B.C. Hasaram & Sons Vs Smt. Nirmala Agarwal

Clarification on Evidence-Based Damages in Trademark Infringement

Factual Background:  The case revolved around a dispute between two manufacturers of Ayurvedic eye drops. The respondent, Smt. Nirmala Agarwal, was the proprietor of M/s Karmayogi Sharbhang Muni, who claimed ownership of the registered trademark “Nayan Jyoti,” used for Ayurvedic eye drops since 1990. The appellant, B.C. Hasaram & Sons, operated under the management of Radha Krishna Chandnani and his sons, and was engaged in a similar business of manufacturing Ayurvedic medicines. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had adopted and used a deceptively similar mark “Amrit Nayan Jyoti” to market identical Ayurvedic eye drops, leading to confusion among consumers.

According to the plaintiff, her trademark “Nayan Jyoti” was well-known under Sections 2(1)(zg) and 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. It was also claimed that the defendant’s mark “Amrit Nayan Jyoti” not only infringed upon her registered trademark but also copied her trade dress—this included the orange-white packaging, typography, depiction of a man, and eye symbol—causing deception and dilution of her goodwill.

The plaintiff also referred to an earlier incident in 2009, when the Director, Ayurveda and Unani Services, Uttarakhand, had issued a warning to the defendant for similar misconduct, resulting in the suspension of their licence. After several years of compliance, the defendant allegedly resumed using the infringing mark in 2023, prompting the plaintiff to initiate legal proceedings.

To verify the alleged infringement, the plaintiff engaged an investigator, who placed an online order for “Amrit Nayan Jyoti” eye drops through the defendant’s website, haridwaryurved.com. The order was delivered in Bhajanpura, Delhi, confirming the defendant’s online sales in the capital city.

Procedural Background:  The plaintiff filed C.S. (COMM) No. 23/2023 before the Commercial Court, North-East District, Karkardooma Courts, seeking a decree of permanent injunction and damages worth ₹1 crore against the defendant. On 10 May 2023, the trial court granted an ex parte ad-interim injunction in favour of the plaintiff and appointed a Local Commissioner to conduct a search and seizure operation at the defendant’s premises. The Commissioner’s report detailed substantial quantities of goods and packaging materials bearing the infringing mark.

The defendant, however, failed to file its written statement, leading the court to strike off its defence on 5 October 2023. Later, the defendant submitted an affidavit stating that they were no longer manufacturing or selling the disputed products and consented to the decree in terms of one prayer clause of the plaint. Consequently, the interim injunction was made absolute, and the trial court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff.

In addition to granting a permanent injunction, the District Judge awarded ₹48,35,610 as compensatory damages and ₹2,27,514 as costs. The damages were based on the quantity of goods seized and the price of the plaintiff’s products, which the court treated as equivalent to the infringing goods. The decision relied heavily on precedents like Koninklijke Philips N.V. v. Amazestore (2019 SCC OnLine Del 8198) and Sandisk LLC v. B-One Mobile (2019 SCC OnLine Del 8022), which supported punitive damages in cases of repeated infringement.

Aggrieved by the computation of damages, B.C. Hasaram & Sons filed the present Regular First Appeal before the Delhi High Court under Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 read with Section 96 of the CPC.

Core Dispute: The appeal raised two core questions before the Delhi High Court: 1. Whether the District Court possessed the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit?  2. Whether the damages awarded were based on valid evidence and proper legal reasoning under Section 135 of the Trade Marks Act?

Appellant's Argument: Appellant argued that the District Court had erred both in jurisdictional finding and in computation of damages. It was contended that no admissible evidence was presented to substantiate the claim for ₹1 crore in damages. The computation of ₹48,35,610, according to the appellant, was based on flawed assumptions—that the seized goods represented one month’s production and that the defendant had been trading for two months before the injunction. The court, she argued, had wrongly applied Sandisk LLC where counterfeit goods were involved, unlike in the present case where the defendant held a valid licence.

The appellant relied on Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba v. Tosiba Appliances Co. (2024 SCC OnLine Del 5594) and Gujarat Ginning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Swadeshi Mills Co. Ltd. (1938 SCC OnLine Bom 94), emphasizing that damages must be proven through evidence and not speculation. The appellant also asserted that the District Court incorrectly used the product’s retail price (₹45 per unit) instead of calculating the profit margin or actual loss caused to the plaintiff, contrary to the principle of compensatory damages under Koninklijke Philips.

Respondent's Argument: Respondent defended the District Court’s judgment, submitting that the damages were reasonably estimated in the absence of the defendant’s financial records. The Local Commissioner’s report, he argued, provided sufficient foundation for computing damages, supported by decisions like Haldiram India Pvt. Ltd. v. Berachah Sales Corporation (2023 SCC OnLine Del 8599) and Puma SE v. Ashok Kumar (2023 SCC OnLine Del 2440), where damages were allowed based on reasonable estimation when the infringing party withheld key data. He further noted that the defendant had, through an affidavit, consented to a decree, implying acceptance of liability.

Judicial Reasoning and Analysis:  The Delhi High Court examined the case in detail, identifying the two principal issues as jurisdiction and quantification of damages.

On territorial jurisdiction, the Court referred to the precedent of Banyan Tree Holding (P) Ltd. v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy (2009 SCC OnLine Del 3780), which introduced the “sliding scale” and “effects” tests for online transactions. The Court emphasized that jurisdiction in online trademark disputes arises only when the website is interactive and specifically targets customers in the jurisdiction, causing injury to the plaintiff’s goodwill or business. Applying this principle, the Court found that the plaintiff’s investigator had successfully purchased the infringing product online, with delivery and invoicing in Bhajanpura, Delhi. Thus, the defendant’s activities satisfied both tests, validating the trial court’s jurisdictional finding.

On the issue of damages, the Court carefully analyzed Section 135 of the Trade Marks Act and Rule 20 of the Delhi High Court Intellectual Property Rights Division Rules, 2022, which govern the award of damages in IP disputes. The High Court clarified that a plaintiff claiming damages must provide a reasonable estimate backed by foundational facts and evidence, either documentary or oral, showing actual or probable loss. The Court reiterated that damages cannot rest on speculative calculations or assumptions unsupported by record.

The Court observed that the plaintiff’s claim for damages was first introduced in the written submissions and not supported by affidavit evidence. No witness was cross-examined on the computation of damages, and the trial court’s reliance on the Local Commissioner’s report to determine one month’s stock as the basis for damages was deemed speculative. The assumption that the defendant’s business operated for two months before injunction was also found unsubstantiated.

In light of Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba (supra), the Bench underscored that speculative or hypothetical assertions cannot justify substantial monetary awards. The plaintiff, having failed to provide a rational evidentiary basis linking the infringement to actual financial loss, had not discharged the burden of proof. Therefore, the damages decree was unsustainable in law.

The Court further emphasized that compensatory damages should reflect either actual loss to the plaintiff or unjust enrichment of the defendant. The absence of a reasoned, evidence-based calculation risked arbitrary enrichment, which goes against the compensatory principles underlying Section 135 of the Trade Marks Act.

Final Reasoning:  The Delhi High Court upheld the finding of territorial jurisdiction and the injunction restraining the defendant from using the mark “Amrit Nayan Jyoti.” However, it set aside the award of ₹48,35,610 as damages on the ground of lack of evidence and misapplication of principles. The matter was remanded to the District Court for fresh determination limited to the issue of damages and account of profits. Both parties were granted liberty to produce evidence and material to assist the Court in re-evaluating damages in accordance with law. No order as to costs was passed.

Conclusion:  This decision by the Delhi High Court reinforces the importance of evidence-based adjudication in intellectual property disputes. While the Court firmly upheld the territorial jurisdiction principle from Banyan Tree, it reiterated that damages in trademark cases cannot be based on assumptions or estimates but must be proven through reliable evidence. The ruling aligns with the emerging jurisprudence that separates injunctive relief—which may be granted on a prima facie showing of infringement—from compensatory damages, which demand concrete proof of loss or gain.

By remanding the matter for fresh assessment, the Court ensured fairness and prevented arbitrary enrichment while reaffirming the procedural discipline necessary for quantification of damages in IP litigation.

Case Title: B.C. Hasaram & Sons Vs Smt. Nirmala Agarwal, Proprietor of Karmayogi Sharbhang Muni

Case Number: RFA (COMM) 214/2025 

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:9867-DB

Date of Judgment: 12 November 2025

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Dabur India Limited Vs Patanjali Ayurved Limited

Disparagement in Ayurvedic Product Advertising

Facts: Dabur India Limited, a household name in the field of Ayurveda since 1884, approached the Delhi High Court seeking protection against what it termed as a false, malicious, and disparaging advertising campaign launched by Patanjali Ayurved Limited and its associate company, Patanjali Foods Limited. Dabur contended that Patanjali had issued an advertisement for its product “Patanjali Special Chyawanprash” that described other Chyawanprash available in the market—including Dabur’s—as “Dhoka” (deception). The advertisement showed a mother feeding her child Chyawanprash, followed by the voice-over “Chalo Dhoka Khao,” and featured Baba Ramdev, who declared that “most consumers are being deceived in the name of Chyawanprash.”

Dabur claimed that the said advertisement directly insulted and defamed the entire class of Chyawanprash manufacturers, creating a false impression that all other brands—including Dabur’s—were fake, inferior, and deceptive. Dabur, being the market leader with over 61% market share and having introduced Chyawanprash commercially in 1949, asserted that this advertisement had a direct and irreparable impact on its goodwill and consumer trust.

Procedural Background

The suit was filed under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 seeking a permanent and mandatory injunction restraining the defendants from broadcasting the impugned advertisement and from engaging in unfair competition, disparagement, and defamation. Dabur also sought damages and removal of the advertisement from all media platforms.

The Core Dispute: The dispute revolved around whether the Patanjali advertisement, which labeled most Chyawanprash products as “Dhoka” (deception), amounted to generic disparagement of Dabur’s product and whether such an advertisement was protected under the right to commercial free speech guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

Dabur argued that the advertisement directly attacked all Chyawanprash products and, by necessary implication, disparaged its own product, which dominates the market. Patanjali, on the other hand, claimed that the advertisement merely exercised its right to “commercial puffery” and that it neither identified nor referred to Dabur’s product, explicitly or implicitly.

Plaintiff’s Submissions

Dabur argued that it has been manufacturing Chyawanprash under a valid AYUSH license in accordance with the Rasa Tantra Saar Va Siddha Prayog Sangraha, one of the authoritative texts under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. It emphasized that the recipe for Chyawanprash is a classical Ayurvedic formulation mentioned in several recognized texts and that any manufacturer following such formula cannot be called deceptive.

Dabur relied on multiple precedents:  Dabur India Ltd. v. Emami Ltd., 2004 SCC OnLine Del 431 — holding that generic disparagement of a class of products affects the market leader.  Dabur India Ltd. v. Colgate Palmolive India Ltd., 2004 SCC OnLine Del 718 — recognizing that even indirect disparagement of a rival product without naming it is actionable.Karamchand Appliances Pvt. Ltd. v. Adhikari Brothers, 2005 SCC OnLine Del 1427 — affirming that disparagement of a product class is impermissible even if generic.HUL v. Reckitt, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 2133 — holding that false, misleading, or generic disparagement is not protected speech.Beiersdorf AG v. HUL, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 3443 — observing that untrue statements of fact in advertisements are impermissible.

Dabur asserted that Patanjali’s use of the word “Dhoka” was a deliberate attempt to malign competitors and mislead consumers. It further relied on the earlier case Dabur India Ltd. v. Patanjali Ayurved Ltd., CS(Comm) 1195/2024, where a similar advertisement had been restrained by the Delhi High Court, and where the Division Bench later permitted only fair comparisons, provided they did not deride a competitor’s product. Dabur claimed the new advertisement violated that express judicial direction.

Defendants’ Submissions:  Patanjali argued that the advertisement was a legitimate exercise of its right to commercial speech under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, as recognized in Tata Press Ltd. v. MTNL, (1995) 5 SCC 139. It contended that advertisements inherently involve exaggeration or “puffery,” and the term “Dhoka” was used in a general, humorous manner, not directed at any specific brand.

Patanjali maintained that there was no mention, identification, or depiction of Dabur or any other brand, and thus no cause of action arose. The company claimed the commercial merely highlighted its own product’s superior qualities, such as containing 51 Ayurvedic herbs, which is permissible under comparative advertising.

The defendants also cited Marico Ltd. v. Adani Wilmar Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine Del 1513, and Havells India Ltd. v. Amritanshu Khaitan, 2015:DHC:2495, to argue that comparative advertisements are allowed to “play in the grey area,” provided they are not wholly false. They contended that “a reasonable viewer” would understand such language as a promotional exaggeration, not a literal accusation.

Judicial Reasoning: The Court  noticed that although commercial advertisements are protected under Article 19(1)(a), this protection is not absolute and is subject to the reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2), especially in cases involving misleading or defamatory content. An advertiser’s right to promote its own product does not extend to defaming another’s.

The Court noted that while comparative advertising is permissible, an advertiser must not cross the line into disparagement. The distinction lies between saying “my product is better” (permissible) and “your product is bad” (impermissible).

Upon viewing the advertisement in its entirety, the Court found that the message conveyed was not limited to promoting Patanjali’s product but went further to allege that all other Chyawanprash, by implication, were “deceptive.” The use of a strong term like “Dhoka,” combined with the stature of Baba Ramdev—a public figure and perceived authority on Ayurveda—gave the message an air of authenticity and seriousness likely to mislead the public.

The Court found that this went beyond mere puffery and amounted to generic disparagement of the entire class of Chyawanprash products, adversely impacting Dabur, the market leader. The judge referred to Dabur v. Emami, HUL v. Gujarat Cooperative, and Reckitt v. Wipro Enterprises, reiterating that even indirect disparagement of a class of products is actionable.

It was further held that all manufacturers of Chyawanprash who possess valid AYUSH licenses and follow statutory formulations under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act cannot be called deceptive. Any representation suggesting otherwise was false and misleading.

Decision:  The Court held that Dabur had made out a strong prima facie case for grant of interim relief. The balance of convenience lay in favour of Dabur, as the advertisement had the potential to cause irreparable damage to its reputation and goodwill. Court restrained Patanjali Ayurved Limited, Patanjali Foods Limited, and all associated entities from broadcasting, publishing, or disseminating the impugned advertisement or any similar advertisement that referred to Chyawanprash as “Dhoka” or “deceptive,” whether in electronic, print, or social media. The Court directed Patanjali to take down the advertisement from all platforms, including YouTube and Instagram, within 72 hours.

Conclusion:  This judgment reinforces the boundary between permissible commercial puffery and unlawful disparagement. It underscores that freedom of commercial speech cannot be used as a shield for misleading the public or defaming competitors. While companies may extol their own products, they cannot malign others under the guise of comparative advertising. Particularly when the subject matter concerns Ayurvedic or medicinal formulations governed by statutory standards, false or misleading claims are strictly impermissible.  The Court’s reasoning harmonizes constitutional free speech with statutory consumer protection, ensuring that advertising remains competitive but fair.

Case Title: Dabur India Limited Vs Patanjali Ayurved Limited & Anr.

Case Number: CS (COMM) 1182/2025

Date of Order: 06 November 2025

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Hon’ble Judge: Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Vinay Aggarwal Vs. State of NCT

Misuse of Criminal Law in Corporate Disputes

Facts of the Case:  This case arises out of a long-standing family and business dispute between the petitioner, Shri Vinay Aggarwal, and his own family members—his father, Shri Jai Gopal, and his younger brother, Shri Ajay Aggarwal. The petitioner claimed to have been engaged in the business of chemicals and chemical compounds used in manufacturing Holi colours and gulal since 1989, under the trademark “Gopal.” To expand the business, he incorporated a private limited company named M/s. Laxmi Narain Jai Gopal Products Pvt. Ltd. in 1994, with its registered office at 18/8, Shakti Nagar, Delhi. The petitioner became the Chairman, while his brother Ajay Aggarwal was made a Director. The business allegedly continued under the same brand name “Gopal,” with the company’s trade name and trademarks being applied for registration under the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

According to the petitioner, due to health complications including multiple surgeries, he was unable to participate actively in the management of the company and relied entirely on his father and brother. In 2011, he discovered that his brother Ajay Aggarwal, with the support of their father, had secretly filed two applications in 2003 for registration of the trademarks “Gopal” and “Gopal Gold” in his personal name, without the petitioner’s knowledge. These trademarks, the petitioner alleged, were being used by Ajay Aggarwal to sell similar products through a sole proprietorship firm titled M/s. Laxmi Narain Jai Gopal & Sons, which was distinct from the original company. This act, according to the petitioner, amounted to cheating, forgery, and criminal breach of trust, as the brother had allegedly diverted the goodwill, reputation, and business assets of the company for personal profit.

The petitioner further alleged that in December 2011, he discovered purchase invoices showing that the address of the company had been illegally changed from its registered office at Shakti Nagar to another address in Rohini without his consent. Upon visiting the company’s premises, he found that all company records, furniture, and equipment had been removed and locked away by his father and brother. The petitioner accused them of misappropriating company funds, forging documents, and illegally benefiting from the reputation of the “Gopal” brand, which he claimed to have built over decades.

Procedural Background:  The petitioner filed a complaint under Sections 199 and 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, read with Section 156(3) CrPC, seeking registration of an FIR against the respondents for offences under Sections 406, 420, 463, 467, 468, 471, 506, and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. He also requested the court to direct the police to investigate the alleged fraud and forgery.

The learned Metropolitan Magistrate (MM), after recording the preliminary evidence of the complainant and several witnesses, including officials from the Trade and Tax Department and the Trademark Registry, dismissed the complaint on 5 September 2016. The Magistrate held that the allegations were not substantiated by documentary evidence and that the dispute appeared to be of a civil and corporate nature, not criminal. The petitioner challenged this order before the learned Additional Sessions Judge (ASJ) through Criminal Revision No. 58482/2016, but the ASJ, by an order dated 3 November 2016, upheld the decision of the MM.

Aggrieved, the petitioner approached the Delhi High Court under Section 482 CrPC, contending that both lower courts had failed to appreciate the prima facie evidence and had wrongly dismissed the complaint without considering that, at the stage of summoning, only a tentative view is required and not a detailed inquiry.

Nature of the Dispute: The core of the dispute revolved around three main issues. First, whether the petitioner could substantiate his claim that he had been carrying on the business of manufacturing and selling Holi colours under the brand name “Gopal” since 1989. Second, whether his brother’s act of registering the trademarks “Gopal” and “Gopal Gold” in 2003 in his own name constituted forgery, cheating, or criminal breach of trust. And third, whether the alleged removal of company records, assets, and funds by the respondents amounted to criminal misappropriation or was merely part of an internal family and business conflict better addressed through civil or company law remedies.

The petitioner’s case was built on the argument that his health had kept him away from business management and that his family members had taken advantage of his absence to usurp his proprietary rights and divert business assets. He claimed that these actions were deliberate and fraudulent, aimed at excluding him from the company and stealing his intellectual property and business identity.

The respondents, on the other hand, maintained that the petitioner’s claims were baseless and contradicted by evidence. They contended that it was, in fact, Ajay Aggarwal who had been running the proprietorship M/s. Laxmi Narain Jai Gopal since 1989–90 and had legitimately registered the trademarks in 2003. They denied any illegal removal of records or misappropriation, asserting that these issues had already been adjudicated in prior proceedings before the Company Law Board and civil courts.

Detailed Judicial Reasoning and Discussion: The Court found that there was no documentary evidence or corroborative witness testimony to prove this claim. The petitioner had failed to produce basic materials such as business registration, bank statements, invoices, or tax records from that period. His argument that all records were taken away by the respondents was found insufficient because, as the Court noted, certain documents would have remained accessible to him, especially those relating to registration and personal business transactions. Thus, the Court concluded that the petitioner’s foundational claim of running a business since 1989 remained unsubstantiated.

On the issue of trademark registration, the Court accepted that the trademarks “Gopal” and “Gopal Gold” were indeed registered in 2003 in the name of Ajay Aggarwal. However, it emphasized that trademark registration in itself does not constitute a criminal act. For offences such as cheating under Section 420 IPC or forgery under Section 463 IPC, there must be clear evidence of fraudulent intent or wrongful gain. Since the petitioner’s claim of prior ownership was unproven, the subsequent registration of trademarks by his brother could not, by itself, be treated as fraudulent. Moreover, the petitioner had not filed any rectification petition under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 to challenge the registration, which weakened his assertion of prior ownership.

With respect to the alleged removal of company records, the Court found that the petitioner had only produced his oral testimony without any supporting material. No independent witness testified that the respondents had removed or concealed company records or assets. The respondents, on their part, pointed out that similar allegations had already been raised before the Company Law Board in Company Petition No. 19(ND)/2013, which had been rejected by the Board in its order dated 15 February 2013. The Board had even appointed a Chartered Accountant to audit the company’s accounts, who found no irregularities or misappropriation attributable to the respondents. The High Court held that these findings of the Company Law Board significantly undermined the petitioner’s allegations of criminal breach of trust and misappropriation.

The Court also noted that a civil suit concerning trademark ownership (Civil Suit No. 50/2013) had been decided earlier, in which it was clearly recorded that the trademarks “Gopal” and “Gopal Gold” were registered in Ajay Aggarwal’s name since 2003, and that no rectification application had been filed by the petitioner. In light of these concurrent civil and quasi-judicial findings, the High Court concluded that the petitioner’s attempt to pursue criminal proceedings was essentially an abuse of process, seeking to criminalize a civil and family business dispute.

Court further observed that for a magistrate to issue summons under criminal law, the standard is whether a prima facie offence is made out. Mere suspicion or allegations without supporting evidence cannot justify summoning. The petitioner’s evidence did not meet this standard, as it largely consisted of self-serving statements without corroboration. The Court agreed with both the Metropolitan Magistrate and the Additional Sessions Judge that no criminal offence had been made out against the respondents.

Final Decision: The Delhi High Court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts, observing that there was no prima facie material to substantiate the allegations of cheating, criminal breach of trust, or forgery. The Court held that the dispute was, at its core, a family and business conflict with civil remedies available under company and intellectual property laws. It reiterated that criminal law should not be used as a weapon in family business disputes or commercial disagreements.

Accordingly, the Court dismissed the petition, affirming the orders dated 5 September 2016 and 3 November 2016 of the Metropolitan Magistrate and the Additional Sessions Judge, respectively. The judgment concluded that there was no merit in the petition and that the petitioner had failed to produce any cogent evidence justifying the initiation of criminal proceedings. All pending applications were disposed of accordingly.

Analytical Perspective:  This judgment exemplifies the judiciary’s cautious approach in distinguishing between civil and criminal liability in cases arising from family or business disputes. While the petitioner alleged forgery and criminal breach of trust, the absence of concrete evidence and the existence of parallel civil proceedings revealed that the matter was fundamentally civil in nature. The High Court reaffirmed the settled principle that criminal law cannot be invoked merely to settle private or commercial scores. By referring to findings of the Company Law Board and earlier civil suits, the Court reinforced the need for consistency in judicial reasoning and the avoidance of conflicting verdicts on identical facts.

The ruling also highlights the importance of evidentiary discipline. Mere allegations of wrongdoing, unsupported by verifiable documentation or witness testimony, cannot justify the serious step of summoning a person to face criminal trial. The Court’s insistence on this evidentiary standard underscores the principle that criminal prosecution must rest on credible prima facie evidence, not conjecture or suspicion.

Case Title: Vinay Aggarwal Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Ors.

Case Number: CRL.M.C. 1262/2017

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:9793

Date of Decision: 10 November 2025

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Coram: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Neena Bansal Krishna

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Rajneet Singh & Ors. Vs. State of NCT of Delhi

Quashing of Non-Compoundable Offences in Trademark Disputes

Facts of the Case: The matter arose out of an FIR No. 460/2024 dated 21st October 2024, registered under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 at Police Station Bara Hindu Rao, Delhi. The FIR was based on a complaint filed by BrandMonitor, acting on behalf of M/s. Gianni Versace S.R.L., a globally recognized luxury fashion brand having its registered office in Milan, Italy. The complaint alleged that certain entities operating within the North Delhi district were involved in the sale, storage, and advertisement of counterfeit goods bearing the trademarks of “Versace”. According to the complainant, these activities amounted to infringement of its registered trademarks and constituted offences under the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

After the FIR was lodged, investigation commenced against the accused persons, namely the petitioners in this case. During the course of time, the petitioners entered into negotiations with the complainant and ultimately reached an amicable settlement. Pursuant to this, M/s. Gianni Versace S.R.L. expressed that it no longer wished to pursue criminal proceedings against the accused. Each petitioner executed a separate settlement agreement with the complainant, agreeing to pay the agreed settlement amounts. The complainant, through its authorized representative, filed an affidavit and No Objection Certificate (NOC) before the Court, confirming that the disputes had been settled voluntarily and without any pressure or coercion.

Procedural Background: Following the settlement, the petitioners filed the present petition under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (corresponding to Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973), seeking quashing of the FIR and all subsequent proceedings arising therefrom. During the hearing, Mr. Vinay Choudhary, the authorized representative of Gianni Versace S.R.L., appeared in person and confirmed that the complainant had indeed settled the matter voluntarily, received the agreed sums, and did not wish to continue with the criminal case. The State, represented by its Additional Public Prosecutor, was also heard, and the Investigating Officer verified the presence and identity of the complainant’s representative.

The petitioners argued that since the matter had been resolved amicably and the complainant did not wish to proceed, continuing the criminal proceedings would serve no purpose and would merely result in wastage of judicial resources. The petitioners, therefore, sought quashing of the FIR on the basis of the settlement.

The Core Dispute: The central question before the Court was whether the FIR registered under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 could be quashed in the exercise of inherent powers under Section 528 BNSS (Section 482 CrPC) when the offences were technically non-compoundable in nature but the parties had amicably settled the dispute. The Court had to balance two competing considerations—first, that offences under the Trade Marks Act involve elements of public interest since they deal with counterfeiting and consumer deception; and second, that continuation of proceedings after a bona fide settlement would be futile and contrary to the interests of justice.

Detailed Reasoning and Judicial Discussion:The Court acknowledged that offences under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 are not compoundable under Section 320 CrPC. However, the High Court retains the inherent power to quash criminal proceedings under Section 528 BNSS (formerly Section 482 CrPC) in appropriate cases where the parties have reached a genuine settlement and the continuation of proceedings would serve no useful purpose.

The Court first referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab & Anr., (2012) 10 SCC 303, where it was held that even non-compoundable offences could be quashed by the High Court if the settlement between the parties was bona fide and the continuation of prosecution would be an exercise in futility. The Court quoted relevant portions from Gian Singh, emphasizing that the ultimate objective of the criminal justice process is to secure justice and not to pursue proceedings mechanically when the complainant no longer wishes to continue.

The Court then relied upon Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr., (2014) 6 SCC 466, where the Supreme Court elaborated guiding principles for quashing criminal proceedings on the basis of compromise. In that judgment, the Apex Court observed that while offences of a heinous or serious nature involving public morality or state interest should not be quashed merely due to a private settlement, criminal cases having a predominantly civil or commercial nature could be quashed to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of the process of law. Justice Narula extracted the key principles from Narinder Singh, noting that the High Court must assess whether the possibility of conviction is remote and whether continuing the case would cause oppression and prejudice to the accused.

Applying these principles, the Delhi High Court recognized that offences under the Trade Marks Act—though linked to public interest—often arise in a commercial context involving disputes between trademark proprietors and alleged infringers. In the present case, the complainant, a reputed international brand, had confirmed a voluntary and complete settlement, had accepted payment, and had expressed its desire not to continue with the criminal case. Therefore, the Court reasoned that the likelihood of conviction was remote because the complainant, being the main prosecution witness, was no longer willing to support the charges. The continuation of such proceedings would thus not advance the cause of justice but instead burden the judicial system.

Court emphasized that while offences under the Trade Marks Act protect public and consumer interest, the Court must also consider the practicality of prosecution in a situation where the aggrieved party has reconciled and withdrawn its complaint. Continuing a prosecution that has lost prosecutorial support would serve no real public purpose. Accordingly, the Court held that it was appropriate to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR and all proceedings emanating therefrom to secure the ends of justice.

However, the Court noted that since the state machinery had been set in motion through the registration of the FIR and subsequent investigation, it was appropriate to impose a nominal cost on the petitioners. Thus, the Court directed each petitioner to deposit Rs. 5,000/- with the Delhi Police Welfare Fund within four weeks.

Decision:  The Delhi High Court allowed the petition and quashed FIR No. 460/2024 dated 21st October 2024, registered under Sections 103 and 104 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 at Police Station Bara Hindu Rao, Delhi, along with all consequential proceedings. The Court found that the matter had been amicably resolved, the complainant had voluntarily withdrawn its grievance, and continuation of the criminal proceedings would only amount to misuse of judicial resources. The petitioners were directed to deposit the prescribed costs as a token responsibility toward the State machinery. The Court concluded by expecting the parties to adhere to the terms of their respective settlement agreements.

Case Title: Rajneet Singh & Ors. Vs. State of NCT of Delhi & Anr.

Case Number: CRL.M.C. 1291/2025, CRL.M.A. 5805/2025

Date of Decision: 07 November 2025

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjeev Narula

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Glorious Investment Limited Vs. Dunlop International Limited

Bar on Intra-Court Appeals in IPD Cases

Facts: Glorious Investment Limited had filed an application before the Deputy Registrar of Trademarks for registration of the trademark “DUNLOP” under the provisions of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Dunlop International Limited opposed this application, claiming prior rights and goodwill in the mark. Despite the objection, the Deputy Registrar, by order dated July 4, 2024, allowed Glorious Investment Limited’s application and permitted registration of the mark “DUNLOP.”

Dunlop International Limited, being aggrieved, preferred an appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 before the Single Judge of the Intellectual Property Rights Division (IPD) of the Calcutta High Court. The learned Single Judge, by an order dated June 11, 2025, set aside the order of the Deputy Registrar and remanded the matter for reconsideration after granting both parties a fresh opportunity of hearing.

Feeling dissatisfied, Glorious Investment Limited filed the present appeal before the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, contending that such a second appeal was maintainable under the Letters Patent and the Calcutta High Court Intellectual Property Division Rules, 2023.

Procedural Background: The sequence of proceedings began with the registration application before the Deputy Registrar of Trademarks, followed by an appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, before the Single Judge of the High Court, and finally culminated in the present appeal before the Division Bench (Commercial Appellate Division) of the same High Court.

The essential procedural question before the Bench was whether an intra-court (Letters Patent) appeal would lie from an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

The central issue was purely legal:Can a second appeal (intra-court appeal) be maintained before a Division Bench against an order passed by a Single Judge under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999?  This question required the court to interpret the interplay between Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the Intellectual Property Rights Division Rules, 2023 of the Calcutta High Court.

Arguments On behalf of the Respondent No. 1 (Dunlop International Limited): Respondent No.1 argued that this appeal was effectively a second appeal, which was barred by Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. According to him, once a Single Judge had exercised appellate jurisdiction under Section 91, no further appeal could lie, even under the Letters Patent. He referred to multiple provisions of the Trade Marks Act—Sections 18, 20, 21, 23, and 91—to show the hierarchical stages and absence of a provision for a second appeal. He relied on Supreme Court precedents such as Kamal Kumar Dutta v. Ruby General Hospital Ltd. (2006) 7 SCC 613, P.S. Sathappan v. Andhra Bank Ltd. (2004) 11 SCC 672, Vasanthi v. Venugopal (2017) 4 SCC 723, and the Delhi High Court Full Bench judgment in Avtar Narain Behal v. Subhash Chander Behal (ILR 2009 II Delhi 411).He further contended that Rule 2(o) of the Calcutta High Court Intellectual Property Division Rules, 2023 does not contemplate a second appeal against an appellate order of a Single Judge.

On behalf of the Respondent No. 2 (Deputy Registrar of Trademarks):He relied on Section 97 of the Trade Marks Act to show that appeals are limited to original orders, not appellate orders, and maintained that the Rules also did not envisage a further appeal.

On behalf of the Appellant (Glorious Investment Limited): Appellant argued that Section 100A of the Code applies only when a Single Judge hears an appeal from a Civil Court. Since the Registrar of Trademarks is not a Civil Court, the bar under Section 100A does not apply. He argued that Rule 4 and Rule 5 of the IPD Rules expressly provide for appeals before the Division Bench from orders passed by Single Judges in intellectual property matters. He relied heavily on the Division Bench judgment of the Delhi High Court in Promoshirt SM SA v. Armassuisse (2023 SCC OnLine Del 5531), and Resilient Innovations Pvt. Ltd. v. PhonePe Pvt. Ltd. (2023 SCC OnLine Del 2972), both of which held that intra-court appeals remain maintainable in such circumstances.

Judicial Reasoning and Analysis:The Court first revisited the classic judgment of the Supreme Court in National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick & Bros. Ltd. (1953) 1 SCC 794, where it was held that once a statute provides an appeal to the High Court, that appeal must follow the procedural framework of the High Court, including the availability of a further appeal under the Letters Patent, unless specifically barred.

However, the Calcutta High Court noted that Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was inserted later, creates such a bar. The Court observed that Section 100A clearly prohibits a further appeal from a decision of a Single Judge exercising appellate jurisdiction from an original or appellate decree or order.

The key question then became whether the Registrar of Trademarks could be considered a Civil Court and whether his decisions amounted to “orders” within the meaning of Section 100A.

The Court conducted a detailed examination of Section 127 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which provides that the Registrar has powers akin to a Civil Court, such as summoning witnesses, receiving evidence, and issuing commissions. The Bench compared these powers with those conferred upon the Company Law Board (CLB) under Section 10E of the Companies Act, 1956, which the Supreme Court had held in Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra) to possess “all the trappings of a Court.”

Following this analogy, the Bench concluded that the Registrar of Trademarks exercises quasi-judicial powers that carry “all the trappings of a Court.” Therefore, an appeal under Section 91 from the Registrar’s order before a Single Judge constitutes a first appeal, and any further appeal from that decision would amount to a second appeal, which is expressly barred by Section 100A of the Code.

The Court also observed that the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, which preceded the 1999 Act, specifically provided for a second appeal (under Section 109(5)), but this provision was consciously omitted in the new Act. Such legislative deletion clearly demonstrated the legislative intent to limit appeals to a single level.

The Court distinguished the Delhi High Court’s decision in Resilient Innovations (PhonePe case) on the ground that it dealt with an original proceeding under Section 57 (Rectification), whereas the present case arose from an appellate order under Section 91, to which Section 100A squarely applies.

Further, the Division Bench noted that even within the Calcutta High Court, a similar approach had been followed earlier in The Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs v. Vishnuprasad Mohanlal Panchal (2016 SCC OnLine Cal 10988), where a Letters Patent appeal from a Single Judge’s order under the Designs Act, 2000 was dismissed on the same reasoning.

Decision: After examining all authorities and statutory provisions, the Division Bench held that the present appeal was not maintainable. The Bench emphasized that Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure bars such intra-court appeals from orders of Single Judges passed in appellate jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Division Bench dismissed TEMPAPO–IPD 5 of 2025 as not maintainable, along with the connected application GA–COM 1 of 2025, without any order as to costs.

Law Settled: This judgment settles the position that no intra-court appeal lies under the Letters Patent or under the IPD Rules of the Calcutta High Court from an order of a Single Judge passed under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The bar under Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure squarely applies to such matters because the Registrar of Trademarks possesses all the trappings of a Civil Court, and hence, any appeal from his order before a Single Judge amounts to a first appeal, making a subsequent appeal impermissible.

This decision aligns the Calcutta High Court’s position with the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Kamal Kumar Dutta v. Ruby General Hospital Ltd. (2006) 7 SCC 613, distinguishing the Delhi High Court’s contrary view in Promoshirt SM SA v. Armassuisse (2023 SCC OnLine Del 5531).

Case Title: Glorious Investment Limited Vs. Dunlop International Limited & Anr.

Case No.: TEMPAPO–IPD 5 of 2025

Date of Order: November 4, 2025

Court: High Court at Calcutta 

Coram: Hon’ble Justice Arijit Banerjee and Hon’ble Justice Om Narayan Rai

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Siddiqua Begum Khan Vs Union of India

Posthumous Privacy and Cinematic Freedom

Factual Background:The case arises out of a legal challenge filed by Ms. Siddiqua Begum Khan, the daughter and surviving legal heir of the late Smt. Shah Bano Begum. The petitioner sought to restrain the release, promotion, and exhibition of a Hindi feature film titled “Haq”, which was scheduled for release on 7th November 2025. The film claimed to be inspired by the historical Shah Bano case — Mohammad Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, (1985) 2 SCC 556 — a landmark Supreme Court decision that became a pivotal moment in Indian constitutional and personal law discourse.

According to the petitioner, the film was a dramatized portrayal of the personal and matrimonial life of her deceased mother, Shah Bano Begum, without her knowledge or consent. The teaser and trailer, released on 23rd September and 23rd October 2025 respectively, allegedly sensationalized her mother’s personal experiences, depicting them inaccurately and exploiting her image for commercial purposes. The petitioner issued a legal notice on 6th October 2025 calling upon the producers to halt release, but the respondents refused, replying on 14th October 2025 that the film was fictional. This prompted the petitioner to approach the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking judicial intervention.

Procedural History:The writ petition was heard by the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench. The petitioner was represented by Advocate Shri Tousif Warsi. Respondent No. 1, the Union of India, was represented by the Deputy Solicitor General, Shri Romesh Dave. Respondent No. 3, one of the producers, was represented by Shri H.Y. Mehta with Shri Chinmay Mehta. Senior Advocate Shri Ajay Bagadia appeared for Respondent No. 5, another production entity involved in the film.

The matter was heard finally with the consent of the parties, considering the film’s imminent release. The Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC) had already granted a UA 13+ certificate on 28th October 2025.

Core Dispute:The primary dispute centered on whether the film “Haq”, inspired by the Shah Bano case, violated the right to privacy, dignity, and reputation of the deceased Shah Bano Begum and whether her legal heir — the petitioner — could claim to have inherited such posthumous rights. The petitioner contended that dramatizing private aspects of her late mother’s life amounted to a violation of Article 21 of the Constitution, and that the CBFC had failed to discharge its statutory duties by certifying the film without ensuring consent from legal heirs.

The respondents, on the other hand, defended the film as a fictional and dramatized adaptation of the English book “Bano: Bharat ki Beti” by journalist Jigna Vora, inspired by the spirit of the Shah Bano judgment, not its factual accuracy. They argued that personality rights and privacy cease upon a person’s death and that freedom of artistic expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution protected their work.

Arguments of the Petitioner: The petitioner argued that releasing the film without her consent infringed her mother’s right to privacy, dignity, and reputation, protected under Article 21. She relied on several precedents to assert that unauthorized portrayal of private life constituted a legal wrong. They relied on the following Judgements:  K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 – recognizing privacy as a facet of the right to life,R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994) 6 SCC 632 – on limits of media publication of private life,Khushwant Singh v. Maneka Gandhi (2002) 4 SCC 30 – balancing free speech with individual reputation,Phoolan Devi v. Shekhar Kapoor 1994 SCC OnLine Del 788 – where depiction of a living person’s life in film required consent,Titan Industries Ltd. v. Ramkumar Jewellers (2012) 50 PTC 486 (Del) – concerning personality and publicity rights, The petitioner emphasized that her late mother’s life, although connected to a public judgment, remained largely private and not intended for commercial dramatization.

Arguments of the Respondents: Respondents No. 3 and 5 (the producers) countered that the film did not depict Shah Bano’s real life but was a fictional story inspired by the judgment and a literary work. They maintained that personality rights and privacy end with death, hence no legal heir can inherit such rights. They invoked the fundamental right of freedom of expression under Article 19(1). They also cited the following authorities:Babuji Rawji Shah v. S. Hussain Zaidi (2023) 20 SCC 660,R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994) 6 SCC 632,R.G. Anand v. Delux Films (1978) 4 SCC 118 – distinction between inspiration and copying,Viacom 18 Media Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (2018) 1 SCC 761 – presumption of validity of CBFC certification,Priya Singh Paul v. Madhur Bhandarkar (2018) 13 SCC 438 – protection of creative freedom,Deepa Jayakumar v. A.L. Vijay 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 2642 – holding that privacy and reputation end with death,Krishna Kishore Singh v. Sarla A. Saraogi 2023 SCC OnLine Del 3997 – similar ruling in the Sushant Singh Rajput film dispute.They further contended that the petitioner delayed filing the writ petition until just six days before the film’s release despite being aware of its production since early 2024.

Judicial Reasoning and Analysis: Court examined the submissions and judicial precedents, approaching the dispute through three major questions:

1. Whether the right to privacy, dignity, or reputation survives the death of an individual and can be inherited.2. Whether a dramatized film inspired by public records violates any existing legal right of a deceased person or their heirs.3. Whether the High Court could interfere when an alternate statutory remedy under Section 5-E of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 was available.

The Court first noted that the right to privacy, as recognized in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), is a natural and inalienable right that exists only during a person’s lifetime. Quoting paragraph 557 of that judgment, it held that privacy “is born with the human being and extinguishes with the human being.”

Referring to Deepa Jayakumar v. A.L. Vijay (AIR 2021 Mad 167), the Court emphasized that privacy and reputation cannot be inherited like movable or immovable property. Once a person dies, their right to control representation of their personality ceases. This principle was reaffirmed by the Delhi High Court in Krishna Kishore Singh v. Sarla A. Saraogi (2023 SCC OnLine Del 3997), concerning depiction of a deceased celebrity.

Applying these principles, Justice Verma held that since Shah Bano was no longer alive, her right to privacy and reputation could not be claimed by her daughter. The petitioner also failed to show how her own rights were violated by the film.

The Court then examined the disclaimer attached to the film, which clearly stated that the film was a “dramatized and fictionalized adaptation” inspired by the Shah Bano judgment and the book Bano: Bharat Ki Beti, disclaiming any authenticity or factual accuracy. It also declared that any resemblance to real persons was purely coincidental. Given this, the Court found that the film did not claim to depict actual events or individuals, and therefore could not be said to have fabricated facts about the petitioner’s family.

Justice Verma further referred to R. Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1994) 6 SCC 632, where the Supreme Court held that once information becomes a matter of public record — including court judgments — it ceases to be private and may be freely discussed or dramatized. Since the Shah Bano judgment is part of public record and extensively debated for decades, the Court held that using it as inspiration does not infringe privacy.

The Court also noted that the CBFC, having issued a valid UA certificate, is presumed to have followed due process. Following Viacom 18 Media Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India (2018) 1 SCC 761, the High Court observed that certification carries a presumption of legality unless procedural irregularity is shown, which was not the case here.

Additionally, the Court emphasized that an effective alternate remedy existed under Section 5-E of the Cinematograph Act, allowing the petitioner to seek revocation or suspension of the certificate through the Central Government. Her direct approach under Article 226 without availing this remedy was therefore not maintainable.

Lastly, the Court observed that the petitioner’s conduct lacked vigilance, as she waited until the eve of the film’s release to file the petition despite being aware of its making for more than a year. Hence, the writ petition also suffered from delay and laches.

Decision: After a detailed consideration of facts, arguments, and precedents, the High Court dismissed the writ petition. It held that:

1. The right to privacy, dignity, or reputation of Shah Bano Begum ceased upon her death and was not inheritable.

2. The film “Haq” was a fictionalized work inspired by public records and literary material, and did not violate any existing right of the petitioner.

3. The CBFC’s certification carried legal presumption of validity, and the petitioner had an alternate statutory remedy that she failed to pursue.

4. The petition suffered from unexplained delay and laches.

Accordingly, the petition was found devoid of merit and dismissed by the Hon’ble Court on 4th November 2025.

Law Settled: This judgment reinforces an emerging judicial consensus that privacy and personality rights are non-heritable and extinguish with death. It also underscores the freedom of artistic and creative expression as long as fictionalization and disclaimers clearly separate fact from dramatization. Moreover, it reaffirms that certification by the CBFC enjoys statutory presumption of legality and that parties must first exhaust remedies under the Cinematograph Act before invoking writ jurisdiction.

Case Title: Ms. Siddiqua Begum Khan v. Union of India & Others

Case Number: Writ Petition No. 42708 of 2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:MPHC-IND:32075

Date of Order: 4th November, 2025

Court: High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Indore

Coram: Hon’ble Shri Justice Pranay Verma

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Madan Lal Purushottam Das Foods Private Limited Vs B. L. Agro Industries

Composite marks, common to trade, and consumer wonderment

Facts:This case arises from a trademark dispute in the edible oil market between B. L. Agro Industries Limited, proprietor of the registered mark “BAIL KOLHU” (word and device), and Madan Lal Purushottam Das Foods Private Limited, which began using the mark “AROHUL KOHLU” with a device featuring an ox tethered to a grinder, for similar goods including edible oils, ghee, fats and allied products, as alleged by the respondent B. L. Agro in the suit below. 

B. L. Agro claims long-standing adoption of the “BAIL KOLHU” mark since 1 January 1986, registrations for the word and device in Class 29 (including edible oils, ghee, fats, dairy products) and other classes, and copyright registrations for the device from 1999, with continuous and extensive use leading to substantial goodwill and turnover growth over the years. 

The appellant had attempted to register similar device marks on a “proposed to be used” basis in 2022 and 2023, but both applications were abandoned by the Registrar of Trade Marks in December 2023 and July 2024 respectively, leaving the appellant without any registration, while the respondent continued to own valid registrations over the BAIL KOLHU word and device marks. 

The respondent alleges that in July 2025 it discovered the appellant’s products on online platforms using “AROHUL KOHLU” with an ox-and-grinder device similar to the respondent’s device for identical goods, likely to confuse consumers and amounting to infringement and passing off, prompting the suit seeking permanent injunction and interim relief.

Procedural detail:In CS (COMM) 464/2025 before the Commercial Court, Shahdara, B. L. Agro sought an ex parte ad interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC to restrain use of the impugned mark and device by the appellant and also sought appointment of a Local Commissioner under Order XXVI Rule 9 CPC to visit the appellant’s premises and seize or inventorize allegedly infringing goods . 

By order dated 4 August 2025, the Commercial Court granted ex parte ad interim injunction restraining the appellant, recorded prima facie infringement of the registered “BAIL KOLHU” trade name/device by deceptive similarity and phonetic similarity, and appointed a Local Commissioner to inventorize and seize goods, with reliance on Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v Kartick Das, and Delhi High Court orders in Munish Kumar Singla Trading v Jollibee Foods Corporation and Devagiri Farms Pvt Ltd v Sanjay Kapur, and fixed the matter for further hearing on 20 September 2025 . 

Aggrieved, the appellant preferred FAO (COMM) 234/2025 before the Delhi High Court under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act read with Order XLIII CPC, challenging the ex parte interim order, and argued for interference by the appellate court rather than remand for an uninfluenced decision by the Commercial Court; upon suggestion by the Bench to allow the trial court to decide the interim application uninfluenced, the appellant declined and pressed the appeal on merits, leading to a detailed appellate analysis within the limited constraints on appellate interference with discretionary interim orders.

Dispute:The core dispute is whether the appellant’s use of “AROHUL KOHLU” with an ox-and-grinder device for edible oils infringes the respondent’s registered “BAIL KOLHU” marks and device under Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, by causing likelihood of confusion or association in the mind of an average consumer of ordinary intelligence and imperfect recollection, and whether interim injunctive relief and appointment of a Local Commissioner were justified at the ex parte stage. 

The appellant argued that “Kolhu” is publici juris describing a traditional wood-press process for extracting mustard oil; that the respondent conceded no objection to use of the words per se; that the ox-with-grinder motif is common to the trade and non-distinctive with numerous similar registrations since 1973; that the respondent does not own a separate registration for the device per se and cannot dissect a composite mark under the anti-dissection rule in Section 17; that the device is descriptive and thus protected by Section 30(2)(a); and that when compared as whole marks “BAIL KOLHU” and “AROHUL KOHLU” are dissimilar and not likely to confuse. 

The respondent maintained status as registered proprietor since 2001 for the device and since at least 2006 and 2016 for the word in Class 29, showing long and extensive use, and argued that the overall impression of the rival marks, including the ox-with-grinder dominant feature and phonetic/visual similarity in the words, creates at least likelihood of association sufficient to find infringement at the interim stage, warranting protection of statutory rights.

Detailed reasoning :The High Court began by reaffirming the settled test that likelihood of confusion is examined from the standpoint of an average consumer of ordinary intelligence and imperfect recollection, and that marks are compared as wholes, not by placing them side by side for a meticulous comparison, consistent with Pernod Ricard v Karanveer Singh Chhabra, Khoday Distilleries Ltd v Scotch Whisky Association, and Parle Products v J.P. Co., as well as the classical position in Amritdhara Pharmacy v Satya Deo Gupta and Cadila Healthcare v Cadila Pharmaceuticals.

The Court emphasized that infringement under Section 29(2) is made out not only when a consumer confuses one mark for another, but also where, owing to similarity of marks and goods, the consumer is likely to believe there is an association between them; thus even a momentary state of wonderment about connection suffices to establish likelihood of confusion at the initial interest stage, which is enough at the interim level without proof of actual confusion . 

Applying this to the rival signs, the Court held that a consumer who had seen the respondent’s “BAIL KOLHU” device mark would, upon encountering the appellant’s “AROHUL KOHLU” with an ox-and-grinder motif for identical goods, at least wonder about an association, given the shared pictorial theme and overlap in the word elements “KOLHU/KOHLU,” which meets the Section 29(2) threshold for likelihood of confusion or association.

On the anti-dissection rule and Section 17, the Court recognized that composite marks must be considered as a whole, but courts may identify dominant or essential features within a composite mark for assessing confusion, as explained by the Supreme Court in Pernod Ricard; it concluded that, in consumer perception, the ox tethered to the grinder is the dominant or at least co-dominant feature of B. L. Agro’s device, which impresses the average consumer more immediately than the words, making replication of that motif a strong indicator of infringement even if the word elements differ. 

Drawing on South India Beverages Pvt Ltd v General Mills Marketing Inc., the Court observed that where both components are equally prominent, both deserve protection; hence, copying the ox-with-grinder motif, which is at least as dominant as the words, would justify injunctive relief, and this approach remains consistent with the anti-dissection principle because the overall commercial impression remains the focus. 

The Court also employed the concept of idea infringement, holding that appropriation of the dominant idea of the registered device—the ox tethered to a grinding machine for mustard oil—by the appellant constitutes infringement because similarity under Section 29(2) includes similarity of the idea conveyed by the marks, especially where that idea anchors consumer association with the registered mark [1].

Regarding the plea that the ox-and-grinder motif is common to the trade and thus unprotectable under Section 17(2), the Court held that merely producing screenshots of several registrations with similar motifs is insufficient; to invoke “common to the trade,” the defendant must show actual market usage in the same trade with material indicating substantial turnover or threat to the distinctiveness of the plaintiff’s mark, as elucidated by Pankaj Goel v Dabur India Ltd and Express Bottlers v Pepsi Inc.; since there was no empirical data on actual usage or market impact in the mustard oil trade, the defence failed at the interim stage. 

The Court further clarified that a trademark proprietor is not obliged to sue every small infringer and may prioritize enforcement; therefore, existence of other potential infringers does not defeat the claim against a particular infringer, per Pankaj Goel and National Bell v Metal Goods. 

The Court also rejected the contention that the device lacks distinctiveness or is descriptive, noting that distinctiveness is a fact-sensitive issue generally requiring evidence and trial, and that the registered status under Section 31 provides prima facie evidence of validity; moreover, Section 30(2)(a) was inapplicable because the ox-with-grinder image does not indicate kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin, time of production, or other characteristics—at best it is suggestive of a process, and suggestive marks are protectable, as explained in T. V. Venugopal v Ushodaya Enterprises.

The Court refused to be swayed by differences in packaging or get-up because an infringement analysis is mark-to-mark, not a passing off inquiry; the Supreme Court’s distinction in Kaviraj Durgadutt Sharma v Navratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories was relied on to stress that added matter on packaging cannot cure infringement where the essential features of the registered mark have been adopted by the defendant. 

On appellate interference, the Bench reminded that appeals against discretionary interim orders are governed by the limits set in Wander Ltd v Antox India, and within those parameters there was no case to upset the Commercial Court’s ex parte injunction and appointment of Local Commissioner, particularly after the appellant elected not to accept a remand to have the Order XXXIX application decided uninfluenced on the next date.

Judgment and decision:The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal under the limited appellate standard applicable to interim orders, thereby affirming the Commercial Court’s ex parte ad interim injunction restraining the appellant from using the impugned mark and device. 

Case Title: Madan Lal Purushottam Das Foods Private Limited Vs B. L. Agro Industries Limited  

Order Date: 28 August 2025  

Case Number: FAO (COMM) 234/2025 

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:7772-DB

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi 

Name of Hon'ble Judges: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla 

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Nilesh Girkar Vs Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited

Judicial Remand and Court Fee Refund

Factual Background and Dispute:The dispute originated when Nilesh Girkar, the appellant, filed a suit against Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited and others, raising grievances that invoked a commercial dispute. The suit's exact subject matter is  led to a disagreement over whether the court where the suit was filed had proper jurisdiction. The initial dismissal of the suit brought to fore questions about how and why a court may decline to hear a matter at the preliminary stage, particularly under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which allows a court to reject a plaint for several technical and substantive reasons.

Procedural Details:After Nilesh Girkar filed his suit, the Commercial Court rejected the plaint against Respondent 1 (Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited) under Order VII Rule 11A of the CPC and returned the plaint against Respondents 2 to 5 under Order VII Rule 10. Order VII Rule 11A essentially empowers a court to reject a plaint if it does not disclose a cause of action or if any legal bar arises. Meanwhile, Order VII Rule 10 concerns instances where a court returns a plaint due to lack of jurisdiction. The appellant then approached the High Court in appeal against this procedural decision, challenging both the rejection and return of the plaint and seeking further remedy for the suit to be reconsidered on merits.

Detailed Reasoning and Judgement Discussion:The High Court’s judgment centres around key statutory provisions and judicial precedents. The appellant’s counsel drew attention to the Division Bench’s earlier decision in Darshan Aggarwal v Kuldeep 1998 ( 1) RCR Civil 425, which set out circumstances under which a refund of court fees is permissible when a suit is remanded after being dismissed at a preliminary stage. The court then examined Section 13 of the Court Fees Act, which states that if a suit is remanded in appeal under any grounds mentioned in Section 351 of the (erstwhile) CPC, the appellant should get a certificate for a refund of all appeal fees paid. 

Order XLI Rule 23 of the CPC allows a higher appellate court to remand a case when the trial court passed a decree on a preliminary point, and the appellate court finds it necessary for the lower court to hear and decide the entire matter afresh. The High Court found that in this case, the Commercial Court had made errors: it wrongly rejected the plaint against Respondent 1 under Order VII Rule 11A and had territorial jurisdiction, so the suit should have been entertained against all parties. The error in prematurely rejecting the plaint meant the suit was remanded for a proper, full hearing in the Commercial Court. Thus, the conditions for remand (as understood under Order XLI Rule 23) were met.

Decision:After considering the legal provisions and precedents, the High Court held that it had earlier remanded the suit for reconsideration due to an error in the initial rejection by the Commercial Court. Because the remand satisfied the statutory and judicial requirements, the appellant was entitled to a refund of all court fees paid on the appeal. The court ordered the Registry to issue a certificate to allow the appellant to claim the refund within four weeks from the order date. This decision places emphasis on the right of litigants to reclaim fees where a suit is wrongly dismissed at a threshold stage and then is reinstated by way of appellate review and remand.

Case Title: Nilesh Girkar Vs Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited & Ors.

Order Date: 15 October 2025

Case Number: RFACOMM 251/2025

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judges: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Honasa Consumer Limited versus Cloud Wellness Private Limited

Colour Combinations, Trade Dress & Copyright

Fact:The Plaintiff, Honasa Consumer Limited, is engaged in the marketing and sale of beauty, skin care, personal care, and baby products, sold both in India and internationally. Defendant No. 1, Cloud Wellness Pvt. Ltd., operates in the same product segment, with Defendant No. 2 being one of its directors. The Plaintiff markets a product line under THE DERMA CO. brand, which uses a distinct visual identity involving unique color schemes, stylized layouts, and packaging termed as its “Subject Trade Dress”. The Defendants market products under DERMATOUCH, whose trade dress is alleged by the Plaintiff to be deceptively similar and a slavish imitation of the Plaintiff's packaging. 

The Plaintiff claims copyright in its trade dress, having commissioned a design agency in 2019 for the artwork and used the designs since January 2020. The Plaintiff believes this trade dress has attained public recognition and acts as a source identifier. The dispute centers around whether Defendants have copied this trade dress, thereby infringing the Plaintiff's copyright and passing off their business as that of the Plaintiff’s, riding on the goodwill and reputation vested in THE DERMA CO mark[1].

Procedural Details:The Plaintiff filed a civil suit in the Delhi High Court seeking an interim injunction against the Defendants under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. The relief requested was to restrain the Defendants from using the impugned trade dress for their beauty and skincare products, asserting infringement of copyright under the Copyright Act, 1957 and passing off under common law. 

Dispute:The core of the dispute is whether the Defendants' product packaging replicates, imitates, or is deceptively similar to the Plaintiff’s protected trade dress. The Plaintiff asserts ownership of original artistic work in the trade dress and claims exclusive rights under Sections 13, 14, and 51 of the Copyright Act, 1957. 

The Plaintiff further relies on the doctrine of passing off, arguing that the Defendants are riding on its goodwill through substantially similar packaging. The Plaintiff argues it has invested heavily in advertising and promotion, resulting in distinctiveness and secondary meaning acquired by its trade dress. 

The Defendants challenge this by questioning the originality of the Plaintiff’s trade dress, claiming prior existence of similar designs in the market before the Plaintiff’s adoption, and highlighting four other companies with similar packaging as early as 2010-2019. They argue the Plaintiff’s color combination and layout are neither unique nor inventive, thus incapable of protection as original artistic work. 

They further submit that consumers buy such products based on quality, ingredients, and price, not packaging, highlighting their own investment in branding and marketing. The Defendants contend their adoption was bona fide, driven by market norms, not as an imitation. They assert ongoing honest co-existence in the market for over four years, with no evidence presented by the Plaintiff of actual confusion among consumers, and argue that any loss, if caused, is compensable monetarily. 

Detailed Reasoning:The Hon'ble Court began its analysis by reiterating that interim injunctions are granted when the existence and violation of asserted legal rights are contested and uncertain. The object is to prevent irreparable injury to the Plaintiff pending trial, subject to three tests: (i) prima facie case, (ii) balance of convenience, and (iii) irreparable injury as required under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2, CPC.

In considering the test of deceptive similarity, the Court placed special emphasis on the nature of the skincare industry, where consumer choices are primarily ingredient-driven rather than packaging-driven. Product packaging, including color schemes or layouts, play a limited role compared to formulations and brand names depicted prominently on each product.

The Court clarified that protection under the Copyright Act, 1957, is for original artistic works as defined under Section 2(c). The Plaintiff’s claim of originality was challenged on grounds of prior art, with Defendants presenting examples of similar packaging by “Hylamide” since 2015, and other companies since 2010, and arguing that mere juxtaposition of two colors cannot be characterized as original unless distinctive creative authorship is proved. The Court referenced industry standards, the role of color theory, and the widespread adoption of similar color schemes for specific product purposes.

On passing off, the Court reiterated the classic trinity—goodwill, misrepresentation, and damage—as enunciated in Heinz Italia, Laxmikant V. Patel, Syed Mohideen, and elaborated by House of Lords and Australian High Court decisions. The burden lies on the Plaintiff to prove its get-up had acquired sufficient recognition such that consumers would likely be misled, even with the Defendants’ distinct brand name DERMATOUCH displayed. 

The Court similarly discussed that secondary meaning is critical, and colour combinations or packaging are registrable only when associated with a distinct single source. No material was provided by the Plaintiff to show exclusive association or substantial public confusion since launch.

On delay and coexistence, it was found that both parties had operated in the market for four years, and no concrete evidence of confusion or decline in Plaintiff’s sales was presented. Injunctions are not typically granted where parties have co-existed openly unless sustained prejudice can be demonstrated. 

The Court concluded that factors like the specialized, well-informed class of buyers; the absence of actual confusion over a prolonged period; the prominent use of distinct brand names; and disputed questions about originality and prior adoption would require thorough evidence, which could only be examined in full trial, not at the interim stage.

Judgment:After careful consideration, the Court held that the Plaintiff had not made out a clear prima facie case for an interim injunction. The disputed facts—originality, distinctiveness, prior use—demanded evidence and could only be resolved at trial. The prolonged market coexistence, lack of customer confusion, and the presence of distinct marks led to the conclusion that no irreparable injury would be caused to the Plaintiff without the injunction, and any loss could be compensated monetarily.

Case Title: Honasa Consumer Limited Versus Cloud Wellness Private Limited & Anr.

Order Date: 26 September 2025

Case Number: CS COMM 483/2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:8662

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Hon'ble Judge: Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Mohammad Talha Vs Karim Hotels Pvt. Ltd.

Evaluating Deceptive Similarity in Restaurant Branding

FACTS:This case started when Karim Hotels Pvt. Ltd., a well-known restaurant chain from Old Delhi, learned in December 2020 about a restaurant named Gulshan-e-Karim running in Moradabad by Mohammad Talha. The word 'Karim' has long been associated with the Delhi-based restaurant established in 1913 by Haji Karimuddin, whose family had been royal cooks in the Mughal Empire. With a long history and many awards, the name ‘Karim’ became famous for Mughlai cuisine. Karim Hotels Pvt. Ltd. owns several registered trademarks for ‘KAREEM’ and 'KARIM' under various classes.

Upon finding out about the Moradabad restaurant, the company filed a lawsuit before the District Judge Commercial Court, Tis Hazari, for a permanent injunction to stop Mohammad Talha from using ‘GULSHAN-E-KARIM’ or anything similar to their marks. Appellant Talha maintained that his father had chosen this name in 1997 and started the restaurant in 2016, claiming continuous use and a Food Safety license from the Government of Uttar Pradesh. He argued that ‘GULSHAN-E-KARIM’ means ‘Garden of God’ in Urdu and further submitted that the word ‘Karim’ means ‘generous’ and is a common word, so consumers wouldn't be confused by both restaurants.

PROCEDURAL DETAILS:The lawsuit for injunction got filed in 2022, with Karim Hotels requesting an interim restraint order against Talha under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Commercial Court granted this request on 15 January 2025, restraining Talha and associates from using 'KARIM' in any form. Aggrieved by this order, Talha appealed to the High Court of Delhi.

DISPUTE:The main dispute is whether the use of ‘GULSHAN-E-KARIM’ by the appellant amounts to infringement of the registered ‘KAREEM/KARIM’ trademarks of the respondent and whether such use could confuse consumers. Talha argued that there’s no deceptive similarity, claimed long-continued honest use in Moradabad, and further challenged the respondent’s claim of exclusivity by saying ‘Karim’ was a common word. On the other side, Karim Hotels asserted priority and exclusivity over ‘KARIM’ based on trademark ownership and decades of use, arguing that any use by Talha was likely to confuse customers, given both restaurants served Mughlai cuisine.

DETAILED REASONING:The Court looked at principles from trademark law under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, notably Sections 28, 29, 31, and 135. Section 28 gives exclusive rights to the registered proprietor of a valid trademark. Section 29 defines infringement, which occurs when someone uses a similar mark in connection with similar goods or services and causes confusion or suggests an association. Section 31 makes registration prima facie evidence of validity.

The respondent Karim Hotels had multiple registrations, much prior in time compared to appellant Talha's restaurant, showing bonafide and priority of use since 1913. The Court found that both names related to restaurants serving Mughlai food, thus targeting the same consumer base. Based on precedents like Parle Products Pvt. Ltd. v J.P. Co (1972) 1 SCC 618, the Court noted that similarity is not viewed by comparing marks side-by-side but by the overall impression they leave in the mind of an ordinary consumer with average intelligence and imperfect recollection.

Further, referencing the principle from Kaviraj Pandit Dura Dutt Sharma v Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories (AIR 1965 SC 980), the Court clarified that passing off differs from infringement; while packing and appearance matter in passing off, in infringement, it's the essential features of the mark which count. Even differences in get-up and additional matter wouldn’t avoid liability if the underlying mark could cause confusion.

Phonetic similarity, per Pianotist Co’s Application (1906 23 RPC 774), is relevant. The Court found that 'KARIM' forms the dominant part of the disputed marks, and a consumer seeing 'GULSHAN-E-KARIM' may instantly relate it to 'KARIM' restaurants in Delhi. This was deemed sufficient for potential confusion.

Regarding appellant’s defense that ‘Karim’ is generic (publici juris), the Court explained that while generic marks generally cannot be exclusively owned, distinctiveness must be assessed relative to its use. 'Karim' may be generic in religious contexts but is distinctive for a restaurant, especially given the reputation established by Karim Hotels.

The appellant’s challenge based on the anti-dissection rule (that the dominant part of the mark shouldn’t be separated for assessment) was rejected. The Court explained, citing South India Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v General Mills Marketing Inc. (2015 61 PTC 231), that the rule mainly applies to a plaintiff’s composite mark, not the defendant’s. Even so, ‘Karim’ was dominant in both marks.

The issue of acquiescence—whether the respondent allowed the use by not acting for years—was dismissed. The court found no actual evidence of commercial use by Talha from 1997 till 2016. Further, as established in Midas Hygiene Industries Pvt. Ltd. v Sudhir Bhatia (2004 3 SCC 90), mere delay does not bar relief in trademark infringement, and where infringement is found, an injunction must follow.

The Commercial Court had taken a strict approach, entirely restraining Talha from any use of ‘GULSHAN-E-KARIM’. On appeal, the High Court considered the principles of balance of convenience and equity, acknowledging that Talha’s use may not have been to capitalize on the respondent’s goodwill but was innocent and limited in scope to Moradabad. The effects of changing the name after years could disproportionately hurt Talha's business.

Thus, the High Court modified the Commercial Court’s order, allowing the appellant to continue using 'GULSHAN-E-KARIM', provided that a conspicuous disclaimer, in both English and Hindi, is displayed immediately below the mark (on signages, adverts, and online platforms). This disclaimer must state that the Moradabad outlet has no connection with the respondent’s group of restaurants and should also display the location and logo of respondent’s outlets.

DECISION:The High Court allowed the appeal to a limited extent. The appellant Mohammad Talha is permitted to use the name 'GULSHAN-E-KARIM' for his restaurant only if he consistently displays a bold, clear disclaimer stating no association with Karim Hotels Pvt. Ltd., in all physical and online places. Failure to comply with this requirement within six weeks would result in dismissal of the appeal, and the original injunction would become effective again. Thus, while the rights of the trademark holder are protected, the balance of convenience and fairness also favours the appellant under equitable principles.

Case Title: Mohammad Talha Vs Karim Hotels Pvt. Ltd.

Order Date: 6 November 2025

Case Number: FAO COMM 82/2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:9713

Court: High Court of Delhi

Hon’ble Judges: Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar, Mr. Justice Ajay Digpaul

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi