Wednesday, March 19, 2025

Panasonic Holdings Corporation Vs Ashok Kumar

Fact of the Case:

Panasonic Holdings Corporation (Japan) and its Indian subsidiary, Panasonic Life Solutions India Pvt. Ltd., filed a suit against Ashok Kumar and others for infringing their registered trademark "ANCHOR" and associated device marks. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were manufacturing and selling counterfeit electrical packaging materials and products, including electric wires, bearing the plaintiffs' well-known mark "ANCHOR" and copying their trade dress, leading to consumer deception and reputational damage.

Procedural Background in Brief:

The plaintiffs filed a commercial suit seeking a permanent injunction, damages, and ancillary reliefs. The Delhi High Court granted an ex parte injunction on 14th February 2025 and appointed three Local Commissioners to seize the infringing goods from the defendants' premises. The plaintiffs were exempted from providing advance notice to the defendants to prevent the removal of counterfeit goods. Summons were issued to the defendants, and the matter was listed for further hearing.

Reasoning of Court:

The Court noted that the plaintiffs had established strong statutory and common law rights over the "ANCHOR" mark, widely used in India since 1996 and associated with high sales turnover and brand recognition. The Court found that the defendants' packaging and use of the mark "ANCHOR" were deceptively similar to the plaintiffs' mark and trade dress, likely to cause confusion among consumers. Additionally, the Court considered public safety concerns, as counterfeit electrical products could result in hazards such as short circuits or fires. The balance of convenience favored the plaintiffs.

Decision:

The Court passed an ex parte ad-interim injunction restraining the defendants from manufacturing, selling, or dealing in products or packaging bearing the plaintiffs’ "ANCHOR" mark or any deceptively similar variant. The Court also appointed Local Commissioners to seize infringing goods from the defendants' premises, authorized them to take inventories and photograph the seized stock, and directed police assistance for the enforcement of the commission.

Case Details:

Case Title: Panasonic Holdings Corporation Vs Ashok Kumar 
Date of Order: 14th February 2025
Case Number: CS(COMM) 126/2025
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Mondal Brothers Enterprises Pvt. Ltd.Vs The Registrar of Trade Marks

Fact of the Case:

Mondal Brothers Enterprises Private Limited, involved in manufacturing tarpaulin, vermi beds, wagon covers, and similar goods, acquired exclusive rights over the trademark "TARPEX" through a Deed of Assignment dated 1st September 2020. The petitioner discovered that respondent no. 3 had registered the mark "TARFLEX Tarp" (Device of Stars) in Class 22, which was deceptively similar to the petitioner’s prior registered mark "TARPEX". The petitioner argued that both marks were phonetically and structurally similar, leading to consumer confusion in the same line of business.

Procedural Background in Brief:

The petitioner filed an application under Sections 47, 57, and 125 of the Trademarks Act, 1999, seeking rectification and cancellation of the impugned mark registered in favor of respondent no. 3. Despite repeated service, respondent no. 3 failed to appear or file any written response. The Registrar of Trade Marks (respondent no.1) did not contest the petition.

Reasoning of Court:

The Court found that Mondal Brothers was the prior adopter and continuous user of the mark "TARPEX" since 2010. The impugned mark "TARFLEX" was found to be phonetically and structurally similar to "TARPEX", creating a likelihood of confusion. The Court noted that respondent no. 3 could not demonstrate any bona fide reason for adopting a similar mark and that the impugned mark lacked distinctive character, violating Sections 9(2) and other provisions of the Trademarks Act. The Court concluded that the impugned registration eroded the goodwill and exclusivity associated with the petitioner’s mark.

Decision:

The Court allowed the petition and ordered the rectification and cancellation of the trademark registration granted in favor of respondent no. 3. 

Case Details:

Case Title: Mondal Brothers Enterprises Private Limited Vs The Registrar of Trade Marks 
Date of Order: 6th March 2025
Case Number: IPDATM/1/2023
Neutral Citation: Not provided
Name of Court: High Court at Calcutta 
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur

Cabcon India Limited Vs Godha Cabcon and Insulation Limited

Fact of the Case:

Cabcon India Limited, a long-standing manufacturer and seller of aluminium conductors, cables, and related products, discovered that Godha Cabcon and Insulation Limited had adopted the mark "CABCON" as part of its corporate name and domain name. The plaintiff, who has been using the "CABCON" mark since 1991 and holds valid trademark registrations for the same, claimed that the defendant’s use of "CABCON" and "GODHA CABCON" in the same line of business was likely to cause confusion, amounting to infringement and passing off.

Procedural Background in Brief:

The plaintiff issued a cease-and-desist notice on 30th October 2023, but the defendant did not respond. Subsequently, Cabcon India Limited filed a suit seeking injunction and related reliefs. On 11th March 2024, an ad-interim order was granted by the Court restraining the defendant from using the mark "CABCON" and allowing only the use of "GODHA" without "CABCON." This interim order was later confirmed. Despite service of summons, the defendant failed to appear or file a written statement, prompting the plaintiff to seek a decree under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC.

Reasoning of Court:

The Court observed that the plaintiff was the prior and continuous user of the "CABCON" mark and had established goodwill and reputation in the industry. The defendant’s adoption of an identical and deceptively similar mark for identical goods (conductors and cables) created a high likelihood of confusion among consumers. The Court found that the defendant's conduct, including the use of the disputed mark in its domain name, indicated dishonest intent. Citing precedents on trademark infringement and passing off, the Court found no factual dispute requiring trial.

Decision:

The Court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff. A permanent injunction was granted restraining the defendant from using the mark "CABCON" or any deceptively similar variation thereof. The Court also held that the defendant could only use the mark "GODHA" independently.

Case Details:

Case Title: Cabcon India Limited Vs Godha Cabcon and Insulation Limited
Date of Order: 5th March 2025
Case Number: IP-COM/45/2024
Neutral Citation: Not provided
Name of Court: High Court at Calcutta 
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur

Pioneer Corporation Vs Mr. Gaurav Kumar

Fact of the Case:

Pioneer Corporation, a Japanese multinational and the registered proprietor of the "PIONEER" trademarks, engaged in manufacturing electronic products globally and in India since 1969, found that multiple defendants were involved in selling counterfeit car audio equipment and accessories under its well-known "PIONEER" marks. These activities were discovered during investigations and confirmed through raids at the defendants’ premises.

Procedural Background in Brief:

The Delhi High Court, on 14th October 2019, granted an ex parte injunction and appointed Local Commissioners, who executed searches on 23rd October 2019. Defendants no. 1 to 14 were eventually impleaded. Defendants no.1, 2, 3, and 9 settled with the plaintiff. Defendants no.4 to 8 and 10 to 14 failed to file written statements and were proceeded ex parte. The plaintiff then sought a decree under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC against the remaining defendants.

Reasoning of Court:

The Court noted that the plaintiff’s "PIONEER" marks are registered in India since 1969 and are globally recognized. The defendants' counterfeit products were visually similar to the plaintiff's goods and used the same marks without authorization. The defendants failed to contest the claims, and the reports of the Local Commissioners, which remained unchallenged, established the defendants' infringing conduct. The Court concluded that the defendants were guilty of trademark infringement and passing off.

Decision:

The Court granted a permanent injunction restraining defendants no.4 to 8 and 10 to 14 from using the "PIONEER" marks. The Court also awarded damages and costs of Rs. 1,50,000/- against each of the remaining defendants, in addition to prior costs borne by the plaintiff for court fees and commissioner fees.

Case Title: Pioneer Corporation Vs Mr. Gaurav Kumar 
Date of Order: 4th March 2025
Case Number: CS(COMM) 571/2019
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Ultratech Cement Limited Vs Sarbjeet Arora Tradi

Fact of the Case:

UltraTech Cement Limited and its affiliate, part of the Aditya Birla Group, alleged that Sarbjeet Arora trading as Lovely Sales Corporation was using the well-known trademark "UltraTech" and an identical yellow-black trade dress for manufacturing and marketing adhesive tapes and related products. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant's use of the "UltraTech" mark and similar trade dress in allied goods was causing confusion, misappropriating their goodwill, and infringing on their trademark rights.

Procedural Background in Brief:

The plaintiffs issued a cease and desist notice to the defendant in January 2025. Although the defendant initially responded with a willingness to "step down" from using the mark, no compliance was shown, prompting the plaintiffs to file the present suit. On 12th March 2025, the Delhi High Court heard the matter and noted that the defendant had been duly served but had failed to appear.

Reasoning of Court:

The Court found that the plaintiffs are the registered proprietors of over 150 trademarks containing "UltraTech," recognized as a well-known mark since 2011. The Court observed that the defendant's use of an identical mark and a deceptively similar color combination (yellow and black) for adhesive tapes, which are allied and cognate goods to cement products, could cause confusion among consumers. The Court found that the plaintiffs had made a prima facie case of trademark infringement and passing off.

Decision:

The Court granted an ex parte ad-interim injunction, restraining the defendant from using the mark "ULTRATECH" or any deceptively similar mark, trade dress, or get-up on its products or in business dealings. The Court also restrained the defendant from infringing the plaintiffs' copyright in their artistic trademarks and ordered compliance under Order XXXIX Rule 3 CPC within two weeks.

Case Title: Ultratech Cement Limited Vs Sarbjeet Arora Tradi
Date of Order: 12th March 2025
Case Number: CS(COMM) 229/2025
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Mini Pushkarna

TM 25 Holding BV Vs Akhtar Ali

Fact of the Case:

TM 25 Holding BV, a Netherlands-based company and part of the G-Star Group of Companies, is the registered proprietor of the well-known "G-STAR" trademarks globally, including India. The company discovered that Akhtar Ali and other defendants were engaged in manufacturing and distributing counterfeit jeans and apparel using the "G-STAR" and "G-STAR RAW" marks without authorization. The plaintiff alleged that these activities infringed its registered trademarks and copyright-protected logos, leading to reputational and commercial harm.

Procedural Background in Brief:

On 19th December 2023, the Delhi High Court granted an ex parte ad-interim injunction restraining the defendants from infringing the plaintiff's trademarks. Local Commissioners were appointed, who conducted raids at the defendants' premises, recovering large quantities of counterfeit goods. All six defendants failed to file written statements within the statutory period and were proceeded ex parte. Defendant no. 2 had made a statement in court that he had stopped using the infringing marks, but thereafter also stopped appearing.

Reasoning of Court:

The Court noted that the defendants had no credible defence and that the plaintiff had established valid trademark rights over the "G-STAR" marks. The Local Commissioners’ reports confirmed the large-scale counterfeit activity. The Court also highlighted that the defendants’ conduct lacked bona fides and was aimed at riding on the goodwill of the plaintiff's marks. The adoption of identical or deceptively similar marks was found to be deliberate and mala fide.

Decision:

The Court decreed the suit in favor of TM 25 Holding BV, granting a permanent injunction against the defendants. The Court awarded damages and costs totaling Rs. 7,20,000 across defendants no. 1 to 6. The Court also directed that infringing goods and labels be destroyed or used for charitable purposes where applicable.

Case Details:

Case Title: TM 25 Holding BV Vs Akhtar Ali
Date of Order: 13th March 2025
Case Number: CS(COMM) 904/2023
Neutral Citation: Not provided
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Mini Pushkarna

Living Media India Limited Vs Telegram

Fact of the Case:

Living Media India Limited and TV Today Network Limited, part of the India Today Group, are publishers of popular magazines such as "India Today", "Business Today", and "Reader’s Digest India". The plaintiffs alleged that several Telegram channels and bots were illegally disseminating pirated versions of their copyrighted magazines and using their registered trademarks without authorization. These infringing activities caused loss of paid subscriptions and financial harm to the plaintiffs.

Procedural Background in Brief:

The plaintiffs filed a suit against Telegram FZ LLC (defendant no.1) and various Telegram channels and administrators (defendants no.2 to 15) in 2022. Initially, Telegram (defendant no.1) assured the Court that it had taken down the infringing channels. The Court subsequently directed Telegram to disclose details of the infringing accounts, which were served via WhatsApp and text messages. Since defendants no.2 to 15 failed to file written statements, they were proceeded against ex parte in September 2024. Telegram complied with all takedown requests, and the matter proceeded to final adjudication.

Reasoning of Court:

The Court found that the plaintiffs had established ownership of the trademarks and copyrights for their publications. The defendants no.2 to 15, by distributing pirated versions of the plaintiffs' magazines and using their marks on Telegram channels, infringed the plaintiffs’ intellectual property rights. The Court observed that the defendants' non-appearance and lack of defence meant the plaintiffs' claims were deemed admitted. The Court further noted that Telegram (defendant no.1) had complied with its obligations and had removed the infringing content.

Decision:

The suit was decreed in favor of the plaintiffs. A permanent injunction was granted against defendants no.2 to 16, restraining them from further infringement. Telegram (defendant no.1) was held bound by its earlier commitments to promptly remove infringing content as notified by the plaintiffs. No additional reliefs were pressed by the plaintiffs.

Case Details:

Case Title: Living Media India Limited & Anr. vs Telegram FZ LLC & Ors.
Date of Order: 3rd March 2025
Case Number: CS(COMM) 120/2022
Neutral Citation: Not provided
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Dinesh Kumar Chowdhury Vs The Registrar of Trade Marks

Fact of the Case:

Dinesh Kumar Chowdhury, the appellant, was using the mark "GANRAJ-Chappan Bhog" in connection with his business under the name "Ganraj Papad Udyog." The private respondent no. 2, however, was the registered proprietor and prior user of the trademark "CHAPPAN BHOG" in respect of dried fruits (makhana), claiming use since 2003 and registration since 2011. Respondent no. 2 also owned copyright in the associated artwork. The dispute arose when respondent no. 2 filed a rectification application to remove the appellant’s mark from the trademark register, alleging dishonesty and deceptive similarity.

Procedural Background in Brief:

The Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks, by an order dated 6th August 2024, allowed the rectification application of respondent no. 2 and directed the removal of the appellant’s mark from the register. Aggrieved by this, Dinesh Kumar Chowdhury filed an appeal before the Calcutta High Court under IPDTMA/13/2024 challenging the Deputy Registrar's order.

Reasoning of Court:

The Court noted that respondent no. 2 was the prior user and proprietor of the "CHAPPAN BHOG" mark since 2003. After comparing the labels, the Court found significant similarities in the artwork, color scheme, packaging, and trade dress of both marks. Relying on precedents such as Ciba Ltd. v. M. Ramalingam and Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhat Shah, the Court emphasized the importance of preventing consumer confusion and protecting honest trade practices. The Court concluded that the appellant’s adoption of the mark was dishonest and likely to cause deception.

Decision:

The Calcutta High Court upheld the Deputy Registrar’s rectification order and dismissed the appeal filed by Dinesh Kumar Chowdhury. No costs were awarded.

Case Title: Dinesh Kumar Chowdhury Vs The Registrar of Trade Marks and Anr
Date of Order: 3rd March 2025
Case Number: IPDTMA/13/2024
Name of Court: High Court at Calcutta 
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur

Dominos IP Vs Dominic Pizza

Fact of the Case:

Dominos IP Holder LLC and its affiliate filed a suit against M/s Dominic Pizza and other entities for trademark infringement, passing off, and dilution. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were using the marks "Dominic Pizza" and "Domindo Pizza," which are deceptively similar to the plaintiffs' registered marks "Domino's" and "Domino's Pizza." The plaintiffs claimed that this unauthorized use caused confusion among consumers, especially through online platforms like Zomato and Swiggy, where the defendants had listed their infringing businesses.

Procedural Background in Brief:

The plaintiffs filed a commercial suit seeking permanent injunction along with interim relief. The Court granted exemption from pre-institution mediation and advance service due to urgency. The plaintiffs also moved an interim application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC seeking an ex parte injunction. The Court registered the suit and issued summons to the defendants.

Reasoning of Court:

The Court noted the plaintiffs’ extensive global presence and long-standing use of the "Domino's" mark since 1960. The Court found the adoption of the names "Dominic" and "Domindo" by the defendants to be phonetically and visually similar to the plaintiffs' marks, likely to mislead consumers. The Court also took into account the plaintiffs' claim that the defendants were exploiting online food delivery platforms to attract customers through deceptive listings. The Court accepted that a prima facie case of infringement and passing off was made out.

Decision:

The Court granted an ex parte ad-interim injunction restraining the defendants (nos. 1 to 5) from using the impugned marks "Dominic Pizza" and "Domindo Pizza" or any other deceptively similar mark to the plaintiffs' registered trademarks. The Court also directed Zomato and Swiggy (defendants nos. 6 and 7) to de-list the infringing businesses from their platforms until further orders.

Case Details:

Case Title: Dominos IP Holder Vs  Dominic Pizza 
Date of Order: 12th March 2025
Case Number: CS(COMM) 231/2025
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Mini Pushkarna

Puma SE Vs Mahesh Kumar

factual background:
puma se filed a suit against mahesh kumar for trademark infringement, unfair trade practices, and passing off. puma alleged that the defendant was engaged in manufacturing and selling counterfeit shoes using its well-known trademarks, including "puma" and its logo, without authorization. a local commissioner appointed by the court confirmed that counterfeit goods were being sold at the defendant’s premises, along with counterfeit products of other reputed brands like adidas and nike.

procedural background:
the court initially issued an ex-parte ad-interim injunction against the defendant on october 18, 2022, restraining them from manufacturing and selling counterfeit products. the defendant failed to file a written statement within the statutory period, leading to their right to defend being closed on september 18, 2024. the court proceeded with the case ex-parte and considered the plaintiff’s application for summary judgment.

provisions of law referred and their context:
the case primarily relied on the trade marks act, 1999, particularly sections 29(1) and 29(2), which prohibit trademark infringement. the plaintiff also invoked order xiii-a and order viii rule 10 of the code of civil procedure, 1908, to seek a summary judgment, arguing that the defendant had no real prospect of defending the claim. the court also considered section 151 cpc for inherent powers.

judgments referred with complete citation and context:
the court relied on louis vuitton malletier v. capital general store & ors., 2023 scc online del 613, which emphasized that counterfeiting is a serious commercial offense that erodes brand value and deceives consumers. the court also referred to jawed ansari v. louis vuitton malletier & ors., 

manu/deor/136880/2023, which upheld stringent action against counterfeiters. another key case cited was hamdard national foundation (india) v. sadar laboratories pvt. ltd., 2022 scc online del 4523, reinforcing that well-known trademarks require higher protection from infringement.

reasoning of the court:
the court found that the defendant was blatantly manufacturing and selling counterfeit goods using the plaintiff’s trademarks. the local commissioner’s report confirmed the large-scale counterfeiting operation, which also involved other well-known brands. since the defendant failed to defend the case, the court held that there was no genuine dispute requiring trial. it noted that counterfeit goods create consumer deception and harm brand reputation. given the strong evidence against the defendant, the court ruled that summary judgment was appropriate.

decision:
the court decreed the suit in favor of puma se and awarded actual litigation costs of ₹9,00,000, along with damages of ₹2,00,000, payable within three months. the defendant was permanently restrained from manufacturing or selling counterfeit products bearing puma’s trademarks. the court also directed the registry to draw up a decree in favor of the plaintiff.

case details:
case title: puma se vs. mahesh kumar
date of order: february 12, 2025 
case number: cs(comm) 725/2022
neutral citation: 2025:dhc:1552
court name: high court of delhi
hon'ble judge: justice mini pushkarna

Star India Private Limited Vs. Stream2Watch.Pk

Fact of the Case:

Star India Private Limited (plaintiff no.1) and Novi Digital Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. (plaintiff no.2) hold exclusive digital and television broadcasting rights for the ICC Men’s T20 World Cup 2024, under an agreement with the International Cricket Council (ICC). The plaintiffs discovered that several rogue websites, including Stream2Watch.Pk and others, were illegally streaming or making available to the public the plaintiffs’ exclusive content (matches and highlights) without authorization, infringing their copyright and broadcast reproduction rights under Section 37 of the Copyright Act, 1957.

Procedural Background in Brief:

The suit was filed prior to the commencement of the ICC T20 World Cup 2024, seeking a permanent injunction to restrain defendants from unauthorized dissemination of the matches. On 28th May 2024, the Delhi High Court granted an ex parte ad interim injunction in favor of the plaintiffs, restraining the initial set of rogue websites and directing blocking of these websites by ISPs and domain registrars. As further rogue websites were identified, plaintiffs successfully impleaded defendants no.33 to 175. The defendants failed to file written statements within the prescribed period, and no defence was raised.

Reasoning of Court:

The Court noted that the defendants did not contest the suit, and the averments made in the plaint were deemed admitted. The Court found that the defendants' unauthorized dissemination of the ICC T20 World Cup 2024 content resulted in irreparable harm to the plaintiffs by infringing their copyrights and broadcast rights, and eroding the commercial value of these exclusive rights. The Court concluded that no trial was warranted and the suit could be decreed under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC.

Decision:

The Court passed a decree of permanent injunction restraining defendants no.1 to 11 and defendants no.33 to 175 from illegally disseminating or broadcasting plaintiffs' exclusive content through rogue websites. The plaintiffs did not press for damages, as the interim reliefs had already been satisfied.

Case Details:

Case Title: Star India Private Limited & Anr. vs. Stream2Watch.Pk & Ors.
Date of Order: 3rd March 2025
Case Number: CS(COMM) 455/2024
Neutral Citation: Not provided
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Eureka Forbes Limited Vs. Mr. Vinod K.

Fact of the Case:

Eureka Forbes Limited, a leading manufacturer and marketer of home appliances including water purifiers, alleged that Mr. Vinod K. and his company were selling counterfeit spares/consumables using the plaintiff's trademarks such as 'AQUAGUARD', 'AQUASFILTER', 'ACTIVE COPPER MAXX', and the slogan 'PAANI KA DOCTOR'. The counterfeit products used identical marks, get-ups, and labels, misleading consumers and infringing upon the plaintiff's intellectual property rights.

Procedural Background (in brief):

The suit was filed on 19th May 2023 seeking permanent injunction and ancillary reliefs. An ex parte ad interim injunction was granted on 23rd May 2023, along with the appointment of Local Commissioners. Infringing products were seized on 26th May 2023. Defendant No. 1 (Mr. Vinod K.) failed to file an effective written statement and was later proceeded ex parte on 11th December 2024. Defendant No. 2 settled the dispute, and the suit was decreed against him on 11th December 2024.

Reasoning of Court:

Defendant No. 1 failed to contest the suit; hence, the averments in the plaint were deemed admitted. The plaintiff proved ownership of well-known trademarks and copyright in artistic works. Evidence, including the Local Commissioner’s report and documents such as sales turnover, trademark and copyright certificates, supported the plaintiff’s claims. The defendant’s use of identical marks and trade dress amounted to trademark infringement, copyright infringement, and passing off. The defendant’s misconduct, including threatening the Local Commissioner, was noted as aggravating conduct.

Decision:

A permanent injunction was granted restraining Defendant No. 1 from using the plaintiff’s marks and get-ups. Damages and costs amounting to Rs. 3,00,000 were awarded to the plaintiff. The suit was decreed in favor of the plaintiff under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC.

Case Details:

Case Title: Eureka Forbes Limited (Formerly Forbes Enviro Solutions Limited) vs. Mr. Vinod K. and Anr.
Date of Order: 4th March 2025
Case Number: CS(COMM) 335/2023
Neutral Citation: Not provided
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Friday, March 14, 2025

Google LLC Vs. DRS Logistics (P) Ltd.

Trademark infringement and Google Ad keywords 

Introduction: The case revolves around whether the use of a trademark as a keyword in Google Ads constitutes "use" under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and if Google can claim protection as an intermediary under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000. DRS Logistics, the plaintiff, alleged that Google allowed third parties to use its trademark "Agarwal Packers and Movers" as a keyword, leading to traffic diversion to competitors' websites. Google contended that using trademarks as keywords did not amount to infringement under the Trade Marks Act and that it was protected under intermediary safe harbor provisions of the IT Act.

Factual Background: Google LLC, a US-based company, operates the Google Search Engine and Google Ads Programme. Its Indian subsidiary, Google India Private Limited, acts as a reseller of the Ads Programme in India. DRS Logistics is engaged in packaging, moving, and logistics services and owns the trademark "Agarwal Packers and Movers", which it claims has gained reputation and goodwill.

DRS alleged that competitors were using its registered trademark as keywords to appear in Google Ads, misleading customers and diverting traffic. The Google Ads Programme allows advertisers to bid for keywords, and Google ranks ads based on Quality Score and Maximum Cost Per Click (CPC). DRS claimed that Google's auction model encouraged trademark misuse for monetary gain.

Procedural Background:DRS filed a suit under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC for an injunction against Google from permitting third parties to use its trademark as keywords. The Single Judge ruled in favor of DRS, holding that using trademarks as keywords constitutes "use" under the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and that Google could not claim safe harbor protection under Section 79 of the IT Act. Google appealed against this decision before the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court.

Issues Involved: Whether the use of a registered trademark as a keyword in Google Ads constitutes "use" under the Trade Marks Act, 1999? 

Submissions of the Parties: DRS contended that the use of its trademark in Google Ads led to consumer confusion and amounted to passing off. It argued that Google actively promoted the use of trademarks as keywords, allowing competitors to benefit unfairly from DRS’s reputation. DRS also claimed that Google’s Keyword Planner tool encouraged advertisers to select well-known trademarks to maximize ad visibility.

Google argued that the use of a trademark as a keyword did not qualify as use in commerce under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, as it was not visible to consumers. It relied on international decisions, including Veda Advantage Ltd. v. Malouf Group Enterprises Pty Ltd. (2016 FCA 255) and Intercity Group (NZ) Ltd. v. Nakedbus NZ Ltd. (2014 NZHC 124), where courts ruled that using trademarks as keywords does not constitute "use" for infringement claims. Google also asserted that it was a neutral intermediary and could not be held liable for advertisers’ actions under Section 79 of the IT Act.

Discussion on Judgments and Citations:The court examined multiple judgments on keyword advertising. It referred to the European Court of Justice's ruling in Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA (C-236/08 to C-238/08), which held that using trademarks as keywords could amount to infringement if it caused confusion. The court also cited Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc. (562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009)), where a US court ruled that selling trademarks as keywords constituted use under the Lanham Act.

In contrast, the Australian case of Veda Advantage Ltd. v. Malouf Group Enterprises Pty Ltd. (2016 FCA 255) held that using a trademark as a keyword did not amount to trademark use, as keywords were not visible to consumers. Similarly, in NZ Fintech Ltd. v. Credit Corp Financial Solutions Pty Ltd. (2019 NZHC 654), the New Zealand High Court ruled that Google’s keyword advertising model did not amount to trademark use.

The court distinguished these foreign judgments by emphasizing that Indian trademark law does not require "visual representation" for use. It relied on Hamdard National Foundation v. Hussain Dalal (2013 SCC OnLine Del 2289), where the Delhi High Court recognized "invisible use" of trademarks as a form of infringement. The court also cited Amway India Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. v. 1MG Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (2019 SCC OnLine Del 9061), which held that meta-tags and keywords can infringe a trademark if they divert traffic from the trademark owner.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: The court held that using trademarks as keywords in Google Ads qualifies as "use" under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, as it influences consumer behavior and affects market competition. It rejected Google's argument that keywords were invisible to consumers, stating that the economic function of a trademark is to attract customers, and any unauthorized use that diverts traffic undermines its purpose.

Regarding Section 79 of the IT Act, the court ruled that Google does not qualify as a passive intermediary because it actively participates in ad placement and profits from keyword sales. The court noted that Google curates ads using its algorithms and Keyword Planner tool, making it an active player rather than a neutral intermediary.

The court also emphasized that Google's policies differed across jurisdictions, restricting trademark use in Europe but allowing it in India, thereby failing to exercise a higher duty of care in protecting trademarks.

Final Decision: The court upheld the Single Judge’s ruling and directed Google to:
Investigate complaints regarding unauthorized use of trademarks as keywords. Review whether Google Ads result in trademark infringement or passing off. Remove ads that violate trademark rights. Google was denied safe harbor protection under Section 79 of the IT Act.

Law Settled in This Case: Using trademarks as keywords in Google Ads constitutes "use" under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Such use can amount to trademark infringement if it misleads consumers or diverts traffic unfairly. Google is not entitled to intermediary protection under Section 79 of the IT Act if it actively participates in ad placement. Invisible use of a trademark (such as in keywords) can amount to infringement if it affects the economic function of the mark.

Case Title: Google LLC Vs. DRS Logistics (P) Ltd. 
Date of Order: August 10, 2023
Case No.: FAO(OS)(COMM) 2/2022 
Neutral Citation: Not specified
Court: Delhi High Court
Judges: Hon'ble Justice Vibhu Bakhru and Justice Amit Mahajan

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney] ,High Court of Delhi

Glaxo Smithkline Consumer Healthcare Vs. Amigo Brushes Private Limited

A slight modification of an existing design does not confer exclusive rights.

Introduction:The case of Glaxo Smithkline Consumer Healthcare vs. Amigo Brushes Private Limited & Anr. revolves around an alleged infringement of a registered toothbrush design. The plaintiff, a global healthcare company, sought an interlocutory injunction restraining the defendant from manufacturing, selling, or offering for sale toothbrushes that were claimed to be an obvious and fraudulent imitation of the plaintiff’s registered design. The primary issues in the case were whether the defendant had infringed the plaintiff’s registered design and whether the plaintiff was entitled to an interlocutory injunction.

Factual Background:Glaxo Smithkline Consumer Healthcare, a German company, was engaged in the healthcare sector, including the design and sale of toothbrushes. The company obtained a design registration (No. 183197) dated February 15, 2000, in Class 3 for toothbrushes. The design was claimed to be novel and unique. Under the Designs Act, 2000, this registration granted the plaintiff copyright protection for five years, extendable by two successive periods of five years each. The plaintiff also secured corresponding design registrations in multiple countries.

In 2003, the plaintiff discovered that defendant No. 2, Hindustan Lever Limited (HLL), was selling toothbrushes under the brand name "Pepsodent Cushion," which was alleged to be a fraudulent imitation of the plaintiff's design. The packaging of the toothbrush disclosed that it was manufactured by Amigo Brushes Private Limited, which was initially named as defendant No. 1 in the suit. The plaintiff had previously initiated legal proceedings against HLL in another suit (CS No. 2515/96), where the interim relief was denied. The plaintiff had also filed copyright infringement suits against HLL in the Bombay High Court.

HLL, in its defense, contended that it was merely a marketer of the toothbrushes, not the manufacturer. The toothbrush handles were imported from China by Seema Impex, which supplied them to Amigo Brushes Pvt. Ltd. for bristling and finishing. The final product was then marketed by HLL under its brand. The defendant argued that the plaintiff’s design lacked novelty and was already in the public domain due to prior publication in the British Dental Journal. It also claimed that the plaintiff’s design was primarily functional and thus ineligible for protection under the Designs Act.

Procedural Background:The plaintiff sought a permanent injunction against the defendants, along with interim relief under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC. After service of notice, defendant No. 2, HLL, contested the application, while the plaintiff withdrew its claims against defendant No. 1, Amigo Brushes Pvt. Ltd. The case proceeded against HLL alone. The defendant argued that the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties, including the Chinese manufacturer and the importer, Seema Impex.

The plaintiff contended that it was entitled to interim relief based on the novelty of its design and the defendant’s deliberate imitation. It submitted that the defendant had previously attempted to imitate its designs and was aware of the plaintiff’s rights. The defendant, however, claimed that the plaintiff’s design lacked originality, had been previously published, and was primarily functional. The defendant also argued that the plaintiff had delayed in filing the suit and had misrepresented facts.

Issues Involved: Whether the defendant’s toothbrush was a fraudulent or obvious imitation of the plaintiff’s registered design, amounting to design infringement? 

Submissions of the Parties:The plaintiff argued that its registered design was novel and had not been previously published. It contended that the defendant had knowingly copied its design to deceive consumers. The plaintiff relied on Castrol India Ltd. v. Tide Water Oil Co. Ltd. (1996 PTC 202) to assert that fraudulent imitation was evident from the similarities in shape, configuration, and ornamentation. It also cited Walker & Co. v. A.G. Scott & Co. (1892 RPC 482) to argue that even an arrangement of well-known parts could constitute a new design.

The defendant countered that the plaintiff’s design lacked novelty and was published in the British Dental Journal before registration, making it unenforceable under Hello Mineral Water Pvt. Ltd. v. Thermoking California Pure (2000 PTC 177). The defendant relied on AMP Incorporated v. Utilux Proprietary Ltd. (1972 RPC 103) and Stenor Ltd. v. Whitesides (1946 RPC 81) to argue that functional designs were not protectable. It also cited Dover Ltd. v. Nurnberger Celluloidwaren Fabrik Gebruder Wolff (1910 RPC 498) to contend that mere trade variants did not constitute a new design.

Discussion on Judgments and Citations:The court analyzed precedents cited by both parties. AMP Incorporated v. Utilux Proprietary Ltd. (1972 RPC 103) held that functional features dictated solely by necessity cannot be protected as designs. This was applied to reject the plaintiff’s claim that the thickness of the handle was novel. Stenor Ltd. v. Whitesides (1946 RPC 81) emphasized that small mechanical variations do not create a new design and was used to counter the plaintiff’s argument that its toothbrush had a unique aesthetic appeal. Dover Ltd. v. Nurnberger Celluloidwaren Fabrik Gebruder Wolff (1910 RPC 498) established that a design must be truly original, not just a variation of existing products, leading the court to find that the plaintiff’s handle was merely a trade variant. Smithkline Beecham Consumer Healthcare GmbH v. G.D. Rathore (2002 PTC 243 (Del)) had previously denied an injunction for a similar toothbrush due to lack of distinctiveness, which the court followed. Castrol India Ltd. v. Tide Water Oil Co. Ltd. (1996 PTC 202) was cited by the plaintiff to argue fraudulent imitation, but the court found the comparison unpersuasive.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:The court ruled that the plaintiff’s design was primarily functional and lacked originality. The court held that the plaintiff’s claim was limited to the handle grip, which was a necessary functional component and not a standalone article under Section 2(a) of the Designs Act, 2000. The thickness of the handle was dictated by ergonomics, making it unprotectable under AMP Incorporated v. Utilux Proprietary Ltd. Prior publication in the British Dental Journal invalidated the claim of novelty. The plaintiff had suppressed material facts regarding previous cases where similar claims were rejected. The defendant’s product had minor differences, making it distinguishable.

Final Decision: The court refused to grant an interlocutory injunction, stating that the plaintiff had not established a prima facie case. The balance of convenience was in favor of the defendant, and the plaintiff would not suffer irreparable harm since it was not selling the toothbrush in India. The suit was not dismissed but was set for trial on merits.

Law Settled in This Case: Functional designs are not protectable under the Designs Act, 2000. A design must have an aesthetic appeal beyond mere utility. Prior publication can invalidate a design registration. If a design has been publicly disclosed before registration, it loses novelty. Trade variants do not qualify as new designs. A slight modification of an existing design does not confer exclusive rights. Suppression of material facts can disqualify a party from obtaining an interim injunction. Courts expect full disclosure of relevant proceedings.

Case Title: Glaxo Smithkline Vs. Amigo Brushes Private Limited 
Date of Order: December 11, 2003 
Citation: 2004 (28) PTC 1 (DEL) 
Court: Delhi High Court 
Judge: Hon'ble Justice Mahmood Ali Khan

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney] ,High Court of Delhi

Diageo Brands Vs Alcobrew Distilleries India Pvt Ltd

The standards for evaluating novelty and originality differ from the standards for determining infringement

Introduction:The case of Diageo Brands B.V. & Anr. vs. Alcobrew Distilleries India Pvt. Ltd. before the Delhi High Court concerns the enforcement of rights under the Designs Act, 2000. The plaintiffs alleged piracy of their registered bottle design used for alcoholic beverages. The court examined the fundamental principles governing the assessment of novelty and originality in registered designs vis-à-vis prior art and the criteria for determining infringement under Section 22 of the Designs Act.

Factual Background:The plaintiffs, Diageo Brands B.V. and its Indian licensee United Spirits Ltd., are part of the globally renowned Diageo Group, which manufactures and sells several popular liquor brands. The plaintiffs are the proprietors of a registered design, Design No. 306577, covering the shape and configuration of a 180 ml bottle, referred to as the “Hipster.” The plaintiffs claim that the Hipster bottle, inspired by smartphone aesthetics, has distinctive features including a rectangular shape, symmetrical edges, rounded shoulders, a ‘V’ shaped neck, plateau-like raised front and rear walls, a rimmed rounded cap, and a dimpled bottom.

The defendant, Alcobrew Distilleries India Pvt. Ltd., sells its whisky product “Golfer’s Shot” in a bottle that the plaintiffs allege infringes their registered design. The plaintiffs pointed out that Alcobrew previously sold its 180 ml products in a differently shaped bottle but switched to the alleged infringing design after the success of the Hipster bottle.

Procedural Background:The plaintiffs filed a suit for injunction before the Delhi High Court under Section 22 of the Designs Act, 2000, and also sought to restrain the defendant from using the tagline “Pocket Shot,” allegedly similar to the plaintiffs’ “Pocket Scotch.” The plaintiffs relied on a prior favorable decision in Diageo Brands B.V. & Anr. vs. Great Galleon Ventures Pvt. Ltd., where the same design was protected against a near-identical infringing product. The defendant contested the interim relief application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC, arguing that the design lacked novelty due to prior publication and that there were clear differences between its product and the plaintiffs’ Hipster bottle.

Issues Involved: Whether the plaintiffs' registered design is novel and original as against prior art?Whether the standards for evaluating novelty and originality differ from the standards for determining infringement?

Submissions of Parties: The plaintiffs argued that the design's novelty had been upheld in Diageo v. Great Galleon and that the defendant’s product imitated all the essential features of the registered design. They further submitted that the comparison between the registered design and prior art is distinct from the assessment of infringement between the registered design and the defendant's product, which is judged from the perspective of the ordinary consumer.  The defendant argued that the Hipster design lacked novelty and was similar to earlier designs such as US Design No. D562138. The defendant also submitted that the differences in the defendant’s product — including dimensions, roundness of edges, and neck shape — were sufficient to avoid infringement.

Discussion on Judgments Cited:  The court referred to multiple judgments to clarify the distinction between novelty analysis and infringement analysis and to identify the legal standards applicable in design law cases.

B. Chawla & Sons vs. Bright Auto Industries, AIR 1981 Delhi 95:Context: Cited by the defendant to establish that novelty must be judged by an “instructed eye,” i.e., an individual aware of prior art and common trade practices. Law laid down: The Delhi High Court held that novelty and originality are to be judged by an instructed person familiar with common trade knowledge. The mere introduction of ordinary trade variants into an old design does not render it new or original.

Negretti & Zambra v. WF Stanley & Co., (1925) 42 RPC 358: Context: Cited by the defendant to argue that for a humble or basic design, infringement requires virtual identity between the registered design and the allegedly infringing product.  Law laid down: The Chancery Division of the UK High Court held that in cases of simple designs, even small differences could be sufficient to defeat an infringement claim. The court emphasized that infringement must be judged “by the eye,” and minor but noticeable variations in appearance could be enough to distinguish two designs.

Phillips v. Harbro Rubber Co., (1920) 37 RPC 233: Context: Referred to reinforce the principle that novelty or originality requires more than mere trade variants and that the instructed eye is the proper standard.Law laid down: Lord Moulton held that a registered design must differ in a substantial manner from prior designs to be considered novel. The instructed eye standard was reaffirmed for novelty analysis.

Carlsberg Breweries A/S v. Som Distilleries & Breweries Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine Del 8125: Context: Relied upon by the defendant to support the argument that infringement of a registered design must be assessed on the basis of an overall visual impression and not by isolating common trade features. Law laid down: The Delhi High Court held that design infringement requires an assessment of the overall appearance of the registered design compared to the alleged infringing design. Features common to the trade or minor variations that do not affect the overall visual impression are not actionable.

Castrol Ltd. v. Tide Water Oil Co. (India) Ltd., 1994 SCC OnLine Cal 303: Context: Referred to by the defendant to argue that not every resemblance amounts to infringement.  Law laid down: The Calcutta High Court held that imitation does not mean duplication, and the comparison must be of the design as a whole. A mere resemblance in certain parts or features is insufficient for infringement.

Dover Ltd. v. Nurnberger Celluloidwaren Fabric Gebruder Wolff, (1910) 27 RPC 498: Context: Cited by the defendant to argue that trivial or infinitesimal variations do not make a design registrable, and that newness must be confined to a substantial and significant part of the design. Law laid down: The court held that for a design to be registrable or to avoid infringement, there must be a substantial and non-trivial difference that creates a distinct identity in the eyes of an instructed person.

Reasoning and Analysis of Judge: The court recognized that the plaintiffs’ registered design had already been upheld as valid in Diageo v. Great Galleon. However, the court clarified that the standards for determining novelty and infringement differ. For novelty, the court emphasized that the standard is the “instructed eye,” aware of prior art and trade practices. Infringement, however, is determined from the perspective of the ordinary consumer or purchaser, i.e., whether the general public perceives the two designs as visually similar.

Applying this distinction, the court noted that while the Hipster design may be novel vis-à-vis the prior art, such as D562138, the question of infringement depended on whether the defendant’s Golfer’s Shot bottle was substantially similar to the Hipster design in the eyes of an ordinary buyer.The court carefully compared the two designs and found visible differences in the neck shape, shoulder configuration, dimensions, and finish of the bottles. It held that such differences would be perceptible to an ordinary consumer and would likely dispel confusion.

Once the Court finds that the distinguishing features in the suit design vis-à-vis prior art, on the basis of which the suit design claims originality and novelty, are also applicable to the impugned design vis-a-vis the suit design, the impugned design has necessarily to be treated as novel and original vis-à-vis the suit design. That conclusion, if arrived at, would rule out, altogether, the allegation of piracy.

The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that similarities in broad elements such as the “hip flask shape” or the rimmed cap were sufficient to establish piracy. The court held that these were common to the trade and not exclusive to the plaintiffs' registered design.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ interim injunction application, holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of piracy under Section 22(1) of the Designs Act. However, the court allowed the suit to proceed to trial for full adjudication based on evidence.

Law Settled in this Case: The court clarified that the novelty of a registered design is to be assessed from the perspective of an instructed eye aware of prior art and industry practices. In contrast, design infringement or piracy under Section 22(1) must be evaluated from the viewpoint of the ordinary consumer, based on the overall visual impression of the two designs. For humble or basic designs, infringement will only be found where the defendant’s design is nearly identical to the registered design, with minor differences being sufficient to avoid liability.Common trade features such as basic shapes or standard configurations cannot be monopolized through a registered design and cannot by themselves form the basis of an infringement claim.

Case Title: Diageo Brands B.V. & Anr. vs. Alcobrew Distilleries India Pvt. Ltd.
Date of Order: 19 December 2022
Case No.: CS(COMM) 30/2022 
Neutral Citation: 2022/DHC/005661
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney] ,High Court of Delhi

Devi Pesticides Private Ltd. Vs Shiv Agro Chemicals Industries

A registered trademark enjoys statutory protection and cannot be diluted merely by adding a prefix

Introduction: The case of Devi Pesticides Private Ltd. vs. Shiv Agro Chemicals Industries is a notable decision concerning trademark infringement and passing-off within the agrochemical industry. The dispute arose when Devi Pesticides Private Ltd. (the plaintiff), a company engaged in the manufacture and sale of fertilizers and flowering stimulants under the trademark "BOOM PLUS," alleged that Shiv Agro Chemicals Industries (the defendant) was selling similar products under the trademark "SUPER BOOM," resulting in confusion among consumers, particularly illiterate farmers.

Factual Background:The plaintiff, Devi Pesticides Private Ltd., has been in the business of manufacturing fertilizers and flowering stimulants since 1985 and has been using the trademark "BOOM PLUS" since 1987. The trademark "BOOM PLUS" was registered under Trademark No. 473179 in Class 1 on June 5, 1987, and the registration has been periodically renewed. Additionally, the plaintiff has four other registered trademarks associated with "BOOM PLUS." The plaintiff's products are well-established in the market, with significant annual sales of approximately one crore rupees, supported by regular advertising expenditure.

In July 2004, the plaintiff discovered that the defendant, Shiv Agro Chemicals Industries, was marketing fertilizers and flowering stimulants under the trademark "SUPER BOOM." The plaintiff claimed that "SUPER BOOM" was deceptively similar to "BOOM PLUS" and could cause confusion among the target consumers, who were mostly farmers with limited literacy.

Procedural Background:The plaintiff filed a suit for perm anent injunction against the defendant before the Madras High Court, seeking to restrain the defendant from infringing its registered trademark "BOOM PLUS" and from passing off its goods as those of the plaintiff. Along with the suit, the plaintiff filed two applications for interim injunction in O.A. Nos. 904 and 905 of 2004 in C.S. No. 862 of 2004.

The defendant filed a counter affidavit contesting the plaintiff's claims, asserting that the word "BOOM" was generic and commonly used in the agrochemical industry and that there was no similarity or likelihood of confusion between "BOOM PLUS" and "SUPER BOOM."

The learned Single Judge dismissed both applications for interim injunction on April 26, 2005, concluding that there was no visual or phonetic similarity between the two marks. Aggrieved by the order, the plaintiff preferred appeals before the Division Bench of the Madras High Court.

Issues Involved:Whether the use of "SUPER BOOM" by the defendant was deceptively similar to "BOOM PLUS" and amounted to passing off?

Submissions of Parties: The plaintiff contended that it had established substantial goodwill and reputation associated with its registered trademark "BOOM PLUS" since 1987. It argued that the defendant's use of "SUPER BOOM" was phonetically similar to "BOOM PLUS" and could cause confusion, particularly among the targeted consumers who were mostly illiterate farmers. The plaintiff also relied on its status as a prior user and owner of a registered trademark to assert exclusive rights under Section 28 of the Trademarks Act, 1999. It was further submitted that the addition of the word "SUPER" did not distinguish the defendant's mark from the plaintiff’s.

The defendant countered that "BOOM" was a common and descriptive term used widely in the industry and lacked distinctiveness. It argued that the defendant's mark "SUPER BOOM" was visually and structurally different from "BOOM PLUS," and the two marks would not cause any confusion. The defendant further submitted that it had been using "SUPER BOOM" in the market for several months and had its independent goodwill.

Discussion on Judgments Cited:The plaintiff relied heavily on Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 73, where the Supreme Court emphasized that phonetic similarity is a significant factor in determining trademark infringement, particularly when the goods are intended for consumption by illiterate or semi-literate people. The Court held that in cases of medicinal products or products used by ordinary people, the test of likelihood of confusion must be applied stringently.The court also referred to Durga Dutt Sharma v. N.P. Laboratories, AIR 1965 SC 980, where it was held that if there is clear imitation or deceptive similarity, further evidence of actual confusion is not required. Another precedent considered was Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah, (2002) 3 SCC 65, where the Supreme Court held that if prima facie facts support the claim of infringement or passing off, an injunction should ordinarily be granted to protect the plaintiff’s goodwill and proprietary rights.

Reasoning and Analysis of Judge: The Division Bench analyzed the phonetic similarity between "BOOM PLUS" and "SUPER BOOM" and found that the dominant part of both marks was "BOOM," which could lead to consumer confusion, especially among the rural population. The court emphasized that phonetic similarity alone could suffice to establish infringement and passing off when the target consumers were illiterate farmers.The court noted that the plaintiff’s mark "BOOM PLUS" was a registered trademark since 1987, whereas the defendant's use of "SUPER BOOM" was recent and unregistered. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that "BOOM" was a generic term, emphasizing that a registered trademark enjoys statutory protection and cannot be diluted merely by adding a prefix such as "SUPER."The court observed that the products of both parties were identical (fertilizers and flowering stimulants) and shared common marketing channels, increasing the likelihood of confusion. The court further invoked Section 29(5) of the Trademarks Act, 1999, which clarifies that using a registered trademark as part of a trade name or business name also constitutes infringement.The court held that the Single Judge erred in disregarding the phonetic and conceptual similarities between the marks and failed to appreciate the likelihood of deception.

Final Decision:The Division Bench allowed the appeals, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge, and granted interim injunctions in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant was restrained from using the trademark "SUPER BOOM" or any other deceptively similar mark until the disposal of the suit.

Law Settled in this Case:The judgment reaffirmed that phonetic similarity is a critical determinant in trademark infringement and passing off actions, particularly where the target consumers are from vulnerable sections of society such as farmers or the unlettered public.  The decision clarified that a registered trademark holder has statutory rights to prevent the use of deceptively similar marks, even if the defendant appends common adjectives like "SUPER" to the infringing mark.The judgment highlighted that Section 29(5) of the Trademarks Act, 1999, widens the scope of infringement to include situations where the registered trademark is used as part of the business name or trade name.The court emphasized that the balance of convenience and irreparable injury in trademark disputes must be weighed carefully, especially when prior user rights and consumer protection are involved.

Case Title: Devi Pesticides Private Ltd. Vs Shiv Agro Chemicals Industries
Date of Order: 18 April 2006
Case No.: C.S. No. 862 of 2004
Neutral Citation: (2006) 2 MLJ 834, 2006 (32) PTC 434 (MAD)
Name of Court: Madras High Court
Name of Judge: Justice P. Sathasivam, Justice J.A.K. Sampathkumar.

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney] ,High Court of Delhi

Cipla Ltd. Vs. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd.

Rejection of a subsequent patent application does not create a carve-out or exception in an earlier granted patent

Introduction:The case of Cipla Ltd. vs. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. & Anr. is a significant judgment in Indian patent jurisprudence, especially concerning pharmaceutical patents. The dispute centers around the alleged infringement and validity of a patent related to Erlotinib Hydrochloride, a life-saving cancer drug marketed by Roche as "Tarceva" and by Cipla as "Erlocip." The case involved core issues such as inventive step, application of Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, and the balance between intellectual property rights and public access to affordable medicines.

Factual Background: Roche applied for a patent in the United States on March 31, 1991, for Erlotinib Hydrochloride, which was granted as US Patent '498 on August 5, 1998. Subsequently, Roche filed an application in India on March 13, 1996, which was eventually granted as Indian Patent IN '774 on February 23, 2007. The patent covered Erlotinib Hydrochloride, an EGFR inhibitor used to treat non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC).

Following further research, Roche discovered that Polymorph B of Erlotinib Hydrochloride exhibited greater thermodynamic stability and enhanced properties. Roche filed a separate patent application for Polymorph B in the United States (granted as US '221) and in India (DEL '507), but the Indian patent application for Polymorph B was rejected by the Controller of Patents. In the meantime, Cipla announced its intention to launch a generic version of Erlotinib Hydrochloride under the name "Erlocip." Roche alleged that Cipla’s product infringed its IN '774 patent.

Procedural Background:Roche approached the Delhi High Court in January 2008 seeking an injunction to restrain Cipla from manufacturing and selling Erlocip. The Single Judge of the Delhi High Court dismissed the interim injunction application on March 19, 2008, primarily considering the public interest involved in making life-saving drugs accessible and affordable to patients. Roche’s appeal against this decision was dismissed by the Division Bench on April 24, 2009. The Supreme Court also refused to entertain Roche’s special leave petition, and the matter proceeded to trial. The Single Judge eventually ruled on the validity of IN '774 and whether Cipla’s activities amounted to infringement.

Issues Involved:The primary issues in the case were whether IN '774 was liable to revocation due to lack of inventive step or being hit by Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, 1970? whether Cipla’s manufacture and sale of Erlocip infringed IN '774; and whether Roche failed to disclose relevant information under Section 8 of the Act, warranting revocation?

Submissions of Parties: Roche contended that IN '774 covered the entire molecule Erlotinib Hydrochloride, inclusive of all its polymorphs. Roche argued that the patented molecule was non-obvious over prior art, demonstrated improved efficacy, and was distinct from previous compounds. The rejection of the Polymorph B application (DEL '507) did not diminish the enforceability or scope of IN '774. Cipla’s manufacture and sale of Erlotinib Hydrochloride, regardless of its form, infringed IN '774.

Cipla argued that IN '774 lacked an inventive step as it was obvious from prior art, particularly Example 51 of EP '226. Cipla maintained that its product was based on Polymorph B of Erlotinib Hydrochloride, which was not covered under IN '774 but rather under the rejected DEL '507 application. Cipla further contended that Roche suppressed information about corresponding foreign patent applications, violating Section 8 of the Act. Cipla also emphasized that Section 3(d) barred patent protection for Polymorph B as it was a mere new form of a known substance without proven enhancement of efficacy.

Discussion of the Court on Subject Matter of the Patent:The court undertook a detailed examination of what constituted the subject matter of IN '774. The court held that IN '774 covered the compound Erlotinib Hydrochloride itself, as described in Claim 1 of the patent, which was independent of the crystalline form (i.e., polymorphic forms A or B). The court interpreted that the subject matter of IN '774 was a chemical compound characterized by its molecular structure, specifically "[6,7-bis(2-methoxyethoxy)quinazolin-4-yl]-(3-ethynylphenyl)amine hydrochloride," and not its physical or crystalline forms.

The court further clarified that polymorphism, which refers to different crystalline arrangements of the same molecule, does not change the chemical identity of the compound. Polymorph A or B merely reflect different solid-state structures of the same chemical molecule, which is Erlotinib Hydrochloride in this case. Since the suit patent claimed the molecule itself, it necessarily covered all polymorphic forms unless the claims explicitly restricted the protection to a specific polymorph, which was not the case with IN '774.

The court noted that Cipla’s argument hinged on conflating the scope of the later DEL '507 application for Polymorph B (which was rejected) with the scope of IN '774. The rejection of DEL '507 under Section 3(d) did not retroactively narrow the coverage of IN '774. The court pointed out that the rejection of a subsequent patent application does not create a carve-out or exception in an earlier granted patent. The subject matter of IN '774 stood independently and remained valid.

The court held that Section 3(d) was intended to prevent the patenting of new forms of known substances that lacked enhanced efficacy, but it was not designed to retrospectively affect the enforceability of valid patents already granted on the parent molecule. Therefore, the invention covered by IN '774 was not barred by Section 3(d) since the patent was granted for the base molecule itself, and not for any specific polymorphic form.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:The Division Bench held that IN '774 granted Roche rights over Erlotinib Hydrochloride, including all its polymorphic forms, as polymorphs are merely different crystalline forms of the same compound. The rejection of DEL '507 under Section 3(d) did not limit the scope of IN '774. Section 3(d) was a filter for patent eligibility but did not operate as a defense against infringement once a valid patent had been granted for the base molecule.

The court emphasized that patent claims should be construed in their plain and ordinary meaning, in accordance with the language of the specification. It rejected Cipla’s argument that Polymorph B should be excluded from the scope of IN '774 merely because a separate patent application for Polymorph B had been rejected under Section 3(d). The court further reasoned that even though polymorphs may exhibit different physical properties, they remain the same chemical entity.

On the issue of non-disclosure under Section 8, the court acknowledged that Roche had not disclosed certain information regarding corresponding foreign applications. However, it exercised discretion under Section 64(1)(m) and refused to revoke the patent solely on this procedural ground, considering that such non-disclosure did not prejudice Cipla’s defense on the merits.

Final Decision:The Division Bench reversed the Single Judge’s decision, holding that Cipla’s Erlocip, being Erlotinib Hydrochloride, infringed Roche’s IN '774 patent. The court upheld the validity of IN '774, ruling that the patent was not liable for revocation based on the grounds raised by Cipla, including lack of inventive step and the Section 3(d) challenge.

Law Settled in this Case:The judgment clarified that once a compound is patented, all polymorphic forms of that compound are covered by the patent unless explicitly excluded. Section 3(d) cannot be used as a defense to infringement; it is applicable at the patent grant stage to filter what constitutes an invention. Procedural lapses such as non-disclosure under Section 8 do not automatically result in patent revocation. The court reaffirmed that patent claims must be interpreted according to their plain meaning and within the context of the specification, without importing limitations from prosecution history or from related but rejected applications.

Case Title: Cipla Ltd. Vs. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. & Anr.
Date of Order: 27 November 2015
Case No.: RFA(OS) 92/2012 & RFA(OS) 103/2012
Name of Court: Delhi High Court
Name of Judge: Hon'ble Judges Shri Pradeep Nandrajog, Mukta Gupta

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney] ,High Court of Delhi

Chanel Ltd. Vs Sunder Chemicals Agarbati

Phonetic similarity alone can be sufficient to establish trademark infringement and passing off, even if visual differences exist

Introduction:The case involves a trademark dispute where the plaintiff, Chanel Ltd., alleged infringement of its registered trademark "CHANEL" by the defendant, Sunder Chemicals Agarbati Works (P) Ltd., which was using the mark "SHANELLE" for perfumes. The plaintiff sought an interim injunction to restrain the defendant from using a mark that was allegedly deceptively similar to its well-known trademark. The Delhi High Court considered whether phonetic similarity and the possibility of consumer confusion justified granting interim relief.

Detailed Factual Background: Chanel Ltd., a globally recognized manufacturer of perfumes and cosmetics, has held the "CHANEL" trademark since 1925. The trademark, derived from the surname of its French founder, has been extensively used and promoted worldwide. The plaintiff reported sales exceeding Rs. 5000 million in the three years preceding the suit and an annual advertising expenditure of approximately Rs. 500 million.

The defendant, Sunder Chemicals Agarbati Works (P) Ltd., launched a perfume brand under the name "SHANELLE." Chanel Ltd. claimed that "SHANELLE" was deceptively similar to "CHANEL," especially in phonetic terms, and was likely to mislead consumers. The defendant contended that its trademark was visually distinct and that there was a significant delay in the plaintiff's legal action.

Detailed Procedural Background:Chanel Ltd. filed a suit before the Delhi High Court for trademark infringement and passing off, seeking a permanent injunction, damages, and other reliefs. The plaintiff also filed an interim application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) for an immediate injunction restraining the defendant from using "SHANELLE."

The defendant opposed the interim relief, arguing that "SHANELLE" was not deceptively similar to "CHANEL" and that the plaintiff had delayed filing the suit, weakening its claim for injunction. The court analyzed the phonetic and visual similarities between the two marks and examined whether the plaintiff had established a strong prima facie case.

Issues Involved in the Case

Whether the trademark "SHANELLE" was deceptively similar to "CHANEL" and likely to cause confusion among consumers? Whether phonetic similarity alone was sufficient to establish trademark infringement and passing off?

Detailed Submission of Parties: The plaintiff argued that "CHANEL" was a globally reputed trademark with extensive recognition in India. It contended that the defendant’s mark "SHANELLE" was phonetically identical and created consumer confusion. The plaintiff relied on previous Supreme Court decisions affirming that phonetic similarity is a crucial factor in determining trademark infringement. The plaintiff also contended that even if there were minor visual differences in packaging, consumers primarily relied on brand names when purchasing perfumes.

The defendant asserted that "SHANELLE" had been in use for over 17 years and that there was no actual evidence of consumer confusion. It contended that Indian consumers would not confuse "CH" (as pronounced in "CHANEL") with "SH" (as in "SHANELLE") and that phonetic resemblance alone was insufficient to establish infringement. The defendant further argued that the plaintiff had delayed legal action, weakening its case for interim relief.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Along with Their Complete Citation Cited by Parties and Their Respective Context Referred in This Case:  Parle Products (P) Ltd. v. J.P. & Co., Mysore, (1972) 1 SCC 618, was cited by the plaintiff to argue that trademark similarity can be visual, phonetic, or both. The Supreme Court held that when there is a strong likelihood of consumer confusion, minor differences in spelling or packaging do not negate infringement.Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satya Deo Gupta, (1963) AIR SC 449, was referenced to emphasize that the test for deceptive similarity must consider the imperfect recollection of an average consumer. The Supreme Court held that a person with average intelligence and imperfect memory may confuse similar-sounding trademarks, making phonetic similarity a decisive factor.K.R. Chinna Krishna Chettiar v. Sri Ambal & Co., (1970) AIR SC 146, was relied upon to highlight that phonetic resemblance alone can lead to deception, even if the marks are visually different. The Supreme Court refused registration of "Sri Andal" because of its phonetic similarity to "Sri Ambal," despite the absence of visual resemblance.Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah & Anr., (2002) 3 SCC 65, was cited in support of the passing off claim. The Supreme Court held that passing off protects traders from unfair competition, which includes misleading consumers into associating one brand with another. The judgment affirmed that a reputation built over decades must be safeguarded against dishonest adoption by competitors.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: The Delhi High Court found that the plaintiff had established a strong prima facie case for trademark infringement and passing off. The court emphasized that phonetic similarity is a key determinant in cases of trademark confusion. It noted that "CH" in "CHANEL" is commonly pronounced as "SH," making "SHANELLE" nearly identical in sound. The court dismissed the defendant’s argument that Indian consumers distinguish between "CH" and "SH" sounds, citing judicial recognition of phonetic similarity in previous cases.The court rejected the defendant's delay argument, noting that the plaintiff had been engaged in opposition proceedings before the Trademark Registry and had promptly challenged the defendant’s trademark once administrative remedies were exhausted. The court reiterated that delay is not a valid defense in trademark infringement cases where deceptive similarity is apparent.

On the balance of convenience, the court found that allowing the defendant to continue using "SHANELLE" would cause irreparable harm to Chanel Ltd. by diluting its brand reputation. The court concluded that an interim injunction was necessary to prevent confusion and protect the plaintiff’s rights.

Final Decision: The Delhi High Court granted an interim injunction in favor of Chanel Ltd., restraining the defendant from manufacturing, selling, or advertising perfumes under the mark "SHANELLE" or any other mark deceptively similar to "CHANEL." The injunction was limited to the interim stage, with the final decision pending trial. The court directed the parties to proceed with evidence submission and scheduled further hearings for final adjudication.

Law Settled in This Case:Phonetic similarity alone can be sufficient to establish trademark infringement and passing off, even if visual differences exist. The test for deceptive similarity must consider the imperfect recollection of an average consumer, who may confuse similar-sounding marks. Delay in legal action does not bar injunctive relief when deceptive similarity is evident. Balance of convenience and irreparable harm favor the protection of well-established trademarks against potentially misleading variations.

Case Title: Chanel Ltd. Vs Sunder Chemicals Agarbati Works (P) Ltd.
Date of Order: 1 October 2002
Case No.: IA No. 11043/2001
Neutral Citation: 2003(26)PTC52(DEL)
Name of Court: Delhi High Court
Name of Judge: Hon'ble Justice Shri Justice S. Mukerjee

Disclaimer:The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman,IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney] ,High Court of Delhi

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