F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG & Another Vs. Natco Pharma Limited

Patent Infringement and Person in the Know

The Appeal: In this matter, the High Court of Delhi was called upon to decide an appeal by F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG against Natco Pharma Limited regarding the manufacture and sale of the drug "Risdiplam." The appellants, holders of Indian Patent IN 3343971 concerning compounds for treating spinal muscular atrophy, sought an injunction to prevent Natco from producing and selling Risdiplam.

Facts: The facts of the case are straightforward. F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG is the patentee for Risdiplam, marketed under the brand name EVRYSDI used for spinal muscular atrophy. Natco Pharma began manufacturing and marketing Risdiplam, which the appellants argued amounted to patent infringement under Section 48 of the Indian Patents Act. The legal question was whether Natco's actions amounted to patent infringement and, if so, whether Natco could successfully invoke statutory defenses to avoid liability.

The Procedural Background: The dispute arose after a single judge of the High Court declined the injunction against Natco, leading the appellants to file the present appeal. Natco Pharma, as defendant, admitted to making and selling Risdiplam but asserted a legal defense under Section 107 of the Patents Act. This defense relies on Section 64(e) and 64(f), which allow a patent to be revoked if the invention is not new (lacking novelty) or is obvious (lacking an inventive step).

The Court’s detailed reasoning began by clarifying the law surrounding appellate review, citing Wander Ltd. v. Antox India P Ltd. (Supreme Court: 1990 Supp SCC 727), emphasizing that appeals against discretionary relief like injunctions are not appeals on facts but on principles. The Court would not substitute its own judgment for that of the original judge unless the lower court exercised its discretion arbitrarily or ignored settled legal principles.

The Legal Provision: Legal provisions under scrutiny included Section 48 (patentee’s rights), Section 64(e) (lack of novelty), and Section 64(f) (obviousness) of the Patents Act. Notably, infringement as such is not strictly defined in the Act, but Section 48 grants patent owners the exclusive right to control the making, using, selling, or importing of the patented product.

The Single Judge, whose decision was under appeal, found in favor of Natco based on these defenses. The core legal issue centered around two concepts: whether Risdiplam was "disclosed" within the scope of prior art (other earlier patents), and whether the claimed invention was obvious to a skilled person in the field.

The Single Judge and the Division Bench focused on whether Risdiplam, though covered under a so-called "Markush" chemical claim in earlier patents (WO916, US955), had been "disclosed" in such a way as to destroy novelty under Section 64(e). The difference between "coverage" (a compound is one of many possible encompassed by a broad patent claim) and "disclosure" (the compound is specifically taught or enabled) was discussed at length, referencing notable precedents including Novartis AG v Union of India (2013 6 SCC 1) and Astrazeneca AB v Intas Pharmaceutical Ltd (2020 84 PTC 326 Del).

While earlier cases such as Astrazeneca held that a plaintiff alleging infringement of both a genus (broad) and a species (narrow) patent amounts to admitting disclosure in the genus patent, the Division Bench in this case questioned whether infringement (predicated on coverage) was the same as invalidity (predicated on disclosure). The Bench favored the view that disclosure must be enabling – it should teach a skilled person how to make the specific compound; mere theoretical coverage is not sufficient. However, as the Single Judge's ruling was consistent with the then-prevailing interpretation of Astrazeneca, it was not faulted.

The obviousness: On the question of obviousness under Section 64(f), the Court examined whether, based on teachings in earlier patents and general knowledge, a skilled person could have arrived at Risdiplam without inventive effort. It was observed that Risdiplam differed from "Compound 809" of the prior art only by a single atom – a nitrogen (N) in place of a CH group. The Division Bench elaborated that several compounds in the prior art involved variations at this very position, and chemical principles (such as those set out in the Grimms Hyride Displacement Law) suggested substituting nitrogen for carbon-hydrogen as a routine modification. The Court also referred to the fact that in pharmaceutical chemistry, it is common to make such changes to optimize properties like potency and stability.

Person in the Know: Importantly, the decision observed that where the inventors of both the earlier patent and the current patent are the same, the "person skilled in the art" test shifts. The actual inventor, being "in the know," is presumed to choose relevant modifications more easily and to know how to arrive at the claimed invention. This mitigates against permitting so-called "evergreening," where a small, obvious change is used to obtain a new patent and extend exclusivity, especially in the realm of essential or life-saving drugs.

The Court cautioned that patent protection is intended only for true inventions, and that prolonging monopolies by minor modifications that would have occurred to the original inventors themselves conflicts with public interest. If inventors are allowed to obtain new patents for minor, obvious changes, society may suffer by not having access to important drugs at affordable rates.

In the concluding part, the Division Bench stated that its appellate review was limited to checking whether the judge below applied the correct legal principles. Since the judge did so, and no arbitrary or capricious conduct was shown, the appeal was dismissed. The Bench did not find it necessary to examine every nuance of the parties’ arguments in detail, since the core legal findings were unimpeachable. A credible challenge to the validity of the patent had been established, so the injunction was rightly denied.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, affirming that a credible defense of obviousness had been shown. The Court did not interfere with the lower court’s exercise of discretion, leaving the validity of the patent and the parties’ broader disputations to potential further proceedings or trial stages if warranted.

Case Title: F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG & Another Vs. Natco Pharma Limited

Order Date: 9th October 2025

Case Number: FAO(OS)(COMM) 43/2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:8943-DB

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Hon’ble Judges: Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Mr. Justice Ajay Digpaul

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Tapas Chatterjee Vs. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs

Guidelines for Assessing Inventive Step in Patent Appeals

Facts: This case involved a patent dispute centering around the process for recovery of potassium sulphate and other valuable products from distillery spent wash, ultimately leading towards a Zero Liquid Discharge (ZLD) system. The appellant, Tapas Chatterjee, applied for a patent for this process in 2019, aiming to address the issue of water pollution caused by alcohol distilleries. The invention was intended to recover potassium sulphate, magnesium sulphate, activated carbon, and other value-added products from effluent, with the additional benefit of ZLD, which meant no liquid effluent was discharged back into the environment. The Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) filed a pre-grant opposition against this application, citing several provisions of the Patents Act, 1970.

Procedural Detail: After the application was filed, the Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs (AC) conducted the standard examination, including the First Examination Report and subsequent reply from the appellant. The AC then dealt with the pre-grant opposition by CSIR, which was based on multiple grounds under Section 25(1) of the Patents Act. The main objections were that the invention was not novel, lacked inventive step, was not patentable under Section 3(d), and the methodology was not sufficiently described.

The AC rejected the opposition regarding lack of novelty but upheld the challenges relating to inventive step and Section 3(d). Consequently, the patent application was refused. The appellant appealed to a Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi, who affirmed the Controller’s decision. The appellant then brought a Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench.

Dispute: The core of the dispute revolved around two primary legal issues: Whether the invention as claimed was non-patentable under Section 3(d) of the Patents Act on grounds of being a mere use of a known process? Whether the invention lacked an inventive step, i.e., it was obvious in light of prior art documents , as per Section 2(1)(ja) and Section 25(1)(e)? The respondents (CSIR) contended that all steps described by the appellant were already disclosed in prior arts individually or in combination, and did not present any technical advance or require inventive faculty?

Detailed Reasoning: The Division Bench delved deeply into the reasons given by the Assistant Controller and the Single Judge. It noted that although the Controller accepted that the subject invention was novel, he still found a lack of inventive step compared to prior arts D1 (US patent) and D2 (Indian Standard). According to the Controller and the Single Judge, the steps of the claimed process were standard chemical engineering procedures, and no aspect of the steps was sufficiently distinct to warrant patent protection. The Controller held that routine operations (like concentration, thermal decomposition, dissolution, recovery) were obvious.

However, the Division Bench identified that the reasoning of both the AC and the Single Judge was inadequate and did not reflect a detailed, independent analysis of the prior arts compared to the subject invention. The Bench emphasized the importance of the legal test for inventive step outlined in F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. Cipla Ltd., which includes identifying the “person skilled in the art,” identifying the inventive concept, assessing the general knowledge at the priority date, and recognizing the differences between prior art and the claimed invention.

The key legal finding was that the Controller had failed to articulate which specific features of the claimed invention were obvious, and simply concluded so without detailed comparison. The prior arts (D1 and D2) had different approaches, products, and processes compared to the claimed invention’s steps, especially regarding the various fractions and recovery steps described in the application, and the additional by-products (magnesium sulphate, activated carbon) which were not claimed outcomes in D1 or D2.

The Division Bench also clarified the application of Section 3(d): it will only apply if the invention is a mere use of a known process, which was not positively shown in this case, and Section 3(d) would not apply if the process yields a new product or uses a new reactant. Since the process resulted in value-added products not described in the prior arts, the invocation of Section 3(d) was incorrect. Ultimately, the approach of the Controller (mechanical and unsupported by explicit reasons) and the analysis of the Single Judge (which skipped essential steps in the Hoffmann test) were found deficient.

Decision: The Division Bench allowed the appeal. The orders of the Single Judge and the Assistant Controller rejecting the appellant’s patent application were set aside. The matter was remanded to CGPDTM (Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks) for fresh consideration, specifically to reconsider the inventive step objection under Section 25(1)(e) read with Section 2(1)(ja), based strictly on the principles laid down in Hoffmann and the present judgment. The Bench unequivocally rejected the Section 3(d) objection raised by CSIR, stating there was no material basis for treating the process as a mere use of a known process. The adjudicating authority was directed to render a well-reasoned decision post-hearing, limited to the material already on record, and both parties were allowed to supplement their written submissions.

Case Title: Tapas Chatterjee Vs. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs & Anr.

Order Date: 6 October 2025

Case Number: LPA 836/2023

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:8824-DB

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Hon’ble Judges: Justice C. Hari Shankar, Justice Ajay Digpaul

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

B. L. Agro Industries Limited Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks

Stay of operation of registration of the mark in Trademark Appeal

Facts  :The appellant, B. L. Agro Industries Limited, is a long-time user and registered proprietor of the trademark "NOURISH" in Class 30, which covers a wide range of food-related products including edible oils, ghee, milk and dairy products, pulses, tea, coffee, flour, confectionery, spices, and other allied goods. The mark "NOURISH" has been in use since 2007, and the appellant holds registrations covering Classes 29, 30, and 31.  

The respondent Urban Exports (P) Ltd. applied for registration of the mark "TeaNOURISH" (stylized) under Application No. 6544100 in Class 30 covering similar goods such as coffee, tea, biscuits, confectionery, spices, and sauces. The respondent claimed user of this mark since December 1, 2020.  

Procedural Detail  :B. L. Agro filed an opposition (Opposition No. 1347124) against the registration of the respondent's mark on the ground that "TeaNOURISH" was deceptively similar to its registered "NOURISH" mark, specifically highlighting that the word "Tea" is descriptive and laudatory, not distinctive on its own. It contended that the exclusive trademark right lies in the word "NOURISH."  

An interim injunction restraining the respondent from using the impugned mark was granted by the Commercial Court, where B. L. Agro also filed a suit (CS(COMM) 910/2024) against the respondent. Given the overlap of issues, the suit was directed to be transferred to the High Court to be heard along with the present appeal.  

Dispute  :The dispute primarily revolves around the similarity and likelihood of confusion between "NOURISH" and "TeaNOURISH" marks, the scope of trademark protection in composite marks, and whether the descriptive word "Tea" can dilute the distinctive character of "NOURISH." The appellant claims prior adoption, use, and registration rights since 2007, whereas the respondent claims usage only from late 2020.  

 Reasoning  :The Court recognized that B. L. Agro is the prior adopter and registered proprietor of the trademark "NOURISH" widely used for a broad variety of food products starting 2007. The impugned mark "TeaNOURISH" overlaps in class and nature of goods leading to a high likelihood of confusion in trade channels and among consumers.  

The Court noted that the addition of the word "Tea" (which is laudatory and descriptive) does not create material distinction because it merely describes some characteristic of the goods and is not a distinctive element. Therefore, the dominant and registrable feature of the respondent’s mark is "NOURISH," which is identical to the appellant’s mark.  

It was held that under Section 9(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, if two marks are identical or deceptively similar and used for similar or allied goods or services, the later mark should be refused registration to prevent confusion among consumers. The suit's interim injunction demonstrates the prima facie case of deception and irreparable injury to the appellant.  

The Court directed that the registration of the respondent's mark "TeaNOURISH" granted by the Registrar of Trade Marks be stayed during the pendency of this appeal and suit. This preserves the balance of rights pending final adjudication.  

Decision  :The Court issued notice to the respondents and stayed the operation of registration of the mark "TeaNOURISH" pending disposal of the appeal and the transferred suit. 

Case Title: B. L. Agro Industries Limited Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks & Another  

Order Date: September 24, 2025  

Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 65/2025  

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi  

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia  

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi  

Pushpdeep Cotex Private Limited Vs Anoop Agarwal

Role of Artistic Labels and Color Combinations in Trademark Disputes

Facts:In this case, Pushpdeep Cotex Private Limited, the petitioner, filed a rectification petition under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking cancellation of trade mark registration no. 5925080. This registration covered a label device granted to respondent Anoop Agarwal on May 6, 2023, in Class 26, which pertains to textile goods like saree falls. 

The petitioner claimed it had been using the trademarks “Rani” and “Rachna” on saree falls and blouse textile pieces for many years, with the earliest trademark “Rani” registered since May 16, 2000. The petitioner presented evidence showing continuous and extensive use of these marks and their artistic labels since 2007. It also produced artistic receipts, newspaper advertising, and a caution notice issued in 2021 well before the respondent’s adoption of the impugned mark.

Procedural Detail:The respondent, Anoop Agarwal, countered the petition by stating that his label “Ragini Smile Polyester Saree Fall” was adopted in February 2022 for honest and bona fide reasons and that the trademark application was granted without any objection from the Trade Mark Registry. The respondent claimed that the mark “Ragini” was distinct from “Rani” and “Rachna,” both phonetically, visually, and conceptually, and that there was no risk of confusion to the public. Proceeding further, the High Court heard arguments from both sides, reviewed evidence placed by the petitioner, and considered the respondent’s defenses.

Dispute:The central dispute revolved around whether the impugned label registered by the respondent was deceptively or confusingly similar to the petitioner’s earlier registered marks and their associated artistic presentation. The matter called for a determination of prior and continuous use, the strength and originality of the petitioner’s artistic labels, and the risk of confusion among the consumers due to similarities in the marks and trade getup.

Reasoning:The High Court thoroughly examined the evidence and noted very strong visual and conceptual similarities between the petitioner’s and respondent’s labels. The petitioner’s label for “Rani” was artistically styled, and the same font, design, color scheme (yellow and red), tagline layout (“Smile Polyester Saree Fall” and “A Quality Product From The House Of …”), and imagery were all replicated in the respondent’s “Ragini” label. The only significant difference was the names “Rani” and “Ragini.” The Court found that even this difference lost importance because both were written in an identical style and lettering, leaving an overall impression of near identity between the labels.

The High Court relied on the benchmark judgment Colgate Palmolive Co. v. Anchor Health and Beauty Care P Ltd. [2003 SCC OnLine Del 1005], which observed that substantial imitation of color combination and get-up of a container can itself cause deception—even if the trade names differ. The test is the likelihood of confusion or deceptiveness in the minds of unwary customers.

The Court also emphasized that distinctive color combinations and artistic styles could serve as trade marks, protected not only against direct copying but also against substantial and conscious imitation. It found the petitioner had shown prior and wide use of its label since 2007, with the 2021 caution notice predating the respondent’s adoption in 2023.

Further, the Court applied the principle that rights of a prior user override registration by a subsequent user. Citing S. Syed Mohideen v. P. Sulochana Bai [2016 2 SCC 683], the Court reiterated that rights of prior use always prevail over later registrants. This was further supported by reference to Neon Laboratories Ltd. v. Medical Technologies Ltd. [2016 2 SCC 672] and N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool Corp. [1996 5 SCC 714], noting that prior use involving generation of goodwill and reputation outscores statutory registration.

The respondent’s defense of honest adoption and absence of registry objection was not accepted because the similarities were overwhelming and the evidence for prior use by the petitioner was clear. The Court concluded that the respondent was a subsequent user and the adoption of the mark was both dishonest and in bad faith.

Decision:Accordingly, the High Court ordered cancellation of respondent’s trademark registration no. 5925080 under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The Registrar of Trade Marks was directed to rectify and remove the impugned trademark from the Register within four weeks. The petition and related applications were disposed of, affirming the legal position that the rights of a prior user, backed by substantial evidence of continuous use, trump a later registration even if the registry was not objected to initially.

Case Title: Pushpdeep Cotex Private Limited Vs Anoop Agarwal & Another

Order Date: September 24, 2025

Case Number: C.O. COMM.IPD-TM 108/2025

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon’ble Judge: Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Gopika Industries Vs Dayal Industries Pvt. Ltd.

Prima Facie Plea of Invalidity of registered Trademark

Facts of the Case:The lawsuit was initiated by Gopika Industries, which claimed infringement of its registered trademark DYAL, used for cattle feed and registered since April 4, 1996 under Trade Mark No. 709502 in Class 31. Gopika Industries had records showing use of the DYAL mark both in English and regional languages. The defendant, Dayal Industries Pvt. Ltd., is also in the business of manufacturing and selling cattle feed and holds its trademark DAYAL (Trade Mark No. 923948) registered on May 10, 2000 in Class 31. Both parties claimed to use their respective marks for similar goods and in similar languages.

Procedural Detail:Dayal Industries filed an application seeking court permission to initiate rectification proceedings against Gopika Industries' registered trademark. In its written statement defending the application, Dayal Industries raised several pleas to challenge the validity of the DYAL mark. These included claims that Dayal Industries was the prior user of the mark DAYAL for cattle feed products since 2000, while the earliest invoice of plaintiff Gopika Industries was from 2001. 

The defendant claimed further rights through its own group company Dayal Fertilizers Pvt. Ltd., which used the mark DAYAL in allied products as early as 1979. The defendant also asserted that the plaintiff was misusing the goodwill of the DAYAL mark to confuse consumers and pass off its products as those of Dayal Industries. Meanwhile, the group company Dayal Fertilizers Pvt. Ltd. had already filed a separate commercial suit against Gopika Industries regarding trademark issues.

Dispute:The core dispute was whether Gopika Industries' registration of DYAL in 1996 gave it superior rights, even if contemporaneous commercial use commenced later (2001), and if Dayal Industries could challenge this registration based on alleged prior use or invalidity. The defendant argued that mere registration did not suffice to claim rights if commercial use was delayed, and invoked grounds such as prior use by their company or affiliated group companies, as well as visual and phonetic similarity of the marks DYAL and DAYAL. The plaintiff countered by relying on statutory provisions and judicial precedents that clarified the status of rights derived from statutory registration of trademarks.

Reasoning :The Court examined arguments from both sides, referring to the Trade Marks Act, 1999, especially Section 34, which deals with infringement protection based on prior use, and Section 18 regarding registration based on actual or proposed use. The defendant contended, relying on Section 34, that the plaintiff was barred from claiming rights based on mere registration, if actual use began after the defendant's usage. 

However, the court referred to the precedent set in Worknest Business Centre LLP v. Worknests through SH Raesh Goyal [2023 SCC OnLine Del 1678]. This landmark judgment clarified that the relevant date for establishing trademark ownership and prior use is the date of registration application, not actual commercial use. 

The law creates a presumption of validity and proprietary ownership for registered marks, irrespective of when commercial use begins, provided the proprietor demonstrates steps towards using the mark—which Gopika Industries did through documentary evidence and correspondence with authorities between 1996 and 1999.

The defendant's argument about prior use through Dayal Fertilizers Pvt. Ltd. was dismissed by the court because its trademark application (TM No. 923948 for cattle feed) only claimed user from May 2000 onward, not from 1979. Furthermore, Dayal Fertilizers Pvt. Ltd. was not selling cattle feed under the DAYAL mark, so its use in allied products (fertilizers) was held irrelevant to the present dispute.

The court cited two further judgments:

- Patel Field Marshal Agencies v. P.M. Diesels Ltd. [2018 2 SCC 112]

- Amrish Aggarwal Trading as Ms. Mahalaxmi Product v. Venus Home Appliances Pvt. Ltd. [2024 SCC OnLine Del 3652] 

Both judgments reconfirmed that the statutory presumption linked to registered marks stands unless clear, continuous prior use in the precise category of goods is established. The court found no adequate demonstration by the defendant of usage of DAYAL for cattle feed before April 4, 1996—the plaintiff's date of registration application—which under law is regarded as the decisive cut-off for prior use.

Decision:The Hon'ble High Court rejected the defendant's request to initiate rectification proceedings against Gopika Industries' trademark and dismissed the plea of invalidity. The application did not raise a triable issue affecting the registered mark DYAL held by Gopika Industries for cattle feed. The court clarified that its observations did not impact separate pending petitions between the parties or Dayal Fertilizers Pvt. Ltd., which would be decided independently. The suit remains listed for further trial on connected matters.

Case Title: Gopika Industries Vs Dayal Industries Pvt. Ltd.

Order Date: September 26, 2025

Case Number: CSCOMM 700/2017

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Judge: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Triumph Designs Limited Vs Tube Investments of India

Non-Use as Grounds for Trademark Cancellation

Fact :This case is about a company called Triumph Designs Limited, which is the petitioner, asking the court to cancel a trademark owned by Tube Investments of India, the first respondent, and another party. The trademark in question is "TRIUMPH," registered under number 135253 in class 12, which covers cycles that are driven only by feet, like basic bicycles. 

The main reason the petitioner wants this cancellation is because the respondent has not used the mark at all for a very long time. The petitioner is a well-known company from the United Kingdom that makes motorcycles and is part of a group including Triumph Motorcycles Limited and Triumph Motorcycles (India) Private Limited. They all use the "TRIUMPH" mark for motorcycles. The petitioner says they have been using "TRIUMPH" since 1886 in the UK, and over time, it has become famous worldwide, including in India, with good reputation and sales. They have registered the mark in India and many other countries for motorcycles. In India, they have used it continuously and advertised it a lot, leading to high sales. 

The petitioner found out about the respondent's old registration, which dates back to September 28, 1950, but claims there is no proof the respondent ever used it for bicycles. To support this, the petitioner showed internet search results showing no evidence of use. They argue that this unused mark is just blocking them from fully using their own mark and should be removed under the law because of non-use.

Procedural Detail  :The petitioner filed this application under Section 47 of the Trademarks Act, 1999, which allows for the removal of a registered trademark if it has not been used. The case number is IPDATM/30/2023, and it was heard in the Intellectual Property Rights Division of the High Court at Calcutta's Original Side.

Dispute  :The main fight here is whether the respondent's trademark "TRIUMPH" for foot-driven cycles should be canceled because it has not been used for over 75 years. The petitioner says yes, because non-use for five years or more means it can be removed under the law, and they provided proof like internet searches showing no activity. They also say this old unused mark is stopping the trademark office from letting them expand their own use. The respondent says no, arguing that the petitioner is not a "person aggrieved" under the law, meaning they are not really hurt by this mark.

The respondent points out that the petitioner has many registrations themselves that they do not use, like for mopeds or scooters, so they are being hypocritical and just want to grab the mark as a business rival. This, they say, is unfair and against public interest. The dispute boils down to whether the petitioner qualifies to ask for cancellation, if non-use is proven, and if there are any excuses for the non-use.

Reasoning:This case focuses on the rules for removing a trademark that is not being used, as set out in Section 47 of the Trademarks Act, 1999. This section says that a registered trademark can be removed if someone who is aggrieved applies, and shows either that it was registered without any real plan to use it and it was never used, or that it was not used for a continuous five years plus three months before the application. There is also a part about special reasons for non-use, like legal restrictions, that might excuse it. 

The court explains that three main things need to be true for removal: the applicant must be a person aggrieved, there must be no use for at least five years and three months before applying, and no special circumstances explain the non-use. To explain this, the court refers to a case called Kellogg Company vs. Pops Food Products (P) Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine Del 6562, decided by the Delhi High Court. 

In that case, the court said that for removal due to non-use, these three conditions must be met, and the use has to be real and commercial in the right category of goods. Here, the court looked at the records and saw that the respondent got the mark in 1950 but showed no proof of using it for 75 years, which is way more than the five-year limit. The court says use must be genuine, meaning actual sales or promotion in the market for bicycles, and there is no explanation from the respondent for why they did not use it.  

To support this point about what counts as genuine use, the court brings up two more cases. One is Russell Corp Australia PTY Limited vs. Ashok Mahajan And Another, (2023) SCC OnLine Del 4796, also from the Delhi High Court. In that judgment, the court discussed how non-use means the mark must be taken off the register if there is no evidence of commercial activity, and internet searches or lack of sales records can prove non-use. 

The other is Fedders Llyod Corporation LTD & Anr vs. Fedders Corporation & Anr., ILR (2005) I Delhi 478, again from Delhi, where the court said that if a mark is registered but not used for years without reason, it blocks others and should be removed to keep the register clean. In this case, the court applies these ideas by saying the respondent's claim of use is empty, with no documents, so non-use is basically admitted.  

Person Aggrieved:Now, on whether the petitioner is a "person aggrieved," the respondent said no, because the petitioner is just a rival trying to corner the market and has unused marks themselves. But the court disagrees, using a key Supreme Court case: Hardie Trading Ltd. vs. Addisons Paint & Chemicals Ltd., (2003) 7 SCC 92. In that judgment, the Supreme Court explained that "person aggrieved" has different meanings depending on the section.

 For non-use under Section 47 (which was Section 46 in the old act, but similar), it is narrower, but for correcting wrong entries under Section 56, it is broader to keep the register pure for public interest.

 The court quotes paragraphs 30 to 32, where the Supreme Court says for non-use, the person must have a real interest, like being in the same trade, but for wrong registrations, anyone in the trade or public can apply. 

Here, the court says the petitioner is aggrieved because they are in a related field—vehicles like motorcycles—and the unused mark blocks them. The petitioner's own non-use of some marks does not matter, as the law focuses on the mark in question. The court rejects the respondent's argument that the petitioner is opportunistic, saying the law allows rivals to apply if non-use is clear.  

Decision :The court allowed the petitioner's application. It ordered that trademark number 135253 for "TRIUMPH" in class 12 be canceled and removed from the register because of proven non-use without any excuse. The court found the petitioner was a person aggrieved, the non-use was for far more than five years, and no special circumstances existed. The case IPDATM/30/2023 was decided in favor of the petitioner.

Case Title:Triumph Designs Limited Vs Tube Investments of India and Anr  

Order date: 25th September, 2025  

Case Number: IPDATM/30/2023  

Name of Court: High Court of Calcutta   

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur  

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Pooja Electric Co. Vs. Anand Tomar

Subsequent Trademark Grants in Pending Suits

Fact :This case involves a legal battle over trademarks between Pooja Electric Co., which is the plaintiff, and Anand Tomar, who runs a business called Pooja Rading Company, as the defendant. The plaintiff is a company dealing in electrical goods and has claimed rights over certain trademarks related to its business. The main suit was filed to protect these trademarks from being used by the defendant in a way that could confuse customers or harm the plaintiff's reputation. 

The plaintiff had applied for registration of three specific trademarks with numbers 2990322, 3382660, and 2990321 before starting the lawsuit. These applications were still pending when the suit began, and the plaintiff had already mentioned this fact in the original complaint, known as the plaint. After the court had gone through the initial stages and set the main issues for trial on December 18, 2024, something new happened. 

On January 14, 2025, the trademark office approved and granted registration for these three trademarks. This meant the plaintiff now had official certificates proving ownership of these marks. Wanting to update the court about this development, the plaintiff filed a request to change the plaint to include this new information. The defendant opposed this request, but did not file any written reply despite getting chances to do so. The court had to decide whether to allow this change at this stage of the case.

Procedural Detail  :The main lawsuit, numbered CS(COMM) 517/2023, was filed by Pooja Electric Co. against Anand Tomar under the laws protecting trademarks. Along with the suit, there were other related requests, like I.A. 14153/2023, but the key one here is I.A. 3702/2025, which is the application for amending the plaint. 

This application was made under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which is a rule that allows parties to correct or update their written statements in a lawsuit if needed, and also under Section 151 of the same code, which gives the court general power to do what is fair. 

Dispute : The main disagreement in this particular application was whether the plaintiff should be allowed to update the plaint to mention the new trademark registrations that were granted after the issues in the case had already been decided. 

The plaintiff argued that this was just a simple update to reflect the current reality, since the pending applications were already disclosed in the original plaint, and now they had become registered. This would help strengthen their case without changing the basic facts. The defendant, on the other hand, opposed the idea, though without explaining why in writing. The broader dispute in the suit is about trademark infringement, where the plaintiff claims the defendant is using similar names or marks that could mislead people into thinking the defendant's products are connected to the plaintiff's business. But for this application, the focus was narrow: is it okay to add this new fact about registrations without a full rewrite of the plaint, especially since the trial stage had started?

Reasoning: The court starts by looking at the rules under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which says that a party can ask to amend their plaint at any time, but after the trial begins, the court can only allow it if the change is needed to settle the real issues and if the party could not have known about it earlier despite trying hard. 

Here, the registrations happened after the issues were framed, so it was a new event that the plaintiff could not have included before. The court agreed that the basic facts about the trademark applications were already in the original plaint, so there was no need to rewrite everything. 

Instead, it allowed the plaintiff to just add the registration certificates to the record as Document-B and use them when presenting evidence. This way, the case can move forward without delay. The court also considered the stage of the suit, noting that issues were framed but evidence had not started yet, so this update would not unfair surprise the defendant. It pointed out that the defendant did not file a reply, which weakened their opposition. Overall, the court used its power under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to do what is just, keeping all arguments about the main dispute open for later.  

Decision  :The court allowed the plaintiff's application in part. It permitted the registration certificates to be placed on record as Document-B, and the plaintiff can use them during evidence. However, it said there is no need to actually amend the plaint because the key facts about the applications were already there. The application was disposed of with these directions, and the defendant's rights to argue on the main issues remain open. For the main suit, the plaintiff must file affidavits of all witnesses within four weeks, and the case is listed before the Joint Registrar on November 21, 2025, to fix dates for evidence.

Case Title:Pooja Electric Co. Vs. Anand Tomar Trading as Pooja Rading Company  

Order date: September 25, 2025  

Case Number: CS(COMM) 517/2023  

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi 

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora  

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Helsinn Healthcare SA & Anr. Vs Hetero Healthcare Limited

Interpreting Time Limits for Replication in Delhi High Court: 

Facts:This case involves a patent dispute between two companies in the healthcare field. The plaintiffs, Helsinn Healthcare SA and another party, filed a lawsuit against the defendant, Hetero Healthcare Limited. The main claim was that the defendant was infringing on the plaintiffs' registered patent number 426553 by selling a product called "NETUPIN." The plaintiffs asked the court for a permanent order to stop the defendant from selling or promoting this product, along with requests for money damages, an accounting of profits, and handing over any infringing items. The lawsuit deals with medicinal or pharmaceutical products, and it touches on complex technology, including references to prior inventions that the defendant used in its defense. The written statement from the defendant was long, running to 81 pages, and relied on 12 earlier documents to argue against the patent claim. 

Procedural Details:The lawsuit started when the plaintiffs filed their complaint, and it first came before the court on April 30, 2024. On that day, the court gave a temporary order stopping the defendant from selling the product until the case could be heard more fully. The complaint was then officially registered as a suit, and a notice was sent to the defendant, who received it on May 21, 2024. The defendant filed its defense document, known as a written statement, on August 16, 2024, but this was late because the rules require it within 30 days of receiving the notice, with a possible extension up to 120 days in some cases. Since it was delayed, the defendant had to ask the court for permission to accept it late. On August 23, 2024, a court officer called the Joint Registrar allowed this delay but made the defendant pay 3,000 rupees as a penalty. The defendant paid this amount on August 30, 2024. After that, the plaintiffs filed their replication on October 5, 2024, along with a request to excuse a 13-day delay in filing it. The court had to decide on this request under a rule from the Delhi High Court that sets time limits for such replies.

Dispute:The main disagreement was about when the clock starts ticking for the plaintiffs to file their replication. The rules of the Delhi High Court say that a replication should be filed within 30 days of receiving the written statement, and the court can extend this by up to 15 more days if there is a good reason, but no longer than that. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs received the written statement by email on August 16, 2024, so the 30-day period ended on September 15, 2024, and even with the extra 15 days, it ended on September 30, 2024. Since the replication came on October 5, 2024, the defendant said it was too late and should not be allowed. The plaintiffs said the time should start from August 23, 2024, when the court officially accepted the late written statement, or even from August 30, 2024, when the penalty was paid. Using that starting point, the 30 days ended on September 22, 2024, and the full 45 days ended on October 7, 2024, making their filing on October 5 timely. They argued that until the court accepts a late defense, there is no need to reply to it, so the time should not start earlier.

Reasoning:The court looked closely at the rule in question, which is Rule 5 of Chapter VII from the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018. This rule says the replication must be filed within 30 days of receiving the written statement, and if the court sees a good reason like something unavoidable stopping the filing on time, it can give up to 15 more days, but not beyond that. The rule also says the plaintiff must pay some costs for the extension, and if no replication is filed even then, the court will decide what to do. An advance copy must be sent to the defendant. The court explained that this rule is meant to keep cases moving quickly and avoid delays, but it needs to be applied fairly. The judge noted that in normal cases where the defense is filed on time, the 30 days start from when the plaintiff gets it. But here, the defense was late, so it only became official when the court allowed the delay.

To support this view, the court discussed several past decisions. First, it referred to SNS Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Ijaz Uddin, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 787. In that case, the court said that when a written statement is filed late and only accepted after excusing the delay, the time for replication starts from the date it is taken on record. The reasoning was simple: if the court rejects the late defense, there is nothing to reply to, so it makes no sense to start the clock earlier. The judge in SNS Products explained that the Division Bench in an earlier case, Ram Sarup Lugani v. Nirmal Lugani & Ors., 2020 SCC OnLine Del 2621, had ruled that the 45-day limit is strict and cannot be extended beyond that, but it did not address when the period starts in cases of late filings. So, SNS Products filled that gap by saying the start date is when the defense is officially accepted.

The court also discussed Aroti Sarkar & Anr. v. Ashok Sarkar & Ors., order dated December 5, 2023 in CS(OS) 823/2022. There, the defense was accepted only if costs were paid, and since the costs were not paid yet, the time for replication had not even started. The judge agreed with SNS Products and said payment of costs is a condition for the defense to count, so the replication time begins after that. Similarly, in Parmeet Singh Anand v. Subhash Chand Aggarwal, order dated August 29, 2024 in CS(COMM) 824/2022, the court held that the replication period starts from when the written statement is taken on record after condoning the delay. The same idea was followed in Tata Sons v. Marvel Ltd., order dated December 19, 2024 in CS(COMM) 724/2024, and Quasar Airlines (P) Ltd. v. Shaurya Aeronautics (P) Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine Del 2821, where the start date was the acceptance of the late defense.

In cases where acceptance depended on paying costs, like Neeraj Saran Srivastava v. Loudon Owen & Ors., Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:283, and Bunch Microtechnologies Private Limited & Ors. v. Creator Economy Tech Private Limited & Ors., order dated March 14, 2024 in CS(OS) 14/2023, the courts said the time starts from when the costs are actually paid. The judge in this case applied these ideas, noting that the defense was accepted on August 23, 2024, with costs paid on August 30, 2024. Even starting from August 23, the replication on October 5 was within 45 days.

The defendant argued using other cases that the time always starts from receipt, like in Presto Stantest Pvt. Ltd. v. Pacorr Testing Instruments Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., Neutral Citation: 2023:DHC:9461, where an email was seen as receipt. Other cases cited included FITJEE Ltd. v. Vidya Mandir Classes & Ors., order dated September 4, 2023 in CS(OS) 656/2021; Shri Ram Housing Finance and Investment of India Ltd. v. Omesh Mishra Memorial Charitable Trust & Ors., order dated October 4, 2023 in CS(OS) 38/2023; Asha & Ors. v. Rajbala & Ors., order dated October 5, 2023 in CS(OS) 662/2021; Smt. Saroj & Ors. v. Smt. Uma & Ors., order dated December 5, 2023 in CS(OS) 539/2023; Dr. Reddys Laboratories Ltd. v. Wockhardt Ltd. and Anr., order dated February 26, 2024 in CS(COMM) 101/2023; Pradeep Kumar v. Sudesh Bhatia, order dated July 15, 2024 in CS(COMM) 500/2023; and Mrs. Bushra Shuaib v. Mr. Hilal Ahmed, order dated August 22, 2024 in CS(OS) 135/2023. These all said time starts from receipt of the defense.

The defendant also used Ram Swarup Lugani v. Nirmal Lugani & Ors., order dated September 30, 2019 in CS(OS) 182/2019; Ram Swarup Lugani v. Nirmal Lugani & Ors., Neutral Citation: 2020:DHC:3049-DB; Louis Dreyfus v. Nutralite Agro, Neutral Citation: 2024:DHC:238; Delhi Gymkhana Club v. Col. Ashish Khanna, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 7022; and the Supreme Court's order dated June 28, 2021 in SLP(C) No. 15142/2020 in Ram Swarup Lugani v. Nirmal Lugani & Ors. These emphasized that the 45-day limit is absolute and cannot be ignored. The defendant said SNS Products was wrong to mix up "receipt" with "taken on record," as receipt means getting the document, not court approval.

The court disagreed, saying those cases did not deal with late defenses, so they do not apply here. Instead, the line of cases like SNS Products better fits when the defense is belated. The judge also referred to Union of India v. Popular Construction Co., (2001) 8 SCC 470, where the Supreme Court said phrases like "but not thereafter" mean no further extensions, but here the issue was the start date, not extending beyond 45 days. 

The court said interpreting "receipt" as the date of official acceptance in late cases makes sense to avoid unfairness and keep the process logical. It helps decide cases on real issues rather than strict time traps. The judge noted the conflict in past decisions but followed the purposive approach, meaning looking at the rule's goal of fair and quick justice.

Decision: The court decided in favor of the plaintiffs. It ruled that the replication was filed within the allowed time, starting from August 23, 2024, when the written statement was accepted. The 13-day delay was excused, and the replication was allowed on record. 

Case Title: Helsinn Healthcare SA & Anr. Vs Hetero Healthcare Limited

Order Date: September 26, 2025

Case Number: CS(COMM)347/2024

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:8658

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Crocs Inc Vs The Registrar of Trademarks

Phonetic and Visual Confusion in Footwear Brands

Facts: This case is about a company called Crocs Inc, which makes and sells footwear, asking the court to cancel a trademark owned by another party. Crocs Inc started in 2002 in the United States and created the brand name "CROCS" for its shoes. The company sells many types of shoes for men, women, and children, with over 300 styles that are popular around the world, including in India. In India, Crocs works through a local company in Gurgaon, Haryana, and sells its products in stores, online, and on websites like Ajio, Tata Cliq, and Myntra. Crocs owns the website crocs.com and Indian sites like shopcrocs.in and crocs.in. The company has registered its "CROCS" trademark in India for different classes like 9, 14, 18, 25, 35, and 10. 

The problem started when Crocs found out about another trademark, a logo that looks like "CROOSE", registered under number 3409214 in class 25 for footwear, owned by Respondent No. 2. Crocs believes this mark is too similar to its own and is being used dishonestly to copy its success. Respondent No. 1 is the government office that handles trademarks, and Respondent No. 2 is the owner of the "CROOSE" mark. Crocs says it has built a lot of goodwill with its brand since 2002, and the similar mark could confuse people.

Procedural Details: Crocs Inc filed a petition in the Delhi High Court under sections 47 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, to cancel the "CROOSE" trademark. Section 47 allows removal of a mark if it's not used properly, and section 57 lets the court correct or cancel entries in the trademark register. The case also had an application numbered IA No.3113/2023, likely for some related relief. The petition was heard by Justice Tejas Karia. Respondent No. 2 was given several chances to file a reply and written arguments but did not do so. On April 23, 2025, the court closed their right to file these documents. However, the court still allowed Respondent No. 2's lawyer to make oral arguments during the hearing. Lawyers for Crocs presented their side, showing evidence like sales records, registrations, and photos of products. The Registrar of Trademarks, as Respondent No. 1, was represented but did not oppose much, as their role is more administrative. 

Dispute: The main issue was whether the "CROOSE" trademark should be cancelled because it is too similar to Crocs' "CROCS" mark. Crocs argued that "CROOSE" is identical or deceptively similar in look, sound, and style, and is used for the same kind of products, like shoes. They said Respondent No. 2 adopted it in bad faith to benefit from Crocs' popularity, as Respondent No. 2 used to sell under other names like "JNG", "AEROLITE", and "RBS" but switched to this similar one. Crocs claimed this could confuse customers into thinking "CROOSE" products come from Crocs, violating section 11(1)(b) of the Act, which stops registration of marks that are likely to deceive or confuse because they are similar to existing marks for similar goods. They also said the mark is not distinctive and should not have been registered under sections 9 and 11. Respondent No. 2 argued that "CROOSE" is different in structure, sound, and look, and that it was properly registered after following the rules, so it should stay.

Reasoning: The court started by confirming that Crocs is the owner of the "CROCS" trademark in India and sells its products widely here, so it is a "person aggrieved" under section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which means it has the right to ask for cancellation. The judge looked at photos of the products side by side. Crocs' shoes have the "CROCS" name placed in a certain way, and "CROOSE" products have a similar placement and style. The court said the marks look similar overall, sound alike when spoken, and are for the same class of goods, footwear in class 25. This makes "CROOSE" deceptively similar to "CROCS", which could confuse people in the market. The court relied on section 11(1)(b) of the Act, which says a trademark cannot be registered if it is so similar to an earlier mark for the same or similar goods that it is likely to deceive or cause confusion. The judge noted that to keep the trademark register clean and fair, such confusing marks should be removed. 

Decision: The court agreed with Crocs and allowed the petition. It ordered the Registrar of Trademarks to cancel and remove the "CROOSE" mark, registration number 3409214 in class 25, from the register. The register must be updated, and the website changed within four weeks. A copy of the order was to be sent to the Registrar by email for action. The case and any pending application were closed.

Case Title: Crocs Inc Vs The Registrar of Trademarks

Order Date: September 26, 2025

Case Number: C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 82/2023

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:8660

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi 

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Honasa Consumer Limited Vs. Cloud Wellness Private Limited

Colour Combinations and Passing Off

Facts: Honasa Consumer Limited brought a suit against Cloud Wellness Pvt. Ltd., alleging that Cloud Wellness had unlawfully copied the packaging, colours, trade dress and overall get-up of its products, thus infringing Honasa’s copyright and passing off. Honasa is a company selling skin care, personal care, and baby products using a unique blend of colours and layouts for packaging—what it calls the “Subject Trade Dress”—since early 2020, especially under its trademark “THE DERMA CO.” The Subject Trade Dress was designed by Lucid Design India Pvt. Ltd. and registered on social media before product launch. Honasa claimed extensive market promotion and fame for its products, which are associated closely with the unique visual style of the packaging. The company noticed similar visual elements in Cloud Wellness’s “DERMATOUCH” branded skin care products and filed a cease and desist notice, which Cloud Wellness rejected. Honasa argued that the colour combinations, brand layout, and product descriptions are unique and that Cloud Wellness's packaging, website, and use of colours are copies seeking to exploit Honasa’s market reputation[1].

Procedural Details:  The lawsuit filed by Honasa included claims for copyright infringement under the Copyright Act, 1957, and passing off under common law principles. Honasa requested an interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) to restrain Cloud Wellness from selling or marketing products using the allegedly copied trade dress until trial. The matter was contested at length, with parties presenting evidence, documents, online sales data, and expert submissions both on originality of the design and market presence. Both side’s counsels argued at length, including extensive reliance on legal precedents and evidentiary documents. The parties have been coexisting in the skincare market for about four years, and Honasa raised its complaint after noticing similar packaging in Cloud Wellness's newer products, released from 2021 onwards[1].

Nature of Dispute:The heart of the dispute was whether Cloud Wellness’s packaging and use of colour combinations in its DERMATOUCH products amounted to copying Honasa’s distinctive trade dress, thus infringing copyright and amounting to passing off. Honasa argued its packaging was a creative, original artistic work per Section 13 of the Copyright Act and uniquely identified with its products in the market through prolonged use, extensive sales, and advertising. Honasa claimed that Cloud Wellness’s adoption of almost identical colour arrangements, label layouts, and website design were deliberate attempts to “hijack” its goodwill and confuse consumers. Cloud Wellness responded by arguing their own adoption was honest, colour combinations for skincare products were industry norms, and similar get-ups existed before Honasa’s in international and domestic markets. Cloud Wellness also challenged the originality and distinctiveness of Honasa’s design, claiming no exclusive right over simple two-colour arrangements, and asserted their larger sales and prior use of the same colour schemes.

Reasoning: The court started with the basic principles for granting interim injunctions: the plaintiff must demonstrate a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and likelihood of irreparable injury. The reasoning emphasized that mere similarity in packaging is not enough—actual risk of confusion among buyers and proof of acquired distinctiveness (secondary meaning) must be shown.

The Court noted that both companies have been selling products with similar two-tone colour panels but under distinct brand names, product compositions, and stated ingredients. The presence of the brand name “THE DERMA CO.” on Honasa products and “DERMATOUCH” on Cloud Wellness’s products was highlighted for being easily distinguishable by buyers. The judge found that skincare consumers are informed and ingredient-focused, with branding and formulation making more impact than colour alone. The comparison also showed that both businesses list product ingredients prominently, affecting purchasing decisions. Therefore, similarity in trade dress, without evidence that consumers equate only the packaging colours with the source, is not enough for confusion.

Justice Karia referenced a series of precedents from Indian and international courts, including Colgate Palmolive Co. v. Anchor Health (2003), Marico Ltd. v. Zee Hygiene Products (2025), Kellogg Company v. Pravin Kumar Bhadabhai (1996), Himalaya Drug Co. v. SBL Ltd. (2010), and more. Precedents set the tone that, especially for passing off, the plaintiff must show (i) goodwill in the get-up at the time defendant adopted it, (ii) misrepresentation by defendant, and (iii) likely damage to plaintiff’s business. Packaging alone rarely signals product origin unless it is proven to have acquired secondary meaning in the market. Monopoly over basic colour schemes and simple trade dress is disfavoured unless market reality shows exclusive association in consumers’ minds. Normal coexistence and the presence of clear brand names further lower risk of confusion. Professor Wadlow, Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour Co., and other foreign decisions were cited to explain that brand name—and not just packaging colour—matters most to consumers in differentiating products.

Decision: Justice Karia dismissed Honasa’s application for interim injunction. He found that Honasa had not established a prima facie case of distinctiveness or exclusive secondary meaning in the two-tone packaging at the relevant time. He also observed that the companies have coexisted for four years without actual confusion reported. The balance of convenience was held to favour Cloud Wellness, whose ongoing business would be seriously harmed by an injunction, while Honasa could be compensated monetarily if injury was found at trial. The judge concluded that originality of the trade dress, prior adoption, and distinctiveness are all issues needing a full trial with evidence, not summary determination at the interim stage. The question will be determined at trial, and until then, both companies may continue using their respective trade dresses.

Case Title: Honasa Consumer Limited Vs. Cloud Wellness Private Limited & Anr.  

Order Date: September 26, 2025  

Case Number: CSCOMM 483/2025  

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:8662

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi, New Delhi  

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Neeraj Gupta Vs. Controller of Patents and Designs

Inventive Step and Procedural Fairness

Facts:  The case involved an appeal by Neeraj Gupta ("Appellant") against the Controller of Patents and Designs ("Respondent") after the rejection of his patent application titled ‘An Intravenous Catheter Device’. The device's primary purpose is to infuse medication or fluids directly into a vein or draw blood samples for testing. The patent application (No. 201911036272) was filed on September 10, 2019 before the Indian Patent Office. The device aimed to improve upon existing catheter technologies, especially in solving problems related to blood backflow prevention.

Procedural Details:  Upon initial scrutiny, the Patent Office issued the First Examination Report (FER) on February 10, 2020, citing lack of novelty and inventive step, with particular reference to prior art documents D1 (WO2018096549A1) and D2 (WO2015161294A1). The Appellant replied to FER, addressing the objections with detailed arguments and clarifications. Subsequently, hearings were held, and written submissions were filed, but the Controller rejected the application via an order dated February 11, 2021. A review petition was filed by the Appellant, which was dismissed as well. The matter then came up before the High Court in appeal under Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970[1].

Nature of Dispute:  The main contention was the validity of the Controller’s rejection, which was based on the assertion that the catheter device lacked the inventive step required under the Patents Act. The Controller held that the disclosed device was obvious to a person skilled in the art when considering the combined teaching of D1 and D2. The Appellant argued that the Controller had not truly considered the novel aspects of his invention, especially the 'valve closure member', and alleged procedural errors and lack of proper reasoning in the Controller’s order.

Reasoning: The Appellant argued that his device's distinguishing feature—a "valve closure member"—was not found in prior art and formed the inventive core of the invention. The Appellant criticized the Controller for arbitrarily combining features from D1 and D2 without showing how an ordinary skilled person would combine these references to produce the invention. The Appellant pointed out that while prior art relied on material elasticity for self-sealing, his invention used a mechanical force exerted by the valve closure member for more reliable prevention of blood backflow.

The Respondent insisted that features claimed as novel were obvious in view of prior documents. Specifically, the Respondent pointed to certain sections and drawings in D1 and D2, arguing they disclosed or at least suggested the allegedly inventive element. However, the Court observed that critical differences, such as the shape, composition, and mechanism of operation of the valve and the effectiveness in long-term prevention of blood backflow, were not discussed in detail in the Controller’s decision.

The High Court referred to precedent, notably Agriboard International LLC v. Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs (2022 SCC OnLine Del 940), which clarified how a controller should examine obviousness. The judgment mandates a three-step reasoning: discuss prior art, discuss the invention under review, and then logically explain why the invention would be obvious to a skilled person.

The Court examined documents D1 and D2 thoroughly.  - D1’s primary goal was to prevent blood backflow using a flexible valve design without an additional closure member.  D2 solved backflow issues using the elasticity and self-sealing property of a septum, also preventing flow by channels engineered for this purpose. However, it relied on intermolecular forces in blood versus air, which only worked for a limited time.  The High Court found that neither prior art fully disclosed a valve closure member as designed by the Appellant, which forcefully sealed the prongs and thus the slit, overcoming limitations of material fatigue and longevity found in prior solutions.The Controller’s finding that all features were present in prior art was critically examined and found lacking. The Court emphasized the absence of meaningful discussion on why the invention would be obvious and pointed out procedural failings—most prominently, the lack of adequate reasoning, a point highlighted in Agriboard International.

Decision: The High Court, after careful review, set aside both the original rejection and the order dismissing the review petition. The Court ordered the matter to be remanded back to the Patent Office for fresh consideration, with the explicit instruction that the Controller must provide an opportunity for re-hearing and apply the three-stage reasoning mandated by law, uninfluenced by any observations made in this Order. 

Conclusion: This judgment reaffirms that decisions rejecting patent applications for lack of inventive step must be supported with clear and logical reasoning. The Court clarified that mere references to prior art are not enough; every element claimed as inventive must be duly examined and reasoned. The procedural protections embedded in patent law exist to ensure that inventors benefit from a fair hearing and thorough consideration. This case also highlights the significance of economic and technical advancement as components of the inventive step under Section 2(1)(ja) of the Patents Act, and sets an example of judicial adherence to reasoned decision-making in intellectual property matters[1].

Case Title: Neeraj Gupta Vs. Controller of Patents and Designs  

Order Date: September 26, 2025  

Case Number: C.A.COMM.IPD-PAT 29/2023  

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:8664 

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi, New Delhi  

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

The Trustees of Princeton University Vs. The Vagdevi Educational Society

Transborder Reputation and Prior User Rights

Facts:  Princeton University, a world-renowned Ivy League institution in the United States, was originally established in 1746 as the College of New Jersey and became “Princeton University” in 1896. Over the centuries, it gained international reputation and became home to numerous Nobel laureates, US Presidents, judges, and other dignitaries. The University has an established presence in India through academic collaborations, student exchange programs, seminars, and enrolment of Indian students. Princeton owns registrations of the trademark “PRINCETON” in India under Classes 16, 25, and 41 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

In 2020, Princeton discovered that the Vagdevi Educational Society, based in Telangana, was running institutions under the name “Princeton” and operating a website www.princetonschoolofeducation.com. The appellant alleged that this amounted to infringement and passing off, since “PRINCETON” is its registered and well-known mark.

The respondents, Vagdevi Educational Society, had been in existence since 1991 and claimed that their use of the word “Princeton” was independent. They asserted that the word was coined from “Prince” and “ton” (a ton of princes/princesses to be educated), and had no connection with the Ivy League University. They also claimed to be prior users in India and denied that any consumer could confuse their local colleges with Princeton University in the US.

Procedural Background: Princeton University filed a civil suit in 2022 (CS (COMM) 270/2022) before a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court seeking an injunction to restrain the respondents from using the mark “Princeton.” Alongside the suit, it filed an interim application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.On 6 September 2023, the learned Single Judge dismissed the interim injunction application. The Single Judge held that Princeton had not established actual use of its mark in India prior to 1991 and that the respondents were entitled to protection under Section 34 of the Trade Marks Act as prior users.Aggrieved, Princeton filed an appeal before the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, challenging the order of dismissal.

Core Dispute:  The essential dispute was whether Princeton University, as a foreign entity with trademark registrations in India, could restrain Vagdevi Educational Society from using the word “Princeton” for its educational institutions in India.Key questions included: Whether Princeton’s historical and international reputation amounted to sufficient use of its mark in India.

Judicial Reasoning:  The Division Bench undertook a detailed analysis of both statutory provisions and judicial precedents.

On use of mark and prior rights, the Court referred to Section 2(2)(c)(ii) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which defines “use in relation to services” as making a statement about availability, provision, or performance of services. The Bench clarified that such use need not be by the proprietor alone. Newspaper reports, academic collaborations, and recognition of Princeton’s presence in India since 1911 were considered sufficient to show actual use .

On transborder reputation, the Court examined Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Prius Auto Industries Ltd. (2018) 2 SCC 1, where the Supreme Court recognised the territoriality principle but also left scope for recognition of foreign marks with strong reputation. The Bench noted that Princeton’s goodwill in India, supported by historical material, admissions of Indian students, and international recognition, distinguished it from Toyota, where there was negligible presence .

On confusion and dilution, the Bench disagreed with the Single Judge’s view that no consumer could confuse a Telangana-based college with Princeton University. The Court explained that confusion could arise not only through direct deception but also through dilution, initial interest confusion, and unfair advantage. Even if fee structures and admission modes were different, the core issue was misuse of a well-known mark for identical services (education)  .

On geographical significance, the respondents argued that “Princeton” was a place name in New Jersey and could not be monopolised. The Court rejected this argument, holding that while geographical names are generally not monopolised, exceptional cases exist where the name acquires distinctiveness through long use and recognition, as seen in Manipal Housing Finance Syndicate Ltd. v. Manipal Stock & Share Brokers (1996 SCC OnLine Mad 736) . Princeton, through decades of global use, had become uniquely associated with the appellant.

On injunction principles, the Bench reiterated the threefold test laid down by the Supreme Court in Ramakant Ambalal Choksi v. Harish Ambalal Choksi (2024) 11 SCC 351: prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable harm. Princeton, as the registered proprietor with global reputation, satisfied all three conditions. Non-interference would allow dilution and unfair advantage by the respondents .

On precedents, the Court relied on Wander Ltd. v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd. [1990 Supp SCC 727], Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah [(2002) 3 SCC 65], and Seema Arshad Zaheer v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai [(2006) 5 SCC 282], holding that appellate courts can interfere when discretion is exercised perversely or contrary to settled law .

Decision: The Division Bench allowed the appeal. The order of the Single Judge dated 6 September 2023 was set aside. The Court restrained the respondents from opening any new institution under the mark “Princeton” or any deceptively similar mark during the pendency of the suit.

However, considering that respondents were already running existing institutions under the name for several decades, the Court directed them to file affidavits every six months disclosing receipts from those institutions. This mechanism was to ensure transparency and prevent further unfair advantage .

Law Settled: The judgment affirms that foreign institutions with substantial reputation and trademark registrations in India are entitled to protection of their marks, even if their physical operations are limited to abroad. It recognises that use of a mark in India can be established through indirect presence, media coverage, and collaborations. The decision strengthens the concept of protection against dilution and initial interest confusion, even in the absence of direct competition. It clarifies that Section 34 protection of prior users is not automatic if the claimant can show earlier and continuous reputation in India.

Case Title: The Trustees of Princeton University Vs. The Vagdevi Educational Society & Ors.

Case Number: FAO (OS) (COMM) 239/2023 

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:8654-DB

Court: High Court of Delhi 

Order Pronounced On: 26 September 2025

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Navin Chawla and Hon’ble Ms. Justice Renu Bhatnagar

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Anugya Gupta And Another Vs. I Think Apps Pvt. Ltd.

Trademark Disputes in Online Education Portals

Fact of the Case: This case revolves around a trademark dispute between Anugya Gupta and another party acting against I Think Apps Pvt. Ltd., represented by Director Arpit Seth. The core business of the plaintiff is providing career and employment-related services in India, with a focus on competitive examination preparation. The plaintiff had started an online service under the name "Sarkari Result" in 2009, and over time built a web portal, mobile apps, and related services using this mark. The mark became widely recognized and used by millions across India. The plaintiff asserted its right over the trademark "Sarkari Result," citing registration records, municipal licenses, domain registration details, Google analytics, and recognitions by various government and private entities. 

Procedural Details: The dispute arose when, during a trademark registry search on 12.01.2025, the plaintiff discovered that the defendants attempted to register a similar trademark, allegedly misusing the plaintiff’s website and brand. When confronted, the defendant sent a cease and desist notice to the plaintiff. This led the plaintiff to seek an injunction from the Commercial Court in Varanasi, dispensing with mandatory pre-institution mediation requirements on grounds of urgency. The Commercial Court granted an ex-parte interim injunction, stopping the defendants from using any mark similar or identical to “Sarkari Result” and directing removal from all public platforms controlled by them. The defendants objected, challenging both the urgency and the merits of the injunction, arguing prior domain use and knowledge by the plaintiff. The trial court, however, found evidentiary support in favor of the plaintiff’s claims and granted relief. Aggrieved, the defendants appealed the order in the Allahabad High Court. 

Nature of Dispute: The main contention is over the trademark and domain name "Sarkari Result." The plaintiff claims to be the prior adopter and continuous user of the mark since 2009, whereas the defendants argue prior use of a similar name and domain from 2012, and raise issues of knowledge, acquiescence, and suppression of material facts. The defendants also question procedural compliance, especially exemption from pre-institution mediation.

Detailed Reasoning : The Court examined extensive documentary evidence and rival submissions. The plaintiff brought forth domain registration documents, municipal corporation licenses from 2011, continuous service history, and widespread usage on social platforms, establishing long-term use and public association with “Sarkari Result.” Financial records certified by a Chartered Accountant and Google analytics demonstrated both substantial investment and user engagement.

The defendants countered these with claims of domain registration from 2012 and cited orders from previous cases before the Delhi High Court and Supreme Court, where they had received some relief against other third parties. However, invoices or primary ownership records for the disputed period were lacking. Defendants further argued that certain email communications between parties (from 2016 and 2023) signaled early knowledge and therefore acquiescence on the plaintiff’s part. The Court, relying on judgments like Ramdev Food Products P Ltd. v. Arvindbhai Rambhai Pater (SCC pp. 769-770, paras 103-106) and Power Control Appliances v. Sumeet Machines P Ltd. explained that acquiescence requires active encouragement or express assent—mere silence or delay is insufficient for a defendant to claim continued use.

The Commercial Court had also relied upon the principle from Midas Hygiene Industries P Ltd. v. Sudhir Bhatia (2004 3 SCC 90), which states that in cases of infringement of trademark or copyright, injunction normally follows, and delay does not by itself defeat relief.The Court observed that the plaintiff’s continuous public use, widespread market recognition, and documentary evidence of early inception outweighed the defendants’ claims. The principle that a mere registration does not confer indefeasible rights in trademark disputes (see N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool Corpn. AIR 1995 Del 300) was also considered.

Decision: The Allahabad High Court upheld the Commercial Court’s decision to grant temporary injunction preserving the plaintiff’s rights in "Sarkari Result." It was noted that the injunction was justified given the plaintiff’s prior continuous use, substantial investment, market reputation, and absence of valid counter-evidence from defendants. The Court repeated that interim relief rests on showing a prima facie case, balance of convenience in plaintiff’s favor, and risk of irreparable harm to goodwill if the injunction is refused. Procedural objections regarding mediation were not persuasive given the urgent nature and previous conduct of both sides. The appeal and connected petitions were dismissed.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Case Title: Anugya Gupta And Another Vs. I Think Apps Pvt. Ltd.

Order Date: 23.09.2025

Case Number: Commercial Appeal No. 24 of 2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:AHC:170327-DB

Name of Court: High Court of Allahabad

Name of Hon'ble Judges: Hon'ble Arun Bhansali, Chief Justice and Hon'ble Kshitij Shailendra, J

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi