Hero Investcorp Pvt. Ltd. Vs Kartar Industries

Hero Investcorp Pvt. Ltd. and another filed a trademark infringement suit against Kartar Industries and its proprietor Seema Sood for unauthorized use of the 'HERO' marks on spare parts and packaging, seeking permanent injunction, passing off, dilution, and ancillary reliefs. On September 11, 2025, the court granted an ex-parte ad-interim injunction restraining the defendant from dealing in infringing products. During the local commissioner's search of the defendant's premises, infringing goods were found, but the defendants manhandled, abused, and threatened the commissioner and plaintiffs' counsel, and instructed employees to burn the counterfeit materials, leading to a contempt application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC. Notices were issued on October 17 and November 27, 2025, where defendants initially sought mediation, then objected to the commissioner's report but withdrew objections, tendered an unconditional apology, and agreed to cease infringement. The court reasoned that a local commissioner is a court officer whose execution cannot be interfered with, and while the apology mitigated punishment, the egregious conduct warranted penalty beyond mere apology, citing the need for hefty consequences for such contempt. For the suit, relying on Strix Ltd. v. Maharaja Appliances Ltd. (2023 SCC OnLine Del 7128), the court noted that without led evidence, damages are notional and based on broad assessment of record, including investigation costs, suit filing, commissioner fees, and contempt proceedings. The court disposed of the contempt by directing defendants to donate ₹2,50,000 to HelpAge India within eight weeks, decreed the suit with permanent injunction per prayer clauses (a) to (e), bound defendants to their undertaking against future infringement, and awarded ₹2,50,000 in costs and damages to plaintiffs.

• In cases of wilful disobedience and interference with court-appointed local commissioner's execution, including threats and evidence destruction, mere unconditional apology does not absolve contempt; punishment is warranted, though mitigated by the apology and undertaking to cease infringement, with the court imposing a donation as penalty  Para 7-8].
• A local commissioner is an officer of the court, and defendants cannot interfere with or threaten them during commission execution without facing consequences  Para 7].
• In infringement suits where no evidence is led, damages are notional, granted on a reasonable and fair basis through broad assessment of the record, including costs of investigation, suit filing, local commissioner fees, and contempt proceedings Para 15-16].

Case Title: Hero Investcorp Pvt. Ltd. Vs Kartar Industries: December 8, 2025: CS(COMM) 971/2025: 2025:DHC:11156:Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Havells India Limited Vs. Cawels Electric Pvt. Ltd.

Havells India Limited and another filed a suit against Cawels Electric Private Limited seeking permanent injunction for trademark infringement, passing off, misrepresentation, dilution, damages, and related reliefs, alleging that the defendant's 'CAWELS' mark is deceptively and phonetically similar to their well-known 'HAVELLS' mark used since 1942 for electrical products, with registrations dating back to 1955 and global presence; the defendant, incorporated in 2024, adopted the impugned mark for similar products like fans and wires, discovered by plaintiffs in September 2025 via the defendant's website, leading to claims of dishonest imitation to usurp goodwill. Procedurally, notice was issued on the interim injunction application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC on 16.10.2025, defendant filed reply, plaintiffs declined rejoinder, and arguments were heard. The court reasoned that the marks share phonetic and structural similarity (e.g., suffix '-ELLS'/' -ELS', minor consonant substitutions like H to C, V to W, one L omitted), likely causing confusion among average consumers with imperfect recollection, especially for identical goods; rejected defendant's origin explanation as afterthought since promoter appointed post-adoption, emphasized higher protection for well-known marks even without proving confusion, noted lack of quality control over defendant's products risking plaintiffs' reputation, and found balance of convenience favoring plaintiffs as prior users with established market over defendant's nascent operations. The court granted interim injunction restraining defendant from using 'CAWELS' or similar marks, corporate name, and website during suit pendency.

• Phonetic similarity constitutes an important index for determining deceptive similarity between marks, and courts must assess overall impression including how marks are spelt and pronounced in commonly used languages: , Para 7.
• Comparison of marks must be based on overall impression as perceived by a consumer of average intelligence and imperfect recollection, considering phonetic, visual, and structural similarity: , Para 9.
• Plaintiff need only prove likelihood of confusion, not actual confusion, determined by court's subjective comparison of material: Exotic Mile v. Imagine Marketing (P) Ltd., 2 Para 10.
• Well-known marks under Section 2(1)(zg) of Trade Marks Act, 1999, entitle highest degree of protection, extending even to dissimilar goods without needing to prove confusion:  Para 12.
• If defendant's mark is not visually or phonetically similar, injunction cannot be granted: , Para 17.
• Overall structural, phonetic, and visual similarity must be examined for deceptive similarity, without presumption of monopoly over dissimilar marks: Para 16.
• Minor variations in marks do not detract from overall phonetic similarity if likely to cause confusion: Para 23.
• Use of deceptively similar domain names and corporate names can amount to infringement and passing off by misleading users: Paras 14-15.
• For electrical products, extra caution warranted due to safety concerns, and balance of convenience favors prior user over nascent defendant: Para 17.

Case Title: Havells India Limited Vs. Cawels Electric Pvt. Ltd.: 01.12.2025:CS(COMM) 1122/2025: 2025:DHC:11704: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Dindayal Industries Ltd. Vs Dindayal Ayurved Bhawan

Dindayal Industries Ltd., a company manufacturing ayurvedic products, claimed prior adoption and continuous use of the trademark "DINDAYAL" and its variants since 1927, with registrations for composite marks like "DINDAYAL Aushadhi Pvt. Ltd." in multiple classes, asserting substantial goodwill through high turnover, wide consumer base, and promotions. Defendants Dindayal Ayurved Bhawan, operating since 2014 under similar marks like "DINDAYAL AYURVED BHAWAN", were accused of infringement and passing off by copying the mark and product range to exploit plaintiff's reputation. Plaintiff filed suit in 2021 seeking permanent injunction, obtained ex-parte ad-interim injunction in January 2022 along with local commissioner appointment, but the trial court dismissed the interim application in September 2023 after considering defendants' claims of independent adoption from family name and licenses.

Plaintiff appealed to Delhi High Court, which analyzed prior use, finding "DINDAYAL" as dominant essential element in plaintiff's composites amounting to standalone use, established prima facie goodwill via sales and reach, applied stricter confusion standard for medicinal goods citing Cadila, determined deceptive similarity and misrepresentation leading to passing off, rejected delay/acquiescence defenses due to plaintiff's vigilant oppositions and notices citing Midas Hygiene, held balance of convenience favored plaintiff as longer-established user, and found trial court erred in relying on copyright NOC/search certificates as irrelevant to trademark rights. The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order, and granted interim injunction restraining defendants from using the impugned marks pending suit.

• In a composite trademark, the dominant and essential element functions as the source identifier, and continuous use of the composite amounts to prior use of that essential mark notwithstanding absence of standalone use: para 39.
• A prima facie case of goodwill and reputation for passing off can be established through evidence of long use, substantial turnover, wide product range, consumer base, and marketing investments, and a single year's financial downturn does not displace sustained market presence: , para 40.
• A stricter standard applies to assess confusing similarity for marks relating to medicinal products due to potential harmful consequences, requiring lesser proof:  (2001) 5 SCC 73).
• Passing off requires misrepresentation in trade calculated to deceive consumers and cause foreseeable damage to another's goodwill:  para 42.
• Delay or laches does not defeat an injunction claim where adoption is prima facie dishonest: Dindayal Industries Ltd. v. Dindayal Ayurved Bhawan & Anr.,  para 44 
• Acquiescence is negated if the proprietor has opposed registration and issued notices, placing continued use at infringer's peril:  para 45.
• Balance of convenience favors the prior long-established user with demonstrated goodwill over recent entrants lacking comparable evidence: para 47.
• Copyright NOC under Section 45(1) of Copyright Act, 1957, search certificates, or label approvals are not determinative of trademark rights or evidence against infringement/passing off:  para 48.

Case Title: Dindayal Industries Ltd. Vs Dindayal Ayurved Bhawan :22.12.2025:FAO (COMM) 15/2024:2025:DHC:11707-DB:Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

CSJ Infrastructure Pvt Ltd Vs Mr. Akash Kohli

CSJ Infrastructure Pvt Ltd filed rectification petitions under Sections 47 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking cancellation of the impugned marks 'Elante Residencies', 'Elante Group', and 'Elante Residencies'/ 'ELANTE' registered in Class 37 by Mr. Akash Kohli, alleging infringement of its prior 'ELANTE' mark adopted in 2010 and used since 2011 for real estate and related services, with registrations in Classes 35 and 36; the petitioner discovered the respondents' use via Elante Residences Ltd (where Kohli is a director) in August 2024, sent a cease-and-desist notice, attempted pre-litigation mediation which failed in May 2025, and proceeded ex-parte as Kohli did not respond or appear.

The court reasoned that the petitioner is the prior adopter, user, and registrant, the marks are identical with 'ELANTE' as the dominant feature, services are similar leading to likely confusion and passing off, the adoption was mala fide, and there was no bona fide use by the registered proprietor, violating Sections 11(1)(a), 11(3)(a), 47, and 57 of the Act, while affirming that prior user rights override subsequent registrations. The petitions were allowed, directing the Registrar to remove the impugned marks from the register.

• A prior user's rights will override the rights of a subsequent user even though the latter's mark may be a registered trade mark: Neon Laboratories Ltd. v. Medical Technologies Ltd., (2016) 2 SCC 672 (Para 9).

[Case Title: CSJ Infrastructure Pvt Ltd Vs Mr. Akash Kohli & Anr., Order date: 27.11.2025, C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 184/2025: 2025:DHC:11178: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia.]

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Dabur India Limited Vs Ashok Kumar

Dabur India Limited filed a suit against Ashok Kumar and others for trademark infringement, copyright violation, passing off, and unfair competition involving its well-known mark "DABUR", where unknown defendants registered fraudulent domain names like daburdistributorships.in and daburdistributor.com to deceive the public by offering fake jobs, dealerships, and products, collecting money via misleading websites mimicking the plaintiff's content and logos, with incomplete WHOIS data hindering identification.

This case was part of a batch of matters addressing systemic cyber frauds through infringing domain names, involving domain name registrars (DNRs), registries, ICANN, banks, telecom providers, and government ministries, with proceedings spanning multiple hearings from 2022 to 2025, including interim injunctions granted ex-parte on March 3, 2022, extended to additional domains, and responses from stakeholders like ICANN, GoDaddy, and MeitY. The court reasoned that domain names form the online identity of businesses requiring protection against misuse for fraud, analyzed DNRs' obligations under ICANN agreements for verification and disclosure, privacy vs. legitimate interest under DPDP Act, banks' role in preventing mismatches via beneficiary name lookup, and intermediaries' due diligence for safe harbor, finding current systems insufficient leading to large-scale deception, thus necessitating stringent measures against non-compliant DNRs including loss of safe harbor and potential blocking. The court granted permanent injunction against the impugned domains, issued dynamic+ injunctions for similar future variations, directed DNRs to implement KYC verification, disclose registrant data within 72 hours, appoint Indian grievance officers, and cease default privacy protection, mandated government consultations for frameworks like NIXI's, required banks to enable beneficiary name lookup and follow SOPs for LEA cooperation, and listed the suit for further proceedings on January 28, 2026.

• Domain Name Registrars (DNRs) and Registry Operators must not offer privacy protection by default but only as a paid opt-in service, and shall disclose registrant details including name, contacts, addresses, and payment info to legitimate requesters, LEAs, or courts within 72 hours under Intermediary Guidelines 2021  Para 275(A)(i)-(ii)].
• Infringing domain names restrained by court order shall be permanently blocked from re-registration and not placed in common pools, with registries ensuring uniform implementation across DNRs  Para 275(A)(iii)].
• For well-known, invented, arbitrary, or fanciful marks with reputation in India, courts may issue injunctions against infringing domain names with different extensions or alphanumeric variations, which DNRs must enforce without promoting alternatives, risking loss of safe harbor under Section 79 IT Act, Para 275(A)(iv)-(v)].
• DNRs offering services in India must appoint Grievance Officers within one month, with email service on them sufficient for court orders; non-compliance may lead to blocking under Section 69A IT Act , Para 275(A)(ix)-(xi)].
• All DNRs must verify registrant details via e-KYC as per CERT-In circular dated April 28, 2022, and provide data to NIXI monthly if under its registry  Para 275(A)(xiii)-(xiv)].
• Government (MeitY, MHA) shall consult stakeholders for a NIXI-like framework for all DNRs, consider a nodal data repository, and block non-compliant entities; coordinate with ICANN for TMCH access; CGPDTM to publish well-known marks with authentic websites , Para 275(B)(xv)-(xvi)].
• Dynamic+ injunctions apply to identical marks, prefixes/suffixes causing confusion, or alphanumeric variations, with legitimate registrants able to seek court relief , Para 275(C)(xvii)].
• Banks must implement Beneficiary Bank Account Name Lookup per RBI circular December 30, 2024, and follow CEIB SOP dated May 31, 2024 for LEA requests  Para 275(D)(xviii)-(xix)].

Case Title: Dabur India Limited Vs Ashok Kumar and Ors:24th December, 2025: CS (COMM) 135/2022:2025:DHC:11862: Hon'ble Justice Ms. Prathiba M. Singh

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Colgate Palmolive Company Vs NIXI

Colgate Palmolive Company and its Indian subsidiary filed a commercial suit against the National Internet Exchange of India (NIXI) and an unknown registrant for infringement of their trademark "COLGATE" and related intellectual properties through a fraudulent domain name used to deceive the public by posing as the company, offering fake jobs, dealerships, and franchises, and collecting money via misleading websites mimicking the plaintiffs' content and logos.

This suit was clubbed with a batch of similar matters involving various trademark owners facing domain name misuse for fraud, counterfeit sales, and impersonation services, where registrant identities were hidden behind fictitious WHOIS details, untraceable emails, and privacy protections, complicating enforcement. Over multiple hearings from 2019 to 2025, the court impleaded domain name registrars (DNRs) like GoDaddy, Hosting Concepts, Newfold Digital, Verisign, and Registry Services, along with government entities such as MeitY, DoT, MHA, RBI, NPCI, UIDAI, Delhi Police, and banks, seeking affidavits, status reports, and submissions on systemic issues including financial fraud investigations, bank cooperation with law enforcement, payment detail mismatches, grievance officer appointments, and privacy features.

The court's reasoning examined the domain name system, roles and agreements under ICANN, NIXI, and Indian laws like the IT Act and Trademarks Act, finding DNRs and registries as intermediaries with due diligence obligations but insufficient safeguards against fraud, balancing privacy with disclosure needs, and emphasizing trademark owners' rights to prevent dilution and consumer deception through measures like dynamic injunctions.

The court concluded that large-scale frauds necessitated reforms and issued directions to DNRs/registries for mandatory disclosure, verification, grievance mechanisms, and compliance; to government for stakeholder consultations, blocking non-compliant DNRs, and policy updates; for dynamic+ injunctions extending to future similar domains; and to banks for implementing beneficiary name lookup to prevent mismatches, while granting the plaintiffs permanent injunction against the defendant's use of "COLGATE", delivery up of infringing material, rendition of accounts, damages of Rs. 2,00,05,000, domain blocking/transfer, and disposal of pending applications.

• Domain Name Registrars (DNRs) and Registry Operators are obligated to disclose registrant details upon court orders and suspend/lock infringing domains to protect third-party intellectual property rights, as their current mechanisms. Paras 163-200).
• Courts may direct DNRs and registries to implement safeguards like mandatory KYC, grievance officers, and privacy feature restrictions to prevent trademark misuse in domain registrations, recognizing domain names as extensions of business identity warranting protection against fraud  Paras 201-222).
• Non-compliant DNRs refusing court orders can face blocking directions under Section 69A of the IT Act, 2000, as intermediaries lose safe harbour for failing due diligence, with dynamic and dynamic+ injunctions extendable to future infringing domains  Paras 223-262).
• Banks must implement beneficiary bank account name lookup facilities to prevent payment mismatches in frauds, with enhanced cooperation protocols for law enforcement in cyber fraud investigations  Paras 236-250).
• Government authorities like MeitY and MHA shall conduct consultations and update policies for better coordination among stakeholders to curb domain-based financial frauds, including centralized databases for registrant data  Paras 248-250).

Case Title: Colgate Palmolive Company & Anr. Vs NIXI & Anr.:24.12.2025:CS(COMM) 193/2019 2025:DHC:111674: Hon'ble Justice Prathiba M. Singh

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Brahmaputra Distillery Vs Associated Alcohol And Beverages

Associated Alcohol and Beverages Company filed a commercial suit under Sections 134 and 135 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, against Brahmaputra Distillery seeking permanent injunction for trademark infringement, passing-off, and rendition of accounts regarding the label, trade-dress, and packaging of country spirit products, along with an application for ad-interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC, which was granted by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Jorhat on 12.11.2025, restraining the defendant from using similar labels and disposing assets.

Brahmaputra Distillery appealed to the Gauhati High Court under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) CPC, raising maintainability issues. The High Court examined the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, noting that Gauhati HC lacks ordinary original civil jurisdiction, thus cannot constitute a Commercial Court or Division except under specific enactments, and held a 2019 government notification designating such courts invalid as issued under a repealed 2015 Ordinance without saving effect for new actions post-repeal.

Reasoning that appeals from orders of Commercial Courts below District Judge level lie before the Commercial Appellate Court at District Judge level per Section 13(1), and ousting the High Court's ordinary appellate jurisdiction despite the suit's valuation exceeding Rs.20 lakh, the court decided the appeal was not maintainable before it, returned it to the appellant for presentation before the District Judge, Jorhat within three weeks, excluding time spent in High Court under Section 14 of Limitation Act, 1963, and suggested government issue fresh notifications under current law.

• The Gauhati High Court does not have jurisdiction as a "Commercial Court" under Section 6 or "Commercial Division" under Sections 4 and 7 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, due to absence of ordinary original civil jurisdiction, save for specific enactments like the Designs Act, 2000 (Para 12).
• Notification No. JDJ-111/2018-ESTT-JUDL-12 dated 13.02.2019, issued by the Government of Assam under the repealed Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Ordinance, 2015, is without jurisdiction and non-est in law, as Section 23 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 saves only prior actions, not empowering post-repeal issuances (Para 13).
• Appeals against orders passed by a Commercial Court below the level of District Judge, including ad-interim injunctions under Order XXXIX CPC in commercial disputes, must be filed before the Commercial Appellate Court at the District Judge level within 60 days as per Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, ousting the High Court's ordinary civil appellate jurisdiction regardless of pecuniary value (Paras 17-19).

Case Title: Brahmaputra Distillery And Anr Vs Associated Alcohol And Beverages Company: 18.12.2025:FAO/73/2025: 2025:GAU-AS:17631:Gauhati High Court :Honourable Mr. Justice Kalyan Rai Surana and Honourable Mr. Justice Manish Choudhury:

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Bhupinder Mehta Vs Sh Pradeep Bareja

Ms. Bhupinder Mehta filed a rectification petition under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking cancellation of the trademark 'BSM' (No. 5149074 in Class 11) registered in favor of Respondent No. 1, Pradeep Bareja, claiming prior adoption and use of the 'BSM' mark since 2014 for lighting products through her family business, with applications filed in 2015 and 2021, one abandoned, one registered in Class 9, and one opposed; she became aware of the impugned mark in June 2024 via opposition to her application.

Notice was issued on 02.09.2024, but Respondent No. 1 failed to file a reply or appear despite extensions, leading to ex-parte proceedings on 06.05.2025, with submissions heard on 12.11.2025 and judgment reserved. The court found the petitioner's averments uncontroverted, established her prior use and goodwill through sales figures up to ₹8.79 crore in 2022-23, promotion via expos and social media, and deemed the impugned mark deceptively similar phonetically, visually, and conceptually to the petitioner's mark for identical goods, likely causing confusion; relying on precedents, it held Respondent No. 1's adoption dishonest and in bad faith, overriding registration, and directed removal of the impugned mark from the register.

Law Point:

• The correct approach to decide the infringing nature of competing marks is to examine whether the defendants have adopted the essential features of the plaintiff's mark, with phonetic similarity being a significant factor, and if goods are identical, confusion cannot be excluded:  [Para 6.8].
• To determine deceptive similarity between marks, focus on broad and essential features without side-by-side comparison for minor differences; overall resemblance likely to mislead is sufficient:  [Para 6.8].
• Rectification of the Trade Marks Register is warranted when registration was applied for in bad faith:  [Para 6.9].
• Prior user's rights override those of a subsequent registered trademark owner, especially for identical/deceptively similar marks on identical goods adopted dishonestly [Paras 12, 14, 15].

Case Title: Bhupinder Mehta Vs Sh Pradeep Bareja"24.12.2025:C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 163/2024:2025:DHC:11863: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Astral Ltd Vs Ajay Enterprises

Astral Ltd, with its principal office in Ahmedabad and a subordinate sales and marketing office in Delhi, filed a suit in Delhi High Court against M/s Ajay Enterprises, based in Udaipur, Rajasthan, alleging infringement and passing off of its trademark 'ASTRAL'.

The defendant filed an application under Order VII Rules 10 and 11 CPC seeking rejection of the plaint for lack of territorial jurisdiction, arguing no cause of action in Delhi and that the suit should be in Ahmedabad, citing no evidence of sales in Delhi and relying on Supreme Court precedents like K. Narayanan v. S. Murali.

The plaintiff countered that the defendant's trademark application and admissions in opposition proceedings under Rule 45 of Trade Mark Rules, claiming pan-India availability including Delhi, created part cause of action there.

The court examined Sections 20 CPC and 134 Trade Marks Act, interpreting the Explanation to Section 20 as deeming a corporation to carry on business at a subordinate office if cause of action arises there, and held that where cause of action partly arises at both principal and subordinate office locations, courts at both have jurisdiction, as Section 134 provides an additional forum for plaintiff convenience without mutual exclusion. Referencing Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia and Ultra Home Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Purushottam Kumar Chaubey, the court found the defendant's nationwide promotion admission binding, establishing part cause of action in Delhi, and dismissed the application, confirming jurisdiction.

• Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 does not oust the applicability of Section 20 CPC and provides an additional remedy to the plaintiff to file a suit where it resides or carries on business (Para 19).
• Under the Explanation to Section 20 CPC, a corporation is deemed to carry on business at its principal office, or at a subordinate office in respect of a cause of action arising there (Para 20).
• The deeming provision in the Explanation to Section 20 CPC is read into Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act to determine where the plaintiff carries on business (Para 21).
• Where part cause of action arises at both the principal and subordinate offices of the plaintiff, courts at both locations have territorial jurisdiction, as these places are not mutually exclusive (Paras 23-27).
• When cause of action arises partly at the subordinate office location, that place is deemed where the plaintiff carries on business, enabling suit institution there under Section 134 Trade Marks Act read with Section 20 CPC (Paras 28-30).

Case Title: Astral Ltd Vs Ajay Enterprises:24.12.2025:CS(COMM) 540/2024:2025:DHC:11925: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Archidply Industries Limited Vs. Archit Nuwood Industries Private Limited

Archidply Industries Limited sued Archit Nuwood Industries Private Limited and others for trademark infringement, seeking permanent injunction to restrain defendants from using 'ARCHIT' and variants deceptively similar to plaintiff's 'ARCHID/ARCHIDPLY/ARCHIDLAM' marks. Due to inadvertent error, pages 50-56 of the plaint contained an affidavit supporting electronic records signed by an unrelated third party and attested in Tamil Nadu, while other affidavits were correctly signed by plaintiff's authorized representative Mr. Atul Krishna Pandey and attested in Delhi on the same date. Plaintiff filed application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC to amend by replacing those pages with correct affidavit, arguing the error was clerical, not deliberate, did not alter plaint contents or merits, and was sought promptly before defendants' written statement. Defendants opposed, contending it was impermissible replacement of document rather than amendment, error unexplained, notary and counsel's involvement suspicious, and violated CPC provisions. Court analyzed precedents on amendment scope, finding procedural rules are handmaids to justice, error appeared inadvertent from negligence without affecting case merits or causing prejudice, and allowed amendment to ensure proper adjudication, subject to plaintiff paying Rs. 25,000 costs to Delhi High Court Staff Welfare Fund within four weeks.

• The power to grant amendment of pleadings under Order VI Rule 17 CPC should be exercised liberally if it serves the ends of justice and can be allowed without injustice to the other side, even if due to negligence or inadvertence:  Para 14 
• Rules of procedure are handmaids to justice and should not defeat substantive rights; amendments cannot be refused merely on technical grounds or for inadvertent errors if no miscarriage of justice results: , Para 15 
• Non-compliance with procedural requirements, if curable and not deliberate, should not lead to rejection unless statutorily mandated or causing irremediable prejudice: , Para 14 
• Amendment to correct inadvertent errors like wrong signatures on affidavits is permissible under Order VI Rule 17 CPC if it does not alter the nature of the suit or merits and is necessary for proper adjudication: , Para 19.

Case Title: Archidply Industries Limited Vs. Archit Nuwood Industries Private Limited :24/12/2025:CS(COMM) 693/2024:2025:DHC:11922: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Amitoje India Pvt. Ltd. Vs Classic Display Systems

Amitoje India Pvt. Ltd. and Ravinder Kaur, engaged in manufacturing display units, sued Classic Display Systems Pvt. Ltd. for infringing their patent IN 533643 titled "A Foldable Product Display Unit" granted in April 2024 after a pre-grant opposition by the defendant was rejected, seeking permanent injunction against the defendant's similar foldable displays sold since at least 2022. 

The suit included an interim injunction application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC, while the defendant filed a counterclaim challenging the patent's validity on grounds of obviousness and prior use, relying on US Patent Publication 20100051568A1 as prior art not cited earlier. 

Procedurally, the court allowed reliance on this prior art for the interim hearing after initial disputes and recalls, noting no presumption of patent validity. Reasoning that the suit patent's key feature of side panels folding sideways in the same direction was a mere workshop improvement obvious to a person skilled in the art from the prior art, which did not teach away, the court found the defendant raised a credible challenge to validity under Section 64(1)(f) of the Patents Act, thus no prima facie case for injunction existed, balance of convenience favored the long-operating defendant, and any harm to plaintiffs could be compensated monetarily. The interim application was dismissed.

There is no presumption of validity of a patent even after grant by the Controller, and its validity can be challenged in court proceedings: Para 25 

For grant of interim injunction in patent infringement suits, if the defendant raises a credible challenge to the patent's validity (a serious question to be tried, not actual invalidity), no injunction should be granted: Para 27 

To determine obviousness/lack of inventive step, courts must follow sequential steps: identify the person skilled in the art, inventive concept, common general knowledge, differences from prior art, and whether differences are obvious without hindsight: Para 21.4.1 

A prior art "teaches away" only if it discourages or diverts the person skilled in the art from the claimed path, not merely by suggesting an alternative without negation: Para 84.

Minor alterations like changing the folding direction of components in a display unit constitute mere workshop improvements obvious to a skilled craftsman and lack inventive step: Para 82.

Case Title: Amitoje India Pvt. Ltd. Vs Classic Display Systems:24.12.2025:Case Number: CS(COMM) 765/2024 :2025:DHC:11991:: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Mini Pushkarna

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation] 

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

A.O. Smith Corporation & Anr. Vs. Star Smith Export Pvt. Ltd

The plaintiffs, proprietors of the well-known trade mark and trade name “A.O. SMITH” used globally since 1874 and in India since 2006 for water heaters and purification products, sued the defendants for infringement and passing off arising from the defendants’ use of “STAR SMITH” as a trade mark, trade name and domain name for identical and allied goods. 

An ex-parte ad-interim injunction was initially granted in 2022 restraining use of the impugned marks, though limited protection was given to the corporate name and domain name pending adjudication; this injunction was later made absolute in 2024, save for those two aspects, which were revived on review. 

The Court held that “SMITH” constituted the dominant and essential feature of the competing marks, that the defendants’ adoption in 2020 was prima facie dishonest and intended to ride on the plaintiffs’ goodwill, and that the plaintiffs’ registrations carried no disclaimer, entitling them to full statutory protection. Rejecting the defence that “SMITH” was generic or common to trade, the Court found the defendants estopped from such a plea having themselves sought registration of marks containing “SMITH”. 

Applying Section 29(5) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the Court held that use of the registered mark as part of a trade name for identical goods constituted infringement per se, and further held that the impugned domain name caused initial interest confusion and passing off. Consequently, finding a strong prima facie case, balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiffs and likelihood of irreparable harm, the Court granted an interim injunction restraining use of the impugned trade name and domain name in addition to the marks.

Law settled:

Use of a registered trade mark or its essential feature as part of a trade name for identical or allied goods constitutes infringement under Section 29(5) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and once statutory conditions are met, injunction must ordinarily follow:  paras 16–17.

Where a trade mark is registered without disclaimer, exclusivity must be determined from the registration certificate alone, and prior examination replies or alleged concessions before the Registry are irrelevant: paras 12–13.

A defendant who has applied for registration of a mark containing a particular element is estopped from contending that the same element is generic or common to trade (principle of approbate and reprobate):  paras 14–15.

Adoption of a deceptively similar domain name for allied goods giving rise to initial interest confusion amounts to passing off and is injunctable even though the Trade Marks Act does not expressly provide for domain names: paras 18–20.

Case Title: A.O. Smith Corporation Vs. Star Smith Export Pvt. Ltd.:24.12.2025:CS(COMM) 532/2022:2025:DHC:11885:DHC:Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Pernod Ricard S.A. France Vs Rhizome Distillers Pvt. Ltd

Pernod Ricard S.A., owner of the well-known whisky brand IMPERIAL BLUE used in India since 1997 with substantial goodwill and turnover exceeding Rs. 317 crores in 2007, filed a rectification application in 2008 seeking removal of Rhizome Distillers Pvt. Ltd.'s registered trademark RHIZOME'S IMPERIAL GOLD (No. 1161682 in class 33) after discovering the registration through opposition proceedings, alleging that the mark was deceptively similar to IMPERIAL BLUE, likely to cause confusion among consumers of average intelligence and imperfect recollection, especially as the respondent prominently used only IMPERIAL GOLD in practice while the applicant was prior in adoption and use and the registration contravened Sections 11, 18 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999; the respondent claimed adoption in 2002 with launch in 2006 and argued the word IMPERIAL was common to trade and no confusion existed, but the IPAB found the applicant to be an aggrieved person with locus standi, held that likelihood of confusion existed on the date of the respondent's application due to the applicant's prior use, applied the test of overall similarity and imperfect recollection, rejected defences of delay and commonality of the word IMPERIAL, and allowed the rectification by directing removal of the mark from the register.

A person aggrieved under Section 57 includes a trader in the same field whose rights are restrained or who may be damaged by the registration, especially where the impugned mark is relied upon in opposition proceedings between the parties (Paras 28-30).

Registration contravening Section 11 on the date of application due to likelihood of confusion from prior use of a similar mark warrants rectification (Para 31).

Marks must be compared as used rather than merely as registered; prominent use of the essential feature IMPERIAL GOLD against prior IMPERIAL BLUE creates confusion (Para 32).

Test of deceptive similarity requires consideration of broad and essential features, overall impression, and viewpoint of a consumer with average intelligence and imperfect recollection, without side-by-side comparison (Paras 33-35, citing Kerly's Law of Trade Marks and Parle Products case).

Prior adoption and use entitle protection even against a registered mark; false claim of user in application supports rectification (Para 36).

Word IMPERIAL being laudatory or common to trade cannot confer exclusive rights on the registrant claiming such commonality (Para 37).

Delay, laches or acquiescence is not a valid defence in rectification proceedings as public interest predominates unless unfair disadvantage is proved (Para 38).

Case Title: Pernod Ricard S.A. France Vs Rhizome Distillers Pvt. Ltd. and Registrar of Trade Marks

Order Date: December 24, 2010

Case Number: ORA/248/08/TM/CH

Neutral Citation: (2011) 1 MIPR 322 : (2011) 46 PTC 96 (IPAB)

Name of Court: Intellectual Property Appellate Board, Chennai

Name of Judges: Hon'ble S. Usha, J; Syed Obaidur Rahaman, Technical Member

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Pernod Ricard S.A. Vs Rhizome Distillers Pvt. Ltd.

Pernod Ricard S.A., a French company owning the IMPERIAL BLUE whisky trademark used in India since 1997 with substantial sales and reputation, filed a rectification application to remove Rhizome Distillers Pvt. Ltd.'s registered mark Rhizome's IMPERIAL GOLD under No. 1161682 in class 33, alleging deceptive similarity, dishonest adoption, copying of their mark and ROYAL STAG trade dress, fraud on the registrar, and contravention of Sections 11(1), 11(3), 11(10), 18, and 57 of the Trade Marks Act 1999; Rhizome countered with claims of honest adoption since 2002, use since 2006, distinctiveness, and that IMPERIAL is common and laudatory; the IPAB reasoned that Pernod Ricard is an aggrieved person with locus standi due to potential trade interference, the marks are deceptively similar phonetically and structurally likely to cause confusion among unwary consumers under the imperfect recollection test despite side-by-side differences, Pernod Ricard's prior adoption and use since 1997 prevails over Rhizome's later use and false 2002 claim, the registration contravenes Section 11 as it would deceive on the application date, delay is not a bar given public interest, and actual use emphasizes IMPERIAL GOLD prominently; the board allowed the application and directed removal of the mark from the register without costs.

• A trade mark registration may be rectified and removed if it contravenes Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, by being deceptively similar to a prior mark, assessed holistically as used rather than merely as registered, applying the test of likelihood of confusion from the viewpoint of a consumer with average intelligence and imperfect recollection, even if the word 'IMPERIAL' is common when combined with colors indicating source [Pernod Ricard S.A. vs Rhizome Distillers Pvt. Ltd., ORA/248/08/TM/CH, decided on 24.12.2010 by IPAB, paras 31-35].

Case Title: Pernod Ricard S.A. Vs Rhizome Distillers Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., Order date: Dec. 24, 2010, Case Number: ORA/248/08/TM/CH, Neutral Citation: (2011) 1 MIPR 322 : (2011) 46 PTC 96 (IPAB), Name of court: Intellectual Property Appellate Board, Chennai, Name of Judge: Hon'ble Judges: S. Usha, J; Syed Obaidur Rahaman, Technical Member.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation] [Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Sun Pharmaceutical Medicare Ltd Vs Tripada Healthcare Pvt. Ltd.

Sun Pharmaceutical Medicare Ltd filed an execution petition to enforce a compromise decree dated 22.05.2023 against Tripada Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., which restrained the judgment debtors from using the mark 'NAPDOM' similar to the decree holder's 'NAXDOM'; on 08.10.2025, the court granted an ex parte injunction extending to 'NAPNIDOM'/'NAPIDOM' based on the decree holder's claim that the debtors applied for its registration on 22.09.2020 without disclosure during the suit, creating an impression of overreach; the debtors filed an application under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC to modify this, arguing suppression by the decree holder who had opposed the 'NAPIDOM' registration on 12.10.2022 before the decree; the court reasoned that the decree holder's non-disclosure of its prior opposition misled the court into believing the debtors hid the application, rendering the initial submission inaccurate; consequently, the court modified the 08.10.2025 order and vacated the injunction in para 14 thereof, directed filing of reply within four weeks, listed for 14.01.2026, and expunged incorrect case law citations at the debtors' request.

• Suppression of material facts by a party, such as prior knowledge and opposition to a trademark application, can lead to modification or vacation of an ex parte injunction granted based on misleading submissions, emphasizing the duty of full disclosure in execution proceedings [Sun Pharmaceutical Medicare Ltd vs Tripada Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., EX.P. 89/2025, decided on 10.12.2025 by Delhi High Court, paras 7-8].

Case Title: Sun Pharmaceutical Medicare Ltd Vs Tripada Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. :10.12.2025: EX.P. 89/2025, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation] [Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Shri Surinder Kumar Vs The Registrar of Copyrights

Rahul Khanna filed a suit in 2016 before the Additional District Judge, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi, seeking injunction against Surinder Kumar for passing off and copyright infringement involving the trademark 'PRAKASH' and artistic label for PVC electrical insulation tape, along with damages and accounts rendition, with evidence completed and matter listed for final arguments on December 17, 2025, while Surinder Kumar filed a counterclaim for injunction against Rahul Khanna for similar passing off and copyright violation. Surinder Kumar also filed a rectification petition originally in 2016 before the Copyright Board (later transferred to IPAB and then to Delhi High Court as C.O.(COMM.IPD-CR) 5/2024) seeking cancellation of Rahul Khanna's copyright registration No. A-115513/2016. Surinder Kumar filed a transfer petition under Section 24 CPC read with Rule 26 of IPD Rules, 2022, arguing commonality of issues and need for consolidation to avoid conflicting decisions. Rahul Khanna opposed, contending Rule 26 applies only to commercial courts and the suit being non-commercial (valued below Rs. 3 lakhs) with advanced stage precludes transfer. The High Court held that while Rule 26 specifies transfer from commercial courts, Section 24 CPC provides general power to transfer any subordinate court matter, including non-commercial IPR suits, to itself at any stage to prevent multiplicity and contradictions, and finding overlap with no prejudice from transfer as evidence was closed, allowed the petition, transferred the suit and counterclaim to itself for consolidation with the rectification petition.

High Court has power under Section 24 CPC to transfer non-commercial IPR suits pending before District Courts to itself for consolidation with related rectification petitions, irrespective of Rule 26 of IPD Rules, 2022 limiting explicit mention to commercial courts, as Section 24 confers general transfer authority to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and conflicting decisions (Paras 7-18).

Relied on Patola Industries v. Mahesh Namkeen Pvt. Ltd., C.O.(COMM.IPD-TM) 187/2021 (Para 2.2); M/s Loreal India Private Limited v. M/s Pornsricharoenpun Co. Ltd., CS(COMM) 496/2023 (Para 2.6); Distinguished Sonani Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Mr. Sanjay Jayanthbai Patel, C.O.(COMM.IPD-CR) 880/2022 (Para 21) and Fox & Mandal v. Somabrata Mandal, 2025 SCC OnLine Cal 8007 (Para 20).

Case Title: Shri Surinder Kumar Vs The Registrar of Copyrights :04.12.2025:TR.P.(C.) 146/2024:2025:DHC:11465: Hon'ble Tejas Karia, J.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Anand Tomar Vs. Pooja Electric Co

Pooja Electric Co., the plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit before the Single Judge of Delhi High Court, filed an application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC to amend the plaint by incorporating the fact of subsequent registration of three trademark applications that were already disclosed as pending in the original plaint. 

The Single Judge, by order dated 25 September 2025, allowed the plaintiff to bring the registration certificates on record for reliance during evidence without requiring formal amendment of the plaint, as all material facts were already present. The defendant Anand Tomar challenged this order by way of appeal under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. 

The Division Bench held that the appeal was not maintainable as orders on applications under Order VI Rule 17 CPC are not appealable under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act read with Order XLIII Rule 1 CPC, and dismissed the appeal without examining merits.

An order allowing or rejecting an application for amendment of plaint under Order VI Rule 17 CPC is not appealable under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 read with Order XLIII Rule 1 CPC (Paras 3-4, 7-8).

Case Title: Anand Tomar Vs. Pooja Electric Co.:15.12.2025:FAO(OS) (COMM) 203/2025: 2025:dhc:11450-DB: C Hari Shankar,  H. J. and Om Prakash Shukla, H. J.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Kirti Dal Mills Limited Vs Rajesh Lunkad

Rajesh Lunkad filed Special Civil Suit No. 24 of 2021 in June 2021 before the District Judge, Pune, seeking injunction and damages against Kirti Dal Mills for alleged trademark infringement and passing off concerning the mark “Champion” in edible oils. 

Kirti Dal Mills challenged the jurisdiction, contending the suit, being a commercial dispute, should lie only before a designated Commercial Court under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and the 2019 Notification, and the Pune District Court was not so designated. 

While that suit remained pending (with interim stay on hearing granted in revision), Kirti Dal Mills filed Commercial Suit No. 1 of 2024 in November 2024 before the designated Commercial Court at Latur seeking injunction against Rajesh Lunkad for using “Champion”. 

Rajesh Lunkad applied under Section 10 CPC for stay of the Latur suit pending disposal of the Pune suit, which was granted on 06.05.2025. Kirti Dal Mills challenged this stay order by way of writ petition. 

The High Court held that since the earlier Pune suit was pending before a court not designated as Commercial Court and therefore lacking competence to grant the relief claimed in the commercial dispute, Section 10 CPC could not be invoked to stay the subsequent properly instituted Latur suit. 

The Court quashed the stay order and directed the Latur Commercial Court to proceed with the suit.

Law Point:

For Section 10 CPC to apply and stay a subsequent suit, the previously instituted suit must be pending in a court competent to grant the relief claimed in the subsequent suit; where the earlier court lacks jurisdiction due to statutory designation requirements under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, stay cannot be granted (Paras 28-32).

Trademark infringement and passing off suits, though required under Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 to be filed before a District Court, must, when constituting commercial disputes, be adjudicated only by courts specifically designated as Commercial Courts under the Commercial Courts Act and relevant notifications, the latter having overriding effect (Paras 24-30).

Case Title: Kirti Dal Mills Limited Vs Rajesh Lunkad:18.12.2025: Writ Petition No. 10521 of 2025:2025:BHC-AUG:35919:Bombay HC Aurangabad:Y. G. Khobragade, J.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Mr. Vashu Bhagnani Vs. Mr. Kamal Rashid Khan

Film producer Vashu Bhagnani filed a defamation suit against actor and critic Kamal Rashid Khan (KRK) alleging that KRK posted defamatory tweets and videos on Twitter (now X) accusing Bhagnani of financial irregularities, non-payment for film rights, hawala transactions, destroying Bollywood by overpaying actors, and personal attacks on his family and films like Bellbottom and Coolie No.1, causing reputational harm, embarrassment, and public ridicule.

Bhagnani sought damages and interim relief under Order 39 Rule 1 CPC via a notice of motion, claiming the content was false, scandalous, and part of a smear campaign for cheap publicity, while KRK defended it as fair film criticism under freedom of speech, denying personal defamation.

The court, after reviewing the material, found a prima facie case of defamation as KRK exceeded criticism limits by encroaching on Bhagnani's privacy and reputation without basis, applied the triple test of prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury, balanced free speech with right to reputation and privacy per constitutional principles, and held that unregulated publication would cause ongoing harm. The court granted interim injunction restraining KRK from publishing or repeating such content and directed deletion of the offending tweets and videos but rejected the prayer for mandatory apology pending full trial evidence.

• Every individual has a right to have their reputation unaffected by false statements, and defamatory imputations that lower one's esteem in society give rise to a prima facie cause of action, with the law presuming falsity unless proven otherwise by the defendant: Jagadishkumar Thakkar Vs. Waahiid Ali Khan, (2024 SCC Online Bom 1079), Para 20 (referencing Para 15 of the cited judgment).
• The test for defamatory statements is their tendency to incite adverse opinions, hatred, contempt, or ridicule, with the burden on the defendant to prove truth or unintentional publication: Jagadishkumar Thakkar Vs. Waahiid Ali Khan, (2024 SCC Online Bom 1079), Para 20 (referencing Para 19 of the cited judgment).
• Right to privacy is a fundamental right, with exceptions only for compelling public interest: Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) Vs. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, Para 20 (referencing Para 19 of the cited judgment).
• For interim injunction in defamation cases, courts must satisfy the triple test of prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury, ensuring interference protects against irreparable harm greater than from granting relief: Dalpat Kumar Vs. Prahlad Singh, AIR 1993 SC 276, Para 16.
• Interim orders in defamation balance reputation and privacy rights with freedom of speech, applying caution per the Bonnard standard to grant injunction only if falsity is certain and unjustifiable: Para 21-22.
• Freedom of speech does not permit breaching another's privacy or reputation; self-restrictions apply when expressing opinions publicly: Para 25.

Case Title: Mr. Vashu Bhagnani Vs. Mr. Kamal Rashid Khan:05th December, 2025: Notice of Motion No.3298 of 2025 in S.C. Suit No.3240 of 2024;MHCC010082932025:Bombay HC:Amit Anant Laulkar

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Revajeetu Builders and Developers Vs Narayanaswamy and Sons

The appellant Revajeetu Builders and Developers filed a suit against the respondents for recovery of money with 18% interest and declaration of absolute ownership of property based on a sale deed dated 30-9-1987, claiming the respondents were unlawfully occupying the building after termination of tenancy. The appellant later sought amendment under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC to insert new paragraphs and add prayers declaring respondents as trespassers from 1-4-1988, seeking mandatory injunction for demolition of unauthorized constructions, permanent injunction against interference, and damages for unauthorized occupation. The trial court allowed the amendment, but the High Court set aside the order, finding it unnecessary, prejudicial, and changing the suit's nature. The Supreme Court, on appeal, upheld the High Court's view, reasoning that courts must exercise discretion judiciously in amendments, refusing mala fide ones while allowing bona fide amendments essential for adjudicating real controversies, considering factors like prejudice compensable by costs, limitation bar, and whether it fundamentally alters the case; here, the amendment was not imperative, caused uncompensable prejudice, was barred by limitation, and altered the suit from money recovery to eviction and damages, dismissing the appeal with Rs 1 lakh costs to discourage such applications.

Law Points:

Courts must exercise wide discretion under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC judiciously, refusing mala fide, worthless or dishonest amendments but not bona fide, legitimate, honest and necessary ones (Reference: Paras 59 and 64 of judgment).

The basic test for granting amendment is whether it is necessary for determining the real question in controversy or for proper/effective adjudication; if not, it cannot be allowed (Reference: Para 58 of judgment).

Courts should consider potential prejudice or injustice to the other side, which if compensable by costs, may not bar amendment, but actual costs are rarely granted in practice (Reference: Para 59 of judgment).

Key principles for allowing/rejecting amendment include: imperative for adjudication, bona fide application, no uncompensable prejudice, avoids injustice/multiple litigation, does not fundamentally change case nature, and limitation bar as a factor though not absolute if justice requires (Reference: Para 63 of judgment).

Bar of limitation on amended claim is a relevant factor in discretion but does not oust jurisdiction if amendment serves interests of justice (Reference: Para 39 of judgment).

Imposition of costs on amendment applications aims to discourage mala fides, compensate delay/inconvenience/expenses, and signal careful pleading; factors include stage of application, pre/post-trial, financial benefit, realistic assessment, extra hearings, and appeal costs (Reference: Paras 61 and 62 of judgment).

Case Title: Revajeetu Builders and Developers Vs Narayanaswamy and Sons and Others

Order Date: October 9, 2009

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 6921 of 2009

Neutral Citation: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 1709

Name of Court: Supreme Court of India

Name of Judge: Dalveer Bhandari and H.S. Bedi, JJ.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Rajkumar Bhatia Vs The State of Madhya Pradesh

The complainant Rajkumar Bhatia filed a complaint in September 2023 alleging that accused persons were manufacturing and selling counterfeit "Bhatia Masale" products, infringing his trademark and copyright, leading to registration of FIR under Sections 420 IPC and 63 Copyright Act, later enhanced with Sections 120-B, 201 IPC and provisions of Trademarks Act. 

Investigation revealed involvement of multiple accused who admitted to producing fake packaging. Chargesheet was filed in December 2022, initial regular bail granted, but on 02.09.2024 JMFC found prima facie case for additional serious offences including Sections 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 473 IPC (punishable up to life imprisonment), cancelled earlier bail and directed committal to Sessions Court.

Accused obtained anticipatory bail from Additional Sessions Judge in September 2024 relying on Arnesh Kumar guidelines assuming offences punishable up to 7 years only. Complainant challenged these anticipatory bail orders; trial court later framed charges dropping Section 467 but High Court in revision restored it. The High Court found the anticipatory bail orders illegal as they ignored the enhanced serious offences punishable with life imprisonment and mechanically applied Arnesh Kumar guidelines, quashed the anticipatory bail orders and directed accused to apply for regular bail before trial court.

When serious offences punishable with imprisonment for life are made out (e.g., Sections 467, 468 etc. IPC), anticipatory bail cannot be granted merely by applying Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 273 guidelines which are limited to offences punishable up to 7 years imprisonment (Reference: Page 9-10 of judgment).

Grant of anticipatory bail ignoring prima facie addition of grave offences attracting life imprisonment renders the order illegal and liable to be quashed (Reference: Page 10 of judgment).

Addition of serious offences after grant of bail does not automatically cancel bail, but where bail was granted without considering such enhanced offences punishable beyond 7 years, the order suffers from illegality (Reference: Page 9-10, distinguishing Pradeep Ram v. State of Jharkhand (2019) 17 SCC 326).

Case Title: Rajkumar Bhatia Vs The State of Madhya Pradesh and Others:17th December, 2025: Criminal Case No. 43273 of 2025:2025:MPHC-GWL:33288:Madhya Pradesh HC: Hon'ble Shri Justice Rajesh Kumar Gupta

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Mandeep Singh Vs. Shabir Momin

Mandeep Singh, creator and prior user since 2012 of the INSTANT BOLLYWOOD brand and device mark for Bollywood entertainment content on digital platforms with millions of followers, entered into a 2019 agreement with One Digital Entertainment Pte. Ltd. (ODE), whose managing director Shabir Momin (Respondent No.1) clandestinely obtained trademark registrations in his personal name around 2020, filed four rectification petitions under Section 57(2) of the Trademarks Act, 1999 seeking cancellation after terminating the agreement in August 2025 and discovering the registrations. 

On 11.12.2025, the Delhi High Court noted the 2019 agreement acknowledging joint 50:50 ownership of the brand IPR, impleaded Times Internet Inc. as Respondent No.3 upon proof of assignment dated 24.10.2025 from Respondent No.1 (of which petitioner had notice), found prima facie admitted 50% rights of petitioner not reflected in registrations or assignment without his consent or consideration, directed status quo on the assignment and restrained creation of third-party interests to protect petitioner's rights, criticised petitioner's suppression of prior knowledge of registrations since 2022 and related documents but declined to dismiss interim application, instead imposing costs of Rs.5 lakhs per petition payable to DHCLSC, and listed the matters further.

Assignee of a trademark (even with drag-along rights) cannot exclude the admitted joint owner (with 50% IPR) from rights without consent or consideration; status quo directed to protect such admitted rights pending rectification (Paras 18-23).

Suppression of material documents and facts (prior knowledge of registrations and related agreements/notices) warrants imposition of heavy costs, though not necessarily dismissal of interim relief where prima facie rights are admitted (Paras 24-26).

Case Title: Mandeep Singh Vs. Shabir Momin :11.12.2025:C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 275/2025:

Name of Judge: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Vishnu & Co Trademarks Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Smotect Pvt. Ltd.

Vishnu and Company Trademarks Pvt. Ltd., proprietor of the well-known 'VIMAL' trademark used since 1986 for pan masala, gutkha, mouth fresheners including non-tobacco 'VIMAL ELAICHI', filed a commercial suit alleging that Smotect Private Limited and its directors, while promoting their smoking cessation product 'Smotect AZAADI', published Instagram videos in November 2025 that prominently displayed the plaintiff's 'VIMAL ELAICHI' label while portraying it as a harmful tobacco/gutkha product, thereby disparaging the plaintiff's brand, infringing its copyright in the artistic label, and damaging its reputation despite 'VIMAL ELAICHI' being a harmless mouth freshener not requiring statutory health warnings. 

The plaintiff sought permanent and interim injunctions for trademark infringement, copyright infringement, disparagement, defamation and passing off. On 12.12.2025, after hearing the plaintiff ex parte and noting advance service on defendants, the Delhi High Court found a prima facie case of wrongful use of the label, misrepresentation of the product as tobacco-containing, copyright infringement and disparagement, held that balance of convenience favoured the plaintiff and irreparable harm would ensue without relief, and granted ex parte ad-interim injunction restraining use of the label or similar marks in advertisements, directed removal of specified impugned videos within 72 hours, permitted approach to Meta if not complied with, and listed the matter for 30.01.2026.

Exemption from pre-litigation mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 is permissible in commercial suits seeking urgent interim relief: Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Keerthi (2024) 5 SCC 815 (Para 5).

Prima facie, depicting a competitor's non-tobacco mouth freshener product label in promotional videos while falsely portraying it as harmful tobacco/gutkha amounts to disparagement, defamation and damage to goodwill (Paras 25-28).

Use of a competitor's registered artistic label in advertisements without authorisation constitutes prima facie copyright infringement under the Copyright Act, 1957 (Para 28).

Ex parte ad-interim injunction justified where prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury are established in intellectual property disputes involving disparagement and infringement (Paras 29-31).

Case Title: Vishnu and Company Trademarks Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Smotect Private Limited & Ors.

Order Date: 12 December 2025

Case Number: CS(COMM) 1333/2025

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Judge: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Leayan Global Pvt Ltd vs Bata India Ltd-DB

Bata India Ltd instituted a trademark infringement suit against Leayan Global Pvt Ltd and its retailer Chawla Boot House alleging Leayan's "POWER FLEX" mark and "THE POWER OF REAL LEATHER" tagline infringed its registered "POWER" mark for footwear, seeking permanent injunction.

The single judge granted ex parte ad interim restraint on "POWER" use, permitted sale of existing stock with monthly statements, and on disposing interim applications, restrained "POWER" in marks or combinations but allowed the tagline without undue prominence to "POWER" and stock sale, while deleting Chawla Boot House as unnecessary party.

Both appealed, Leayan challenging the restraint and Bata contesting tagline/stock permissions and deletion; the division bench analyzed that impleadment irregularity did not bar relief, "POWER FLEX" was deceptively similar to "POWER" phonetically/visually under average consumer test with imperfect recollection considering trade channels and expansion scope, "POWER" was suggestive not descriptive hence protectable.

Leayan failed to prove goodwill/reputation in "POWER FLEX" via inadequate evidence, no delay/acquiescence barred injunction as infringement mandates it absent dishonesty exception, upheld tagline/stock directions as discretionary without prejudice, but set aside Chawla Boot House deletion for fresh adjudication post-hearing, ultimately dismissing both appeals with that sole modification.

The manner in which defendants are arrayed in a suit cannot constitute a ground to disentitle the plaintiff to interim relief under Order XXXIX CPC: (Para 31.11).

Canvas footwear and leather footwear are "similar" goods for purposes of Section 29(2)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, especially as both fall in Class 25: (Para 33.4.4).

In assessing deceptive similarity, courts must consider reasonable scope of expansion of plaintiff's goods: (Para 33.4.5).

The test for deceptive similarity is the average consumer of imperfect recollection who is reasonably informed, observant and circumspect, forming overall impression without dissection: (Para 34).

Marks that are suggestive (requiring imagination to connect to goods) are protectable and registrable, unlike purely descriptive marks: (Para 34.5.1).

In cases of trademark infringement, injunction must normally follow and mere delay is insufficient to defeat it: (Para 35.6).

Volume of sales and extent of advertisement are relevant considerations for deciding acquired reputation or goodwill: (Para 35.3.6).

Case Title: Leayan Global Pvt Ltd vs Bata India Ltd:15.12.2025:FAO(OS) (COMM) 105/2019 & FAO(OS) (COMM) 193/2019 : Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar & Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation] 

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Ganraj Enterprises Vs. Landmark Crafts Ltd

The appellant sought rectification of the respondent’s registered trademark “HP” on grounds of territorial limitation, alleged false user claim, and lack of locus, after facing opposition and infringement action against its later mark “HP+”. 

The Registrar rejected rectification, holding the respondent to be the prior user and proprietor with valid registrations, including a subsequent pan-India registration. 

The High Court upheld this view, reasoning that territorial restrictions in one registration do not automatically extend to another associated registration, questions of alleged false user since 1995 were sub judice before the Commercial Court, and the appellant, though a “person aggrieved”, failed to substantiate grounds for cancellation since the respondent’s use of “HP” pre-dated the appellant and was otherwise lawful. 

The appeal was accordingly dismissed and the Registrar’s order affirmed.

Law Settled

Territorial limitations or disclaimers attached to one trademark registration do not ipso facto apply to another associated or subsequent registration of the same mark; each registration is distinct :paras 11.3.1–11.3.4, relying on Foodlink F & B Holdings India (P) Ltd. v. Wow Momo Foods (P) Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 4719, para 30).

A rival trader facing opposition or infringement action can qualify as a “person aggrieved” for rectification, but rectification will fail absent proof that the impugned registration is wrongly remaining on the register (paras 11.4.1–11.4.3).

Territorial restriction in a registration limits statutory infringement rights to that territory but does not bar the proprietor’s use elsewhere nor extinguish common law passing-off rights (para 11.6).

Case Title: Ganraj Enterprises Vs. Landmark Crafts Ltd.:02.12.2025:C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 164/2022:2025:DHC:10774:Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

S. Kalatmamani Vs . DS.S. Sudhakaran

In a partition suit (O.S. No. 195/2009), the trial court passed a preliminary decree on 24.08.2022. Respondents challenged this decree before the Madras High Court by filing a Civil Revision Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, alleging fraud on the court, and the High Court on 14.12.2023 allowed the revision, set aside the preliminary decree, and granted liberty to proceed further in the suit.

Appellants approached the Supreme Court contending that since a regular first appeal under Section 96 CPC was available against the preliminary decree, the High Court erroneously exercised supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227. 

The Supreme Court held that the allegation of fraud was debatable and, in the presence of an appellate remedy under the CPC, the High Court should not have entertained the Article 227 petition. 

Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order without examining merits, restored the preliminary decree, and permitted the affected defendants to file or re-file their appeals under Section 96 CPC within four weeks with appropriate directions for condonation and entertainment.

Law Point:

High Courts should not exercise supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to interfere with decrees or orders when a statutory remedy of appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (such as Section 96 CPC) is available, especially where allegations like fraud are debatable (Paras 3-6).

The principle that alternative remedies under CPC must be availed before invoking Article 227 is reaffirmed, relying on Virudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma Paribalana Sabai v. Tuticorin Educational Society (2019) 9 SCC 538 and Mohd. Ali v. V. Jaya (2022) 10 SCC 477 (Para 5).

Case Title: S. Kalatmamani & Ors. Vs . DS.S. Sudhakaran & Ors.

Order Date: November 27, 2025

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 12251/2025

Name of Court: Supreme Court of India

Name of Judges: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Manoj Misra and Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.V.N. Bhatti

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Nawal Kishore Sharma Vs. Union of India,

Nawal Kishore Sharma, a seaman with the Shipping Corporation of India, was declared permanently unfit for sea service in 2011 due to dilated cardiomyopathy after over 20 years of service, leading him to return to his native Bihar where he claimed disability compensation, which was rejected via correspondence addressed to him there. 

He filed a writ petition in Patna High Court seeking compensation, but it was dismissed for lack of territorial jurisdiction as the employment and decisions occurred outside Bihar; an interim order had granted partial payment, yet jurisdiction was later denied. 

On appeal to the Supreme Court, the court reasoned that under Article 226(2) of the Constitution, jurisdiction exists if even a fraction of the cause of action arises within the High Court's territory, and here, the receipt of the rejection letter and correspondences in Bihar constituted such a fraction, further noting the respondents' participation without initial objection estopped them from raising the issue later. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's dismissal, and remitted the case to Patna High Court for adjudication on merits.

Law Point:

The High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within its territorial limits, even if the authority or person is outside the territory: paras 9, 16.

"Cause of action" under Article 226(2) is assigned the same meaning as under Section 20(c) CPC, being a bundle of facts necessary for the petitioner to prove infringement of a legal right: Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 329, paras 9, 13-14.

Even a fraction of cause of action, such as receipt of a communication rejecting a claim, suffices to confer territorial jurisdiction on the High Court, paras 17-19.

Participation in writ proceedings without raising jurisdictional objection at the interim stage may estop the respondent from later challenging maintainability on that ground: para 19.

Case Title: Nawal Kishore Sharma Vs. Union of India, Order date: August 7, 2014, Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 7414 of 2014, Neutral Citation: (2014) 9 SCC 329

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]