered under Indian law. They discovered in 2023 that Lordcent and Torcent were selling similar medicines with nearly identical branding, which could confuse customers.

Alkem argued that Lordcent and Torcent had copied their branding, leading to trademark, copyright infringement, and passing off. The records showed Lordcent and Torcent gave written assurances to stop using the disputed branding, but Alkem later found similar products still on sale in 2025, prompting this lawsuit for a permanent injunction against further use.

The Court recognized Alkem’s prior rights and found the competing products’ branding was deceptively similar. It ordered Lordcent and Torcent to immediately stop selling, marketing, or advertising any products using the disputed marks or packaging. The Court also ordered the removal of such products from third-party websites and set deadlines for replies and further proceedings. The injunction will remain in effect until the next hearing.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Ashiana Ispat Limited Vs. Kamdhenu Limited

Maintainability Vs. Entertainability of Trademark Writ Petitions 

Facts:Ashiana Ispat Limited (Appellant) applied to register a trademark "AL KAMDHENU GOLD" for its products under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. 5 applications were made, and some were accepted and advertised, while others received an examination report (FER) from the Registrar citing certain conflicting trademarks but not all. Kamdhenu Limited (Respondent) claimed that many of its own previously registered trademarks were not cited as similar marks in the Registrar’s process. Instead of opposing the trademark through the standard legal channel, Kamdhenu Limited challenged this process by filing writ petitions in court, alleging procedural lapses by the Registrar and omission in the examination of similar marks.

Main Dispute: Whether the Registrar of Trade Marks properly followed the legal procedures for examining and advertising the trademark applications, given that all potentially conflicting registered trademarks (especially Kamdhenu’s) were not cited or considered in the examination report.

Legal Challenge: Kamdhenu Limited questioned the integrity of the Registrar’s trademark examination, particularly concerning the omission of 16 of its registered marks from the search report, and whether the acceptance/advertsisement of Ashiana Ispat’s trademark applications should be set aside for fresh examination.

Legal Reasoning: The judgment began by explaining the process for trademark registration under the Trade Marks Act and the Trade Marks Rules:

Application is filed under Section 18(1) of Trademarks Act 1999.

Registrar examines it, may accept or refuse it (Section 18(4) of Trademarks Act 1999..

Registrar can withdraw acceptance before registration if mistakes are found (Section 19) of Trademarks Act 1999.

If accepted, Registrar advertises the application (Section 20(1) of Trademarks Act 1999. .

Anyone can oppose within 4 months of advertisement (Section 21(1) of Trademarks Act 1999..

If opposition is decided in applicant’s favour or if no opposition is filed, registration proceeds (Section 23) of Trademarks Act 1999.

Rule 33 of the Trade Marks Rules outlines detailed examination steps, requiring a search of prior similar marks and issuing a First Examination Report (FER) highlighting objections and similar marks. If the applicant does not respond timely, the application may be treated as abandoned.

Maintainability Vs. Entertainability: The court discussed that “maintainability” relates to whether the High Court has basic jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to hear the petition. “Entertainability” relates to whether the court should exercise this jurisdiction, especially when alternative remedies exist.A writ petition is maintainable if it fits Article 226. Courts have the discretion whether to entertain it, and usually don’t if alternate remedies are available unless exceptional circumstances exist.

The court cited Supreme Court judgments, clarifying that alternate remedy is usually a policy or discretionary bar, not a legal bar, and in exceptional cases (like violation of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction, fundamental rights breach, etc.), a writ can be entertained even if another remedy exists.Registrar’s Duty and Rights of Trademark Owners.The Registrar is duty-bound to cite all prior, confusingly similar marks in the FER and give the applicant a chance to respond.Owners of existing registered marks have a right to see their marks cited in FERs and protect their intellectual property.If Registrar omits similar marks from the examination, affected owners can challenge this, even via a writ petition (i.e., it is actionable if Registrar is negligent).

Court’s Approach to the Case: The Single Judge (previous hearing) had allowed Kamdhenu’s writ petitions and ordered the Registrar to conduct a fresh (de novo) examination of the trademark applications, without formally issuing notice or allowing Ashiana Ispat to file a counter-affidavit.

The appellate court disagreed with this on procedural fairness grounds, stating that Ashiana Ispat should have been allowed to file a counter-affidavit in response, as the Single Judge’s approach was overly summary.

The court clarified that while the writ petition was maintainable, whether it should be entertained (especially given available alternative remedies) required fuller consideration and an opportunity for all parties to make submissions.

The appellate court quashed the Single Judge’s order and directed a fresh hearing, returning the matter to the Single Judge so all parties could be properly heard.

Decision:The appellate court set aside (quashed) the Single Judge’s impugned order.Affirmed that the writ petition was maintainable (not barred by the availability of alternative remedy).Left open the question of entertainability – whether the writ petition should be pursued despite alternative remedies, for the Single Judge to decide after hearing both sides.Directed that Ashiana Ispat (appellant) be given formal notice and time to file a counter-affidavit; Kamdhenu can file a rejoinder.

Case Title: Ashiana Ispat Limited Vs. Kamdhenu Limited & Ors.

Order Date: 03 September 2025

Case Number: LPA 407/2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:7801-DB

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Hon'ble Judges: Justice C. Hari Shankar and Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Sonani Industries Pvt. Ltd. Vs Mr. Sanjay Jayantbhai Patel

Case Title: Sonani Industries Pvt. Ltd. Vs Mr. Sanjay Jayantbhai Patel & Anr.

Order Date: 04.11.2024

Case Number: C.O.(COMM.IPD-CR) 880/2022

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Ms. Justice Mini Pushkarna

Sonani Industries Pvt. Ltd. (the petitioner, formerly Sonani Jewels Pvt. Ltd.) has filed three rectification petitions seeking cancellation of copyright registrations held by Respondent No. 1 (Mr. Sanjay Jayantbhai Patel). Separately, the petitioner has filed a suit for copyright infringement against Respondent No. 1 in the District Court, Surat, which is pending. On 09.09.2024, the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (C) 20025/2014 (Sonani Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Prime Diamond Tech and Ors.) directed the Surat District Court to endeavor to decide the suit within one year. Respondent No. 2 appears to be a government or official party, represented through counsel via video conference.

The petitioner argues that the copyright registrations in favor of Respondent No. 1 are invalid because the mandatory requirement under Rule 70(9) of the Copyright Rules, 2013 was not followed. Specifically, while submitting Form XIV for registration, Respondent No. 1 was required to give notice to the petitioner (as a potential interested party), which was not done. Thus, the petitioner claims the registrations cannot stand and must be struck off from the Copyright Register for non-compliance with statutory provisions. The petitioner relies on Bharat Tea Suppliers v. Gujarat Tea Traders and Another (2021 SCC OnLine BOM 3637) and an order dated 02.05.2024 by a coordinate bench of this court in C.O.(COMM.IPD-CR) 750/2022.

Respondent No. 1 counters that the issues in these petitions overlap with those in the pending Surat infringement suit, so the High Court should await its outcome. Respondent No. 1 asserts full compliance with Rule 70(9), and notes that the copyright is not a public document, so no presumption of infringement or dispute arises automatically. Further, the Surat court found no prima facie case for the petitioner, and even the Supreme Court granted only partial relief (direction to maintain accounts and not divulge copyright info to third parties), denying a full injunction against Respondent No. 1's business.

Considering the submissions, the court found it appropriate to await the decision in the pending copyright infringement suit in the District Court, Surat, before proceeding with the rectification petitions. The matters are re-notified for hearing on 28.04.2025.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Kryolan GmbH and Anr. Vs Krelon Cosmetics

Case Title: Kryolan GmbH Vs Krelon Cosmetics and Anr.

Order Date: 01.09.2025

Case Number: CS(COMM) 920/2025

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

Kryolan GmbH (Plaintiff No. 1, a German company) has used the trademark 'KRYOLAN' as its trade mark, trade name, house mark, and company name since 1945 worldwide, including India, for cosmetics like mascara, gel eyeliner, makeup sponges, lipsticks, and cream blushes. Its Indian wholly-owned subsidiary (Plaintiff No. 2, established 2002) continues this use. The mark is registered in India (No. 601757, Class 3, since 15.07.1993), with additional applications pending.

Defendants (M/s Krelon Cosmetics as No. 1 and Anr. as No. 2) use 'KRELON/KRELON COSMETICS' for identical cosmetics. Plaintiffs sent a cease-and-desist notice on 20.12.2024 demanding stoppage of use or similar marks; defendants replied 06.01.2025 refusing compliance, claiming descriptive adoption. Defendants filed TM application No. 548169 (09.06.2022, Class 3, proposed use, pending under opposition by Plaintiff No. 1) and No. 6114674 (18.09.2023, Class 35, registered since unopposed, but rectification petition filed by Plaintiff No. 1 as unaware at advertisement time). Defendants claim use since 21.11.2022 and 10 years in beauty industry. On distributor site (Maniram Balwant Rai), searching defendants' products suggests plaintiffs', indicating confusion.

The suit seeks permanent injunction against trademark infringement, passing off, dilution, unfair competition, damages, etc., under Trade Marks Act, 1999. Plaintiffs argue 'KRELON/KRELON COSMETICS' (impugned mark) is deceptively similar to 'KRYOLAN'—visually (similar structure), phonetically (sound alike), and conceptually (fanciful marks in identical cosmetics category, Class 3)—likely confusing average consumers into believing defendants' products are authorized/affiliated. Addition of 'COSMETICS' is descriptive and non-distinctive. Defendants' Class 35 registration irrelevant (services, not goods). Plaintiffs' mark is invented/fanciful house mark; defendants' descriptive claim fallacious. Bad faith presumed: Defendants aware of plaintiffs' prior use (sales ₹71.79 crores in 2022-23) yet adopted in 2022. Trade channels/consumers identical, risking misrepresentation. Defendants absent despite advance service.

The court found  Found prima facie case: Plaintiffs prior registered proprietors (No. 601757, Class 3); 'KRYOLAN' invented/fanciful with substantial goodwill/sales; 'KRELON' deceptively similar (visual/phonetic), not descriptive, in identical goods/channels, presuming bad faith awareness. Balance of convenience/irreparable injury favors plaintiffs; public interest in avoiding confusion. Ex parte ad-interim injunction granted until next hearing: Defendants, proprietors/partners/directors, and agents restrained from using 'KRELON/KRELON COSMETICS' or deceptively similar marks/names in Class 3 for cosmetics, infringing 'KRYOLAN'. Notice via all modes on process fee payment, returnable next date; reply within four weeks of notice; rejoinder four weeks thereafter.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Jyothy Labs Limited Vs. Gautam Kumar

Case Title: Jyothy Labs Limited v. Gautam Kumar & Anr.

Order Date: 26.08.2025

Case Number: CS(COMM) 893/2025

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Jyothy Labs Limited (the plaintiff) is a company that markets and sells household essentials, including its flagship product, the 'MAXO GENIUS MACHINE' mosquito repellent machine and refills (launched in 2000). This product is sold under the registered trademark 'MAXO' (in Classes 5, 7, 9, 11, and 21 since 18.07.2000), with a copyright registration (No. A-149826/2023 dated 14.12.2023) for the artwork on the packaging (trade dress), and design registrations (Nos. 332182-001 dated 20.08.2020; 375296-001 and 375295-001 dated 09.12.2022) for the bottle/refill shape.

The defendants (Gautam Kumar as Defendant No. 1 and Anr. as No. 2) are involved in manufacturing and selling spying cameras and digital gadgets. In May 2025, the plaintiff learned that the defendants were tampering with genuine 'MAXO' machines by embedding spy cameras inside them, along with refills containing mosquito repellent liquid, and selling these as "Infringing Products" on platforms like YouTube (@smarsofficial8875), Amazon, Flipkart, and their websites (www.smars.in and www.spyimporter.in). An investigator purchased samples from the defendants' listings (paying ₹2,999 on smars.in, ₹3,860 and ₹3,425 on Amazon/Flipkart via UPI/Paytm), confirming delivery of tampered products to New Delhi on 21-22.05.2025. The defendants concealed the 'MAXO' mark on online listings but delivered products with visible 'MAXO' branding and trade dress, misleading buyers into thinking they were authorized plaintiff products.

The main issue is trademark infringement, copyright infringement, passing off, dilution and tarnishment of the 'MAXO' mark and trade dress, unfair trade practices, unfair competition, disparagement, and false trade description. The plaintiff argues that the defendants' tampering alters the product's condition and functionality (from mosquito repellent to spy device), violating Sections 29, 30(3), and 30(4) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (no exhaustion under Section 30(2)(d) due to impairment and legitimate opposition reasons). This creates confusion, misrepresents origin/quality, and exposes the plaintiff to liability for illegal privacy breaches (e.g., sting operations), damaging its reputation and goodwill. The defendants' deliberate concealment online shows bad faith, leading to unjust enrichment from the plaintiff's brand. The suit seeks permanent injunction, damages, accounts, and delivery up. Defendants did not appear.

The court found a prima facie case. Defendants' tampering impairs the product, misappropriates the 'MAXO' mark/trade dress, and alters origin (not covered by Trade Marks Act exhaustion due to changes under Section 30(3)/(4)). Online concealment but visible delivery shows mala fides; infringing products risk illegal use, harming plaintiff's reputation irreparably. Balance of convenience favors plaintiff; no prejudice to defendants. Ex parte ad-interim injunction granted until next hearing: Defendants, assignees, affiliates, licensees, distributors, dealers, stockists, retailers, agents restrained from manufacturing, offering for sale, selling, advertising, or dealing in infringing products (spy cameras in 'MAXO' machines/refills or similar bearing 'MAXO'/deceptively similar marks, infringing trademark/copyright A-149826/2023).

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

GlaxoSmithKline Pharmaceuticals Vs. Chembott Chemicals

GlaxoSmithKline Pharmaceuticals Limited Vs. Chembott Chemicals and Pharmaceutical Private Limited  29.08.2025  CS(COMM) 916/2025 Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

GlaxoSmithKline Pharmaceuticals Limited (the plaintiff), a major player in the global healthcare industry and part of the GSK group, has been using and owning the registered trademark 'COBADEX' since 1958 (Registration No. 185987 in Class 5). This mark is used for multivitamin and mineral deficiency medicines, including tablets, capsules, and previously syrups. The plaintiff started using it in India in 1974 and has built strong goodwill through continuous sales and heavy marketing investments. Its products, like COBADEX CZS (containing ingredients such as Pyridoxine Hydrochloride, Nicotinamide, Cyanocobalamin, Folic Acid, Chromium, Zinc, and Selenium), target vitamin and mineral deficiencies in adults. The company has grown its sales significantly over the years and operates in the pharmaceutical sector.

The defendants, Chembott Chemicals and Pharmaceutical Private Limited (Defendant No. 1, a company under the Companies Act, 2013) and its director (Defendant No. 2), are also in the pharmaceutical business. In March 2024, the plaintiff learned of Defendant No. 2's trademark application (No. 6252220) for 'COZIDEX' (the impugned mark), covering similar pharmaceutical products, published in the Trade Marks Journal on 26.02.2024. 

The plaintiff opposed this on 23.04.2024, citing prior rights. Defendant No. 2 filed a counter-statement claiming use of 'COZIDEX' but missed deadlines for evidence, filing a late affidavit on 08.05.2025 with invoices from Defendant No. 1 showing the mark on similar products. Defendant No. 1's GST registration is suspended. The plaintiff sent a cease-and-desist notice on 20.06.2025, but defendants replied on 24.06.2025 denying similarity. The opposition is pending before the Trade Marks Registry. The plaintiff believes defendants are using 'COZIDEX' based on the invoices, though the product is not openly available in the market.

Dispute

The core issue is trademark infringement and passing off. The plaintiff claims 'COZIDEX' is deceptively similar to 'COBADEX'—phonetically, visually, conceptually, and structurally—because defendants altered 'BA' to 'ZI' in the mark. 

 Ex parte ad-interim injunction granted until next hearing: Defendants, their directors, officers, employees, agents, dealers, licensees, affiliates, etc., restrained from manufacturing, selling, displaying, advertising, or marketing (online/offline) any products (syrups or others) under 'COZIDEX' or similar marks deceptively akin to 'COBADEX'. Notice issued returnable next date; reply within four weeks, rejoinder four weeks thereafter. Order XXXIX Rule 3 CPC compliance within two weeks.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Centrient Pharmaceuticals Vs Dalas Biotech Limited

This case revolves around a patent infringement dispute in the pharmaceutical industry. The plaintiffs, Centrient Pharmaceuticals Netherlands B.V. and another entity, hold a patent numbered IN 247301. This patent covers a specific process for preparing Amoxicillin Trihydrate, which is a key ingredient used in antibiotics. The plaintiffs filed a commercial suit (CS(COMM) 218/2019) seeking a permanent injunction to stop the defendant, Dalas Biotech Limited, from using or infringing on this patented process. They claimed that the defendant was manufacturing Amoxicillin Trihydrate using a method that violated their patent rights.

The defendant filed a written statement denying the infringement. In paragraph 94 of this statement, they described their manufacturing process for Amoxicillin Trihydrate. However, the plaintiffs argued that this description was vague and full of ambiguities.

The plaintiffs application (I.A. 15057/2019) under Order XI Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), 1908, as amended by the Commercial Courts Act, 2016, read with Section 151 CPC.

The main dispute in this application was whether the court should force the defendant to answer the plaintiffs' interrogatories and disclose detailed information about their manufacturing process and regulatory filings.

The defendant opposed, saying the interrogatories were irrelevant to the suit, sought confidential business information, and were just a "fishing expedition" to gather evidence instead of proving the case through trial.

In essence, this was a battle over discovery rights: How much detail must the defendant reveal early in the case to defend against infringement claims, especially when it involves trade secrets and regulatory approvals?

• Burden under Section 104A(1)(b) Patents Act: Plaintiffs must prove infringement first (via product comparison). Their attempt here is to discover the defendant's "exclusive evidence" through fishing—e.g., demanding documents that reveal trade secrets.
• Interrogatories can't replace cross-examination. The "optionality" issues (enzyme, acids, pH) can be tested during trial by questioning the defendant's witnesses on credibility.

The court dismissed the application. It held that directing the defendant to answer the interrogatories would not serve justice, as it amounts to an impermissible roving inquiry. The issues can be resolved at trial through evidence and cross-examination. No merit in the application; it stands dismissed.

This decision emphasizes the limits of discovery in patent suits: Plaintiffs can't use interrogatories to force disclosure of confidential processes without strong proof of relevance, especially when trial mechanisms exist. It protects trade secrets while upholding the burden-shifting under the Patents Act.

Case Title: Centrient Pharmaceuticals Netherlands Vs Dalas Biotech Limited

Order Date: January 27, 2021

Case Number: CS(COMM) 218/2019

Neutral Citation: AIRONLINE 2021 DEL 68

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice V. Kameswar Rao

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Arteform Designs Private Ltd. Vs. Abrol Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd

When Interrogatories Cross the Line

Factual Background: Arteform Designs Pvt. Ltd. (the plaintiff) entered into a turnkey contract with Abrol Engineering Co. Pvt. Ltd. (the defendant) for the construction of a residential house in Kapurthala, Punjab, for the defendant’s Managing Director.

Under this turnkey arrangement, Arteform was to construct and hand over a fully functional house at a fixed cost of ₹5,000 per square foot (plus taxes). According to the plaintiff, about 80–90% of the project was completed, but when the defendant stopped paying the running bills (RA bills), Arteform stopped further work and filed the present recovery suit.

The defendant, however, questioned the cost of construction and filed an application under Order XI Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), seeking the Court’s permission to serve interrogatories (a set of written questions to be answered on oath by the other party).

Core Dispute

The main issue before the Court was:Whether the defendant could compel the plaintiff to disclose details of procurement of goods, vendor names, GST numbers, bills, and payments related to the project by using interrogatories, even when the contract was for a fixed rate of ₹5,000 per square foot.

The Court dismissed the defendant’s applications under Order XI CPC.It held that the interrogatories sought were irrelevant to the dispute, amounted to a fishing inquiry, and could not override the admitted terms of the contract.

Order XI CPC is not meant for fishing inquiries or filling gaps in evidence.

Interrogatories must be directly connected to the issues framed in the suit, and their scope is narrower than cross-examination.

If dissatisfied with performance or quality, a party must file a counter-claim or separate suit, not misuse interrogatories.

Arteform Designs Private Ltd. Vs. Abrol Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd.:Case Number: CS(COMM) 142/2022:High Court of Delhi :Hon’ble Judge: Justice Jasmeet Singh:Order Date: 4 March 2024

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Essel Sports Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India

Interrogatories Cannot Replace Cross-Examination

Factual Background: Essel Sports Pvt. Ltd., the plaintiff, is the company behind the Indian Cricket League (ICL). The defendants include the Union of India and notably the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI). The plaintiff alleged that BCCI engaged in unfair practices, intimidating and threatening players who were associated with the ICL, thereby damaging the plaintiff’s business interests. During the trial, the plaintiff produced six witnesses, including famous cricketers like Kapil Dev and Kiran More, who testified in support of the plaintiff. Their cross-examination concluded in 2009 and 2010 respectively. The plaintiff thereafter closed its evidence.

Later, BCCI (Defendant No. 5) filed an application under Order XI CPC (Civil Procedure Code) seeking permission to serve interrogatories (a set of written questions that must be answered on oath) to the plaintiff. The reason was that BCCI had received letters in 2012 from Kapil Dev and Kiran More stating they had disassociated themselves from Essel Sports and ICL, and allegedly implying their earlier testimonies may have been given under pressure.

Core Dispute:The dispute before the Court was whether, at such a late stage (after completion of plaintiff’s evidence and cross-examination), BCCI could still serve interrogatories on the plaintiff regarding these two witnesses and their disassociation from the company.

Submissions by the Parties:Defendant No. 5 (BCCI):Argued that Order XI CPC does not limit when interrogatories may be served.Claimed that the plaintiff concealed the fact that Kapil Dev and Kiran More had later disassociated from ICL.Asserted that the interrogatories were necessary for proper adjudication and relied on case laws like:Aluminium Corporation of India Ltd. v. Lakshmi Ratan Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. (AIR 1968 All 601).Smt. Sharda Dhir v. Ashok Kumar Makhija (99 (2002) DLT 350).Canara Bank v. Rajiv Tyagi (166 (2010) DLT 523)

Plaintiff (Essel Sports):Opposed the application as mala fide (bad faith) and an attempt to cover up deficiencies in BCCI’s earlier cross-examinations.Argued that the interrogatories were irrelevant, scandalous, and amounted to abuse of process.Stated that since the witnesses’ cross-examinations had been completed years earlier, their later disassociation letters were not relevant.Submitted that BCCI was trying to delay the trial and engage in a “roving inquiry.”

Court’s Reasoning:Justice Vipin Sanghi carefully analyzed the legal position and facts:

Timing of Interrogatories:Order XI CPC allows interrogatories but they must be relevant and timely.Interrogatories are meant to clarify issues or shorten litigation, not to substitute cross-examination.

Stage of the Case:Plaintiff’s witnesses had been cross-examined and discharged years before the letters surfaced.Evidence was closed, so there was no concealment by the plaintiff.If BCCI wanted to rely on the new letters, they could either produce Kapil Dev and Kiran More as their own witnesses or seek recall of those witnesses for further cross-examination.

Limitations of Interrogatories:Interrogatories cannot be used to reopen evidence or fix gaps in cross-examination.Rule 1 of Order XI clearly restricts interrogatories to matters directly related to issues in the suit.

Distinguishing Cited Cases:The precedents cited by BCCI involved situations where interrogatories were raised before or during trial, not after completion of evidence.Thus, those cases were not applicable here.

Fairness and Justice:Allowing interrogatories at this late stage would be unfair and contrary to natural justice.The Court observed that BCCI was trying to indirectly nullify the testimony of Kapil Dev and Kiran More through interrogatories instead of following the proper legal route.

Final Decision:The Court dismissed BCCI’s application as misconceived and unjustified. The Court held that interrogatories at this stage were not permissible. 

Case Title:Essel Sports Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union of India

Date of Order:26.08.2013

Case No.: CS (OS) 1566 OF 2007

Name of Court:Delhi High Court

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Shri Vipin Sanghi

Law Settled by the Case:Interrogatories under Order XI CPC cannot be used as a substitute for cross-examination. They must be relevant to issues framed in the suit and cannot be raised at any arbitrary stage. After witnesses are cross-examined and discharged, interrogatories cannot be served to indirectly challenge or discredit their testimony. If fresh facts arise later, the correct remedy is to either recall the witnesses (with court’s permission) or produce them as one’s own witnesses, not to misuse interrogatories.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Castrol Limited Vs . Sanjay Sonavane

Castrol Limited Vs . Sanjay Sonavane:CS(COMM) 855/2025:High Court of Delhi:19.08.2025: Hon'ble Judge Justice Tejas Karia

Castrol Limited, a global leader in engine oils and lubricants, sells products in India under its well-known trademarks and packaging. Castrol uses marks like “3X,” “3X PROTECTION,” “3XCLEAN,” and “3 IN 1 FORMULA.” The Defendants, however, claimed exclusive rights over their own “3P” mark and alleged copyright infringement. They threatened Castrol and its distributors with legal proceedings, published a public notice warning the public, and even caused police seizure of Castrol’s genuine products, leading to an FIR against Castrol’s Indian subsidiary and its distributor.

The dispute was whether Castrol’s use of “3X” related marks infringed the Defendants’ “3P” marks or copyright. Castrol argued that the threats were false and unjustified under Section 142 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and Section 60 of the Copyright Act, 1957, and sought an injunction against such groundless threats.

The Court held that Castrol’s “3X” marks were completely different from the Defendants’ “3P” marks, and the Defendants could not claim monopoly over the number “3.” The seizure and public notice amounted to groundless threats. The Court found a prima facie case in Castrol’s favour and restrained the Defendants from issuing any further threats or legal actions against Castrol, its Indian subsidiary, or distributors regarding use of the “3X” marks until the next hearing.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Exphar S A & Anr. Vs. Essphar Private Limited

Exphar S.A. Vs. Essphar Private Limited:CS(COMM) 891/2025High Court of Delhi:26.08.2025:Hon’ble Judge: Justice Tejas Karia

Exphar S.A., a Belgium-based pharmaceutical company, has been using the coined trade name and mark “EXPHAR” since 1981 and selling in India since 1991. It holds trademark registrations in India and internationally. Essphar Pvt. Ltd. adopted the mark “ESSPHAR”, which looked and sounded very similar to “EXPHAR,” used the same red, black, and white color scheme, the red plus (+) sign, and even sold medicines through online platforms like Apollo Pharmacy. Exphar alleged that this imitation was dishonest and risky in the pharmaceutical field where confusion can be dangerous.

Exphar claimed infringement under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and violation of copyright under the Copyright Act, 1957, arguing that Essphar’s mark was deceptively similar to its own and caused confusion. Essphar opposed, arguing that the Delhi High Court lacked jurisdiction since Exphar was a foreign company and sales were only exports, not within India.

The Court noted that Exphar had sales in India and under Section 56 of the Trade Marks Act, even exports from India count as “use” of the mark in India. The Court found the two marks—“EXPHAR” and “ESSPHAR”—to be visually, phonetically, and structurally similar. Since pharmaceuticals are sensitive products, such similarity could cause serious harm to patients and irreparable damage to Exphar’s goodwill.

Therefore, the Court granted an ad-interim injunction, restraining Essphar from using “ESSPHAR” or any similar mark, and directed removal of its listings from Apollo Pharmacy, JustDial, IndiaMart, PharmaCompass, Tata nexarc, CB Insights, and LinkedIn.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Basant Goel Vs. Som Prakash Sethi

Court’s Approach to New Facts Introduced in Rebuttal Affidavits

Facts of the Case  :This case revolves around a civil dispute involving Basant Goel (Plaintiff) and Som Prakash Sethi & Others (Defendants) related to an Agreement to Sell dated 27 June 2021. The core issue is whether the terms of this agreement were modified later, and if any party failed to perform their obligations under it.

During the case proceedings, an important piece of evidence came into focus—a WhatsApp chat dated 21 September 2021 between the parties. The Plaintiff filed a rebuttal affidavit after the completion of evidence by both parties. This late filing included fresh explanations concerning the WhatsApp chat and a specific meeting dated 20 September 2021, where threats were allegedly made, and discussions about forfeiture of earnest money took place.

The Defendants objected strongly to this late evidence, claiming that the Plaintiff tried to introduce facts beyond the original pleadings and delayed dealing with the WhatsApp chat despite knowing about it since the start.

Dispute  :The main dispute was whether the Plaintiff should be allowed to file and rely upon the rebuttal affidavit that introduces new evidence (the 20 September meeting and explanation of the 21 September WhatsApp chat) at such an advanced stage of the trial, given these facts were not mentioned in the original plaint or in the Plaintiff’s initial evidence affidavit.

The Defendants argued that:  - The WhatsApp chat had been in Plaintiff’s knowledge from the beginning since it was filed with the Defendants’ written statement.  - Plaintiff had a full opportunity during their evidence and cross-examination phases to deal with the chat but did not.  - The Plaintiff's filing of the rebuttal affidavit after evidence had closed was an improper attempt to fill gaps and address shortcomings in the earlier evidence.  - The Plaintiff’s case should be confined to the original pleadings, which did not mention this meeting or the WhatsApp discussion explicitly.

The Plaintiff argued that:  - The onus (burden) to prove modification of the agreement lies on the Defendants (Issue No. c), thus Plaintiff had reserved the right to file rebuttal evidence.  - The Plaintiff’s initial evidence affidavit was filed as "Affirmative Evidence," indicating intent to reserve rebuttal.  - A formal separate application for filing rebuttal evidence is not necessary under Order XVIII Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) 1908.  - The WhatsApp chat had been referred to indirectly and was part of the defense, needing explanation in light of the Defendants’ evidence.  

- The pleadings should be read with a liberal approach, not overly technical, and facts relevant to the dispute should not be excluded on technicalities.

Reasoning by the Court  The Court carefully reviewed the facts and the applicable law. The following points are crucial:

Pleadings and Evidence:The Court examined the plaint (the formal statement of claims) and found it absent of any reference to the WhatsApp chat dated 21 September 2021 or the meeting on 20 September 2021. This meant the Plaintiff was introducing new facts very late.

Opportunity to Deal With Evidence:Though the WhatsApp chat was produced by Defendants with their written statement, the Plaintiff had ample opportunity to address and explain this chat during the evidence phase but chose not to do so. This included cross-examination of a Defendant's witness where the chat was discussed.

Rebuttal Evidence Rules:Order XVIII Rule 3 CPC allows rebuttal evidence to be led without prior leave of the court but must be strictly confined to rebutting the evidence of the other side and not to introduce new facts. The Court observed that the Plaintiff’s rebuttal affidavit introduced entirely new facts (like the meeting and alleged threats) not pleaded earlier.

Liberal Construction of Pleadings:While the Court acknowledged that pleadings should be liberally construed and not interpreted narrowly, this principle does not allow a party to bring in new facts beyond original pleadings at a late stage to gain tactical advantage.

No Sufficient Cause Provided:   The Plaintiff did not provide satisfactory reasons for the delay or for not including these facts earlier. It appeared to the Court that the Plaintiff was trying to patch up defects noticed in the earlier evidence.

Cross Examination and Opportunity: The Plaintiff argued no questions were asked during cross-examination about the WhatsApp chat, but the Court found this was incorrect. Questions related to this chat had indeed been put to both Plaintiff and Defendant witnesses.

Decision  :The Court rejected the Plaintiff’s attempt to file the rebuttal affidavit containing new facts related to the WhatsApp chat and the meeting of 20 September 2021. The Plaintiff failed to show sufficient cause to allow such evidence at the advanced stage of the case.

 Key Legal Provisions Discussed  :Order XVIII Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code 1908: Related to the filing of rebuttal evidence after afffirmative evidence, allowing it only to contradict the evidence already led, and not to introduce new facts. 

Crux of the case:The Plaintiff tried to introduce new claims and explanations through rebuttal evidence at the very late stage of the trial, namely to explain a WhatsApp chat and a meeting where threats were made. However, these claims were not mentioned in the original complaint or the initial evidence. The documents were already with Plaintiff early on, so they had many chances to talk about it but chose not to. The Court held that allowing this late evidence would be unfair and against proper legal procedure. Therefore, the Court did not allow the late rebuttal affidavit and insisted the case proceed to final hearing based on the evidence already admitted.

Case Title: Basant Goel Vs. Som Prakash Sethi

Case Number: CS(COMM) 557/2022

Court: High Court of Delhi

Hon’ble Judge: Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

Order Date: 27.08.2025

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By:Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Cyril Bath Company Vs. Controller of Patents and Designs

Cyril Bath Company Vs. Controller of Patents and Designs :IPDPTA/8/2025: High Court at Calcutta: Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur:01.09.2025

Dispute: Cyril Bath Company had filed a divisional patent application in India (Application No. 1376/KOLNP/2013). The Controller of Patents rejected the divisional application, holding that modification of claims in a PCT national phase application is not allowed under the Patents Act and Rules. The Controller concluded that such modification could only be sought through amendment, not by filing a divisional application.

Reasons (Court’s Discussion): The Court observed that the Controller’s order was defective because it only quoted provisions (like Sections 10, 11, 16, etc. of the Patents Act) but gave no reasoning. Under law, an order must satisfy the tests of “why” and “what”—the reasoning must explain why the conclusion has been reached. Without reasons, the order becomes unsustainable.

The Court also noted that the Controller had wrongly relied on the Delhi High Court decision in Boehringer Ingelheim without considering the later judgment in Syngenta Ltd. v. Controller of Patents (2023), which had clarified the law.

Decision:The High Court set aside the Controller’s order and remanded the matter back to the Controller of Patents to decide the divisional application afresh in accordance with law, within three months. The Court made it clear that it had not given any opinion on the merits of the divisional application itself.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi)

Hero Ecotech Limited and Another Vs. Hero Cycles Limited

Interplay of Statutory Requirements and Private Agreements in Trademark Infringement Disputes

Facts of the Case:This legal dispute involves several companies and family members from the Munjal business family, centered on the use and ownership of the trademark “HERO” in the manufacturing and marketing of bicycles and related products. The Munjal family business was once unified but diversified over the years into different segments. To manage this complexity and avoid conflicts, the four branches of the Munjal family entered into a Family Settlement Agreement (FSA) and a Trademark and Name Agreement (TMA) in 2010. These agreements clearly divided trademark rights and business domains among the four groups. Specifically, the use of the “HERO” trademark for bicycles was assigned exclusively to one family group (F-4 Family Group), while other groups were allocated different trademark rights related to other products or geographic regions.

Despite these agreements, disputes arose when Hero Ecotech Limited (F-1 Family Group) and associated entities started using the name "HERO ECOTECH" on bicycle products marketed by their group company under the brand name "KROSS." The plaintiffs (Hero Cycles Limited and others, representing the F-4 Family Group) alleged this was in violation of the FSA and TMA, amounts to infringement of the “HERO” trademark in relation to bicycles, and constitutes passing off. The plaintiffs had obtained interim injunctions in earlier proceedings prohibiting the defendants from using the “HERO” mark in bicycle manufacture and sales.

Dispute:The core dispute is whether the defendants violated the injunction and family agreements by using the "HERO ECOTECH" name on bicycle products, which the plaintiffs allege is trademark infringement and amounts to contempt of court. The defendants argued that “HERO ECOTECH LIMITED” was only used as a legal manufacturer’s name on packaging as required by law, not as a trademark or brand. They also contended that the trial court erred in initiating contempt proceedings without following proper procedural requirements, such as instituting a miscellaneous judicial case and permitting evidence.

Legal Provisions Involved: Order XXXIX Rule 2A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC): Prescribes the procedure and consequences for disobedience of any injunction granted by the court, including attachment of property and imprisonment for contempt.

Section 141 of the CPC: Requires the procedure for miscellaneous proceedings to follow the suit trial procedure as far as possible.

Rule 459 (a) (xii) of the Civil Court Rules of Patna High Court: Requires miscellaneous judicial cases such as those under Order XXXIX Rule 2A to be instituted separately.

Trade Marks Act, 1999: Governs protection of registered trademarks against infringement and passing off.

Legal Metrology Act, 2009 and Legal Metrology (Packaged Commodities) Rules, 2011: Mandates specification of manufacturer’s name and address on product packaging.

Reasoning by the High Court:

Procedural Shortcomings: The Court first observed that the trial court had prematurely ordered initiating contempt proceedings without first instituting a separate miscellaneous judicial case as mandated by Rule 459 (a) (xii) of the Civil Court Rules. Further, Section 141 of the CPC requires following suit procedures for evidence and document production in such proceedings, which the trial court bypassed.

Premature Contempt Finding: The court noted that the trial court recorded a prima facie finding of contempt against the defendants before leading evidence or adjudicating the issues, which violates principles of fair play and procedural fairness. The label of “contempt” was inappropriate since the proceedings under Order XXXIX Rule 2A are meant to assess if there has been disobedience or breach of injunction, a question requiring evidence.

Interpretation of Family Agreements: The Court observed that neither the Family Settlement Agreement nor the Trademark and Name Agreement explicitly prohibited the defendants from using their corporate or manufacturer names on products or packaging.

Finality of Supreme Court Orders: The defendants had unsuccessfully challenged earlier injunctions in various courts and the Supreme Court had restored injunctions against the defendants from using the “HERO” mark in bicycle manufacturing and sales. However, the matter of whether the defendants used the mark as a trademark or merely stated their corporate name remained open for further inquiry.

Scope of High Court’s Supervisory Jurisdiction: The High Court, exercising its supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution, declined to assume appellate functions or enter into merits and fact-finding. It focused solely on legality and procedural propriety of the trial court’s order.

Decision: The High Court held that the trial court’s order dated 07-09-2019 initiating contempt proceedings against the defendants was an erroneous exercise of jurisdiction for the following reasons:

Failure to institute a separate miscellaneous judicial case as per Rule 459 (a) (xii).Premature recording of contempt finding without evidence and without proper procedure.Inappropriate use of “contempt” label where the question was about breach of injunction warranting inquiry.Failure to consider statutory mandate of Legal Metrology Act on manufacturer name disclosure.Procedural irregularities that go to root of jurisdiction.The Court accordingly set aside the trial court’s impugned order and allowed the civil miscellaneous petition. It also reminded the trial court to expedite disposal of the underlying trademark suit.

Case Title: Hero Ecotech Limited and Another Vs. Hero Cycles Limited and Others

Order Date: 03-09-2025

Case Number: Civil Mis No.1711 of 2019

Name of Court: High Court of Patna

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Honourable Mr. Justice Arun Kumar Jha

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi