Indigenous Energy Storage Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Controller of Patent and Designs & Anr.

Failure in following procedures for assessing inventive step in a case of Remand of Patent Controller Order

Introduction

In a notable decision emphasizing fair and reasoned decision-making in patent matters, the Delhi High Court set aside an order revoking a patent for a sustainable process to make hard carbon electrode material from cattle manure. The court did not decide whether the invention deserved a patent but sent the case back to the Patent Office for fresh consideration. It held that the Deputy Controller failed to properly apply the established legal test for checking if an invention involves an “inventive step” (something non-obvious to a skilled person).

The ruling highlights how Indian courts expect patent authorities to carefully evaluate prior art documents, identify the skilled worker in the field, and avoid deciding with the benefit of hindsight. It also allowed additional experimental data to be considered, stressing that justice requires looking at all relevant evidence. Delivered on 12 March 2026 by Justice Jyoti Singh, the judgment protects innovators working on green technologies while reminding authorities to follow due process.

Factual Background

Indigenous Energy Storage Technologies Pvt. Ltd., the appellant, is a company focused on sustainable energy storage, especially sodium-ion battery technology. It developed a process to turn cattle manure and other bio-waste into hard carbon, a key material used as an electrode in sodium-ion batteries and supercapacitors.

The invention offers several practical benefits: it is low-cost, environmentally friendly (repurposing agricultural waste), scalable for industry, and delivers good technical performance. The patent application (leading to Indian Patent No. 373806 or IN’806) was filed on 4 November 2020, examined, and granted on 4 August 2021. The title of the patent is “Cattle Manure Derived Hard Carbon as Electrode Material for Sodium Ion Batteries and Super Capacitors.”

The process in Claim 1 involves simple steps: drying the manure at 50–100°C, grinding it, treating it with acid solutions (like hydrofluoric acid) under specific conditions, washing, vacuum drying, and finally high-temperature calcination in a controlled environment. Dependent claims cover variations in the type of manure, use in different metal-ion batteries, and a specific composite electrode formulation.

Procedural Background

Soon after the grant, a post-grant opposition was filed on 3 August 2021 under Section 25(2) of the Patents Act, 1970, challenging the patent on grounds including lack of novelty, lack of inventive step (Section 25(2)(e)), and insufficient disclosure (Section 25(2)(g)). The opponent relied on three prior art documents: D1 (a WO publication on processing animal-derived waste for hard carbon), D2 (a textbook on physical chemistry showing water phase diagrams), and D3 (a US patent on electrode materials for sodium-ion batteries).

The Patent Office heard the parties and, on 18 October 2024, revoked the patent. It rejected the novelty objection but upheld lack of inventive step (finding the process obvious over D1, combined with D2 and D3) and insufficient disclosure (citing lack of experimental data on yield, purity, and scalability).

The patentee filed an appeal under Section 117A of the Patents Act before the Delhi High Court. During the appeal, it also moved an application to place additional evidence on record, including an expert opinion distinguishing the invention from prior art, data showing superior yield, and a letter about the revocation order. The High Court allowed this additional evidence, citing the Supreme Court judgment in Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin (2012) 8 SCC 148, as it would help in just adjudication.

Reasoning

The High Court examined whether the Controller’s revocation order was legally sound. It found serious procedural and substantive flaws.

First, the court stressed that deciding inventive step is not a simple comparison of documents. Indian law requires following a structured five-step test laid down by the Delhi High Court in the F. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Cipla case. The Controller failed to identify the “person skilled in the art” (a skilled but unimaginative worker in battery materials or biomass processing), did not clearly define the inventive concept of the patent, and did not properly analyze differences between the claimed process and prior art without using hindsight.

The court noted that the appellant had highlighted key differences: the patent skips the expensive “charring” step mandatory in D1, uses hydrofluoric acid (HF) at lower temperatures (25–60°C) instead of HCl at higher temperatures, avoids certain pre-treatments like “sink and float,” and employs specific vacuum drying conditions. These steps allegedly lead to better purity, higher yield, and a material better suited for sodium-ion batteries. The Controller dismissed many points by saying the patentee did not prove “technical advantage” or provide enough experimental data, but the court found this approach flawed and hindsight-driven.

On the combination of prior arts, the court observed that D2 (a general chemistry textbook on water phases) and D3 (electrode formulations) appeared non-analogous to the biomass-to-hard-carbon process in D1. Mosaic combinations (piecing unrelated documents together) are not freely allowed unless the prior art itself suggests the combination with a reasonable expectation of success.

Regarding insufficient disclosure under Section 25(2)(g), the court held that the specification sufficiently described at least one way to work the invention, which is generally enough. Doubts about industrial scalability based on laboratory yields should not lead to revocation without giving the patentee a proper chance to submit supporting data. The court verified that the Controller’s claim of providing opportunities for data was not fully supported by records. It therefore allowed the additional experimental data filed in the appeal.

Overall, the High Court found the impugned order lacked proper reasoning and failed to follow mandatory legal procedures for assessing inventive step and sufficiency. It emphasized that patent decisions must be speaking orders that address all key arguments raised by the parties.

Key Judgments Discussed with Citations and Context

The court relied on several important precedents to guide its analysis, explaining them in a way that shows how they apply to everyday patent examination:

• F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. & Anr. v. Cipla Ltd., 2015 SCC OnLine Del 13619: This landmark Division Bench decision of the Delhi High Court laid down a clear five-step test for evaluating inventive step/obviousness under Section 2(1)(ja) of the Patents Act. The steps include identifying the skilled person, the inventive concept, common general knowledge, differences from prior art, and whether those differences would be obvious without hindsight. The court in the present case explained that this test prevents arbitrary decisions and ensures a structured, fair analysis. The Controller’s failure to follow it sequentially vitiated the order.
• Tapas Chatterjee v. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs and Another, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 6369: A recent Division Bench ruling reaffirming that the five steps from Hoffmann-La Roche must be followed sequentially in obviousness examinations. The High Court used this to underline that skipping the identification of the skilled person alone was enough to set aside the order.
• Agriboard International LLC v. Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 940: This case held that when rejecting a patent for lack of inventive step, the Controller must discuss the prior art, the subject invention, and how the invention would (or would not) be obvious to a skilled person. Mere conclusions without detailed reasoning violate the law. The court applied this to criticize the impugned order’s superficial analysis.
• Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin and Another, (2012) 8 SCC 148: Cited to justify allowing additional evidence in appeal. The Supreme Court held that documents with a bearing on just adjudication can be taken on record in the interest of justice. Here, it supported admitting the expert opinion and yield data.

The court discussed these judgments to stress procedural fairness: patent offices must give reasoned decisions addressing all points, avoid hindsight, and consider all relevant evidence before revoking a granted patent.

Final Decision of the Court

The Delhi High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the revocation order dated 18 October 2024. It remanded the post-grant opposition back to the Deputy Controller for fresh consideration. The Controller must now examine the matter afresh, taking into account the additional documents allowed by the High Court, all issues raised by the appellant in its reply and written submissions, and the arguments in the appeal. Both parties must be heard, and a decision should be taken within four months. The court clarified that it expressed no opinion on the merits of the patent’s validity, leaving that entirely to the Patent Office.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

This judgment reinforces simple but important principles for anyone dealing with patents in India:

When checking if an invention is obvious (lacks inventive step), the Patent Office must follow a clear, step-by-step process: identify who the skilled worker is, what the new idea really is, what everyone in the field already knew, what is different from old inventions, and whether those differences would have been obvious without looking backward with knowledge of the new invention. Skipping these steps or using hindsight makes the decision invalid.

Additionally, when sufficiency of disclosure is challenged, the specification needs only to describe at least one clear way for a skilled person to carry out the invention — not prove every possible use with extensive data upfront. If more data becomes relevant later, authorities should give the patentee a fair opportunity to submit it rather than revoking the patent outright.

Finally, courts can allow additional evidence in appeals if it helps reach a just decision, especially in technical fields like green energy where experimental proof of advantages matters. Patent decisions must be detailed and address all key arguments raised by the parties; vague or incomplete reasoning will not stand.

The ruling encourages innovation in sustainable technologies by ensuring patent challenges are handled with proper legal rigor and fairness.

Case Title: Indigenous Energy Storage Technologies Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Deputy Controller of Patent and Designs & Anr. Date of Order: 12 March 2026 Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 3/2025 Name of Court: High Court of Delhi Name of Hon'ble Judge: Justice Jyoti Singh

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation. Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles for the Article:

1. Delhi High Court Remands Cattle Manure Hard Carbon Patent: Controller Must Follow Proper Inventive Step Test
2. Sustainable Battery Innovation Gets Second Chance: Key Lessons from Indigenous Energy Storage Patent Appeal
3. Why the Delhi High Court Sent Back a Green Tech Patent Revocation – A Simple Explanation
4. Inventive Step Scrutiny in Indian Patents: Delhi HC Emphasizes Structured Analysis in Manure-to-Electrode Case

Suitable Tags: Patent Revocation, Inventive Step, Section 25(2)(e), Section 25(2)(g), Post-Grant Opposition, Delhi High Court, Hard Carbon Electrode, Sodium-Ion Batteries, Cattle Manure Biomass, F. Hoffmann-La Roche v Cipla, Patent Sufficiency of Disclosure, Remand Order, Green Technology Patent

Headnote of the Article In Indigenous Energy Storage Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Controller of Patents (2026), the Delhi High Court set aside the revocation of a patent for producing hard carbon from cattle manure for sodium-ion batteries. The court held that the Controller failed to apply the mandatory five-step test for inventive step and did not adequately address the patentee’s arguments on process differences and data. Remanding the matter for fresh consideration, the judgment reinforces procedural fairness, structured obviousness analysis, and the opportunity to submit supporting evidence in patent oppositions.

Crystal Crop Protection Ltd Vs. Assistant Controller of Patents

Rejection of Patent Appeal: Mere Mixture of Known Weed Killers Not Inventive

Introduction

In a significant ruling on patentability of agrochemical compositions, the Delhi High Court on 28 February 2026 dismissed an appeal by Crystal Crop Protection Ltd. and upheld the Assistant Controller’s decision rejecting its patent application for a herbicidal composition. The invention involved a ready-to-use synergistic mixture of two known herbicides — halosulfuron-methyl (a sulfonylurea) and metribuzin (a triazinone) — in specific weight percentages for controlling weeds in field crops like sugarcane.

Delhi High Court held that the claimed binary composition was a mere admixture of known substances that did not demonstrate any unexpected synergistic effect or technical advancement over prior art. The court also allowed additional prior art documents filed by the opponent at the appellate stage, emphasizing that in patent appeals involving public interest and monopoly rights, courts can admit relevant evidence to ensure only genuine inventions receive protection. The judgment reinforces that incremental changes in ratios or combinations of known active ingredients require clear proof of synergy or inventive step to overcome statutory bars under the Patents Act.

This decision provides practical guidance for companies in the crop protection sector: simply combining known herbicides, even in optimized proportions, will not qualify for patent protection unless it produces results clearly beyond what a skilled person would expect from adding their individual effects.

Factual Background

Crystal Crop Protection Ltd. (formerly Crystal Phosphates Ltd.) filed Indian Patent Application No. 2228/DEL/2011 on 5 August 2011 for a “Herbicidal Composition for Field Crops.” The complete specification was filed on 6 August 2012. The invention claimed a synergistic herbicidal ready-to-use composition comprising halosulfuron-methyl (10-15% w/w) and metribuzin (50-60% w/w), optionally with other components. Halosulfuron-methyl acts systemically by inhibiting amino acid synthesis, while metribuzin disrupts photosynthesis. The appellant asserted that their specific combination produced enhanced weed control at lower doses, offering broad-spectrum efficacy against narrow and broad-leaf weeds in crops like sugarcane, while being cost-effective and environmentally friendlier.

The application was published in 2013, and a request for examination was filed in 2012. Pre-grant oppositions were filed by Haryana Pesticides Manufacturers’ Association (Respondent No. 2) in 2017 and by Dr. Meera Sharma (Respondent No. 3) in 2022. The First Examination Report was issued in 2018, and the appellant responded with replies and claim amendments. Hearings were conducted, and post-hearing submissions were exchanged. On 28 March 2023, the Assistant Controller rejected the application under Section 25(1) of the Patents Act, primarily on grounds of lack of inventive step (Section 25(1)(e)) and non-patentability as a mere admixture under Section 3(e) (via Section 25(1)(f)).

Procedural Background

After filing the application, the patent office issued the FER in January 2018. The appellant filed its response in May 2018. Respondent No. 2 filed Pre-Grant Opposition in March 2017, to which the appellant replied in July 2021. Respondent No. 3 filed Pre-Grant Opposition II in January 2022, prompting further replies and minor claim amendments in October 2022 and March 2023. A hearing notice was issued in December 2022 for a hearing in February 2023. Both parties filed post-hearing written submissions in February-March 2023. The Assistant Controller passed the impugned rejection order on 28 March 2023, finding the claims anticipated or obvious over cited prior arts (including WO2000027203, US patents, and other documents) and falling under the Section 3(e) bar as a mere aggregation of known properties without synergy.

The appellant filed the present appeal under Section 117A before the Delhi High Court. During the appeal proceedings, Respondent No. 2 filed I.A. 20715/2025 under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC and IPD Rules seeking to place additional documents on record, including EPA registrations, scientific articles on herbicide modes of action, and product labels demonstrating known combinations and uses of the active ingredients. The court heard arguments on this application alongside the main appeal and delivered a common judgment on 28 February 2026.

Reasoning

The High Court first addressed the application for additional evidence. It noted that the documents were publicly available prior art (EPA records, university publications, and product labels) relevant to assessing inventive step and Section 3(e). Although the opponent had opportunities during pre-grant proceedings, the court exercised discretion under the IPD Rules and Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, holding that in patent matters — which grant monopolies operating against the public (in rem) — courts should admit relevant evidence if it aids in pronouncing a just judgment and prevents erroneous grants. The appellant’s objections on delay and lack of due diligence were overruled, as the documents helped complete the record on common general knowledge and motivation for a skilled person (PSITA).

On the merits, the court examined the claimed invention against prior arts. It found that combinations of halosulfuron-methyl and metribuzin (or closely related sulfonylureas with metribuzin) were already known in documents like GWN-9889 (EPA-registered product with similar ratios), WO publications, and tank-mix studies. The specific percentages claimed fell within or were obvious variations of disclosed ranges. The court observed that omitting an optional third component (tribenuron-methyl) or substituting components with known functional equivalents (e.g., replacing a PPO inhibitor with a PSII inhibitor like metribuzin for sugarcane use) would be a predictable, routine modification for a person skilled in the art.

Regarding synergy, the court scrutinized Table 1 in the specification showing weed control data. It held that the results did not demonstrate unexpected enhancement beyond additive effects. Improved control at certain doses was attributable to higher concentrations or expected aggregation of properties rather than true synergy. The appellant’s argument that lower combined doses yielded better results than individual components was not persuasive enough to overcome the Section 3(e) bar, which prohibits patents for mere admixtures resulting only in the sum of known properties.

The court emphasized that the burden lies on the applicant to prove inventive step and technical advancement under Section 2(1)(ja). Mere optimization of known ingredients without clear data showing surprising results or economic significance does not suffice. Hindsight analysis was avoided, but the prior arts provided clear motivation for the claimed combination in the context of sugarcane weed control.

Key Judgments Discussed with Citations and Context

The judgment extensively discussed principles from landmark cases to explain patentability standards in a simple, accessible manner:

• Novartis AG v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 1: The Supreme Court laid down that incremental inventions, especially new forms or combinations of known substances, must demonstrate significant technical advance or enhanced efficacy to qualify for patents in India. The court applied this to stress that the appellant failed to show anything beyond expected additive effects of the two known herbicides.
• F. Hoffmann-La Roche Limited v. Cipla Ltd., 2009 (40) PTC 125 (Del): This Delhi High Court decision (and related appeals) was cited for the principle that patent examination is not infallible, and courts in appeals can scrutinize validity based on all available prior art to protect public interest against unwarranted monopolies.
• Biomoneta Research Pvt. Ltd. v. Controller General of Patents, Designs and Anr., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 1482: Referenced by the appellant for the proposition that true synergistic combinations exceeding additive effects can be patentable. The court distinguished it, finding no such clear synergy established here.
• Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148: Cited in arguments on additional evidence. The court clarified its application in patent contexts, allowing admission where necessary for just adjudication, especially given the public interest in preventing invalid patents.
• K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 216 and Wadi v. Amilal, (2015) 1 SCC 677: Used to explain the restrictive yet flexible scope of Order XLI Rule 27 CPC for additional evidence in appeals, balancing diligence with the need for complete justice.

Other cases like Macleods Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Controller of Patents (2025) and Bristol-Myers Squibb decisions reinforced that patent grants do not create irrebuttable presumptions of validity, and opponents can challenge them with relevant prior art even at appellate stages.

Final Decision of the Court

The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Assistant Controller’s order dated 28 March 2023 rejecting the patent application. It allowed the application for additional documents (I.A. 20715/2025) and took them on record as relevant prior art. The court found no merit in the claims of inventive step or synergy, holding the composition as a mere admixture barred under Section 3(e). No costs were awarded.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

This judgment settles important practical points for anyone involved in patents, explained simply:

In patent appeals, especially for compositions of known substances, courts can admit additional relevant prior art documents under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC and IPD Rules if they help reach a correct decision on patentability, even if not filed earlier — because patents affect the public at large and prevent unjust monopolies.

A combination of two known active ingredients (like herbicides) is not patentable if it is merely an admixture whose properties are the predictable sum of the individual components, without clear evidence of unexpected synergistic effects or technical advancement (Section 3(e) and Section 2(1)(ja)). Optimizing ratios or omitting optional components does not automatically create an inventive step; the applicant must prove surprising benefits beyond what a skilled farmer or scientist would expect.

The burden remains on the patent applicant to demonstrate inventive step with supporting data. Prior art disclosures of similar combinations or uses in the same crop (e.g., sugarcane) make obviousness easier to establish. Section 3(e) acts as a strong filter against routine formulations lacking real innovation.

Finally, in agrochemical patents, courts prioritize public interest in accessible farming solutions over procedural technicalities when admitting evidence that completes the picture of existing knowledge.

Case Title: Crystal Crop Protection Ltd Vs. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs & Ors.

Date of Order: 28 February 2026

Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 19/2023

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC: 1828

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles for the Article:

1. Delhi High Court Rejects Herbicidal Patent: Mere Mixture of Known Weed Killers Not Inventive
2. No Synergy, No Patent: Crystal Crop’s Appeal Dismissed in Halosulfuron-Metribuzin Case
3. Additional Prior Art Allowed in Patent Appeal: Key Lessons from Crystal Crop Protection Judgment
4. Section 3(e) Bar Upheld: Delhi HC Explains Limits on Patenting Agrochemical Combinations

Suitable Tags:

Herbicidal Composition, Section 3(e), Inventive Step, Synergistic Effect, Pre-Grant Opposition, Additional Evidence in Patent Appeal, Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, Halosulfuron Methyl, Metribuzin, Delhi High Court, Agrochemical Patent, Mere Admixture

Headnote of the Article

In Crystal Crop Protection Ltd v. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs (2026), the Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld rejection of a patent for a binary herbicidal composition of halosulfuron-methyl and metribuzin. The court admitted additional prior art documents at the appellate stage and held that the claimed combination was a mere admixture lacking inventive step or unexpected synergy, falling under the Section 3(e) bar. The judgment clarifies standards for patenting known substance combinations and the scope of admitting evidence in IP appeals to protect public interest.

Flipkart India Private Limited Vs Marc Enterprises Pvt Ltd

Addition of House Mark in small font does not negate chances of confusion

Introduction:

In a significant ruling that highlights the importance of trademark protection for established brands, the Delhi High Court dismissed an appeal filed by Flipkart India Private Limited against an interim injunction restraining it from using the mark “MarQ” (and variants like “marq”) for its consumer electronics and appliances. The court found that Flipkart’s mark was deceptively similar to the older registered trademark “MARC” owned by Marc Enterprises Pvt Ltd, a Delhi-based company dealing in electrical goods.

This decision underscores how courts evaluate likelihood of confusion between similar-sounding and similar-looking marks, especially in the fast-growing e-commerce and electronics sector. Even house marks like “Flipkart” added in small font will not negate the chances of confusion.

Factual Background

Marc Enterprises Pvt Ltd, the respondent, has been in the business of manufacturing and selling electrical accessories, fittings, equipment, appliances, and instruments for decades. It adopted the mark “MARC” as early as 1981 and secured registrations starting from 1984 in relevant classes such as 7, 9, 11 etc. The company claimed continuous use through invoices and other documents dating back to the early 1980s.

Flipkart India Private Limited, the appellant, is a well-known e-commerce platform. In 2017, it decided to launch its own private label for large appliances including televisions, air conditioners, washing machines, and microwave ovens. For this line, Flipkart adopted the marks “marq”, styling them with a capital “Q” . It filed trademark applications in July 2017 and began selling products under these marks from October-November 2017 through its website.

Marc Enterprises filed a suit in the trial court seeking to stop Flipkart from using “MarQ”/“marq”, alleging trademark infringement, passing off, dilution, and related reliefs. It argued that the marks were phonetically and structurally too close, likely causing ordinary consumers to confuse the source of the goods.

Procedural Background

The trial court (Additional District Judge, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi) initially granted an ad-interim injunction in January 2018 against Flipkart’s use of the impugned marks. Flipkart challenged this before the High Court and obtained limited extensions to clear existing stock. Later, Flipkart applied to vacate the injunction, while Marc Enterprises sought confirmation of the interim relief.

In October 2018, the trial court passed the impugned order confirming the injunction in favor of Marc Enterprises under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and dismissed Flipkart’s vacation application. Aggrieved, Flipkart filed the present appeal under Order 43(1)(R) CPC before the Delhi High Court. The operation of the injunction was stayed during the pendency of the appeal.

After hearings, the High Court reserved judgment. Flipkart later sought to place additional documents on record showing subsequent registrations of composite marks like “Flipkart MarQ” and “MarQ by Flipkart” in certain classes. The court allowed this but with costs. Final arguments concluded, leading to the judgment on 10 April 2026.

Reasoning

The High Court applied the limited scope of interference in appeals against discretionary interim injunction orders. It could only intervene if the trial court’s decision was perverse or contrary to settled law — meaning no reasonable person could have reached the same conclusion on the facts and legal principles. Citing landmark Supreme Court decisions, the court stressed that appellate courts should not substitute their own view merely because another outcome seems preferable.

On merits, the court examined the three classic ingredients for interim injunction in trademark cases: prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury. It found that Marc Enterprises had a strong prima facie case as the prior user (since 1981) and prior registrant (from 1984) of an inherently distinctive, coined mark “MARC”. Flipkart’s adoption in 2017 came much later for allied goods in the electrical and electronics category.

The core issue was deceptive similarity. The court held that “MARC” and “MARQ”/“marq” were phonetically similar . Visually too, they overlapped significantly. The court rejected Flipkart’s argument that its unique stylization with a capital “Q” (pronounced as “Mar Queue”) and association with “quality” made the marks distinct. It noted that consumers, including semi-literate ones, may not perceive such nuances and could easily confuse the marks.

Flipkart’s reliance on using its house mark “Flipkart” alongside “MarQ” was also dismissed. The court observed that the house mark was often used in a minuscule font or sometimes not at all, and mere addition of a house mark does not eliminate confusion when the dominant elements are similar. It cited precedents emphasizing that the overall impression on consumers matters more than minor differences.

The goods were allied and cognate — both involved electrical/electronic appliances sold through common channels, including online platforms like Flipkart’s own website (where Marc’s products were also available). This increased the likelihood of confusion among the same class of buyers.

On the “common to the trade” defense, the court clarified that mere registrations or pending applications containing “MAR”, “MARC”, or “MARK” do not prove actual widespread use in the market. Common-to-register is not the same as common-to-trade; substantial evidence of actual use by third parties is required, which Flipkart failed to establish convincingly.

Regarding Flipkart’s later registrations of composite marks like “Flipkart MarQ”, the court held these did not impact the appeal. The injunction was based on passing off and prior rights as well, and the subsequent events (post-dating the impugned order) could not retrospectively validate the adoption or override the deceptive similarity finding at the prima facie stage.

The court also addressed procedural fairness concerns raised by Flipkart but found no violation that warranted interference.

Key Judgments Discussed with Citations and Context

The court referred to several important precedents to guide its analysis, explaining their relevance in simple terms:

• Wander Ltd. v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd. (1991 PTC 1 (SC)) and Mohd. Mehtab Khan v. Khushnuma Ibrahim Khan (2013) 9 SCC 221: These Supreme Court cases lay down the limited appellate interference in interim injunction matters. The High Court explained that unless the trial court’s order is manifestly perverse, the appellate court should not re-appreciate evidence or substitute its discretion. This principle prevented the court from overturning the trial court’s well-reasoned findings.
• Cadila Healthcare Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2001) 5 SCC 73: A landmark Supreme Court decision on deceptive similarity and likelihood of confusion. The court applied the test of an average consumer with imperfect recollection, emphasizing that phonetic similarity can lead to infringement even if goods are not identical but allied.
• Ruston & Hornsby Ltd. v. The Zamindara Engineering Co. (1969) 2 SCC 727: Highlighted that in infringement cases involving similar marks, the plaintiff must show likelihood of deception or confusion. The Delhi High Court found this test satisfied here due to the closeness of “MARC” and “MARQ”.
• F. Hoffmann-la Roche & Co. Ltd. v. Geoffrey Manner & Co. Pvt. Ltd. (1969) 2 SCC 716, Nandhini Deluxe v. Karnataka Cooperative Milk Producers Federation Ltd. (2018), and others like Skyline Education Institute Pvt. Ltd. v. S.L. Vaswani (2010) 2 SCC 142: These cases were cited by Flipkart to argue that phonetic similarity alone is insufficient. The court distinguished them, noting that when overall similarity (phonetic + structural + visual) creates confusion, especially with prior rights, infringement is made out.
• Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. v. B. Vijaya Sai (2022 SCC OnLine SC 61) and Marico Ltd. v. Minolta Natural Care (2025:BHC-OS:24054): Used to reject the house mark defense. Adding company name does not always dispel confusion if the infringing element remains dominant.
• Exotic Mile v. Imagine Marketing (P) Ltd. (2025 SCC OnLine Del 5969): Relevant for online sales; even e-commerce does not eliminate phonetic similarity concerns.

The court discussed these judgments in the context of Indian market realities, consumer behavior, and the need to protect prior users while discouraging dishonest or confusing adoptions.

Final Decision of the Court

The Delhi High Court dismissed Flipkart’s appeal in its entirety, upholding the trial court’s interim injunction. It found no perversity or legal error in the impugned order. The stay granted earlier was vacated. However, considering the pendency of the appeal and practical difficulties, the court granted Flipkart time until 15 May 2026 to clear or withdraw existing stock bearing the “MarQ”/“marq” marks from the market. No costs were awarded. All observations were prima facie, as the main suit remains pending.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

This judgment reinforces several practical principles :

First, prior use and registration give strong rights; a later adopter bears the risk if its mark closely resembles an established one, especially for related goods.

Second, deceptive similarity is assessed holistically — how an ordinary consumer (not an expert) would perceive the marks in real-life buying situations, considering imperfect memory. Phonetic and structural overlaps matter a lot, even in stylized forms or online sales.

Third, adding a house mark in small font does not automatically save a similar mark if the core part remains confusingly close. The overall commercial impression counts.

Fourth, claims of “common to trade” require solid evidence of actual widespread use by others, not just registry searches.

Finally, appellate courts are reluctant to interfere with interim injunctions unless they are clearly unreasonable, preserving the status quo and protecting established goodwill during litigation.

The ruling sends a clear message to brands: conduct thorough clearance searches and avoid marks that could ride on the reputation of earlier ones, particularly in competitive sectors like electronics and e-commerce.

Case Title:Flipkart India Private Limited Vs Marc Enterprises Pvt Ltd

Date of Order: 10 April 2026

Case Number: FAO-IPD 46/2021

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:3004

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Justice Shri Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles for the Article:

1. Delhi High Court Rules ‘MarQ’ Deceptively Similar to ‘MARC’: Flipkart Loses Trademark Appeal
2. ‘MARQ’ vs ‘MARC’: Why Flipkart Must Stop Using Its Private Label Mark – A Simple Breakdown of the Delhi HC Judgment
3. Prior Trademark Rights Prevail: Delhi High Court Upholds Injunction Against Flipkart’s ‘MarQ’ Brand
4. Trademark Confusion in E-Commerce: Key Takeaways from Flipkart vs Marc Enterprises Case

Suitable Tags:

Trademark Infringement, Deceptive Similarity, Delhi High Court, Flipkart MarQ, MARC Trademark, Prior User Rights, House Mark Defense, Interim Injunction, Passing Off, Intellectual Property Law India, Consumer Confusion, Electronics Trademark Dispute

Headnote of the Article

In Flipkart India Pvt Ltd v. Marc Enterprises Pvt Ltd (2026), the Delhi High Court upheld an interim injunction against Flipkart’s use of “MarQ” for appliances, holding it deceptively similar to the prior registered mark “MARC”. Emphasizing phonetic, structural, and overall similarity likely to confuse average consumers, the court clarified limits on house mark defenses and the limited scope of appellate interference in injunction matters. The decision reinforces strong protection for established trademarks in allied goods categories.

Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. Vs. Satej M. Katekar

Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. Vs. Satej M. Katekar

​Court: High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Commercial Division)

Case No.: Commercial IP Suit No. 111 of 2013

Neural Citation:2026:BHC-OS:10275

Coram: Justice Manish Pitale

Date of Judgment: April 22, 2026

​1. Introduction and Facts

​The Plaintiff, Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd., a leading manufacturer of medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations, filed a suit for permanent injunction and damages against the Defendant, Satej M. Katekar (Proprietor of Absun Pharma). The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant’s use of the marks 'ABSUN' and 'ABSUN PHARMA' infringed upon its registered house marks 'SUN' and 'SUN PHARMA'. Additionally, the Plaintiff sought to restrain the Defendant from using the mark 'E-MIST', alleging it was deceptively similar to its registered trademark 'EYEMIST'.

​The Plaintiff has held registrations for the device mark 'SUN' since 1983 (with user claim since 1978) and word marks 'SUN PHARMA' since 2007 (with user claim since 1993). The Defendant contended that 'ABSUN' was honestly adopted by combining alphabets from the names of his son (Abheejit) and wife (Sunita).

​2. Key Issues

• ​Whether the Defendant’s use of 'ABSUN'/'ABSUN PHARMA' infringed the Plaintiff’s registered marks under the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

• ​Whether such use constituted passing off.

• ​Whether the trademark 'SUN' is common to the pharmaceutical trade.

• ​Whether the Plaintiff had acquiesced to the Defendant’s use of the marks.

​3. Arguments and Observations

• ​Infringement: The Plaintiff argued that prefixing 'AB' to 'SUN' did not eliminate deceptive similarity, as the marks must be compared as a whole. The Defendant argued that Section 29(5) only applies if the exact registered mark is used as a trade name. The Court rejected this, clarifying that Section 29(5) also covers use of the mark as "part of" a trade name. 31.

• ​Export Deemed as Domestic Use: The Defendant argued they only exported products to Africa and did not sell in India. The Court applied Section 56 of the Trade Marks Act, ruling that applying a trademark to goods for export constitutes "use" of the trademark in India.36,37.

• ​Proof of Goodwill: The Court upheld the validity of Chartered Accountant certificates for sales and promotional expenses as evidence of goodwill, noting that in a Commercial Suit, the Defendant’s failure to specifically deny these documents by admission denial affidavit resulted in their admission under Order VIII Rules 3 and 5 of the CPC.40-42.

​4. Final Judgment

​The High Court decreed the suit in favor of the Plaintiff. Key findings included:

• ​Permanent Injunction: The Defendant was restrained from using the marks 'ABSUN', 'ABSUN PHARMA', and 'E-MIST'.

• ​Infringement & Passing Off: The Court found the Defendant to be a "first-time knowing infringer" as they were aware of the Plaintiff's marks since 1995 but failed to conduct a registry search before adoption.
• Use of House Mark also amount to Infringement:27.
• ​Costs: In addition to the injunction, the Court awarded partial costs of Rs. 10 lakhs to the Plaintiff, citing similar precedents in commercial litigation. 53.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi"

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Hatsun Agro Product Ltd. Vs. Patanjali Biscuits Pvt. Ltd

Hatsun Agro Product Ltd. Vs. Patanjali Biscuits Pvt. Ltd.21.04.2026:OSA No. 263 of 2020: MadHC: Hon’ble Mr. Justice P. Velmurugan and Hon’ble Mrs. Justice K. Govindarajan Thilakavadi

​Facts of the Case

​The appellant, Hatsun Agro Product Ltd., a major private sector dairy in India, has used the registered trademark "AROKYA" for its milk and dairy products (Class 29) since 1994. The appellant alleged that the respondents (Patanjali Biscuits Pvt. Ltd. and Patanjali Ayurved Ltd.) infringed upon this trademark by selling biscuits under the mark "PATANJALI AAROGYA" (Class 30).

​The appellant sought a permanent injunction for infringement and passing off, claiming the marks were phonetically similar and likely to cause consumer confusion. The respondents contended that "Aarogya" is a generic Sanskrit term meaning "well-being" and that their products were distinct and registered under a different class (Class 30).

​Issues for Consideration

1. ​Whether a suit for infringement is maintainable against a registered trademark holder under the Trade Marks Act.

1. ​Whether the products (milk vs. biscuits) and trademarks ("AROKYA" vs. "PATANJALI AAROGYA") were sufficiently similar to cause confusion.

1. ​Whether the learned single Judge was justified in dismissing the suit via a summary judgment under Order XIII-A of the CPC.

​Arguments

• ​Appellant: Argued that the phonetic similarity of "Arokya" and "Aarogya" created bad faith and dishonesty, damaging their established goodwill. They maintained that since biscuits contain milk, there was an overlap in product association.

• ​Respondents: Argued that Section 28(3) of the Trade Marks Act protects co-existing registered owners of similar marks. They highlighted that the prefix "Patanjali" made their brand distinctive and that the appellant did not hold a registration under Class 30 (biscuits).

​Judgment

​The Division Bench upheld the single Judge’s decision to dismiss the suit through a summary judgment. The Court found:

• ​No Real Prospect of Success: Applying the principle from Vishnudas Trading v. Vazir Sultan Tobacco Ltd., the Court held the appellant could not claim a monopoly over a mark for products they do not produce.

• ​Distinctiveness: The goods falling under Class 30 (biscuits) were found to be entirely different from those in Class 29 (milk products).

• ​Statutory Protection: Under Section 28(3) of the Trade Marks Act, the respondents were protected as registered holders of their mark.

• ​Procedural Validity: The Court affirmed that there were no compelling reasons to record oral evidence, justifying the use of summary judgment under the Commercial Courts Act.

​Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed, and the summary judgment in favor of the respondents was sustained. 

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi"

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Modi Woodspace Private Limited Vs. The Registrar of Trade Marks

Modi Woodspace Private Limited Vs. The Registrar of Trade Marks:22.04.2026:C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 56/2025: 2026:DHC:3341:Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela

​Overview

​The Delhi High Court set aside an order passed by the Registrar of Trade Marks which had refused the registration of the wordmark "KAMA CASA". The Court emphasized the "Anti-Dissection Rule" and remanded the matter for fresh consideration.

​Facts

• ​Application: The appellant, Modi Woodspace Private Limited, filed an application (No. 6087367) for the mark "KAMA CASA" (word) in Classes 20 and 35 on a "Proposed to be used" basis.

• ​Objection: The Registrar raised objections under Section 11(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, citing prior registrations of the marks "KAMA" and "CASA".

• ​Impugned Order: On May 21, 2025, the Registrar refused the application, concluding that since "KAMA" and "CASA" were already registered in Class 20, the combined mark would cause public confusion.

​Legal Issues

1. ​Whether a composite wordmark can be dissected into individual components for comparison with prior marks under Section 11(1).

1. ​Whether a wordmark can be considered deceptively similar to device marks containing similar text elements.

​Court’s Observations & Findings

• ​The Anti-Dissection Rule: The Court held that the Registrar committed a fundamental flaw by breaking the mark "KAMA CASA" into separate parts. A trademark must be viewed as a whole; comparing a composite mark against two separate marks is "anti-thesis to the prudence of registration".

• ​Wordmark vs. Device Mark: The Court noted that the appellant sought a wordmark, while the cited marks were device/label marks. These device marks cannot be stripped of their visual elements to compare only the text.

• ​Existence of Similar Marks: The appellant presented a search report (not previously shown to the Registrar) indicating numerous existing registrations for marks containing "CASA" in the same class.

​Conclusion

​The High Court quashed the impugned order and remitted the matter to the Registrar for de novo consideration. The Registrar was directed to pass a fresh order within four months, specifically taking into account the search report provided by the appellant.

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Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi"

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New Bharat Overseas Vs Bhagwati Lacto

Factual and procedural background

New Bharat Overseas has been processing and exporting rice since 1978 and holds long standing trademarks and copyright for its Taj Mahal brand which features an artistic drawing of the Taj Mahal on its packaging. In 2019 Bhagwati Lacto Vegetarian Exports obtained copyright registration for its own artistic packaging label named Garimaa Gold which also prominently shows the Taj Mahal along with rice. New Bharat had earlier filed police complaints and FIRs against Bhagwati alleging that the Garimaa Gold packaging copied its Taj Mahal design. New Bharat only learnt about the copyright registration during related court proceedings and then filed a rectification petition in the Delhi High Court asking to cancel the registration because Bhagwati had not given it any notice before obtaining the copyright.

Dispute in question

The main dispute was whether Bhagwati’s copyright registration for the Garimaa Gold artistic work should be cancelled because Bhagwati failed to send mandatory notice to New Bharat who already had a clear interest and ongoing dispute over the very same type of Taj Mahal packaging design.

Reasoning and decision of court

The court examined the Copyright Rules which require anyone applying for copyright to give notice to every person who claims an interest in the work or disputes the applicant’s rights. The judge found that New Bharat was clearly such a person because of its earlier trademarks FIRs and complaints against Bhagwati over the identical artistic element. Bhagwati had not disclosed these disputes while applying for copyright and had not sent any notice to New Bharat. This breach of the mandatory notice rule made the registration procedurally invalid. The court therefore cancelled the Garimaa Gold copyright registration revived Bhagwati’s original application and gave New Bharat four weeks to file its objections so the Registrar can decide the matter afresh on merits within three months while leaving all other issues open for future hearing.

Legal point settled in this case

When someone applies for copyright registration they must give prior notice to any person who has a genuine claim or dispute over the artistic work otherwise the registration is procedurally invalid and can be cancelled by the court.

New Bharat Overseas Vs Bhagwati Lacto :08.09.2025: C.O.(COMM.IPD-CR) 843/2022:Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora.

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Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Anuradha Sharma Vs Jiva Ayurvedic

Factual and procedural background

Jiva Ayurvedic Pharmacy and its group have been using the trademark Jiva since 1992 for Ayurvedic medicines wellness centres and related services and have built substantial reputation through registrations sales and advertising. In 2018 the Sharma family associated with the well-known Baidyanath brand registered the mark Shatam Jeeva in Class 5 and later launched a wellness retreat under that name in 2021 to mark 100 years of Baidyanath adding the words By Baidyanath and using a distinct logo with herbs and the letter S. In 2022 Jiva discovered the retreat when a customer inquired about it and sent a legal notice alleging infringement and passing off. Jiva then filed a commercial suit seeking permanent injunction and also applied for a temporary injunction. The commercial court at Tis Hazari granted the temporary injunction restraining the Sharmas from using Shatam Jeeva finding the marks deceptively similar. The Sharmas appealed to the division bench of the Delhi High Court.

Dispute in question

The core dispute was whether the Sharmas use of the mark Shatam Jeeva for their wellness retreat infringed Jiva’s registered trademarks or amounted to passing off by creating confusion or riding on Jiva’s goodwill.

Reasoning and decision of court

The division bench examined both marks as a whole including their visual phonetic and overall commercial impression. The court found no deceptive similarity because Shatam Jeeva is a composite mark with different spelling colour scheme artwork and the clear distinguishing phrase By Baidyanath while Jiva’s mark features a lotus and different styling. The bench held that an average consumer would not be confused and that Jiva could not claim monopoly over the common Sanskrit word Jeeva without proving secondary meaning. The court also noted that Jiva failed to establish essential ingredients of passing off such as misrepresentation and damage. Finding the commercial court’s order perverse and contrary to settled principles the division bench allowed the appeal set aside the injunction and permitted the Sharmas to continue using their mark.

Legal point settled in this case

In trademark disputes involving composite marks courts must compare the rival marks as a whole under the anti-dissection rule rather than focusing only on one common or dominant element to decide if there is any likelihood of confusion.

Anuradha Sharma Vs Jiva Ayurvedic: 21.04.2026:FAO (COMM) 334/2025:2026:DHC:3302-DB: Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla.

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Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Castrol Limited Vs Sanjay Sonavane

Factual and procedural background

Castrol Limited, a well-known manufacturer of engine oils and lubricants, filed two separate commercial suits in the Delhi High Court against Sanjay Sonavane and others. In the first suit Castrol sought a declaration that its 3X trademark did not infringe Sonavane’s 3P mark and an injunction to stop him from issuing groundless threats of legal action. This suit arose after a police raid on one of Castrol’s authorised distributors triggered by a complaint and FIR filed by Sonavane. In the second suit Castrol sued Sonavane along with several newspapers, a YouTube channel and other media outlets for publishing allegedly disparaging articles and videos about the raid which tarnished Castrol’s reputation. The single judge dismissed the second suit holding it was barred under Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure because both suits arose from the same set of facts and Castrol should have claimed all reliefs in the first suit. Aggrieved by this order Castrol filed the present appeal before the division bench.

Dispute in question

The central dispute was whether the second suit filed by Castrol was barred by Order II Rule 2 CPC on the ground that it arose from the same cause of action as the first suit and that Castrol had omitted to claim the reliefs of disparagement and media takedown in the earlier proceeding.

Reasoning and decision of court

The division bench examined both plaints in detail and the timeline of events. The court found that while the initial police raid and Sonavane’s complaint formed the background, the second suit was based on distinct subsequent events including specific media publications and WhatsApp messages circulated after the first suit had already been filed. The bench reviewed several Supreme Court judgments on Order II Rule 2 CPC and held that the causes of action in the two suits were not identical and the reliefs claimed in the second suit could not have been sought in the first suit at the time it was instituted. The court accordingly allowed Castrol’s appeal set aside the single judge’s order dismissing the second suit and directed that the second suit be restored and proceed in accordance with law.

Legal point settled in this case

A second suit is not barred by Order II Rule 2 CPC merely because it relates to events connected with the first suit if the causes of action are distinct or the facts and reliefs in the later suit arose or came to the plaintiff’s knowledge only after the first suit was filed.

Castrol Limited Vs Sanjay Sonavane:20.04.2026:RFA(OS)(COMM) 38/2025:2026:DHC:3210-DB: High Court of Delhi, Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla.

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Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Rubinetterie Bresciane Bonomi SpA Vs Lehry Instrumentation

Factual and procedural background

An Italian company called Rubinetterie Bresciane Bonomi SpA makes brass valves and plumbing products and sells them worldwide under its well-known trademarks RB and Rubinetterie Bresciane. It appointed an Indian firm Lehry Instrumentation & Valves Pvt Ltd as its authorised distributor in India for several years. Later the Italian company received complaints from customers that some valves bearing its trademark looked different from genuine products and came with suspicious quality certificates. Believing counterfeit goods were being sold under its name the Italian company filed a suit for passing off and injunction. After terminating the distributorship it sent letters to customers warning them not to deal with the Indian firm. The Indian company then filed its own suit claiming the letters were defamatory and had damaged its reputation and business. Both suits were heard together by a single judge who dismissed the Italian company’s case and awarded damages to the Indian company. The Italian company appealed to the division bench of the Madras High Court.

Dispute in question

The main dispute was whether the Indian distributor had sold counterfeit products using the Italian company’s trademark and whether the letters sent by the Italian company to customers after terminating the distributorship amounted to actionable defamation or were justified to protect its brand.

Reasoning and decision of court

The High Court examined the evidence in detail including clear admissions by the distributor that the Italian company was the prior owner and user of the RB trademark. The court found that the distributor had internally generated quality certificates based on the Italian company’s earlier documents which could mislead buyers into thinking the goods were genuine. The court held that the Italian company had acted in good faith on customer complaints and was entitled to terminate the distributorship and inform the trade to safeguard its reputation. The letters were not defamatory as they were issued to prevent confusion in the market. The division bench set aside the single judge’s judgment allowed the Italian company’s appeal decreed its suit for injunction and accounts and dismissed the Indian company’s defamation suit.

Legal point settled in this case

In a passing off action a court can rely on circumstantial evidence such as admissions of prior trademark use internal generation of misleading quality certificates and the overall conduct of the parties to establish likelihood of confusion even without producing the actual counterfeit product in court.

Rubinetterie Bresciane Bonomi SpA Vs Lehry Instrumentation & Valves Pvt. Ltd.:17.04.2026, O.S.A.Nos.241 & 255 of 2020: , MadrasHC:Hon’ble Mr. Justice P.Velmurugan and Hon’ble Mr. Justice K.Govindarajan Thilakavadi.

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Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Emami Agrotech Limited Vs The Deputy Inspector General of Registration

Factual and procedural background

Emami Agrotech Limited received a deed from Rasoi Limited in September 2014 assigning copyrights in several product labels and brands for a stated consideration of Rs 9 crore. The deed was registered with the authorities who accepted the valuation and granted full exemption from stamp duty under Article 23 of the Indian Stamp Act charging only a nominal Rs 300. Years later the stamp authorities issued notices and passed orders demanding Rs 53 99 700 as deficit stamp duty claiming the exemption did not apply because the assignment was not made “by entry” under the Copyright Act and certain registration certificates were allegedly missing. Emami’s appeal was rejected leading the company to file a writ petition before the Calcutta High Court.

Dispute in question

The core dispute was whether the copyright assignment deed qualified for complete exemption from stamp duty or whether the authorities could reopen the already registered document years later and demand full duty by questioning the mode of assignment and production of additional certificates.

Reasoning and decision of court

The High Court found that the deed was validly executed in writing and registered exactly as required under Sections 18 and 19 of the Copyright Act 1957. It held that the registering authorities had already accepted the market value and granted the exemption at the time of registration so they could not later invoke the undervaluation provisions of Section 47A without any fresh ground or proper procedure. The court ruled that the exemption under Article 23 applies to such copyright assignments and the authorities failed to give any valid reason for denying it. Both the original demand order and the appellate order were set aside and the writ petition was allowed.

Legal point settled in this case

A properly executed and registered deed of assignment of copyright qualifies for full exemption from stamp duty under Article 23 of Schedule IA of the Indian Stamp Act 1899 and registering authorities cannot arbitrarily reopen the matter years later to demand deficit duty once they have accepted the document and granted the exemption at registration.

Emami Agrotech Limited Vs The Deputy Inspector General of Registration, Range-III, Hooghly & Ors., Order date: 20.04.2026, Case Number: W.P.A. No. 19812 of 2022, Neutral Citation: Not Provided, Name of court and Judge: High Court at Calcutta, Hon’ble Justice Krishna Rao.

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Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Sri Sai Baba Impex Vs Venkateswara Food Products

Factual and procedural background

A company named M/s Sri Sai Baba Impex has been manufacturing and selling processed sunflower seeds under the trademark RAM-G GOLD since 2015 and got one of its marks registered in 2022. When a rival firm Venkateswara Food Products started using a very similar name SRI RAM-G GOLD for exactly the same product, Sri Sai Baba Impex filed a suit in the district court at Ananthapuramu seeking to stop the copying. In the interim application the trial court chose to issue notice to the other side instead of granting an immediate order to halt sales. Feeling that its business was at immediate risk, Sri Sai Baba Impex rushed to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh through a revision petition asking for urgent protection.

Dispute in question

The central question was whether the court should immediately restrain Venkateswara Food Products from making or selling its sunflower seeds under the deceptively similar trademark while the main case was still pending, especially after the lower court refused to grant any stop-order without first hearing the rival.

Reasoning and decision of court

The High Court found that Sri Sai Baba Impex had a strong prima facie case as the earlier user and registered owner of the mark while the rival’s marks were almost identical in name, style, colour scheme and packaging, making customer confusion highly likely. The judge held that the trial court had erred by thinking a pending trademark application by the rival prevented any interim relief. To prevent irreparable harm to the first company’s goodwill and business, the court granted an ex-parte ad-interim injunction stopping the rival from using the similar mark for three weeks, giving the petitioner time to seek further orders from the trial court.

Case law settled in this case

The court applied the Supreme Court ruling in S. Syed Mohideen Vs. P. Sulochana Bai that prior user rights in a trademark prevail over any subsequent registration or application, so the first user cannot be defeated merely because someone else later applies for registration.

Sri Sai Baba Impex Vs Venkateswara Food Products:15.04.2026:Civil Revision Petition No.1101/2026,APHC010197992026: High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati, Hon’ble Ms. Justice B. S. Bhanumathi.

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Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Akash Arora Vs Reckitt and Colman

factual and procedural background

Mr Akash Arora, who runs Grand Chemical Works and sells household cleaning products under the brand GAINDA, found himself in a legal fight with Reckitt and Colman Overseas Hygiene Home Limited, the makers of well-known brands like Harpic and Colin. The bigger company had obtained an interim injunction in March 2026 stopping Arora from using certain bottle shapes and labels for his glass cleaner and toilet cleaner, claiming they looked too similar to theirs. Arora appealed to the Delhi High Court, explaining that he had been selling these products since 2019 and was left with a large amount of already-made stock sitting with distributors as well as empty bottles and packaging materials ready at his factory.

dispute in question

The main disagreement was whether Arora should be allowed to sell off his existing finished stock and finish packaging the empty bottles he had already paid for, or whether the entire inventory had to be destroyed because of the injunction. Arora argued that destroying the stock would cause him heavy financial loss and create unnecessary waste, while Reckitt insisted that letting the products stay in the market would weaken their rights.

reasoning and decision of court

The judges accepted that Arora had been in the market for years and that suddenly stopping all sales would hurt him far more than it would help Reckitt, especially since the products are not perishable and Arora promised to keep proper accounts of every sale. To strike a fair balance, the court permitted him to use the empty bottles but only after making simple changes to reduce any similarity, such as using yellow caps and labels for the toilet cleaner and a white spray nozzle for the glass cleaner. The court laid down clear deadlines: packaging must be completed by the end of May 2026, distributors could sell till the end of July 2026, and retailers could clear remaining stock till the end of December 2026, after which everything unsold had to be recalled. Reckitt was also allowed to verify the stock numbers at Arora’s premises. The order was passed purely to balance the equities during the appeal and without deciding the final merits of the case.

one important case law settled in this case

The court focused on practical equity and the need to avoid economic hardship and environmental waste when granting time-bound relief for exhausting existing inventory in trade-dress disputes.

Akash Arora Vs Reckitt and Colman:21.04.2026:FAO(OS) (COMM) 88/2026:2026:DHC:3282:Hon’ble Mr. Justice V. Kameswar Rao and Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora.

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Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Gorkha Security Services Vs. Government (NCT of Delhi)

Factual and procedural background

Gorkha Security Services, a private firm, won a contract in 2011 to provide security guards at a Delhi government-run hospital. The one-year deal was later extended informally as the company kept supplying services. The government accused the firm of serious lapses such as not paying minimum wages to its guards, failing to deposit provident fund and insurance contributions, and not submitting required documents. After notices and replies, the authorities issued a show-cause notice in February 2013 listing the defaults and warning of costs plus “other actions as deemed fit.” In September 2013 the government terminated the contract, imposed financial penalties and blacklisted the firm for four years, stopping it from bidding on any government tenders. The company challenged the order in the Delhi High Court, which upheld the blacklisting. Gorkha then approached the Supreme Court.

Dispute in question

The core dispute was whether the government could blacklist the firm when the show-cause notice never clearly said blacklisting was even being considered.

Reasoning and decision of court

The Supreme Court explained that blacklisting is an extremely harsh step, practically a “civil death” for a business because it shuts the door on future government contracts. Principles of natural justice therefore demand that the affected party must be told in advance, in clear words, that such a penalty is proposed so it can properly defend itself. The court found that the notice given to Gorkha only spoke of levying costs and used vague language about “other actions.” It did not mention or even hint at blacklisting, even though the contract contained a clause allowing it. The judges held that the mere existence of that clause was not enough; the department had to spell out the proposed punishment specifically. Because proper notice was missing, the blacklisting order violated natural justice. The Supreme Court quashed the blacklisting but made it clear the government could start the process afresh after issuing a correct show-cause notice.

Gorkha Security Services Vs. Government (NCT of Delhi):(2014) 9 SCC 105

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Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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R.N. Gosain Vs. Yashpal Dhir

Factual and procedural background

Yashpal Dhir, a retired government employee who had worked with the Haryana government and later the Haryana Agricultural University, sought eviction of his tenant R.N. Gosain from a residential house in Chandigarh under special provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act meant for specified landlords. The Rent Controller dismissed the eviction petition, holding that Dhir did not qualify as a specified landlord. On revision, the High Court allowed the eviction, found Dhir eligible, and gave the tenant one month’s time to vacate provided he paid arrears of rent and filed an undertaking to hand over vacant possession at the end of that period. The tenant filed the required undertaking but added a note saying it was subject to his right to file a special leave petition in the Supreme Court, and then approached the Supreme Court challenging the eviction order.

Dispute in question

The key issue was whether the tenant, after giving the undertaking to the High Court and availing the benefit of one month’s protection from immediate eviction, could still challenge the High Court’s judgment before the Supreme Court.

Reasoning and decision of court

The Supreme Court held that once the tenant elected to accept the benefit of the High Court’s order by filing the undertaking and thereby secured one month’s time to vacate, he could not later turn around and assail the very same order. The court applied the principle that a person cannot both approbate and reprobate the same instrument — he cannot take advantage of an order on the footing that it is valid and then challenge its validity to gain some other advantage. The tenant had two clear options — either accept the one-month protection by giving the undertaking or face immediate eviction — and having chosen the first, he was bound by it. The special leave petition was accordingly dismissed without examining the merits of the eviction order.

R.N. Gosain Vs. Yashpal Dhir:23.10.1992:Criminal Appeal No. 341 of 1990:MANU/SC/0078/1993, Name of court and Judge: Supreme Court of India, Justices K. Jayachandra Reddy and S.C. Agrawal.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Rahul Mavai Vs Union of India

Factual and procedural background

Rahul Mavai applied for a Group D government post but his related case was dismissed by the Central Administrative Tribunal on 17 July 2018. He waited almost six years before filing a writ petition in the Delhi High Court in 2024. In the petition he claimed that his previous lawyer in Gurgaon had misled him with fake dates, did not file the case properly, and that he only discovered this when he visited the lawyer in August 2024 after which he obtained the complete file from the tribunal.

Dispute in question

The main point before the court was whether the writ petition filed after such a long delay of six years should be entertained at all or dismissed outright on the ground of delay and laches.

Reasoning and decision of court

The division bench observed that the explanation given by the petitioner was vague and insufficient to justify six years of delay. The judges relied on several Supreme Court rulings which hold that delay defeats equity and that a person who sleeps over his rights for a long time cannot be granted extraordinary relief under writ jurisdiction. They also disapproved the common practice of simply blaming the lawyer for delay without placing convincing material on record to show that the litigant had been regularly following up and was genuinely misled. Since the delay was not satisfactorily explained the court dismissed the writ petition on the ground of laches without examining the merits of the case.

Rahul Mavai Vs Union of India:18.12.2024:W.P.(C) 17440/2024:2024:DHC:9873-DB:Hon'ble Justices C. Hari Shankar and Anoop Kumar Mendiratta.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Novo Nordisk Vs Dr Reddys Laboratories

Factual and procedural background

Novo Nordisk A/S filed a commercial suit in the Delhi High Court against Dr Reddy’s Laboratories Limited claiming that the defendant was infringing its registered trademark OZEMPIC by using the mark OLYMVIQ on similar diabetes injection products. The suit sought a permanent injunction to restrain the defendant from manufacturing selling promoting or dealing in any goods under the OLYMVIQ mark or any deceptively similar name.

Dispute in question

The core disagreement was whether Dr Reddy’s could continue using the OLYMVIQ trademark and what should happen to the existing stock of injections already manufactured under that mark.

Reasoning and decision of court

During the hearing the parties reached a settlement which the court accepted. Dr Reddy’s gave undertakings to immediately stop all manufacture sale supply export promotion and commercial use of products under OLYMVIQ including its logo and packaging to withdraw all pending trademark applications for the mark and to switch to a new mark called OLYMRA. The court permitted Dr Reddy’s to sell its existing stock of injections within 30 days after which any remaining stock would be donated to a government hospital in the presence of Novo Nordisk’s representative. Novo Nordisk was awarded 30 per cent of the costs claimed in the bill of costs and a full refund of court fees. The suit was decreed in terms of the settlement and disposed of along with all pending applications.

Novo Nordisk Vs Dr Reddys Laboratories Limited:30.03.2026: CS(COMM) 317/2026:H.J. Justice Jyoti Singh.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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