Glorious Investment Limited Vs. Dunlop International Limited

Bar on Intra-Court Appeals in IPD Cases

Facts: Glorious Investment Limited had filed an application before the Deputy Registrar of Trademarks for registration of the trademark “DUNLOP” under the provisions of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Dunlop International Limited opposed this application, claiming prior rights and goodwill in the mark. Despite the objection, the Deputy Registrar, by order dated July 4, 2024, allowed Glorious Investment Limited’s application and permitted registration of the mark “DUNLOP.”

Dunlop International Limited, being aggrieved, preferred an appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 before the Single Judge of the Intellectual Property Rights Division (IPD) of the Calcutta High Court. The learned Single Judge, by an order dated June 11, 2025, set aside the order of the Deputy Registrar and remanded the matter for reconsideration after granting both parties a fresh opportunity of hearing.

Feeling dissatisfied, Glorious Investment Limited filed the present appeal before the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, contending that such a second appeal was maintainable under the Letters Patent and the Calcutta High Court Intellectual Property Division Rules, 2023.

Procedural Background: The sequence of proceedings began with the registration application before the Deputy Registrar of Trademarks, followed by an appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, before the Single Judge of the High Court, and finally culminated in the present appeal before the Division Bench (Commercial Appellate Division) of the same High Court.

The essential procedural question before the Bench was whether an intra-court (Letters Patent) appeal would lie from an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

The central issue was purely legal:Can a second appeal (intra-court appeal) be maintained before a Division Bench against an order passed by a Single Judge under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999?  This question required the court to interpret the interplay between Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the Intellectual Property Rights Division Rules, 2023 of the Calcutta High Court.

Arguments On behalf of the Respondent No. 1 (Dunlop International Limited): Respondent No.1 argued that this appeal was effectively a second appeal, which was barred by Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. According to him, once a Single Judge had exercised appellate jurisdiction under Section 91, no further appeal could lie, even under the Letters Patent. He referred to multiple provisions of the Trade Marks Act—Sections 18, 20, 21, 23, and 91—to show the hierarchical stages and absence of a provision for a second appeal. He relied on Supreme Court precedents such as Kamal Kumar Dutta v. Ruby General Hospital Ltd. (2006) 7 SCC 613, P.S. Sathappan v. Andhra Bank Ltd. (2004) 11 SCC 672, Vasanthi v. Venugopal (2017) 4 SCC 723, and the Delhi High Court Full Bench judgment in Avtar Narain Behal v. Subhash Chander Behal (ILR 2009 II Delhi 411).He further contended that Rule 2(o) of the Calcutta High Court Intellectual Property Division Rules, 2023 does not contemplate a second appeal against an appellate order of a Single Judge.

On behalf of the Respondent No. 2 (Deputy Registrar of Trademarks):He relied on Section 97 of the Trade Marks Act to show that appeals are limited to original orders, not appellate orders, and maintained that the Rules also did not envisage a further appeal.

On behalf of the Appellant (Glorious Investment Limited): Appellant argued that Section 100A of the Code applies only when a Single Judge hears an appeal from a Civil Court. Since the Registrar of Trademarks is not a Civil Court, the bar under Section 100A does not apply. He argued that Rule 4 and Rule 5 of the IPD Rules expressly provide for appeals before the Division Bench from orders passed by Single Judges in intellectual property matters. He relied heavily on the Division Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court in Promoshirt SM SA v. Armassuisse (2023 SCC OnLine Del 5531), and Resilient Innovations Pvt. Ltd. v. PhonePe Pvt. Ltd. (2023 SCC OnLine Del 2972), both of which held that intra-court appeals remain maintainable in such circumstances.

Judicial Reasoning and Analysis:The Court first revisited the classic judgment of the Supreme Court in National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick & Bros. Ltd. (1953) 1 SCC 794, where it was held that once a statute provides an appeal to the High Court, that appeal must follow the procedural framework of the High Court, including the availability of a further appeal under the Letters Patent, unless specifically barred.

However, the Calcutta High Court noted that Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was inserted later, creates such a bar. The Court observed that Section 100A clearly prohibits a further appeal from a decision of a Single Judge exercising appellate jurisdiction from an original or appellate decree or order.

The key question then became whether the Registrar of Trademarks could be considered a Civil Court and whether his decisions amounted to “orders” within the meaning of Section 100A.

The Court conducted a detailed examination of Section 127 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which provides that the Registrar has powers akin to a Civil Court, such as summoning witnesses, receiving evidence, and issuing commissions. The Bench compared these powers with those conferred upon the Company Law Board (CLB) under Section 10E of the Companies Act, 1956, which the Supreme Court had held in Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra) to possess “all the trappings of a Court.”

Following this analogy, the Bench concluded that the Registrar of Trademarks exercises quasi-judicial powers that carry “all the trappings of a Court.” Therefore, an appeal under Section 91 from the Registrar’s order before a Single Judge constitutes a first appeal, and any further appeal from that decision would amount to a second appeal, which is expressly barred by Section 100A of the Code.

The Court also observed that the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, which preceded the 1999 Act, specifically provided for a second appeal (under Section 109(5)), but this provision was consciously omitted in the new Act. Such legislative deletion clearly demonstrated the legislative intent to limit appeals to a single level.

The Court distinguished the Delhi High Court’s decision in Resilient Innovations (PhonePe case) on the ground that it dealt with an original proceeding under Section 57 (Rectification), whereas the present case arose from an appellate order under Section 91, to which Section 100A squarely applies.

Further, the Division Bench noted that even within the Calcutta High Court, a similar approach had been followed earlier in The Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs v. Vishnuprasad Mohanlal Panchal (2016 SCC OnLine Cal 10988), where a Letters Patent appeal from a Single Judge’s order under the Designs Act, 2000 was dismissed on the same reasoning.

Decision: After examining all authorities and statutory provisions, the Division Bench held that the present appeal was not maintainable. The Bench emphasized that Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure bars such intra-court appeals from orders of Single Judges passed in appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Division Bench dismissed TEMPAPO–IPD 5 of 2025 as not maintainable, along with the connected application GA–COM 1 of 2025, without any order as to costs.

Law Settled: This judgment settles the position that no intra-court appeal lies under the Letters Patent or under the IPD Rules of the Calcutta High Court from an order of a Single Judge passed under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The bar under Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure squarely applies to such matters because the Registrar of Trademarks possesses all the trappings of a Civil Court, and hence, any appeal from his order before a Single Judge amounts to a first appeal, making a subsequent appeal impermissible.

This decision aligns the Calcutta High Court’s position with the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Kamal Kumar Dutta v. Ruby General Hospital Ltd. (2006) 7 SCC 613, distinguishing the Delhi High Court’s contrary view in Promoshirt SM SA v. Armassuisse (2023 SCC OnLine Del 5531).

Case Title: Glorious Investment Limited Vs. Dunlop International Limited & Anr.

Case No.: TEMPAPO–IPD 5 of 2025

Date of Order: November 4, 2025

Court: High Court at Calcutta 

Coram: Hon’ble Justice Arijit Banerjee and Hon’ble Justice Om Narayan Rai

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi