Fullstack Education Pvt Ltd vs. Institut Europeen D Administration Des Affaires

Introduction:The case of Fullstack Education Pvt Ltd versus Institut Europeen D Administration Des Affaires (INSEAD) Association & Anr. exemplifies the tensions that arise when two entities hold seemingly similar trademarks for related services, leading to disputes over rectification under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. 

This appeal before the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court challenged a Single Judge's decision to rectify the trademark register by removing the appellant's mark based on phonetic similarity and potential confusion. The core issue revolved around whether a rectification petition under Section 57 of the Act could be decided on a "prima facie" basis or required a final, conclusive determination.

The judgment underscores the procedural rigor demanded in rectification proceedings, distinguishing them from interim relief applications, and highlights the enduring relevance of classical trademark infringement tests in modern disputes involving educational institutions specializing in artificial intelligence and business administration. 

By setting aside the impugned order and remitting the matter for fresh consideration, the court reinforced the need for definitive findings in matters that could irrevocably alter trademark rights, while also addressing broader implications for honest adoption and consumer deception in a globalized educational market.

Factual Background:The dispute originated from the registration of trademarks by two educational entities offering services in higher education, particularly involving artificial intelligence and data science. The respondent, Institut Europeen D Administration Des Affaires (INSEAD) Association, a renowned international business school, held the registered trademark "INSEAD," which stands for its full name and is associated with providing executive education and business programs worldwide. 

On the other hand, the appellant, Fullstack Education Pvt Ltd, operated under the mark "INSAID," representing "International School of AI and Data Science," and offered similar services in AI-focused higher education. Both marks were undisputedly registered under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, but the respondent alleged that the appellant's mark created a manifest phonetic similarity, potentially leading to consumer confusion among students seeking admissions. 

The respondent contended that the appellant's adoption of "INSAID" was dishonest, pointing to evidence that the appellant's CEO, Mr. Manvender Singh, was aware of INSEAD's reputation prior to adopting the similar acronym. This awareness was inferred from materials such as interviews and website content where the CEO referenced INSEAD, suggesting that the choice of "INSAID" was not coincidental but deliberate, occurring later in time than INSEAD's established use. 

The competing marks visually differed in styling—"INSEAD" featured a circular logo with the tagline "The Business School for the World," while "INSAID" had a colorful design emphasizing AI and data science—but the auditory resemblance formed the crux of the conflict, with arguments centering on how terms like "-ead" and "-aid" could be pronounced similarly, akin to words like "dead" and "said." This factual matrix set the stage for a rectification petition invoking Section 11 of the Act, which prohibits registration of marks likely to cause confusion due to similarity with existing marks.

Procedural Background:The procedural journey began when the respondent filed a petition under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking rectification of the trademark register by removing the appellant's "INSAID" mark. This petition was heard by a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, who, after considering arguments on phonetic similarity and likelihood of confusion, allowed the petition via a judgment dated 17 May 2023. During the Single Judge proceedings, the respondent emphasized initial interest confusion among educated consumers like students, while the appellant countered that the targeted audience's sophistication precluded any real deception and invoked tests from landmark cases like Pianotist Co.'s Application.

The Single Judge reserved orders on an interim relief application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code on 10 September 2021, but the matter was reopened on 12 January 2023 after a significant lapse, leading to the final impugned judgment. Aggrieved by this, the appellant filed Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) No. 536/2023 before the Division Bench, along with applications for stay and additional facts. 

The appeal was argued on grounds that the Single Judge erred in applying Section 11 without fully evaluating classical infringement principles and, crucially, decided the rectification petition on a prima facie basis rather than through a conclusive determination. 

The Division Bench heard submissions from both sides, with the appellant's counsel detailing flaws in the confusion analysis and the respondent's counsel urging expeditious disposal given the petition's pendency since 2021. The court ultimately allowed the appeal on 30 October 2023, setting aside the Single Judge's order and remitting the matter for fresh adjudication, while requesting fast-tracking subject to court priorities.

Reasoning and Decision of Court:The Division Bench's reasoning pivoted on a critical procedural distinction between interim relief and final rectification under Section 57 of the Act. While acknowledging the Single Judge's analysis of phonetic similarity—observing that "INSEAD" and "INSAID" shared auditory traits that could invoke initial interest confusion, especially in educational services—the court noted that these conclusions were repeatedly qualified as "prima facie." For instance, the Single Judge held that phonetic similarity existed based on examples like "dead" and "said," and that even enlightened students might experience momentary wonderment upon encountering the marks, satisfying the likelihood of confusion test under Section 11. 

Similarly, on dishonest adoption, the Single Judge prima facie rejected honest concurrent use, citing the appellant's CEO's prior knowledge of INSEAD from interviews and materials. However, the Division Bench emphasized that Section 57 empowers courts to cancel or vary registrations with finality, as such orders result in a mark being struck off the register, carrying irreversible consequences. 

A prima facie opinion, being tentative and based on preliminary examination, suffices for ad interim injunctions but falls short for rectification petitions, which demand definitive and conclusive findings. 

The court rejected the respondent's attempt to downplay the "prima facie" language as mere phrasing, insisting on adhering to the explicit record. Although the appellant raised substantive arguments on infringement tests from Pianotist Co.'s Application, the Bench set aside the judgment on this narrow ground without delving deeply into them, deeming it sufficient for reversal. The decision allowed the appeal, remitted the petition to the Single Judge for fresh consideration with expeditious disposal, kept all contentions open, and disposed of pending applications, thereby ensuring a thorough trial-like evaluation rather than a summary disposal.

Point of Law Settled in the Case:This judgment settles a pivotal point in trademark rectification proceedings: that decisions under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, must be based on final and conclusive determinations rather than prima facie opinions. The court clarified that while prima facie assessments are appropriate for granting interim relief under provisions like Order XXXIX of the Civil Procedure Code, rectification petitions involve exercising a power imbued with finality, as they lead to the permanent removal of a registered mark from the register. Such actions cannot rest on tentative views formed from initial impressions or preliminary examinations of the dispute, as they would undermine the stability and integrity of the trademark system. By drawing this distinction, the ruling reinforces that rectification requires a rigorous, evidence-based conclusion on elements like phonetic similarity, likelihood of confusion, and honest adoption, ensuring that only after a comprehensive evaluation—potentially akin to a trial—can a court direct alterations to the register. This principle protects registered proprietors from hasty cancellations and aligns with the Act's objective of maintaining a reliable public record of trademarks, while also highlighting that procedural lapses, such as conflating interim and final standards, can vitiate even well-reasoned substantive analyses.

Case Title: Fullstack Education Pvt Ltd vs. Institut Europeen D Administration Des Affaires (INSEAD) Association & Anr.

Date of Order: 30 October 2023

Case Number: LPA 536/2023

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Yashwant Varma and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ravinder Dudeja

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

The Procter & Gamble Company Vs. IPI India Private Limited

Introduction:The dispute between The Procter & Gamble Company, a global giant in consumer goods, and IPI India Private Limited, a local player in similar product categories, exemplifies this tension. This case revolves around the petitioner's established brands "VICKS" and "VAPORUB," which have become synonymous with relief from cold and respiratory ailments, and the respondent's marks "VAPORIN" and related variants, which the petitioner argued were crafted to ride on the goodwill of their iconic products. 

Filed under Sections 47, 57, and 125 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the petitions sought rectification of the trademark register by removing the respondent's registrations, asserting that the impugned marks were deceptively similar in phonetics, visuals, structure, and concept, leading to potential confusion among consumers. 

The Madras High Court's adjudication in this matter not only underscores the principles of trademark law in India but also reinforces the protection afforded to well-known marks against dishonest adoption. By examining the historical use, registration details, and market presence of both parties, the court delved into whether the respondent's marks crossed the threshold of permissible similarity, ultimately weighing factors like consumer perception, trade channels, and the overall impression created by the marks. 

This analytical article dissects the judgment, providing insights into how courts apply the anti-dissection rule, the test of imperfect recollection, and the concept of house marks in resolving such conflicts, offering valuable lessons for trademark practitioners and businesses alike.

Factual Background: The Procter & Gamble Company, founded in 1837 and headquartered in Cincinnati, Ohio, United States, stands as one of the world's leading multinational corporations in the manufacture and trade of health care, personal care, and hygiene products. Among its portfolio, the brand "VICKS" holds a flagship position, particularly for pharmaceutical and medicinal preparations aimed at alleviating cold, cough, and respiratory issues. 

Launched internationally in 1890 and introduced to the Indian market in 1964, "VICKS" has cultivated immense recognition and loyalty among consumers and the trade. Complementing this, the company has developed a family of marks under the "VAPO" formative prefix, including "VICKS VAPORUB," "VICKS VAPOCOOL," "VICKS VAPOPATCH," "VICKS VAPOEASE," "VICKS VAPAPADS," "VICKS COUGH DROPS," and "VICKS INHALER." These products, especially "VAPORUB," have garnered tremendous goodwill through extensive marketing, sales, and consistent quality, becoming household names associated with instant relief. 

The petitioner's trademarks "VICKS" and "VAPORUB" were registered globally as early as 1928, with Indian registrations dating back to 1954 for "VICKS" in Class 5 and 1977 for "VAPORUB" in the same class. Additional registrations include device marks and labels from 2007 and 2008, alongside copyrights in the distinctive packaging artistry. 

Courts across India have repeatedly acknowledged and protected these marks, affirming their well-known status. In contrast, IPI India Private Limited, based in Telangana, India, entered the market with products under marks like "VAPORIN COLD RUB" and "VAPORIN," promoted with slogans such as "Vapor In, Stress Out. Anytime, Anywhere." These products targeted similar categories—personal care and medicinal preparations in Classes 3 and 5—leading the petitioner to discover their existence and perceive them as imitations designed to capitalize on established reputation. 

Upon learning of the respondent's registrations (No. 3897775 in Class 3, No. 4285435 in Class 5, and No. 3461733 in Class 3), the petitioner issued a cease and desist notice on September 27, 2022, alleging deceptive similarity and dishonest intent, which prompted the filing of rectification petitions to expunge these entries from the trademark register.

Procedural Background: The proceedings commenced with the filing of three original petitions under Sections 47 (removal for non-use), 57 (rectification or variation of register), and 125  all in the name of the first respondent, IPI India Private Limited, with the Registrar of Trade Marks as the second respondent. The petitions were consolidated for a common hearing given the overlapping issues. 

The petitioner argued prior registration, deceptive similarity, and dishonest adoption, citing extensive evidence of their marks' global and Indian presence, sales figures, and judicial recognitions. The first respondent  countered by claiming that "VAPO" was descriptive and common to trade, thus not monopolizable, and that their marks were distinct enough to avoid confusion. 

Reasoning and Decision of Court:The Madras High Court's central reasoning was the test for deceptive similarity under Section 2(1)(h) of the Trade Marks Act, which deems marks similar if they are likely to cause confusion. The court rejected the respondent's plea to dissect the marks, invoking the anti-dissection rule from precedents like Amritdhara Pharmacy, where the Supreme Court held that marks must be compared as wholes, considering phonetic, visual, structural, and conceptual resemblances from the viewpoint of a person of average intelligence with imperfect recollection. 

Here, "VAPORUB" and "VAPORIN" were found phonetically akin, with the shared "VAPOR" prefix dominating the impression, and the suffixes "UB" and "IN" insufficient to differentiate, especially in spoken trade where pronunciation overlaps. Visually and structurally, the marks' composition mirrored each other, heightening confusion risks. 

The court noted the identical goods—cold rubs and medicinal preparations—sold through overlapping channels to the same consumer base, amplifying the likelihood of deception. Dismissing the respondent's argument that "VAPO" is descriptive (evoking vapor for ointments), the court observed that the petitioner's long use had rendered it distinctive, and the respondent's adoption of a similar formative element betrayed dishonest intent to freeride on goodwill, as evidenced by similar packaging, colors, and layouts. 

The house mark "VICKS" was recognized as a common identifier, making "VAPORUB" the key differentiator, which the respondent's marks encroached upon. Relying on Section 9's absolute grounds for refusal (lack of distinctiveness, potential for confusion) and Section 11's relative grounds (similarity to earlier marks), the court found the registrations violative. 

Prior user rights under Section 34 were upheld for the petitioner, given their 1964 Indian launch versus the respondent's later entry. Judicial precedents, including Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Ltd., reinforced that initial interest confusion could harm reputation. Ultimately, the court allowed all three petitions, directing the Registrar to remove the impugned registrations from the register and awarding costs to the petitioner, emphasizing that trademark law safeguards consumer interests and prevents unjust enrichment.

Point of Law Settled in the Case: This judgment solidifies the application of the deceptive similarity test in cases involving formative marks, clarifying that prefixes like "VAPO," when acquired distinctiveness through prolonged use and market dominance, cannot be appropriated even if arguably descriptive, as such adoption evidences bad faith. It reiterates that trademarks must be assessed holistically, without dissection, from the lens of an ordinary consumer's imperfect recollection, and that similarity extends beyond words to trade dress and packaging. The decision underscores the primacy of prior user rights and the well-known status of marks, as per Section 2(1)(zg), in rectification proceedings, establishing that house marks do not dilute the independent protection of sub-brands within a family. Furthermore, it affirms that registrations granted in error, causing confusion or deceiving the public, warrant expungement under Sections 47 and 57, prioritizing public interest over registrant's claims of commonality. This precedent serves as a deterrent against parasitic branding, particularly in pharmaceutical sectors where consumer health and trust are paramount, and highlights the courts' role in maintaining the integrity of the trademark register.

Case Title: The Procter & Gamble Company Vs. IPI India Private Limited & Anr.

Date of Order: January 6, 2026

Case Number: O.P.(TM)Nos.48, 49 and 50 of 2024

Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Mr. Justice N. Senthilkumar

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Sanjeev Kumar Juneja Vs Terrace Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd.

Terrace Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. filed a suit in 2018 against Sanjeev Kumar Juneja and another for infringement of their registered trademark "MANTRA" and passing off due to defendants' use of similar "MANTRA" formative marks like "ROOP MANTRA" in medicinal and cosmetic goods.

Defendants contested, filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC to reject the plaint which was dismissed and upheld in revision, then applied under Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 to challenge validity and stay the suit.

Trial Court framed an additional issue on validity but dismissed the stay as belated. In revision, the High Court reasoned that Section 124 mandates stay of infringement suits once prima facie invalidity is found to allow rectification but does not apply to passing off actions, held composite suits permissible but severable under Order II Rule 6 CPC due to delay caused by joinder, and modified the order to grant three months for rectification, stay the infringement claim, and direct separation and proceeding of the passing off claim as a new suit.

• Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 applies only to suits for infringement of registered trade marks and not to actions for passing off:  Para 19.
• A composite suit joining causes of action for trade mark infringement and passing off is permissible, but the causes are severable, and the court can order separate trials under Order II Rule 6 CPC if joinder causes delay or inconvenience:  Para 25.

Case Title: Sanjeev Kumar Juneja Vs Terrace Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd.:22.01.2026:CR No.6252 of 2023:Punjab and Haryana HC:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Pankaj Jain

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. Vs Ranvir Kumar Bindeshwari Singh

Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. and Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. filed a suit in August 2018 against Ranvir Kumar Bindeshwari Singh and others for infringing their Indian Patent No. 209816 covering Sitagliptin by advertising and exporting the infringing product SEPAMET-XR containing Sitagliptin Phosphate Monohydrate, seeking permanent injunction, damages, rendition of accounts, delivery up, and costs.

The court granted ex-parte interim injunction in August 2018. Defendants filed written statement denying infringement, export for domestic market, and court's jurisdiction but later ceased appearing, leading to ex-parte proceedings in March 2024 after substituted service. The patent lapsed in July 2022, rendering injunction infructuous, so plaintiffs restricted relief to damages and costs, filing unrebutted affidavit evidence.

The court, accepting plaintiffs' evidence, calculated compensatory damages based on defendants' estimated export profits over 12 months at Rs.49,44,450 with 25% margin, awarded exemplary damages of Rs.10 lakhs for willful post-injunction infringement posing public health risks, and granted actual costs of Rs.21,67,074, holding defendants jointly liable.

• In patent infringement suits proceeded ex-parte, unrebutted affidavit evidence of plaintiffs is sufficient to establish entitlement to compensatory damages calculated on the basis of infringer's estimated profits from export data with a reasonable profit margin:  Para 25.
• Exemplary damages may be awarded in patent infringement cases where defendants willfully disobey court injunction orders and continue infringing activities, considering public health risks from sub-standard medicines:  Para 28.
• Actual legal costs, including court fees and expenses supported by affidavit, are recoverable in commercial patent suits under the Commercial Courts Act, especially when unrebutted:  Para 29.

Case Title: Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. Vs Ranvir Kumar Bindeshwari Singh :23.01.2026:CS(COMM) 1075/2018:2026:DHC:571:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Jesal Vimal Jetha Vs Controller General of Patents

Jesal Vimal Jetha filed a patent application in 2018 for a customizable comforter system with a supporter for therapeutic use, addressing issues like backache and posture through adjustable compartments for individual body needs.

The First Examination Report (FER) in January 2020 raised objections on novelty and inventive step based on prior arts D1 and D2, to which the appellant responded. Subsequent hearing notices introduced additional prior arts D3, D4, and D5, leading to hearings in July and September 2020 where the appellant submitted detailed technical replies.

The Controller rejected the application in October 2020 under Section 2(1)(ja) for lack of inventive step without adequately considering the appellant's responses, particularly the July 2020 reply addressing D3-D5, and contained factual errors in analyzing prior arts.

The Delhi High Court, finding violations of natural justice due to non-consideration of key submissions, jurisdictional infirmities, procedural unfairness, and inconsistencies like shifting the closest prior art from D1 to D3, set aside the rejection order and remanded the matter for fresh consideration with a new hearing, clarifying that merits were not examined.

• The failure to consider the appellant's detailed technical response to objections based on newly cited prior arts in the hearing notice constitutes a violation of natural justice and procedural fairness Para 13.
• The Controller's impugned order must explicitly advert to and consider all submissions, including highly technical responses to prior arts, and absence thereof renders the decision unfathomable and invalid:  Para 15.
• Factual errors in the Controller's analysis of prior arts, such as misstating positional rearrangement of compartments not disclosed in the cited document, indicate non-application of mind and require judicial interference:  Para 16.
• The ability to arrange or re-arrange compartments in any spatial manner, including multilayer stacking, may constitute a novel inventive feature when contrasted with linear parallel arrays in prior arts, and failure to address this vitiates the rejection:  Para 17.
• Procedural fairness in patent examination may require issuance of a Second Examination Report (SER) under Section 13(3) of the Patents Act in cases involving amendments or new objections, to ensure all issues are compositely put to the applicant before response: Para 18.

Case Title: Jesal Vimal Jetha Vs Controller General of Patents:23.01.2026: C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 233/2022:2026:DHC:573:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

LMC Computers Vs. iThink Apps Private Limited

In the suit filed by LMC Computers against iThink Apps Private Limited & Ors before the Delhi High Court, the plaintiff sought condonation of delay in filing replication to the written statement. The written statement was taken on record on 18.09.2025, replication was filed on 03.11.2025 (46th day, as the 45th day fell on Sunday), but served on defendants only on 10.11.2025 after Registry objection, despite defendants' email reminder on 05.11.2025. 

Plaintiff argued that filing on next working day after Sunday was valid under Section 10 General Clauses Act, 1897 and Rule 6 Chapter I Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, while delay arose due to voluminous pleadings and multiple inter se litigations; defendants opposed, alleging deliberate non-service for unfair advantage and insisting strict compliance with Rule 5 Chapter VII requiring service endorsement for acceptance. 

The Court held that the 30+15 days limit under Rule 5 is strict and non-extendable beyond 45 days, but filing on next open day after Sunday was permissible; however, non-service provision in Rule 5 was held directory (mere irregularity, not mandatory illegality) condonable by Court in justice interests, unlike Registry's binding duty. Accordingly, replication was taken on record subject to plaintiff paying Rs.1,00,000 costs to defendants within four weeks. 

The Court also issued notice on plaintiff's applications for directions restraining defendants from intimidating proposed witness and for impleadment of two partners as co-plaintiffs, with replies/rejoinders directed and matter listed on 21.05.2026.

Law settled: 

The 30 days period for filing replication under Rule 5 Chapter VII Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018 is extendable by maximum 15 days (total 45 days) and not thereafter; no further condonation possible even for sufficient cause, to ensure expeditious disposal of commercial disputes. Para 15, 19.

Where the last day of prescribed/extended period falls on a Sunday/holiday/Court-closed day, filing on the next working day is valid under Section 10 General Clauses Act, 1897 read with Rule 6 Chapter I Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018. Para 11, 16.

The requirement under Rule 5 Chapter VII Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018 that replication shall not be accepted unless it contains endorsement of service on defendant/his advocate is directory and not mandatory; non-service constitutes mere irregularity condonable by Court in interests of justice, though binding on Registry. Para 17-18.

Case Title: LMC Computers Vs. iThink Apps Private Limited & Ors.:14.01.2026:CS(COMM) 729/2025: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Yatishkumar Baburao Gaikwad Vs. Sachin Sariya

The petitioners/defendants challenged the Trial Court's order dated 17.09.2025 dismissing their application under Order VII Rule 11(a) & (d) CPC for rejection of the plaint in a trademark infringement suit, contending that the plaint disclosed no cause of action and that Delhi courts lacked territorial jurisdiction, as the defendants were based in Solapur (Maharashtra), manufactured fuses there, never supplied goods beyond Maharashtra, and the plaintiff's bald averments in para 46 about availability/sale in Delhi markets (Naraina, R.K. Puram, Sarojini Nagar) and through Just Dial lacked supporting documents or proof of actual purchase/sale.

The plaintiff/plaintiff opposed, relying on averments in paras 46-48 of the plaint about advertising, soliciting, supplying, and offering for sale via Just Dial e-commerce platform, plus filed Just Dial printouts, arguing this conferred jurisdiction. 

The High Court held that at the Order VII Rule 11 stage only plaint averments are to be considered without mini-trial or requiring proof/documents, and the averments in paras 46-48 sufficiently alleged facts conferring territorial jurisdiction on Delhi courts, particularly in view of evolved law on e-commerce/online offers for sale.

The defendants' contentions on absence of actual sale or documents were matters for trial, not rejection at threshold, hence the petition under Article 227 was dismissed without costs, with liberty to raise similar objections in written statement for Trial Court consideration.

Law settled: 

In trademark infringement/passing off cases involving e-commerce platforms, mere accessibility and looming presence of a website/offer for sale in a geography, even without aggressive targeting or actual completed sale, is sufficient to characterize it as targeting the forum and to confer territorial jurisdiction on courts where such commercial transaction could be concluded, as the tort stands committed where infringing goods are capable of being sold/purchased.

Once allegedly infringing goods are listed/available for sale on e-commerce platforms (accessible in the forum), the situs of the tort of infringement includes every place where a commercial transaction could be concluded, enabling suit filing in courts having jurisdiction over such place, irrespective of whether listing was at defendant's instance or by third party. 

Case Title: Yatishkumar Baburao Gaikwad Vs. Sachin Sariya:19.01.2026 : CM(M)-IPD 40/2025 : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Dev Sahitya Kutir Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Archana Debnath

The plaintiffs (widow and son of late renowned cartoonist Narayan Debnath) filed Title Suit No.01 of 2026 before the District Judge at Alipore alleging copyright infringement by the appellant-publisher (Dev Sahitya Kutir Pvt Ltd) in respect of Debnath's literary and artistic works, claiming a 2012 agreement granted only two-year publishing rights after which unauthorized publication continued without adequate royalty.

They asserted inheritance via a 2020 Will (plaintiff no.1 as Executrix, plaintiff no.2 as legatee). The Trial Court granted ex parte ad interim injunction restraining the appellant from publishing/selling/distributing the works till February 9, 2026, just before a book fair.

The appellant appealed (FMAT 18 of 2026), contending lack of locus standi of plaintiffs absent probate under Section 213 Indian Succession Act 1925 (applicable in West Bengal).

Bar under Order IX Rule 9 CPC due to prior suit dismissal for default, suppression of facts, delay/laches defeating equity, balance of convenience against injunction causing huge losses, and non-compliance with Order XXXIX Rule 3 guidelines. 

The Division Bench dismissed the appeal, upholding the injunction, holding that even in Section 57/213 areas, an executor/legatee can protect/defend the estate pre-probate as "intermediate acts" validated retrospectively under Sections 211 and 227.

Copyright infringement cause of action is continuing/day-to-day, so no bar under Order IX Rule 9/limitation/delay applies, no material suppression occurred (copy of prior order annexed), and prima facie case/irreparable injury justified injunction at ad interim stage per settled precedents, though observations not conclusive at trial.

Law Point:

An executor or legatee under a Will of a Hindu in territories specified under Section 57 (including West Bengal) can maintain a suit to protect/defend the estate/prevent infringement pre-grant of probate, as such acts qualify as "intermediate acts" validated retrospectively upon probate grant under Sections 211 and 227 of Indian Succession Act 1925 (Paras 59–62).

In copyright infringement cases, the cause of action is continuing and arises de die in diem; thus, injunction is normally granted as a matter of course on prima facie case, delay/laches do not bar relief, and prior suit dismissal for default does not attract bar under Order IX Rule 9 CPC as the cause is not the "self-same" one (Paras 66–69)

At ad interim ex parte stage, the Court proceeds on plaint averments as sacrosanct without mini-trial; damages not necessarily adequate remedy in widespread copyright infringement; non-strict repetition of Shiv Kumar Chadha/Morgan Stanley guidelines does not vitiate reasoned order (Paras 70–83).

Case Title: Dev Sahitya Kutir Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Archana Debnath:22.01.2026: FMAT 18 of 2026: 2026:CHC-AS:96-DB: Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Justice Supratim Bhattacharya  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Dr. Dulal Kumar De Vs Union of India

Dr. Dulal Kumar De along with co-inventors filed patent application No. 202031002063 on 17 January 2020 for “Herbal Anti-Venom against Catfish Sting”, published on 14 February 2020; 

First Examination Report issued on 4 July 2022 via email to Midnapore College's registered address, with response deadline 4 January 2023 extended to 4 April 2023; 

Email overlooked due to college's 150th anniversary celebrations, status inquiry on 9 June 2023 revealed abandonment under section 21(1) of Patents Act 1970; 

Petitioner filed writ petition alleging invalid service without postal communication under section 149, claiming time period not triggered and abandonment erroneous. 

Court reasoned section 149's "may" for postal service is permissive not mandatory, Rules 2003 as amended in 2016 and Office Order 23/2016 recognize email as valid service especially since petitioner provided email address, harmonizing with Information Technology Act 2000; time limits under section 21 and Rule 24B mandatory, non-compliance deems abandonment without judicial relaxation; distinguished petitioner's cited cases on strict statutory compliance as inapplicable here. Writ petition dismissed, upholding abandonment.

Law Point:

Service of notices under section 149 of the Patents Act, 1970 is permissive and not mandatory by post; email service is valid and effective as per amended Patents Rules, 2003 and Office Order 23/2016: paras 7-9.

Time limits for responding to First Examination Report under section 21(1) of the Patents Act, 1970 read with Rule 24B are mandatory; non-compliance results in automatic abandonment without scope for judicial extension: 

Subordinate rules framed under section 159 of the Patents Act, 1970 supplement the Act without superseding it, allowing alternative modes like email service for efficiency: para 8.

Case Title: Dr. Dulal Kumar De Vs  Union of India:19/01/2026:WPA-IPD No.2 of 2025:2026:CHC-AS:78:The Hon'ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

The Supreme Industries Limited Vs Moorthi Rabeha

The Supreme Industries Limited filed a commercial IP suit against Moorthi Rabeha for trademark infringement, copyright infringement, and passing off, alleging adoption of "SUPREME" mark since 1987 for plastic products with registrations in class 17 and others, stylized label with copyright, and massive goodwill from sales over Rs.10,000 crores in 2023-24; discovered defendant's "SUPREMES GOLD" registration in class 19 in June 2024, filed rectification, and suit in October 2024 upon finding goods, seeking interim injunction. 

Defendant defended claiming "SUPREME" descriptive and common, marks dissimilar in color/font/layout, own use since 2015 with registration, and plaintiff's concealment of class 19 refusal. Court reasoned deceptive similarity visually/phonetically/structurally as defendant copied essential stylized "SUPREME" adding 's' and "GOLD" dishonestly to ride on goodwill, 

Defendant's registration ex facie invalid under sections 9/11 as likely to confuse average imperfect-recollecting consumer for identical goods, plaintiff proved prior use/goodwill/reputation without needing actual damage, balance of convenience and irreparable harm favored plaintiff despite defendant's registration. Interim injunction granted restraining defendant from using "SUPREMES GOLD" or similar marks.

Law Point:

In passing off, deceptive similarity is assessed by overall impression on average consumer with imperfect recollection, considering visual, phonetic, structural aspects holistically without dissection: 

Court can grant interim injunction against registered trademark if registration is ex facie illegal, fraudulent, or shocks conscience, despite section 28, as validity challenge at interlocutory stage possible on strong prima facie case.

Passing off requires goodwill, misrepresentation leading to likely deception no fraudulent intent needed), and likelihood of damage presumed from confusion without actual proof: para 34 

Registration of label mark without disclaimer confers exclusivity over distinctive word element if no other features, and defendant estopped from claiming descriptiveness after own registration: paras 31-32.

Case Title: The Supreme Industries Limited Vs  Moorthi Rabeha :19/01/2026:Commercial IP Suit No. 336 of 2024:2026:BHC-OS:1417:Hon'ble Ms. Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Khandelwal Dhaba Vs. Khandelwal Dhaba

Mohit Khandelwal, plaintiff, filed a passing off suit against Manoj Bhagchandani, defendant, claiming exclusive rights to "Khandelwal Dhaba" since 2001 with established goodwill, alleging defendant fraudulently adopted identical name in 2009 for adjacent restaurant causing confusion. Defendant countered with authorization from Shyam Sunder Khandelwal (plaintiff's father) who purportedly used it since 1977 and filed counterclaim for injunction. 

Trial court framed issues, granted permanent injunction to plaintiff in 2017 dismissing counterclaim; on appeal, High Court remanded issue 4 in 2019; trial court reaffirmed in 2019 favoring plaintiff based on documents proving continuous use since 2001, defendant's admissions, and failure to prove valid authorization or honest adoption. Defendant appealed. 

High Court analyzed passing off trinity: plaintiff proved goodwill via documents/telephone bills/licenses and defendant's pleadings admitting use; misrepresentation via dishonest adoption without justification for "Khandelwal" (defendant from Sindhi community lacking surname connection) inferring intent to deceive; likelihood of damage presumed from confusion. 

Law Point:

Prior user's rights in passing off emanate from common law and prevail over subsequent registration or authorization, unaffected by Trade Marks Act provisions: 

Dishonest adoption of identical/similar mark without justification raises strong presumption of mala fides and intent to ride on prior user's goodwill: 

In passing off, no proof of actual damage required; likelihood of confusion/deception presumes injury to goodwill: 

Adoption of another's trade/corporate name, if likely to cause confusion, constitutes passing off even if derived from personal elements

Case Title:  Khandelwal Dhaba Vs. Khandelwal Dhaba :15/01/2026:S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 283/2020 :[2025:RJ-JP:43211]Name of court: High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur :Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjeet Purohit  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Pramod Kumar Vs Gannon Dunkerley

Pramod Kumar, appointed as Junior Engineer with Gannon Dunkerley in 1992 and rising to Deputy General Manager over 27 years, was terminated in February 2020 during approved leave for his son's wedding, invoking a 2012 policy clause. He claimed unpaid dues totaling Rs.4,10,184 including balance notice pay, leave encashment for 153 days, travel expenses, and laptop deposit refund, sending legal notices in 2020 and 2022 without response. He filed a recovery suit in Commercial Court, which dismissed it on 30.04.2024 holding it was not a "commercial dispute" under Section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 as it involved employee-employer service recovery from a private entity. In appeal, the High Court agreed the dispute was non-commercial, not fitting categories like merchants or traders, but reasoned that under Order VII Rule 10 CPC, the Commercial Court erred by dismissing instead of returning the plaint for presentation to a competent non-commercial court, distinguishing dismissal as final merits adjudication from return as procedural for wrong forum, citing precedents like AJ Organica Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2019 SCC OnLine Bom 1311) and Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. K.S. Infraspace LLP (2020) 15 SCC 1 emphasizing return to avoid remedilessness. The appeal was allowed, impugned judgment set aside, suit restored, and Commercial Court directed to return plaint under Order VII Rule 10A CPC with appearance date 03.02.2026, permitting pragmatic use of existing pleadings and evidence with parties' consent for de novo proceedings per EXL Careers v. Franklin Aviation Services (2020) 12 SCC 667.

• A recovery suit for salary or terminal benefits by an employee against a private employer does not qualify as a "commercial dispute" under Section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, as it falls outside enumerated categories like merchants, bankers, financiers, traders, or specified commercial transactions (Para 11).
• Upon determining lack of jurisdiction due to a non-commercial dispute, a Commercial Court must return the plaint under Order VII Rule 10 CPC for presentation to the competent court, rather than dismiss the suit, as dismissal constitutes final adjudication while return is procedural for wrong forum (Paras 12-13, citing AJ Organica Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 1311 at Para 14; Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. K.S. Infraspace LLP & Anr., (2020) 15 SCC 1 at Para 14-17).
• On return of plaint under Order VII Rule 10 CPC, de novo proceedings are required, but courts may utilize existing pleadings and evidence (documentary and oral) with parties' consent for pragmatic efficiency (Para 19, citing EXL Careers v. Franklin Aviation Services, (2020) 12 SCC 667).

Case Title: Pramod Kumar Vs Gannon Dunkerley and Co. Ltd.:20.01.2026:RFA(COMM) 348/2024:2026:DHC:2026:DHC:464-DB:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Anil Kshetarpal and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Mahajan

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]