U.S. Green Building Council Vs. Deming Certification Services Pvt Ltd

U.S. Green Building Council sued Deming Certification Services Pvt Ltd in 2022 alleging trademark infringement, copyright infringement and passing off by the defendant's use of marks including a circular logo with building design, the abbreviation IGBC and content copied from the plaintiff's website in relation to green building certification services. The defendant filed a written statement but thereafter stopped appearing, leading to proceedings ex parte. The plaintiff moved an application under Order VIII Rules 1 and 10 CPC for judgment on admissions and non-traversal. The Delhi High Court found the defendant's written statement evasive without specific denial of plaintiff's assertions of prior adoption, registration, reputation and deceptive similarity, treated key averments as admitted, held infringement, copyright violation and passing off established, decreed the suit with permanent injunction, delivery up and costs of Rs. 5 lakhs.

• Non-specific or evasive denials in a written statement amount to admission under Order VIII Rule 5 CPC, entitling the plaintiff to judgment under Order VIII Rule 10 where the defendant ceases to appear (Paras on admissions and application of Order VIII).
• Use of a deceptively similar logo and abbreviation (IGBC resembling plaintiff's known marks) along with copied website content in identical services (green building certification) constitutes infringement, copyright infringement and passing off (Paras on comparison of marks/content and likelihood of confusion).
• In ex parte proceedings, where written statement contains admissions due to lack of proper denial, the court can pronounce judgment without requiring further evidence from the plaintiff (Paras on procedure under Order VIII Rules 1 & 10).

Case Title: U.S. Green Building Council Vs. Deming Certification Services Pvt Ltd:24.12.2025: CS(COMM) 664/2022:2025:DHC:11865:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Trident Limited Vs. Controller of Patents

Trident Limited appealed against the Controller's order dated 05.01.2021 refusing patent application No. 1867/DEL/2010 titled “Air Rich Yarn and Fabric and its Method of Manufacturing” on grounds of lack of inventive step under Section 2(1)(ja). The Controller relied on prior arts D1 to D5, held the claims obvious by combining teachings particularly of D1 and D3, and found no technical advancement or unexpected effect demonstrated. The Delhi High Court found the Controller's analysis of inventive step deficient for failing to identify the skilled person's knowledge, not explaining why the combination was obvious, ignoring appellant's evidence of commercial success and technical advantages like superior air retention and softness, and introducing new objections post-hearing without opportunity to respond, set aside the refusal order and remanded the application for fresh consideration within three months.

• The Controller must provide reasoned analysis for lack of inventive step, including identifying the person skilled in the art, the obviousness of combining prior arts, and addressing evidence of technical advance or secondary indicia like commercial success; mere conclusory statements are insufficient (Paras on inventive step assessment).
• New prior arts or grounds of objection cannot be introduced in the final refusal order without prior notice in FER or hearing notice, violating natural justice (Paras on procedural fairness).
• Evidence of commercial success, long-felt need, and comparative data showing unexpected technical effects must be considered in assessing inventive step and cannot be disregarded without reasons (Paras on secondary considerations).

Case Title: Trident Limited Vs. Controller of Patents: August 11, 2025:C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 162/2022:2025:DHC:10343: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Tesla Inc. Vs. Tesla Power

Tesla Inc. filed a suit in 2024 alleging trademark infringement and passing off by Tesla Power India Private Limited and others using marks like ‘TESLA POWER’ and ‘TESLA POWER USA’ for batteries and related products, including domain names, claiming deceptive similarity to its globally renowned ‘TESLA’ mark with transborder reputation spilling over to India. Defendants initially undertook not to enter the EV market or use the mark for EVs, but plaintiff alleged continued misuse and leveraging of its reputation. The Delhi High Court found prima facie triple identity in marks, goods (allied/cognate batteries and power products) and trade channels, dishonest adoption evident from ‘TESLA POWER USA’ suggesting US origin connection, likelihood of confusion including initial interest confusion, and transborder reputation established despite limited direct sales in India, granted interim injunction extending the undertaking to restrain use of the impugned marks for all current goods/services including batteries, inverters, UPS and all advertising until final disposal of the suit.

• Transborder reputation of a foreign trademark spills over to India through global publicity, website traffic from India and international fame, entitling protection even without substantial local sales or registration in relevant classes (Paras on spillover reputation and goodwill).
• Where marks are identical with dominant feature ‘TESLA’, goods allied (batteries/power products cognate to EVs and advanced battery tech), and same trade channels, a case of ‘triple identity’ exists warranting interim injunction for infringement and passing off (Paras on similarity analysis).
• Adoption of ‘TESLA POWER USA’ indicates dishonest intent to mislead consumers into believing association with US-based plaintiff or origin of technology (Paras on dishonest adoption and ‘USA’ suffix).
• Doctrine of initial interest confusion applies in trademark cases, particularly with well-known marks, where initial attraction due to similarity causes irreparable harm even if confusion clarified later (Paras on confusion and prejudice).

Case Title: Tesla Inc. Vs. Tesla Power India Private Limited : November 24, 2025: CS(COMM) 353/2024:2025:DHC:10367: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation] [Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Sunil Jain Vs. Registrar of Trademarks

Sunil Jain appealed against the Registrar's order dated 17.06.2025 allowing registration of Respondent No.2's trademark application No. 6480151 for 'Secure Fencing' in Class 7 despite the appellant's opposition. The appellant and Respondent No.2, being brothers, jointly used the mark 'Secure Fencing' from 2013 pursuant to a family business, and under an oral family settlement in 2019 agreed that the appellant would exclusively own 'Secure Fencing' while Respondent No.2 would own 'Kisaan Jaali and Fencing'. Respondent No.2 surreptitiously obtained registrations for 'Secure Fencing' and in one proceeding admitted the appellant's exclusive rights, yet proceeded with the opposed application. The Delhi High Court found prima facie evidence of the family settlement, Respondent No.2's inconsistent stand, and likelihood of confusion, granted interim injunction restraining Respondent No.2 from using 'Secure Fencing' pending the appeal, and directed expeditious disposal.

• Oral family settlements dividing trademark rights in a family business are enforceable and can form the basis for granting interim relief in trademark opposition appeals where prima facie evidence supports exclusive allocation to one party (Order paras on family settlement and prima facie case).
• Inconsistent admissions by a party in earlier trademark proceedings regarding exclusive ownership of a mark bind them and constitute strong prima facie evidence against subsequent contradictory applications (Order paras on Respondent No.2's admission in TM No. 5350849).
• Where parties are family members with prior joint use and a settlement allocating marks, surreptitious registration attempts by one party justify interim injunction to maintain status quo (Order paras on balance of convenience and irreparable harm).

Case Title: Sunil Jain Vs. Registrar of Trademarks & Anr. Order Date: December 17, 2025 Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 60/2025 & I.A. 22422/2025 Neutral Citation: Not available in document Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi Name of Judge: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation] [Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. Vs. Oziel Pharmaceuticals

Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. filed a suit for permanent injunction against Oziel Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. and its director alleging trademark infringement and passing off of its registered marks ‘PEPFIZ’ (registered since 1991) and ‘MINOZ’ (registered since 2003). The plaintiff moved an application for summary judgment under Order XIIIA CPC against Defendant No. 2 (director) on the basis of admissions in the written statement and defendant's non-appearance despite service. The Delhi High Court noted that Defendant No. 2 admitted the plaintiff's prior registrations and use, acknowledged the defendants' adoption of identical marks, and failed to contest the suit, held that no triable issues existed regarding infringement liability of the director jointly with the company, granted summary judgment decreeing the suit against Defendant No. 2 with permanent injunction, nominal damages of Rs. 2 lakhs, and costs.

• In trademark infringement suits, summary judgment under Order XIIIA CPC can be passed against a defendant (including director) based on clear admissions in the written statement regarding plaintiff's prior rights and defendant's use of identical marks, coupled with non-appearance, without requiring trial (Paras on application of Order XIIIA in IP suits).
• Directors can be held jointly liable for infringement committed by the company where admissions establish their involvement or control, and summary decree of injunction and damages can be passed against them (Paras on joint liability and summary procedure).

Case Title: Sun Pharmaceutical Vs. Oziel Pharmaceuticals:December 16, 2025: CS(COMM) 1041/2024:2025:DHC:11923: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation] [Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Street One GmbH Vs. The Registrar of Trade Marks

Street One GmbH appealed against the Registrar's order dated 25.01.2024 dismissing its opposition and allowing registration of the mark “STREET9” in Class 25 applied for by Respondent No.3 on 24.11.2020 with user claim since 01.04.2014. The appellant, proprietor of prior registered marks “STREET ONE/Street One” adopted in 1983 and registered in India since 2003 including in Class 25, opposed on grounds of deceptive similarity under Section 11. The Registrar dismissed the opposition primarily on lack of evidence of reputation and spillover, treating prior use as relevant. The Delhi High Court held that the Registrar misapplied Section 11 by requiring proof of reputation when the appellant relied on prior registrations, as Section 11 read with Section 29 protects registered marks without needing proof of prior use or transborder reputation once similarity and identical goods are established, set aside the impugned order, and remanded the matter for fresh decision on relative grounds under Section 11.

• Where opposition is based on prior registered trademarks for identical goods, Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 is attracted without requirement of proving reputation or prior use in India; the Registrar cannot dismiss opposition merely for lack of evidence of spillover reputation (Paras examining misapplication of Section 11, relying on principles that Section 11 is alter ego of Section 29).
• Proof of transborder reputation or actual use is not mandatory for invoking Section 11 when relying on prior Indian registrations; the relative grounds of refusal focus on likelihood of confusion due to similarity of marks and goods (Paras on correct application of Section 11).

Case Title: Street One GmbH Vs. The Registrar of Trade Marks :November 28, 2025: C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 38/2024:2025:DHC:11169: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Shri Kirit Bhadiadra Vs. Wings Pharmaceuticals Private Limited

Wings Pharmaceuticals Private Limited sued Kirit Bhadiadra, proprietor of Rapple Healthcare, for trademark infringement and passing off, claiming its registered mark “MEDILICE” (used since 2004 for anti-lice shampoo) was infringed by the defendant's “MEDILICE LICE KILLER” (used for ayurvedic anti-lice hair oil). The Commercial Court decreed the suit on 04.03.2024, granting permanent injunction and awarding Rs. 10 lakhs punitive damages. On appeal, the Delhi High Court Division Bench found the marks deceptively similar with “MEDILICE” as the dominant essential feature, the products allied addressing the same lice issue likely causing confusion, defendant's prior use claim unsupported by credible evidence, and infringement/passing off established; it upheld the injunction but reduced damages to Rs. 3 lakhs considering the circumstances, dismissing the appeal.

• In pharmaceutical/medicinal products for treating the same ailment (head lice), even if one is shampoo and the other hair oil, the goods are allied, and use of an identical dominant mark creates likelihood of confusion warranting injunction for infringement and passing off (Paras examining similarity of goods and marks, relying on established principles in medicinal trademark cases requiring higher scrutiny).
• The dominant and essential feature of the mark is “MEDILICE”; addition of descriptive words like “LICE KILLER” does not distinguish it sufficiently to avoid deception (Paras on anti-dissection rule and phonetic/visual similarity).
• Prior use defence requires robust documentary evidence of continuous commercial use; mere manufacturing licenses or pending applications are insufficient (Paras on evaluation of defendant's evidence).
• Punitive damages in trademark infringement can be awarded but must be proportionate; reduction from Rs. 10 lakhs to Rs. 3 lakhs is appropriate where infringement is established but scale justifies moderation (Paras on damages assessment).

Case Title: Shri Kirit Bhadiadra Vs. Wings Pharmaceuticals Private Limited: December 22, 2025: RFA(COMM) 149/2024:2025:DHC:11709-DB:Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Reckitt and Colman Vs. Ind Swift Limited

Reckitt and Colman Overseas Health Limited appealed against the Registrar of Trade Marks' order dated 09.02.2024 dismissing its opposition and allowing registration of Ind Swift Limited's mark 'DECA-NEROPHEN' in Class 05, applied for on 26.02.1999 with claimed use since 1992, for pharmaceutical preparations. Reckitt, proprietor of the prior registered mark 'NUROFEN' (registered since 1983), contended that 'DECA-NEROPHEN' was deceptively similar as 'NUROFEN' was wholly subsumed and 'DECA' was descriptive of Nandrolone Decanoate, that adoption was dishonest given 'NUROFEN' being a coined word and Respondent's failure to search the register, and that no concurrent honest use was established due to lack of credible evidence predating or contemporaneous with the application. The Registrar erred in holding the marks dissimilar yet granting benefit under Section 12 for alleged concurrent use, and in accepting post-application evidence. The Delhi High Court found the marks phonetically similar, adoption dishonest, no honest concurrent use proven, and Registrar's contradictory findings unsustainable, set aside the impugned order, allowed the opposition, and refused registration of 'DECA-NEROPHEN'.

• In pharmaceutical trademarks, a higher degree of scrutiny is required, and honest concurrent use under Section 12 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 cannot be claimed where adoption is dishonest, especially when the prior mark is a coined word and the later mark subsumes it with a descriptive prefix (Paras 28-32, relying on Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 73).
• The Registrar cannot simultaneously hold rival marks as dissimilar and yet apply Section 12 (honest concurrent use), as the provision presupposes similarity; such contradictory findings vitiate the order (Paras 20-22).
• Dishonest adoption is inferred where no explanation is provided for choosing a mark incorporating a prior registered coined mark, and the applicant fails to conduct a trademark search despite the stringent duty in pharmaceutical cases (Paras 25-30, citing Bal Pharma Ltd. v. Centaur Laboratories Pvt. Ltd., 2002 (24) PTC 226 (Bom)).
• Evidence of use post-dating the application cannot establish honest concurrent use for Section 12, and illegible or inadequate documentary proof fails to discharge the burden (Paras 33-35).

Case Title: Reckitt and Colman Vs. Ind Swift Limited : December 24, 2025:C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 51/2024: 2025:DHC:11867: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Osaka University Vs. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs

Osaka University appealed against the Assistant Controller's order dated 29.08.2020 refusing patent application No. 3495/DELNP/2012 for bridged artificial nucleosides and nucleotides featuring a five to seven-membered cyclic amide bridge, on grounds of lack of inventive step under Section 2(1)(j) and non-patentability under Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, 1970. The Controller primarily relied on prior art D2, miscompared nuclease resistance data by wrongly referencing Example 13 instead of Example 12, failed to explain how multiple prior arts rendered the invention obvious to a person skilled in the art, introduced new reasoning in the impugned order without prior notice, and raised Section 3(d) objections without identifying the specific known substance or prior art in the FER and hearing notice, denying the appellant opportunity to respond. The Delhi High Court found these procedural and substantive infirmities rendered the order unsustainable and remanded the matter for fresh consideration with a hearing within six months.

• While rejecting a patent for lack of inventive step under Section 2(1)(ja), the Controller must discuss three elements: invention in prior art, invention in the application, and how it would be obvious to a person skilled in the art; a bare conclusion without such analysis is impermissible (Paras 33-34, following Agriboard International LLC v. Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 4786).
• New grounds or reasoning for objections under Sections 2(1)(j) or 3(d) cannot be introduced for the first time in the final refusal order without giving the applicant prior notice and opportunity to address them (Paras 55, 60).
• For an objection under Section 3(d), the Controller must specifically identify the "known substance" and explain how the claimed compounds are new forms or derivatives thereof; failure to do so in the FER or hearing notice violates principles of natural justice (Paras 56-62, following DS Biopharma Limited v. The Controller of Patents and Designs, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 3211).

Case Title: Osaka University Vs. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs:24.12.2025:C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 390/2022:2025:DHC:11878:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation] [Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Nippon Steel Corporation Vs. The Controller of Patents

Nippon Steel Corporation filed a patent application in India on 01.07.2021 for a high-strength steel sheet invention involving four employee-inventors, one of whom, Kohichi Sano, had passed away before filing. The company submitted Form 1 signed by the three living inventors, a declaration referencing internal Basic Regulations assigning employee inventions to the company, and later an employment agreement of the deceased inventor. The Controller refused the application vide order dated 27.11.2024, holding that the employment agreement and declaration did not constitute sufficient proof of right under Section 7(2) of the Patents Act, particularly since the inventor was deceased and no assignment from his legal representative or death certificate was filed. On appeal, the Delhi High Court examined the documents, distinguished Section 68 (applicable only to granted patents), and held that the duly executed employment agreement combined with the declaration and corporate policy sufficiently established the company's right as assignee under Section 6(1)(b) read with Section 7(2), especially given consistent acceptance of identical documents in six prior granted patents with the same inventors. The Court set aside the refusal order and directed further examination for grant.

• An employment agreement executed by an employee-inventor, when read with a declaration and internal corporate regulations providing for automatic assignment of inventions conceived during employment, constitutes sufficient “proof of the right” under Section 7(2) of the Patents Act, 1970 to enable the employer-assignee to file a patent application (Paras 42–47).
• Section 68 of the Patents Act, 1970 applies only to assignment of a granted patent and not to assignment of the right to apply for a patent before grant (Para 38).
• Section 6(1)(c) requiring assignment from the legal representative of a deceased person has no application where the employer establishes its right as assignee under Section 6(1)(b) through pre-existing employment terms vesting rights in the employer (Paras 14, 40–42).
• Procedural requirements under the Patents Act are intended to advance justice and not to defeat substantive rights where sufficient documentary evidence of ownership exists (Paras 48–50).

Case Title: Nippon Steel Corporation Vs. The Controller of Patents:24.12.2025: C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 10/2025:2025:DHC:11876:Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation] [Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Malkit Singh Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks Trademarks

Malkit Singh, proprietor of Makhan Fish Corner, claimed use of the trademark ‘MAKHAN FISH CORNER’ since 1962 for restaurant and food services in Class 43, obtained registration in 2023 after successfully defending an opposition filed by Makhan Fish Co in 2016 which was dismissed in 2022.

However Makhan Fish Co subsequently filed a rectification petition in 2024 leading to the Registrar removing the mark from the register vide order dated 14.08.2025 on the ground that Makhan Fish Co was the prior user with evidence from 1981 while the appellant’s earliest document was from 2013.

The Delhi High Court in appeal found the impugned order non-speaking as it failed to consider or evaluate the appellant’s evidence including third-party affidavits and CA certificates from 2001 substantiating use, ignored substantive objections to maintainability of rectification, overlooked class distinction between Class 29/35 and Class 43 and likelihood of confusion analysis, and violated principles of natural justice by lacking reasons, consequently the appeal was allowed, the impugned order set aside and the rectification petition remanded for fresh decision with directions to pass a reasoned order within six months without being influenced by prior observations.

Law Point:

• A quasi-judicial order, particularly one adversely affecting statutory rights of a registered trademark proprietor, must be a reasoned and speaking order disclosing application of mind to facts, evidence and submissions; failure renders it unsustainable (Paras 18-20).
• Non-consideration of material evidence on record and proceeding on erroneous assumptions demonstrate non-application of mind (Paras 13, 17).
• Distinction in classes of goods/services and absence of analysis on likelihood of confusion, trade channels and consumer overlap are essential considerations in rectification proceedings (Paras 15-16).
• Principles of natural justice and legitimate expectation require statutory authorities to provide reasons for conclusions (Para 20).
• 
  

Case Title: Malkit Singh Proprietor Makhan Fish Corner Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks Trademarks Registry & Anr.:26.11.2025:C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 80/2025:2025:DHC:10956:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Saurabh Gupta Vs. Sheopals Pvt. Ltd.

Saurabh Gupta, owner of the registered trademark OPAL in Class 3 since 1992 for cosmetics with substantial goodwill and turnover exceeding ₹28 crores by 2023-24, sued Sheopals Pvt. Ltd. (SPL) in 2024 alleging infringement and passing off by SPL's use of SHEOPAL’S mark launched in the market around that time despite SPL having adopted the mark in 2016, applied for registration in Class 3 in 2018 and 2022 (opposed by Saurabh) and holding registration in Class 5 since 2018. The Commercial Court initially granted ex-parte injunction in favour of Saurabh in August 2024 but vacated it in September 2024; on appeal, a Division Bench remanded the matter in November 2024 criticising dissection of the mark, following which the Commercial Court in April 2025 vacated the injunction citing delay of six years in filing suit despite knowledge of trademark applications and applying dominant part test to find deceptive similarity yet denying relief on account of laches and prejudice to SPL. In cross-appeals, the Division Bench of Delhi High Court disagreed with the Commercial Court's application of anti-dissection and dominant part principles, held that OPAL and SHEOPAL’S were neither visually nor phonetically similar with no likelihood of confusion when viewed as wholes, found no infringement or passing off, upheld vacation of injunction but on the ground of absence of deceptive similarity rather than delay, and dismissed Saurabh's appeal while allowing SPL's appeal to set aside adverse findings on merits.

• Anti-dissection rule requires comparison of competing marks in their entirety as average consumers perceive them, without breaking into components, and dominant part test applies only exceptionally where one element overwhelmingly dominates perception (Paras 13.3-13.10).
• Marks OPAL and SHEOPAL’S are neither visually, structurally nor phonetically similar; prefix SHE in SHEOPAL’S sufficiently distinguishes the marks as wholes, resulting in no likelihood of confusion or deception (Paras 13-20).
• No infringement under Section 29(2)(b) of Trade Marks Act, 1999 or passing off established where marks lack deceptive similarity despite identical/similar goods in Class 3 (Paras 21-22).
• Delay/laches not relied upon as primary ground but noted that knowledge of trademark application does not necessarily imply knowledge of actual use in market (Paras 23-25).

Case Title: Saurabh Gupta Vs. Sheopals Pvt. Ltd.26.11.2025: FAO (COMM) 175/2025: 2025:DHC:10443-DB: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Fair Food Overseas Pvt Ltd Vs KRBL Limited

Fair Food Overseas Pvt. Ltd. filed a transfer petition seeking to move a copyright infringement and passing off suit (TM No. 305 of 2021) instituted by KRBL Limited against it, which was pending before the District Court (valued below Rs. 3 lakhs and thus non-commercial), to the High Court of Delhi for consolidation with KRBL's pending rectification petition (C.O.(COMM.IPD-CR) 707/2022) challenging the validity of Fair Food's copyright registration in the same artistic work/trade dress. The suit was at an early stage with interim injunction and amendment applications pending. The respondent opposed the transfer, arguing that Rule 26 of the IPD Rules, 2022 limits consolidation powers to commercial matters and does not permit transfer of non-commercial suits. The Court held that while Rule 26 of IPD Rules contemplates transfer only from Commercial Courts, the general and independent power under Section 24 CPC remains available and is not curtailed by Rule 26, allowing the High Court to transfer any IPR-related proceeding, including non-commercial suits, to avoid multiplicity, parallel adjudication and conflicting decisions on identical subject matter. Accordingly, the suit was transferred to the High Court and consolidated with the rectification petition.

• The power of the High Court under Section 24 CPC to transfer suits or proceedings is general, wide and independent, and is not restricted or circumscribed by Rule 26 of the Intellectual Property Rights Division Rules, 2022, even in IPR matters (Paras 9-14).
• Rule 26 of IPD Rules, which refers to exercise of Section 24 CPC powers for transferring matters from Commercial Courts for consolidation, does not limit the broader transfer powers available under Section 24 CPC for non-commercial IPR suits pending before District Courts (Paras 11-12, 16).
• To prevent multiplicity of proceedings and conflicting decisions, the High Court can transfer a non-commercial IPR suit from a District Court to itself under Section 24 CPC and consolidate it with related rectification proceedings pending before the IP Division, irrespective of the limitations in Rule 26 of IPD Rules (Paras 12-13, 17-18).

Case Title: Fair Food Overseas Pvt Ltd Vs KRBL Limited: 04.12.2025:TR.P.(C.) 7/2024: 2025:DHC:11705: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Koninklijke Philips N.V. Vs. Karma Mindtech

Koninklijke Philips N.V. filed a suit against Karma Mindtech and others, including former employee Karan Patel (Defendant No. 2), alleging copyright infringement, trade secret misappropriation, and circumvention of technological protection measures concerning its IntelliSpace Portal (ISP) medical imaging software by selling pirated/tampered versions on refurbished hardware; an ex-parte injunction was granted in December 2023, a local commissioner seized infringing materials, and in December 2024 the court directed defendants to answer detailed interrogatories via affidavit.

Defendant No. 2 filed a delayed affidavit in February 2025 containing vague denials that contradicted his own written statement (admitting purchase of pirated software from a Chinese source), admissions in the local commissioner’s report (confirming use since August 2021), and admitted employment documents confirming access to confidential information.

The court found these contradictions deliberate, amounting to suppressio veri and suggestio falsi, constituting perjury and obstruction of justice, and accordingly initiated criminal proceedings against Defendant No. 2 under relevant provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

• Deliberate false statements in affidavits filed in response to court-ordered interrogatories, especially when contradicting prior admissions, written statements, local commissioner reports, and admitted documents, amount to perjury and warrant initiation of criminal proceedings even at the interlocutory stage (Paras 6.10-6.13, 10-12 ).
• Local Commissioner’s report forms part of court record and undisputed statements therein are deemed seen by the court; contradictory sworn statements obstruct administration of justice 
• Pendency of the main suit does not bar initiation of perjury proceedings upon discovery of deliberate falsehood under oath.

Case Title: Koninklijke Philips N.V. Vs. Karma Mindtech:24/11/2025:CS(COMM) 914/2023: 2025:DHC:10345:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Indian Express Vs. Fundamental Hospitality

Indian Express and Commercial Ventures and Projects Private Limited, operating restaurants under the registered trademark "House of Mandarin" since 2016 and claiming popular use of its acronym "HOM" from 2017, filed a suit for trademark infringement and passing off against Fundamental Hospitality Private Limited and another, who adopted "HOM" (derived from Sanskrit for fire offering) for their modern Indian restaurant launched in October 2025 near the plaintiff's Bandra outlet, after the plaintiff became aware in September 2025 via congratulatory messages mistaking it as their expansion.

The court reasoned that the plaintiff failed to provide cogent evidence, such as extensive media references, customer reviews, or consistent public domain use over eight years, to show "HOM" was popularly associated with them in the public mind, thus no extension of statutory protection from the registered mark to the unregistered acronym under the Trade Marks Act, distinguishing from Mahindra & Mahindra where long-term evidence existed; for passing off, the plaintiff lacked proof of standalone goodwill in "HOM," misrepresentation by defendants (whose adoption was honest and bona fide from November 2024), or likelihood of confusion among discerning premium customers, given different cuisines (Pan-Asian vs. Indian), stylized marks, and unreliable evidence like undated materials and unsubstantiated WhatsApp chats. The court dismissed the interim application, finding no prima facie case.

• The benefit of use and registration of a trade mark inures to its natural abbreviation only if the abbreviation is used to such an extent that the general public and trade recognize the plaintiff by it, making it a brand identifier associated solely with the plaintiff in the public mind:  Para 18 
• An abbreviation becomes a protectable trade mark if, through use by customers, trade, or media, it is identified in the public mind with a particular company, even without formal use by the company itself: Para 16 
• In a passing off action, the plaintiff must prove goodwill or reputation in the mark, misrepresentation by the defendant, and likelihood of damage; intent to deceive is not necessary, but likelihood of confusion or deception is required, and goods need not be identical if misrepresentation affects the plaintiff's reputation:  Para 25 
• Passing off is a tort of deceit distinguished from confusion, where deception involves false representation but confusion may arise without lies; factors for deceptive similarity include mark nature, resemblance, goods nature, purchaser class, purchase mode, and surrounding circumstances: , Paras 26-27 
• Common law rights in passing off are broader than infringement, unaffected by non-registration, and protect goodwill against misrepresentation causing consumer confusion: I Para 24 

Case Title: Indian Express and Commercial Ventures Vs. Fundamental Hospitality :19.12.2025:Commercial IP (L) No.35330 of 2025:2025:BHC-OS:25517:Bombay HC: Sharmila U. Deshmukh

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Hubei Ji Su Kan Dian Tech Vs. Lark Engineering

Hubei Ji Su Kan Dian Technology Co., Ltd., a Chinese company engaged in design and development of computer programs under the 'LARK' mark for services like messaging, video conferencing, and collaborative tools, filed a petition under Sections 47 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking rectification of the 'LARK' trademark registered by Lark Engineering Company (India) Pvt. Ltd., an Indian firm specializing in poultry and cattle feed machinery including accessories like computer hardware and software, in Class 42 since 2016 with claimed use from 1994, after the respondent's mark was cited against the petitioner's 2018 application; the petitioner argued non-use of the mark for Class 42 services and false user date, citing Supreme Court precedents like Vishnudas Trading and Nandhini Deluxe, while the respondent countered with invoices and promotional material showing use in machinery-related hardware and software customization. The court analyzed the proviso to Section 47(1), determining that the services were of the same description as the respondent's core goods due to shared source, trade channels, and conjunctive use, as evidenced by invoices for items like PLC panels and automation systems sold alongside machinery, and rejected the false user date claim since use was established per se from 1994 and for services from 2016 prior to the petitioner's application, finding no mala fide adoption and dismissing the petition without costs.

• The proviso to Section 47(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, protects a trademark from removal for non-use if there is bona fide use by the proprietor in relation to goods or services of the same description or associated goods/services, and the phrase "goods or services of the same description" should not be given a restrictive meaning but considered based on factors like nature, composition, uses, functions, and trade channels (Para 14, 15, 16, ).
• To determine if goods or services are of the same description under the proviso to Section 47(1), each case must be decided on its facts, with emphasis on relevant characteristics such as shared source, trade channels, and conjunctive use, allowing protection where services like hardware/software development are provided in relation to and alongside core goods like machinery (Para 16, 17, 18, 19).
• A trademark registration is not liable to rectification for false date of use if documents establish use of the mark per se from the claimed date and for the specific services prior to the challenger's application, demonstrating no mala fide adoption, even if direct evidence for services dates later (Para 22, 23, 25, ).

Case Title: Hubei Ji Su Kan Dian Technology Co., Ltd. Vs. Lark Engineering Company (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Anr.: 24.12.2025:C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 119/2021:2025:DHC:11926:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Hero Investcorp Pvt. Ltd. Vs Kartar Industries

Hero Investcorp Pvt. Ltd. and another filed a trademark infringement suit against Kartar Industries and its proprietor Seema Sood for unauthorized use of the 'HERO' marks on spare parts and packaging, seeking permanent injunction, passing off, dilution, and ancillary reliefs. On September 11, 2025, the court granted an ex-parte ad-interim injunction restraining the defendant from dealing in infringing products. During the local commissioner's search of the defendant's premises, infringing goods were found, but the defendants manhandled, abused, and threatened the commissioner and plaintiffs' counsel, and instructed employees to burn the counterfeit materials, leading to a contempt application under Order XXXIX Rule 2A CPC. Notices were issued on October 17 and November 27, 2025, where defendants initially sought mediation, then objected to the commissioner's report but withdrew objections, tendered an unconditional apology, and agreed to cease infringement. The court reasoned that a local commissioner is a court officer whose execution cannot be interfered with, and while the apology mitigated punishment, the egregious conduct warranted penalty beyond mere apology, citing the need for hefty consequences for such contempt. For the suit, relying on Strix Ltd. v. Maharaja Appliances Ltd. (2023 SCC OnLine Del 7128), the court noted that without led evidence, damages are notional and based on broad assessment of record, including investigation costs, suit filing, commissioner fees, and contempt proceedings. The court disposed of the contempt by directing defendants to donate ₹2,50,000 to HelpAge India within eight weeks, decreed the suit with permanent injunction per prayer clauses (a) to (e), bound defendants to their undertaking against future infringement, and awarded ₹2,50,000 in costs and damages to plaintiffs.

• In cases of wilful disobedience and interference with court-appointed local commissioner's execution, including threats and evidence destruction, mere unconditional apology does not absolve contempt; punishment is warranted, though mitigated by the apology and undertaking to cease infringement, with the court imposing a donation as penalty  Para 7-8].
• A local commissioner is an officer of the court, and defendants cannot interfere with or threaten them during commission execution without facing consequences  Para 7].
• In infringement suits where no evidence is led, damages are notional, granted on a reasonable and fair basis through broad assessment of the record, including costs of investigation, suit filing, local commissioner fees, and contempt proceedings Para 15-16].

Case Title: Hero Investcorp Pvt. Ltd. Vs Kartar Industries: December 8, 2025: CS(COMM) 971/2025: 2025:DHC:11156:Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Havells India Limited Vs. Cawels Electric Pvt. Ltd.

Havells India Limited and another filed a suit against Cawels Electric Private Limited seeking permanent injunction for trademark infringement, passing off, misrepresentation, dilution, damages, and related reliefs, alleging that the defendant's 'CAWELS' mark is deceptively and phonetically similar to their well-known 'HAVELLS' mark used since 1942 for electrical products, with registrations dating back to 1955 and global presence; the defendant, incorporated in 2024, adopted the impugned mark for similar products like fans and wires, discovered by plaintiffs in September 2025 via the defendant's website, leading to claims of dishonest imitation to usurp goodwill. Procedurally, notice was issued on the interim injunction application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC on 16.10.2025, defendant filed reply, plaintiffs declined rejoinder, and arguments were heard. The court reasoned that the marks share phonetic and structural similarity (e.g., suffix '-ELLS'/' -ELS', minor consonant substitutions like H to C, V to W, one L omitted), likely causing confusion among average consumers with imperfect recollection, especially for identical goods; rejected defendant's origin explanation as afterthought since promoter appointed post-adoption, emphasized higher protection for well-known marks even without proving confusion, noted lack of quality control over defendant's products risking plaintiffs' reputation, and found balance of convenience favoring plaintiffs as prior users with established market over defendant's nascent operations. The court granted interim injunction restraining defendant from using 'CAWELS' or similar marks, corporate name, and website during suit pendency.

• Phonetic similarity constitutes an important index for determining deceptive similarity between marks, and courts must assess overall impression including how marks are spelt and pronounced in commonly used languages: , Para 7.
• Comparison of marks must be based on overall impression as perceived by a consumer of average intelligence and imperfect recollection, considering phonetic, visual, and structural similarity: , Para 9.
• Plaintiff need only prove likelihood of confusion, not actual confusion, determined by court's subjective comparison of material: Exotic Mile v. Imagine Marketing (P) Ltd., 2 Para 10.
• Well-known marks under Section 2(1)(zg) of Trade Marks Act, 1999, entitle highest degree of protection, extending even to dissimilar goods without needing to prove confusion:  Para 12.
• If defendant's mark is not visually or phonetically similar, injunction cannot be granted: , Para 17.
• Overall structural, phonetic, and visual similarity must be examined for deceptive similarity, without presumption of monopoly over dissimilar marks: Para 16.
• Minor variations in marks do not detract from overall phonetic similarity if likely to cause confusion: Para 23.
• Use of deceptively similar domain names and corporate names can amount to infringement and passing off by misleading users: Paras 14-15.
• For electrical products, extra caution warranted due to safety concerns, and balance of convenience favors prior user over nascent defendant: Para 17.

Case Title: Havells India Limited Vs. Cawels Electric Pvt. Ltd.: 01.12.2025:CS(COMM) 1122/2025: 2025:DHC:11704: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Dindayal Industries Ltd. Vs Dindayal Ayurved Bhawan

Dindayal Industries Ltd., a company manufacturing ayurvedic products, claimed prior adoption and continuous use of the trademark "DINDAYAL" and its variants since 1927, with registrations for composite marks like "DINDAYAL Aushadhi Pvt. Ltd." in multiple classes, asserting substantial goodwill through high turnover, wide consumer base, and promotions. Defendants Dindayal Ayurved Bhawan, operating since 2014 under similar marks like "DINDAYAL AYURVED BHAWAN", were accused of infringement and passing off by copying the mark and product range to exploit plaintiff's reputation. Plaintiff filed suit in 2021 seeking permanent injunction, obtained ex-parte ad-interim injunction in January 2022 along with local commissioner appointment, but the trial court dismissed the interim application in September 2023 after considering defendants' claims of independent adoption from family name and licenses.

Plaintiff appealed to Delhi High Court, which analyzed prior use, finding "DINDAYAL" as dominant essential element in plaintiff's composites amounting to standalone use, established prima facie goodwill via sales and reach, applied stricter confusion standard for medicinal goods citing Cadila, determined deceptive similarity and misrepresentation leading to passing off, rejected delay/acquiescence defenses due to plaintiff's vigilant oppositions and notices citing Midas Hygiene, held balance of convenience favored plaintiff as longer-established user, and found trial court erred in relying on copyright NOC/search certificates as irrelevant to trademark rights. The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order, and granted interim injunction restraining defendants from using the impugned marks pending suit.

• In a composite trademark, the dominant and essential element functions as the source identifier, and continuous use of the composite amounts to prior use of that essential mark notwithstanding absence of standalone use: para 39.
• A prima facie case of goodwill and reputation for passing off can be established through evidence of long use, substantial turnover, wide product range, consumer base, and marketing investments, and a single year's financial downturn does not displace sustained market presence: , para 40.
• A stricter standard applies to assess confusing similarity for marks relating to medicinal products due to potential harmful consequences, requiring lesser proof:  (2001) 5 SCC 73).
• Passing off requires misrepresentation in trade calculated to deceive consumers and cause foreseeable damage to another's goodwill:  para 42.
• Delay or laches does not defeat an injunction claim where adoption is prima facie dishonest: Dindayal Industries Ltd. v. Dindayal Ayurved Bhawan & Anr.,  para 44 
• Acquiescence is negated if the proprietor has opposed registration and issued notices, placing continued use at infringer's peril:  para 45.
• Balance of convenience favors the prior long-established user with demonstrated goodwill over recent entrants lacking comparable evidence: para 47.
• Copyright NOC under Section 45(1) of Copyright Act, 1957, search certificates, or label approvals are not determinative of trademark rights or evidence against infringement/passing off:  para 48.

Case Title: Dindayal Industries Ltd. Vs Dindayal Ayurved Bhawan :22.12.2025:FAO (COMM) 15/2024:2025:DHC:11707-DB:Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

CSJ Infrastructure Pvt Ltd Vs Mr. Akash Kohli

CSJ Infrastructure Pvt Ltd filed rectification petitions under Sections 47 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking cancellation of the impugned marks 'Elante Residencies', 'Elante Group', and 'Elante Residencies'/ 'ELANTE' registered in Class 37 by Mr. Akash Kohli, alleging infringement of its prior 'ELANTE' mark adopted in 2010 and used since 2011 for real estate and related services, with registrations in Classes 35 and 36; the petitioner discovered the respondents' use via Elante Residences Ltd (where Kohli is a director) in August 2024, sent a cease-and-desist notice, attempted pre-litigation mediation which failed in May 2025, and proceeded ex-parte as Kohli did not respond or appear.

The court reasoned that the petitioner is the prior adopter, user, and registrant, the marks are identical with 'ELANTE' as the dominant feature, services are similar leading to likely confusion and passing off, the adoption was mala fide, and there was no bona fide use by the registered proprietor, violating Sections 11(1)(a), 11(3)(a), 47, and 57 of the Act, while affirming that prior user rights override subsequent registrations. The petitions were allowed, directing the Registrar to remove the impugned marks from the register.

• A prior user's rights will override the rights of a subsequent user even though the latter's mark may be a registered trade mark: Neon Laboratories Ltd. v. Medical Technologies Ltd., (2016) 2 SCC 672 (Para 9).

[Case Title: CSJ Infrastructure Pvt Ltd Vs Mr. Akash Kohli & Anr., Order date: 27.11.2025, C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 184/2025: 2025:DHC:11178: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia.]

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Dabur India Limited Vs Ashok Kumar

Dabur India Limited filed a suit against Ashok Kumar and others for trademark infringement, copyright violation, passing off, and unfair competition involving its well-known mark "DABUR", where unknown defendants registered fraudulent domain names like daburdistributorships.in and daburdistributor.com to deceive the public by offering fake jobs, dealerships, and products, collecting money via misleading websites mimicking the plaintiff's content and logos, with incomplete WHOIS data hindering identification.

This case was part of a batch of matters addressing systemic cyber frauds through infringing domain names, involving domain name registrars (DNRs), registries, ICANN, banks, telecom providers, and government ministries, with proceedings spanning multiple hearings from 2022 to 2025, including interim injunctions granted ex-parte on March 3, 2022, extended to additional domains, and responses from stakeholders like ICANN, GoDaddy, and MeitY. The court reasoned that domain names form the online identity of businesses requiring protection against misuse for fraud, analyzed DNRs' obligations under ICANN agreements for verification and disclosure, privacy vs. legitimate interest under DPDP Act, banks' role in preventing mismatches via beneficiary name lookup, and intermediaries' due diligence for safe harbor, finding current systems insufficient leading to large-scale deception, thus necessitating stringent measures against non-compliant DNRs including loss of safe harbor and potential blocking. The court granted permanent injunction against the impugned domains, issued dynamic+ injunctions for similar future variations, directed DNRs to implement KYC verification, disclose registrant data within 72 hours, appoint Indian grievance officers, and cease default privacy protection, mandated government consultations for frameworks like NIXI's, required banks to enable beneficiary name lookup and follow SOPs for LEA cooperation, and listed the suit for further proceedings on January 28, 2026.

• Domain Name Registrars (DNRs) and Registry Operators must not offer privacy protection by default but only as a paid opt-in service, and shall disclose registrant details including name, contacts, addresses, and payment info to legitimate requesters, LEAs, or courts within 72 hours under Intermediary Guidelines 2021  Para 275(A)(i)-(ii)].
• Infringing domain names restrained by court order shall be permanently blocked from re-registration and not placed in common pools, with registries ensuring uniform implementation across DNRs  Para 275(A)(iii)].
• For well-known, invented, arbitrary, or fanciful marks with reputation in India, courts may issue injunctions against infringing domain names with different extensions or alphanumeric variations, which DNRs must enforce without promoting alternatives, risking loss of safe harbor under Section 79 IT Act, Para 275(A)(iv)-(v)].
• DNRs offering services in India must appoint Grievance Officers within one month, with email service on them sufficient for court orders; non-compliance may lead to blocking under Section 69A IT Act , Para 275(A)(ix)-(xi)].
• All DNRs must verify registrant details via e-KYC as per CERT-In circular dated April 28, 2022, and provide data to NIXI monthly if under its registry  Para 275(A)(xiii)-(xiv)].
• Government (MeitY, MHA) shall consult stakeholders for a NIXI-like framework for all DNRs, consider a nodal data repository, and block non-compliant entities; coordinate with ICANN for TMCH access; CGPDTM to publish well-known marks with authentic websites , Para 275(B)(xv)-(xvi)].
• Dynamic+ injunctions apply to identical marks, prefixes/suffixes causing confusion, or alphanumeric variations, with legitimate registrants able to seek court relief , Para 275(C)(xvii)].
• Banks must implement Beneficiary Bank Account Name Lookup per RBI circular December 30, 2024, and follow CEIB SOP dated May 31, 2024 for LEA requests  Para 275(D)(xviii)-(xix)].

Case Title: Dabur India Limited Vs Ashok Kumar and Ors:24th December, 2025: CS (COMM) 135/2022:2025:DHC:11862: Hon'ble Justice Ms. Prathiba M. Singh

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Colgate Palmolive Company Vs NIXI

Colgate Palmolive Company and its Indian subsidiary filed a commercial suit against the National Internet Exchange of India (NIXI) and an unknown registrant for infringement of their trademark "COLGATE" and related intellectual properties through a fraudulent domain name used to deceive the public by posing as the company, offering fake jobs, dealerships, and franchises, and collecting money via misleading websites mimicking the plaintiffs' content and logos.

This suit was clubbed with a batch of similar matters involving various trademark owners facing domain name misuse for fraud, counterfeit sales, and impersonation services, where registrant identities were hidden behind fictitious WHOIS details, untraceable emails, and privacy protections, complicating enforcement. Over multiple hearings from 2019 to 2025, the court impleaded domain name registrars (DNRs) like GoDaddy, Hosting Concepts, Newfold Digital, Verisign, and Registry Services, along with government entities such as MeitY, DoT, MHA, RBI, NPCI, UIDAI, Delhi Police, and banks, seeking affidavits, status reports, and submissions on systemic issues including financial fraud investigations, bank cooperation with law enforcement, payment detail mismatches, grievance officer appointments, and privacy features.

The court's reasoning examined the domain name system, roles and agreements under ICANN, NIXI, and Indian laws like the IT Act and Trademarks Act, finding DNRs and registries as intermediaries with due diligence obligations but insufficient safeguards against fraud, balancing privacy with disclosure needs, and emphasizing trademark owners' rights to prevent dilution and consumer deception through measures like dynamic injunctions.

The court concluded that large-scale frauds necessitated reforms and issued directions to DNRs/registries for mandatory disclosure, verification, grievance mechanisms, and compliance; to government for stakeholder consultations, blocking non-compliant DNRs, and policy updates; for dynamic+ injunctions extending to future similar domains; and to banks for implementing beneficiary name lookup to prevent mismatches, while granting the plaintiffs permanent injunction against the defendant's use of "COLGATE", delivery up of infringing material, rendition of accounts, damages of Rs. 2,00,05,000, domain blocking/transfer, and disposal of pending applications.

• Domain Name Registrars (DNRs) and Registry Operators are obligated to disclose registrant details upon court orders and suspend/lock infringing domains to protect third-party intellectual property rights, as their current mechanisms. Paras 163-200).
• Courts may direct DNRs and registries to implement safeguards like mandatory KYC, grievance officers, and privacy feature restrictions to prevent trademark misuse in domain registrations, recognizing domain names as extensions of business identity warranting protection against fraud  Paras 201-222).
• Non-compliant DNRs refusing court orders can face blocking directions under Section 69A of the IT Act, 2000, as intermediaries lose safe harbour for failing due diligence, with dynamic and dynamic+ injunctions extendable to future infringing domains  Paras 223-262).
• Banks must implement beneficiary bank account name lookup facilities to prevent payment mismatches in frauds, with enhanced cooperation protocols for law enforcement in cyber fraud investigations  Paras 236-250).
• Government authorities like MeitY and MHA shall conduct consultations and update policies for better coordination among stakeholders to curb domain-based financial frauds, including centralized databases for registrant data  Paras 248-250).

Case Title: Colgate Palmolive Company & Anr. Vs NIXI & Anr.:24.12.2025:CS(COMM) 193/2019 2025:DHC:111674: Hon'ble Justice Prathiba M. Singh

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Brahmaputra Distillery Vs Associated Alcohol And Beverages

Associated Alcohol and Beverages Company filed a commercial suit under Sections 134 and 135 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, against Brahmaputra Distillery seeking permanent injunction for trademark infringement, passing-off, and rendition of accounts regarding the label, trade-dress, and packaging of country spirit products, along with an application for ad-interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC, which was granted by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Jorhat on 12.11.2025, restraining the defendant from using similar labels and disposing assets.

Brahmaputra Distillery appealed to the Gauhati High Court under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) CPC, raising maintainability issues. The High Court examined the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, noting that Gauhati HC lacks ordinary original civil jurisdiction, thus cannot constitute a Commercial Court or Division except under specific enactments, and held a 2019 government notification designating such courts invalid as issued under a repealed 2015 Ordinance without saving effect for new actions post-repeal.

Reasoning that appeals from orders of Commercial Courts below District Judge level lie before the Commercial Appellate Court at District Judge level per Section 13(1), and ousting the High Court's ordinary appellate jurisdiction despite the suit's valuation exceeding Rs.20 lakh, the court decided the appeal was not maintainable before it, returned it to the appellant for presentation before the District Judge, Jorhat within three weeks, excluding time spent in High Court under Section 14 of Limitation Act, 1963, and suggested government issue fresh notifications under current law.

• The Gauhati High Court does not have jurisdiction as a "Commercial Court" under Section 6 or "Commercial Division" under Sections 4 and 7 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, due to absence of ordinary original civil jurisdiction, save for specific enactments like the Designs Act, 2000 (Para 12).
• Notification No. JDJ-111/2018-ESTT-JUDL-12 dated 13.02.2019, issued by the Government of Assam under the repealed Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Ordinance, 2015, is without jurisdiction and non-est in law, as Section 23 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 saves only prior actions, not empowering post-repeal issuances (Para 13).
• Appeals against orders passed by a Commercial Court below the level of District Judge, including ad-interim injunctions under Order XXXIX CPC in commercial disputes, must be filed before the Commercial Appellate Court at the District Judge level within 60 days as per Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, ousting the High Court's ordinary civil appellate jurisdiction regardless of pecuniary value (Paras 17-19).

Case Title: Brahmaputra Distillery And Anr Vs Associated Alcohol And Beverages Company: 18.12.2025:FAO/73/2025: 2025:GAU-AS:17631:Gauhati High Court :Honourable Mr. Justice Kalyan Rai Surana and Honourable Mr. Justice Manish Choudhury:

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Bhupinder Mehta Vs Sh Pradeep Bareja

Ms. Bhupinder Mehta filed a rectification petition under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking cancellation of the trademark 'BSM' (No. 5149074 in Class 11) registered in favor of Respondent No. 1, Pradeep Bareja, claiming prior adoption and use of the 'BSM' mark since 2014 for lighting products through her family business, with applications filed in 2015 and 2021, one abandoned, one registered in Class 9, and one opposed; she became aware of the impugned mark in June 2024 via opposition to her application.

Notice was issued on 02.09.2024, but Respondent No. 1 failed to file a reply or appear despite extensions, leading to ex-parte proceedings on 06.05.2025, with submissions heard on 12.11.2025 and judgment reserved. The court found the petitioner's averments uncontroverted, established her prior use and goodwill through sales figures up to ₹8.79 crore in 2022-23, promotion via expos and social media, and deemed the impugned mark deceptively similar phonetically, visually, and conceptually to the petitioner's mark for identical goods, likely causing confusion; relying on precedents, it held Respondent No. 1's adoption dishonest and in bad faith, overriding registration, and directed removal of the impugned mark from the register.

Law Point:

• The correct approach to decide the infringing nature of competing marks is to examine whether the defendants have adopted the essential features of the plaintiff's mark, with phonetic similarity being a significant factor, and if goods are identical, confusion cannot be excluded:  [Para 6.8].
• To determine deceptive similarity between marks, focus on broad and essential features without side-by-side comparison for minor differences; overall resemblance likely to mislead is sufficient:  [Para 6.8].
• Rectification of the Trade Marks Register is warranted when registration was applied for in bad faith:  [Para 6.9].
• Prior user's rights override those of a subsequent registered trademark owner, especially for identical/deceptively similar marks on identical goods adopted dishonestly [Paras 12, 14, 15].

Case Title: Bhupinder Mehta Vs Sh Pradeep Bareja"24.12.2025:C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 163/2024:2025:DHC:11863: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Astral Ltd Vs Ajay Enterprises

Astral Ltd, with its principal office in Ahmedabad and a subordinate sales and marketing office in Delhi, filed a suit in Delhi High Court against M/s Ajay Enterprises, based in Udaipur, Rajasthan, alleging infringement and passing off of its trademark 'ASTRAL'.

The defendant filed an application under Order VII Rules 10 and 11 CPC seeking rejection of the plaint for lack of territorial jurisdiction, arguing no cause of action in Delhi and that the suit should be in Ahmedabad, citing no evidence of sales in Delhi and relying on Supreme Court precedents like K. Narayanan v. S. Murali.

The plaintiff countered that the defendant's trademark application and admissions in opposition proceedings under Rule 45 of Trade Mark Rules, claiming pan-India availability including Delhi, created part cause of action there.

The court examined Sections 20 CPC and 134 Trade Marks Act, interpreting the Explanation to Section 20 as deeming a corporation to carry on business at a subordinate office if cause of action arises there, and held that where cause of action partly arises at both principal and subordinate office locations, courts at both have jurisdiction, as Section 134 provides an additional forum for plaintiff convenience without mutual exclusion. Referencing Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia and Ultra Home Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Purushottam Kumar Chaubey, the court found the defendant's nationwide promotion admission binding, establishing part cause of action in Delhi, and dismissed the application, confirming jurisdiction.

• Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 does not oust the applicability of Section 20 CPC and provides an additional remedy to the plaintiff to file a suit where it resides or carries on business (Para 19).
• Under the Explanation to Section 20 CPC, a corporation is deemed to carry on business at its principal office, or at a subordinate office in respect of a cause of action arising there (Para 20).
• The deeming provision in the Explanation to Section 20 CPC is read into Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act to determine where the plaintiff carries on business (Para 21).
• Where part cause of action arises at both the principal and subordinate offices of the plaintiff, courts at both locations have territorial jurisdiction, as these places are not mutually exclusive (Paras 23-27).
• When cause of action arises partly at the subordinate office location, that place is deemed where the plaintiff carries on business, enabling suit institution there under Section 134 Trade Marks Act read with Section 20 CPC (Paras 28-30).

Case Title: Astral Ltd Vs Ajay Enterprises:24.12.2025:CS(COMM) 540/2024:2025:DHC:11925: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Archidply Industries Limited Vs. Archit Nuwood Industries Private Limited

Archidply Industries Limited sued Archit Nuwood Industries Private Limited and others for trademark infringement, seeking permanent injunction to restrain defendants from using 'ARCHIT' and variants deceptively similar to plaintiff's 'ARCHID/ARCHIDPLY/ARCHIDLAM' marks. Due to inadvertent error, pages 50-56 of the plaint contained an affidavit supporting electronic records signed by an unrelated third party and attested in Tamil Nadu, while other affidavits were correctly signed by plaintiff's authorized representative Mr. Atul Krishna Pandey and attested in Delhi on the same date. Plaintiff filed application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC to amend by replacing those pages with correct affidavit, arguing the error was clerical, not deliberate, did not alter plaint contents or merits, and was sought promptly before defendants' written statement. Defendants opposed, contending it was impermissible replacement of document rather than amendment, error unexplained, notary and counsel's involvement suspicious, and violated CPC provisions. Court analyzed precedents on amendment scope, finding procedural rules are handmaids to justice, error appeared inadvertent from negligence without affecting case merits or causing prejudice, and allowed amendment to ensure proper adjudication, subject to plaintiff paying Rs. 25,000 costs to Delhi High Court Staff Welfare Fund within four weeks.

• The power to grant amendment of pleadings under Order VI Rule 17 CPC should be exercised liberally if it serves the ends of justice and can be allowed without injustice to the other side, even if due to negligence or inadvertence:  Para 14 
• Rules of procedure are handmaids to justice and should not defeat substantive rights; amendments cannot be refused merely on technical grounds or for inadvertent errors if no miscarriage of justice results: , Para 15 
• Non-compliance with procedural requirements, if curable and not deliberate, should not lead to rejection unless statutorily mandated or causing irremediable prejudice: , Para 14 
• Amendment to correct inadvertent errors like wrong signatures on affidavits is permissible under Order VI Rule 17 CPC if it does not alter the nature of the suit or merits and is necessary for proper adjudication: , Para 19.

Case Title: Archidply Industries Limited Vs. Archit Nuwood Industries Private Limited :24/12/2025:CS(COMM) 693/2024:2025:DHC:11922: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Amitoje India Pvt. Ltd. Vs Classic Display Systems

Amitoje India Pvt. Ltd. and Ravinder Kaur, engaged in manufacturing display units, sued Classic Display Systems Pvt. Ltd. for infringing their patent IN 533643 titled "A Foldable Product Display Unit" granted in April 2024 after a pre-grant opposition by the defendant was rejected, seeking permanent injunction against the defendant's similar foldable displays sold since at least 2022. 

The suit included an interim injunction application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC, while the defendant filed a counterclaim challenging the patent's validity on grounds of obviousness and prior use, relying on US Patent Publication 20100051568A1 as prior art not cited earlier. 

Procedurally, the court allowed reliance on this prior art for the interim hearing after initial disputes and recalls, noting no presumption of patent validity. Reasoning that the suit patent's key feature of side panels folding sideways in the same direction was a mere workshop improvement obvious to a person skilled in the art from the prior art, which did not teach away, the court found the defendant raised a credible challenge to validity under Section 64(1)(f) of the Patents Act, thus no prima facie case for injunction existed, balance of convenience favored the long-operating defendant, and any harm to plaintiffs could be compensated monetarily. The interim application was dismissed.

There is no presumption of validity of a patent even after grant by the Controller, and its validity can be challenged in court proceedings: Para 25 

For grant of interim injunction in patent infringement suits, if the defendant raises a credible challenge to the patent's validity (a serious question to be tried, not actual invalidity), no injunction should be granted: Para 27 

To determine obviousness/lack of inventive step, courts must follow sequential steps: identify the person skilled in the art, inventive concept, common general knowledge, differences from prior art, and whether differences are obvious without hindsight: Para 21.4.1 

A prior art "teaches away" only if it discourages or diverts the person skilled in the art from the claimed path, not merely by suggesting an alternative without negation: Para 84.

Minor alterations like changing the folding direction of components in a display unit constitute mere workshop improvements obvious to a skilled craftsman and lack inventive step: Para 82.

Case Title: Amitoje India Pvt. Ltd. Vs Classic Display Systems:24.12.2025:Case Number: CS(COMM) 765/2024 :2025:DHC:11991:: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Mini Pushkarna

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation] 

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

A.O. Smith Corporation & Anr. Vs. Star Smith Export Pvt. Ltd

The plaintiffs, proprietors of the well-known trade mark and trade name “A.O. SMITH” used globally since 1874 and in India since 2006 for water heaters and purification products, sued the defendants for infringement and passing off arising from the defendants’ use of “STAR SMITH” as a trade mark, trade name and domain name for identical and allied goods. 

An ex-parte ad-interim injunction was initially granted in 2022 restraining use of the impugned marks, though limited protection was given to the corporate name and domain name pending adjudication; this injunction was later made absolute in 2024, save for those two aspects, which were revived on review. 

The Court held that “SMITH” constituted the dominant and essential feature of the competing marks, that the defendants’ adoption in 2020 was prima facie dishonest and intended to ride on the plaintiffs’ goodwill, and that the plaintiffs’ registrations carried no disclaimer, entitling them to full statutory protection. Rejecting the defence that “SMITH” was generic or common to trade, the Court found the defendants estopped from such a plea having themselves sought registration of marks containing “SMITH”. 

Applying Section 29(5) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the Court held that use of the registered mark as part of a trade name for identical goods constituted infringement per se, and further held that the impugned domain name caused initial interest confusion and passing off. Consequently, finding a strong prima facie case, balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiffs and likelihood of irreparable harm, the Court granted an interim injunction restraining use of the impugned trade name and domain name in addition to the marks.

Law settled:

Use of a registered trade mark or its essential feature as part of a trade name for identical or allied goods constitutes infringement under Section 29(5) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and once statutory conditions are met, injunction must ordinarily follow:  paras 16–17.

Where a trade mark is registered without disclaimer, exclusivity must be determined from the registration certificate alone, and prior examination replies or alleged concessions before the Registry are irrelevant: paras 12–13.

A defendant who has applied for registration of a mark containing a particular element is estopped from contending that the same element is generic or common to trade (principle of approbate and reprobate):  paras 14–15.

Adoption of a deceptively similar domain name for allied goods giving rise to initial interest confusion amounts to passing off and is injunctable even though the Trade Marks Act does not expressly provide for domain names: paras 18–20.

Case Title: A.O. Smith Corporation Vs. Star Smith Export Pvt. Ltd.:24.12.2025:CS(COMM) 532/2022:2025:DHC:11885:DHC:Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]