Ms. Rajilaxmi Oils Vs. Kriti Nutrients Ltd.

Written Statement can not be filed beyond 120 days in a Commercial Dispute

Fact: This case arises from a dispute between Ms. Rajilaxmi Oils and Kriti Nutrients Ltd. involving trademark and copyright claims. The petitioner, Ms. Rajilaxmi Oils, filed a civil suit under Section 142 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and Section 60 of the Copyright Act, 1957, in 2020 before the Commercial Court, Indore. Subsequently, the respondent filed another suit against the petitioner in 2021, also in the Commercial Court, Indore. During the pendency of these suits, the respondent obtained an ex-parte injunction from the Commercial Court, Delhi, which led to the seizure of the petitioner’s products. The petitioner alleged wrongful seizure and continued non-release of their goods even after the dismissal of the Delhi suit.

Right to file Written Statement beyond 120 days: Due to these circumstances, the petitioner delayed filing their written statement in the main suit before the Commercial Court, Indore. They applied for condonation of this delay and for their written statement to be taken on record. The trial court denied this application, holding that the delay was unjustified and that the written statement was filed beyond the 120-day statutory limit prescribed by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The petitioner challenged this denial by filing the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

The core dispute: The dispute hinged mainly on whether the trial court was justified in refusing to allow the belated filing of the written statement. The court carefully analyzed the provisions of Order VIII Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code as amended by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, which governs the time limit for filing written statements. These provisions stipulate that a defendant must file a written statement within 30 days of service of summons but may be granted an extension by the court for reasons recorded in writing, provided it does not exceed 120 days. Beyond this 120-day period, the right to file a written statement is forfeited, and the court is not empowered to allow further extensions.

The Reasoning: The court gave detailed consideration to the petitioner’s submissions that the delay was caused due to parallel suits and the impact of an ex-parte injunction obtained in the Delhi court, which impaired their ability to file the written statement on time. The court rejected these arguments, emphasizing that the Delhi suit was dismissed well before the filing of the written statement and that no genuine effort was made to file it within the statutory period after that dismissal.

The court referred extensively to authoritative Supreme Court judgments including SCG Contracts India Private Limited v. K.S. Chamankar Infrastructure Private Limited (2019 12 SCC 210), Raj Process Equipment and Systems Pvt. Ltd. v. Honest Derivatives Pvt. Ltd. (2022 SCC Online SC 1877), and Prakash Corporates v. Dee Vee Projects Limited (2022 5 SCC 112), which underscore the imperative of maintaining strict timelines in commercial litigation to ensure speedy justice. The court noted that these rulings maintain that the Commercial Courts Act’s 120-day period for filing written statements is mandatory and not extendable except within that window.

Decision: Ultimately, the court held that the trial court had rightly exercised its discretion and abided by statutory mandates in refusing to permit the belated written statement. The petition was dismissed as devoid of merit, affirming that procedural timelines in commercial suits are strict and that delay without sufficient cause cannot be condoned in the interest of expedient dispute resolution.

Case Title: Ms. Rajilaxmi Oils Vs. Kriti Nutrients Ltd.

Order Date: 6th October 2025

Case Number: M.P. No. 4924/2023

Neutral Citation: 2025 MPHC IND 29084

Name of Court: High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore

Hon’ble Judges: Shri Justice Vivek Rusia and Shri Justice Binod Kumar Dwivedi

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Lifestyle Equities C.V. & Another Vs. Amazon Technologies Inc.

Unconditional Stay and Jurisdictional Fairness: A Reaffirmation of Judicial Discretion under Order XLI Rule 5 CPC

Facts: Lifestyle Equities C.V., headquartered in Amsterdam, along with its Indian licensee, owned the registered trademark “Beverly Hills Polo Club (BHPC)” used for apparel, shoes, accessories, furniture, and personal care products. Amazon Technologies Inc. was accused of facilitating sales of counterfeit goods bearing a mark identical or deceptively similar to the BHPC logo.

The Suit: In 2020, Lifestyle filed a commercial suit (CS(COMM) 443/2020) in the Delhi High Court, alleging trademark infringement and passing off, seeking permanent injunction, delivery-up of infringing goods, and damages of Rs. 2.00 crore. The suit named three defendants—Amazon Technologies Inc. (Defendant 1), Cloudtail Pvt. Ltd. (Defendant 2), and Amazon Seller Services Pvt. Ltd. (Defendant 3).

Summons were issued to all defendants. Defendant No. 1 did not appear and was proceeded ex parte. An interim order dated 12 October 2020 restrained all defendants from using the BHPC mark. The suit was ultimately decreed ex parte against Amazon Technologies Inc. by order dated 25 February 2025, granting damages of Rs. 336 crores, costs of Rs. 3.23 crores, and a permanent injunction, based on an alleged computation of damages worth USD 38.78 million.

The Appeal: Amazon’s appeal before the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court (RFA(O.S.)(COMM) 11/2025) resulted in the High Court staying execution of the money decree without requiring deposit of the decretal amount, subject only to an undertaking by the appellant to comply if the appeal were dismissed. Lifestyle Equities filed a Special Leave Petition (SLP) before the Supreme Court challenging this “unconditional stay.”

Procedural Details: The matter reached the Supreme Court through Special Leave Petition (C) No. 19767 of 2025 under Article 136 of the Constitution.

The SLP questioned whether the Delhi High Court erred in not insisting upon deposit/security as mandated under Order XLI Rule 1(3), Rule 5(3), and Rule 5(5) of the CPC while granting a stay on execution of a money decree and whether an unconditional stay was legally sustainable? 

The Dispute: The crux lay in reconciling two competing legal principles: The CPC’s general rule that mere appeal does not automatically stay execution, and that stay may be granted only upon sufficient cause with adequate security, and The High Court’s discretion to conditionally or unconditionally stay execution in exceptional cases.

Lifestyle argued that the stay was unlawful for lack of mandatory deposit. Conversely, Amazon contended that valid service of summons was never effected, the decree suffered from gross procedural and substantive irregularities, and the ex parte decree was inflated far beyond the original Rs. 2 crore claim without any amendment or notice.

Reasoning of the Court: Court's detailed reasoning traversed historical, statutory, and judicial contexts of Order XLI — balancing procedural discipline with judicial discretion.

Purpose of Order XLI Rules 1 & 5 CPC: The Court traced the legislative amendments of 1976 that introduced sub-rule (3) in Rule 1 (obliging appellants to deposit decretal amounts or furnish security) and sub-rule (5) in Rule 5 (barring stay if deposit/security is not furnished). The Court emphasized that the Parliament intended to prevent abuse of appellate process while permitting equitable discretion in exceptional cases.

Whether deposit/security is mandatory: The Court reaffirmed that the requirement of deposit is directory, not mandatory. Non-deposit disentitles stay but does not invalidate the appeal. Appellate courts may grant unconditional stay if exceptional circumstances make enforcement unjust or impossible.

Scope of judicial discretion: An unconditional stay of a money decree can only be justified if the decree is: egregiously perverse, riddled with patent illegalities, facially untenable, or affected by exceptional causes akin to fraud or manifest injustice.

Service of summons: The Supreme Court concurred with the High Court that Amazon Technologies was never served valid summons. The record revealed no affidavit of service post the order dated 7 July 2021, nor proof of notice via email/WhatsApp as directed earlier. Proceeding ex parte without proper service thus constituted a foundational illegality, vitiating jurisdiction. Reliance by Lifestyle on Order IX Rule 13 proviso and Sunil Poddar v. Union Bank (2008) 2 SCC 326 was found misplaced.

On damages and maintainability: The Supreme Court noted that the single judge’s decree inflated damages from Rs. 2 crore (as in plaint) to Rs. 336 crore without any amendment, notice, or proof. This violated Order VII Rule 2 and 7 of the CPC, which require precise quantification in money suits. The absence of pleadings or evidence supporting enhancement rendered the decree prima facie perverse.

License and liability findings: The High Court correctly observed that Amazon Technologies merely licensed its “SYMBOL” brand to Cloudtail and had no role in manufacturing or affixing the alleged infringing logo. No legal or contractual link established complicity. The single judge’s inference that all Amazon entities were one “cohesive commercial entity” lacked any pleading or evidence. These findings were perverse and speculative.

Analogy with Arbitration Act: Rejecting the petitioner’s reliance on Section 36(3) of the Arbitration Act, the Court clarified that unconditional stay power is not limited solely to cases of fraud or corruption. Discretion to grant such stay under Order XLI Rule 5 subsists independently but should be ~rarely~ exercised in extreme circumstances.

Protection of due process: The bench reaffirmed that valid service of summons is the basis of jurisdiction. Absence of due service entitles the defendant to avoid liability regardless of procedural lapses by counsel or co-defendants. The right to defend cannot be presumed to have been waived.

Judgment and Decision

Decision: The Supreme Court upheld the Delhi High Court’s judgment dated 1 July 2025, dismissing the Special Leave Petition. It held there was no valid reason to interfere, as the Division Bench rightly found the single judge’s decree tainted by serious procedural irregularities and lack of jurisdiction. The stay of execution, therefore, was justified even without deposit.

Court emphasized that unconditional stay is not the rule but an exception, permissible where enforcement of decree would cause grave miscarriage of justice. In this case, the court found multiple irregularities, including: absence of valid summons to Amazon, massive jump in damages without amendment, lack of specific findings of infringement against Amazon, and misreading of a license agreement unconnected to the infringing mark.

Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed that the High Court’s exercise of discretion under Order XLI Rule 5 CPC did not suffer from any legal infirmity.

Final Holding:  The Special Leave Petition was dismissed on 7 October 2025, confirming the High Court’s order of unconditional stay. The Court reiterated that unconditional stay of a money decree remains permissible in exceptional circumstances and highlighted due process and fairness over procedural rigidity.

Case Title: Lifestyle Equities C.V. & Another Vs. Amazon Technologies Inc.

Order Date: 7th October 2025

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 19767 of 2025

Neutral Citation: 2025 INSC 1190

Name of Court: Supreme Court of India

Hon’ble Judges: J.B. Pardiwala J. and K.V. Viswanathan J.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Kanhiaya Lal and Others Vs. Subhash Chandbr

Court’s Power to Implead Legal Heirs in Trademark Disputes

Facts: This case involves a trademark dispute that traces back to the family business of Panchhi Petha Store, founded in 1952 in Agra by late Panchhi Lal. Over time, the business and the trademark rights were distributed between his two sons, Kanhaiya Lal and Subhash Chander, and their respective descendants. The original partnership registered the trademark "PANCHHI KA PETHA AUR DALMOTH" in 1971. After Panchhi Lal’s passing, a family settlement was executed in 1982 stipulating rights to use the trademark and maintaining a one-kilometer distance between respective shops operating under the "PANCHHI" name. As years passed, disputes arose when the petitioners learned that the respondent, Subhash Chandbr, had secured multiple trademark registrations in different classes without the knowledge or inclusion of the petitioners. This led to the filing of rectification petitions challenging the registrations and asserting independent rights over the "PANCHHI" trademark, as stipulated in the family settlement.

Procedural Details: Rectification petitions were originally filed before the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB) and subsequently transferred to the Delhi High Court after the IPAB was abolished. During the course of proceedings, two key petitioners, Kanhaiya Lal and Anil Kumar, passed away. Applications were filed to bring their legal heirs on record and to condone the delay in such filings—delays that resulted from bereavement, gathering legal documentation, and ongoing mediation. Respondents objected, arguing that the applications were filed well beyond prescribed limits and that the cause of action had abated against the deceased petitioners. Relying on Order XXII Rule 4 of the CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the petitioners pleaded that the delay was not deliberate but caused by unforeseen circumstances, and that the proceedings should continue on merits by impleading the legal heirs.

Dispute: The dispute centered on control and use of the "PANCHHI" trademark arising from the family settlement, as well as the right of descendants to carry out business under the established brand name. The petitioners contended their rights were being undermined by the respondent’s unilateral trademark registrations and sought to rectify the Trademark Register to restore a fair balance as agreed upon in the family settlement. The respondent resisted, citing technical delays and lack of proper cause for condonation, and relied on prior legal precedents suggesting abatement and loss of legal standing due to late filing.

Detailed Reasoning: The Court examined the facts carefully, including the terms of the family settlement that gave rise to independent trademark rights for both families and their male descendants. It cited the Supreme Court judgment in Mithailal Dalsanagar Singh v. Annabai Devram Kini (2003 10 SCC 691), which established that applications to bring legal heirs on record must be liberally construed, and that technicalities should not override substantive justice. The Court found that bereavement, mediation attempts, and administrative complexities following the death of petitioners justified condoning the delay. The family settlement agreement, especially Clause 4, was strongly relied upon, affirming the rights of descendants to carry out business under the "PANCHHI" brand and to take legal action collectively to protect their interests.

The Court also dismissed respondent’s reliance on DSGMC v. Jagmohan Singh (2021 SCC OnLine Del 5423) and Shivamma dead by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969), finding those cases inapplicable to the particular family arrangement and independent rights at stake. The judge underscored that technical defaults should not bar parties from having their disputes decided on merits, especially where equity and long-standing business interests are involved.

Decision: The Court allowed the applications for impleadment of legal heirs, condoned the delay, and restored the abated petitions. The legal heirs—Mohit Goyal, Ankit Goyal, and Gaurav Goyal—were impleaded with direction for the petitioners to file amended memoranda within two weeks and pay costs of Rs. 25,000 per case to the respondent. By adopting a justice-oriented approach rather than dismissing on procedural grounds, the Court reinforced the principle that matters of substantial interest—like rights under a family settlement and registered trademark—should be adjudicated on merits and not buried due to technical delays.

Case Title: Kanhiaya Lal and Others Vs. Subhash Chandbr and Another

Order Date: 9th October 2025

Case Number: C.O. COMM.IPD-TM 339/2022 

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:8983

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Hon’ble Judge: Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG & Another Vs. Natco Pharma Limited

Patent Infringement and Person in the Know

The Appeal: In this matter, the High Court of Delhi was called upon to decide an appeal by F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG against Natco Pharma Limited regarding the manufacture and sale of the drug "Risdiplam." The appellants, holders of Indian Patent IN 3343971 concerning compounds for treating spinal muscular atrophy, sought an injunction to prevent Natco from producing and selling Risdiplam.

Facts: The facts of the case are straightforward. F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG is the patentee for Risdiplam, marketed under the brand name EVRYSDI used for spinal muscular atrophy. Natco Pharma began manufacturing and marketing Risdiplam, which the appellants argued amounted to patent infringement under Section 48 of the Indian Patents Act. The legal question was whether Natco's actions amounted to patent infringement and, if so, whether Natco could successfully invoke statutory defenses to avoid liability.

The Procedural Background: The dispute arose after a single judge of the High Court declined the injunction against Natco, leading the appellants to file the present appeal. Natco Pharma, as defendant, admitted to making and selling Risdiplam but asserted a legal defense under Section 107 of the Patents Act. This defense relies on Section 64(e) and 64(f), which allow a patent to be revoked if the invention is not new (lacking novelty) or is obvious (lacking an inventive step).

The Court’s detailed reasoning began by clarifying the law surrounding appellate review, citing Wander Ltd. v. Antox India P Ltd. (Supreme Court: 1990 Supp SCC 727), emphasizing that appeals against discretionary relief like injunctions are not appeals on facts but on principles. The Court would not substitute its own judgment for that of the original judge unless the lower court exercised its discretion arbitrarily or ignored settled legal principles.

The Legal Provision: Legal provisions under scrutiny included Section 48 (patentee’s rights), Section 64(e) (lack of novelty), and Section 64(f) (obviousness) of the Patents Act. Notably, infringement as such is not strictly defined in the Act, but Section 48 grants patent owners the exclusive right to control the making, using, selling, or importing of the patented product.

The Single Judge, whose decision was under appeal, found in favor of Natco based on these defenses. The core legal issue centered around two concepts: whether Risdiplam was "disclosed" within the scope of prior art (other earlier patents), and whether the claimed invention was obvious to a skilled person in the field.

The Single Judge and the Division Bench focused on whether Risdiplam, though covered under a so-called "Markush" chemical claim in earlier patents (WO916, US955), had been "disclosed" in such a way as to destroy novelty under Section 64(e). The difference between "coverage" (a compound is one of many possible encompassed by a broad patent claim) and "disclosure" (the compound is specifically taught or enabled) was discussed at length, referencing notable precedents including Novartis AG v Union of India (2013 6 SCC 1) and Astrazeneca AB v Intas Pharmaceutical Ltd (2020 84 PTC 326 Del).

While earlier cases such as Astrazeneca held that a plaintiff alleging infringement of both a genus (broad) and a species (narrow) patent amounts to admitting disclosure in the genus patent, the Division Bench in this case questioned whether infringement (predicated on coverage) was the same as invalidity (predicated on disclosure). The Bench favored the view that disclosure must be enabling – it should teach a skilled person how to make the specific compound; mere theoretical coverage is not sufficient. However, as the Single Judge's ruling was consistent with the then-prevailing interpretation of Astrazeneca, it was not faulted.

The obviousness: On the question of obviousness under Section 64(f), the Court examined whether, based on teachings in earlier patents and general knowledge, a skilled person could have arrived at Risdiplam without inventive effort. It was observed that Risdiplam differed from "Compound 809" of the prior art only by a single atom – a nitrogen (N) in place of a CH group. The Division Bench elaborated that several compounds in the prior art involved variations at this very position, and chemical principles (such as those set out in the Grimms Hyride Displacement Law) suggested substituting nitrogen for carbon-hydrogen as a routine modification. The Court also referred to the fact that in pharmaceutical chemistry, it is common to make such changes to optimize properties like potency and stability.

Person in the Know: Importantly, the decision observed that where the inventors of both the earlier patent and the current patent are the same, the "person skilled in the art" test shifts. The actual inventor, being "in the know," is presumed to choose relevant modifications more easily and to know how to arrive at the claimed invention. This mitigates against permitting so-called "evergreening," where a small, obvious change is used to obtain a new patent and extend exclusivity, especially in the realm of essential or life-saving drugs.

The Court cautioned that patent protection is intended only for true inventions, and that prolonging monopolies by minor modifications that would have occurred to the original inventors themselves conflicts with public interest. If inventors are allowed to obtain new patents for minor, obvious changes, society may suffer by not having access to important drugs at affordable rates.

In the concluding part, the Division Bench stated that its appellate review was limited to checking whether the judge below applied the correct legal principles. Since the judge did so, and no arbitrary or capricious conduct was shown, the appeal was dismissed. The Bench did not find it necessary to examine every nuance of the parties’ arguments in detail, since the core legal findings were unimpeachable. A credible challenge to the validity of the patent had been established, so the injunction was rightly denied.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, affirming that a credible defense of obviousness had been shown. The Court did not interfere with the lower court’s exercise of discretion, leaving the validity of the patent and the parties’ broader disputations to potential further proceedings or trial stages if warranted.

Case Title: F. Hoffmann-La Roche AG & Another Vs. Natco Pharma Limited

Order Date: 9th October 2025

Case Number: FAO(OS)(COMM) 43/2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:8943-DB

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Hon’ble Judges: Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Mr. Justice Ajay Digpaul

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Tapas Chatterjee Vs. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs

Guidelines for Assessing Inventive Step in Patent Appeals

Facts: This case involved a patent dispute centering around the process for recovery of potassium sulphate and other valuable products from distillery spent wash, ultimately leading towards a Zero Liquid Discharge (ZLD) system. The appellant, Tapas Chatterjee, applied for a patent for this process in 2019, aiming to address the issue of water pollution caused by alcohol distilleries. The invention was intended to recover potassium sulphate, magnesium sulphate, activated carbon, and other value-added products from effluent, with the additional benefit of ZLD, which meant no liquid effluent was discharged back into the environment. The Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) filed a pre-grant opposition against this application, citing several provisions of the Patents Act, 1970.

Procedural Detail: After the application was filed, the Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs (AC) conducted the standard examination, including the First Examination Report and subsequent reply from the appellant. The AC then dealt with the pre-grant opposition by CSIR, which was based on multiple grounds under Section 25(1) of the Patents Act. The main objections were that the invention was not novel, lacked inventive step, was not patentable under Section 3(d), and the methodology was not sufficiently described.

The AC rejected the opposition regarding lack of novelty but upheld the challenges relating to inventive step and Section 3(d). Consequently, the patent application was refused. The appellant appealed to a Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi, who affirmed the Controller’s decision. The appellant then brought a Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench.

Dispute: The core of the dispute revolved around two primary legal issues: Whether the invention as claimed was non-patentable under Section 3(d) of the Patents Act on grounds of being a mere use of a known process? Whether the invention lacked an inventive step, i.e., it was obvious in light of prior art documents , as per Section 2(1)(ja) and Section 25(1)(e)? The respondents (CSIR) contended that all steps described by the appellant were already disclosed in prior arts individually or in combination, and did not present any technical advance or require inventive faculty?

Detailed Reasoning: The Division Bench delved deeply into the reasons given by the Assistant Controller and the Single Judge. It noted that although the Controller accepted that the subject invention was novel, he still found a lack of inventive step compared to prior arts D1 (US patent) and D2 (Indian Standard). According to the Controller and the Single Judge, the steps of the claimed process were standard chemical engineering procedures, and no aspect of the steps was sufficiently distinct to warrant patent protection. The Controller held that routine operations (like concentration, thermal decomposition, dissolution, recovery) were obvious.

However, the Division Bench identified that the reasoning of both the AC and the Single Judge was inadequate and did not reflect a detailed, independent analysis of the prior arts compared to the subject invention. The Bench emphasized the importance of the legal test for inventive step outlined in F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd v. Cipla Ltd., which includes identifying the “person skilled in the art,” identifying the inventive concept, assessing the general knowledge at the priority date, and recognizing the differences between prior art and the claimed invention.

The key legal finding was that the Controller had failed to articulate which specific features of the claimed invention were obvious, and simply concluded so without detailed comparison. The prior arts (D1 and D2) had different approaches, products, and processes compared to the claimed invention’s steps, especially regarding the various fractions and recovery steps described in the application, and the additional by-products (magnesium sulphate, activated carbon) which were not claimed outcomes in D1 or D2.

The Division Bench also clarified the application of Section 3(d): it will only apply if the invention is a mere use of a known process, which was not positively shown in this case, and Section 3(d) would not apply if the process yields a new product or uses a new reactant. Since the process resulted in value-added products not described in the prior arts, the invocation of Section 3(d) was incorrect. Ultimately, the approach of the Controller (mechanical and unsupported by explicit reasons) and the analysis of the Single Judge (which skipped essential steps in the Hoffmann test) were found deficient.

Decision: The Division Bench allowed the appeal. The orders of the Single Judge and the Assistant Controller rejecting the appellant’s patent application were set aside. The matter was remanded to CGPDTM (Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks) for fresh consideration, specifically to reconsider the inventive step objection under Section 25(1)(e) read with Section 2(1)(ja), based strictly on the principles laid down in Hoffmann and the present judgment. The Bench unequivocally rejected the Section 3(d) objection raised by CSIR, stating there was no material basis for treating the process as a mere use of a known process. The adjudicating authority was directed to render a well-reasoned decision post-hearing, limited to the material already on record, and both parties were allowed to supplement their written submissions.

Case Title: Tapas Chatterjee Vs. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs & Anr.

Order Date: 6 October 2025

Case Number: LPA 836/2023

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:8824-DB

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Hon’ble Judges: Justice C. Hari Shankar, Justice Ajay Digpaul

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi