S. Kalatmamani Vs . DS.S. Sudhakaran

In a partition suit (O.S. No. 195/2009), the trial court passed a preliminary decree on 24.08.2022. Respondents challenged this decree before the Madras High Court by filing a Civil Revision Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, alleging fraud on the court, and the High Court on 14.12.2023 allowed the revision, set aside the preliminary decree, and granted liberty to proceed further in the suit.

Appellants approached the Supreme Court contending that since a regular first appeal under Section 96 CPC was available against the preliminary decree, the High Court erroneously exercised supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227. 

The Supreme Court held that the allegation of fraud was debatable and, in the presence of an appellate remedy under the CPC, the High Court should not have entertained the Article 227 petition. 

Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order without examining merits, restored the preliminary decree, and permitted the affected defendants to file or re-file their appeals under Section 96 CPC within four weeks with appropriate directions for condonation and entertainment.

Law Point:

High Courts should not exercise supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to interfere with decrees or orders when a statutory remedy of appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (such as Section 96 CPC) is available, especially where allegations like fraud are debatable (Paras 3-6).

The principle that alternative remedies under CPC must be availed before invoking Article 227 is reaffirmed, relying on Virudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma Paribalana Sabai v. Tuticorin Educational Society (2019) 9 SCC 538 and Mohd. Ali v. V. Jaya (2022) 10 SCC 477 (Para 5).

Case Title: S. Kalatmamani & Ors. Vs . DS.S. Sudhakaran & Ors.

Order Date: November 27, 2025

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 12251/2025

Name of Court: Supreme Court of India

Name of Judges: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Manoj Misra and Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.V.N. Bhatti

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[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Nawal Kishore Sharma Vs. Union of India,

Nawal Kishore Sharma, a seaman with the Shipping Corporation of India, was declared permanently unfit for sea service in 2011 due to dilated cardiomyopathy after over 20 years of service, leading him to return to his native Bihar where he claimed disability compensation, which was rejected via correspondence addressed to him there. 

He filed a writ petition in Patna High Court seeking compensation, but it was dismissed for lack of territorial jurisdiction as the employment and decisions occurred outside Bihar; an interim order had granted partial payment, yet jurisdiction was later denied. 

On appeal to the Supreme Court, the court reasoned that under Article 226(2) of the Constitution, jurisdiction exists if even a fraction of the cause of action arises within the High Court's territory, and here, the receipt of the rejection letter and correspondences in Bihar constituted such a fraction, further noting the respondents' participation without initial objection estopped them from raising the issue later. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's dismissal, and remitted the case to Patna High Court for adjudication on merits.

Law Point:

The High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within its territorial limits, even if the authority or person is outside the territory: paras 9, 16.

"Cause of action" under Article 226(2) is assigned the same meaning as under Section 20(c) CPC, being a bundle of facts necessary for the petitioner to prove infringement of a legal right: Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 329, paras 9, 13-14.

Even a fraction of cause of action, such as receipt of a communication rejecting a claim, suffices to confer territorial jurisdiction on the High Court, paras 17-19.

Participation in writ proceedings without raising jurisdictional objection at the interim stage may estop the respondent from later challenging maintainability on that ground: para 19.

Case Title: Nawal Kishore Sharma Vs. Union of India, Order date: August 7, 2014, Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 7414 of 2014, Neutral Citation: (2014) 9 SCC 329

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[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Dileep Bakliwal Vs Mohan Singh Panwar

The respondent/plaintiff filed a trademark infringement suit against the petitioner/defendant alleging infringement of his registered trademark “Shri Ankit” by the defendant's use of “Ankit” since 1988 for pipes and allied products, with the suit valued at Rs.55,600/-. 

The defendant sought transfer of the suit to the Commercial Court under Section 15(2) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, contending it was a commercial dispute under Section 2(1)(c)(xvii) and the valuation was arbitrary as the trademark's commercial value exceeded the Rs.3 lakh specified value threshold, but the trial court rejected the application holding that the plaintiff's valuation below Rs.3 lakh precluded Commercial Court jurisdiction. 

Aggrieved, the defendant filed the present miscellaneous petition, arguing that IPR disputes are inherently commercial and courts must independently assess true value. 

The High Court upheld the trial court's order, reasoning that a dispute qualifies as commercial only if the specified value is at least Rs.3 lakh as per Section 2(1)(i), the plaintiff's valuation governed, the Vishal Pipes Limited precedent was overruled, and determination of prior user in this trademark dispute did not mandate commercial classification absent the threshold value, dismissing the petition.

Law Point:

Trademark infringement disputes, though falling under the definition of "commercial dispute" in Section 2(1)(c)(xvii) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, are triable by Commercial Courts only if the "specified value" of the suit is not less than Rs.3 lakh as mandated by Section 2(1)(i); suits valued below this threshold remain with regular civil courts, and plaintiff's valuation is binding unless proven arbitrary in a manner warranting revaluation (Paras 9-14).

The overruling of Vishal Pipes Limited v. Bhavya Pipe Industry (2022 SCC OnLine Del 1730) by Pankaj Ravjibhai Patel v. SSS Pharmachem Pvt. Ltd. (2023 SCC Delhi 7013) reinforces that low-valued IPR suits need not be automatically transferred or revalued for Commercial Court jurisdiction (Para 12).

Case Title: Dileep Bakliwal Prop Poonam Marketing Through Power of Attorney Ms Sonam Geda Vs . Mohan Singh Panwar: 11.12.2025: Misc. Petition No. 4539 of 2025: 2025:MPHC-IND:36415: Madhya Pradesh HC:Hon'ble Shri Justice Alok Awasthi

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[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Sri Athmanathaswami Devasthanam Vs. K. Gopalaswami Ayyangar

Sri Athmanathaswami Devasthanam, a temple trust, sued in civil court for damages claiming the respondent was a trespasser on about 727 acres of land let into his possession in 1944 without Board sanction, treating the transaction as an invalid permanent lease under the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act 1927. 

The respondent contended the lands were ryoti, he was a ryot with occupancy rights under the Madras Estates Land Act 1908, and the suit was only cognizable by revenue court under Section 189. Trial court decreed on merits holding the lease invalid, but High Court reversed, finding the lands ryoti, respondent a ryot, lease valid, and civil court lacked jurisdiction, ordering return of plaint, while also dismissing appellant's cross-objection on a payment credit. 

Supreme Court, on appeal, focused first on jurisdiction as a threshold issue, holding that if a court lacks jurisdiction over the subject-matter, it cannot decide merits or cross-objections but must only determine jurisdiction and return the plaint if absent, as civil courts are barred from suits for rent arrears or ejectment against ryots under Section 189 read with Schedule Part A; it upheld the return of plaint but set aside the High Court's order on cross-objection for overstepping, dismissing the appeal with costs except on that point.

Law Point:

When a court lacks jurisdiction over the subject-matter of a suit, it cannot decide any question on merits, including cross-objections; it must confine itself to determining the jurisdictional issue and, if absent, return the plaint for presentation to the proper court (Para 14).

Suits by landholders for recovery of rent arrears or ejectment against ryots with occupancy rights in estates are exclusively within the jurisdiction of revenue courts (District Collector or Collector as Revenue Court), and civil courts have no original jurisdiction to entertain them under Section 189(1) of the Madras Estates Land Act 1908 read with Entries 3 and 11 of Schedule Part A (Para 13).

Case Title: Sri Athmanathaswami Devasthanam Vs. K. Gopalaswami Ayyangar: 9 May 1963: Civil Appeal No. 70 of 1961: 1963 SCC OnLine SC 251: Supreme Court of India: K. Subba Rao, Raghubar Dayal and J.R. Mudholkar, JJ. 

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[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Federal Express Corporation Vs. Fedex Securities Pvt.Ltd:

Federal Express Corporation, a global transportation and e-commerce leader, adopted the FEDEX mark in 1973 as an abbreviation of Federal Express, registered it internationally including in India from 1986 in various classes, and established significant reputation and presence in India through operations, acquisitions, and domain names. 

Defendants, financial services companies, incorporated in 1995-1998 and changed names to include FEDEX in 1996-2001, claiming it derived from founders' Federal Bank affiliation, and registered domain fedexindia.in in 2011. Plaintiff discovered this in 2011, sent cease-and-desist notices demanding discontinuation, but defendants refused, leading to failed settlement talks. 

Plaintiff filed infringement and passing-off suit in Delhi High Court in 2014, which returned the plaint in 2017 for lack of jurisdiction, allowing presentation in Bombay High Court, where it was registered in 2019. 

In the interim application, plaintiff argued infringement under Sections 29(4) and 29(5) of Trade Marks Act 1999, passing off, and dilution of well-known mark FEDEX (declared well-known in 2024 but claimed so since 1986). 

Court reasoned that defendants' use of identical mark as essential part of corporate names constituted infringement despite added words like 'Securities', adoption was dishonest without due cause, plaintiff's mark had trans-border reputation and distinctiveness in India causing confusion/deception, no common field required for passing off, delay not fatal absent acquiescence, balance of convenience favored plaintiff with mala fides on defendants' part, and irreparable harm if not restrained. 

Court granted interim injunction restraining defendants from using FEDEX or similar marks in any manner, disposed application without costs.

Legal Points

Addition of non-distinctive words like 'Securities' to an identical registered trademark does not avoid infringement as the registered mark forms the essential feature of the impugned name: Ruston & Hornsby Ltd. v. Zamindara Engineering Co., AIR 1970 SC 1649, para 5.

Well-known trademark owner can prevent use of identical/deceptively similar mark for any goods/services under Section 29(5): Journal No.2144 dated 19th February 2024 declaring FEDEX well-known, para 6.

For dilution under Section 29(4), prove adoption without due cause, reputation in India, unfair advantage/detriment to distinctive character/repute: RPG Enterprises Ltd. v. Riju Kaushal, (2022) 90 PTC 312, paras 39-45, para 8, 11.

Case Title: Federal Express Corporation Vs. Fedex Securities Pvt.Ltd:11.12.2025: Comm IPR Suit No.1406 of 2019:  R.I. Chagla H. J.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Inreco Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. Vs Nav Records Pvt. Ltd.

Inreco Entertainment Private Limited filed a commercial suit against Nav Records Private Limited and another for alleged infringement of copyright in soundtracks of Punjabi songs by Jasdev Yamla, which the plaintiff discovered in 2016 when uploaded on the defendant's platform, leading to email correspondences from February 2020 attempting resolution, a cease-and-desist notice in December 2022, and the suit's filing thereafter with dispensation from pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act 2015 granted initially but revoked by order dated 14 July 2025 on grounds of unexplained nine-year delay post-2016, lack of vigilance, and artificial urgency. 

The plaintiff sought review of that order, contending the court overlooked ongoing emails from 2020 demonstrating alertness. The court, relying on precedents, reasoned that review jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC is limited to errors apparent on the record's face, not for reappraisal of evidence or appeals in disguise, and found no such patent error, new discovery, or sufficient reason, as the delay remained glaring and the finding of post-2016 inaction stood justified despite the charted correspondences. The review application and connected interlocutory application were dismissed.

Law Point Settled:

The jurisdiction of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC is not that of an appeal and can be entertained only if there is an error apparent on the face of the record, not for mere repetition of arguments or minor mistakes: , Para 5 .

A review is a serious step and proper only where a glaring omission, patent mistake, or grave error has crept in by judicial fallibility, and cannot be a rehearing of the case: , Para 5 

An error which is not self-evident and requires a process of reasoning to detect cannot be considered an error apparent on the face of the record for review purposes: ., Para 5 

The power to review is a creature of statute, and a review court is not an appellate court; mere possibility of two views or reassessing evidence is not a ground for review: , Para 6.

Review proceedings must be strictly confined to the scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, and are not permissible for rehearing and correcting erroneous decisions:., Para 7 

Case Title: Inreco Entertainment Private Limited Versus Nav Records Private Limited: 08.12.20225: RVW-IPD/3/2025:Cal HC: Ravi Krishan Kapur, H. J.

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[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Anheuser Busch Inbev India Ltd. Versus Jagpin Breweries

Anheuser Busch Inbev India Ltd., the registered proprietor of trademarks "HAYWARDS 5000" (label mark No. 436744 since 1985) and "FIVE THOUSAND" (word mark No. 1521743 since 2010) for beer in Class 32, sued Jagpin Breweries Ltd. for infringement and passing off by using "COX 5001" on beer, seeking injunction and Rs. 20 lakhs damages, claiming continuous use since 1983, well-known status declared in 2003, and prior successful actions against similar marks including against defendant for "COX 5000" in 2006 where injunction was granted. 

Defendant filed written statement raising defenses like dissimilarity, abandonment, numeral 5000 being common to trade, disclaimer, suppression of facts, and consent, but led no evidence despite opportunities, its rectification application was dismissed by IPAB in 2011, interim injunctions granted in 2012 and 2014 were unchallenged, and defendant failed to appear at final hearing despite notice. 

The court reasoned that numeral 5000 is essential feature of plaintiff's marks protected by registration, defendant's "5001" is deceptively similar creating confusion for average consumer with imperfect recollection, adoption dishonest without explanation, no abandonment as plaintiff showed continuous use, defenses untenable without evidence, passing off established by plaintiff's goodwill and likelihood of deception, but damages not proved lacking evidence of loss or defendant's profits. 

The suit was decreed granting permanent injunction restraining infringement and passing off, but denying damages, and awarding Rs. 10 lakhs costs to plaintiff considering defendant's conduct.

Law Point:

Registration of a composite label mark protects all its essential and leading features, including numerals like "5000", entitling the proprietor to restrain use of deceptively similar marks under Section 28 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999: Para 23.

In assessing deceptive similarity for infringement, courts must consider overall impression, essential and dominant features rather than minute side-by-side comparison, focusing on imperfect recollection of average consumer: Anheuser Busch Inbev India Ltd. v. Jagpin Breweries Ltd., Para 27 

Minor variations like changing "5000" to "5001" do not avoid infringement if they create confusion, especially for identical goods like beer:  Paras 24-26.

Dishonest adoption inferred if defendant provides no explanation for choosing similar mark and fails to conduct registry search: ., Para 23 .

For passing off, plaintiff need not prove actual confusion but likelihood thereof, based on goodwill, misrepresentation, and potential damage: Para 26 .

Disclaimer in registration applies only to specified descriptive matter, not extending to distinctive numerals unless expressly recorded: Anheuser Busch Inbev India Ltd. v. Jagpin Breweries Ltd., Para 27.

Damages or accounts of profits require specific proof of loss or gains; not awarded without evidence: Anheuser Busch Inbev India Ltd. v. Jagpin Breweries Ltd., Para 28.

In commercial suits, costs including legal fees awardable under amended Section 35 CPC considering party's conduct like non-appearance: Anheuser Busch Inbev India Ltd. v. Jagpin Breweries Ltd., Para 28.

Case Title: Anheuser Busch Inbev India Ltd. Versus Jagpin Breweries Limited:08.12.2025:Commercial Suit No.110 of 2012: 2025:BHC-OS:24184:Bomb HC: Name of Hon'ble Judge: Arif S. Doctor, J.

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[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Marico Limited Vs Minolta Natural Care

Marico Limited filed a commercial IP suit against M/s Minolta Natural Care and others for trademark infringement, copyright infringement and passing off concerning its hair oil products marketed under Parachute Jasmine/Advanced Jasmine since 2000 and Hair & Care since 1990, alleging defendants' Sangini Jasmine and Sangini Hair Protection products adopted deceptively similar logos, labels, packaging and trade dress; plaintiff holds registrations for composite device marks, claimed goodwill through sales and awards, discovered infringement in July 2016, issued cease and desist notice leading to failed settlement talks, rediscovered products in January 2021 and August 2025 despite assurances of discontinuation, and sought interim injunction restraining use of impugned marks and features. 

The court rejected defendants' objections on territorial jurisdiction and limitation noting ongoing negotiations and steps taken by plaintiff averting laches, held that composite marks must be compared holistically including disclaimed elements for confusion assessment, found Jasmine not used descriptively by defendants but as trademark, dismissed publici juris defense for lack of evidence, determined overall visual and structural similarity likely to deceive average consumers, upheld prima facie case of infringement and piracy of artwork, irreparable harm to goodwill, and balance of convenience favoring plaintiff. The court granted the interim injunction in terms of prayers (a) to (f).

While assessing deceptive similarity in composite trademarks, the marks must be compared as a whole, including disclaimed or non-distinctive elements, as disclaimers do not enter the marketplace and do not preclude possibility of public confusion [ Para 43-45].

Under Section 17 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, registration of a composite mark confers exclusive rights to the mark as a whole, but exclusivity in distinctive parts can be established aliunde even without separate registration, unless proven common to trade [Para 46-47].

Mere presence of shared generic or descriptive words in rival marks does not justify deceptive similarity; courts must holistically examine visual, phonetic, structural and conceptual elements for overall impression [Para 49].

Delay alone is not a defense in trademark infringement if plaintiff demonstrates active steps like notices and negotiations post-knowledge, as laches requires proof of acquiescence Para 53].

For interim injunction in IP cases, prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable harm are assessed considering prior adoption, registration, deceptive similarity, unexplained adoption and potential goodwill dilution [ Para 54-55].

Case Title: Marico Limited Vs Minolta Natural Care :09.12.2025:Commercial IP (L) No.28094 of 2025:2025:2025:BHC-OS:24054:Bombay HC:Sharmila U. Deshmukh

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[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Zee Entertainment Vs Mohalla Tech

Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited filed a suit against Mohalla Tech Private Limited seeking permanent injunction for copyright infringement on the defendant's platforms ShareChat and Moj, alleging unauthorized use of its sound recordings, music videos, and underlying works after the expiry of their User Content and Revenue Sharing Agreement on August 1, 2023 and License Agreement on July 14, 2023, despite prior notices and the defendant's claims of removal; 

The defendant, an intermediary under the IT Act, denied liability attributing infringement to users and filed an application under Order VII Rule 10 CPC to return the plaint for lack of territorial jurisdiction in Delhi High Court, citing exclusive jurisdiction clauses in the agreements favoring Mumbai courts, plaintiff's registered office in Mumbai, and insufficient evidence of cause of action in Delhi beyond mere platform accessibility. 

The court reasoned that the suit was for post-expiry statutory copyright infringement under the Copyright Act, not contractual breach, rendering the agreements' jurisdiction clauses inapplicable; distinguished trademark and passing-off cases requiring specific targeting or commercial harm, holding that in copyright matters, mere accessibility, interactivity, and availability of infringing content via the platforms' in-built music libraries to users in Delhi constituted part of the cause of action under Section 20(c) CPC, without needing proof of consumer confusion or restricted access; affirmed plaintiff's dominus litis to choose the forum where part cause arises. The court dismissed the application, upholding its jurisdiction, and listed the suit for further hearing.

Law Points:

Tests for determining jurisdiction in trademark infringement cases, such as specific targeting of viewers in the forum state for commercial transactions resulting in harm, are not applicable to copyright infringement suits, where mere accessibility and interactivity of the infringing content on online platforms suffice to establish part cause of action under Section 20(c) CPC [Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited vs Mohalla Tech Private Limited, CS(COMM) 745/2023, Para 30-31].

In copyright infringement involving digital platforms, even if the website is not directly targeted at a particular territory, its unrestricted access characterizes it as targeting that territory, conferring territorial jurisdiction on the court where the platform is accessible [Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited vs Mohalla Tech Private Limited, CS(COMM) 745/2023, Para 32].

Exclusive jurisdiction clauses in expired agreements do not bind parties in suits for statutory copyright infringement post-termination, as such claims arise independently of contractual obligations [Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited vs Mohalla Tech Private Limited, CS(COMM) 745/2023, Para 34].

The plaintiff holds dominus litis under Section 20(c) CPC to institute a copyright infringement suit in a court where part of the cause of action arises due to accessibility of infringing content [Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited vs Mohalla Tech Private Limited, CS(COMM) 745/2023, Para 35].

Case Title: Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited Vs Mohalla Tech Private Limited:08.12.2025: CS(COMM) 745/2023 :2025:DHC:11002:Hon'ble Ms. Justice Mini Pushkarna

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[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Gajulipalli Mallikarjuna Prasad Vs State of A.P

Gajulapalli Mallikarjuna Prasad was convicted by the trial court and appellate court for offences under Sections 63, 65 and 68A of the Copyright Act, 1957 after police, on 18.07.2000, seized a large number of pirated audio cassettes and duplication equipment from his shop in Proddatur following a complaint by PW-1, an authorised investigator of Indian Music Industry (IMI). 

The petitioner challenged the concurrent convictions in revision before the Andhra Pradesh High Court contending that no copyright holder was examined, no copyright certificates were produced, seizure was defective and ingredients of Sections 52A and 68A were not proved. 

The High Court upheld the conviction holding that PW-1 was duly authorised by IMI (comprising major music companies), his testimony and the notarised authorisation sufficiently established the right to complain, the seized cassettes lacked the mandatory particulars required under Section 52A(1) (name/address of maker, copyright owner and year of publication), the seizure was duly proved through the mediator (PW-2), and the unexplained possession of pirated cassettes and machinery sufficiently established infringement under Sections 63 and 65; 

The court distinguished the Kerala High Court judgments relied upon by the petitioner and declined probation under Section 360 Cr.P.C. as the petitioner was engaged in commercial piracy and was above 25 years of age at the time of offence. Consequently, the criminal revision was dismissed.

Points of Law Settled:

An authorised representative of a collective body like Indian Music Industry (IMI), armed with proper authorisation from member copyright owners, is competent to lodge complaint and depose regarding infringement without individual copyright holders being examined (Para 6, 9).

For proving offence under Section 68A r/w Section 52A(1) of the Copyright Act, it is sufficient to show that the seized sound recordings do not display the name/address of the person who made the recording, name/address of the copyright owner and year of first publication; specific proof of each missing particular on every cassette is not required when the overall evidence establishes the violation (Para 10). -11).

Unexplained possession of large quantities of pirated cassettes together with duplication machinery is sufficient to establish knowing infringement under Section 63 and possession of plates for making infringing copies under Section 65 of the Copyright Act (Para 7-8).

Case Title: Gajulipalli Mallikarjuna Prasad Vs State of A.P: 03 December 2025: Criminal Revision Case No.1840 of 2008:APHC010327112008 High Court of Andhra Pradesh:Hon’ble Sri Justice Subhendu Samanta

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[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Parul Ruparelia. Vs. Camme Wang

Parul Ruparelia and Anr (Indian importers) filed a suit for infringement and passing off of the trademark “PL SUPREME” (registered by them in India in 2019 with user claimed since 2016) against Camme Wang and Anr (Chinese manufacturers), alleging that they had coined and used the mark since 2013. 

The petitioners obtained ex-parte injunctions restraining import of goods bearing the mark. The respondents contested, claiming they were the original manufacturers who adopted “PL SUPREME” (derived from Polar Lights) in China as early as 2009, registered it there in 2014, and had been continuously exporting the marked goods to India through the petitioners and others since 2010. 

The court found overwhelming documentary evidence (invoices, BIS certificate, Chinese registration) establishing the respondents as prior adopters, manufacturers and brand owners, while the petitioners were mere importers/distributors with no independent goodwill. 

The court further held that the petitioners suppressed material facts about pre-suit orders and outstanding dues exceeding ₹7 crores, indulged in under-invoicing and came to court with unclean hands. Consequently, the interim injunctions were vacated, applications dismissed and seized goods ordered to be returned to the respondents.

Principles of Law Reaffirmed / Applied:

Ownership and goodwill in a trademark ordinarily vest in the manufacturer who first affixes the mark on the goods; an importer/distributor cannot claim proprietorship merely by reselling the goods (Paras 9, 10, 15, 16 citing Imperial Tobacco Co. v. Bonnan (1924) AC 755; Double Coin Holdings Ltd. v. Trans Tyres (India) Pvt. Ltd. 2011 SCC OnLine Del 1842 & 2012 SCC OnLine Del 596; Sunny Sales v. Binod Khanna 2014 SCC OnLine Cal 18505).

Prior use, even by a foreign manufacturer, prevails over subsequent Indian registration if supported by evidence (Para 8 citing N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool (1996) 5 SCC 714; Milmet Oftho v. Allergan (2004) 12 SCC 624).

Section 30(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 only provides a defence to infringement and does not confer any positive right on an importer to claim ownership (Paras 10, 46–47 citing Samsung Electronics v. Kapil Wadhwa 2012 SCC OnLine Del 1004).

Suppression of material facts, unclean hands and lack of balance of convenience disentitle a plaintiff to interim relief (Paras 17–19, 20 citing Barbara Taylor Bradford v. Sahara Media (2004) 1 CHN 448).

Case Title: Parul Ruparelia and Anr. Vs. Camme Wang and Anr.: 05.12.2025:IP-COM/11/2025 with IA GA-COM/1/2025:High Court at CalcuttaHon’ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Orient Cables (India) Limited Vs Office of the Regional Director

Orient Cables (India) Limited, whose name was corrected by the RoC in 2007 and which later converted to a public company in 2024, faced a rectification application filed by Respondent No. 3 in August 2025 under Section 16(1)(b) of the Companies Act, 2013, seeking to change the company’s name on grounds of similarity. The Petitioner approached the Delhi High Court by way of a writ petition seeking to prohibit the Regional Director from entertaining the application, primarily on the ground that it was hopelessly time-barred (three-year limitation having expired in 2010) and apprehending that the Regional Director might suo moto invoke Section 16(1)(a) without notice. The High Court declined to interdict the proceedings at the threshold but directed the Regional Director to first decide the limitation issue with specific findings, postponed the next hearing by one week, mandated communication of the final order by email, and kept any adverse order on merits in suspension for one week to enable the Petitioner to challenge it. Crucially, the Court restrained the Regional Director from invoking suo moto powers under Section 16(1)(a) while deciding Respondent No. 3’s application and held that any such suo moto exercise would necessarily require prior notice to the company in accordance with natural justice.

- The Regional Director, while deciding an application filed by a third party under Section 16(1)(b) of the Companies Act, 2013, must first adjudicate the issue of limitation with specific findings before proceeding (if at all) to merits (Para 11).

- The Regional Director cannot, while deciding a third-party application under Section 16(1)(b), simultaneously or covertly invoke suo moto jurisdiction under Section 16(1)(a) without issuing an independent notice to the affected company; doing so would violate principles of natural justice (Para 16).

- If an adverse order on merits is ultimately passed under Section 16(1)(b) against the company, the same shall remain suspended for one week to enable the company to avail further remedies (Para 12).

Case Title: Orient Cables (India) Limited Vs Office of the Regional Director (Northern Region), Ministry of Corporate Affairs & Ors.  

Order Date: 01 December 2025  

Case Number: W.P.(C)-IPD 59/2025 & CMs 247-248/2025  

Neutral Citation: Not yet available  

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi  

Name of Judge: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Visage Beauty and Healthcare Private Limited Vs. Freecia Professional India Private Limited

Visage Beauty and Healthcare Pvt Ltd filed a suit in 2022 against Freecia Professional India Pvt Ltd for trademark infringement, passing off, and copyright violation alleging defendants copied its registered marks D-TAN, DERMOMELAN, SHINE & GLOW and verbatim reproduced ingredients lists and usage steps from its three O3+ facial kits on identical skincare products; defendants initially defended claiming marks descriptive/common to trade and content industry standard but were proceeded ex-parte. The Delhi High Court held that plaintiff established prima facie prior adoption, registrations, substantial goodwill through sales over Rs.28 crores and ads exceeding Rs.21 crores; finding slavish copying of literary content in ingredients/steps for all kits amounting to copyright infringement, dishonest use of DERMOMELAN, but SHINE & GLOWING descriptive not infringing SHINE & GLOW, and deferring D-TAN injunction due to unsubstantiated common use claims and pending rectification, granted interim injunction on 21.11.2025 restraining defendants from using copied layouts/ingredients/steps for the three kits and DERMOMELAN mark.

- To resist exclusivity on ground of marks being common to trade, defendant must substantiate substantial third-party use with evidence of extent, trade volume, and dilution impact; mere unsubstantiated claims or solitary instances insufficient (Para 8.6-8.7, 23).

- Verbatim reproduction of product descriptions like ingredients lists and usage steps constitutes prima facie copyright infringement in original literary works if unjustified by industry standards (Para 18.8, 20.2, 22.1).

- Descriptive phrases in rival product names may not infringe registered composite marks if overall get-up distinct and no deceptive similarity (Para 24.1).

- Single foreign third-party use does not validate domestic infringement of registered coined/fanciful mark absent evidence of commonality (Para 23.2-23.3).

Case Title: Visage Beauty and Healthcare Private Limited Vs. Freecia Professional India Private Limited & Anr.  

Order Date: 21 November 2025  

Case Number: CS(COMM) 633/2022  

Neutral Citation: Not yet assigned  

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi  

Judge: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Triom Hospitality Vs J.S. Hospitality Services Pvt. Ltd.

M/s J.S. Hospitality Services Pvt. Ltd., owner of the registered trademark “Pind Balluchi” for restaurants, filed suit CS(COMM) 392/2024 against M/s Triom Hospitality for infringement and passing off after discovering the latter using the mark at a Dwarka outlet since October 2023; interim injunction was granted on 16.08.2024 restraining the defendant. The defendant filed Section 8 application under Arbitration Act invoking arbitration clause in an alleged MOU dated 22.06.2022 purportedly granting rights, but plaintiff denied execution alleging forgery and filed affidavit; trial court dismissed the application on 28.08.2024 holding prima facie non-existence due to forgery making dispute non-arbitrable requiring civil adjudication. On appeal, the Delhi High Court held that referral courts under Section 8 conduct only prima facie review of arbitration agreement's existence/validity without deep inquiry into forgery which is for arbitrator unless serious fraud vitiates the agreement entirely; noting pre-existing commercial ties and need for evidence, it found the dispute arbitrable even for non-signatory per group doctrine; setting aside the order on 24.11.2025, the court allowed referral to arbitration and dismissed the suit.

- Allegations of forgery/fabrication do not ipso facto render disputes non-arbitrable unless serious/complex fraud permeates the contract requiring public adjudication (A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam, (2016) 10 SCC 386, Para 17-19).

- Under Section 8 of Arbitration Act, courts exercise prima facie review limited to formal validity/existence of arbitration agreement; substantive issues like forgery are for arbitral tribunal under Section 16 (Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1, Para 20).

- Non-signatories can be bound to arbitration if intent/consent inferred from conduct/relationship per group of companies doctrine (Cox & Kings Ltd. v. SAP India (P) Ltd., (2024) 4 SCC 327, Para 71).

Case Title: Triom Hospitality Vs J.S. Hospitality Services Pvt. Ltd.  

Order Date: 24 November 2025  

Case Number: FAO (COMM) 174/2024  

Neutral Citation: Not yet assigned  

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi  

Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar & Hon’ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Trident Limited Vs. Controller of Patents

Trident Limited appealed under Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970 against the Controller's order dated 05.01.2021 refusing patent application No. 1867/DEL/2010 filed on 24.09.2010 for air rich yarn and fabric with homogenously distributed pores across radial cross-section and its manufacturing method, after FER on 21.06.2018, reply on 20.12.2018, hearings on 10.07.2020 and 05.10.2020 with submissions, on grounds of lack of inventive step under Section 2(1)(ja) based on prior arts D1-D4. The Delhi High Court held that prior arts neither disclose nor suggest homogenous radial pore distribution, that Controller's presumption of identical processes yielding identical products ignored differing soluble fibre weights and was hindsight-driven, that homogeneity is not routine per literature teaching away, and that the order was contradictory, failed to cite specific prior art teachings or address specification examples; setting aside the order on 24.11.2025, the court remanded the matter to another Controller for fresh consideration within six months, including auxiliary claims.

- For determining inventive step under Section 2(1)(ja) of the Patents Act, 1970, mere presence of invention elements in prior arts does not ipso facto establish obviousness; there must be a coherent thread leading from prior arts to the invention without hindsight (Enercon (India) Limited v. Aloys Wobben, ORA/6/2009/PT/CH, Para 66).

- Where a combination of prior arts after hindsight analysis fails to achieve the claimed result, it constitutes teaching away from the invention (Pharmacyclics, LLC v. Controller General of Patents, Designs & Trade Marks, OA/2/2013/PT/MUM, Para 67).

- Patent refusal orders must specifically cite prior art portions disclosing claimed features and address applicant's examples and submissions; contradictory findings vitiate the order (Para 78-79).

Case Title: Trident Limited Vs. Controller of Patents  

Order Date: 24 November 2025  

Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 162/2022  

Neutral Citation: Not yet assigned  

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi  

Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

The Coca-Cola Company Vs Raj Trade Links

The Coca-Cola Company (Plaintiff 1, manufacturer of concentrates) and its authorized bottler (Plaintiff 2) filed suit in 2007 against defendants for trademark infringement, unfair competition, injunction, damages, and delivery up, alleging defendants hoarded used Coca-Cola bottles causing market shortage and potential spurious refilling; Defendant 2 filed counter-claim for damages. 

Issues framed in 2008; plaintiffs' evidence closed in 2018; Defendant 2 repeatedly delayed filing evidence despite court directions and costs. In 2022, Defendant 2 filed affidavit with ITRs for 2007-08 to 2011-12 as additional documents to prove damages; in 2024, applied under Order XI Rule 10 CPC (as per Commercial Courts Act) to take them on record. 

The Delhi High Court held the documents, being Defendant 2's own records, were always in its possession and no reasonable cause shown for 15-year delay; corona pandemic excuse invalid as docs pre-date it; allowing would prejudice plaintiffs and defeat CC Act's object of expeditious disposal. The court dismissed the application on 24.11.2025, making related summons application infructuous, and listed for evidence.

In commercial suits, documents must be filed with written statement/counter-claim under Order XI Rule 7 CPC (as amended by Commercial Courts Act, 2015), and late filing under Rule 10 permitted only upon establishing reasonable cause for non-disclosure (Para 9).

Belated filing of documents after closure of opponent's evidence, without justification, causes prejudice and delays trial, contrary to expeditious disposal under Commercial Courts Act (Para 14, relying on Societe DES Produits Nestle S.A. v. Essar Industries, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 4279).

Negligence or lackadaisical conduct in adhering to timelines does not constitute reasonable cause; courts must strictly enforce CC Act provisions (Para 17, relying on Scindia Potteries & Services P. Ltd. v. J.K. Jain, 2012 SCC OnLine Del 5296).

Case Title: The Coca-Cola Company Vs Raj Trade Links & Anr.  : 24 November 2025:CS(COMM) 439/2018 :  2025:DHC:10369: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Tesla Inc. Vs. Tesla Power India Private Limited

Tesla Inc., a multinational EV and battery manufacturer using 'TESLA' mark since 2003 with Indian registrations from 2013, filed suit in 2024 against Tesla Power India Pvt Ltd & Ors for trademark infringement and passing off, alleging defendants' dishonest use of 'TESLA POWER USA' since around 2020 for lead acid batteries, inverters, UPS and water purifiers caused confusion; defendants responded to 2022 C&D denying similarity and claiming inspiration from Nikola Tesla. 

Court recorded defendants' May 2024 undertaking not to deal in EVs; after arguments, the Delhi High Court held plaintiff proved prior use, trans-border reputation spilling to India, dishonest adoption by defendants, triple identity leading to inevitable confusion, and granted interim injunction on 24.11.2025 restraining defendants from using impugned marks for batteries, automobiles, inverters, UPS, and bound them to no EV activities.

Mere delay in filing suit is no ground to deny injunction if adoption is dishonest (Midas Hygiene Industries P. Ltd. v. Sudhir Bhatia, (2004) 3 SCC 90; Hindustan Pencils Private Limited v. India Stationery Products Co., 1989 SCC OnLine Del 34, Para 26).

Trans-border reputation protects a mark in India even without local sales if spillover goodwill is established through media, website access, and awards (Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Prius Auto Industries Ltd., (2018) 2 SCC 1, Para 39).

Initial interest confusion at pre-purchase stage suffices for infringement under Section 29 of Trade Marks Act, 1999 (Under Armour Inc v. Anish Agarwal, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 3784, Para 22).

Party seeking registration cannot later claim the mark is generic or common to trade, as it amounts to approbation and reprobation (Automatic Electric Limited v. R.K. Dhawan, 1999 SCC OnLine Del 27; Indian Hotels Company Ltd. v. Jiva Institute of Vedic Science & Culture, 2008 SCC OnLine Del 1758, Para 31).

Triple identity in marks, goods, and trade channels warrants interim injunction to prevent confusion (Para 44).

Case Title: Tesla Inc. Vs. Tesla Power India Private Limited :24 November 2025:CS(COMM) 353/2024  :2025:DHC:10367: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Sunil Niranjan Shah Vs. Vijay Bahadur

Sunil Niranjan Shah, claiming adoption and use of trademarks 'GAAY CHHAP', 'COW BRAND' and variants since 1975 for detergent products with registrations and artistic works featuring a cow, filed a suit against Vijay Bahadur for infringement, passing off, unfair competition, damages, and delivery up, alleging the defendant's use of deceptively similar marks like 'GOPAL GAI CHHAP' caused confusion; the plaintiff sought interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC, while the defendant contested territorial jurisdiction, claimed prior use since 1973, and alleged plaintiff's concealment of facts. 

The Delhi High Court, finding jurisdiction based on the defendant's interactive IndiaMart listing accessible in Delhi constituting purposeful availment, held that the plaintiff established prior use and goodwill with high turnover, while the defendant's evidence of prior use was doubtful and unreliable; noting triple identity in marks, goods, and trade channels leading to inevitable confusion, prima facie dishonest adoption by the defendant, balance of convenience and irreparable harm favoring the plaintiff, the court granted the interim injunction on 24.11.2025 restraining the defendant from using the impugned marks.

Rights of prior user of a trademark are superior to those of a subsequent registrant (Century Traders v. Roshan Lal Duggar & Co., 1977 SCC OnLine Del 50, Para 15).

Territorial jurisdiction in trademark suits can be invoked where the defendant's interactive e-commerce platform (like IndiaMart) is accessible in the forum state, establishing purposeful availment (Banyan Tree Holding (P) Limited v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3780, Para 8-9).

A party seeking registration of a mark cannot later claim it is descriptive and common to trade, as it amounts to approbation and reprobation (Automatic Electric Limited v. R.K. Dhawan and Anr., 1999 SCC OnLine Del 27; Indian Hotels Company Ltd. v. Jiva Institute of Vedic Science & Culture, 2008 SCC OnLine Del 1758, Para 15).

In cases of triple identity (identical marks, goods, and trade channels), interim injunction is warranted to prevent confusion and protect goodwill (Para 19).

Case Title: Sunil Niranjan Shah Vs. Vijay Bahadur  : 24 November 2025:CS(COMM) 669/2025:2025:DHC:10364:Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. Vs. Artura Pharmaceuticals P. Ltd.

Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. filed a suit for trademark infringement, passing off, and related reliefs against Artura Pharmaceuticals P. Ltd. alleging that the defendant's marks PEPFIX and NEOVITAL were deceptively similar to its registered marks PEPFIZ and REVITAL; an ex-parte interim injunction was granted on 21.11.2024 restraining the defendant from dealing in goods under the impugned marks. 

The defendant filed an application under Order VII Rule 10 CPC seeking return of the plaint for lack of territorial jurisdiction, contending it had no business in Delhi, manufactured only for export, and its website was not interactive enough to confer jurisdiction. 

The Delhi High Court dismissed the application on 24.11.2025 holding that at the demurrer stage, plaint averments must be taken as true, and the plaintiff's pleadings about the defendant's website being accessible in Delhi with a "Contact Us" page inviting services, downloadable product brochures mentioning impugned marks, and listing on a third-party aggregator platform with an enquiry form raised mixed questions of fact and law regarding interactivity and purposeful availment under the Banyan Tree test, which could not be resolved without evidence at trial; the court directed that territorial jurisdiction be decided as a preliminary issue after pleadings and evidence.

In trademark infringement suits involving internet-based disputes, territorial jurisdiction under Section 20 CPC is determined at the demurrer stage by assuming plaint averments as true, and objections succeed only if the court lacks jurisdiction as a matter of law even on those facts (Para 25, relying on Exphar SA v. Eupharma Laboratories Limited, (2004) 3 SCC 688).

Accessibility of a defendant's website in the forum state, coupled with features like a "Contact Us" page inviting services and downloadable product information, may prima facie constitute purposeful availment conferring jurisdiction, subject to evidence at trial on interactivity under the sliding scale and effects tests (Para 27-29, relying on Banyan Tree Holding (P) Limited v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy & Anr., 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3780).

Third-party aggregator listings promoting products with enquiry forms can contribute to cause of action arising in the forum state if averred to facilitate trade opportunities, and such factual disputes cannot be summarily resolved under Order VII Rule 10 CPC without trial (Para 31).

In passing off and infringement actions, cause of action arises where confusion or deception occurs or injury is caused to the plaintiff, and online accessibility creating potential for such harm in the forum state suffices to invoke jurisdiction pending trial determination (Para 26, relying on Millennium & Copthorne International Limited v. Aryans Plaza Services Private Limited, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 8260).

Case Title: Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. Vs. Artura Pharmaceuticals P. Ltd.:24 November 2025:CS(COMM) 1038/2024:2025:DHC:10348:Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Softgel Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. Vs Pfizer Inc.

Pfizer Inc., holder of US Patent No. 9,777,441 for crystalline forms of Tafamidis sold as VyndaMax, filed infringement suits in the US District Court, Delaware against Cipla and Hikma upon their ANDA submissions; to gather evidence from Indian third-party manufacturer Softgel Healthcare allegedly supplying the API, the US court issued letters rogatory under the Hague Convention; the Madras High Court single judge allowed execution by appointing a commissioner in O.P.(PT) Nos.5 & 6 of 2024 on 28.01.2025; Softgel appealed contending the request contravenes India's Patents Act 1970 and India's reservation against pre-trial discovery; the division bench, finding the request aimed at pre-trial documents which India excludes under Article 23 of the Hague Convention, lacking specificity under Article 3, and prejudicial to sovereignty under Article 11 given Softgel's pending Indian patent application, allowed the appeals on 25.11.2025 setting aside the single judge order and dismissing the applications for commission.

- India has declared under Article 23 of the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, 1970 that it will not execute letters of request issued for pre-trial discovery of documents (Para 33).

- Letters rogatory from a foreign court must contain the specificity required under Article 3 of the Hague Convention; vague or non-specific requests are not enforceable in India (Para 34).

- Under Article 11 of the Hague Convention, a person may refuse to give evidence if it would prejudice the sovereignty or security of the requested state, particularly when the evidence relates to a pending patent application in India (Para 34).

- Execution of letters rogatory in India under Order XXVI Rules 19-22 read with Section 78 CPC is subject to compliance with the Hague Convention and India's reservations thereunder; requests for pre-trial discovery in patent matters pending in India may be refused (Para 32).

Case Title: Softgel Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. Vs Pfizer Inc. & Ors.  

Order Date: 25 November 2025  

Case Number: L.P.A. Nos.17 & 18 of 2025  

Neutral Citation: Not yet assigned  

Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras  

Judge: Hon’ble Dr. Justice G. Jayachandran & Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mummineni Sudheer Kumar  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

SKA Insurance Surveyors and Loss Assessors Private Limited Vs. Regional Director (Northern Region), Ministry of Corporate Affairs

SKA Insurance Surveyors and Loss Assessors Pvt. Ltd., incorporated on 25.02.2022 by Mr. Sushil Kumar Agarwal who had resigned only two months earlier from the 2008-incorporated SKAAD Insurance Surveyors and Loss Assessors Pvt. Ltd. (of which he had been a director for 13 years), was directed by the Regional Director under Section 16(1)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013 to change its name within three months on the ground that “SKA” and “SKAAD” followed by identical descriptive words were too nearly resembling and likely to cause confusion, especially since both companies carry on identical business. The petitioner challenged the order in a writ petition contending that Section 16(1)(a) cannot be invoked when the earlier company has no registered trademark and that the RD impermissibly entered into trademark/passing-off considerations. The Delhi High Court dismissed the writ petition on 19.11.2025 holding that Section 16(1)(a) operates independently of trademark rights and is attracted merely on similarity of corporate names without requiring proof of deception or confusion, that the names were substantially identical when read as a whole, and that the common directorship and identical business made the RD’s conclusion unassailable.

- Section 16(1)(a) of the Companies Act, 2013 is attracted merely on objective similarity/near resemblance of corporate names and does not require proof of likelihood of confusion or deception as in a passing-off action (Para 7-10).  

- Jurisdiction under Section 16(1)(a) is wider than trademark/passing-off jurisdiction and operates independently of the existence of a registered trademark (Para 8, 10).  

- While comparing names under Section 16(1)(a), the names must be considered as a whole; addition or deletion of one letter (“SKA” vs “SKAAD”) in the dominant part followed by identical descriptive words renders the names too nearly resembling (Para 10).  

- Common directorship and identical nature of business are relevant circumstances that strengthen the conclusion of near resemblance under Section 16(1)(a) (Para 11).  

- The Regional Director is not required to decide ownership of trademark or passing-off while exercising power under Section 16(1)(a) (Para 9, 12).

Case Title: SKA Insurance Surveyors and Loss Assessors Private Limited Vs. Regional Director (Northern Region), Ministry of Corporate Affairs & Anr.  

Order Date: 19 November 2025  

Case Number: W.P.(C) 17574/2025  

Neutral Citation: Not yet assigned  

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi  

Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Prateek Jalan  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Shroff Geeta Vs Asst. Controller of Patents and Design

Shroff Geeta’s patent application 3853/COL/MP/2008 filed in 2008 for a composition comprising human embryonic stem cells derived from 2–7 day old human embryos and their derivatives was rejected by the Controller on 24.09.2018 primarily under Section 3(b) of the Patents Act, 1970 holding that the invention necessarily involved destructive use of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes which is contrary to public order and morality. The applicant appealed under Section 117A contending that the invention did not necessarily destroy embryos and the Controller misapplied Section 3(b). The Calcutta High Court dismissed the appeal on 17.11.2025 upholding the refusal, holding that derivation of human embryonic stem cells by immunological or mechanical isolation from the inner cell mass of the embryo inevitably requires destructive use of the embryo, that commercial exploitation of such cells is contrary to morality and public order, and that the Controller’s order was reasoned, in conformity with the National Guidelines for Stem Cell Research 2017 and required no interference.

- Inventions involving derivation of human embryonic stem cells by destructive isolation from human embryos (even at blastocyst stage) are hit by Section 3(b) of the Patents Act, 1970 as being contrary to public order or morality (Para 9-10).

- Commercial or industrial use of human embryos or embryonic stem cells obtained by processes that lead to destruction of the embryo is non-patentable under Section 3(b) irrespective of the therapeutic potential of the invention (Para 10).

- Section 3(b) excludes inventions whose primary or intended use or commercial exploitation is contrary to morality even if the invention is novel and inventive (Para 6-7, 10).

- Use of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes falls within the classic examples of immoral inventions excluded from patentability (Para 8).

Case Title: Shroff Geeta Vs Asst. Controller of Patents and Design  

Order Date: 17 November 2025  

Case Number: IPDPTA/88/2023 (OA/10/2019/PT/KOL)  

Neutral Citation: Not yet assigned  

Court: High Court at Calcutta (Original Side – Intellectual Property Rights Division)  

Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Sh. Gaurav Khattar Vs. Sh. Virender Aggarwal

Gaurav Khattar had suffered an ex-parte decree in a cheque-bounce recovery suit on 10.06.2016 after summons were served on his father at 186 Teliwara, Delhi on 18.05.2016; he filed RFA 485/2025 with a delay of 3192 days claiming he never knew of the suit because he lived at 219 Teliwara and was estranged from his father. The High Court dismissed the appeal on 25.06.2025 holding the service valid and the delay unexplained. Thereafter, Khattar filed a review petition relying on “newly discovered” Aadhaar card and bank passbook showing address 219 Teliwara and medical records of his father’s cataract surgery in December 2016 and family discord. The High Court held that Aadhaar and passbook were always obtainable with due diligence hence not “new evidence”, that even if accepted they did not prove residence at the material time in May 2016, that service on father was lawful under CPC, and that the father’s surgery being post-service was irrelevant; finding no error apparent on record nor any ground for review, the court dismissed the review petition on 24.11.2025.

- Review cannot be allowed on documents (Aadhaar, bank records) that were always capable of being obtained by due diligence from concerned authorities (Para 8-9).

- For “newly discovered evidence” under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, the document must not have been within the applicant’s power to produce at the proper time despite reasonable diligence (Para 8).

- Service of summons on adult family member (father) at the defendant’s known address is valid service under CPC; subsequent medical condition of the family member is irrelevant if it arose after service (Para 9, 12-13).

- No error apparent exists merely because certain documents on record were not specifically adverted to in the judgment if they do not affect the legality of service already effected (Para 10-13).

Case Title: Sh. Gaurav Khattar Vs. Sh. Virender Aggarwal  

Order Date: 24 November 2025  

Case Number: Review Pet. 427/2025 in RFA 485/2025  

Neutral Citation: Not yet assigned  

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi  

Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Rallis India Limited Vs. Deputy Controller of Patents

Rallis India Limited appealed against the Deputy Controller's order dated 05 March 2024 rejecting its patent application No. 4135/CHEN/2014 for a stable herbicidal composition comprising Pendimethalin and Metribuzin in emulsifiable concentrate formulation, filed on 25 August 2014 with examination request on 27 September 2017 leading to FER on 22 July 2019 citing lack of novelty inventive step and non-patentability under Sections 3(d) and 3(e); 

Pre-grant oppositions were filed by Haryana Pesticide Manufacturers Association on 10 September 2019 and Chimanbhai Chauhan challenging under Sections 25(1)(b) to (g) with hearings concluded by 2023. 

The Madras High Court reasoned that the impugned order erroneously relied on D3 (IN 2243/MUM/2014) as prior art without addressing whether its EC claims were fairly based on the provisional specification filed 09 July 2014 which disclosed only suspo-emulsion not EC, 

Ignored expert affidavits distinguishing formulations and D3's deemed revocation status, overlooked additional prior arts cited by opponents, and inadequately assessed comparative data for synergy. The appeal was allowed order set aside and matter remanded to a different Controller for fresh reasoned decision within four months after hearing parties keeping all contentions open without the Court's observations binding the remand.

Important Law Point:

For a complete specification to claim priority from a provisional specification under Section 11(2) of the Patents Act, 1970, the claims must be fairly based on the disclosure in the provisional; failure disqualifies it as prior art for anticipation if the specific invention (e.g., EC formulation) is absent in the provisional. 

The Controller must provide explicit reasoned findings on all material contentions responses evidence including expert affidavits and status of cited patents (e.g., deemed revocation under Rule 58(2) of Patents Rules, 2003) in refusal orders; omission renders the order unsustainable. 

 In appeals under Section 117A(2) of the Patents Act, 1970, the High Court may set aside a patent refusal and remand for fresh adjudication by a different officer if the order lacks proper consideration without the appellate observations prejudicing the remand. 

Case Title: Rallis India Limited Vs. Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs & Ors.  

Order date: 20 November 2025  : C.M.A.(PT) No. 21 of 2024 :Mad HC: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Novo Nordisk Vs. Dr. Reddys Laboratories

Novo Nordisk A/S, holder of Indian Patent No. 262697 (IN'697) granted on 5 September 2014 with priority from 18 March 2005 for acylated GLP-1 analogs including Semaglutide used in treating Type 2 diabetes and obesity, filed a suit against Dr. Reddy's Laboratories Limited alleging infringement by their manufacture and intended sale of generic Semaglutide and sought interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC. 

Defendants countered with revocation grounds under Sections 64(1)(a), (e), (f) of Patents Act 1970 claiming anticipation by prior claiming in plaintiff's own genus patent IN'964, prior publication, obviousness/lack of inventive step, and evergreening. 

The Single Judge, after detailed analysis, held the suit patent prima facie vulnerable to revocation as the species compound Semaglutide was anticipated by claims in IN'964, obvious to a 'person in the know' (same inventor) without inventive step over prior art teachings, constituted evergreening to extend monopoly, and no other grounds favored validity. 

The interim injunction application was dismissed with prima facie observations not binding trial.

In assessing obviousness under Section 64(1)(f) of the Patents Act, 1970, for a species patent derived from a prior genus patent by the same inventor, the perspective shifts from the ordinary 'person skilled in the art' to a 'person in the know' who is intimately familiar with the genus patent's details, making obviousness easier to establish. ( paras 67-70, 90)

A subsequent species patent may be invalidated for anticipation by prior claiming under Section 64(1)(a) if its claims are subsumed within the broader claims of an earlier genus patent by the same patentee, even if the specific compound is not explicitly disclosed. (paras 26-55)

 Evergreening through minor modifications to extend patent monopoly without significant therapeutic enhancement renders the patent vulnerable, especially when the species lacks inventive step over the genus. (paras 89-90)

For interim injunction in patent infringement, where validity is credibly challenged on grounds like obviousness and evergreening, no prima facie case exists if the patent appears revocable; balance of convenience favors denying relief when plaintiff does not manufacture locally and damages are quantifiable. (paras 94-99)

 Defendants who 'clear the way' by challenging patent validity prior to launch may avoid interim injunction, promoting timely resolution over market disruption. (paras 96-98)

Case Title: Novo Nordisk Vs. Dr. Reddys Laboratories Limited : 02 December 2025  : CS(COMM)565/2025  :2025:DHC:10820:Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Nannir Water Source LLP Vs Syed Imran

Nannir Water Source LLP, proprietor of registered trademark NANNIR and manufacturer of eco-friendly electricity-free water treatment systems, filed a commercial suit before the Madras High Court against YouTuber Syed Imran and YouTube seeking interim injunction restraining the defendants from keeping online an allegedly false, malicious and disparaging product review video uploaded on 25 May 2025 in the channel “Buying Facts”. 

The Single Judge, relying on the Bombay High Court decision in Marico Ltd v Abhijeet Bhansali, held that the statements in the video were prima facie reckless, malicious and not backed by any credible scientific material, that freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) does not extend to maligning or disparaging another’s goods, and that such conduct violates the plaintiff’s right to carry on trade under Article 19(1)(g). Finding prima facie case, irreparable injury and balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiff, the Court granted ex-parte interim injunction and directed YouTube to take down the impugned video till further orders.

False, reckless and malicious statements in a YouTube product review video that disparage and malign the goods of another without any credible scientific basis constitute slander of goods/disparagement and are not protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. (Nannir Water Source LLP v Syed Imran & Ors, O.A.Nos.1107 & 1108 of 2025 in C.S.(Comm.Div.) No.302 of 2025, paras 3-7, relying on Marico Limited v Abhijeet Bhansali dated 15.01.2020 (Bombay High Court))

Commercial speech is part of Article 19(1)(a) but cannot be abused to malign or disparage the product of others; such disparagement amounts to an unreasonable restriction on the aggrieved party’s fundamental right to carry on trade and business under Article 19(1)(g). (paras 4-6)

When prima facie malice and falsity are established in a disparaging video, ex-parte interim injunction and mandatory take-down direction against the platform are justified. (paras 7-8)

Case Title: Nannir Water Source LLP Vs Syed Imran : : 26 November 2025  : C.S. (Comm.Div.) No.302 of 2025  :Mad HC:Hon'ble Mr. Justice N. Senthilkumar  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Ms Anuradha Sharma . Vs. Jiva Ayurvedic Pharmacy Ltd.

Jiva Ayurvedic Pharmacy Limited obtained an ex-parte interim injunction from the Commercial Court restraining Anuradha Sharma and another from using their registered trademark SHATAM JEEVA on the ground of similarity with Jiva’s mark JIVA. 

In appeal, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court stayed the injunction till the next date of hearing, holding that since the appellants possess a registration for SHATAM JEEVA, no case of infringement arises. 

On passing off, the marks JIVA and SHATAM JEEVA are prima facie entirely dissimilar when compared as composite device marks, the plaintiff Jiva had disclaimed the word “Jiva” in one of its registrations, and crucially, the Commercial Court failed to record any finding on accumulation of goodwill in JIVA prior to 2018 (the appellant’s date of adoption/registration) despite the law requiring sales and advertisement figures to prove goodwill existing before the defendant’s entry, rendering the grant of injunction unsustainable at the prima facie stage.

Important Law Point:

A registered trademark cannot be injuncted on the ground of infringement of another mark; only passing off remains available against a registered mark. (paras 14-15)

 In a passing off action, the rival marks must be compared as composite/device marks and not merely as word marks; added features and overall visual impression are decisive. (paras 15(i) 

To succeed in passing off, the plaintiff must prima facie establish goodwill in its mark prior to the date of adoption/registration of the mark by the defendant; mere sales figures post-dating the defendant’s entry are insufficient. (paras 15(iii)-(vi), citing Brihan Karan Sugar Syndicate (P) Ltd v. Yashwantrao Mohite Krushna Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana (2024) 2 SCC 577 and Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Prius Auto Industries Ltd. (2018) 2 SCC 1)

Absence of a clear finding on pre-existing goodwill is fatal to the grant of interim injunction in a passing off action. (paras 15(vi), 16)

Case Title: Ms Anuradha Sharma. Vs. Jiva Ayurvedic Pharmacy Limited : 01 December 2025  : FAO (COMM) 334/2025 :Del DB:: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Kohinoor Seed Fields India Vs Veda Seed Sciences-DB

Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt Ltd filed a trademark infringement and passing off suit against Veda Seed Sciences Pvt Ltd in Delhi High Court, claiming Veda infringed its registered marks TADAAKHA and SADANAND, and common law mark BASANT, by using similar marks like VEDA TADAAKHA GOLD for cotton hybrid seeds after appellant terminated their non-exclusive marketing agreement executed in Delhi, which had permitted Veda limited use for specific hybrids produced by appellant. 

Veda filed an application under Order VII Rule 10 CPC challenging territorial jurisdiction; a Single Judge allowed it and returned the plaint, holding no cause of action arose in Delhi as the agreement was not integral to the infringement claim, mere trademark registration in Delhi insufficient, and no evidence of sales or targeting in Delhi via e-commerce listings by third parties. 

On appeal, the Division Bench reasoned that the marketing agreement formed part of the cause of action since infringement stemmed from use beyond its permitted scope and it was executed in Delhi, registration alone does not confer jurisdiction but infringement location does, interactive e-commerce availability of products accessible in Delhi constitutes purposeful availment conferring jurisdiction unlike passive sites, and the Single Judge erred by relying on material outside the plaint to dismiss third-party listings' relevance. The appeal was allowed, impugned order set aside, and suit restored as maintainable in Delhi High Court.

Point of Law Settled:

Execution of a marketing agreement in a particular jurisdiction constitutes part of the cause of action for a trademark infringement suit where the infringement is alleged to arise from use of marks beyond the agreement's permitted scope, thereby vesting territorial jurisdiction in that court under Section 20(c) of the CPC. ( paras 18-18.8)

Mere registration of a trademark at the Trade Marks Registry located in Delhi does not confer territorial jurisdiction on the Delhi High Court for an infringement suit unless the actual infringement occurs within its territorial limits. (paras 17-17.13)

In trademark infringement cases involving e-commerce, if the defendant's website is interactive and enables customers within the jurisdiction to place orders, make inquiries, or engage in transactions, it amounts to purposeful availment of the jurisdiction, thereby vesting territorial jurisdiction in that court. (paras 19-19.15)

Availability of allegedly infringing products on third-party e-commerce platforms accessible within the jurisdiction can support a plea of territorial jurisdiction if the plaint avers potential sales or confusion there, though the defendant's actual responsibility for such listings is a matter for trial and cannot be dismissed at the threshold based on material outside the plaint. ( paras 21-21.4)

 Where no part of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the plaintiff's principal office but arises at a subordinate office, the plaintiff cannot invoke jurisdiction at the principal office under Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, but this principle does not apply if elements like agreement execution or e-commerce targeting create cause of action at the principal office. (paras 20-20.5)

Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt Ltd Vs Veda Seed Sciences Pvt Ltd : 3 December 2025  : FAO(OS) (COMM) 66/2025:2025:DHC: 10789-DB:Del HCHigh Court of Delhi at New Delhi  : Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]