Shyam Rastogi Trading as Shyam Hosiery Industries and Anr. Vs. Hugo Boss Trade Mark

Rejection of additional document in Commercial Suit

Introduction

In a significant ruling emphasizing timely disclosure of documents in commercial suits, the Delhi High Court on 29 January 2026 dismissed a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution by Shyam Rastogi trading as Shyam Hosiery Industries. The petitioners sought to challenge the trial court’s order refusing permission to place additional old documents on record at a late stage in a trademark infringement suit filed by Hugo Boss Trademark Management GmbH & Co KG.

Justice Tushar Rao Gedela held that the defendants failed to show any “reasonable cause” for not disclosing the documents along with their written statement as required under the Commercial Courts Act and the amended Order XI of the CPC. The court observed that most documents were in the power, possession, or control of the defendants and related to their claimed prior use of the “BIG BOSS” mark since 1995. Vague explanations about old records and a subsequent query by the Division Bench in appeal were not sufficient. This judgment reinforces that in commercial disputes, procedural timelines for document disclosure must be strictly followed to prevent delays and ensure fair adjudication.

Factual Background

Shyam Rastogi trading as Shyam Hosiery Industries and another claimed rights in the trademark “BIG BOSS” for hosiery and garments, asserting prior use since 1995. Hugo Boss, a well-known international fashion brand, filed a commercial suit (CS(COMM) 538/2023) alleging infringement and passing off. The trial court granted an ad interim injunction in favour of Hugo Boss on 25 September 2023.

The defendants filed their written statement on 27 October 2023 but did not annex the supporting documents they later sought to produce. Issues were framed on 21 February 2024 (or 21.05.2024 as per some references). The defendants also filed an application under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC to vacate the injunction, which was dismissed.

Later, while hearing an appeal (FAO(COMM) 87/2024) against the injunction order, the Division Bench on 5 July 2024 noted the defendants’ submission about wanting to file additional documents showing sales under “BIG BOSS” from 1996-97. The defendants then searched old records and, on 20 January 2025, moved an application before the trial court under Order XI Rule 1(10) and Order XIII Rule 1 CPC seeking to place on record twelve categories of documents. These included sales tax challans from 1996-2005, income tax returns from 2001-2023, printing and purchase bills from 1995 onwards, sales records, manufacturing bills from Tirupur units, advertisement bills, and company registration documents. The defendants claimed these proved prior use of “BIG BOSS” and supported vacating the injunction.

The trial court dismissed the application on 12 September 2025, finding no reasonable cause for the late disclosure and noting that many documents were in the defendants’ possession all along.

Procedural Background

Hugo Boss filed the suit in 2023. After granting an ex parte ad interim injunction, the trial court heard the defendants’ vacation application under Order XXXIX Rule 4, which was dismissed on 2 January 2024. The defendants preferred an appeal. During appeal hearings, they indicated intent to file additional documents. The Division Bench on 5 July 2024 noted the submission but did not grant specific liberty for late production before the trial court.

The defendants then filed the application for additional documents before the trial court on 20 January 2025 — more than a year after filing the written statement and after issues were framed. The trial court rejected it on 12 September 2025, relying on the strict provisions of the Commercial Courts Act and relevant judgments. Aggrieved, the defendants filed the present petition under Article 227 along with applications for condonation of delay (allowed) and other interim reliefs.

Reasoning

The High Court first clarified the scope of Order XI Rule 1(10) CPC as applicable to commercial suits. It requires defendants to disclose all relevant documents in their power, possession, control, or custody along with the written statement. Late production is permitted only upon showing “reasonable cause” for non-disclosure.

Drawing from Supreme Court precedents, the court explained that “reasonable cause” sets a lower threshold than “sufficient cause” or “good cause,” but some genuine explanation is still mandatory. The defendants’ plea — that documents were old, records were unavailable earlier, and they searched only after a Division Bench query — was found insufficient. Most documents (sales tax challans, income tax returns, sales invoices, purchase bills) were clearly in the defendants’ possession or control from the beginning. They could and should have been disclosed with the written statement.

The court noted that the defendants failed to fill the mandatory proforma in the list of documents regarding power/possession, originality, mode of execution, and custody chain. This procedural lapse further weakened their case.

Even assuming some documents came from third parties, the defendants did not explain why they were not disclosed earlier or obtained promptly. The trial court correctly observed that the documents related directly to the core defence of prior use, making timely disclosure essential. Allowing late production without strong cause would undermine the time-bound framework of the Commercial Courts Act, which aims for speedy resolution of commercial disputes.

The High Court distinguished cases from ordinary civil suits, stressing that stricter standards apply in commercial matters. It rejected the argument that the Division Bench’s observation granted automatic liberty for late filing. No such permission was given, and the defendants delayed even after that observation.

Ultimately, the petition lacked merit as no reasonable cause for non-disclosure was demonstrated, and the trial court’s order showed no jurisdictional error warranting interference under Article 227.

Key Judgments Discussed with Citations and Context

The court discussed several important precedents to explain document disclosure rules in commercial suits:

• Hassad Food Company Q.S.C. & Anr. v. Bank of India & Ors., CS(COMM) 9/2018 (decided 15.10.2019): This Delhi High Court judgment interpreted “reasonable cause” under Order XI Rule 1(5) as requiring a lower degree of proof than “good cause” or “sufficient cause.” It emphasized liberal yet disciplined exercise of discretion in commercial suits, balancing justice with procedural timelines.
• Sudhir Kumar @ S. Baliyan v. Vinay Kumar G.B., (2021) 13 SCC 71: The Supreme Court held that the Statement of Truth and document disclosure requirements under Order XI are mandatory in commercial suits. Late production is allowed only upon establishing reasonable cause or when documents are discovered later and were not in the party’s control earlier. The court applied this to stress timely disclosure.
• Sugandhi (Dead) v. P. Rajkumar, (2020) 10 SCC 706: Cited by the petitioners, this Supreme Court decision allowed late production in an ordinary civil suit to do substantial justice. The High Court distinguished it, noting it dealt with Order VIII Rule 1A(3) in non-commercial cases, not the stricter regime under the Commercial Courts Act.
• Madanlal v. Shyamlal, (2002) 1 SCC 535: Referenced in Hassad Food to explain that “good cause” requires lower proof than “sufficient cause,” supporting a liberal yet reasoned approach.

The court used these judgments to underscore that while technicalities should not defeat justice, in commercial suits, parties must act diligently. Reasonable cause must be shown for non-disclosure at the pleading stage; vague claims of old records or later searches do not suffice when documents were always available or obtainable.

Final Decision of the Court

The Delhi High Court dismissed the petition under Article 227. It upheld the trial court’s order dated 12 September 2025 rejecting the application for additional documents. The application for condonation of delay was allowed, but the main petition failed on merits. Pending applications were disposed of. No costs were awarded.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

In commercial suits under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, parties must disclose all relevant documents in their power, possession, control, or custody along with the plaint or written statement. Late production under Order XI Rule 1(10) or similar provisions is allowed only if the party shows “reasonable cause” for the initial non-disclosure — not just any delay or later discovery.

“Reasonable cause” has a lower threshold than “sufficient cause,” but vague explanations (such as “old records were unavailable” or “searched after court query”) are insufficient when documents relate to the party’s own business and could have been produced earlier. Courts will examine whether the documents were truly beyond control or if the party failed to act diligently.

The mandatory proforma for listing documents (indicating possession, originality, execution mode, and custody) must be properly filled; failure weakens the application. While courts aim for substantial justice and may condone delays in ordinary suits, commercial matters demand stricter adherence to timelines to ensure speedy resolution.

Trial courts can consider the stage of proceedings and overall conduct. Higher courts will not interfere under Article 227 unless there is clear error. The ruling discourages casual or tactical late filings that prolong litigation and reminds parties that procedural rules in commercial disputes are tools for efficient justice, not hurdles to be bypassed lightly.

Case Title: Shyam Rastogi Trading as Shyam Hosiery Industries and Anr. Vs. Hugo Boss Trade Mark Management GmbH and Co KG and Anr. Date of Order: 29 January 2026 Case Number: CM(M)-IPD 4/20266 Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:703 Name of Court: High Court of Delhi Name of Hon'ble Judge: Justice Tushar Rao Gedela

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles for the Article:

1. Delhi High Court Refuses Late Documents in “BIG BOSS” Trademark Battle: Reasonable Cause Not Shown
2. Strict Disclosure Rules in Commercial Suits: Petition to File Old Sales Records Dismissed
3. No Indulgence for Delayed Documents: High Court Upholds Trial Court Order in Hugo Boss Case
4. Prior Use Defence Weakened by Late Filing: Key Ruling on Order XI CPC in Trademark Suit

Suitable Tags: Commercial Courts Act, Order XI Rule 1(10) CPC, Additional Documents, Reasonable Cause, Trademark Infringement, BIG BOSS vs Hugo Boss, Prior User, Article 227 Petition, Delhi High Court, Document Disclosure, Sudhir Kumar Case

Headnote of the Article In CM(M)-IPD 4/2026, the Delhi High Court dismissed a petition under Article 227 challenging the rejection of an application to place additional old documents on record in a commercial trademark suit. The court held that the defendants failed to demonstrate “reasonable cause” under Order XI Rule 1(10) CPC for not disclosing sales tax records, invoices, and other evidence of alleged prior use of “BIG BOSS” with their written statement. Emphasizing the mandatory disclosure regime in commercial suits and distinguishing ordinary civil cases, the judgment reinforces diligence in procedural compliance and limits late production without genuine justification.

Innovative Derma Care Vs. Vardhaman Skincare Pvt. Ltd.

Sufficient Cause Required for filing Witness List at later stage

Introduction

In a ruling that highlights the importance of timely and diligent conduct of litigation, the Delhi High Court on 28 February 2026 dismissed a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution challenging an order of the District Judge (Commercial Court) that refused permission to examine two additional witnesses in a long-pending trademark infringement suit concerning the mark “Clariwash” for skin care products.

Court held that the trial court was justified in rejecting the plaintiff’s repeated requests to add more witnesses at a late stage, especially when the suit was already six years old and the plaintiff’s evidence stage had been dragging on. The court emphasized that while parties have some flexibility to produce their own witnesses without court summons, they must still provide sufficient and convincing reasons for not including those witnesses in the initial list. Mere claims of health issues or work commitments, without supporting documents, were not enough to justify further delay. This decision serves as a reminder to litigants that courts expect efficiency in commercial disputes and will not readily allow repeated changes that prolong trials without good cause.

Factual Background

Innovative Derma Care, the petitioner, is engaged in marketing and selling skin care products under the trademark “Clariwash”. In July 2018, it discovered that Vardhaman Skincare Pvt. Ltd. and another were allegedly manufacturing and selling face wash products under the same mark. This led the petitioner to file a commercial suit (CS(COMM) No. 403/2019) before the District Judge (Commercial), West District, Tis Hazari Courts, New Delhi, seeking relief for trademark infringement and passing off.

The plaintiff initially filed a list of witnesses proposing only its sole proprietor, Mr. Rajesh Kumar Taneja, as PW-1. A Local Commissioner was appointed for recording evidence. Later, the plaintiff successfully sought permission to add three more witnesses (PW-2 to PW-4). However, on 22 April 2025, it filed another application under Order XVI Rule 1 CPC seeking to add two further witnesses — Mr. Amit Chopra (proprietor of Mediwings) as PW-5 and Mr. Gulshan Kumar (proprietor of GM Medicine Centre) as PW-6. The plaintiff claimed Mr. Amit Chopra could not be included earlier due to deteriorating health and Mr. Gulshan Kumar due to frequent travel and work commitments. An application for early hearing of this request was filed, but the trial court dismissed the application on 21 November 2025, citing the age of the suit, previous additions of witnesses, and lack of sufficient justification.Aggrieved, the plaintiff approached the High Court under Article 227 challenging the trial court’s refusal.

Procedural Background

The commercial suit was instituted in 2019. After initial proceedings, including mediation, issues were framed on 4 February 2025. The plaintiff filed its initial witness list on 10 February 2025 naming only one witness. A Local Commissioner was appointed on 11 February 2025 for evidence recording.

In March 2025, the plaintiff moved an application to add three additional witnesses, which the trial court allowed after hearing the parties. Evidence recording continued. On 22 April 2025, the plaintiff filed the subject application to add two more witnesses. It also sought early hearing of the application. On 21 November 2025, the trial court heard the early hearing request and dismissed the underlying application, observing that the suit was one of the oldest pending matters, the plaintiff had already added witnesses once, and no cogent reasons were shown for the further delay in naming the new witnesses. The plaintiff then filed the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution before the Delhi High Court.

The High Court heard arguments from both sides. Respondent No. 2 (represented by Mr. Ajay Amitabh Suman and team) opposed the petition, arguing that the plaintiff was indulging in dilatory tactics and that the names could have been included earlier. The matter was decided on 28 February 2026.

Reasoning

The High Court carefully examined the provisions of Order XVI Rule 1 and Rule 1A of the Code of Civil Procedure. Rule 1 requires parties to file a list of witnesses within the prescribed time after issues are settled. Rule 1A allows a party to produce its own witnesses without court summons, but this is subject to the court’s power under Rule 1(3) to permit additional witnesses only for sufficient cause.

The court relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Mange Ram v. Brij Mohan to explain the balance between flexibility and discipline in examining witnesses. While parties can bring their own witnesses without summons, the court still has discretion to refuse if names were not included earlier without good reason. The High Court noted that the petitioner failed to provide any documentary evidence supporting claims of health issues or unavailability. Such vague explanations were insufficient, especially in a six-year-old suit where the plaintiff had already been granted one opportunity to add three witnesses.

The trial court’s observation that the plaintiff was responsible for delaying its own evidence was found reasonable. Repeated applications to expand the witness list without strong justification suggested an attempt to prolong proceedings rather than a genuine need. No prejudice to the defendant was even required to be shown when the plaintiff could not demonstrate sufficient cause for the omission.

The High Court concluded that the trial court had applied its mind properly and exercised discretion in a balanced manner, considering the overall delay in the matter. Interference under Article 227 was not warranted as there was no jurisdictional error or grave miscarriage of justice.

Key Judgments Discussed with Citations and Context

The court primarily discussed Mange Ram v. Brij Mohan, (1983) 4 SCC 36. In this Supreme Court case, the question was whether a party could be prevented from examining witnesses it produces on its own (without court summons) merely because their names were not in the initial list filed under Order XVI Rule 1. The Supreme Court clarified that Rule 1A gives parties the liberty to produce their own witnesses without court assistance, but this is subject to the court’s power under Rule 1(3) to allow additional witnesses only upon showing sufficient cause for omission from the list. The provision aims to prevent abuse while ensuring relevant evidence is not shut out on mere technicalities. However, the court must still be satisfied that there is genuine reason for the late inclusion.

The High Court applied this principle to the facts, holding that the petitioner failed to show “sufficient cause” through concrete evidence (such as medical records). It distinguished the situation from cases where witnesses were genuinely unavailable or newly discovered, noting the repeated nature of the requests and the advanced stage of the suit.

Final Decision of the Court

The Delhi High Court dismissed the petition under Article 227. It found no infirmity in the trial court’s order dated 21 November 2025 refusing permission to add two additional witnesses. The petition was dismissed with no order as to costs.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

In a lawsuit, once issues are framed, parties must file a list of witnesses they want to examine. While you can bring your own witnesses without asking the court for summons (under Order XVI Rule 1A), if you want to add names later that were not in your original list, you must show a strong and genuine reason (“sufficient cause”). Vague explanations like “health issues” or “busy with work” are not enough unless supported by proper proof, such as medical documents.

Courts will look at the overall progress of the case. If the suit is already old and the party has already been given chances to add witnesses, further requests are likely to be rejected to prevent unnecessary delays. The goal is to ensure trials move forward efficiently, especially in commercial disputes where time is important for businesses.

Trial courts have reasonable discretion in such matters, and higher courts will not interfere under Article 227 unless there is a clear legal error or serious injustice. Parties must plan their evidence carefully from the beginning rather than treating witness lists as changeable at will.

Case Title: Innovative Derma Care Vs. Vardhaman Skincare Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.

Date of Order: 28 February 2026

Case Number: CM(M)-IPD 47/2025

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:1829

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles for the Article:

1. Delhi High Court Dismisses Petition to Add More Witnesses in Trademark Suit: Delay Not Tolerated
2. No Repeated Additions of Witnesses: High Court Upholds Trial Court’s Refusal in “Clariwash” Case
3. Sufficient Cause Required for Late Witness List: Key Ruling Under Order XVI CPC
4. Article 227 Petition Fails: Commercial Court’s Control Over Evidence Recording Upheld

Suitable Tags:

Order XVI Rule 1 CPC, Additional Witnesses, Sufficient Cause, Article 227 Petition, Commercial Suit Delay, Trademark Infringement, Witness List, Delhi High Court, Mange Ram Case, Evidence Recording

Headnote of the Article

In CM(M)-IPD 47/2025, the Delhi High Court dismissed a petition under Article 227 challenging the trial court’s refusal to permit addition of two more witnesses in a six-year-old trademark suit for “Clariwash”. Relying on Mange Ram v. Brij Mohan (1983) 4 SCC 36, the court held that parties must show sufficient cause for omitting names from the initial witness list under Order XVI Rule 1 CPC; vague reasons like health or travel without evidence are insufficient, especially after prior additions and in an old matter. The judgment reinforces timely conduct of trials and limited interference in procedural discretion.

Shubham Goldiee Masale Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Jai Shiv Oil Industries

Confusion is assessed from the perspective of an average consumer with imperfect recollection

Introduction

In a clear victory for brand owners protecting their established trademarks, the Delhi High Court on 8 April 2026 ordered the cancellation and removal of two trademark registrations for the mark “GOLDI” (label and logo) belonging to Jai Shiv Oil Industries and its assignee. The court found the marks deceptively similar to the petitioner’s long-standing and well-known “GOLDIEE” trademark used for spices, edible oils, and related food products since 1980.

Justice Tushar Rao Gedela held that the respondent’s adoption of “GOLDI” was likely to cause confusion among consumers due to phonetic, visual, and structural similarities, especially in the Hindi script where the dominant elements appeared nearly identical. The petitioner’s prior adoption, use, and registration, combined with substantial goodwill and sales, outweighed the respondent’s later registrations. The respondents failed to appear or file any reply, leaving the petitioner’s evidence unrebutted. This judgment underscores that prior users and registrants with strong reputation can successfully seek rectification of confusingly similar marks even in related goods classes, protecting consumers from deception and safeguarding established brands.

Factual Background

Shubham Goldiee Masale Pvt. Ltd., a Kanpur-based company engaged in manufacturing and marketing spices, edible oils, and allied food products, claimed rights in the trademark “GOLDIEE” and its formative variants. The company traced its adoption of the mark through predecessors to 1980 and had been using it continuously for decades. “GOLDIEE” also formed part of the company’s trade name.

The petitioner held multiple registrations for “GOLDIEE” labels and word marks in Classes 3, 29, and 30, with the oldest dating back to 1 October 1980. It built significant goodwill through high-quality products, extensive advertising in print and visual media, distributor networks across India, and certifications like ISO 9001:2000 and HACCP. Sales figures grew impressively — from Rs. 43 crores in 2000-01 to nearly Rs. 297 crores by 2012-13 — supported by promotional campaigns, including sampling at major marathons and government awards for excellence.

The petitioner discovered the respondent’s use of “GOLDI” (label) only in late August 2014. Jai Shiv Oil Industries had obtained registration No. 945240 in Class 29 for mustard oil (edible oil) with a claimed user date of 1 January 2000, granted on 16 September 2005. It also secured registration No. 2023762 in Class 31 for foodstuffs (oil cake) for animals, granted on 16 March 2012, again claiming user from 1 January 2000. The petitioner alleged dishonest adoption, deceptive similarity, and fraud on the Trade Marks Registry, asserting that the marks were phonetically, visually, and conceptually confusing, especially since both parties dealt in edible oils and related foodstuffs available through similar trade channels.

Procedural Background

The rectification petitions under Sections 47, 57, and 125 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, were originally filed before the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB). Following the abolition of the IPAB, they were transferred to the Delhi High Court as C.O.(COMM.IPD-TM) 392/2021 and 393/2021. Notices were issued, and the matter progressed through several hearings. The petitioner filed applications to implead the assignee (respondent no.3) after discovering an assignment deed dated 17 September 2015.

The respondents, including the original registrant and assignee, were served but chose not to file replies or appear despite opportunities. Their right to file written statements was closed, and they were proceeded ex parte. The petitioner placed on record extensive evidence of its prior use, registrations, sales turnover, advertisements, and invoices. No counter-evidence was produced by the respondents regarding their adoption, use, or bona fides.

Reasoning

The High Court began by noting the procedural history and the ex parte nature of the proceedings. It observed that while averments in unrebutted petitions are generally deemed admitted, it would still examine the merits independently. The court compared the petitioner’s long history of use and registration with the respondent’s later applications.

On comparison, the marks “GOLDIEE” and “GOLDI” were found phonetically identical in pronunciation, visually and structurally nearly the same (differing only by the extra “EE”), and conceptually indistinguishable. In Hindi script, the dominant word portions appeared even more similar, making confusion likely. The court emphasized that the word “GOLDI”/“GOLDIEE” formed the prominent and dominant element of both labels.

The goods were similar or allied: the petitioner’s registrations covered spices and foodstuffs in Classes 29 and 30, while the respondent’s covered edible oil (Class 29) and oil cake for animals (Class 31). Trade channels, retail outlets, and consumer bases overlapped significantly, increasing the likelihood of confusion. An average consumer with imperfect recollection could easily mistake the respondent’s products for those of the petitioner or associate them with it.

The petitioner’s evidence of substantial sales growth, extensive advertising, and reputation since well before the respondent’s claimed user date established prior rights and goodwill. The respondent provided no explanation for adopting “GOLDI” or evidence of bona fide use, raising suspicions of dishonest adoption aimed at riding on the petitioner’s reputation.

The court applied principles from prior judgments to hold that coverage of a trademark is determined by the registration certificate, not limited to actual proven use in every listed good. It also considered allied/cognate goods based on trade connection, intended purpose, complementary nature, and common retail channels. Even for Class 31 goods, confusion or association was likely.

Provisions under Sections 9 (distinctiveness), 11 (deceptive similarity), and 47 (non-use or lack of bona fide intention) further supported cancellation. The absence of rebuttal strengthened the case for removal.

Key Judgments Discussed with Citations and Context

The court relied on established precedents to explain deceptive similarity and allied goods in simple terms understandable to non-lawyers:

• Fybros Electric (P) Ltd. v. Vasu Dev Gupta Trading as Vasu Electronics, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 3179: This Delhi High Court decision clarified that trademark coverage is based on the goods listed in the registration certificate, not merely on proven actual use. The court used this to hold that the petitioner’s registrations in Classes 29 and 30 protected against similar marks in related goods, even if specific use evidence varied slightly.
• FDC Limited v. Docsuggest Healthcare Services Pvt. Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine Del 6381: Justice Vipin Sanghi’s judgment explained “allied or cognate” goods/services as those related by nature, trade connection, complementary use, or targeting similar customers (e.g., pharmaceuticals and medical appointment services). The court applied this principle to find overlap between edible oils/foodstuffs and oil cake for animals sold through common retail channels, increasing confusion risk.

These cases were discussed in the context of assessing likelihood of confusion holistically — considering mark similarity, goods relatedness, trade channels, and consumer perception — rather than isolated factors.

Final Decision of the Court

The Delhi High Court allowed both rectification petitions and directed the cancellation and removal of the impugned trademark registrations “GOLDI” (label) under No. 945240 in Class 29 and No. 2023762 in Class 31 from the Register of Trade Marks. The Registrar of Trade Marks was required to comply within six weeks. No costs were awarded. The petitions, along with pending applications, stood disposed of.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

Prior adoption, continuous use, and registration of a mark create strong rights that can override later registrations of deceptively similar marks, especially when the earlier mark has built substantial goodwill and reputation. Even small differences (like removing “EE” from “GOLDIEE” to make “GOLDI”) do not prevent a finding of deceptive similarity if the overall impression, pronunciation, and dominant elements remain confusingly alike.

When comparing marks, courts look at the whole mark but give weight to the prominent or dominant features. Confusion is assessed from the perspective of an average consumer with imperfect recollection, not side-by-side comparison by experts. Goods need not be identical; if they are allied or cognate — sharing trade channels, retail outlets, or consumer bases — the risk of confusion or association increases.

In rectification proceedings, unrebutted evidence of prior rights, sales, advertising, and reputation carries significant weight. Registrations obtained without bona fide intention or through material misstatements can be cancelled under provisions like Section 47. Coverage of a registered mark extends to all goods listed in the certificate, strengthening protection against similar marks in related fields.

Overall, the case highlights that trademark law protects both consumers from deception and honest businesses from unfair competition by preventing later entrants from riding on established reputations through similar marks.

Case Title: Shubham Goldiee Masale Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Jai Shiv Oil Industries and Anr.

Date of Order: 08 April 2026

Case Number: C.O.(COMM.IPD-TM) 392/2021

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:2935

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Justice Tushar Rao Gedela

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles for the Article:

1. Delhi High Court Cancels “GOLDI” Trademark for Confusing Similarity with “GOLDIEE” Brand
2. Prior User Triumphs: Shubham Goldiee Masale Wins Rectification Petitions Against “GOLDI” Mark
3. Deceptive Similarity Leads to Removal of “GOLDI” Registrations in Edible Oil and Animal Feed Cases
4. Protecting Established Brands: Key Takeaways from Goldiee Masale Rectification Judgment

Suitable Tags:

Trademark Rectification, Deceptive Similarity, Prior User Rights, GOLDIEE vs GOLDI, Section 47 Trade Marks Act, Cancellation of Registration, Allied Goods, Delhi High Court, Edible Oil Trademark, Spices Brand Protection

Headnote of the Article

In Shubham Goldiee Masale Pvt. Ltd. v. Jai Shiv Oil Industries (2026:DHC:2935), the Delhi High Court allowed rectification petitions and ordered cancellation of “GOLDI” trademark registrations in Classes 29 and 31 for being deceptively similar to the petitioner’s prior and well-established “GOLDIEE” mark used since 1980 for spices and foodstuffs. Emphasizing phonetic, visual, and conceptual confusion, overlapping trade channels, and the petitioner’s strong goodwill evidenced by sales and advertising, the court held that the later marks could not remain on the register, reinforcing prior rights and consumer protection under the Trade Marks Act.

Indigenous Energy Storage Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Controller of Patent and Designs & Anr.

Failure in following procedures for assessing inventive step in a case of Remand of Patent Controller Order

Introduction

In a notable decision emphasizing fair and reasoned decision-making in patent matters, the Delhi High Court set aside an order revoking a patent for a sustainable process to make hard carbon electrode material from cattle manure. The court did not decide whether the invention deserved a patent but sent the case back to the Patent Office for fresh consideration. It held that the Deputy Controller failed to properly apply the established legal test for checking if an invention involves an “inventive step” (something non-obvious to a skilled person).

The ruling highlights how Indian courts expect patent authorities to carefully evaluate prior art documents, identify the skilled worker in the field, and avoid deciding with the benefit of hindsight. It also allowed additional experimental data to be considered, stressing that justice requires looking at all relevant evidence. Delivered on 12 March 2026 by Justice Jyoti Singh, the judgment protects innovators working on green technologies while reminding authorities to follow due process.

Factual Background

Indigenous Energy Storage Technologies Pvt. Ltd., the appellant, is a company focused on sustainable energy storage, especially sodium-ion battery technology. It developed a process to turn cattle manure and other bio-waste into hard carbon, a key material used as an electrode in sodium-ion batteries and supercapacitors.

The invention offers several practical benefits: it is low-cost, environmentally friendly (repurposing agricultural waste), scalable for industry, and delivers good technical performance. The patent application (leading to Indian Patent No. 373806 or IN’806) was filed on 4 November 2020, examined, and granted on 4 August 2021. The title of the patent is “Cattle Manure Derived Hard Carbon as Electrode Material for Sodium Ion Batteries and Super Capacitors.”

The process in Claim 1 involves simple steps: drying the manure at 50–100°C, grinding it, treating it with acid solutions (like hydrofluoric acid) under specific conditions, washing, vacuum drying, and finally high-temperature calcination in a controlled environment. Dependent claims cover variations in the type of manure, use in different metal-ion batteries, and a specific composite electrode formulation.

Procedural Background

Soon after the grant, a post-grant opposition was filed on 3 August 2021 under Section 25(2) of the Patents Act, 1970, challenging the patent on grounds including lack of novelty, lack of inventive step (Section 25(2)(e)), and insufficient disclosure (Section 25(2)(g)). The opponent relied on three prior art documents: D1 (a WO publication on processing animal-derived waste for hard carbon), D2 (a textbook on physical chemistry showing water phase diagrams), and D3 (a US patent on electrode materials for sodium-ion batteries).

The Patent Office heard the parties and, on 18 October 2024, revoked the patent. It rejected the novelty objection but upheld lack of inventive step (finding the process obvious over D1, combined with D2 and D3) and insufficient disclosure (citing lack of experimental data on yield, purity, and scalability).

The patentee filed an appeal under Section 117A of the Patents Act before the Delhi High Court. During the appeal, it also moved an application to place additional evidence on record, including an expert opinion distinguishing the invention from prior art, data showing superior yield, and a letter about the revocation order. The High Court allowed this additional evidence, citing the Supreme Court judgment in Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin (2012) 8 SCC 148, as it would help in just adjudication.

Reasoning

The High Court examined whether the Controller’s revocation order was legally sound. It found serious procedural and substantive flaws.

First, the court stressed that deciding inventive step is not a simple comparison of documents. Indian law requires following a structured five-step test laid down by the Delhi High Court in the F. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Cipla case. The Controller failed to identify the “person skilled in the art” (a skilled but unimaginative worker in battery materials or biomass processing), did not clearly define the inventive concept of the patent, and did not properly analyze differences between the claimed process and prior art without using hindsight.

The court noted that the appellant had highlighted key differences: the patent skips the expensive “charring” step mandatory in D1, uses hydrofluoric acid (HF) at lower temperatures (25–60°C) instead of HCl at higher temperatures, avoids certain pre-treatments like “sink and float,” and employs specific vacuum drying conditions. These steps allegedly lead to better purity, higher yield, and a material better suited for sodium-ion batteries. The Controller dismissed many points by saying the patentee did not prove “technical advantage” or provide enough experimental data, but the court found this approach flawed and hindsight-driven.

On the combination of prior arts, the court observed that D2 (a general chemistry textbook on water phases) and D3 (electrode formulations) appeared non-analogous to the biomass-to-hard-carbon process in D1. Mosaic combinations (piecing unrelated documents together) are not freely allowed unless the prior art itself suggests the combination with a reasonable expectation of success.

Regarding insufficient disclosure under Section 25(2)(g), the court held that the specification sufficiently described at least one way to work the invention, which is generally enough. Doubts about industrial scalability based on laboratory yields should not lead to revocation without giving the patentee a proper chance to submit supporting data. The court verified that the Controller’s claim of providing opportunities for data was not fully supported by records. It therefore allowed the additional experimental data filed in the appeal.

Overall, the High Court found the impugned order lacked proper reasoning and failed to follow mandatory legal procedures for assessing inventive step and sufficiency. It emphasized that patent decisions must be speaking orders that address all key arguments raised by the parties.

Key Judgments Discussed with Citations and Context

The court relied on several important precedents to guide its analysis, explaining them in a way that shows how they apply to everyday patent examination:

• F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. & Anr. v. Cipla Ltd., 2015 SCC OnLine Del 13619: This landmark Division Bench decision of the Delhi High Court laid down a clear five-step test for evaluating inventive step/obviousness under Section 2(1)(ja) of the Patents Act. The steps include identifying the skilled person, the inventive concept, common general knowledge, differences from prior art, and whether those differences would be obvious without hindsight. The court in the present case explained that this test prevents arbitrary decisions and ensures a structured, fair analysis. The Controller’s failure to follow it sequentially vitiated the order.
• Tapas Chatterjee v. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs and Another, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 6369: A recent Division Bench ruling reaffirming that the five steps from Hoffmann-La Roche must be followed sequentially in obviousness examinations. The High Court used this to underline that skipping the identification of the skilled person alone was enough to set aside the order.
• Agriboard International LLC v. Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 940: This case held that when rejecting a patent for lack of inventive step, the Controller must discuss the prior art, the subject invention, and how the invention would (or would not) be obvious to a skilled person. Mere conclusions without detailed reasoning violate the law. The court applied this to criticize the impugned order’s superficial analysis.
• Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin and Another, (2012) 8 SCC 148: Cited to justify allowing additional evidence in appeal. The Supreme Court held that documents with a bearing on just adjudication can be taken on record in the interest of justice. Here, it supported admitting the expert opinion and yield data.

The court discussed these judgments to stress procedural fairness: patent offices must give reasoned decisions addressing all points, avoid hindsight, and consider all relevant evidence before revoking a granted patent.

Final Decision of the Court

The Delhi High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the revocation order dated 18 October 2024. It remanded the post-grant opposition back to the Deputy Controller for fresh consideration. The Controller must now examine the matter afresh, taking into account the additional documents allowed by the High Court, all issues raised by the appellant in its reply and written submissions, and the arguments in the appeal. Both parties must be heard, and a decision should be taken within four months. The court clarified that it expressed no opinion on the merits of the patent’s validity, leaving that entirely to the Patent Office.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

This judgment reinforces simple but important principles for anyone dealing with patents in India:

When checking if an invention is obvious (lacks inventive step), the Patent Office must follow a clear, step-by-step process: identify who the skilled worker is, what the new idea really is, what everyone in the field already knew, what is different from old inventions, and whether those differences would have been obvious without looking backward with knowledge of the new invention. Skipping these steps or using hindsight makes the decision invalid.

Additionally, when sufficiency of disclosure is challenged, the specification needs only to describe at least one clear way for a skilled person to carry out the invention — not prove every possible use with extensive data upfront. If more data becomes relevant later, authorities should give the patentee a fair opportunity to submit it rather than revoking the patent outright.

Finally, courts can allow additional evidence in appeals if it helps reach a just decision, especially in technical fields like green energy where experimental proof of advantages matters. Patent decisions must be detailed and address all key arguments raised by the parties; vague or incomplete reasoning will not stand.

The ruling encourages innovation in sustainable technologies by ensuring patent challenges are handled with proper legal rigor and fairness.

Case Title: Indigenous Energy Storage Technologies Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Deputy Controller of Patent and Designs & Anr. Date of Order: 12 March 2026 Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 3/2025 Name of Court: High Court of Delhi Name of Hon'ble Judge: Justice Jyoti Singh

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation. Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles for the Article:

1. Delhi High Court Remands Cattle Manure Hard Carbon Patent: Controller Must Follow Proper Inventive Step Test
2. Sustainable Battery Innovation Gets Second Chance: Key Lessons from Indigenous Energy Storage Patent Appeal
3. Why the Delhi High Court Sent Back a Green Tech Patent Revocation – A Simple Explanation
4. Inventive Step Scrutiny in Indian Patents: Delhi HC Emphasizes Structured Analysis in Manure-to-Electrode Case

Suitable Tags: Patent Revocation, Inventive Step, Section 25(2)(e), Section 25(2)(g), Post-Grant Opposition, Delhi High Court, Hard Carbon Electrode, Sodium-Ion Batteries, Cattle Manure Biomass, F. Hoffmann-La Roche v Cipla, Patent Sufficiency of Disclosure, Remand Order, Green Technology Patent

Headnote of the Article In Indigenous Energy Storage Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. Deputy Controller of Patents (2026), the Delhi High Court set aside the revocation of a patent for producing hard carbon from cattle manure for sodium-ion batteries. The court held that the Controller failed to apply the mandatory five-step test for inventive step and did not adequately address the patentee’s arguments on process differences and data. Remanding the matter for fresh consideration, the judgment reinforces procedural fairness, structured obviousness analysis, and the opportunity to submit supporting evidence in patent oppositions.

Crystal Crop Protection Ltd Vs. Assistant Controller of Patents

Rejection of Patent Appeal: Mere Mixture of Known Weed Killers Not Inventive

Introduction

In a significant ruling on patentability of agrochemical compositions, the Delhi High Court on 28 February 2026 dismissed an appeal by Crystal Crop Protection Ltd. and upheld the Assistant Controller’s decision rejecting its patent application for a herbicidal composition. The invention involved a ready-to-use synergistic mixture of two known herbicides — halosulfuron-methyl (a sulfonylurea) and metribuzin (a triazinone) — in specific weight percentages for controlling weeds in field crops like sugarcane.

Delhi High Court held that the claimed binary composition was a mere admixture of known substances that did not demonstrate any unexpected synergistic effect or technical advancement over prior art. The court also allowed additional prior art documents filed by the opponent at the appellate stage, emphasizing that in patent appeals involving public interest and monopoly rights, courts can admit relevant evidence to ensure only genuine inventions receive protection. The judgment reinforces that incremental changes in ratios or combinations of known active ingredients require clear proof of synergy or inventive step to overcome statutory bars under the Patents Act.

This decision provides practical guidance for companies in the crop protection sector: simply combining known herbicides, even in optimized proportions, will not qualify for patent protection unless it produces results clearly beyond what a skilled person would expect from adding their individual effects.

Factual Background

Crystal Crop Protection Ltd. (formerly Crystal Phosphates Ltd.) filed Indian Patent Application No. 2228/DEL/2011 on 5 August 2011 for a “Herbicidal Composition for Field Crops.” The complete specification was filed on 6 August 2012. The invention claimed a synergistic herbicidal ready-to-use composition comprising halosulfuron-methyl (10-15% w/w) and metribuzin (50-60% w/w), optionally with other components. Halosulfuron-methyl acts systemically by inhibiting amino acid synthesis, while metribuzin disrupts photosynthesis. The appellant asserted that their specific combination produced enhanced weed control at lower doses, offering broad-spectrum efficacy against narrow and broad-leaf weeds in crops like sugarcane, while being cost-effective and environmentally friendlier.

The application was published in 2013, and a request for examination was filed in 2012. Pre-grant oppositions were filed by Haryana Pesticides Manufacturers’ Association (Respondent No. 2) in 2017 and by Dr. Meera Sharma (Respondent No. 3) in 2022. The First Examination Report was issued in 2018, and the appellant responded with replies and claim amendments. Hearings were conducted, and post-hearing submissions were exchanged. On 28 March 2023, the Assistant Controller rejected the application under Section 25(1) of the Patents Act, primarily on grounds of lack of inventive step (Section 25(1)(e)) and non-patentability as a mere admixture under Section 3(e) (via Section 25(1)(f)).

Procedural Background

After filing the application, the patent office issued the FER in January 2018. The appellant filed its response in May 2018. Respondent No. 2 filed Pre-Grant Opposition in March 2017, to which the appellant replied in July 2021. Respondent No. 3 filed Pre-Grant Opposition II in January 2022, prompting further replies and minor claim amendments in October 2022 and March 2023. A hearing notice was issued in December 2022 for a hearing in February 2023. Both parties filed post-hearing written submissions in February-March 2023. The Assistant Controller passed the impugned rejection order on 28 March 2023, finding the claims anticipated or obvious over cited prior arts (including WO2000027203, US patents, and other documents) and falling under the Section 3(e) bar as a mere aggregation of known properties without synergy.

The appellant filed the present appeal under Section 117A before the Delhi High Court. During the appeal proceedings, Respondent No. 2 filed I.A. 20715/2025 under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC and IPD Rules seeking to place additional documents on record, including EPA registrations, scientific articles on herbicide modes of action, and product labels demonstrating known combinations and uses of the active ingredients. The court heard arguments on this application alongside the main appeal and delivered a common judgment on 28 February 2026.

Reasoning

The High Court first addressed the application for additional evidence. It noted that the documents were publicly available prior art (EPA records, university publications, and product labels) relevant to assessing inventive step and Section 3(e). Although the opponent had opportunities during pre-grant proceedings, the court exercised discretion under the IPD Rules and Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, holding that in patent matters — which grant monopolies operating against the public (in rem) — courts should admit relevant evidence if it aids in pronouncing a just judgment and prevents erroneous grants. The appellant’s objections on delay and lack of due diligence were overruled, as the documents helped complete the record on common general knowledge and motivation for a skilled person (PSITA).

On the merits, the court examined the claimed invention against prior arts. It found that combinations of halosulfuron-methyl and metribuzin (or closely related sulfonylureas with metribuzin) were already known in documents like GWN-9889 (EPA-registered product with similar ratios), WO publications, and tank-mix studies. The specific percentages claimed fell within or were obvious variations of disclosed ranges. The court observed that omitting an optional third component (tribenuron-methyl) or substituting components with known functional equivalents (e.g., replacing a PPO inhibitor with a PSII inhibitor like metribuzin for sugarcane use) would be a predictable, routine modification for a person skilled in the art.

Regarding synergy, the court scrutinized Table 1 in the specification showing weed control data. It held that the results did not demonstrate unexpected enhancement beyond additive effects. Improved control at certain doses was attributable to higher concentrations or expected aggregation of properties rather than true synergy. The appellant’s argument that lower combined doses yielded better results than individual components was not persuasive enough to overcome the Section 3(e) bar, which prohibits patents for mere admixtures resulting only in the sum of known properties.

The court emphasized that the burden lies on the applicant to prove inventive step and technical advancement under Section 2(1)(ja). Mere optimization of known ingredients without clear data showing surprising results or economic significance does not suffice. Hindsight analysis was avoided, but the prior arts provided clear motivation for the claimed combination in the context of sugarcane weed control.

Key Judgments Discussed with Citations and Context

The judgment extensively discussed principles from landmark cases to explain patentability standards in a simple, accessible manner:

• Novartis AG v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 1: The Supreme Court laid down that incremental inventions, especially new forms or combinations of known substances, must demonstrate significant technical advance or enhanced efficacy to qualify for patents in India. The court applied this to stress that the appellant failed to show anything beyond expected additive effects of the two known herbicides.
• F. Hoffmann-La Roche Limited v. Cipla Ltd., 2009 (40) PTC 125 (Del): This Delhi High Court decision (and related appeals) was cited for the principle that patent examination is not infallible, and courts in appeals can scrutinize validity based on all available prior art to protect public interest against unwarranted monopolies.
• Biomoneta Research Pvt. Ltd. v. Controller General of Patents, Designs and Anr., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 1482: Referenced by the appellant for the proposition that true synergistic combinations exceeding additive effects can be patentable. The court distinguished it, finding no such clear synergy established here.
• Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin, (2012) 8 SCC 148: Cited in arguments on additional evidence. The court clarified its application in patent contexts, allowing admission where necessary for just adjudication, especially given the public interest in preventing invalid patents.
• K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 216 and Wadi v. Amilal, (2015) 1 SCC 677: Used to explain the restrictive yet flexible scope of Order XLI Rule 27 CPC for additional evidence in appeals, balancing diligence with the need for complete justice.

Other cases like Macleods Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Controller of Patents (2025) and Bristol-Myers Squibb decisions reinforced that patent grants do not create irrebuttable presumptions of validity, and opponents can challenge them with relevant prior art even at appellate stages.

Final Decision of the Court

The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Assistant Controller’s order dated 28 March 2023 rejecting the patent application. It allowed the application for additional documents (I.A. 20715/2025) and took them on record as relevant prior art. The court found no merit in the claims of inventive step or synergy, holding the composition as a mere admixture barred under Section 3(e). No costs were awarded.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

This judgment settles important practical points for anyone involved in patents, explained simply:

In patent appeals, especially for compositions of known substances, courts can admit additional relevant prior art documents under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC and IPD Rules if they help reach a correct decision on patentability, even if not filed earlier — because patents affect the public at large and prevent unjust monopolies.

A combination of two known active ingredients (like herbicides) is not patentable if it is merely an admixture whose properties are the predictable sum of the individual components, without clear evidence of unexpected synergistic effects or technical advancement (Section 3(e) and Section 2(1)(ja)). Optimizing ratios or omitting optional components does not automatically create an inventive step; the applicant must prove surprising benefits beyond what a skilled farmer or scientist would expect.

The burden remains on the patent applicant to demonstrate inventive step with supporting data. Prior art disclosures of similar combinations or uses in the same crop (e.g., sugarcane) make obviousness easier to establish. Section 3(e) acts as a strong filter against routine formulations lacking real innovation.

Finally, in agrochemical patents, courts prioritize public interest in accessible farming solutions over procedural technicalities when admitting evidence that completes the picture of existing knowledge.

Case Title: Crystal Crop Protection Ltd Vs. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs & Ors.

Date of Order: 28 February 2026

Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 19/2023

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC: 1828

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles for the Article:

1. Delhi High Court Rejects Herbicidal Patent: Mere Mixture of Known Weed Killers Not Inventive
2. No Synergy, No Patent: Crystal Crop’s Appeal Dismissed in Halosulfuron-Metribuzin Case
3. Additional Prior Art Allowed in Patent Appeal: Key Lessons from Crystal Crop Protection Judgment
4. Section 3(e) Bar Upheld: Delhi HC Explains Limits on Patenting Agrochemical Combinations

Suitable Tags:

Herbicidal Composition, Section 3(e), Inventive Step, Synergistic Effect, Pre-Grant Opposition, Additional Evidence in Patent Appeal, Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, Halosulfuron Methyl, Metribuzin, Delhi High Court, Agrochemical Patent, Mere Admixture

Headnote of the Article

In Crystal Crop Protection Ltd v. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs (2026), the Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld rejection of a patent for a binary herbicidal composition of halosulfuron-methyl and metribuzin. The court admitted additional prior art documents at the appellate stage and held that the claimed combination was a mere admixture lacking inventive step or unexpected synergy, falling under the Section 3(e) bar. The judgment clarifies standards for patenting known substance combinations and the scope of admitting evidence in IP appeals to protect public interest.

Flipkart India Private Limited Vs Marc Enterprises Pvt Ltd

Addition of House Mark in small font does not negate chances of confusion

Introduction:

In a significant ruling that highlights the importance of trademark protection for established brands, the Delhi High Court dismissed an appeal filed by Flipkart India Private Limited against an interim injunction restraining it from using the mark “MarQ” (and variants like “marq”) for its consumer electronics and appliances. The court found that Flipkart’s mark was deceptively similar to the older registered trademark “MARC” owned by Marc Enterprises Pvt Ltd, a Delhi-based company dealing in electrical goods.

This decision underscores how courts evaluate likelihood of confusion between similar-sounding and similar-looking marks, especially in the fast-growing e-commerce and electronics sector. Even house marks like “Flipkart” added in small font will not negate the chances of confusion.

Factual Background

Marc Enterprises Pvt Ltd, the respondent, has been in the business of manufacturing and selling electrical accessories, fittings, equipment, appliances, and instruments for decades. It adopted the mark “MARC” as early as 1981 and secured registrations starting from 1984 in relevant classes such as 7, 9, 11 etc. The company claimed continuous use through invoices and other documents dating back to the early 1980s.

Flipkart India Private Limited, the appellant, is a well-known e-commerce platform. In 2017, it decided to launch its own private label for large appliances including televisions, air conditioners, washing machines, and microwave ovens. For this line, Flipkart adopted the marks “marq”, styling them with a capital “Q” . It filed trademark applications in July 2017 and began selling products under these marks from October-November 2017 through its website.

Marc Enterprises filed a suit in the trial court seeking to stop Flipkart from using “MarQ”/“marq”, alleging trademark infringement, passing off, dilution, and related reliefs. It argued that the marks were phonetically and structurally too close, likely causing ordinary consumers to confuse the source of the goods.

Procedural Background

The trial court (Additional District Judge, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi) initially granted an ad-interim injunction in January 2018 against Flipkart’s use of the impugned marks. Flipkart challenged this before the High Court and obtained limited extensions to clear existing stock. Later, Flipkart applied to vacate the injunction, while Marc Enterprises sought confirmation of the interim relief.

In October 2018, the trial court passed the impugned order confirming the injunction in favor of Marc Enterprises under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and dismissed Flipkart’s vacation application. Aggrieved, Flipkart filed the present appeal under Order 43(1)(R) CPC before the Delhi High Court. The operation of the injunction was stayed during the pendency of the appeal.

After hearings, the High Court reserved judgment. Flipkart later sought to place additional documents on record showing subsequent registrations of composite marks like “Flipkart MarQ” and “MarQ by Flipkart” in certain classes. The court allowed this but with costs. Final arguments concluded, leading to the judgment on 10 April 2026.

Reasoning

The High Court applied the limited scope of interference in appeals against discretionary interim injunction orders. It could only intervene if the trial court’s decision was perverse or contrary to settled law — meaning no reasonable person could have reached the same conclusion on the facts and legal principles. Citing landmark Supreme Court decisions, the court stressed that appellate courts should not substitute their own view merely because another outcome seems preferable.

On merits, the court examined the three classic ingredients for interim injunction in trademark cases: prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury. It found that Marc Enterprises had a strong prima facie case as the prior user (since 1981) and prior registrant (from 1984) of an inherently distinctive, coined mark “MARC”. Flipkart’s adoption in 2017 came much later for allied goods in the electrical and electronics category.

The core issue was deceptive similarity. The court held that “MARC” and “MARQ”/“marq” were phonetically similar . Visually too, they overlapped significantly. The court rejected Flipkart’s argument that its unique stylization with a capital “Q” (pronounced as “Mar Queue”) and association with “quality” made the marks distinct. It noted that consumers, including semi-literate ones, may not perceive such nuances and could easily confuse the marks.

Flipkart’s reliance on using its house mark “Flipkart” alongside “MarQ” was also dismissed. The court observed that the house mark was often used in a minuscule font or sometimes not at all, and mere addition of a house mark does not eliminate confusion when the dominant elements are similar. It cited precedents emphasizing that the overall impression on consumers matters more than minor differences.

The goods were allied and cognate — both involved electrical/electronic appliances sold through common channels, including online platforms like Flipkart’s own website (where Marc’s products were also available). This increased the likelihood of confusion among the same class of buyers.

On the “common to the trade” defense, the court clarified that mere registrations or pending applications containing “MAR”, “MARC”, or “MARK” do not prove actual widespread use in the market. Common-to-register is not the same as common-to-trade; substantial evidence of actual use by third parties is required, which Flipkart failed to establish convincingly.

Regarding Flipkart’s later registrations of composite marks like “Flipkart MarQ”, the court held these did not impact the appeal. The injunction was based on passing off and prior rights as well, and the subsequent events (post-dating the impugned order) could not retrospectively validate the adoption or override the deceptive similarity finding at the prima facie stage.

The court also addressed procedural fairness concerns raised by Flipkart but found no violation that warranted interference.

Key Judgments Discussed with Citations and Context

The court referred to several important precedents to guide its analysis, explaining their relevance in simple terms:

• Wander Ltd. v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd. (1991 PTC 1 (SC)) and Mohd. Mehtab Khan v. Khushnuma Ibrahim Khan (2013) 9 SCC 221: These Supreme Court cases lay down the limited appellate interference in interim injunction matters. The High Court explained that unless the trial court’s order is manifestly perverse, the appellate court should not re-appreciate evidence or substitute its discretion. This principle prevented the court from overturning the trial court’s well-reasoned findings.
• Cadila Healthcare Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (2001) 5 SCC 73: A landmark Supreme Court decision on deceptive similarity and likelihood of confusion. The court applied the test of an average consumer with imperfect recollection, emphasizing that phonetic similarity can lead to infringement even if goods are not identical but allied.
• Ruston & Hornsby Ltd. v. The Zamindara Engineering Co. (1969) 2 SCC 727: Highlighted that in infringement cases involving similar marks, the plaintiff must show likelihood of deception or confusion. The Delhi High Court found this test satisfied here due to the closeness of “MARC” and “MARQ”.
• F. Hoffmann-la Roche & Co. Ltd. v. Geoffrey Manner & Co. Pvt. Ltd. (1969) 2 SCC 716, Nandhini Deluxe v. Karnataka Cooperative Milk Producers Federation Ltd. (2018), and others like Skyline Education Institute Pvt. Ltd. v. S.L. Vaswani (2010) 2 SCC 142: These cases were cited by Flipkart to argue that phonetic similarity alone is insufficient. The court distinguished them, noting that when overall similarity (phonetic + structural + visual) creates confusion, especially with prior rights, infringement is made out.
• Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. v. B. Vijaya Sai (2022 SCC OnLine SC 61) and Marico Ltd. v. Minolta Natural Care (2025:BHC-OS:24054): Used to reject the house mark defense. Adding company name does not always dispel confusion if the infringing element remains dominant.
• Exotic Mile v. Imagine Marketing (P) Ltd. (2025 SCC OnLine Del 5969): Relevant for online sales; even e-commerce does not eliminate phonetic similarity concerns.

The court discussed these judgments in the context of Indian market realities, consumer behavior, and the need to protect prior users while discouraging dishonest or confusing adoptions.

Final Decision of the Court

The Delhi High Court dismissed Flipkart’s appeal in its entirety, upholding the trial court’s interim injunction. It found no perversity or legal error in the impugned order. The stay granted earlier was vacated. However, considering the pendency of the appeal and practical difficulties, the court granted Flipkart time until 15 May 2026 to clear or withdraw existing stock bearing the “MarQ”/“marq” marks from the market. No costs were awarded. All observations were prima facie, as the main suit remains pending.

Point of Law Settled in the Case

This judgment reinforces several practical principles :

First, prior use and registration give strong rights; a later adopter bears the risk if its mark closely resembles an established one, especially for related goods.

Second, deceptive similarity is assessed holistically — how an ordinary consumer (not an expert) would perceive the marks in real-life buying situations, considering imperfect memory. Phonetic and structural overlaps matter a lot, even in stylized forms or online sales.

Third, adding a house mark in small font does not automatically save a similar mark if the core part remains confusingly close. The overall commercial impression counts.

Fourth, claims of “common to trade” require solid evidence of actual widespread use by others, not just registry searches.

Finally, appellate courts are reluctant to interfere with interim injunctions unless they are clearly unreasonable, preserving the status quo and protecting established goodwill during litigation.

The ruling sends a clear message to brands: conduct thorough clearance searches and avoid marks that could ride on the reputation of earlier ones, particularly in competitive sectors like electronics and e-commerce.

Case Title:Flipkart India Private Limited Vs Marc Enterprises Pvt Ltd

Date of Order: 10 April 2026

Case Number: FAO-IPD 46/2021

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:3004

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Justice Shri Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested Titles for the Article:

1. Delhi High Court Rules ‘MarQ’ Deceptively Similar to ‘MARC’: Flipkart Loses Trademark Appeal
2. ‘MARQ’ vs ‘MARC’: Why Flipkart Must Stop Using Its Private Label Mark – A Simple Breakdown of the Delhi HC Judgment
3. Prior Trademark Rights Prevail: Delhi High Court Upholds Injunction Against Flipkart’s ‘MarQ’ Brand
4. Trademark Confusion in E-Commerce: Key Takeaways from Flipkart vs Marc Enterprises Case

Suitable Tags:

Trademark Infringement, Deceptive Similarity, Delhi High Court, Flipkart MarQ, MARC Trademark, Prior User Rights, House Mark Defense, Interim Injunction, Passing Off, Intellectual Property Law India, Consumer Confusion, Electronics Trademark Dispute

Headnote of the Article

In Flipkart India Pvt Ltd v. Marc Enterprises Pvt Ltd (2026), the Delhi High Court upheld an interim injunction against Flipkart’s use of “MarQ” for appliances, holding it deceptively similar to the prior registered mark “MARC”. Emphasizing phonetic, structural, and overall similarity likely to confuse average consumers, the court clarified limits on house mark defenses and the limited scope of appellate interference in injunction matters. The decision reinforces strong protection for established trademarks in allied goods categories.

Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. Vs. Satej M. Katekar

Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. Vs. Satej M. Katekar

​Court: High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Commercial Division)

Case No.: Commercial IP Suit No. 111 of 2013

Neural Citation:2026:BHC-OS:10275

Coram: Justice Manish Pitale

Date of Judgment: April 22, 2026

​1. Introduction and Facts

​The Plaintiff, Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd., a leading manufacturer of medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations, filed a suit for permanent injunction and damages against the Defendant, Satej M. Katekar (Proprietor of Absun Pharma). The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant’s use of the marks 'ABSUN' and 'ABSUN PHARMA' infringed upon its registered house marks 'SUN' and 'SUN PHARMA'. Additionally, the Plaintiff sought to restrain the Defendant from using the mark 'E-MIST', alleging it was deceptively similar to its registered trademark 'EYEMIST'.

​The Plaintiff has held registrations for the device mark 'SUN' since 1983 (with user claim since 1978) and word marks 'SUN PHARMA' since 2007 (with user claim since 1993). The Defendant contended that 'ABSUN' was honestly adopted by combining alphabets from the names of his son (Abheejit) and wife (Sunita).

​2. Key Issues

• ​Whether the Defendant’s use of 'ABSUN'/'ABSUN PHARMA' infringed the Plaintiff’s registered marks under the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

• ​Whether such use constituted passing off.

• ​Whether the trademark 'SUN' is common to the pharmaceutical trade.

• ​Whether the Plaintiff had acquiesced to the Defendant’s use of the marks.

​3. Arguments and Observations

• ​Infringement: The Plaintiff argued that prefixing 'AB' to 'SUN' did not eliminate deceptive similarity, as the marks must be compared as a whole. The Defendant argued that Section 29(5) only applies if the exact registered mark is used as a trade name. The Court rejected this, clarifying that Section 29(5) also covers use of the mark as "part of" a trade name. 31.

• ​Export Deemed as Domestic Use: The Defendant argued they only exported products to Africa and did not sell in India. The Court applied Section 56 of the Trade Marks Act, ruling that applying a trademark to goods for export constitutes "use" of the trademark in India.36,37.

• ​Proof of Goodwill: The Court upheld the validity of Chartered Accountant certificates for sales and promotional expenses as evidence of goodwill, noting that in a Commercial Suit, the Defendant’s failure to specifically deny these documents by admission denial affidavit resulted in their admission under Order VIII Rules 3 and 5 of the CPC.40-42.

​4. Final Judgment

​The High Court decreed the suit in favor of the Plaintiff. Key findings included:

• ​Permanent Injunction: The Defendant was restrained from using the marks 'ABSUN', 'ABSUN PHARMA', and 'E-MIST'.

• ​Infringement & Passing Off: The Court found the Defendant to be a "first-time knowing infringer" as they were aware of the Plaintiff's marks since 1995 but failed to conduct a registry search before adoption.
• Use of House Mark also amount to Infringement:27.
• ​Costs: In addition to the injunction, the Court awarded partial costs of Rs. 10 lakhs to the Plaintiff, citing similar precedents in commercial litigation. 53.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi"

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Hatsun Agro Product Ltd. Vs. Patanjali Biscuits Pvt. Ltd

Hatsun Agro Product Ltd. Vs. Patanjali Biscuits Pvt. Ltd.21.04.2026:OSA No. 263 of 2020: MadHC: Hon’ble Mr. Justice P. Velmurugan and Hon’ble Mrs. Justice K. Govindarajan Thilakavadi

​Facts of the Case

​The appellant, Hatsun Agro Product Ltd., a major private sector dairy in India, has used the registered trademark "AROKYA" for its milk and dairy products (Class 29) since 1994. The appellant alleged that the respondents (Patanjali Biscuits Pvt. Ltd. and Patanjali Ayurved Ltd.) infringed upon this trademark by selling biscuits under the mark "PATANJALI AAROGYA" (Class 30).

​The appellant sought a permanent injunction for infringement and passing off, claiming the marks were phonetically similar and likely to cause consumer confusion. The respondents contended that "Aarogya" is a generic Sanskrit term meaning "well-being" and that their products were distinct and registered under a different class (Class 30).

​Issues for Consideration

1. ​Whether a suit for infringement is maintainable against a registered trademark holder under the Trade Marks Act.

1. ​Whether the products (milk vs. biscuits) and trademarks ("AROKYA" vs. "PATANJALI AAROGYA") were sufficiently similar to cause confusion.

1. ​Whether the learned single Judge was justified in dismissing the suit via a summary judgment under Order XIII-A of the CPC.

​Arguments

• ​Appellant: Argued that the phonetic similarity of "Arokya" and "Aarogya" created bad faith and dishonesty, damaging their established goodwill. They maintained that since biscuits contain milk, there was an overlap in product association.

• ​Respondents: Argued that Section 28(3) of the Trade Marks Act protects co-existing registered owners of similar marks. They highlighted that the prefix "Patanjali" made their brand distinctive and that the appellant did not hold a registration under Class 30 (biscuits).

​Judgment

​The Division Bench upheld the single Judge’s decision to dismiss the suit through a summary judgment. The Court found:

• ​No Real Prospect of Success: Applying the principle from Vishnudas Trading v. Vazir Sultan Tobacco Ltd., the Court held the appellant could not claim a monopoly over a mark for products they do not produce.

• ​Distinctiveness: The goods falling under Class 30 (biscuits) were found to be entirely different from those in Class 29 (milk products).

• ​Statutory Protection: Under Section 28(3) of the Trade Marks Act, the respondents were protected as registered holders of their mark.

• ​Procedural Validity: The Court affirmed that there were no compelling reasons to record oral evidence, justifying the use of summary judgment under the Commercial Courts Act.

​Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed, and the summary judgment in favor of the respondents was sustained. 

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi"

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Modi Woodspace Private Limited Vs. The Registrar of Trade Marks

Modi Woodspace Private Limited Vs. The Registrar of Trade Marks:22.04.2026:C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 56/2025: 2026:DHC:3341:Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela

​Overview

​The Delhi High Court set aside an order passed by the Registrar of Trade Marks which had refused the registration of the wordmark "KAMA CASA". The Court emphasized the "Anti-Dissection Rule" and remanded the matter for fresh consideration.

​Facts

• ​Application: The appellant, Modi Woodspace Private Limited, filed an application (No. 6087367) for the mark "KAMA CASA" (word) in Classes 20 and 35 on a "Proposed to be used" basis.

• ​Objection: The Registrar raised objections under Section 11(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, citing prior registrations of the marks "KAMA" and "CASA".

• ​Impugned Order: On May 21, 2025, the Registrar refused the application, concluding that since "KAMA" and "CASA" were already registered in Class 20, the combined mark would cause public confusion.

​Legal Issues

1. ​Whether a composite wordmark can be dissected into individual components for comparison with prior marks under Section 11(1).

1. ​Whether a wordmark can be considered deceptively similar to device marks containing similar text elements.

​Court’s Observations & Findings

• ​The Anti-Dissection Rule: The Court held that the Registrar committed a fundamental flaw by breaking the mark "KAMA CASA" into separate parts. A trademark must be viewed as a whole; comparing a composite mark against two separate marks is "anti-thesis to the prudence of registration".

• ​Wordmark vs. Device Mark: The Court noted that the appellant sought a wordmark, while the cited marks were device/label marks. These device marks cannot be stripped of their visual elements to compare only the text.

• ​Existence of Similar Marks: The appellant presented a search report (not previously shown to the Registrar) indicating numerous existing registrations for marks containing "CASA" in the same class.

​Conclusion

​The High Court quashed the impugned order and remitted the matter to the Registrar for de novo consideration. The Registrar was directed to pass a fresh order within four months, specifically taking into account the search report provided by the appellant.

Disclaimer: Donot treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain subjective errors.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi"

#IPUpdate #IPCaselaw #IPCaseLaw #IPLaw #IPRNews #IPIndiaupdate #Trademark #Copyright #DesignLaw #PatentLaw #Law #Legal #IndianIPUpdate #AdvocateAjayAmitabhSuman #IPAdjutor