Shri Surinder Kumar Vs The Registrar of Copyrights

Rahul Khanna filed a suit in 2016 before the Additional District Judge, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi, seeking injunction against Surinder Kumar for passing off and copyright infringement involving the trademark 'PRAKASH' and artistic label for PVC electrical insulation tape, along with damages and accounts rendition, with evidence completed and matter listed for final arguments on December 17, 2025, while Surinder Kumar filed a counterclaim for injunction against Rahul Khanna for similar passing off and copyright violation. Surinder Kumar also filed a rectification petition originally in 2016 before the Copyright Board (later transferred to IPAB and then to Delhi High Court as C.O.(COMM.IPD-CR) 5/2024) seeking cancellation of Rahul Khanna's copyright registration No. A-115513/2016. Surinder Kumar filed a transfer petition under Section 24 CPC read with Rule 26 of IPD Rules, 2022, arguing commonality of issues and need for consolidation to avoid conflicting decisions. Rahul Khanna opposed, contending Rule 26 applies only to commercial courts and the suit being non-commercial (valued below Rs. 3 lakhs) with advanced stage precludes transfer. The High Court held that while Rule 26 specifies transfer from commercial courts, Section 24 CPC provides general power to transfer any subordinate court matter, including non-commercial IPR suits, to itself at any stage to prevent multiplicity and contradictions, and finding overlap with no prejudice from transfer as evidence was closed, allowed the petition, transferred the suit and counterclaim to itself for consolidation with the rectification petition.

High Court has power under Section 24 CPC to transfer non-commercial IPR suits pending before District Courts to itself for consolidation with related rectification petitions, irrespective of Rule 26 of IPD Rules, 2022 limiting explicit mention to commercial courts, as Section 24 confers general transfer authority to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and conflicting decisions (Paras 7-18).

Relied on Patola Industries v. Mahesh Namkeen Pvt. Ltd., C.O.(COMM.IPD-TM) 187/2021 (Para 2.2); M/s Loreal India Private Limited v. M/s Pornsricharoenpun Co. Ltd., CS(COMM) 496/2023 (Para 2.6); Distinguished Sonani Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Mr. Sanjay Jayanthbai Patel, C.O.(COMM.IPD-CR) 880/2022 (Para 21) and Fox & Mandal v. Somabrata Mandal, 2025 SCC OnLine Cal 8007 (Para 20).

Case Title: Shri Surinder Kumar Vs The Registrar of Copyrights :04.12.2025:TR.P.(C.) 146/2024:2025:DHC:11465: Hon'ble Tejas Karia, J.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Anand Tomar Vs. Pooja Electric Co

Pooja Electric Co., the plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit before the Single Judge of Delhi High Court, filed an application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC to amend the plaint by incorporating the fact of subsequent registration of three trademark applications that were already disclosed as pending in the original plaint. 

The Single Judge, by order dated 25 September 2025, allowed the plaintiff to bring the registration certificates on record for reliance during evidence without requiring formal amendment of the plaint, as all material facts were already present. The defendant Anand Tomar challenged this order by way of appeal under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. 

The Division Bench held that the appeal was not maintainable as orders on applications under Order VI Rule 17 CPC are not appealable under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act read with Order XLIII Rule 1 CPC, and dismissed the appeal without examining merits.

An order allowing or rejecting an application for amendment of plaint under Order VI Rule 17 CPC is not appealable under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 read with Order XLIII Rule 1 CPC (Paras 3-4, 7-8).

Case Title: Anand Tomar Vs. Pooja Electric Co.:15.12.2025:FAO(OS) (COMM) 203/2025: 2025:dhc:11450-DB: C Hari Shankar,  H. J. and Om Prakash Shukla, H. J.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Kirti Dal Mills Limited Vs Rajesh Lunkad

Rajesh Lunkad filed Special Civil Suit No. 24 of 2021 in June 2021 before the District Judge, Pune, seeking injunction and damages against Kirti Dal Mills for alleged trademark infringement and passing off concerning the mark “Champion” in edible oils. 

Kirti Dal Mills challenged the jurisdiction, contending the suit, being a commercial dispute, should lie only before a designated Commercial Court under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and the 2019 Notification, and the Pune District Court was not so designated. 

While that suit remained pending (with interim stay on hearing granted in revision), Kirti Dal Mills filed Commercial Suit No. 1 of 2024 in November 2024 before the designated Commercial Court at Latur seeking injunction against Rajesh Lunkad for using “Champion”. 

Rajesh Lunkad applied under Section 10 CPC for stay of the Latur suit pending disposal of the Pune suit, which was granted on 06.05.2025. Kirti Dal Mills challenged this stay order by way of writ petition. 

The High Court held that since the earlier Pune suit was pending before a court not designated as Commercial Court and therefore lacking competence to grant the relief claimed in the commercial dispute, Section 10 CPC could not be invoked to stay the subsequent properly instituted Latur suit. 

The Court quashed the stay order and directed the Latur Commercial Court to proceed with the suit.

Law Point:

For Section 10 CPC to apply and stay a subsequent suit, the previously instituted suit must be pending in a court competent to grant the relief claimed in the subsequent suit; where the earlier court lacks jurisdiction due to statutory designation requirements under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, stay cannot be granted (Paras 28-32).

Trademark infringement and passing off suits, though required under Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 to be filed before a District Court, must, when constituting commercial disputes, be adjudicated only by courts specifically designated as Commercial Courts under the Commercial Courts Act and relevant notifications, the latter having overriding effect (Paras 24-30).

Case Title: Kirti Dal Mills Limited Vs Rajesh Lunkad:18.12.2025: Writ Petition No. 10521 of 2025:2025:BHC-AUG:35919:Bombay HC Aurangabad:Y. G. Khobragade, J.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Mr. Vashu Bhagnani Vs. Mr. Kamal Rashid Khan

Film producer Vashu Bhagnani filed a defamation suit against actor and critic Kamal Rashid Khan (KRK) alleging that KRK posted defamatory tweets and videos on Twitter (now X) accusing Bhagnani of financial irregularities, non-payment for film rights, hawala transactions, destroying Bollywood by overpaying actors, and personal attacks on his family and films like Bellbottom and Coolie No.1, causing reputational harm, embarrassment, and public ridicule.

Bhagnani sought damages and interim relief under Order 39 Rule 1 CPC via a notice of motion, claiming the content was false, scandalous, and part of a smear campaign for cheap publicity, while KRK defended it as fair film criticism under freedom of speech, denying personal defamation.

The court, after reviewing the material, found a prima facie case of defamation as KRK exceeded criticism limits by encroaching on Bhagnani's privacy and reputation without basis, applied the triple test of prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury, balanced free speech with right to reputation and privacy per constitutional principles, and held that unregulated publication would cause ongoing harm. The court granted interim injunction restraining KRK from publishing or repeating such content and directed deletion of the offending tweets and videos but rejected the prayer for mandatory apology pending full trial evidence.

• Every individual has a right to have their reputation unaffected by false statements, and defamatory imputations that lower one's esteem in society give rise to a prima facie cause of action, with the law presuming falsity unless proven otherwise by the defendant: Jagadishkumar Thakkar Vs. Waahiid Ali Khan, (2024 SCC Online Bom 1079), Para 20 (referencing Para 15 of the cited judgment).
• The test for defamatory statements is their tendency to incite adverse opinions, hatred, contempt, or ridicule, with the burden on the defendant to prove truth or unintentional publication: Jagadishkumar Thakkar Vs. Waahiid Ali Khan, (2024 SCC Online Bom 1079), Para 20 (referencing Para 19 of the cited judgment).
• Right to privacy is a fundamental right, with exceptions only for compelling public interest: Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) Vs. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, Para 20 (referencing Para 19 of the cited judgment).
• For interim injunction in defamation cases, courts must satisfy the triple test of prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury, ensuring interference protects against irreparable harm greater than from granting relief: Dalpat Kumar Vs. Prahlad Singh, AIR 1993 SC 276, Para 16.
• Interim orders in defamation balance reputation and privacy rights with freedom of speech, applying caution per the Bonnard standard to grant injunction only if falsity is certain and unjustifiable: Para 21-22.
• Freedom of speech does not permit breaching another's privacy or reputation; self-restrictions apply when expressing opinions publicly: Para 25.

Case Title: Mr. Vashu Bhagnani Vs. Mr. Kamal Rashid Khan:05th December, 2025: Notice of Motion No.3298 of 2025 in S.C. Suit No.3240 of 2024;MHCC010082932025:Bombay HC:Amit Anant Laulkar

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Revajeetu Builders and Developers Vs Narayanaswamy and Sons

The appellant Revajeetu Builders and Developers filed a suit against the respondents for recovery of money with 18% interest and declaration of absolute ownership of property based on a sale deed dated 30-9-1987, claiming the respondents were unlawfully occupying the building after termination of tenancy. The appellant later sought amendment under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC to insert new paragraphs and add prayers declaring respondents as trespassers from 1-4-1988, seeking mandatory injunction for demolition of unauthorized constructions, permanent injunction against interference, and damages for unauthorized occupation. The trial court allowed the amendment, but the High Court set aside the order, finding it unnecessary, prejudicial, and changing the suit's nature. The Supreme Court, on appeal, upheld the High Court's view, reasoning that courts must exercise discretion judiciously in amendments, refusing mala fide ones while allowing bona fide amendments essential for adjudicating real controversies, considering factors like prejudice compensable by costs, limitation bar, and whether it fundamentally alters the case; here, the amendment was not imperative, caused uncompensable prejudice, was barred by limitation, and altered the suit from money recovery to eviction and damages, dismissing the appeal with Rs 1 lakh costs to discourage such applications.

Law Points:

Courts must exercise wide discretion under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC judiciously, refusing mala fide, worthless or dishonest amendments but not bona fide, legitimate, honest and necessary ones (Reference: Paras 59 and 64 of judgment).

The basic test for granting amendment is whether it is necessary for determining the real question in controversy or for proper/effective adjudication; if not, it cannot be allowed (Reference: Para 58 of judgment).

Courts should consider potential prejudice or injustice to the other side, which if compensable by costs, may not bar amendment, but actual costs are rarely granted in practice (Reference: Para 59 of judgment).

Key principles for allowing/rejecting amendment include: imperative for adjudication, bona fide application, no uncompensable prejudice, avoids injustice/multiple litigation, does not fundamentally change case nature, and limitation bar as a factor though not absolute if justice requires (Reference: Para 63 of judgment).

Bar of limitation on amended claim is a relevant factor in discretion but does not oust jurisdiction if amendment serves interests of justice (Reference: Para 39 of judgment).

Imposition of costs on amendment applications aims to discourage mala fides, compensate delay/inconvenience/expenses, and signal careful pleading; factors include stage of application, pre/post-trial, financial benefit, realistic assessment, extra hearings, and appeal costs (Reference: Paras 61 and 62 of judgment).

Case Title: Revajeetu Builders and Developers Vs Narayanaswamy and Sons and Others

Order Date: October 9, 2009

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 6921 of 2009

Neutral Citation: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 1709

Name of Court: Supreme Court of India

Name of Judge: Dalveer Bhandari and H.S. Bedi, JJ.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Rajkumar Bhatia Vs The State of Madhya Pradesh

The complainant Rajkumar Bhatia filed a complaint in September 2023 alleging that accused persons were manufacturing and selling counterfeit "Bhatia Masale" products, infringing his trademark and copyright, leading to registration of FIR under Sections 420 IPC and 63 Copyright Act, later enhanced with Sections 120-B, 201 IPC and provisions of Trademarks Act. 

Investigation revealed involvement of multiple accused who admitted to producing fake packaging. Chargesheet was filed in December 2022, initial regular bail granted, but on 02.09.2024 JMFC found prima facie case for additional serious offences including Sections 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 473 IPC (punishable up to life imprisonment), cancelled earlier bail and directed committal to Sessions Court.

Accused obtained anticipatory bail from Additional Sessions Judge in September 2024 relying on Arnesh Kumar guidelines assuming offences punishable up to 7 years only. Complainant challenged these anticipatory bail orders; trial court later framed charges dropping Section 467 but High Court in revision restored it. The High Court found the anticipatory bail orders illegal as they ignored the enhanced serious offences punishable with life imprisonment and mechanically applied Arnesh Kumar guidelines, quashed the anticipatory bail orders and directed accused to apply for regular bail before trial court.

When serious offences punishable with imprisonment for life are made out (e.g., Sections 467, 468 etc. IPC), anticipatory bail cannot be granted merely by applying Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 273 guidelines which are limited to offences punishable up to 7 years imprisonment (Reference: Page 9-10 of judgment).

Grant of anticipatory bail ignoring prima facie addition of grave offences attracting life imprisonment renders the order illegal and liable to be quashed (Reference: Page 10 of judgment).

Addition of serious offences after grant of bail does not automatically cancel bail, but where bail was granted without considering such enhanced offences punishable beyond 7 years, the order suffers from illegality (Reference: Page 9-10, distinguishing Pradeep Ram v. State of Jharkhand (2019) 17 SCC 326).

Case Title: Rajkumar Bhatia Vs The State of Madhya Pradesh and Others:17th December, 2025: Criminal Case No. 43273 of 2025:2025:MPHC-GWL:33288:Madhya Pradesh HC: Hon'ble Shri Justice Rajesh Kumar Gupta

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Mandeep Singh Vs. Shabir Momin

Mandeep Singh, creator and prior user since 2012 of the INSTANT BOLLYWOOD brand and device mark for Bollywood entertainment content on digital platforms with millions of followers, entered into a 2019 agreement with One Digital Entertainment Pte. Ltd. (ODE), whose managing director Shabir Momin (Respondent No.1) clandestinely obtained trademark registrations in his personal name around 2020, filed four rectification petitions under Section 57(2) of the Trademarks Act, 1999 seeking cancellation after terminating the agreement in August 2025 and discovering the registrations. 

On 11.12.2025, the Delhi High Court noted the 2019 agreement acknowledging joint 50:50 ownership of the brand IPR, impleaded Times Internet Inc. as Respondent No.3 upon proof of assignment dated 24.10.2025 from Respondent No.1 (of which petitioner had notice), found prima facie admitted 50% rights of petitioner not reflected in registrations or assignment without his consent or consideration, directed status quo on the assignment and restrained creation of third-party interests to protect petitioner's rights, criticised petitioner's suppression of prior knowledge of registrations since 2022 and related documents but declined to dismiss interim application, instead imposing costs of Rs.5 lakhs per petition payable to DHCLSC, and listed the matters further.

Assignee of a trademark (even with drag-along rights) cannot exclude the admitted joint owner (with 50% IPR) from rights without consent or consideration; status quo directed to protect such admitted rights pending rectification (Paras 18-23).

Suppression of material documents and facts (prior knowledge of registrations and related agreements/notices) warrants imposition of heavy costs, though not necessarily dismissal of interim relief where prima facie rights are admitted (Paras 24-26).

Case Title: Mandeep Singh Vs. Shabir Momin :11.12.2025:C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 275/2025:

Name of Judge: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Vishnu & Co Trademarks Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Smotect Pvt. Ltd.

Vishnu and Company Trademarks Pvt. Ltd., proprietor of the well-known 'VIMAL' trademark used since 1986 for pan masala, gutkha, mouth fresheners including non-tobacco 'VIMAL ELAICHI', filed a commercial suit alleging that Smotect Private Limited and its directors, while promoting their smoking cessation product 'Smotect AZAADI', published Instagram videos in November 2025 that prominently displayed the plaintiff's 'VIMAL ELAICHI' label while portraying it as a harmful tobacco/gutkha product, thereby disparaging the plaintiff's brand, infringing its copyright in the artistic label, and damaging its reputation despite 'VIMAL ELAICHI' being a harmless mouth freshener not requiring statutory health warnings. 

The plaintiff sought permanent and interim injunctions for trademark infringement, copyright infringement, disparagement, defamation and passing off. On 12.12.2025, after hearing the plaintiff ex parte and noting advance service on defendants, the Delhi High Court found a prima facie case of wrongful use of the label, misrepresentation of the product as tobacco-containing, copyright infringement and disparagement, held that balance of convenience favoured the plaintiff and irreparable harm would ensue without relief, and granted ex parte ad-interim injunction restraining use of the label or similar marks in advertisements, directed removal of specified impugned videos within 72 hours, permitted approach to Meta if not complied with, and listed the matter for 30.01.2026.

Exemption from pre-litigation mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 is permissible in commercial suits seeking urgent interim relief: Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Keerthi (2024) 5 SCC 815 (Para 5).

Prima facie, depicting a competitor's non-tobacco mouth freshener product label in promotional videos while falsely portraying it as harmful tobacco/gutkha amounts to disparagement, defamation and damage to goodwill (Paras 25-28).

Use of a competitor's registered artistic label in advertisements without authorisation constitutes prima facie copyright infringement under the Copyright Act, 1957 (Para 28).

Ex parte ad-interim injunction justified where prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury are established in intellectual property disputes involving disparagement and infringement (Paras 29-31).

Case Title: Vishnu and Company Trademarks Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Smotect Private Limited & Ors.

Order Date: 12 December 2025

Case Number: CS(COMM) 1333/2025

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Judge: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Leayan Global Pvt Ltd vs Bata India Ltd-DB

Bata India Ltd instituted a trademark infringement suit against Leayan Global Pvt Ltd and its retailer Chawla Boot House alleging Leayan's "POWER FLEX" mark and "THE POWER OF REAL LEATHER" tagline infringed its registered "POWER" mark for footwear, seeking permanent injunction.

The single judge granted ex parte ad interim restraint on "POWER" use, permitted sale of existing stock with monthly statements, and on disposing interim applications, restrained "POWER" in marks or combinations but allowed the tagline without undue prominence to "POWER" and stock sale, while deleting Chawla Boot House as unnecessary party.

Both appealed, Leayan challenging the restraint and Bata contesting tagline/stock permissions and deletion; the division bench analyzed that impleadment irregularity did not bar relief, "POWER FLEX" was deceptively similar to "POWER" phonetically/visually under average consumer test with imperfect recollection considering trade channels and expansion scope, "POWER" was suggestive not descriptive hence protectable.

Leayan failed to prove goodwill/reputation in "POWER FLEX" via inadequate evidence, no delay/acquiescence barred injunction as infringement mandates it absent dishonesty exception, upheld tagline/stock directions as discretionary without prejudice, but set aside Chawla Boot House deletion for fresh adjudication post-hearing, ultimately dismissing both appeals with that sole modification.

The manner in which defendants are arrayed in a suit cannot constitute a ground to disentitle the plaintiff to interim relief under Order XXXIX CPC: (Para 31.11).

Canvas footwear and leather footwear are "similar" goods for purposes of Section 29(2)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, especially as both fall in Class 25: (Para 33.4.4).

In assessing deceptive similarity, courts must consider reasonable scope of expansion of plaintiff's goods: (Para 33.4.5).

The test for deceptive similarity is the average consumer of imperfect recollection who is reasonably informed, observant and circumspect, forming overall impression without dissection: (Para 34).

Marks that are suggestive (requiring imagination to connect to goods) are protectable and registrable, unlike purely descriptive marks: (Para 34.5.1).

In cases of trademark infringement, injunction must normally follow and mere delay is insufficient to defeat it: (Para 35.6).

Volume of sales and extent of advertisement are relevant considerations for deciding acquired reputation or goodwill: (Para 35.3.6).

Case Title: Leayan Global Pvt Ltd vs Bata India Ltd:15.12.2025:FAO(OS) (COMM) 105/2019 & FAO(OS) (COMM) 193/2019 : Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar & Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation] 

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Ganraj Enterprises Vs. Landmark Crafts Ltd

The appellant sought rectification of the respondent’s registered trademark “HP” on grounds of territorial limitation, alleged false user claim, and lack of locus, after facing opposition and infringement action against its later mark “HP+”. 

The Registrar rejected rectification, holding the respondent to be the prior user and proprietor with valid registrations, including a subsequent pan-India registration. 

The High Court upheld this view, reasoning that territorial restrictions in one registration do not automatically extend to another associated registration, questions of alleged false user since 1995 were sub judice before the Commercial Court, and the appellant, though a “person aggrieved”, failed to substantiate grounds for cancellation since the respondent’s use of “HP” pre-dated the appellant and was otherwise lawful. 

The appeal was accordingly dismissed and the Registrar’s order affirmed.

Law Settled

Territorial limitations or disclaimers attached to one trademark registration do not ipso facto apply to another associated or subsequent registration of the same mark; each registration is distinct :paras 11.3.1–11.3.4, relying on Foodlink F & B Holdings India (P) Ltd. v. Wow Momo Foods (P) Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 4719, para 30).

A rival trader facing opposition or infringement action can qualify as a “person aggrieved” for rectification, but rectification will fail absent proof that the impugned registration is wrongly remaining on the register (paras 11.4.1–11.4.3).

Territorial restriction in a registration limits statutory infringement rights to that territory but does not bar the proprietor’s use elsewhere nor extinguish common law passing-off rights (para 11.6).

Case Title: Ganraj Enterprises Vs. Landmark Crafts Ltd.:02.12.2025:C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 164/2022:2025:DHC:10774:Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi