Monday, August 19, 2013

VIJAYA HINGOLI CASE


                       

COMMENT:

1.         In this cancellation petition, there was no any pleading regarding the pleading of the person aggrieved, however from the facts of the case, the Hon’ble Court has held the respondent/petitioner for cancellation to be the person aggrieved. (Para 8)

2.         The Hon’ble Court has observed that the underlying principles in relation to copyright law are different from those relating to trademark law.(Para 15)

 

3.         The Hon’ble Board has accepted the contention of respondent that the Respondent's advertisements carry a telephone number with seven digits, it has been explained by the Respondent that he had given the telephone number as existed in the year 1996 as part of his application which was submitted on 27th March, 1996 (Para 16).

4.         In a petition for cancellation of copyright, the registrar of copyright is not necessarily required to be made a party. (Para 17).

 

                         IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

                                                 RFA 86/2008

            RAJ KUMAR SARAF, PROPRIETOR M/S. BINDAL

            FOOD PRODUCTS ..... Appellant Through: Mr. S.K. Bansal, Mr. Ajay Amitabh

                                                Suman, Mr. Vikas Khera and Mr. Santosh Kumar, Advocates

 

                                    Versus

            M/S. VAIDYA NANDRAM GIGRAJ CHAMARIA ..... Respondent Through: Mr.                                                  A.K. Behera, Advocate

 

Date of Decision : July 19, 2013

 

CORAM:

 

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE REVA KHETRAPAL

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE PRATIBHA RANI

 

1. By way of this appeal, the Appellant - Raj Kumar Saraf seeks to assail the order dated 19.9.2007 passed by the Copyright Board rectifying the Register of Copyrights by expunging the entry bearing No.A-66496/04 relating to the art work of the Appellant.

2. The facts leading to the passing of the impugned order by the Copyright Board may be briefly delineated as follows.

3. The Respondent - Vaidya Nandram Gigraj Chamaria had filed an application under Section 50 of the Copyright Act, 1957 before the Copyright Board for expunging/deleting the registration of the artistic work of the Appellant registered as Registration No.66496/04 dated 26.2.2004 from the Register of Copyright. As per the averments made in the rectification petition, the Respondent firm had been in the business of manufacturing and marketing of Pansarat and Ayurvedic medicines ever since the year 1958 and had been issued Ayurvedic Drug License way back in the year 1983 vide License No.174 (A & U) dated 19.1.1983. Besides, the Respondent had also applied for sales tax registration number for carrying on the aforesaid business in the territory of Delhi in the year 1979 and had been issued Sales Tax Registration No.LC/03/019829 dated 17.2.1979. The Respondent had earned tremendous goodwill in the market in relation to manufacturing and marketing of several Ayurvedic and Pansarat products including "Vijay Hingoli". The Respondent was holding various registered trademarks and an application for registration of "Vijay Hingoli" was pending consideration before the Trademarks Registry. The said product, viz., "Vijay Hingoli" had been launched in 1981 and was being marketed in bottles and plastic packs ever since 1981 and from the year 1991 in pouches. The Respondent in paragraph 5 of the petition has set out its sales figures for the year 1994-95 till 2003-04 and submitted that ever since 1981 it had been marketing its product "Vijay Hingoli" using the artistic work and get up enclosed with the petition. During the course of marketing of the said product, the Respondent had issued several advertisements in newspapers, audio-video cassettes, magazines, glow signs, banners, advertisements on the body of DTC buses, wall painting and other ancillary modes of advertisements, portraying and advertising the said artistic work and get up, samples whereof were enclosed for the perusal of the Copyright Board. It was alleged that the Appellant - Shri Raj Kumar Saraf (the Respondent before the Copyright Board) was fully aware of the existence of the Respondent in the market in relation to the manufacturing and marketing of Pansarat and Ayurvedic products and specifically the product "Vijay Hingoli". It was asserted that the father of the Respondent, namely, Shri Shiv Kumar Saraf is a blood relation/cousin of the members of the Respondent firm and hailed from the same village in the State of Rajasthan. The said Shri Raj Kumar Saraf surreptitiously and with malafide intention made an application before the Registrar of Copyrights on 26.7.2003 to register the aforementioned artistic work and get up in his name by making some cosmetic changes therein in relation to the same product titled "Vijay Hingoli". In the said application, the Appellant represented before the Registrar of Copyrights that he had been using the said artistic work and get up as well as name since 1995. The Registrar accordingly issued registration No.A-66496/04 on 26.2.2004. The Respondent came to know about the fact through an advertisement given by the Appellant in a local newspaper, namely, Sandhya Times on 24.11.2004, thus compelling the Respondent to file the rectification petition before the Copyright Board.

4. The Copyright Board on consideration of the rival submissions of the parties and after appreciating the documents filed by both the parties passed the impugned order cancelling the registration of the Appellant by expunging the entry bearing No.A-66496/04 made in favour of the Appellant in the Copyright Register.

5. We have heard the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and scrutinized the documentary evidence on record. The Appellant has assailed the order of the Copyright Board principally on the ground that in the year 1995 the Appellant as the sole proprietor of Bindal Food Products had conceived, coined and authored the artistic label comprising of a human bust, having small moustache on the face, bearing spectacles on eyes and wearing a cap on the head (hereinafter referred to as " the human bust") and the words ANMOL-G VIJAYA & HING GOLI known as ANMOL-G VIJAYA HING GOLI. On 10.6.2003, the Appellant had applied for registration of its copyright before the Registrar of Copyright, which was granted by the Registrar on 26.2.2004 under No.A-66496/04. The said art work was duly made public by the Appellant by different modes of media through advertising, letter pads, bills/invoices, distribution of trade literature, hoardings, etc. The Appellant had also been very prompt in safeguarding his right in the said art work/label against violation thereof by various infringers and in this behalf had filed a suit bearing CS(OS) No.1233/04, titled as Shri Raj Kumar Saraf vs. M/s. G.K. Products before the Delhi High Court, which was later compromised and decreed in favour of the Appellant. Further, in order to obtain statutory rights over the trademark VIJAYA and ANMOL-G, trademark applications on behalf of the Appellant's firm, M/s. Bindal Food Products were filed on 5.11.2002 in Class 5, on 6.12.2001 in Class 30 and on 6.12.2001 in Class 05 and in Class 30. Out of the aforementioned trade applications, the earlier three trademarks now stand registered in favour of the Appellant firm, i.e., M/s. Bindal Food Products. On or about 25th day of December, 2004, the Respondent filed the rectification petition under Section 50 of the Copyright Act, 1957 falsely alleging to be the owner and author of the impugned art work. On or about 26.3.2007, the Appellant filed his written statement along with supporting documents before the Copyright Board. The learned Board, however, ordered rectification of the Copyright Register by expunging the registration made in favour of the Appellant.

6. The learned counsel for the Appellant in support of his submission that the order of the Copyright Board is not sustainable raised the following contentions:-

(i) In the rectification petition, the Respondent nowhere alleged itself to be a person aggrieved, which is a sine qua non for maintainability of rectification petition and hence the same ought to have been dismissed.

(ii) In rectification proceedings, the onus was on the Petitioner (the Respondent herein) to establish that the publication of his art work was prior in point of time to the publication of the art work of the Appellant in terms of Section 3 of the Copyright Act, 1957. Not a single document was filed by the Respondent pertaining to the publication of the impugned art work prior to the art work of the Appellant.

(iii) The Appellant, on the other hand, had placed on record the letter head of M/s. M.M. Marketing Company to establish the prior publication of his art work which bore the date 15.5.1993. The said letter was carrying the human bust, which is the most essential feature of the said art work. The Appellant had also placed on record the affidavit of his brother Shri Manoj Kumar Aggarwal (then trading as M/s. M.M. Marketing Company, B- 154, Suraj Mal Vihar, Delhi-92) to show that the Appellant had allowed him to use the said bust on the letterhead and promotional material of M/s. M.M. Marketing Company but the learned Board had erroneously ignored the same.

(iv) The learned Board was wrong in not giving any benefit of the registered trademarks VIJAYA and ANMOL-G to the Appellant and in not considering the fact that the same form part of the art work of the Appellant.

(v) The Respondent had relied upon the impugned trademark/label application under No.70384 in Class 05, allegedly filed on 27.3.1996, claiming the user since the year 1981. However, in the impugned label, telephone No.2925206 (seven digit telephone number) is printed, and in the year 1981 seven digit telephone number was not in existence, leading to the inference that the Respondent is wrongly alleging the user of the impugned art work since the year 1981.

(vi) The learned Board ought to have dismissed the petition on the sole ground that the Registrar of Copyrights had not been made a party therein. The Board in this context erred in not following the precedent laid down by it in its earlier judgment titled as Shree Sawaram Agarbatti Bhandar vs. Ghanshyam Perfumery & Co., 2007 (35) PTC 1001 (CB).

7. Learned counsel for the Respondent rebutted the aforesaid contentions raised on behalf of the Appellant and relied upon the submissions made by it before the Copyright Board and the findings of the Copyright Board thereon.

8. Adverting in the first instance to the contention of the Appellant that in the rectification petition, the Respondent nowhere alleged itself to be a person aggrieved, which is a sine qua non for the maintainability of a rectification petition and hence the same ought to have been dismissed, we find the aforesaid contention to be factually incorrect. The impugned order in fact specifically records that the Respondent (the Petitioner before the Copyright Board) was a person aggrieved in terms of Section 50 of the Act in the following terms: "7. At the outset, it is necessary for us to determine as to whether it was obligatory upon the respondent to give a notice to the petitioner in terms of rule 16(3) of the Copyright Rules, 1958 while making an application to the Registrar for registration. Petitioner has claimed that the proprietors on both the sides are related and hail from the same village in Rajasthan. Further, both the parties deal in similar goods and thus possibly having the same network of dealers whereby knowing each other's presence in the market. We feel that these grounds by themselves are not sufficient to conclude for us that the respondent had knowledge about the petitioner being an interested person in the matter. With a view to proceed further in the instant matter relating to rectification of the registration, it is essential to determine as to the petitioner being person aggrieved in terms of section 50 of the Act. Both the petitioner and the respondent deal in similar goods and the impugned artistic work bears similarity to the artistic work and trade mark of the petitioner. We feel this is enough for us to infer that the petitioner is an aggrieved person in the matter."

9. As regards the contention of the Appellant with regard to publication of his art work being prior in point of time to the art work of the Respondent, we deem it expedient to refer to the definition of publication as set out in the Copyright Act, 1957. Section 3 of the said Act defines publication as follows:

"3. Meaning of publication. - For the purposes of this Act, "publication" means making a work available to the public by issue of copies or by communicating the work to the public."

10. It is beyond cavil that "publication" in any part of the Copyright Act, 1957 is to be understood in terms of its definition given in Section 3 of the Act as set out above. It also cannot be disputed that the word "publication" in Column 9 of the Statement of Particulars of Form 4, which is required to be submitted for registration of Copyright, is to be understood as defined in Section 3 of the Act. Section 3 of the Act, as noted above, stipulates that for the purposes of the Copyright Act, "publication" means making a work available to the public by issue of copies or by communicating the work to the public. Thus, the work can be made available to the public either by issuance of copies or by communicating the work to the public. Section 2(ff) provides a definition for "communication to the public" as under:

"2. Interpretation. -In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-

............................................

(ff) "communication to the public" means making any work available for being seen or heard or otherwise enjoyed by the public directly or by any means of display or diffusion other than by issuing copies of such work regardless of whether any member of the public actually sees, hears or otherwise enjoys the work so made available.

Explanation.- For the purposes of this clause, communication through satellite or cable or any other means of simultaneous communication to more than one household or place of residence including residential rooms of any hotel or hostel shall be deemed to be communication to the public."

11. The submission of the Respondent before the Copyright Board was that the Appellant had made false averments before the Registrar as to the "publication" of the work being that of 1995. It was also submitted that the Appellant was in violation of the proviso to Sub- Section (1) of Section 45 of the Act having not made the necessary declaration and not having obtained the certificate from the Registrar of Trademarks. For the sake of ready reference, Section 45 of the Act is reproduced as under:

"45. Entries in register of Copyrights.- (1) The author or publisher of, or the owner of or other person interested in the copyright in, any work may make an application in the prescribed form accompanied by the prescribed fee to the Registrar of Copyrights for entering particulars of the work in the Register of Copyrights :

[Provided that in respect of an artistic work which is  used or is capable of being used in relation to any goods, the application shall include a statement to that effect and shall be accompanied by a certificate from the Registrar of Trade Marks referred to in section 4 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, to the effect that no trade mark identical with or deceptively similar to such artistic work has been registered under that Act in the name of, or that no application has been made under that Act for such registration by, any person other than the applicant.]"

12. A look at the documentary evidence on record shows that in the instant case the Appellant in the application filed by it for registration of its art work, under Column 9, has claimed the year of first publication as 1995. In the written statement filed by it, the Appellant has submitted that he had authored/conceived portrait of bust of human being having small moustache on the face, bearing spectacles on eyes and wearing cap on the head in the year 1993 and had allowed his brother Shri Manoj Kumar Aggarwal, then trading as M/s. M.M. Marketing Company to use the said bust on the letterhead and promotional materials of M/s. M.M. Marketing Company. He has also placed on record the affidavit of Shri Manoj Kumar Aggarwal in this regard. As rightly observed by the Copyright Board, however, there is no primary evidence placed on record by the Appellant to substantiate his authorship of this art work. The earliest document adduced in evidence relates to the year 1993 being the aforesaid letter dated 15.5.1993 written by the proprietor of M/s. M.M. Marketing Company on the printed letter pad of the firm to the Sales Tax Officer, Ward No.083, Bikrikar Bhawan requesting for an extension of period to complete the requirements of some registration. The original of this letter has not been produced and only a photocopy has been placed on record. A cursory look at the bust on the said photocopy shows that the said art work/bust is not the same as the art work/bust appended to the application for registration on 28.7.2003. Further, the said art work has the word "Rajasthani" appearing behind it whereas in the art work appended to the application the words ANMOL-G HING GOLI appear at the top with several other inscriptions on the said art work on all sides which are conspicuously absent on the letterhead of M.M. Marketing Company. Further, the Appellant himself has submitted in paragraph 3 of his written statement that he conceived, coined and authored the art work in 1995 and in view of his said statement it is not understandable as to how the art work appears in a letterhead of M/s. M.M. Marketing Company dated 15.5.1993. In such circumstances, the Board has rightly observed that inscription of some mark which bears no similarity to the impugned artistic work on the letter pad of a third person indicating no authorship of the work is no publication in terms of the provisions of the Act.

13. Other documents cited by and relied upon by the Appellant also do not substantiate the case of the Appellant of prior publication of his art work. As regards the reliance placed by the Appellant on the filing of CS (OS) No.1233/2004, the said suit was filed in the High Court of Delhi by the Appellant against M/s. G.K. Product, in the year 2004 which resulted in a settlement in the same year. The filing of this suit, therefore, does not substantiate the case of the Appellant in any manner. Reliance placed by Appellant on trademark registrations is also wholly misplaced. The Appellant filed an application for registration of the word VIJAYA per se as trademark on 5.11.2002, which application was advertised in the Trademarks Journal on 25.11.2003. Trademark No.1148151 effective from 5.11.2002 was issued on 5.3.2005. Therefore, this too does not further the case of the Appellant with regard to prior publication of his art work. The only other documents are copies of bills relatable to the years 2002 to 2004 evidencing the sale of the products of the Appellant, including ANMOL-G VIJAYA HING GOLI. Needless to state that these bills are of no help to the Appellant in proving the fact of publication of the artistic work in 1995 as they do not carry the art work on them. In the affidavit of the brother of the Appellant Shri Manoj Kumar Aggarwal, reference is made to "promotional material" which allegedly carries the art work of the Appellant, but no such promotional material has seen the light of the day either before the Copyright Board or before this Court. Indubitably, the newspaper advertisements carrying the art work of the Appellant are there on record, but these advertisements relate to the year 2004 and can provide no benefit to the Appellant.

14. The Respondent, on the other hand, has proved through overwhelming evidence that his art work was published as far back as in the year 1996, that he was manufacturing and marketing Ayurvedic medicines including "Vijay Hingoli" ever since 1981 and started marketing the said product in pouches in 1991. Petitioner in evidence submitted as Ex.P1 and P2 his applications for necessary Ayurvedic licensing and Sales Tax registrations, P3 is the copy of the label of his mark, P4 are the copies of the vouchers and bills for advertisement expenditures. He has also placed on record the acknowledgments dated 27.3.1996 issued by the Registrar of Trademarks Office in favour of Ram Awatar Chamaria trading as Vaidya Nandram Gigraj Chamaria, Tilak Bazar, Delhi. This document which carries the acknowledgment of the Registrar of Trademarks contains the art work of the Respondent and is dated 22nd March, 1996 and in the column "User Claimed" specifically states "Since the year 1981".

15. We also find no merit in the contention of the Appellant that the Copyright Board erred in not giving any benefit of the registered trademarks VIJAYA and ANMOL-G to the Appellant and in not considering the fact that the same form part of the art work of the Appellant. The Copyright Board, in our opinion, has rightly observed that the underlying principles in relation to copyright law are different from those relating to trademark law, except that proviso to Section 45(1) provides that if the work is an artistic work which is used or is capable of being used in relation to any goods, the application shall include a certificate from the Registrar of Trademarks to the effect that no trademark identical with or deceptively similar to such artistic work has been registered under that Act in the name of any person other than the applicant or that no application has been made under that Act for such registration by any person other than the applicant. There is no provision in the Copyright Act for any premium to be accorded in respect of an artistic work in respect of which the trademark has been registered under the Trademark Act, 1999. Publication is a sine qua non under the Act for claiming authorship of an artistic work. A perusal of Rule 16 of the Copyright Rules, 1958 read with Form 4 shows that an applicant for registration of a copyright is required tomandatorily file statement of particulars setting out whether the work is published or not and the year of publication, etc. In the instant case, the dealers profile of the Appellant Bindal Food Products placed on record shows that the Appellant commenced business on 18 th October, 2002. Thus, quite clearly the year of commencement of business set out in the application for registration of copyright, i.e., 1995 is a false declaration. The falsity of the case of the Appellant is also borne out from the affidavits of the brother of the Appellant Mr. Manoj Kumar and the Appellant himself, which if taken on their face value show that the age of the brother of the Appellant was 33 years and the age of the Appellant was 35 years on the date on which the affidavit was sworn, thereby leading to the inference that Manoj Kumar was 19 years in the year 1993, and the Appellant himself as per his own affidavit was 17 years in the year 1993 when allegedly the Appellant assigned the artistic work created by him to his brother Manoj Kumar for the purposes of his firm M.M. Marketing Company. Even otherwise, no Assignment Deed has been placed on record by the Appellant and by virtue of the provisions of Section 19 of the Copyright Act, 1957, no assignment of copyright in any work shall be valid unless it is in writing, signed by the assignor or by its duly authorized agent. Sub- Section (5) of Section 19 further provides that in case the period of assignment is not specified in the Assignment Deed, it shall be deemed to be 5 years from the date of assignment, meaning thereby that the assignment in any event even assuming there was an Assignment Deed (which is not even asserted by the Appellant), lapsed in the year 1998.

16. As regards the contention of the Appellant that the Respondent's advertisements carry a telephone number with seven digits, it has been explained by the Respondent that he had given the telephone number as existed in the year 1996 as part of his application which was submitted on 27th March, 1996.

17. As regards the non-impleadment of the Registrar of Copyrights as a necessary party to the petition under Section 50 of the Copyright Act, no such objection appears to have been raised by the Appellant before the Copyright Board as is evident from a perusal of the written statement of the Appellant filed before the Copyright Board and such objection must, therefore, be deemed to be waived. In any event, no specific provision in the Copyright Act or the Rules framed there under has been pointed out to us for putting the Registrar on notice in a petition for rectification of the Register. This being so, we are not inclined to interfere with the order of the Copyright Board on this objection belatedly taken by the Appellant to defeat the legitimate rights of the Respondent.

18. For all the aforesaid reasons, the Appeal fails and is dismissed.

REVA KHETRAPAL

JUDGE

PRATIBHA RANI

JUDGE

July 19, 2013

 

TATA VERSUS TATA GOLD


                       

COMMENT:

1.         In this Case the Hon’ble Court has held TATA to be a well known trademark. (Para 11)

2.         The Hon’ble Court, after relying upon the doctrine of dilution of trademark, has restrained the defendant from using the trademark TATA GOLD in relation to pressure cooker.(Para 12)
 
3.          As the evidence of the plaintiff has gone un rebutted, the Hon'ble Court has awarded the decree of damage also. (Para 15)

 

                        THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

                                       CS (OS) No. 1228/2004

                                       Date of Decision: 29.04.2013

TATA SONS LTD. & ANR. .......Plaintiff

Through: Mr. Achuthan Sreekumar, Ms.Udita, Advs.

Versus

AMIT MAHNA & ORS. ......Defendant

Through: Nemo

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.L. MEHTA

M.L. MEHTA, J.

1. The present suit has been instituted by the plaintiffs against the defendants seeking permanent injunction restraining infringement of trademarks TATA by the defendants. The plaintiffs are also praying for an order of delivery-up of all infringing materials along with the rendition of accounts of profit illegally earned as well as damages.

2. This suit has been filed by Tata Sons Ltd., a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913. The plaintiff has contended that it was established in the year 1917 and is the principal investment holding company of the Tata Group, which is India‟s CS (OS) No. 1228/2004 Page 1 of 9 oldest, largest and best-known conglomerate with a turnover of USD 9 Billion. The name TATA is stated to be have been derived from the surname of its founder Mr. Jamsetji Nusserwanji Tata. It is also stated that the name TATA is being used by the plaintiffs since its inception in the year 1917 and it is claimed that on account of its highly descriptive nature and pioneering activities of the founder, the name TATA has consistently been associated with and exclusively denotes the conglomeration of companies forming the Tata group, which is known for high quality of products manufactured and/or services rendered by it under the trademark/name TATA.

3. It is stated that the House of TATA comprises over 50 companies which use TATA as a key and essential part of their corporate name. Additionally, it is also contended that there are numerous overseas companies, philanthropic bodies and autonomous public institutions which are promoted by the plaintif. And that plaintiff is the registered proprietor of the trademarks pertaining to and/or comprising the word TATA in relation to various goods falling across various classes of the Fourth Schedule of the Trade Mark Rules, 2002. By virtue of the said registration, it is contended that plaintiff has the exclusive right in the said trademark and is thus entitled to the exclusive use thereof.

4. And that various companies belonging to the House of TATA dealing in goods clearly state on their products/packaging, the legend „A TATA PRODUCT‟, while those dealing in services identify themselves by the distinctive trading style of TATA. The use of the trademark TATA by various companies belonging to the House of TATA is governed by a carefully formulated policy, called the „The TATA Brand Equity and Business Promotion Scheme‟. And that the plaintiff is the registered proprietor of various TATA trade marks that are licensed through Registered User Agreements to other TATA Companies, which manufacture the goods and sell them under the said trademark(s). The Registered User Agreements have also been duly recorded with the Trade Marks Registry in India in accordance with the relevant provisions of law.

5. The plaintiff submits that as a result of extensive use of the plaintiff‟s trade mark TATA over a long period of time spanning a wide geographical area coupled with vast promotion and publicity, the trade mark TATA has acquired an impeccable and unparalleled reputation and goodwill and has come about to acquire the status of „well-known trade mark‟. It submits that reputed and well-known trade marks especially those that embody an aura of preeminent excellence and quality, such as the plaintiff‟s trade mark TATA are entitled to the highest degree of protection against any third party misuse, even in relation to different goods and/or services.

6. The plaintiff submits that in September 2004, it came across pressure cookers in the market bearing the trade mark TATA. The impugned products contained the trade name „TATA GOLD‟, which is represented in a manner wherein the mark TATA is portrayed in bold and prominent manner, while the mark GOLD is written in small print. Upon further investigation, it appeared that these goods are being manufactured and/or sold by the defendant no. 1, Mr. Amit Mahna, who is the proprietor of defendant no.2, Bali Kitchenware Industries, which is located at No. 48/1, Sayed Nangoli, New Delhi - 110041. Defendant no. 3, Mr. Hans Raj Mahna, is the proprietor of defendant no. 4, Hamnani Stores, which is located at 891-C, Chowk Qutub Road, Sadar Bazar, Delhi - 110006. The plaintiff states that it instructed the conduct of an investigation of the defendants‟ premises and that the affidavit of the investigator is annxed as ANNEXURE A. And that the defendants catalogue and price list (annexed as ANNEXURE A1 and ANNEXURE A2 respectively), reveal that the defendants are engaged in the manufacture and sale of pressure cookers under various other brandnames like MILTON and CROMPTION. The plaintiff submits that the defendants, instead of developing their own brands, are merely seeking to free-ride on the goodwill of established brands. And that the use of a mark that is phonetically and visually identical to the plaintiff‟s registered trade mark TATA amounts to infringement of the registered trade mark, as also passing off by the defendants as per the provisions of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

7. The plaintiff states that the defendants activities are undoubtedly motivated by malafides, and that their choice of the mark TATA was not a mere coincidence but led by an ulterior motive to misappropriate and trade upon the goodwill land reputation of the plaintiff‟s trade mark. The plaintiff further states that, by being tainted at its very inception, no amount of subsequent use can cleanse the defendants‟ vice of dishonest adaptation of the mark TATA GOLD. And that by adopting the plaintiff‟s trade mark, the defendant is trying to derive an unfair advantage in the consumer market by creating the impression that the defendant‟s products emanate from the plaintiff or have some connection, nexus, association, affiliation, or endorsement with the plaintiff. And that the impugned goods are bound to confuse and mislead the public to their origin and induce them to buy the said products believing them to be originating from the plaintiff.

8. The plaintiff states that the cause of action arose for the present suit in September 2004, when it came across the impugned goods, bearing the mark TATA. And that the cause of action continues to subsist till such time the defendants are permanently restrained by an order of injunction. And that this Court has the necessary territorial jurisdiction to entertain and try the present suit as the defendants reside and carry on business/work for gain within the jurisdiction of this Court.

9. In support of its contentions, the plaintiff has also placed on record, the decisions of this Court in Tata Sons Ltd. v. A. K. Chaudhary & Anr., CS (OS) No. 842/2002 (AK Chaudhary Case) as well as Tata Sons Ltd. v. Manoj Dodia & Ors., CS (OS) No. 264/2008 (Manoj Dodia Case), where this Court has recognized the „well-known‟ status of the TATA mark. The plaintiff has also produced a table of all the cases (as cited in the table in Paragraph 20 of the plaint), that they have filed before this Court, as well as the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Centre, with respect to the misuse of its trade mark as well as domain names. I have heard the arguments of the Counsel for the plaintiff. I have also perused through the evidence placed on record.

10.Before proceeding to decide the matter, it is pertinent to note that the Trade Marks Act, 1999 accords statutory protection to well- known marks. Section 29(4) of the Act, which is relevant in this regard is as under.

"29(4) A registered trade mark is infringed by a person who, not being a registered proprietor or a person using by way of permitted use, uses in the course of trade, a mark which -

(a) Is identical with or similar to the registered trade mark; and

(b) Is used in relation to goods or services which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is registered; (c) The registered trade mark has a reputation in India and the use of the mark without due cause takes unfair advantage of or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute of the registered trade mark."

11.This Court in the Manoj Dodha Case (supra) has held:

"Considering that (a) the mark TATA whether word mark or device or in conjunction with other words is being used for last more than 100 years, in respect of a large number of goods and services, (b) Tata Group, which is probably the oldest and largest industrial and business conglomerate having a turnover of Rs. 96,000 crores in the year 2005-06, the Tata Group comprises a number of large companies, millions of customers are using one or more TATA products throughout India and other countries, (c) there are more than 100 registrations of the trade mark TATA either by way of word mark, or device or use of the name TATA and other words, (d) the Courts having in a number of judgments/orders recognize TATA as a well-known mark, (e) there is no evidence of any other person, holding registration of or using the trademark TATA and (f)the reputation which companies of Tata Group enjoys not only in India but in other countries, it is difficult to dispute that the trade mark TATA is a famous and well-known brand in India. I, therefore,, have no hesitation in holding that the mark TATA whether word mark or device or when used in conjunction with some other words, is a well-known trade mark, within the meaning of Section 2(z)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The use of the trade mark TATA in relation to any goods or services, is therefore, likely to be taken as a connection between House of Tata and the goods or services, which are sold under this trade mark or a trade mark which is similar to it.

12.Further, in the AK Chaudhary Case (supra), this Court has also made pertinent observations regarding passing off under the doctrine of dilution and unfair competition. The Court observed:

"According to the doctrine of dilution, even if a person uses another's well-known trademark or trade mark similar thereto for goods or services that are not similar to those provided by such other person, although it does not cause confusion among the consumers as to the source of goods or services, it may cause damage to the well-known trade mark by reducing or diluting the trade mark's power to indicate the source."

13.In the instant case, I have perused through the report of the Local Commissioner along with the list of inventory prepared by him of the impugned goods which were first taken in his custody and later released upon superdarinama. I have also perused through the other documents placed on record. I am of the opinion that the plaintiff has established a case of passing off with respect to the defendant‟s products carrying the plaintiff‟s trade mark TATA. The impugned goods are also clearly infringing the well-known trade mark of the plaintiff.

14.The suit of the plaintiff is accordingly decreed and an order of permanent injunction restraining the defendants from manufacturing, selling, advertising pressure cookers or goods of any description bearing a trade mark that is identical or similar to the plaintiff‟s trade mark TATA. The defendants are also directed to destroy the goods and packaging material or any other printed material bearing the trade mark TATA within a period of four weeks from today.

15.With regards the relief of damages prayed for by the plaintiff for the loss of profits to the tune of at least Rs. 5,05,000/- (Rupees Five Lakh Five Thousand Only). It is pertinent to note that the defendant has been proceeded ex parte vide Order date May 6, 2005. The evidence of the plaintiff has gone un rebutted, which includes loss of business, reputation and goodwill in the market. Since the amount of damages claimed is based on assessment of the plaintiff which is unassailed, I am of the view that a sum of Rs. 5,05,000/- (Rupees Five Lakh Five Thousand Only) can be reasonably awarded to the plaintiff as compensatory for the loss of business and damage to the goodwill. Decree be drawn accordingly.

M.L. MEHTA, J.

APRIL 29, 2013

 

ALBERTO CULVER CASE


COMMENT: Here is the reproduction of relevant paragraph of the judgment , in which the Hon’ble Court has referred to DHODHA HOUSE Judgment and explained the meaning of carry on business, and work for gain.

 

          “the expression ‘carries on business’ and the expression, ‘personally works for gain’ connote two different meanings.  For the purpose of carrying on business only presence of a man at a place is not necessary. Such business may be carried at a place through an agent or a manager or through a servant.  The owner may not even visit that place.  The phrase ‘carries on business’ at a certain place would, therefore, mean having an interest in a business at that place, a voice in what is done, a share in the gain or loss and some control thereover. The expression is much wider than what the expression in normal parlance connotes, because of ambit of a civil action within the meaning of Section 9 of the Code. But it is, inter alia, necessary that the agent must be a special agent who attends exclusively to the business of the principal and carries it on in the name of the principal and not a general agent who does business for any one who pays him. In the case in hand, there is no allegation in the plaint that agent is an exclusive agent of the respondent/plaintiff. From the documents placed on record it would appear that J.L. Morison is doing the business for other persons also. 

 

 

IN THE HIGH COURT  OF  DELHI  AT NEW DELHI

SUBJECT : CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

FAO 480/2011

Date of Decision:  July 1, 2013

PIONEER PRODUCTS  ..... Appellant Through : Mr.Suhail Dutt, Sr.Adv. with Mr.N.K.Kantawala, Mr.Praver Sharma, Mr.Satyender Chahar and Mr.Ritesh Mehra, Advs.

versus

          ALBERTO CULVER INTERNATIONAL INC.  ..... Respondent        Through    : Mr.S.K.Bansal with Mr.Vikas Khera, Advs.

          CORAM:HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE VEENA BIRBAL

VEENA BIRBAL, J.

1                   Present appeal has been preferred by the appellant against the order dated 1st October, 2011 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, New Delhi whereby application of the respondent under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 CPC was allowed and the interim order dated 9th September, 2009 has been confirmed.

 

2                   Appellant herein is defendant no.1 before the learned trial court.  Respondent herein is plaintiff before the learned trial court. The respondent/plaintiff has filed a suit under Section 134 and 135 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against appellant/defendnant no.1 and one R.P. General Stores i.e. defendnat no.2 before the trial court for the relief of permanent injunction retraining the appellant/defendant no.1 from using in any manner including by way of manufacturing, sale trade etc. of the impugned marks VOV, VO5 or similar or identical marks in relation to cosmetics, toiletries and personal care products such as hair sprays, shampoos, personal deodorants, hair tonic, etc. Prayer is also made for damages and/or rendition of accounts. Along with the aforesaid suit an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 was also filed praying for the grant of ad interim injunction during the pendency of the suit restraining the appellant/defendant no.1 from manufacturing, selling, offering for sale, advertising in India and exporting their products under the Trase Mark VOV which is phonetically similar to the respondent’s/plaintiff’s Trade Mark VO5 in relation to aforesaid products. The respondent/plaintiff is engaged in the business of manufacture and distribution of wide range of cosmetic products such as hair sprays, shampoos, deodorants, hair and scalp conditioners, hair oil, hair tonic, and other allied products etc. It is alleged that in the year 1955, respondent/plaintiff through its predecessors adopted and started using the Trade Marks VO5 and V05 along with letters ‘ALBERTO’. With the passage of time, respondent/plaintiff also started using the Trade Mark VO in the course of trade in respect of its goods. The Trade Mark VO, VO5 is an essential, material and distinguishing feature of the said Trade Mark Label. As per respondent/plaintiff, it has acquired worldwide reputation. The respondent’s/plaintiff’s Trade Mark ALBERTO VO5, VO5 Label and V05 are duly registered in India under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The dates of registration are given in the plaint. It is alleged that in view of registration of its Trade Mark, respondent/plaintiff has exclusive rights thereto within the meaning of the aforesaid Act. The art works involved in the aforesaid Trade Mark/Label are original artistic work and the respondent/plaintiff holds copy right therein. It is alleged that art work involved in the respondent/plaintiff’s Trade Mark/Label VO5 along with the word ALBERTO is duly registered under the Indian Copyright Act, 1957. It is alleged that respondent/plaintiff has already built up a globally valuable trade under the aforesaid Trade Mark/Label and has conducted handsome business thereunder running into billions of dollars worldwide. The respondent/plaintiff has spent millions of dollars in advertising its products. It is alleged that respondent’s goods are known, recognized, demanded, sold and traded world over with reference to the said Trade Mark/Label. It is alleged that respondent’s/plaintiff’s goods under the aforesaid Trade mark/Label are available in Delhi including New Delhi and other parts of the country through its authorized importer and distributor M/s J.L.Morison (India) Ltd., “Crystal”, 79, Annie Besant Road, Worli, Mumbai-400018 also at 404, Rohit House 3 Tolstoy Marg, New Delhi-1100001.

 

3. It is alleged that the respondent/plaintiff is a global leader in the aforesaid goods and business. M/s Alberto Culver Company is the predecessor-in-title of the respondent/plaintiff. The said predecessor has assigned all rights, titles and interests in the aforesaid trade marks/ copyrights along with the goodwill to the respondent/plaintiff, vide a Deed of Assignment dated 14.04.2006. It is alleged that respondent/plaintiff is one of the Group Companies of M/s Alberto Culver Company.

 

4.       The respondent/plaintiff has alleged that appellant/defendant No.1 has adopted an identical/deceptively similar trade mark VOV (which is a colourable imitation of the respondent’s/plaintiff’s mark since ‘5’ is written in Roman numerals ‘V’) in relation to the same/similar goods being cosmetics including nail polish, lipstick, eye liner, compact, liquid kumkum and other beauty products etc. It is alleged that appellant/defendant no.1 had filed an application for registration of trade mark VOV which was abandoned. The defendant no.2 i.e.R.P. General Stores is the dealer/distributor of the appellant/defendant no.1 in Delhi including the markets of South Delhi. The trade mark VOV being used by the appellant/defendant no.1 in relation to their goods and business is identical with and deceptively similar to respondent’s/plaintiff’s said “VO, VO5 and VO5 with ALBERTO” trade marks in each and every respect including phonetically, structurally, conceptually and in its essential features. It is alleged that appellant/defendant no.1 by their impugned adoption and use of the trade mark VOV amounts to violating respondent’s/plaintiff’s trade mark and amounts to passing off their goods as that of respondent/plaintiff.

 

5. The case of the appellant/defendant no.1 is that respondent/plaintiff has wrongly invoked the territorial jurisdiction to entertain and try the present suit against appellant/defendant no.1. There is no cause of action in favour of respondent/plaintiff against appellant/defendant no.1. That the respondent/plaintiff has never used nor advertised the mark ALBERTO VO5 or VO5 in India at any point of time. It is alleged that appellant/defendant no.1 is carrying on its lawful business as manufacturer and merchant of cosmetics under the mark V O V (label) in a specific artistic way and the three letters V O V written within rectangles is altogether different and distinct from that of the mark ALBERTO VO5 of respondent /plaintiff. The appellant/defendant no.1 honestly and bona fidely adopted the mark V O V for kumkum only in the year 1987 and in the year 2002 added more cosmetic products under the mark VOV and has used the same openly and continuously. It is also alleged that there is no document on record to show that user/reputation of the mark ALBERTO VO5 in India. Respondent /plaintiff from time to time made statements before the Registrar of Trade Marks that the impugned mark is “proposed to be used”. It is stated that even in the matter of latest application no.1349772; filed by respondent /plaintiff on 8.4.2005 for the mark ALBERTO VO5 in India, the user shown is `proposed to be used’ which is clear indicator of the fact that even in 2005, respondent no.1/plaintiff had an intention to use the mark ALBERTO VO5 whereas appellant/defendant no.1 is using the mark V O V since 1987 for kumkum and since 2002 for other cosmetics. It is also stated that conduct of respondent/plaintiff shows that respondent/plaintiff is interested only to harass the appellant/defendant no.1 in one way or the other. It is stated that respondent /plaintiff has filed number of cases, the details of those are given in reply dated 12.8.2011 of appellant/defendant. It is alleged that the same shows conduct of respondent/plaintiff. It is also alleged that respondent no.1/plaintiff has never used or advertised the mark ALBERTO VO5 in India at any point of time. It is further alleged that respondent/plaintiff has filed a copy of the alleged distribution agreement dated 09.02.2009 with J.L.Morison (India) Ltd to show that J.L.Morison (India) is an exclusive distributor in Delhi. It is alleged that apart from the copy of agreement dated 9.2.2009, no other documents have been filed to prove that the alleged distributor is an ‘exclusive distributor’ or has at any point of time distributed the goods of respondent no.1/plaintiff under the mark ALBERTO VO5 in Delhi or within the jurisdiction of this court. It is their further stand that the goods of respondent no.1/plaintiff under the mark ALBERTO VO5 have never been sold in any part of India or within the jurisdiction of this court. It is further alleged that J.L. Morison (India) Limited is not an exclusive distributor of the respondent’s/plaintiff’s goods under the mark ‘ALBERTO VO5’. It is alleged that the so called distributor has never distributed the goods of the respondent’s/plaintiff’s in India under the mark ALBERTO VO5 at any time. It is alleged that as per respondent/plaintiff the distributorship was applied only on 09.02.2009 whereas appellant/defendant is using the mark V O V for kumkum in 1987 and in 2002 for other cosmetic products. It is further alleged that labels/packaging/artworks of appellant/defendant no.1 for the mark V O V are different from that of the labels/packaging/artworks of respondent/plaintiff impugned mark ALBERTO VO5 which is altogether different and distinct from the mark V O V of appellant/defendant no.1. 

 

6.       Vide impugned order dated 1st October, 2011, the learned trial court has allowed the application of the respondent/plaintiff under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC and has confirmed the order dated 9th September, 2010 thereby allowing the application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC.

 

7.       At this stage, it may be necessary to refer to the history of litigation between the parties to the present case.

 

8.       Respondent/plaintiff had earlier filed CS(OS) no.672/2004 on the original side of this court.  In that case, appellant/defendant herein was made the sole defendant. After pleadings were completed, issues were framed.   One of the issues framed, relates to the territorial jurisdiction of this court. 

9.       The learned Single Judge of this court vide order dated 27th August, 2010 treated the issue relating to territorial jurisdiction as a preliminary issue and held that this court has no jurisdiction to try the suit and ordered that suit be returned to the respondent/plaintiff to be filed before the Principal Civil Judge at Thane with the following observation:-“8. .………………………………………………………….. .……………………………………………………………….... ………………………………………………………………….. ………………………………………………………………….. In Dhodha House case, the Supreme Court held that the mere fact that the goods are available in a particular place – in that instance in Delhi or that they were sold in different area, would not itself mean that the plaintiff carried on any business in Delhi. This Court is bound by that ruling. The materials on record, particularly the pleadings, nowhere point to the plaintiff having any office in Delhi or even averring that it appointed a distributor whose office are located within the jurisdiction of the Court nor is there any averment whosoever vague disclosing that the plaintiff has any business either substantially or otherwise in the form of turn over from Delhi or for that matter in India. In these circumstances, this Court is satisfied that the suit so far as the infringement is concerned based upon the application of Section-134, is not maintainable.

 

9. So far as question as to whether any part of the cause of action has arisen in the jurisdiction of this Court is concerned, the documents available in the form of about 557 pages filed along with the list of documents would reveal that there is no material establishing that the defendant sold their products within the jurisdiction of this Court or anywhere in Delhi. No doubt, the plaintiff has a right to adduce the evidence in the trial to establish the defendant’s presence, but the Court is conscious of the fact that after issues were framed, parties were provided with the opportunity to produce further or additional documents. It was not pointed out that such additional documents were ever filed all this while after the issues were framed more than 4½ years ago. In any event, no such application for producing additional documents to establish the defendant’s presence within the territorial limits of this Court’s jurisdiction was ever moved. It is also settled that once issues are struck and the parties are required to lead evidence, there is no question of the Court entertaining the application for adducing further documentary evidence during the trial.

 

10.     Having regard to this, it is apparent that the Court now has to consider the effect of the two documents placed on the record by the defendant. While the defendant’s arguments that the Court’s enquiry is to be confined to while considering the plea about jurisdiction or the lack of it in the averments in the suit and the list of documents filed along with it as correct, at the same time, the Court cannot be oblivious of the materials which are on the record particularly after admission/denial. The defendant here has placed two invoices on the record. At best, they only indicate that some goods were dispatched to Delhi.  That by itself is sufficient, in the opinion of the Court, to hold that the defendant is either trading in Delhi or cause of action of such nature is occurred, occasioning the plaintiff to file the present suit. The two transactions at best would amount to a flash in the pan, which, in no way, establish that the dispute can be entertained as is sought to be urged by the plaintiff. In Sector Twenty One Owner’s Welfare Association v. Air Force Naval Housing Board 65 (1997) DLT 81, it was held that trivial or insignificant part of the cause of action arising at a particular place would not be enough to confer jurisdiction.

 

11. This Court is not persuaded to take a view different from that taken in Alberto’s case (supra) where the plaint was returned. In the circumstances, the suit is returned to the plaintiff to be filed before the Principal Civil Judge at Thane. Parties are directed to be present before the Principal Civil Judge, Thane, on 25th October, 2010.”

10.     The order dated 27th August, 2010 passed by the learned Single Judge attained finality as no recourse was taken by the respondent/plaintiff against the said order. During the period CS(OS) 672/2004 on the Original side of this court, there was no interim order operating between the parties. 

 

11. On 09.09.2010 the respondent/plaintiff instead of filing the returned plaint at the Courts at Thane, preferred a fresh suit against appellant/defendant No.1 at the District Court at Saket Courts Complex.  This time the respondent/plaintiff claimed that the court has territorial jurisdiction to try the suit in view of agreement dated 09.02.2009 whereby one J.L. Morison (India) Ltd. (hereinafter J.L. Morison) has been appointed as agents and distributors in India for their products marketed under the trade mark VO5 and that J.L. Morison has their regional distributorship at 404, Rohit House, 3 Tolstoy Marg, New Delhi. In addition, the defendant No.2 i.e. R.P. General Stores was made a party to the case. Here it may be mentioned that defendant No.2 was the same entity to whom the appellant/defendant No.1 had supplied the goods in pursuance of the two invoices which were relied by the plaintiff in CS(OS) No.672/2004 for contending that the courts at Delhi has the territorial jurisdiction to try the suit.

 

12.     The learned Additional District Judge to whom the suit was assigned granted ex parte stay to the respondent/plaintiff. After completion of pleadings the learned Additional District Judge vide order dated 28th May, 2011, in view of the fact that the office of the regional distributorship of J.L. Morison was at New Delhi district and not in South Delhi District returned the plaint for being presented before the court of competent jurisdiction and the interim order dated 9.9.2010 was ordered to be continued for a period of five days.

 

13.     The respondent/plaintiff presented the plaint returned by the court at Saket to the court of Additional District Judge-I, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi on 1st June, 2011. On the aforesaid dated the learned Additional District Judge, New Delhi, issued notice to appellant/defendant no.1 and  extended the interim order dated 9th September, 2010. The appellant/defendant preferred an appeal against the order dated 1st June, 2011 before this court which was registered as FAO 344/2011. The learned Single Judge of this court has disposed of the said appeal vide order dated 8th August, 2011. The relevant paras of the order dated 8th August, 2011 reads as under:-

“3. I agree with the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant that there is no question of extension of stay as has been done by the impugned order because after the plaint was returned by the order dated 9.9.2010 by the ADJ, at Saket Courts, Delhi, filing of the suit in a competent Court, there was a fresh filing of the suit and therefore whether or not injunction ought to have been granted should have been considered afresh keeping in mind the requirements of Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC. Also, the application of the respondent/plaintiff for seeking extension of injunction is also misconceived for self-same reason. If the trial Court was inclined to grant an ex parte injunction de novo, the trial Court ought to have discussed the triple factors, prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss and which are not found in the impugned order. The order is completely a non-speaking order.

 

4.       Accordingly, though the impugned order, in view of what is stated above, is liable to set aside, however, if one does not go on technicalities, it can also be said that the impugned order seeks to grant an ex parte injunction in a fresh suit. However, the ex parte injunction would suffer from the infirmities of not being a speaking order and not considering the necessary ingredients for grant of the injunction and more so on grant of an exparte injunction, the requirement of Order 39 Rule 3 CPC had to be directed to be complied with and which  has  not been done.

 

5.       Accordingly, while accepting the appeal and setting aside the impugned order, I direct that the matter be taken up by the trial Court on 17th August, 2011 and on which date the respondent/plaintiff will file an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC for grant of interim orders. I may hasten to clarify that though the impugned order is being set aside, interim order passed by the trial Court on 1.6.2011 is being continued only and only upto 17.8.2011 and when the trial Court will examine the issue with respect to entitlement of the respondent/plaintiff to an injunction uninfluenced by the fact that interim injunction is continued till 17.8.2011 and after ensuring that requirements of law for grant of an interim order in terms of Order 39 CPC are complied with. The trial Court will hear both the parties and pass a speaking order as to the entitlement or disentitlement of grant of interim orders.     With the aforesaid observations the appeal and application are disposed of.”

 

14.     Thereupon respondent/plaintiff filed fresh application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of CPC. The arguments were heard on the said application. Vide order dated 01.10.2011, impugned in this appeal, the learned ADJ confirmed the stay granted earlier on 09.09.2010.

 

15. On the territorial jurisdiction, Learned senior counsel Mr.Suhail Dutt appearing for the appellant/defendant no.1 has contended that the respondent/plaintiff has wrongly invoked the jurisdiction as per section 134(2) of the Act as respondent/plaintiff does not carry any business in Delhi either directly or through any exclusive dealer/distributor. It is contended that respondent/plaintiff has no sale in Delhi or even in India. It is contended that not even a single document is produced which shows any use or advertisement of trade mark ALBERTO VO5 by respondent/plaintiff in India. It is contended that as per respondent/plaintiff it has appointed authorized importer/distributor in India on 9.2.2009 but has failed to produce a single document to prove sales, if any, done by it in India either prior or even after its appointment. It is contended that jurisdiction or cause of action paras of the plaint does not say that J.L.Morrison Ltd. is the respondent/plaintiff’s “Exclusive Distributor”, the plaint only says “Distributor”. Learned Senior Counsel has also contended that the plaint of first suit was returned by this court in CS(OS) No.672/2002 vide order dated 27.8.2010 by holding that Delhi Courts lack territorial jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit.  In the said order, specific finding was given by the learned Single Judge of this court that two invoices of defendant no.2  placed on record were insufficient to hold that respondent/plaintiff was either trading in Delhi or cause of action had occurred at Delhi. It is contended that the said order was not assailed by respondent/plaintiff, as such, suit is barred by res judicata. It is further contended that plaint of second suit being Suit No.1389/2010 vide order dated 28.5.2011 by the learned ADJ, Saket, was returned to be presented before the court of competent jurisdiction. In that case, it was observed that court at Delhi lacks jurisdiction.

 

16.     On merits, learned senior counsel has contended that marks of both the parties are visually and phonetically different and customers of respondent/plaintiff’s are different. It is contended that the respondent’s/plaintiff’s products are not available in India. It is contended that in case the same are made available the same would be purchased by elite and literate society as the products of respondent/plaintiff are costly. It is further contended that the customers of products of both the parties are literate who can easily distinguish between the two in terms of the mark, their packaging, their use etc. It is contended that there is huge price variation of products of both the parties. It is further contended that products of both the parties are entirely different in use and their application. The appellant/defendant no.1’s products are nail polish, compact powder, kumkum, mascara, lip gloss etc and respondent/plaintiff only produces hair related products i.e., shampoo and conditioners. It is contended that respondent/plaintiff uses the word ALBERTO as a prefix to VO5 whereas appellant/defendant no.1 uses the single word V O V i.e., WOW which suggest great pleasure and amazement.  It is contended that in the earlier suit i.e. CS(OS) 672/2004 filed by respondent/plaintiff, no injunction in its favour was granted by this court and the said suit remained pending for 6 years. On return of the plaint, respondent/plaintiff filed a fresh suit at District Court at Saket Court Complex and obtained an ex parte order dated 9.9.2010 and later on the said plaint was also returned and thereafter injunction was granted vide impugned order dated 1st October, 2011 by the ld.ADJ, Patiala House Courts. In these circumstances, balance of convenience was also in favour of appellant/defendant no.1 and the learned trial court has not considered the same. It is contended that appellant/defendant no.1 has documentary evidence to prima facie show use of the mark trade VOV for the past 25 years whereas there is no prima facie case in favour of respondent/plaintiff. It is contended that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellant/defendant no.1 would suffer an irreparable loss and injury if the impugned order is not set aside.

 

17. Learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff has contended that respondent/plaintiff is a registered proprietor of trade mark VO5 in India, accordingly, the respondent/plaintiff is entitled for the remedy of infringement. It is contended that for the purpose of territorial jurisdiction, the respondent/plaintiff is entitled to special benefit of section 134(2) of the Act wherein respondent/plaintiff is provided with additional forum for filing suit in case of infringement of its trade mark at a place where respondent/plaintiff resides and carries on its business. It is further contended that respondent/plaintiff has also pleaded jurisdiction of this court on account of appellant’s/defendant no.1’s activities of selling its products in New Delhi area clandestinely and surreptitiously, under the provisions of section 20 of CPC. It is contended that M/s J.L.Morison India Ltd was appointed on 9.2.2009 as exclusive distributor of VO5 products in India and M/s J.L.Morison India Ltd has its office at Mumbai and also at Tolstoy Mark, New Delhi which is within the jurisdiction of this court, as such, courts at Delhi has jurisdiction to try the present suit. It is contended that respondent/plaintiff has Indian trade mark registrations for the mark ‘ALBERTO VO5’ (word mark) under No.196213B in Class 3 dated 30.5.1960; ALBERTO ‘VO5’ label under No.1349772 in Class 3 dated 8.4.2005; VO5 (word mark) under No.788766 in Class 3 dated 23.1.1998; VO5 logo under No.788768 in Class 3 dated 23.1.1998. It is contended that respondent/plaintiff has exclusive rights to use the trade mark VO5 under Sections 28 and 29 of the Act, 1999. It is contended that appellant/defendant no.1 in its trade mark application filed in the Trade Marks Office No.1263141 in Class 3 has claimed use of its trade mark V O V from 31st December, 2002 in relation to cosmetic preparations whereas in the present appeal, appellant/defendant no.1 is trying to claim use of the trade mark from 1986. It is contended that no document in this regard has been filed. It is contended that respondent/plaintiff has trade mark registration for ALBERTO VO5 since 1960 and VO5 from the year 1998 and respondent/plaintiff has claimed use of the mark internationally since 1955. It is contended that appellant/defendant no.1 has not been able to establish continuous use of the mark prior to respondent/plaintiff’s registration. It is contended that respondent/plaintiff is also entitled to the benefit of trans border use and reputation of the mark. It is further contended that the learned ADJ after considering the facts and circumstances of the case has exercised discretion by granting injunction in favour of respondent/plaintiff. It is contended that there is nothing on record to show that discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, as such, the appellate court would not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitutes its own unless discretion has been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously.

 

18.     In order to succeed in his application, the respondent/plaintiff was required to establish that it has a good prima facie case. Such inquiry would have necessarily required the examination of question as to whether the courts at Delhi have the territorial jurisdiction to try this suit. The respondent/plaintiff may have averred in the plaint that Courts at Delhi have jurisdiction to try this suit but the issue that would arise is as to whether the respondent/plaintiff has succeeded in prima facie showing that the courts at Delhi have such jurisdiction. The courts at Delhi have the jurisdiction to try the suit either under Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 or under Section 20 of CPC. Apart from relying on the two documents which relate to the transaction between the two defendants and which were held to be not sufficient to vest the courts at Delhi with the territorial jurisdiction in CS(OS) No.672/2004, the respondent/plaintiff has relied upon its dealership agreement with J.L. Morison which is having its regional distribution at 404, Rohit House, 3 Tolstoy Marg, New Delhi. The plaintiff also relies on the fact that the defendant No.2 is residing and carrying on business at Delhi.

 

19.     The respondent/plaintiff itself is neither registered at Delhi nor has its office at Delhi. It is otherwise not the case of the respondent/plaintiff that it is personally working for gain at Delhi. Thus, to that extent the position in the suit and the earlier suit remains the same. 

20.     In the case of Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi 2006 (9) SCC 4, the Supreme Court has held that the expression ‘carries on business’ and the expression, ‘personally works for gain’ connote two different meanings.  For the purpose of carrying on business only presence of a man at a place is not necessary. Such business may be carried at a place through an agent or a manager or through a servant.  The owner may not even visit that place.  The phrase ‘carries on business’ at a certain place would, therefore, mean having an interest in a business at that place, a voice in what is done, a share in the gain or loss and some control thereover. The expression is much wider than what the expression in normal parlance connotes, because of ambit of a civil action within the meaning of Section 9 of the Code. But it is, inter alia, necessary that the agent must be a special agent who attends exclusively to the business of the principal and carries it on in the name of the principal and not a general agent who does business for any one who pays him. In the case in hand, there is no allegation in the plaint that agent is an exclusive agent of the respondent/plaintiff. From the documents placed on record it would appear that J.L. Morison is doing the business for other persons also.  It is not shown at this stage that the respondent/plaintiff is having an interest in the business or at the place of business of J.L. Morison at Delhi, or a voice in what is done, or a share in the gain or loss and some control thereover. Not even a single document has been placed on record to show, sales if any, done by it in Delhi or India after the appointment of J.L. Morison as its distributor. Thus, under Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 is of no assistance to the respondent/plaintiff. To my mind, in the facts of this case, fact that the defendant No.2 is doing business at Delhi is also of no significance inasmuch as the two documents relating to the transaction between the two i.e. appellant/defendant no.1 and defendant no.2 were held to be not sufficient to vest the courts at Delhi with territorial jurisdiction. After having chosen to continue the earlier suit without making the defendant No.2 a party to the said suit the plaintiff cannot now agitate the same issue on the basis of same documents by making defendant No.2 a party to the suit. Every violation of a trade mark or act of passing of may be a fresh cause of action. That however, cannot mean the respondent/plaintiff is at liberty to rely on those very transactions, which were the subject matter of the earlier suit between the parties and which were specifically gone into by the court. Thus, Section 20 CPC is also not going to help the respondent/plaintiff at this stage.

 

21. In the circumstances, it appears to this court that respondent/plaintiff has failed to prima facie show that the courts at Delhi have territorial jurisdiction to try the suit for reason of his Dealership Agreement with J.L. Morison or on account of having made defendant No.2 party to the suit. 

 

22.     In view of above discussion, I do not find it appropriate to deal with other contentions of the parties as the same pertains to merits of the case. Accordingly, the other contentions and case law referred to by the parties have not been discussed herewith.

 

23.     Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order stands set aside. The trial court shall now proceed in accordance with law for which the parties shall appear before the learned Trial Judge on 16.7.2013. 

 

24.     The appeal stands disposed of.

 

25.     Nothing contained in this order shall be treated as expression of opinion on the merits of the case. 

 

 

Sd/VEENA BIRBAL, J JULY 1, 2013

DGT HOLDING CASE


COMMENT: In this Judgment, the Hon’ble Delhi High Court has laid down the important proposition.

1. The plaintiff would be entitled to institute an action of passing off in respect of a design used by him as a trade mark, provided the action contains the necessary ingredients to maintain such a proceeding. (Para No.10).

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
CS(OS) 1414 of 2012

DGT HOLDING B.V & ANR ..... Plaintiffs

Through: Mr. N. Mahabir and Dr. Sheetal Vohra, Advocates.

 
versus


RAVI SCIENTIC INDUSTRIES & ANR ..... Defendants

Through: Mr. Ashish Deep Verma, Advocate.


CORAM: JUSTICE S. MURALIDHAR
ORDER 11.07.2013





I.A. No. 20660 of 2012 (by Defendants under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC) and I.A. No. 9360 of 2012 (filed by Plaintiffs under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 CPC)
  
1. The background facts to the present suit have been set out in some detail in the order date 16th May 2012 passed by this Court in I.A. No. 9358 of 2012 filed by the Plaintiff under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC in paras 9 and 10 which read as under:
"9. As per the plaint, plaintiffs are in the business of manufacturing and marketing goods and products for use in Chess particularly clocks for use in chess matches. Since the year 1993 the plaintiffs have been producing several types of digital clocks and electronic chess boards. The products of the plaintiffs are sold in over 70 countries. One of the most successful products of the plaintiffs is DGT 2010 chess clock, which is the official FIDE chess clock. Plaintiffs are the copyright owners of the drawings/artistic work based on which the DGT FIDE clock was introduced. Plaintiffs are also the owners of packaging in which the clock DGT 2010 is packed and sold. Plaintiffs are advertising its products through their websites www.dgtprojects.com and www.digitalgametechnology.com.
 
10. Learned senior counsel for the plaintiffs submits that the plaintiffs have learnt that defendants have started selling clocks bearing identical trade dress, get up, in the market under a trade mark NEW 2020, which is deceptively similar to the plaintiffs trade mark DGT 2010. Defendants are also selling another model of Chess Clock bearing identical trade dress and get up. Counsel further submits that the defendants not only copied the entire colour combination but also copied all the features including shape/get up, drawings and even the brochure/user manual is identical to the brochure and the manual of the plaintiffs. Senior counsel further submits that in fact defendants’ packaging is a substantial reproduction of plaintiffs’ packaging. In support of his submission, learned senior counsel for the plaintiffs has drawn the attention of the Court to a comparison between clocks of the plaintiffs and the defendants as extracted in the plaint. Senior counsel for the plaintiffs has also produced in Court the original clocks of the plaintiffs and the defendant to show the similarity between both the clocks. Senior counsel next submits that the defendant has adopted a similar trademark NEW 2010 coupled with substantially similar shape and design as that of the plaintiffs DGT 2010 with a view to take undue advantage and ride over the goodwill and reputation of the plaintiffs. Senior counsel in these circumstances prays for ex parte ad interim injunction."



2. The Court accordingly on that day passed an ex parte ad interim injunction restraining the Defendants from selling, advertising, marketing its clocks or any other clock under the names ‘NEW 2020’ and ‘Chess Clock’, and the user manual, the packaging with the present trade dress and the identical features of the DGT 2010 clock.

3. The Court also appointed Local Commissioner (LC) to seize all the infringing products stored in the premises of the Ravi Scientific Industries. The report of the LC has been filed. The LC has, in the report, noted that when a third cupboard in the premises of the Defendants was opened, it had "identical clocks as the plaintiffs under the mark New 2020". Further, the "boxes found were the same on the exteriror as to that of the plaintiff and had a celphene wrapped on the said box". The LC was informed by Mr. Ravi Chadha, Proprietor of the Defendant No.1 that "he had no invoices" as he purchased them from the dealer Mr. Sagar and the money had been transferred from his account. He had been selling these items without bill (5 in number)". The LC also found other boxes which were plain white of identical dimension as that of the Plaintiffs’ DGT 2010 clocks. The covers on the said boxes were labeled as ‘Chess clock’. The picture on the sliding cover was identical to the Plaintiff’s clock DGT 2010. Mr. Chadha informed the LC that "these clocks were assembled here but the parts were imported from China". He also stated that "there were low volumes no margins and there were no account books available". The photographs of the stocks found at the Defendants’ premises have also been enclosed with the report.

 
4. The written statement was filed by the Defendants on 28th September 2012. The Defendants had also filed an I.A. No. 20660 of 2012 under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC on 5th November 2012 seeking the vacation of the interim orders dated 16th May 2012.



5. Counsel for the Defendants placed considerable reliance on the decision in Samsonite Corporation v. Vijay Sales 73 (1998) DLT 732 to urge that since registration of the Defendants design had been granted, the suit for passing off would not be maintainable.

 
6. Counsel for the Plaintiff, on the other hand, placed reliance on the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in Mohan Lal v. Sona Paint & Hardwares MIPR 2013 (2) 156 to contend that notwithstanding the grant of registration of the infringing design a suit for passing off would be maintainable. He also informed the Court that the Plaintiff had taken steps to have the registration of the infringing design in favour of the Defendants cancelled.

 
7. The Court finds the plea of the Defendants unsustainable in law. The majority in Mohan Lal v. Sona Paint & Hardwares has indeed answered the issue against the Defendants. The three issues that arose for consideration in the said decision were:
"I. Whether the suit for infringement of registered Design is maintainable against another registered proprietor of the design under the Designs Act, 2000?
II. Whether there can be an availability of remedy of passing off in absence of express saving or preservation of the common law by the Designs Act, 2000 and more so when the rights and remedies under the Act are statutory in nature?
III. Whether the conception of passing off as available under the Trade Marks can be joined with the action under the Designs Act when the same is mutually inconsistent with that of remedy under the Designs Act, 2000?"

8. The answers to issues 2 and 3, which are relevant to the case on hand, are as follows:
"…….a design can be used as a trade mark and if by virtue of its use, goodwill is generated in the course of trade or business, it can be protected by an action in the nature of passing off."……..
22. In our view, the aforesaid contentions are flawed for the reason that while the Trade Marks Act confers certain statutory rights qua a registered trade mark, it does not deprive a user of an unregistered trade mark the right to protect the misuse of his mark by a defendant who is in possession of a registered trade mark. Therefore, in so far as a design, which is registered under the Designs Act is concerned, it may not have the statutory rights, which a registered trade mark has, under the Trade Marks Act, it would certainly have the right to take remedial steps to correct a wrong committed by a defendant by instituting a passing off action. If such an action is instituted, the plaintiff would have to demonstrate that the registered design was used by him as a trade mark which, in the minds of the purchasing public is associated with his goods or services which, have acquired goodwill/reputation which is worth protecting. Quite naturally, result of such an action, would depend upon whether or not the plaintiff is successful in proving the essential ingredients involved in a passing off action, to which we have already made a reference hereinabove.
 
22.1 Therefore, the argument that since there is no saving clause in the Designs Act as found in Section 27(2) of the Trade Marks Act, and consequently such a remedy ought not to be made available qua a registered design, which is used as a trade mark, is in our view, completely without merit. As is obvious, such a passing off action would be based on a plea that: the design, which is an unregistered mark, was being used by the plaintiff for the purposes of business; and that the plaintiff's goods and/or services had acquired a reputation and/or goodwill, which were identified in the minds of the consumers, by associating the design/the mark, with the goods and/or services. In other words, the plea would be that the design which was being used as a mark identified the plaintiff, as the source of the goods supplied or services offered."
 

9. The Full Bench also approved the decision of the Bombay High Court in Gorbatschow Wodka KG v. John Distilleries Ltd. 2011 (47) PTC 100 (Bom.) and in particular the following passages:


"...15. The fact that the Defendant has obtained registration under the Designs Act, 2000, does not impinge the right of the Plaintiff to move an action for passing off. Section 27(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 provides that nothing in the Act shall be deemed to affect the right of action against any person for passing off goods or services. Section 27(2) is a statutory recognition of the principle that the remedy of passing off lies and is founded in common law.
 

16. Now, in the present case, the material which has been placed on the record by the Plaintiff, prima facie indicates that the Plaintiff has an established trans border reputation and that an integral part of that reputation lies in the shape of the bottle in which Vodka is sold. The shape of the bottle which the Plaintiff has adopted has no functional relationship with the nature sold. The shape, to use the language of a leading authority on the subject, is capricious. It is capricious in the sense that it is novel and originated in the ingenuity and imagination of the Plaintiff. The true test is not as to whether the Defendant took a search from the Design Register. As the first user of the shape, the Plaintiff was not bound to register it under the Designs Act, 2000. If the Defendant knew that the bottles of the Plaintiff with a distinctive shape were in the market -as a prudent person in the trade would know upon a diligent enquiry no amount of search in the Register would bring it within the purview of an honest adoption....

22. The test is whether the shape that has been adopted by the Plaintiff is one that is adopted capriciously, purely to give the article a distinctive appearance or characteristic of the goods of the manufacturer. If that be so, the manufacturer may be able to establish that he has a reputation and goodwill in the distinctive appearance of the article itself which would furnish a cause of action in passing off....

Secondly, under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the shape of goods and their packaging is statutorily recognized as a constituent element of a trade mark as distinguishing the goods or services of a person with those of others; Thirdly, the submission of the Plaintiff that no other manufacturer either globally or in India has adopted the shape of the bottle of the Plaintiff (save and except for the Defendant) has not been disputed in the course of submissions by counsel for the Defendant; Fourthly the shape which has been adopted by the Plaintiff is unique to the point of being capricious...."

10. Finally, the Full Bench crystallized its answers to the questions in para 34 of the judgment affirmatively holding that "The plaintiff would be entitled to institute an action of passing off in respect of a design used by him as a trade mark provided the action contains the necessary ingredients to maintain such a proceeding. The argument that such a suit could be instituted only after the expiry of the statutory period provided under Section 11 of the Designs Act, does not find favour with us". The Court also answered the issue stating that "a composite suit for infringement of a registered design and a passing off action would not lie".



11. The second plea that no registration of a trademark in relation to the shape of the products could be granted is also tenable. It will always be open to the Plaintiff, as long as it satisfies the Court about the ingredients of a suit for passing off, to maintain such action. The plea that the Plaintiff cannot claim infringement even on the basis of the Copyright Act should also fail for the same reason.



12. Learned counsel for the Defendants admitted that there was no document showing prior user of the infringing design by the Defendants. He also was candid that there were invoices to show that the Defendants’ products were in the market in the past five years.



13. The Court clarifies that the above observations are prima facie in nature and will not influence the final decision of the Court at the conclusion of the trial.

 

14. In the circumstances, the Court finds no reason to vacate the interim injunction granted in favour of the Plaintiff on 16th May 2012.



15. Accordingly, I.A. No. 20660 of 2012 filed by the Plaintiff under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC is dismissed, and I.A. No. 9358 of 2012 filed by the Plaintiff under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 CPC is disposed of by making the interim order 16th May 2012 absolute during the pendency of the suit.


CS(OS) No. 1414 of 2012
 

16. The following issues are framed:


(i) Have the Plaintiffs made out a case restraining the Defendants from advertising, marketing and selling clocks under the name of ‘NEW 2020’ clock or ‘Chess clock’ and any other clock similar thereto? OPP

(ii) Are the Plaintiffs entitled to a permanent injunction to restain the Defendants infringing the copyright in the artistic work of the Plaintiff in its DGT 2010 clock? OPP
 
 
      (iii) What is the effect of the Defendants having obtained registration under the Designs Act in respect of the infringing design? OPP


      (iv) Whether there is an infringement of copyright in the user manual and packaging of the Plaintiffs in their DGT 2010 clock by the Defendants by selling, advertising, marketing or making user manual or packaging with its ‘NEW 2020’ clock or ‘Chess clock’ and any other similar clock thereto? OPP


      (v) Are the Defendants liable for passing off their products being sold under the mark NEW 2020 and ‘Chess clock’ as that of the Plaintiffs’ DGT 2010 clock? OPP


      (vi) Are the Plaintiffs entitled to damages, as prayed for? OPP

      (vii) Are the Plaintiffs entitled to register the shape of their products under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and the effect thereof? OPD
      (viii) Relief.

      17. No other issue either arises or is pressed.
       
      18. List the matter before the Joint Registrar on 25th September 2013 for admission/denial of documents and for further steps. The affidavits by way

      of admission/denial be filed by that date.



       




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