Sunday, December 7, 2025

Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. Vs. Artura Pharmaceuticals P. Ltd.

Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. filed a suit for trademark infringement, passing off, and related reliefs against Artura Pharmaceuticals P. Ltd. alleging that the defendant's marks PEPFIX and NEOVITAL were deceptively similar to its registered marks PEPFIZ and REVITAL; an ex-parte interim injunction was granted on 21.11.2024 restraining the defendant from dealing in goods under the impugned marks. 

The defendant filed an application under Order VII Rule 10 CPC seeking return of the plaint for lack of territorial jurisdiction, contending it had no business in Delhi, manufactured only for export, and its website was not interactive enough to confer jurisdiction. 

The Delhi High Court dismissed the application on 24.11.2025 holding that at the demurrer stage, plaint averments must be taken as true, and the plaintiff's pleadings about the defendant's website being accessible in Delhi with a "Contact Us" page inviting services, downloadable product brochures mentioning impugned marks, and listing on a third-party aggregator platform with an enquiry form raised mixed questions of fact and law regarding interactivity and purposeful availment under the Banyan Tree test, which could not be resolved without evidence at trial; the court directed that territorial jurisdiction be decided as a preliminary issue after pleadings and evidence.

In trademark infringement suits involving internet-based disputes, territorial jurisdiction under Section 20 CPC is determined at the demurrer stage by assuming plaint averments as true, and objections succeed only if the court lacks jurisdiction as a matter of law even on those facts (Para 25, relying on Exphar SA v. Eupharma Laboratories Limited, (2004) 3 SCC 688).

Accessibility of a defendant's website in the forum state, coupled with features like a "Contact Us" page inviting services and downloadable product information, may prima facie constitute purposeful availment conferring jurisdiction, subject to evidence at trial on interactivity under the sliding scale and effects tests (Para 27-29, relying on Banyan Tree Holding (P) Limited v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy & Anr., 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3780).

Third-party aggregator listings promoting products with enquiry forms can contribute to cause of action arising in the forum state if averred to facilitate trade opportunities, and such factual disputes cannot be summarily resolved under Order VII Rule 10 CPC without trial (Para 31).

In passing off and infringement actions, cause of action arises where confusion or deception occurs or injury is caused to the plaintiff, and online accessibility creating potential for such harm in the forum state suffices to invoke jurisdiction pending trial determination (Para 26, relying on Millennium & Copthorne International Limited v. Aryans Plaza Services Private Limited, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 8260).

Case Title: Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. Vs. Artura Pharmaceuticals P. Ltd.:24 November 2025:CS(COMM) 1038/2024:2025:DHC:10348:Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Softgel Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. Vs Pfizer Inc.

Pfizer Inc., holder of US Patent No. 9,777,441 for crystalline forms of Tafamidis sold as VyndaMax, filed infringement suits in the US District Court, Delaware against Cipla and Hikma upon their ANDA submissions; to gather evidence from Indian third-party manufacturer Softgel Healthcare allegedly supplying the API, the US court issued letters rogatory under the Hague Convention; the Madras High Court single judge allowed execution by appointing a commissioner in O.P.(PT) Nos.5 & 6 of 2024 on 28.01.2025; Softgel appealed contending the request contravenes India's Patents Act 1970 and India's reservation against pre-trial discovery; the division bench, finding the request aimed at pre-trial documents which India excludes under Article 23 of the Hague Convention, lacking specificity under Article 3, and prejudicial to sovereignty under Article 11 given Softgel's pending Indian patent application, allowed the appeals on 25.11.2025 setting aside the single judge order and dismissing the applications for commission.

- India has declared under Article 23 of the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 1970 that it will not execute letters of request issued for pre-trial discovery of documents (Para 33).
- Letters rogatory from a foreign court must contain the specificity required under Article 3 of the Hague Convention; vague or non-specific requests are not enforceable in India (Para 34).
- Under Article 11 of the Hague Convention, a person may refuse to give evidence if it would prejudice the sovereignty or security of the requested state, particularly when the evidence relates to a pending patent application in India (Para 34).
- Execution of letters rogatory in India under Order XXVI Rules 19-22 read with Section 78 CPC is subject to compliance with the Hague Convention and India's reservations thereunder; requests for pre-trial discovery in patent matters pending in India may be refused (Para 32).

Case Title: Softgel Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. Vs Pfizer Inc. & Ors.  
Order Date: 25 November 2025  
Case Number: L.P.A. Nos.17 & 18 of 2025  
Neutral Citation: Not yet assigned  
Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras  
Judge: Hon’ble Dr. Justice G. Jayachandran & Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mummineni Sudheer Kumar  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

SKA Insurance Surveyors and Loss Assessors Private Limited Vs. Regional Director (Northern Region), Ministry of Corporate Affairs

SKA Insurance Surveyors and Loss Assessors Pvt. Ltd., incorporated on 25.02.2022 by Mr. Sushil Kumar Agarwal who had resigned only two months earlier from the 2008-incorporated SKAAD Insurance Surveyors and Loss Assessors Pvt. Ltd. (of which he had been a director for 13 years), was directed by the Regional Director under Section 16(1)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013 to change its name within three months on the ground that “SKA” and “SKAAD” followed by identical descriptive words were too nearly resembling and likely to cause confusion, especially since both companies carry on identical business. The petitioner challenged the order in a writ petition contending that Section 16(1)(a) cannot be invoked when the earlier company has no registered trademark and that the RD impermissibly entered into trademark/passing-off considerations. The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition on 19.11.2025 holding that Section 16(1)(a) operates independently of trademark rights and is attracted merely on similarity of corporate names without requiring proof of deception or confusion, that the names were substantially identical when read as a whole, and that the common directorship and identical business made the RD’s conclusion unassailable.

- Section 16(1)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013 is attracted merely on objective similarity/near resemblance of corporate names and does not require proof of likelihood of confusion or deception as in a passing-off action (Para 7-10).  
- Jurisdiction under Section 16(1)(a) is wider than trademark/passing-off jurisdiction and operates independently of the existence of a registered trademark (Para 8, 10).  
- While comparing names under Section 16(1)(a), the names must be considered as a whole; addition or deletion of one letter (“SKA” vs “SKAAD”) in the dominant part followed by identical descriptive words renders the names too nearly resembling (Para 10).  
- Common directorship and identical nature of business are relevant circumstances that strengthen the conclusion of near resemblance under Section 16(1)(a) (Para 11).  
- The Regional Director is not required to decide ownership of trademark or passing-off while exercising power under Section 16(1)(a) (Para 9, 12).

Case Title: SKA Insurance Surveyors and Loss Assessors Private Limited Vs. Regional Director (Northern Region), Ministry of Corporate Affairs & Anr.  
Order Date: 19 November 2025  
Case Number: W.P.(C) 17574/2025  
Neutral Citation: Not yet assigned  
Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi  
Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Prateek Jalan  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Shroff Geeta Vs Asst. Controller of Patents and Design

Shroff Geeta’s patent application 3853/COL/MP/2008 filed in 2008 for a composition comprising human embryonic stem cells derived from 2–7 day old human embryos and their derivatives was rejected by the Controller on 24.09.2018 primarily under Section 3(b) of the Patents Act, 1970 holding that the invention necessarily involved destructive use of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes which is contrary to public order and morality. The applicant appealed under Section 117A contending that the invention did not necessarily destroy embryos and the Controller misapplied Section 3(b). The Calcutta High Court dismissed the appeal on 17.11.2025 upholding the refusal, holding that derivation of human embryonic stem cells by immunological or mechanical isolation from the inner cell mass of the embryo inevitably requires destructive use of the embryo, that commercial exploitation of such cells is contrary to morality and public order, and that the Controller’s order was reasoned, in conformity with the National Guidelines for Stem Cell Research 2017 and required no interference.

- Inventions involving derivation of human embryonic stem cells by destructive isolation from human embryos (even at blastocyst stage) are hit by Section 3(b) of the Patents Act, 1970 as being contrary to public order or morality (Para 9-10).
- Commercial or industrial use of human embryos or embryonic stem cells obtained by processes that lead to destruction of the embryo is non-patentable under Section 3(b) irrespective of the therapeutic potential of the invention (Para 10).
- Section 3(b) excludes inventions whose primary or intended use or commercial exploitation is contrary to morality even if the invention is novel and inventive (Para 6-7, 10).
- Use of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes falls within the classic examples of immoral inventions excluded from patentability (Para 8).

Case Title: Shroff Geeta Vs Asst. Controller of Patents and Design  
Order Date: 17 November 2025  
Case Number: IPDPTA/88/2023 (OA/10/2019/PT/KOL)  
Neutral Citation: Not yet assigned  
Court: High Court at Calcutta (Original Side – Intellectual Property Rights Division)  
Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Sh. Gaurav Khattar Vs. Sh. Virender Aggarwal

Gaurav Khattar had suffered an ex-parte decree in a cheque-bounce recovery suit on 10.06.2016 after summons were served on his father at 186 Teliwara, Delhi on 18.05.2016; he filed RFA 485/2025 with a delay of 3192 days claiming he never knew of the suit because he lived at 219 Teliwara and was estranged from his father. The High Court dismissed the appeal on 25.06.2025 holding the service valid and the delay unexplained. Thereafter, Khattar filed a review petition relying on “newly discovered” Aadhaar card and bank passbook showing address 219 Teliwara and medical records of his father’s cataract surgery in December 2016 and family discord. The High Court held that Aadhaar and passbook were always obtainable with due diligence hence not “new evidence”, that even if accepted they did not prove residence at the material time in May 2016, that service on father was lawful under CPC, and that the father’s surgery being post-service was irrelevant; finding no error apparent on record nor any ground for review, the court dismissed the review petition on 24.11.2025.

- Review cannot be allowed on documents (Aadhaar, bank records) that were always capable of being obtained by due diligence from concerned authorities (Para 8-9).
- For “newly discovered evidence” under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, the document must not have been within the applicant’s power to produce at the proper time despite reasonable diligence (Para 8).
- Service of summons on adult family member (father) at the defendant’s known address is valid service under CPC; subsequent medical condition of the family member is irrelevant if it arose after service (Para 9, 12-13).
- No error apparent exists merely because certain documents on record were not specifically adverted to in the judgment if they do not affect the legality of service already effected (Para 10-13).

Case Title: Sh. Gaurav Khattar Vs. Sh. Virender Aggarwal  
Order Date: 24 November 2025  
Case Number: Review Pet. 427/2025 in RFA 485/2025  
Neutral Citation: Not yet assigned  
Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi  
Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Rallis India Limited Vs. Deputy Controller of Patents

Rallis India Limited appealed against the Deputy Controller's order dated 05 March 2024 rejecting its patent application No. 4135/CHEN/2014 for a stable herbicidal composition comprising Pendimethalin and Metribuzin in emulsifiable concentrate formulation, filed on 25 August 2014 with examination request on 27 September 2017 leading to FER on 22 July 2019 citing lack of novelty inventive step and non-patentability under Sections 3(d) and 3(e); 

Pre-grant oppositions were filed by Haryana Pesticide Manufacturers Association on 10 September 2019 and Chimanbhai Chauhan challenging under Sections 25(1)(b) to (g) with hearings concluded by 2023. 

The Madras High Court reasoned that the impugned order erroneously relied on D3 (IN 2243/MUM/2014) as prior art without addressing whether its EC claims were fairly based on the provisional specification filed 09 July 2014 which disclosed only suspo-emulsion not EC, 

Ignored expert affidavits distinguishing formulations and D3's deemed revocation status, overlooked additional prior arts cited by opponents, and inadequately assessed comparative data for synergy. The appeal was allowed order set aside and matter remanded to a different Controller for fresh reasoned decision within four months after hearing parties keeping all contentions open without the Court's observations binding the remand.

Important Law Point:

For a complete specification to claim priority from a provisional specification under Section 11(2) of the Patents Act, 1970, the claims must be fairly based on the disclosure in the provisional; failure disqualifies it as prior art for anticipation if the specific invention (e.g., EC formulation) is absent in the provisional. 

The Controller must provide explicit reasoned findings on all material contentions responses evidence including expert affidavits and status of cited patents (e.g., deemed revocation under Rule 58(2) of Patents Rules, 2003) in refusal orders; omission renders the order unsustainable. 

 In appeals under Section 117A(2) of the Patents Act, 1970, the High Court may set aside a patent refusal and remand for fresh adjudication by a different officer if the order lacks proper consideration without the appellate observations prejudicing the remand. 

Case Title: Rallis India Limited Vs. Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs & Ors.  
Order date: 20 November 2025  : C.M.A.(PT) No. 21 of 2024 :Mad HC: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Novo Nordisk Vs. Dr. Reddys Laboratories

Novo Nordisk A/S, holder of Indian Patent No. 262697 (IN'697) granted on 5 September 2014 with priority from 18 March 2005 for acylated GLP-1 analogs including Semaglutide used in treating Type 2 diabetes and obesity, filed a suit against Dr. Reddy's Laboratories Limited alleging infringement by their manufacture and intended sale of generic Semaglutide and sought interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC. 

Defendants countered with revocation grounds under Sections 64(1)(a), (e), (f) of Patents Act 1970 claiming anticipation by prior claiming in plaintiff's own genus patent IN'964, prior publication, obviousness/lack of inventive step, and evergreening. 

The Single Judge, after detailed analysis, held the suit patent prima facie vulnerable to revocation as the species compound Semaglutide was anticipated by claims in IN'964, obvious to a 'person in the know' (same inventor) without inventive step over prior art teachings, constituted evergreening to extend monopoly, and no other grounds favored validity. 

The interim injunction application was dismissed with prima facie observations not binding trial.

In assessing obviousness under Section 64(1)(f) of the Patents Act, 1970, for a species patent derived from a prior genus patent by the same inventor, the perspective shifts from the ordinary 'person skilled in the art' to a 'person in the know' who is intimately familiar with the genus patent's details, making obviousness easier to establish. ( paras 67-70, 90)

A subsequent species patent may be invalidated for anticipation by prior claiming under Section 64(1)(a) if its claims are subsumed within the broader claims of an earlier genus patent by the same patentee, even if the specific compound is not explicitly disclosed. (paras 26-55)

 Evergreening through minor modifications to extend patent monopoly without significant therapeutic enhancement renders the patent vulnerable, especially when the species lacks inventive step over the genus. (paras 89-90)

For interim injunction in patent infringement, where validity is credibly challenged on grounds like obviousness and evergreening, no prima facie case exists if the patent appears revocable; balance of convenience favors denying relief when plaintiff does not manufacture locally and damages are quantifiable. (paras 94-99)

 Defendants who 'clear the way' by challenging patent validity prior to launch may avoid interim injunction, promoting timely resolution over market disruption. (paras 96-98)

Case Title: Novo Nordisk Vs. Dr. Reddys Laboratories Limited : 02 December 2025  : CS(COMM)565/2025  :2025:DHC:10820:Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Nannir Water Source LLP Vs Syed Imran

Nannir Water Source LLP, proprietor of registered trademark NANNIR and manufacturer of eco-friendly electricity-free water treatment systems, filed a commercial suit before the Madras High Court against YouTuber Syed Imran and YouTube seeking interim injunction restraining the defendants from keeping online an allegedly false, malicious and disparaging product review video uploaded on 25 May 2025 in the channel “Buying Facts”. 

The Single Judge, relying on the Bombay High Court decision in Marico Ltd v Abhijeet Bhansali, held that the statements in the video were prima facie reckless, malicious and not backed by any credible scientific material, that freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) does not extend to maligning or disparaging another’s goods, and that such conduct violates the plaintiff’s right to carry on trade under Article 19(1)(g). Finding prima facie case, irreparable injury and balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiff, the Court granted ex-parte interim injunction and directed YouTube to take down the impugned video till further orders.

False, reckless and malicious statements in a YouTube product review video that disparage and malign the goods of another without any credible scientific basis constitute slander of goods/disparagement and are not protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. (Nannir Water Source LLP v Syed Imran & Ors, O.A.Nos.1107 & 1108 of 2025 in C.S.(Comm.Div.) No.302 of 2025, paras 3-7, relying on Marico Limited v Abhijeet Bhansali dated 15.01.2020 (Bombay High Court))

Commercial speech is part of Article 19(1)(a) but cannot be abused to malign or disparage the product of others; such disparagement amounts to an unreasonable restriction on the aggrieved party’s fundamental right to carry on trade and business under Article 19(1)(g). (paras 4-6)

When prima facie malice and falsity are established in a disparaging video, ex-parte interim injunction and mandatory take-down direction against the platform are justified. (paras 7-8)

Case Title: Nannir Water Source LLP Vs Syed Imran : : 26 November 2025  : C.S. (Comm.Div.) No.302 of 2025  :Mad HC:Hon'ble Mr. Justice N. Senthilkumar  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Ms Anuradha Sharma . Vs. Jiva Ayurvedic Pharmacy Ltd.

Jiva Ayurvedic Pharmacy Limited obtained an ex-parte interim injunction from the Commercial Court restraining Anuradha Sharma and another from using their registered trademark SHATAM JEEVA on the ground of similarity with Jiva’s mark JIVA. 

In appeal, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court stayed the injunction till the next date of hearing, holding that since the appellants possess a registration for SHATAM JEEVA, no case of infringement arises. 

On passing off, the marks JIVA and SHATAM JEEVA are prima facie entirely dissimilar when compared as composite device marks, the plaintiff Jiva had disclaimed the word “Jiva” in one of its registrations, and crucially, the Commercial Court failed to record any finding on accumulation of goodwill in JIVA prior to 2018 (the appellant’s date of adoption/registration) despite the law requiring sales and advertisement figures to prove goodwill existing before the defendant’s entry, rendering the grant of injunction unsustainable at the prima facie stage.

Important Law Point:

A registered trademark cannot be injuncted on the ground of infringement of another mark; only passing off remains available against a registered mark. (paras 14-15)

 In a passing off action, the rival marks must be compared as composite/device marks and not merely as word marks; added features and overall visual impression are decisive. (paras 15(i) 

To succeed in passing off, the plaintiff must prima facie establish goodwill in its mark prior to the date of adoption/registration of the mark by the defendant; mere sales figures post-dating the defendant’s entry are insufficient. (paras 15(iii)-(vi), citing Brihan Karan Sugar Syndicate (P) Ltd v. Yashwantrao Mohite Krushna Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana (2024) 2 SCC 577 and Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Prius Auto Industries Ltd. (2018) 2 SCC 1)

Absence of a clear finding on pre-existing goodwill is fatal to the grant of interim injunction in a passing off action. (paras 15(vi), 16)

Case Title: Ms Anuradha Sharma. Vs. Jiva Ayurvedic Pharmacy Limited : 01 December 2025  : FAO (COMM) 334/2025 :Del DB:: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Kohinoor Seed Fields India Vs Veda Seed Sciences-DB

Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt Ltd filed a trademark infringement and passing off suit against Veda Seed Sciences Pvt Ltd in Delhi High Court, claiming Veda infringed its registered marks TADAAKHA and SADANAND, and common law mark BASANT, by using similar marks like VEDA TADAAKHA GOLD for cotton hybrid seeds after appellant terminated their non-exclusive marketing agreement executed in Delhi, which had permitted Veda limited use for specific hybrids produced by appellant. 

Veda filed an application under Order VII Rule 10 CPC challenging territorial jurisdiction; a Single Judge allowed it and returned the plaint, holding no cause of action arose in Delhi as the agreement was not integral to the infringement claim, mere trademark registration in Delhi insufficient, and no evidence of sales or targeting in Delhi via e-commerce listings by third parties. 

On appeal, the Division Bench reasoned that the marketing agreement formed part of the cause of action since infringement stemmed from use beyond its permitted scope and it was executed in Delhi, registration alone does not confer jurisdiction but infringement location does, interactive e-commerce availability of products accessible in Delhi constitutes purposeful availment conferring jurisdiction unlike passive sites, and the Single Judge erred by relying on material outside the plaint to dismiss third-party listings' relevance. The appeal was allowed, impugned order set aside, and suit restored as maintainable in Delhi High Court.

Point of Law Settled:

Execution of a marketing agreement in a particular jurisdiction constitutes part of the cause of action for a trademark infringement suit where the infringement is alleged to arise from use of marks beyond the agreement's permitted scope, thereby vesting territorial jurisdiction in that court under Section 20(c) of the CPC. ( paras 18-18.8)

Mere registration of a trademark at the Trade Marks Registry located in Delhi does not confer territorial jurisdiction on the Delhi High Court for an infringement suit unless the actual infringement occurs within its territorial limits. (paras 17-17.13)

In trademark infringement cases involving e-commerce, if the defendant's website is interactive and enables customers within the jurisdiction to place orders, make inquiries, or engage in transactions, it amounts to purposeful availment of the jurisdiction, thereby vesting territorial jurisdiction in that court. (paras 19-19.15)

Availability of allegedly infringing products on third-party e-commerce platforms accessible within the jurisdiction can support a plea of territorial jurisdiction if the plaint avers potential sales or confusion there, though the defendant's actual responsibility for such listings is a matter for trial and cannot be dismissed at the threshold based on material outside the plaint. ( paras 21-21.4)

 Where no part of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the plaintiff's principal office but arises at a subordinate office, the plaintiff cannot invoke jurisdiction at the principal office under Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, but this principle does not apply if elements like agreement execution or e-commerce targeting create cause of action at the principal office. (paras 20-20.5)

Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt Ltd Vs Veda Seed Sciences Pvt Ltd : 3 December 2025  : FAO(OS) (COMM) 66/2025:2025:DHC: 10789-DB:Del HCHigh Court of Delhi at New Delhi  : Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

ITC Limited Vs. Adyar Gate Hotels Limited


The plaintiffs ITC Ltd. and ITC Hotels alleged that Adyar Gate Hotels wrongfully used the mark “DAKSHIN” for its standalone Chennai restaurant after expiry of their hotel operating agreement, claiming infringement, passing off, and copyright violation.

 The defendant asserted long, continuous adoption since 1989, concurrent trademark registration, acquiescence, and absence of Delhi jurisdiction. 

The Court held that no commercial transaction or targeted business occurred in Delhi, the plaintiffs’ apprehension of future expansion was unsubstantiated, and Section 134/62 “long-arm jurisdiction” was unavailable as the cause of action arose in Chennai. 

On merits, the Court further noted that both parties hold valid registrations for “DAKSHIN,” attracting Section 28(3) and 30(2)(e) protection, meaning no infringement action lies unless the defendant’s registration is first cancelled; therefore only passing-off could be examined. 

Ultimately, the Court refused interim injunction for lack of territorial jurisdiction and absence of prima-facie infringement.

  • A plaintiff cannot rely on mere accessibility of defendant’s restaurant listings on Zomato/Instagram/EazyDiner to establish territorial jurisdiction; specific targeting and commercial transaction within the forum must be shown (Paras 35–41, 45–47).
  • Reservation of a table online is not a “commercial transaction” within the forum state unless the service is actually rendered there (Para 45).
  • A quia-timet jurisdictional plea requires tangible and reasonable material; a bald apprehension of future expansion into Delhi is insufficient for interim relief (Paras 57–64).
  • Section 134 Trade Marks Act and Section 62 Copyright Act cannot be invoked where the cause of action arises at the place of plaintiff’s principal place of business; Sanjay Dalia principle applied (Paras 65–69).
  • When both parties hold valid registrations for the same mark, Section 28(3) and Section 30(2)(e) bar an infringement claim unless the defendant’s registration is first rectified (Paras 72–75).
  • Passing-off remains maintainable even where both parties are registered proprietors (S. Syed Mohideen rule reaffirmed) (Para 75) 

 ITC Limited Vs. Adyar Gate Hotels Limited: 4 December 2025: CS(COMM) 119/2025: 2025:DHC: 10842: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Disclaimer[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Ganraj Enterprises Vs Landmark Crafts Pvt. Ltd.



The appeal arose from Ganraj Enterprises’ challenge to the Registrar’s rejection of its rectification petition against trademark registration No. 1566805 for the mark “HP” owned by Landmark Crafts. The Court noted that Landmark was the prior adopter and user of “HP”, supported by undisputed invoices since 2006, whereas Ganraj’s claimed user of “HP+” from 2014 lacked credible proof. The Court held that alleged territorial restriction in the earlier registration could not limit the effect of the later pan-India registration (TM No. 2848372), and issues of alleged false user claim of 1995 or infringement consequences were matters for the pending commercial suit. Holding that Ganraj had locus but no merit on grounds urged, the Court upheld the Registrar’s order and dismissed the appeal.


Law Settled 

  • Territorial limitations or conditions attached to one registration cannot automatically extend to an associated or later registration unless expressly included. Foodlink F&B Holdings v. Wow Momo Foods, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 4719; applied in Para 11.3.1–11.3.4.
  • Filing of an infringement/passing-off suit by the registered proprietor is not a ground to maintain rectification. Para 12(i).
  • Prior user right of proprietor established through undisputed invoices (here, from 28.09.2006) prevails over later adoption by the applicant. Para 11.4.3.
  • Territorial limitation in TM No. 1566805 does not restrain proprietor from using the mark outside that territory; it only affects the ability to sue for statutory infringement in those territories, not passing off rights. Para 11.6.
  • Allegations of false user claim (1995) were left open to be decided in the pending commercial suit and cannot sustain rectification when the appellant itself avoids adjudication on that point. Para 10 & 12(ii).

Ganraj Enterprises Vs Landmark Crafts Pvt. Ltd. : 02 December 2025: C.A. (COMM.IPD-TM) 164/2022:Del HC: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora


[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]


[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent and Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi]

Saturday, December 6, 2025

Edible Products (India) Limited Vs Shalimar Chemical Works Pvt. Ltd.


The plaintiff Shalimar Chemical Works sued Edible Products India Ltd. for passing off and infringement, alleging deceptive similarity in trade dress, colour scheme and HDPE bottle shape used for coconut oil, and obtained an ex parte injunction that was later made absolute; the defendant appealed. 

The Calcutta High Court held that passing off—being broader than infringement—required application of the Trinity Test, and found that Shalimar had long-standing goodwill linked to its distinctive yellow-green HDPE packaging since 2006, while the defendant offered no credible explanation for adopting a strikingly similar get-up, including bottle shape and colour arrangement, thereby creating likelihood of confusion for an average consumer. 

The Court concluded that goodwill, misrepresentation and likelihood of damage were clearly established, rejected the defendant's arguments on generic bottle shape, distinct labels, different product class (hair oil), non-suing of other infringers, and upheld the trial court’s grant of temporary injunction, dismissing the appeal.

Law Settled:

A passing-off action remains independent of trademark registration and is broader than infringement; Section 27(2) preserves the common law tort of deceit (Paras 42–45, S. Syed Mohideen v. P. Sulochana Bai, (2016) 2 SCC 683).

The Classical Trinity Test—goodwill, misrepresentation, and likelihood of damage—governs passing off; assessment is from the viewpoint of an average person with imperfect recollection (Paras 47–50, Reckitt & Colman v. Borden [1990] RPC 340).

Distinctiveness of trade dress is judged on overall get-up, not isolated elements; similarity in total impression is sufficient for injunction (Paras 51–57, Gerbatschow Wodka KG v. John Distilleries Ltd., (2011) 47 PTC 100).

Class or category of goods is irrelevant in passing off when the get-up causes confusion regarding trade origin (Para 63, Sony Kabushiki Kaisha v. Mahaluxmi Textile Mills, (2009) 1 CHN 852 (FB)).

Defence of publici juris/common to trade fails without proof of substantial and continued use by others (Paras 71–73, Assam Roofing Ltd. v. JSB Cement LLP, AIR 2016 Cal 41).

Adoption of a similar get-up without explanation raises presumption of dishonesty (Para 69, Satyam Infoway Ltd. v. Siffynet Solutions, (2004) 6 SCC 145).

Appellate Court will not interfere with a well-reasoned discretionary injunction unless findings are perverse (Para 79, settled principles of appellate review).

Edible Products (India) Limited Vs Shalimar Chemical Works Pvt. Ltd.: 03.12.2025: FMAT No. 189 of 2024;: 2025:CHC-AS:2186-DB:Calcutta HC:Hon’ble Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Hon’ble Justice Supratim Bhattacharya

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent and Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi]

Classic Legends Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Tide Water Oil Co. (India) Ltd.



The case concerned the fate of the historic ‘YEZDI’ trademark after Ideal Jawa’s winding-up proceedings, where the company had ceased production since 1996 and the Official Liquidator neither renewed nor protected the mark for over 15 years. The Single Judge had held Ideal Jawa to be the continuing owner and declared later registrations in favour of Mr. Boman Irani as void; however, on appeal, the Division Bench examined the factual background of the liquidation, the complete absence of use, the omission of the trademark from the valuation and sale of assets, and the expiry and removal of the registrations. It held that the trademark and any associated goodwill had entirely dissipated due to prolonged non-use, non-renewal and inaction of the OL, that no rights survived in favour of the company in liquidation, and consequently allowed the appeals and set aside the impugned order.


Law Settled:

Service of notice on the trade mark agent of the company would amount to service of notice on the company. [Para 79]

A trademark not renewed and not used for decades loses all common-law and statutory protectability; goodwill does not survive prolonged non-use. Classic Legends Pvt. Ltd. v. Tide Water Oil Co. (India) Ltd., paras 67


• Trademarks are not automatically treated as saleable assets in liquidation unless asserted, protected, valued, or included in asset sale documentation; omission from valuation and sale extinguishes any claim. Paras 26–29.

 
• Section 47(3) “special circumstances” cannot rescue a mark where the company and OL show complete inaction for 15+ years; liquidation alone is not a shield. Para 69 .

 
• Once registrations lapse and are removed, and no steps for restoration or protection are taken, no goodwill remains with the company in liquidation. Paras 108.

 
• Appellate court may overturn a Single Judge’s declaration of ownership when factual materials show absolute abandonment and dissipation of trademark rights. Para 110.

Classic Legends Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Tide Water Oil Co. (India) Ltd.: 27 November 2025: OSA No. 8-13 of 2023: Karnataka HC: Justice D.K. Singh and Justice Venkatesh Naik T


[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation[

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Capital Meters Ltd. Vs B.P. Electric

The plaintiff, owner of the registered trademark CAPITAL used since 1986 for electrical goods, filed a suit alleging that the defendant had clandestinely begun marketing fans under the identical mark, thereby infringing and passing off goods as those of the plaintiff. The defendant was served but proceeded ex parte. The plaintiff’s unrebutted evidence—including trademark registration, long and extensive user, invoices, advertisements, and deceptive similarity between the parties’ labels—was accepted by the Court. Holding that the defendant had dishonestly adopted the mark to exploit the plaintiff’s goodwill, the Court restrained the defendant by permanent injunction, directed delivery-up of infringing material, and ordered rendition of accounts through a Local Commissioner.


 Law Settled in the Case 

  • Deceptively similar trademark used on allied/cognate goods constitutes infringement and passing off; adoption of an identical mark like CAPITAL for fans was held likely to cause confusion and deception (Para 4).
  • Unrebutted ex parte evidence proving long user, registration, and goodwill is sufficient to establish infringement when defendant does not contest the suit (Paras 3–4).
  • Dishonest adoption inferred where defendant copies a well-established mark to trade upon plaintiff’s goodwill, entitling the plaintiff to injunction and consequential relief (Para 4).
  • Court may order delivery-up of infringing goods and materials for destruction as part of protective relief in trademark infringement suits (Para 4).
  • Where infringement is proved, defendant is liable for rendition of accounts, and Court may appoint a Local Commissioner for computation of profits (Para 5).

Complete Citation: Capital Meters Ltd. v. B.P. Electric, 2001 SCC OnLine Del 1155 : (2002) 95 DLT 846 : 2002 AIHC 2340 : (2002) 24 PTC 382 (Del).

Case Title: Capital Meters Ltd. Vs B.P. Electric
Order Date: 12 October 2001
Case Number: Suit No. 1413 of 1998
Neutral Citation: 2001 SCC OnLine Del 1155
Court: High Court of Delhi
Judge: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Sharda Aggarwal


[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent and Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi]

Bignet Solutions LLP Vs. Novex Communications Pvt. Ltd

Bignet Solutions LLP filed a suit seeking declaration that 15 specific pre-1965 sound recordings were in the public domain and no licence from Novex Communications Pvt. Ltd. was not required for playing them at a private event on 12.10.2025. The venue had insisted on an NOC from Novex, which quoted a fee. On 10.10.2025 the court passed interim orders permitting the event upon undertakings, the event was peacefully held, and only the listed 15 songs were played. Novex clarified that these particular recordings never formed part of its repertoire, that it never asserted rights over pre-1965 recordings whose copyright had expired, and that the quotation was issued because the initial request did not specify release years. Finding that Novex asserted no rights over pre-1965 sound recordings, that the event concluded without interference and the limited cause of action stood satisfied, the court disposed of the suit along with pending applications while rejecting the claim for damages and refund of court fees.

- Novex Communications Pvt. Ltd. does not claim and has never claimed copyright in sound recordings published before 1965 whose term has expired under Section 27 of the Copyright Act, 1957, and no licence fee is payable to it for public performance of such recordings (Paras 6, 6.1, 11 & 12).

Bignet Solutions LLP Vs. Novex Communications Pvt. Ltd.  : 21.11.2025  : CS(COMM) 1094/2025  :DHC: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora  

[Readers are advised to exercise their own discretion as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

ARQ Providores Vs Schloss HMA Pvt. Ltd.

The Delhi High Court considered a trademark infringement and passing-off action filed by ARQ Providores, a sweets and confectionery brand using the mark “ARQ” since 2018, against Schloss HMA (The Leela Group), which launched luxury hospitality services under “THE ARQ / ARQ BY THE LEELA” in 2024. Although the plaintiff established prior use, goodwill, and the defendants’ knowledge of its mark, the defendants possessed a subsisting registration for “THE ARQ” in Class 43, preventing an infringement claim but not a passing-off action. The Court held that the parties operate in allied and cognate fields catering to similar high-end consumers, creating a likelihood of confusion. However, since defendants had already commenced services, the balance of convenience warranted interim directions rather than a complete injunction. The Court ordered the defendants to use “ARQ” only as “ARQ BY THE LEELA,” discontinue their existing logo, refrain from using “ARQ” for sweets, confectioneries, catering, or in-villa restaurant services, and file a reply before the next hearing.

Case Law Held:

Vaidya Rishi India Health (P) Ltd. v. Suresh Dutt Parashar, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 6147:Cited by the Court to reiterate that no infringement action lies against a registered proprietor using its own registered trademark for the class in which it is registered. The principle upheld: registration acts as a statutory defence, but passing off action still survives. [Referred in the present order at Para 24–25.]

Suparshva Swabs India v. AGN International, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 8239 [Relied upon to reaffirm that courts cannot restrain use of a validly registered trademark .The Court held that only passing off can be maintained even when the defendant owns a registration. [Referred in the present order at Para 24–25.]

Indian Hotels Co. Ltd. v. Jiva Institute of Vedic Science & Culture, 2008 SCC OnLine Del 1758C[ited by the defendants; the case held that where a party has obtained registration without objection, balance of convenience may tilt in its favour when use has already commenced.  [Referred in the present order at Para 17.6]

Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Krithi, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1382 Cited for the principle that pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act is not mandatory when urgent interim relief is sought.Applied to grant exemption from pre-litigation mediation.[eferred in the present order at Para 2.]

ARQ Providores Vs Schloss HMA Pvt. Ltd. : 17.11.2025: CS(COMM) 1227/2025: High Court of Delhi: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised to exercise their own discretion as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Aristo Pharmaceutical Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Healing Pharma India Pvt. Ltd

The Court held that the plaintiff’s mark ACECLO, being a clipped and descriptive form of the International Non-Proprietary Name Aceclofenac, is publici juris and incapable of exclusive monopolisation under Section 13 of the Trade Marks Act; since both parties adopted marks derived from the same INN and the defendant’s mark “ACECLOHEAL” added a distinctive suffix, the rival marks were prima facie dissimilar, the plaintiff’s inconsistent use of its originally registered mark weakened any claim of acquired distinctiveness, and no likelihood of confusion or misrepresentation was established; therefore, no prima facie case of infringement or passing off was made out and the application for interim injunction was rejected.

Case law relied/held:

Sun Pharmaceutical Laboratories Ltd. v. Hetero HealthCare Ltd. & Anr., 2022 SCC OnLine Del 2580, relied upon in Paras 17–18, holding that INN-derived marks or clipped forms thereof cannot confer exclusivity as they remain publici juris.


Schering Corporation & Ors. v. Alkem Laboratories Ltd., 1990 SCC OnLine Bom 425, discussed in Para 17 as precedent recognising that abbreviations or truncated forms of generic drug names remain descriptive and non-monopolisable.


M/s Panacea Biotec Ltd. v. M/s Recon Ltd., 1996 PTC 16, cited in Para 19 for the principle that marks descriptive of pharmaceutical ingredients or indicative of drug composition cannot be exclusively appropriated.


F. Hoffman-La Roche & Co. Ltd. v. Geoffrey Manners & Co. Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1970 SC 2062, relied upon in Para 21 for evaluating similarity based on the distinctive/uncommon parts when the common element is descriptive or generic.


Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 73, noted in Para 23 for clarifying that Schedule-H status does not dilute the test for deceptive similarity in pharmaceutical marks.

Aristo Pharmaceutical Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Healing Pharma India Pvt. Ltd.: 25 November 2025: Commercial IP Suit (L) No. 25932 of 2025: 2025:BHC-OS:22177: High Court of Bombay : Hon’ble Ms. Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh

[Readers are advised to exercise their own discretion as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation[

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Arif Elahi Vs. Martin Davis

The Court noted that both the present suit and the defendant’s suit before the Commercial Court concerned the same trademark “MR COOK”, and held that consolidation was necessary to avoid multiple proceedings and conflicting decisions. Rejecting the defendant’s objection that a pending Order VII Rule 11 application made consolidation improper, the Court reasoned that such pendency does not bar transfer under Rule 26 of the IPD Rules. Accordingly, the Court ordered the transfer of CS(COMM) 866/2025 from the Commercial Court to the High Court for consolidation with the present suit.

Case Law Held (with Para Reference):
The Court held that under Rule 26 of the Delhi High Court IPD Rules, proceedings involving the same or related IP subject matter ought to be consolidated to prevent conflicting decisions and expedite adjudication (Para 7–9).

Arif Elahi Vs. Martin Davis: 28.11.2025: CS(COMM) 59/2025:DHC: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised to exercise their own discretion as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]
[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent and Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi]

Ajay alias Vishal Veeru Devgan The Artists Planet



The plaintiff, actor Ajay Devgn, sued various defendants for impersonation, unauthorized sale of merchandise, and circulation of AI-generated deepfake and pornographic content misusing his name, image, voice and likeness. The Court held that his well-established celebrity status gives him protectable personality and publicity rights, and found prima facie infringement by defendants involved in impersonation, sale of merchandise, and AI-morphed content. Considering the irreparable harm and balance of convenience, the Court granted an ex-parte ad-interim injunction directing takedown of infringing URLs, blocking of pornographic domains, cessation of misuse of his persona, and mandated platforms to provide BSI details and ensure compliance.


Case Law Held:
• D.M. Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. v. Baby Gift House & Ors., MANU/DE/2043/2010 — Recognition of personality/publicity rights of celebrities; unauthorized merchandise amounts to passing off (Para 50).

• Anil Kapoor v. Simply Life India & Ors., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 6914 — Protection against deepfakes and unauthorized digital exploitation of celebrity persona (Paras 38–40 referred in Para 50).

• Jaikishan Kaku Bhai Sarf Alias Jackie Shroff v. The Peppy Store & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine Del 3664 — Personality rights include name, image, voice, likeness; protection against AI-generated obscene or unsavoury content (Para 50).

• Reference to statutory framework: Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Keerthi, (2024) 5 SCC 815 — Cited regarding exemption from pre-institution mediation (Para 10).

• Interpretation of obligations under Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 — Court emphasized mandatory first-resort takedown mechanism (Para 56)


Ajay alias Vishal Veeru Devgan  Vs The Artists Planet : 27.11.2025: CS(COMM) 1269/2025: High Court of Delhii: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora


[Readers are advised to exercise their own discretion as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation. Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent and Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi]

Friday, December 5, 2025

Kohinoor Seed Fields India Vs. Veda Seed Sciences

Below is the full research-style analytical legal paper based entirely on the uploaded judgment. All legal points are simplified for a wide audience, including law students, general readers, litigants and junior practitioners. No bullet points or para numbering have been used, as requested.


Legal Analysis Research Paper

Brief Introductory Head Note

The case of Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Veda Seed Sciences Pvt. Ltd. decided by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court deals with a very important question under trademark and procedural law: Where can a trademark lawsuit be filed when the defendant disputes territorial jurisdiction?

The order focuses on whether the Delhi High Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain a trademark infringement suit filed by Kohinoor Seed Fields. A Single Judge had earlier ordered that the plaint be returned because he believed the Court did not have jurisdiction. The Division Bench reversed that decision and restored the suit.

This judgment clarifies how Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 interacts with Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), especially in cases where the plaintiff has its head office in one place and subordinate offices elsewhere. It also discusses whether e-commerce activity and contractual disputes can contribute to territorial jurisdiction.


Summary of Case and Factual Background

Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd is the plaintiff engaged in manufacturing and selling agricultural hybrid seeds, including cotton seeds under the trademarks "TADAAKHA", "SADANAND", and the unregistered mark "BASANT". These marks are used in multiple Indian states.

The defendant Veda Seed Sciences Pvt. Ltd. allegedly began selling cotton hybrid seeds under similar names such as “VEDA TADAAKHA GOLD BG II”, “VEDA SADANAND GOLD BG II” and “VEDA BASANT GOLD BG II”. The plaintiff alleged this amounted to trademark infringement and passing off.

The plaintiff claimed that listings of the defendants’ products appeared on e-commerce platforms such as IndiaMart, which could be accessed in Delhi. The plaintiff also pointed out that its registered trademarks were recorded with a Delhi address.

Alongside infringement relief, the plaint referenced a Marketing Agreement allegedly breached by the defendant.

The plaintiff therefore approached the Delhi High Court under Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act claiming jurisdiction on the ground that its principal place of business was in Delhi.


Procedural Detail

After the suit was filed, the defendant submitted an application under Order VII Rule 10 CPC seeking return of the plaint, claiming Delhi had no jurisdiction.

The plaintiff also filed an application under Order II Rule 2 CPC, reserving the right to bring additional claims including breach of contract and additional trademarks. That application was partly allowed earlier.

The Single Judge accepted the objections on territorial jurisdiction, ruled that Delhi was not the correct forum, and returned the plaint for filing before a court in Telangana, where the alleged infringement and marketing activities took place.

The plaintiff appealed this order through FAO(OS) (COMM) 66/2025.


Core Dispute

The core legal dispute revolved around the question:

Does the Delhi High Court have territorial jurisdiction to entertain a trademark infringement suit merely because the plaintiff has its principal place of business in Delhi, even if no part of cause of action occurred in Delhi?

This involved interpreting:

  • Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999
  • Section 20 of CPC
  • Supreme Court ruling in Indian Performing Rights Society v. Sanjay Dalia
  • Delhi High Court ruling in Ultra Home Construction v. Purushottam Chaubey
  • E-commerce jurisdiction principles including Banyan Tree Holdings and World Wrestling Entertainment (WWE) rulings.

Detailed Reasoning and Discussion by the Court

The Division Bench began by reviewing the Single Judge’s grounds, which rested mainly on the principles in Sanjay Dalia and Ultra Home Construction. The Single Judge felt that when the plaintiff had subordinate offices in Telangana, and the infringement happened there, Delhi could not be the forum of convenience merely because the plaintiff’s head office was in Delhi.

However, the Division Bench observed that Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act is a special provision giving the plaintiff an additional forum beyond Section 20 CPC. It enables a trademark owner to file a suit where it carries on business, even if the defendant is not located there.

The Bench found that the Single Judge misapplied Sanjay Dalia. The Supreme Court held that Section 134 cannot be used to indulge in “forum shopping” when the cause of action clearly arises elsewhere and the plaintiff has a working subordinate office there. But that principle only applies when it is clear from the plaint that the cause of action is exclusively elsewhere.

The Division Bench held that, in this case, the plaint contained pleaded facts linking the defendant’s acts and internet visibility to Delhi. It noted that under Banyan Tree Holding and WWE, internet presence accessible within a jurisdiction can constitute part of cause of action if commercial targeting is alleged.

The Court further noted that the marketing agreement may be relevant to the cause of action and must be tested during trial—not at the threshold stage—since Order VII Rule 10 CPC requires looking only at the plaint and its annexures.

The Court found that the Single Judge also erred by examining additional material beyond the plaint, such as invoices, to conclude lack of jurisdiction. Under the law, only the plaint’s averments must be examined when deciding jurisdiction objections under Order VII Rule 10.

The Bench held that the plaintiff’s registration certificates reflected Delhi as the business address and this supports jurisdiction.

Thus, the Court held that the suit was maintainable in Delhi.


Decision

The Division Bench allowed the appeal. It set aside the Single Judge’s order returning the plaint and held that the Delhi High Court has territorial jurisdiction to continue hearing the suit.

The related application under Order VII Rule 10 (IA 2200/2023) was dismissed.

The suit was ordered to be restored to the original court for further proceedings. No costs were imposed.


Concluding Note

This decision reinforces the principle that trademark owners have a statutory right to sue where they carry on business under Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, provided the plaint discloses some factual basis connecting the dispute to that forum. Courts must avoid rejecting suits prematurely unless lack of jurisdiction is obvious from the face of the plaint.

It also highlights how digital commerce, online availability and contractual relationships can form part of the jurisdictional matrix in intellectual property disputes.

This ruling contributes significantly to evolving jurisprudence where online trade and multi-state operations raise complex territorial questions.


Case Metadata

Case Title: Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Veda Seed Sciences Pvt. Ltd.

Order Date: 03 December 2025

Case Number: FAO(OS) (COMM) 66/2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:____ (as per judgment pagination header)

Court: High Court of Delhi

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar & Hon’ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla


Suggested Publication Titles

  1. Jurisdiction in Trademark Litigation after Sanjay Dalia: A Study of Kohinoor Seeds v. Veda Seeds
  2. Territorial Jurisdiction and E-Commerce in India: Legal Lessons from Kohinoor Seeds Case
  3. Head Office as a Jurisdictional Anchor in IP Suits: Delhi High Court’s Interpretation in 2025
  4. Section 134(2) vs Section 20 CPC: Rebalancing Plaintiff Rights in IP Enforcement
  5. Forum Selection, Online Sales and Trademark Rights: Emerging Judicial Trends in India

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi


Delhi High Court Restores Trademark Suit Returned for Lack of Jurisdiction — Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Veda Seed Sciences Pvt. Ltd. | Order dated 03 December 2025 | FAO(OS) (COMM) 66/2025 | Before Hon’ble Justice C. Hari Shankar & Hon’ble Justice Om Prakash Shukla | High Court of Delhi

In a significant ruling concerning territorial jurisdiction in trademark disputes, the Delhi High Court has set aside the earlier decision of a Single Judge who had returned the plaint filed by Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd. on the ground that Delhi lacked jurisdiction. The Division Bench restored the suit, holding that the Court could hear the matter under Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Kohinoor Seed Fields had initiated proceedings alleging infringement of its registered trademarks "TADAAKHA" and "SADANAND" and passing off of its unregistered mark "BASANT" by Veda Seed Sciences Pvt. Ltd. The defendant filed an application under Order VII Rule 10 CPC, arguing that the alleged infringement occurred in Telangana and that Delhi was not the appropriate forum.

The Single Judge accepted the objection and returned the plaint, stating that mere presence of the plaintiff’s head office in Delhi could not create territorial jurisdiction when the cause of action arose elsewhere. However, the Division Bench disagreed, holding that the plaint contained adequate assertions linking part of the cause of action to Delhi, including the plaintiff’s registered trademarks being associated with a Delhi address and the online availability of allegedly infringing products.

The Court emphasized that jurisdiction objections at the threshold stage must be determined solely on the plaint and its supporting documents and not on additional evidence or assumptions. The decision reinforces the broader jurisdictional rights granted to trademark plaintiffs under Section 134(2), particularly in cases involving online commerce and multi-location business operations.

With the order, the suit has been restored for trial before the Single Judge. No costs were imposed.


Disclaimer: This is for general information only and should not be construed as legal advice as it may contain human errors in perception and presentation: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent & Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi.

Novo Nordisk Vs. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd.

Below is the complete analytical legal research paper written exactly in the manner requested, in simple but legally accurate language, without bullet points or paragraph numbering. Suggested publication titles are provided at the end.


Brief Introductory Head Note

This legal analysis examines the recent judgment delivered by the High Court of Delhi in the matter Novo Nordisk A/S v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd. & Anr., concerning alleged infringement of Indian Patent No. 262697 relating to the pharmaceutical compound Semaglutide. The case raises complex legal issues on patent validity, anticipation, prior claiming, inventive step, and the applicability of Section 107A relating to regulatory exceptions. The judgment also addresses questions of public interest, commercial intent, and balance of convenience where a pharmaceutical patent is near expiry.


Summary of Case and Factual Background

The Plaintiff, Novo Nordisk A/S, is a well-known global healthcare corporation specializing in diabetes medicines. It owns Indian Patent No. 262697 covering the compound Semaglutide, a once-weekly injectable drug used for treating Type-2 diabetes and obesity. The patent was granted in 2014 and is set to expire in March 2026.

In late 2024, Novo Nordisk discovered that the Defendants, Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories and OneSource Specialty Pharma Pvt. Ltd., were importing and manufacturing Semaglutide in India. Upon further investigation, it appeared that the Defendants were producing the compound not only for research purposes but in volumes suggesting commercial intent. The Plaintiff issued a cease-and-desist notice, after which the Defendants filed a revocation petition challenging the patent.

Novo Nordisk then initiated the present suit seeking a permanent injunction along with urgent interim relief restraining the Defendants from manufacturing or exporting the drug during the subsistence of the patent.


Procedural Detail

The suit was filed before the High Court of Delhi under the Commercial Courts Act. On first listing, the Defendants stated that although they had begun manufacturing, they would not sell the drug in India until they secured local marketing approval. However, they reserved the right to export to countries where the Plaintiff did not hold a valid patent.

The Court initially allowed the exports but recorded the assurance of no domestic sale. The Plaintiff appealed, leading to directions from the Division Bench that the interim injunction application be decided expeditiously.

Extensive arguments were heard over multiple dates from July to September 2025. The judgment was reserved and finally pronounced on 2 December 2025.


Core Dispute

The core controversy is whether the Defendants should be restrained from manufacturing Semaglutide in India, even for export purposes, during the remaining term of the patent.

The Defendants argue that:

Semaglutide is not novel and is anticipated by an earlier Genus Patent IN’964.
The Plaintiff has admitted, through filings and international conduct, that Semaglutide falls within the earlier genus claims.
The patent is invalid under Section 64 on grounds of prior claiming, anticipation, lack of inventive step, and Section 3(d).
Manufacture is protected under the research exception of Section 107A and does not amount to infringement.

The Plaintiff argues that:

Semaglutide is a novel and inventive species compound and demonstrates significantly higher therapeutic efficacy compared to earlier molecules, especially Example-61 in the Genus Patent.
The Defendants have admitted infringement by applying for licenses and regulatory approvals.
Export-oriented manufacture is still infringement under Section 48.
After nearly nineteen years without challenge, the patent must be treated as prima facie valid.


Detailed Reasoning and Discussion by the Court

The Court first clarified that there is no presumption of patent validity in India, as per Section 13(4) of the Patents Act and the Supreme Court ruling in Bishwanath Prasad Radhey Shyam v. Hindustan Metal Industries. Therefore, when a defendant raises a revocation-based defence under Section 107(1), the Court must assess whether a credible challenge has been raised.

The Defendants relied heavily on Section 64(1)(a), arguing that the compound was already claimed in an earlier genus patent. The Court examined the chemical structure comparison between Example-61 of the Genus Patent and Semaglutide, and also considered scientific literature where Example-61 was referred to as “Alanine Semaglutide”, suggesting structural proximity.

However, the Court held that proximity alone is insufficient. A species claim can only be said to be anticipated if the earlier genus patent provides an enabling disclosure. Relying on Novartis AG v. Natco Pharma Ltd., the Court reiterated that mere coverage is not disclosure. A person skilled in the art should be able to derive the exact species without hindsight reconstruction.

On inventive step, the Defendants’ argument that substitution of Alanine with Aib at position 8 was obvious was rejected at this preliminary stage. The Court noted that no prior art demonstrated that such substitution would yield the exceptionally prolonged half-life and once-weekly dosing achieved by Semaglutide. This aligned with the long-felt need and marked clinical improvement recognized in F. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Cipla Ltd.

Regarding Section 3(d), the Court held that Semaglutide is a new compound, not a minor modification of a known substance, and its enhanced efficacy was evident.

On infringement, the Court relied on MSD v. Sanjeev Gupta and clarified that manufacture—even solely for export—falls within the prohibited acts under Section 48. Section 107A does not permit commercial scale manufacture.

Finally, regarding balance of convenience, the Court held that allowing the Defendants to continue manufacturing would irreversibly damage the Plaintiff’s statutory monopoly, whereas any loss to the Defendants was compensable in money.


Decision

The Court granted an interim injunction restraining the Defendants from manufacturing, exporting, selling, offering for sale, commercializing, or otherwise dealing in Semaglutide or any formulation containing it, until expiry of the patent or further orders.

The earlier statement protecting exports was vacated.


Concluding Note

This judgment reinforces the principle that Indian patent law does not grant multiple opportunities to monopolize the same invention and that near-expiry patents cannot be invalidated lightly without strong evidence. The Court balanced innovation incentives with public interest considerations and clarified that Section 107A cannot be used as a shield for pre-commercial stockpiling. The decision will likely influence pharmaceutical patent enforcement strategy and ongoing debate over genus vs. species patents in India.


Case Citation Details

Case Title: Novo Nordisk A/S v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd. & Anr.
Order / Judgment Date: 02 December 2025
Case Number: CS(COMM) 565/2025 & connected applications
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:____ (as per Court record heading)
Court: High Court of Delhi, New Delhi
Judge: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora


Suggested Titles for Publication

  1. Semaglutide Patent Litigation: Navigating Genus–Species Conflict in Indian Patent Jurisprudence
  2. Export Manufacturing and Patent Rights: Legal Boundaries After Novo Nordisk v. Dr. Reddy’s
  3. Coverage vs. Disclosure: A Judicial Revisit in Pharmaceutical Patent Enforcement
  4. When Research Becomes Commerce: Section 107A Tested in Semaglutide Litigation
  5. Balancing Innovation and Access: Delhi High Court’s Interim Approach in Diabetes Drug Patent Case

Disclaimer

The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By:
Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor
Patent and Trademark Attorney
High Court of Delhi


Delhi High Court Restrains Dr. Reddy’s from Manufacturing Semaglutide Pending Patent Expiry — Novo Nordisk A/S v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd. & Anr., Order dated 02 December 2025, CS(COMM) 565/2025, before Hon’ble Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora, High Court of Delhi


In a significant development impacting the pharmaceutical patent landscape, the Delhi High Court has granted an interim injunction restraining Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories and OneSource Specialty Pharma from manufacturing or exporting the anti-diabetic drug Semaglutide until the expiry of Indian Patent No. 262697 held by Novo Nordisk A/S.


Novo Nordisk approached the Court alleging that the Defendants had begun large-scale manufacture of Semaglutide in India intended for export, despite the Plaintiff’s subsisting patent rights until March 2026. The Defendants argued that the compound lacked novelty and was anticipated by an earlier “genus patent,” contending that the suit patent was invalid and therefore unenforceable. They further sought shelter under Section 107A of the Patents Act, claiming the manufacture was protected as research activity.


After hearing extensive arguments, the Court rejected the Defendants’ contentions at the interim stage and held that a credible inventiveness dispute existed, requiring full trial. However, it found that the Defendants’ ongoing commercial-scale manufacturing—even for export—amounted to prima facie infringement under Section 48 of the Patents Act. The Court clarified that Section 107A does not permit stockpiling or commercial manufacture during the patent term.


The Court also noted that the patent had remained uncontested for nearly nineteen years, and allowing continued manufacture would irreversibly harm the statutory monopoly granted to the patentee. The balance of convenience and irreparable loss were held to be in favour of the Plaintiff.


The injunction will remain in force until the expiry of the patent term or further judicial orders.


With this ruling, the Court has reaffirmed the enforceability of species patents and clarified legal boundaries around export manufacturing under Section 107A—a ruling expected to influence ongoing pharmaceutical patent disputes in India.



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Disclaimer: This is for general information only and should not be construed as legal advice as it may contain human errors in perception and presentation: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent & Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi.

Edible Products (India) Ltd. Vs. Shalimar Chemical Works Pvt. Ltd.

LEGAL ANALYTICAL RESEARCH PAPER


Brief Introductory Head Note

The case of Edible Products (India) Limited vs. Shalimar Chemical Works Private Limited revolves around a dispute relating to passing off and alleged infringement of trade dress in the market of coconut oil products. The central concern before the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court was whether the defendant’s product packaging, colour scheme, bottle shape, and overall get-up were deceptively similar to that of the plaintiff, thereby misleading ordinary consumers into believing that both products originated from the same source.

The matter examines fundamental principles of passing off under Indian trademark jurisprudence, including the Classical Trinity Test consisting of goodwill, deception, and likelihood of damage. The decision also touches upon the distinction between infringement and passing off, the test of an average consumer, relevance of prior use, and the significance of trade dress in consumer-facing packaged goods.


Summary of Case and Factual Background

The plaintiff, Shalimar Chemical Works Private Limited, is a long-established manufacturer of coconut oil products under the brand “Shalimar.” The company has been operating in the market since 1945 and, specifically, selling its products in the present HDPE (plastic) bottles in yellow and green colour scheme since approximately 2006. The plaintiff claims substantial goodwill, a large customer base, heavy advertisement expenditure, and brand recognition associated with its unique trade dress.

The defendant, Edible Products (India) Limited, began selling coconut oil in containers similar in shape, colour, bottle texture, label style, and overall packaging in the market. The plaintiff contended that this similarity was intentional and capable of misleading the general public.

The plaintiff approached the Commercial Court seeking injunction against the defendant from using the similar trade dress. The trial court granted an interim injunction, and later confirmed it after hearing both parties. The defendant appealed that order before the Calcutta High Court.


Procedural History

The plaintiff initially obtained an ex-parte interim injunction on August 16, 2023, restraining the defendant from marketing products in deceptively similar packaging. The defendant filed an application seeking vacation of the injunction, which was heard along with the plaintiff’s main interim injunction application.

On May 15, 2024, the Commercial Court made the injunction absolute and rejected the defendant’s vacating petition.

Dissatisfied, the defendant preferred FMAT No. 189 of 2024, contesting the injunction before the Calcutta High Court, which heard arguments over multiple dates and delivered judgment on December 03, 2025.


Core Dispute

The primary issue was whether the defendant’s product packaging amount to passing off by imitation of the plaintiff's distinctive trade dress, even though the trademarks used were different.

The questions before the court included:

Whether the defendant’s packaging was deceptively similar when viewed from the perspective of an average consumer.

Whether the plaintiff had established goodwill in the packaging sufficient to attract passing off protection.

Whether the similarity of shape, colour, label layout, cap texture, and graphical elements created a likelihood of confusion.

Whether the plaintiff must prove actual damage or whether likelihood of deception is sufficient.

Whether different end-uses of coconut oil (edible vs. hair use) defeat the allegation of passing off.


Detailed Legal Reasoning and Court Discussion

The Court traced the legal foundation of passing off to Section 27(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, recognising that passing off is an independent common-law remedy available even where trademarks are unregistered.

The Court relied heavily on the Classical Trinity Test, drawn from Reckitt & Colman Ltd. v. Borden Inc. [1990] RPC 340, popularly known as the Jif Lemon Case. The test requires proof of:

Goodwill
Misrepresentation
Likelihood of damage

On the first limb—goodwill—the Court noted that the plaintiff had used the distinctive HDPE packaging since 2006 and the Shalimar brand since 1945. Evidence of invoices, advertisements, and market dominance demonstrating more than ₹450 crore turnover was submitted. The Court held goodwill was clearly established.

On the second limb—misrepresentation—the Court observed that both products shared remarkably similar elements: yellow-green backgrounds, identical style coconut tree graphics, similar ribbed bottle design, and near-identical bottle cap shape. Even though the names "KMP" and "Shalimar" were different, the overall visual impression outweighed label differences. The Court applied the standard of an average consumer with imperfect memory, rejecting the defendant’s argument that labels were distinct enough to avoid confusion.

Key supporting citations included:

Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories, AIR 1965 SC 980 – Held that added matter may distinguish, but only if effective.

Satyam Infoway Ltd. v. Siffynet Solutions (P) Ltd., (2004) 6 SCC 145 – Presumption of dishonesty exists when later user cannot justify adopting similar features despite earlier user’s presence.

Gerbatschow Wodka KG v. John Distilleries Ltd., (2011) 47 PTC 100 – Bottle shape forms part of protectable trade dress.

The defendant argued the packaging was generic and common to trade. However, the Court rejected this contention because:
(a) No proof was produced to show widespread similar usage by others.
(b) Defendant itself applied for shape trademark registration, undermining its claim of genericness.

On the third limb—likelihood of damage—the Court held that given the plaintiff’s long-standing reputation, similarity in packaging, and the nature of the product sold to public masses, damage was inevitable even if not presently quantified.

The Court also dismissed the argument that edible oil and hair oil are different categories, relying on Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 73, and the Full Bench ruling in Sony Kabushiki Kaisha v. Mahaluxmi Textile Mills, (2009) 1 CHN 852, ruling that class of goods is irrelevant in a passing off action, if confusion exists.


Decision

The Calcutta High Court upheld the trial court’s order and dismissed the appeal. The interim injunction restraining the defendant from using the disputed packaging remained in force. The Court clarified that its findings are prima-facie and will not bind final trial adjudication.

No order as to costs was imposed.


Concluding Note

This judgment underscores the Indian judiciary’s commitment to protecting brand identity, packaging, and trade dress under passing-off law. The ruling clarifies that trade dress protection does not require registered rights, and even common-law goodwill can justify injunctions. The decision reinforces the doctrine that the overall impression matters more than individual differences, and average consumer perception remains a central test. It sends a strong message that unfair imitation in packaging, especially in mass-market goods, will attract swift judicial intervention.


Case Details

Case Title: Edible Products (India) Limited vs. Shalimar Chemical Works Private Limited
Order Date: 03 December 2025
Case Number: FMAT No. 189 of 2024 with CAN 2 & CAN 3 of 2024
Neutral Citation: 2025:CHC-AS:2186-DB
Court: High Court at Calcutta, Appellate Side
Bench: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya & Hon’ble Mr. Justice Supratim Bhattacharya


Suggested Titles for Publication

  1. Trade Dress and Passing Off: Consumer Perception and Legal Protection in FMCG Packaging Disputes
  2. Beyond the Label: Judicial Approach to Passing Off in the Indian Marketplace
  3. The Classical Trinity Test in Modern Trademark Litigation: A Case Study
  4. Protecting Brand Identity through Trade Dress: Lessons from the Calcutta High Court
  5. Imperfect Memory, Perfect Protection: Understanding Consumer Confusion Doctrine in Indian Passing Off Law

Disclaimer

The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Calcutta High Court Upholds Injunction in Trade Dress Passing-Off Dispute Between Edible Products and Shalimar Chemical Works
Order dated 03 December 2025 | FMAT No. 189 of 2024 | Before Hon’ble Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Hon’ble Justice Supratim Bhattacharya | High Court at Calcutta (Appellate Side)

In a significant ruling involving trade dress protection in the FMCG sector, the Calcutta High Court dismissed the appeal filed by Edible Products (India) Limited and upheld the interim injunction granted in favour of Shalimar Chemical Works Private Limited. The injunction restrains the appellant from using packaging alleged to be deceptively similar to the respondent’s coconut oil product presentation.

The dispute arose after Shalimar Chemical Works, a brand in the coconut oil sector since 1945, accused Edible Products of adopting an almost identical bottle shape, colour combination, label layout, and overall packaging that could mislead consumers in the marketplace. The Trial Court had granted an ex-parte injunction, later confirmed after hearing both sides. The appellant challenged the order arguing lack of similarity, generic nature of the packaging, and distinct trade labels.

The Division Bench rejected the appellant’s arguments and held that passing-off protection focuses on the overall look and impression, not merely label differences. The Court applied the Classical Trinity Test from the Jif Lemon Case and held that Shalimar had established goodwill, the defendant’s packaging created likelihood of confusion, and continued use could harm the plaintiff’s long-standing market reputation. The Court emphasized the standard of an “average consumer with imperfect memory” and noted that even if the names differed, the similarities in packaging could influence consumer perception.

The Court also observed that the defendant’s subsequent attempt to register the bottle shape undermined its argument that the design was generic or commonly used. The Bench concluded that the trial court took a plausible view and no interference was warranted at the interim stage.


Disclaimer: This is for general information only and should not be construed as legal advice as it may contain human errors in perception and presentation: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent & Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi.

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