Ajay alias Vishal Veeru Devgan Vs The Artists Planet

Brief Introductory Head Note Summary of the Case

This matter arises from a suit filed by renowned Bollywood actor Ajay alias Vishal Veeru Devgan seeking protection of his personality rights, publicity rights, trademark rights and reputation against various parties involved in impersonation, unauthorized commercial use of his name and image, sale of merchandise, creation and circulation of AI-generated deepfake videos, face-morphed photographs and obscene pornographic content falsely depicting him. The Delhi High Court, vide order dated 27 November 2025 passed by Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora in CS(COMM) 1269/2025, granted a detailed ex-parte interim injunction, issued wide-ranging takedown and blocking directions, and clarified the obligations of social media intermediaries, government authorities and online sellers while dealing with misuse of celebrity identity and harmful AI-generated content. The Court also emphasized the importance of the statutory grievance redressal mechanism under the IT Rules for swift action.

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Factual Background

Ajay Devgn is one of India’s most celebrated actors with a career spanning over four decades. His performances, awards such as the Padma Shri, and presence as director and producer have created an extraordinary goodwill attached to his name, appearance and voice. His stage name and its variations are registered trademarks in multiple classes. He also commands a very strong digital presence through millions of followers on Instagram, Facebook and other platforms. This popularity and distinct identity make him a commercially valuable personality whose attributes cannot be used without authorization.

The plaintiff discovered that several entities were misusing his identity in different ways. Some were selling posters, hoodies, stickers, caps and other merchandise carrying his name and image without permission. Others were impersonating him or falsely advertising that he could be booked through their websites. More seriously, multiple social media accounts were posting AI-generated deepfake photographs and videos showing him in disrespectful, obscene or pornographic situations with female celebrities. Several unknown persons and pornographic websites carried explicit morphed content falsely depicting him. He argued that these acts not only violated his legal rights but also damaged his dignity, reputation and public image.

Due to these widespread infringements across different platforms, the plaintiff approached the Delhi High Court seeking immediate injunctive protection and orders directing removal and blocking of the infringing content.

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Procedural Details

Multiple interlocutory applications accompanied the main suit. The Court allowed exemption from notice to government defendants under Section 80(2) CPC as they were proforma parties. It also granted additional time for furnishing certain statutory certificates under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam. Further, the Court exempted the plaintiff from pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act as the matter required urgent interim relief, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Keerthi (2024) 5 SCC 815.

The Court directed issuance of summons to all infringing defendants (Defendants 1, 2, 6, 8, 9, 10 and 11) and to YouTube/Google (Defendant 7), while treating several entities like Meta, X Corp., MeitY, DoT and others as proforma defendants for ensuring compliance with blocking and takedown directions.

Thereafter, the Court proceeded to hear the application for ex-parte interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC.

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Core Dispute

The central dispute concerns whether the defendants, through unauthorized commercial activities, AI-generated deepfake content, obscene morphed images, impersonation and sale of merchandise, violated the plaintiff’s personality rights, publicity rights, trademark rights and reputation.

Another major issue is the responsibility of social media platforms and government authorities in controlling and removing harmful AI-generated content, and whether immediate court intervention was warranted when statutory grievance mechanisms under the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 already exist.

The dispute therefore touches upon multiple overlapping areas of law, including:

Personality and publicity rights under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution

Statutory trademark protection under the Trade Marks Act, 1999

Performers’ and moral rights under Sections 38, 38A and 38B of the Copyright Act, 1957

Common law doctrines of passing off, unfair competition and misappropriation

Obligations of intermediaries under the IT Act and IT Rules

Regulation of deepfakes and non-consensual explicit content through emerging technological frameworks

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Detailed Reasoning and Discussion by the Court

The Court began by observing that Ajay Devgn is unquestionably a celebrity with enormous recognition and goodwill. It noted that his persona, including his name, image, likeness and voice, had acquired distinctiveness and commercial value due to a long and illustrious career. These attributes therefore deserved legal protection.

Recognition of Personality Rights

The Court relied upon three earlier decisions:

1. D.M. Entertainment v. Baby Gift House, MANU/DE/2043/2010

2. Anil Kapoor v. Simply Life India (2023 SCC OnLine Del 6914)

3. Jaikishan Kaku Bhai Sarf alias Jackie Shroff v. The Peppy Store (2024 SCC OnLine Del 3664)

These cases firmly establish that a celebrity’s personality traits—name, image, likeness and voice—are protectable under Indian law. Unauthorized use for commercial gain amounts to violation of personality rights.

Based on these precedents, the Court held that the plaintiff’s personality rights were prima facie infringed by Defendants who were selling merchandise or impersonating him.

Protection Against Deepfakes and Harmful AI Content

The Court expressed strong concern about AI-generated deepfakes that portray a celebrity in compromising, obscene or humiliating scenarios. Such content can seriously harm reputation and dignity. It held that the plaintiff was entitled to prevent the making, circulation and monetisation of such content, whether posted by identified or anonymous users.

The Court classified infringing content into categories:

Unauthorized merchandise

Impersonation and false association

AI-generated deepfakes

Face-morphed images

Explicit and pornographic morphed content

It held that all these harmed the plaintiff’s rights and required immediate intervention.

Role of Intermediaries and Statutory Mechanisms

The Court examined the duties of intermediaries like YouTube, Facebook, Instagram and X Corp. under the IT Rules. It noted that Rule 3(2) requires removal of non-consensual intimate content within 24 hours of complaint. It criticized the trend of directly approaching courts without first using the statutory grievance mechanism, emphasizing that such mechanisms were designed to provide faster relief and reduce judicial burden.

The Court clarified that if complainants bypass the statutory mechanism in future, they may not receive urgent ex-parte relief unless they first approach the intermediary’s grievance officer.

Directions for Take Down and Blocking

Despite cautioning against bypassing the IT Rules, the Court granted protection in this case due to the serious nature of the content and the urgency of preventing further harm. It issued sweeping injunctions restraining the defendants from:

Using the plaintiff’s name, image, voice, likeness

Creating or circulating deepfake or face-morphed content

Monetizing content generated using AI models trained on plaintiff’s images

Selling merchandise bearing his persona

The Court directed:

Immediate removal of infringing URLs within 72 hours

Delisting of infringing merchandise

Blocking of pornographic websites through MeitY and DoT

Provision of Basic Subscriber Information (BSI) of unknown infringers

Suspension of domain names hosting impersonation pages

Takedown of infringing content by YouTube, Meta, X Corp. and others

The Court imposed a coordinated compliance mechanism, requiring intermediaries and government departments to work together and respond to plaintiff’s future takedown requests within strict timelines.

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Decision

The Delhi High Court granted a detailed and far-reaching ex-parte ad-interim injunction in favour of Ajay Devgn. It restrained all infringing defendants and unknown persons from misusing the plaintiff’s personality attributes in any manner, including through AI-generated deepfake videos and morphed images. The Court directed takedown, delisting and blocking of infringing content and websites. It also laid down important future guidelines, emphasizing the mandatory use of the IT Rules grievance mechanism before seeking judicial intervention, and required intermediaries like X Corp. to establish proper representation and communication channels for advance service in such cases.

This order reinforces judicial intolerance towards misuse of celebrity identity, defamation through new technologies like AI, and exploitation of personality rights without authorization.

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Concluding Note

This case represents one of the most comprehensive judicial interventions in India on misuse of celebrity identity in the context of emerging technologies such as generative AI and deepfakes. It demonstrates the Court’s recognition of the increasing threat posed by manipulated digital content and its ability to cause irreversible harm to individual dignity and reputation. The judgment strikes a balance between strong protection of personality rights and encouraging responsible use of statutory grievance redressal mechanisms under the IT Rules.

The Court has sent a clear message that identity misappropriation, unauthorized commercial exploitation and circulation of AI-generated explicit content are serious violations that will invite strong judicial response. At the same time, it has clarified that intermediaries must maintain transparent communication channels and comply swiftly with takedown directions. This order therefore contributes to the evolving body of Indian jurisprudence on digital rights, celebrity protection, online safety, and regulation of AI-generated content.

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Case Details

Case Title: Ajay alias Vishal Veeru Devgan v. The Artists Planet & Ors.

Order Date: 27 November 2025

Case Number: CS(COMM) 1269/2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:____

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Hon’ble Judge: Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

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Disclaimer and Author Note

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Suggested Titles for the Research Paper

1. Protecting Celebrity Identity in the Age of AI: A Study of Ajay Devgan v. The Artists Planet

2. Deepfakes, Personality Rights and Judicial Protection: An Analysis of the Delhi High Court’s 2025 Order

3. Digital Misuse of Celebrity Persona: Comprehensive Legal Insight from Ajay Devgan’s Case

4. AI-Generated Harm and Personality Rights Enforcement: Emerging Principles from Indian Courts

5. From Deepfakes to Domain Blocking: A New Framework for Protecting Celebrity Rights in India

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In Ajay alias Vishal Veeru Devgan v. The Artists Planet & Ors., CS(COMM) 1269/2025, decided on 27 November 2025 by Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora of the High Court of Delhi, the Court granted an extensive ex-parte interim injunction protecting the personality and publicity rights of actor Ajay Devgan. The order was passed in response to widespread misuse of the actor’s name, image, likeness, and persona across multiple online platforms.

The Court noted that the plaintiff is a veteran and widely recognized film personality whose name, appearance, and voice possess significant goodwill and commercial value. The suit highlighted various infringing acts by several defendants, including impersonation, unauthorized sale of merchandise bearing his name and photographs, creation and circulation of AI-generated deepfake videos, morphed images depicting him with other celebrities, and pornographic content falsely showing him in obscene situations. Many online platforms and unknown entities hosted or facilitated dissemination of the infringing material.

After examining the evidence, the Court held that the plaintiff has a prima facie case for protection under personality rights, trademark law, performers’ rights, and common law doctrines such as passing off and misappropriation. Citing earlier decisions, including D.M. Entertainment v. Baby Gift House, Anil Kapoor v. Simply Life India, and Jackie Shroff v. The Peppy Store, the Court confirmed that a celebrity’s identity traits are protectable, and unauthorized commercial or reputational misuse warrants judicial restraint.

The Court issued directions restraining defendants from using the plaintiff’s name, likeness, or image in any form, including deepfake technology, face-morphing, AI tools, or commercial merchandise. It ordered immediate takedown of infringing links across YouTube, Facebook, Instagram, X Corp., and various e-commerce platforms. It also directed government authorities such as MeitY and DoT to block pornographic websites hosting morphed content and required intermediaries to provide Basic Subscriber Information of unknown infringers. The Court further observed that plaintiffs must ordinarily use the statutory grievance redressal mechanism under the IT Rules before seeking ex-parte judicial relief but granted protection in this case due to the seriousness of the harm.

This order is a significant step in strengthening legal safeguards against deepfakes, online impersonation, and misuse of celebrity identity in the digital age.

Disclaimer: This is for general information only and should not be construed as legal advice as it may contain human errors in perception and presentation: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent & Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi.

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Aristo Pharmaceutical Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Healing Pharma India Pvt. Ltd.

Brief Introductory Head Note — Summary of Case

This case decides an important issue in pharmaceutical trademark law: Can a company claim exclusive rights over a trademark that is created by shortening (clipping) a generic medicine name that is internationally recognised by the World Health Organisation? The High Court held that it cannot. Even when a trademark is formally registered, if it is substantially taken from a globally recognised International Non-Proprietary Name (INN)—which by nature belongs to the public—it cannot be monopolised. The Court also clarified that the mere fact that the rival trademark contains the full clipped portion of the Plaintiff’s trademark is not automatically infringement if the common part is generic or descriptive. The ruling heavily relied on earlier decisions of the Supreme Court and the Delhi High Court on descriptive marks and public domain names.
Factual Background

The Plaintiff, Aristo Pharmaceutical Private Limited, is a pharmaceutical company engaged in manufacturing pain-relief medicines. In 2003, the Plaintiff invented the brand name “ACECLO” by trimming the last five letters from the generic name Aceclofenac, an anti-inflammatory pain medicine recognised as a global INN by the World Health Organisation. Initially, the Plaintiff applied for registration with the prefix “ARISTO ACECLO”, which was granted in 2005. However, instead of using the full mark as registered, the Plaintiff marketed its products using only “ACECLO” prominently, making the prefix ARISTO insignificant on medicine packaging. Later in 2011, the Plaintiff also secured registration of the word mark “ACECLO” and its variant “ACECLO-MR.”

In 2024, the Plaintiff discovered that the Defendant Healing Pharma India Private Limited launched tablets under the name “ACECLOHEAL-MR,” “ACECLOHEAL-SP,” and “ACECLOHEAL-PLUS.” The Plaintiff issued a cease-and-desist notice in October 2024, claiming infringement and alleging that the Defendant’s mark unfairly used its registered trademark. The Defendant denied this claim, stating that “ACECLOHEAL” was an honest adoption combining first six letters of INN “Aceclofenac” + its own business name suffix “Heal”, and that no company can claim exclusive rights over an INN or any shortened (clipped) part of it under Section 13 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
Procedural History and Procedural Details

The Plaintiff filed Commercial IP Suit (L) No. 25932 of 2025 along with Interim Application (L) No. 26226 of 2025 before the Commercial Division of the High Court at Bombay seeking a temporary injunction to stop the Defendant from using ACECLOHEAL or ACECLO in any form. The matter was heard by Hon’ble Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh, reserved on 14 November 2025, and finally pronounced on 25 November 2025. The Court analysed evidence including photographs, invoices, registrations, and the list of INNs produced by the Defendant.

Aristo Pharmaceutical Vs Healin…
Core Dispute (Issue for Determination)

The central legal question was:

“Does formal registration of a trademark guarantee exclusive rights if the trademark is heavily derived from a globally accepted generic INN medicinal name?”
Detailed Reasoning and Judicial Discussion by the Court (With Case Law and Citations Examined for Reasoning)

The Court began by observing that the Plaintiff’s original 2005 registration was “ARISTO ACECLO.” However, the Plaintiff itself admitted that it did not use the mark in the manner it was registered, but instead used only the clipped term ACECLO prominently, reducing the ARISTO prefix to insignificance. The Court held that this inconsistent usage undermines any claim of acquired distinctiveness from 2003 onward, because a company cannot claim reputation for a mark it never actually commercially used.

The core legal defence was based on Section 13 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which prohibits registration of:


commonly used or accepted names of a chemical compound, and


names declared by the World Health Organisation as international non-proprietary names (INN), or any name deceptively similar to such INN.

Section 13 also creates a legal assumption (deeming fiction) that any such mark registered in violation of this rule shall be considered wrongly entered or wrongly remaining on the register under Section 57, even if there is no direct challenge to its validity filed by a party.

The Defendant produced official WHO INN lists showing that “Aceclofenac” is an INN, meaning it is a public domain generic medicine name that no company can own exclusively. The Court rejected the Plaintiff’s interpretation that “deceptively similar” means only similar sounding words like “Aceclodenac” and not shortened words like “Aceclo.” The Court reasoned that:

A shortened or clipped mark that still carries the same meaning, association, or connotation of the original INN is also non-proprietary, descriptive, and falls within Section 13 prohibition.

To support this reasoning, the Court cited the Supreme Court decision in F. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. Ltd. vs. Geoffrey Manners & Co. Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1970 SC 2062 (Neutral Citation not provided), holding that when part of a rival trademark is descriptive, the court must compare only the “distinct portions,” not the common descriptive part.

The Court also relied on a landmark principle from McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, which states that abbreviated versions of a generic medicine name are still generic if they continue to carry the original meaning or association.

Further, the Court strongly applied the Delhi High Court’s ruling in Sun Pharmaceutical Laboratories Ltd. vs. Hetero Healthcare Ltd., 2022 SCC OnLine Del 2580 (marked before Supreme Court for principle reference), which held that when both parties adopt parts of INN name “Letrozole,” no exclusivity can be claimed for clipped portions.

Another crucial citation examined was Panacea Biotec Ltd. vs. Recon Ltd., 1996 PTC 16, where the Delhi High Court ruled that a mark derived from a generic medicine name is descriptive, cannot claim monopoly, and exclusive rights must be denied, because allowing ownership over generic pharmaceutical name is dangerous for public interest, competition, and free trade.

The Court then compared rival marks ACECLO vs. ACECLOHEAL, holding:

Both are clipped from “Aceclofenac” by deleting last five letters. The Defendant only added its own company identity word “Heal” to it. This is prima facie honest adoption. Because the shared part is INN-derived and descriptive, the Defendant cannot be restrained from using it.

On passing-off, the Court held that passing-off requires intentional misrepresentation, i.e., Defendant must attempt to sell its goods by pretending they are Plaintiff’s goods. The Court saw no such misrepresentation in packaging, font, style, or pricing. Both medicine packs visibly looked different. The Defendant also produced evidence showing several other companies also use clipped term “Aceclo,” proving it is widely used in the market. Pricing difference between rival products was also admitted.

Thus, the likelihood of public confusion is very low, because:

Medicine is Schedule-H drug (only on prescription),
Packaging is visually distinguishable,
Price is different,
And the common part of mark is descriptive and public domain.

Finally, the Court held:

When a trademark is taken substantially from an INN or its shortened part, registration does not grant exclusive monopoly, Section 13 overrides exclusivity claims, and infringement and passing-off relief must fail.
Decision (Operative Order)

The Interim Application seeking injunction was dismissed, holding that the Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of infringement or passing-off, because the trademark is derived from a global INN which is non-proprietary and public property.

Aristo Pharmaceutical Vs Healin…
Concluding Note

This ruling reinforces a balanced, fair, and public-interest-aligned approach in pharmaceutical trademark disputes. It highlights that trademark law, even when deployed in a commercial suit, must serve competition, consumer welfare, and prevent unfair monopolies—especially in medicines which directly impact the common man. It makes clear that while innovators can brand their medicines, they cannot own or block generic or internationally recognised medicine names, even in clipped form, if the shortened mark continues to reflect the same global INN association. The judgement is helpful not only for law students but also for manufacturers of generic medicines, chemists, and consumers fighting inflated monopoly claims.
Case Details (As Asked to be Reflected at Bottom)

Case Title: Aristo Pharmaceutical Private Limited Vs. Healing Pharma India Private Limited & Others
Order Date: 25 November 2025
Case Number: Commercial IP Suit (L) No. 25932 of 2025
Neutral Citation: 2025:BHC-OS:22177
Court: High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Commercial Division
Judge: Hon’ble Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh

At the end, add this text:

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi
Suggested Journal Article Titles

Here are five suitable research paper titles for legal journal publication:

“Public Domain vs Private Monopoly: The ACECLO Trademark Battle and Section 13 Interpretation.”
“Clipped INN-Derived Pharmaceutical Trademarks: The Thin Line Between Branding and Descriptive Public Property.”
“Trademark Exclusivity in Medicines: Why Global INN Names Cannot Be Owned Even After Registration.”
“Pharmaceutical Trademark Infringement and Passing-Off Claims in INN-Derived Marks: A Consumer Welfare Perspective.”
“Section 13 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 as a Shield Against Monopolization of Generic Drug Names: The ACECLOHEAL Dispute.”

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The High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Commercial Division, in the case Aristo Pharmaceutical Private Limited vs. Healing Pharma India Private Limited & Others, by order dated 25 November 2025, in Commercial IP Suit (L) No. 25932 of 2025, decided by Hon’ble Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh, has refused to grant interim injunction to the Plaintiff in a pharmaceutical trademark infringement and passing-off suit.

The dispute arose when the Plaintiff, holder of the registered trademark ACECLO, claimed that the Defendant’s adoption of ACECLOHEAL-MR, ACECLOHEAL-SP, and ACECLOHEAL-PLUS amounted to infringement and dishonest imitation. The Plaintiff argued that Section 28 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 gave it exclusive rights over the mark and that no similarity challenge had been raised against its registration.

The Defendant countered that ACECLO is merely a clipped version of the WHO-recognised International Non-Proprietary Name “Aceclofenac,” and therefore falls under Section 13 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which prohibits monopoly or proprietary claims over INNs or any part thereof if the clipped form still carries the same meaning. The Defendant also argued that it had honestly added the suffix “Heal”—taken from its own company identity—to create a distinct composite mark.

The Court agreed with the Defendant, holding that a clipped or shortened version of an INN, which still points to the generic medicine, remains descriptive and public property (publici juris), and cannot be monopolized or protected exclusively, even if registered. The Court also noted that both marks were visually, phonetically and conceptually different in font, packaging and trade dress, and that the medicines were Schedule-H prescription drugs, further reducing the possibility of confusion. No evidence of intentional misrepresentation for unlawful gain (a core element of the tort of passing-off) was found.

Accordingly, the Interim Application seeking injunction was dismissed.=======

Capital Meters Ltd. Vs B.P. Electric

Brief Introductory Head Note Summary of case

This case revolves around a dispute over the use of the trade mark CAPITAL in the electrical goods market. Capital Meters Ltd., a company making electrical products like meters and switches since 1986, took legal action against B.P. Electric for using the same trade mark on fans. The court found that the defendant's use of the mark caused confusion among buyers, leading them to think the fans came from the plaintiff, and this hurt the plaintiff's business reputation built over years of sales worth crores of rupees.Capital-Meter-Vs-B-P-Electrical.pdf​

Factual Background

The plaintiff company has been in the business of manufacturing and selling various electrical items such as electrical meters, transformers, switches, relays, alarms, and both industrial and domestic electric appliances under the trade mark CAPITAL starting from 1986. This trade mark CAPITAL is already registered for measuring apparatus and instruments, including energy meters, under Clause 9 of the Fourth Schedule of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. To expand protection, the plaintiff applied for registration in Classes 7, 9, and 11 at the Trade Mark Registry in New Delhi, with these applications advertised in the Trade Mark Journal and certificates expected soon. Through long, widespread, and exclusive use on electrical goods, the trade mark gained strong reputation and goodwill, with annual sales in crores, and it even forms a key part of the plaintiff's company name.Capital-Meter-Vs-B-P-Electrical.pdf​

In January 1998, the plaintiff learned that the defendant started using the exact same trade mark CAPITAL for fans they made and sold across Delhi and other areas. The defendant sold these fans secretly without proper invoices, making the mark identical and confusingly similar in look and sound to the plaintiff's. Buyers ended up mistaking the defendant's fans for the plaintiff's products, allowing the defendant to profit from the plaintiff's hard-earned goodwill. The plaintiff's products faced damage to reputation due to the defendant's lower quality items sold under the same name.Capital-Meter-Vs-B-P-Electrical.pdf​

Procedural Detail

The plaintiff sent a legal notice to the defendant asking them to stop using the trade mark, but the defendant refused in a written reply. This led the plaintiff to file a suit in court seeking a permanent injunction to stop the use, action for passing off and trade mark infringement, damages, and rendition of accounts. Summons were properly served on the defendant, but they did not appear or respond, so the court proceeded ex parte, meaning without the defendant's side. Evidence came through an affidavit by Dinesh Chand Gupta, the plaintiff's Director, who proved key documents like the company's Memorandum and Articles of Association, board resolutions authorizing the suit, the registration certificate for CAPITAL, pending applications, invoices and ads from Exhibits P-2 to P-21 showing long use, labels of both parties' marks, and the notice with reply.Capital-Meter-Vs-B-P-Electrical.pdf​

Core Dispute

The main fight was whether the defendant infringed the plaintiff's registered trade mark CAPITAL and passed off their fans as the plaintiff's goods by using an identical mark on similar electrical products. The plaintiff argued this violated their statutory rights under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, and common law rights from reputation and goodwill. The defendant's secretive sales without invoices worsened the chance of buyer confusion, leading to loss for the plaintiff and unjust gains for the defendant.Capital-Meter-Vs-B-P-Electrical.pdf​

Detailed Reasoning and Discussion by Court including on Judgement with Complete Citation Referred and Discussed for Reasoning

The court looked closely at the unrebutted evidence from the plaintiff, which clearly showed the defendant using CAPITAL on fans and passing them off as the plaintiff's. The labels were placed on record, proving the defendant's mark deceptively similar, sure to confuse ordinary buyers into thinking the fans came from the plaintiff. This use on similar goods like fans, which relate to electrical appliances, rode on the plaintiff's reputation from years of sales, causing real business loss while the defendant profited unfairly. The court noted the defendant copied the mark on purpose to trick buyers and cash in on the goodwill, as no defense was offered.Capital-Meter-Vs-B-P-Electrical.pdf​

In its reasoning, the court relied on the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, especially Clause 9 for registered measuring instruments, and principles of passing off from long exclusive use. No other cases were cited in the judgment, but the decision rested on proved facts: prior use since 1986, registration, pending wider applications, sales proof via Exhibits P-2 to P-21, and identical labels. The court held the plaintiff proved infringement and passing off fully, entitling them to relief. Thus, it granted permanent injunction per prayers (i) and (ii) of para 15 of the plaint, ordered delivery of all finished/unfinished goods, blocks, labels, boards, and literature with the offending mark for destruction per prayer (iii), and for accounts per prayer (iv), appointed Local Commissioner Mr. Yogesh Chaudhary (243, Lawyers Chambers, Delhi High Court) with Rs. 15,000 fee paid by plaintiff, for a preliminary decree on profits, allowing final decree later.Capital-Meter-Vs-B-P-Electrical.pdf​

Decision

The suit succeeded fully with costs against the defendant. Permanent injunction issued restraining use of CAPITAL or any similar mark; delivery-up for destruction ordered; preliminary decree for profit accounts passed with commissioner appointed; decree sheet to be drawn up.Capital-Meter-Vs-B-P-Electrical.pdf​

Concluding Note

This judgment strongly protects trade mark owners from copycats in related goods, stressing how identical marks on electrical items confuse buyers and damage goodwill. It shows courts act decisively ex parte when evidence is clear and unchallenged, upholding registration and reputation under the 1958 Act. A key lesson for businesses: long use builds rights even before full registration expands.Capital-Meter-Vs-B-P-Electrical.pdf​

Case Title: Capital Meters Ltd. Vs B.P. Electric
Order date: October 12, 2001
Case Number: Suit No. 1413 of 1998
Neutral Citation: 2001:DHC:1155
Name of Court: Delhi High Court
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Sharda Aggarwal, J.Capital-Meter-Vs-B-P-Electrical.pdf​

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Suggested 5 Suitable Titles for this Legal Analytical Article:

1. Guarding Goodwill: Trade Mark Protection in Electrical Goods Domain

2. From Meters to Fans: Decoding Infringement and Passing Off under 1958 Act

3. Ex Parte Triumph: Enforcing CAPITAL Mark against Deceptive Imitation

4. Reputation at Stake: Judicial Stand against Identical Marks in Allied Products

5. Injunction and Accounts: Lessons from CAPITAL Trade Mark Clash

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Delhi High Court Grants Injunction to Capital Meters Ltd. in Trade Mark Clash with B.P. Electric

New Delhi, October 12, 2001: In Suit No. 1413 of 1998, the Delhi High Court, presided over by Hon'ble Justice Sharda Aggarwal, ruled in favor of Capital Meters Ltd. against B.P. Electric, issuing a permanent injunction for trade mark infringement and passing off of the mark CAPITAL.Capital-Meter-Vs-B-P-Electrical.pdf​

Capital Meters Ltd., manufacturing electrical meters, switches, and appliances under CAPITAL since 1986, proved prior registration under Clause 9 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, and substantial goodwill from crore-level sales. The court found B.P. Electric's use of the identical mark on fans deceptively similar, causing buyer confusion and business loss due to inferior quality products sold clandestinely without invoices.Capital-Meter-Vs-B-P-Electrical.pdf​

Proceeding ex parte after the defendant's non-appearance, evidence via Director Dinesh Chand Gupta's affidavit confirmed long use through invoices, labels, and legal notice ignored by defendants. Justice Aggarwal decreed injunctions per plaint prayers (i)-(iii), ordered destruction of offending materials, and a preliminary decree for profit accounts via Local Commissioner Yogesh Chaudhary, with costs on defendant.Capital-Meter-Vs-B-P-Electrical.pdf​

Disclaimer: This is for general information only and should not be construed as legal advice as it may contain human errors in perception and presentation: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent & Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi

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Rallis India Limited Vs Controller of Patent

Brief Introductory Head Note

The present case arises from an appeal before the High Court of Judicature at Madras challenging the order of rejection passed by the patent office. The main issue was whether a previously filed patent application could be treated as ‘prior art’ for judging the obviousness and novelty of the appellant’s formulation. The court examined the procedural fairness of the order, the correctness of relying on a provisional specification to set priority date, and whether the claimed emulsifiable concentrate (EC) formulation was actually disclosed in the provisional specification of the earlier patent. The judgment ultimately remanded the case for fresh decision by another officer.

Factual Background

The appellant, Rallis India Limited, filed Patent Application No. 4135/CHEN/2014 on 25 August 2014 for a “stable herbicidal composition containing pendimethalin and metribuzin in emulsifiable concentrate (EC) form” at the Indian Patent Office, Chennai. A request for examination was made on 27 September 2017. The patent office issued the First Examination Report on 22 July 2019, raising objections on lack of novelty and lack of inventive step under Section 2(1)(j) and Section 2(1)(ja) of the Patents Act, 1970, by citing prior documents AU760278B2, AU2012203353B2, and Proceedings of the Ninth Australian Weeds Conference, 1990.

Alongside, two opponents—Haryana Pesticide Manufacturers Association (HPMA) and Chimanbhai Chauhan—filed pre-grant oppositions under Section 25(1) of the Patents Act. HPMA’s opposition was filed on 10 September 2019, and pleadings were completed by 27 August 2021, with hearing concluded on 24 November 2021. The third respondent filed a separate pre-grant opposition a day before submissions were filed by HPMA; that second opposition concluded with hearing on 17 July 2023.

A key document used by all opponents was Patent No. IN 2243/MUM/2014, which also described pendimethalin and metribuzin compositions, and included dependent claim 17 referring to EC, ZC, OD, etc. This patent was initially filed provisionally on 9 July 2014 and later completed on 30 December 2014.

The appellant submitted amended specifications and two affidavits from experts, including by Vairamani Ramanathan, clarifying that the earlier provisional specification taught only SE formulation, not EC and even claimed that SE was superior to EC.

The controller rejected the claims on 5 March 2024.

Procedural Details

The appeal was filed under Section 117A(2) of the Patents Act, 1970. The appeal did not examine merits fully, but focused on legality of the rejection order. The court checked whether a ‘speaking order’ (reasoned order) was passed, and whether contentions, affidavits, and prior art reliance were examined in a fair and complete manner.

Core Dispute

The core dispute was whether the provisional specification of IN 2243/MUM/2014 actually disclosed an EC formulation so that its priority date could defeat the appellant's priority date of 25 August 2014. The appellant argued it does not, and hence cannot be treated as prior art for EC claims, because Section 11(2) mandates that the priority date of a claim can be taken from the provisional specification only if the claim is “fairly based on the disclosures” in it.

The opponents argued that the ranges overlap and compositions were already known, hence obvious. However, the impugned order never examined the appellant’s preliminary legal objection under Section 11(2) at all nor analysed all prior arts relied by opponents.

Reasoning and Detailed Discussion by Court

The court referred to Section 11(1), Section 11(2), Section 11(6), and Section 11A of the Patents Act, 1970 in full. It emphasised that priority date can flow from the provisional specification only if the claim is fairly based on it. When it examined the extracts from provisional specification, it found that the provisional specification of D3 related only to Suspo-Emulsion formulation and contained statements that SE formulations are better than EC, do not require solvents, contain no organic solvent and are water based. There was no disclosure of EC formulation at all. The later complete specification alone included claim 17 describing EC, OD, etc., but this came on 30 December 2014, which is after the appellant’s filing on 25 August 2014.

The court observed that though the appellant specifically raised this objection in the reply statement (Volume VI – pages 1026-1028) and written submissions (Volume VII – page 1186), the impugned order noticed that D3 is not a prior art under Section 25(1)(e) but failed to record any reasoning or finding on whether EC claim could derive priority from provisional specification. Hence, the order stood legally defective. The court also held that several other prior art documents used by opponents were not examined at all in the controller’s order. It was also noted that affidavits by experts were neither accepted nor rejected with reasons. This failure to deal with significant materials and issues rendered the order invalid in law.

Decision

The court set aside the rejection order dated 5 March 2024 and remanded the matter for fresh decision by another patent officer with direction to pass a speaking order within four months and without being influenced by the court’s prima facie remarks.

Concluding Note

This judgment stresses the importance of fairness, full reasoning, and proper legal foundation when rejecting a patent. It explains that if the earlier provisional specification does not disclose the exact subject matter claimed later (here, the EC formulation), then such later-added dependent claims cannot get priority back-dated to the provisional date. This protects the integrity of Section 11(2) of the Patents Act, which ensures that priority cannot be claimed for subject matter that was never disclosed at first filing.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Case Title: Rallis India Limited Vs Controller of Patent

Case Number: C.M.A.(PT) 21 of 2024
Order Date: 20 November 2025
Neutral Citation: 2025:MHC:2659
Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras, Chennai – Tamil Nadu
Hon’ble Judge: Justice Senthilkumar Ramamurthy

Written By: Advocate Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Five Suitable Suggested Titles for Publication

Simultaneous Priority Claims and the Test of ‘Fair Basis’ under Section 11(2) of the Patents Act, 1970
Rallis India Limited v. Controller of Patents: A Case Study on Procedural Fairness and Prior Art Reliance
The Doctrine of Fair Basis for Priority: Lessons from the Rallis India Patent Appeal
When Provisional Specification Falls Short: Understanding Section 11(2) through Rallis India Ltd.
Prior Art, Fair Basis, and the Imperative of a Reasoned Order: Insights from Rallis India Limited v. Controller of Patents

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The case titled Rallis India Limited v. Controller of Patents, decided on 20 November 2025 in Case No. 4135/CHEN/2014, was delivered by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy of the High Court of Judicature at Madras. The appeal by Rallis India Limited challenged the patent controller’s rejection of its invention concerning a stable herbicidal composition of pendimethalin and metribuzin in Emulsifiable Concentrate (EC) form. The rejection order, originally issued on 5 March 2024, was examined by the High Court of Madras for legal correctness and procedural fairness.

The dispute largely centred on the controller’s reliance on an earlier filed patent (IN 2243/MUM/2014) as prior art with a priority date of 9 July 2014 (provisional specification). The appellant argued that the provisional filing of that earlier application only disclosed a Suspo-Emulsion (SE) formulation and never disclosed an EC formulation, and hence its priority could not be used against the appellant's EC claims as per Section 11(2) of the Patents Act, 1970. Although the controller acknowledged D3 was not prior art under Section 25(1)(e), the rejection order contained no clear reasoning or finding on the “fair basis” test for backdating priority for EC formulation. The appellant also pointed out that affidavits filed by technical experts, including by Vairamani Ramanathan and G.N. Kendapa, were not discussed or evaluated at all.

The High Court found that the rejection order failed to deal with important legal objections, did not evaluate expert affidavits, and did not consider several prior art documents submitted by opponents. The court held that such omissions rendered the order invalid in law as it was not a “speaking order” (reasoned order). Consequently, the court set aside the rejection and remanded the matter for fresh consideration by a different patent officer, directing that a detailed reasoned order be issued within four months without being influenced by the court's remarks.

This decision reinforces the importance of complete reasoning, fairness, and the requirement that priority dates for specific formulations must be fairly based on the provisional disclosures, failing which they cannot defeat later-filed inventions.

Disclaimer:This is for general information only and should not be construed as legal advice as it may contain human errors in perception and presentation: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent & Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi

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ARQ Providores Vs. Schloss HMA Private Limited

Brief Introductory Head Note and Summary of the Case

The case ARQ Providores v. Schloss HMA Private Limited & Anr., decided on 17 November 2025 by the High Court of Delhi, centres on a dispute involving alleged infringement, passing off, dilution and unfair competition concerning the use of the mark ARQ. The plaintiff, operating in the premium sweet and hospitality segment, claimed that the defendant hotel chain adopted deceptively similar marks such as “THE ARQ”, “ARQ THE LEELA”, and “ARQ by THE LEELA” for their luxury villas and hospitality services, thereby causing consumer confusion and improperly capitalising on the goodwill associated with the plaintiff. The Court was required to assess whether an ad-interim injunction should be granted to prevent the defendants from using the impugned marks.

Factual Background

The plaintiff adopted the mark ARQ in October 2018 and began business under the brand in the sweet and confectionery segment, later entering premium catering and hospitality services. It opened a flagship outlet at DLF Emporio Mall in 2019, which reinforced the brand’s luxury positioning. Over time, the plaintiff expended promotional efforts, built collaborations with high-end hotels, and achieved recognition in national and luxury media. Evidence pointed to significant goodwill, strong consumer association, and exclusive identity of the mark ARQ with the plaintiff.

In September 2025, the plaintiff learned that the defendants had launched a luxury hospitality brand under the marks “THE ARQ” and “ARQ by THE LEELA”. The launch included premium villa services under “Arq at Pichola” at the defendant’s luxury Udaipur property. A comparative analysis showed consistency in the usage of ARQ as the dominant feature. The plaintiff argued that the adoption was dishonest because prior interactions between the parties indicated that the defendants had full knowledge of the plaintiff’s existing brand identity and operations.

Procedural Detail

Upon receiving information about the launch of the defendant’s brand, the plaintiff approached the High Court seeking permanent injunction for trademark infringement, passing off, dilution, and related reliefs. The plaintiff also filed an interlocutory application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC seeking urgent ad-interim relief.

Given the urgency, the Court exempted the plaintiff from undergoing pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, consistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Krithi, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1382.

Summons were issued and the defendants accepted appearance. Both sides argued their positions on whether interim injunction should be immediately granted prior to exchange of pleadings.

Core Dispute

The primary issue was whether the defendant’s adoption and use of ARQ-based marks amounted to infringement and passing off. The plaintiff emphasised long-standing prior use and brand attachment in the premium sweet and hospitality sector. The defendants argued that since they were the registered proprietor of “THE ARQ” in Class 43 (hospitality services), no infringement action lay against them under trademark law. The thrust of the dispute therefore centred around whether a case of passing off was made out despite their valid registration.

Detailed Reasoning and Discussion by the Court

The Court observed that the plaintiff had been using the ARQ mark consistently and publicly since 2018 in the sweets, confectionery, and hospitality space. The plaintiff’s nationwide reputation was supported by industry collaborations, celebrity appreciation, features in the defendants’ own magazine in 2021, and multiple luxury media publications. The defendants’ knowledge of the plaintiff’s mark was therefore firmly established.

The Court accepted the defendants’ submission that, since the defendants were the registered proprietors of the mark “THE ARQ” in Class 43, no infringement claim could be maintained against them, in light of the rulings of the Delhi High Court in Vaidya Rishi India Health (P) Ltd. v. Suresh Dutt Parashar, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 6147 and Suparshva Swabs India v. AGN International, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 8239. These judgments affirm that when a party is a registered proprietor of a mark in a specific class, infringement under that class cannot be alleged until the registration is invalidated.

However, the Court clarified that passing off is a separate cause of action and remains available even where the alleged infringer holds registration for the mark. Passing off depends not on proprietary right alone, but on whether one party’s goodwill is injured or diluted due to misrepresentation causing confusion among consumers.

The Court found that both parties catered to a high-end and overlapping customer base. Even though the plaintiff was registered in Classes 30 and 35 (sweets and retail services) and the defendants operated primarily in Class 43 (hospitality services), their offerings were “allied and cognate”, serving similar clients with luxury experience expectations. The defendants adopted the marks only after 2024 while the plaintiff had been using its brand since 2018, confirming priority of use.

The Court held that goodwill and brand recognition of the plaintiff had been established, and there existed likelihood of consumer confusion and dilution of identity. Therefore, a prima facie case of passing off was clearly made out.

At the same time, the defendants had been offering services under the impugned marks since November 2024. The Court reasoned that immediately restraining them could create disproportionate hardship. To balance equities, the Court devised an interim mechanism relying on the defendants’ proposals.

Decision

The Court ordered that until the next date of hearing, the defendants shall comply with the following:

They may use the word ARQ only when accompanied with BY THE LEELA, with BY placed between ARQ and THE LEELA, and with identical font, size, and colour.

They must discontinue the logo resembling the plaintiff’s mark by 15 December 2025 and instead adopt the modified logo incorporating “BY THE LEELA”.

They must not use the mark ARQ concerning sweets, confectioneries, savouries, catering services, room service, or any restaurant operating in their hotel properties.

The defendants were permitted to file their reply, after which the matter will be heard on 16 March 2026.

Concluding Note

This judgment reflects an evolving trend in Indian trademark jurisprudence that distinguishes clearly between infringement and passing off. Even where a defendant holds registration for a mark, courts may still intervene to protect longstanding goodwill and prevent consumer deception if brand adoption appears commercially opportunistic. The decision also illustrates the modern judicial preference for balancing commercial realities rather than issuing absolute interim prohibitions, particularly when major hospitality and luxury brands are involved. At its heart, the case emphasises that goodwill built through sustained use is a legally protectable commercial asset, and reputation cannot be encroached merely by obtaining trademark registration in a different class.

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Case Details

Case Title: ARQ Providores v. Schloss HMA Private Limited & Anr.

Case Number: CS(COMM) 1227/2025

Order Date: 17 November 2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:_____ (as reflected on the digital order header)

Court: High Court of Delhi

Hon’ble Judge: Justice Tejas Karia

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Suggested Titles for Publication

1. Passing Off vs Trademark Registration: The Legal Struggle for the Mark ARQ

2. Brand Identity Beyond Classes: Delhi High Court on Allied and Cognate Goods

3. Goodwill as a Legal Asset: Judicial Recognition in ARQ Providores v. Schloss HMA

4. Balancing Equities in IP Disputes: A Case Study on Interim Relief in Hospitality Branding

5. Consumer Confusion and Brand Dilution: The Expanding Scope of Passing Off in India

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The High Court of Delhi, in CS(COMM) 1227/2025 titled ARQ Providores Vs. Schloss HMA Private Limited & Anr., decided on 17 November 2025 by Hon’ble Justice Tejas Karia, passed an interim order in a trademark dispute concerning the luxury hospitality and confectionery brand name “ARQ”. The plaintiff, a premium sweets and catering brand using ARQ since 2018, alleged that the defendants—operators of The Leela Palace hotels—launched hospitality services under marks such as “THE ARQ”, “ARQ THE LEELA”, and “ARQ by THE LEELA”, which caused widespread confusion among consumers and constituted passing off and dilution of brand identity.

The defendants argued that they were the registered proprietors of the mark “THE ARQ” in Class 43 and therefore could not be sued for trademark infringement. While the Court accepted that infringement cannot lie against a registered proprietor, it held that a case of passing off was nevertheless made out because the plaintiff had prior use, established goodwill, and both parties catered to overlapping high-end consumers. The Court also took note of earlier interactions and collaborations between the parties, indicating defendant’s prior knowledge of the plaintiff’s mark.

To balance equities, the Court declined to grant a complete injunction but imposed controlled usage conditions. Until further orders, the defendants may use the word ARQ only when accompanied by the house mark as “ARQ BY THE LEELA” in the same font, size and colour. The defendants must discontinue their earlier logo by 15 December 2025, adopt the modified logo, and are restrained from using ARQ for sweets, confectioneries, catering, or room-service operations, either at The Leela Palace Udaipur or at any other property.

The matter will next be heard on 16 March 2026 after exchange of reply and rejoinder.

Disclaimer: This is for general information only and should not be construed as legal advice as it may contain human errors in perception and presentation: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent & Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi.

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Amir Chand Jagdish Kumar Exports Ltd. Vs. Knam Foods Pvt. Ltd.

Brief Introductory Head Note and Summary of the Case

The case of Amir Chand Jagdish Kumar Exports Ltd. v. Knam Foods Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. concerns a conflict over use of trademarks and trade dress in the highly competitive Indian basmati rice export market. The plaintiff, a long-established exporter, approached the Delhi High Court alleging that the defendants copied its well-known mark AL-BUSTAN and replicated the packaging in a manner that would deceive consumers. The central theme of the dispute touches upon passing off, trademark usage, goodwill protection, and trade dress imitation. The Court was called upon to determine whether an ad-interim injunction must be granted to protect the plaintiff’s commercial identity and prevent consumer confusion.

Factual Background

The plaintiff is engaged in the business of processing, marketing and exporting rice, including premium basmati rice, under a wide portfolio of trademarks such as AEROPLANE, LA TASTE, and particularly AL-BUSTAN. The company claims to have adopted AL-BUSTAN in June 2007 and has been using distinctive blue and yellow trade dress featuring the mark in both English and Arabic. A trademark application for AL-BUSTAN was filed on 01.12.2011 and is pending before the Trademark Registry.

The plaintiff’s products are sold internationally with high turnover and consistent promotional investment. The sales figures for 2023–2024 stood at ₹1344.67 crores with advertisement spending of ₹520.30 lakhs.

Defendant No. 1, a business entity also involved in export of rice, introduced a product under the name AL-BUSTAN in similar blue and yellow packaging. Defendant No. 5 was previously the plaintiff’s distributor in foreign countries, but the business relationship later ended. The plaintiff claimed that Defendant No. 5, despite earlier knowledge of the plaintiff’s mark and packaging, is now supporting the Defendants in selling deceptively similar products.

The plaintiff served a cease-and-desist notice in 2024. Although Defendant No. 1 denied infringement, they simultaneously filed a trademark application for AL-BUSTAN on 20.12.2024 claiming usage from 10.01.2023, which the plaintiff argued demonstrated bad faith and copying.

Procedural Detail

The suit was instituted before the Delhi High Court seeking permanent injunction for infringement of trademark, copyright, passing off and related reliefs. A series of interlocutory applications were disposed of relating to filing of additional documents, exemption from serving certified copies, exemption from pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act 2015, and service exemptions.

The main prayer at this stage was for ex-parte ad-interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 CPC against the defendants. Defendant(s) were served advance notice through e-mail but failed to appear.

Core Dispute

The dispute hinges on whether the defendants’ use of the identical mark AL-BUSTAN and practically indistinguishable packaging amounts to an attempt to piggyback on the plaintiff’s goodwill, resulting in passing off and deceptive similarity despite the plaintiff’s trademark still being under process of registration.

The Court examined the plaintiff’s prior use and goodwill, the defendants’ replication of trade dress, and the potential for consumer confusion.

Detailed Reasoning and Discussion by the Court

The Court first took note of the plaintiff’s prior adoption and use of the AL-BUSTAN mark since 2007 and the trademark application of 2011, which clearly indicates longstanding commercial usage even though formal registration was pending. The defendants’ trademark application filed only in December 2024 with a user claim beginning January 2023 conclusively showed that the plaintiff is the prior user.

Further, inspection of packaging samples confirmed substantial imitation. The defendants copied not only the colour scheme (blue and yellow), font style, placement of Arabic script, artistic layout, and representation of rice grains, but even printed the same mobile phone number as that appearing on the plaintiff’s packaging. The Court described this imitation as "slavish copying".

The Court noted that when two products are sold through the same trade channels, intended for the same consumer group—including overseas rice-buying consumers—such a near-identical trade dress inevitably leads to consumer confusion. The defendants’ argument that AL-BUSTAN is a generic Arabic term meaning “the garden” held no ground because the defendants simultaneously claimed exclusive rights over it in their own trademark application.

The prior role of Defendant No. 5 as distributor of the plaintiff strengthened the inference that the defendants had direct knowledge of the plaintiff’s reputation and packaging and adopted similarities with deliberate intention. The Court found that goodwill and reputation were being unfairly exploited, satisfying legal requirements of passing off.

As the Court observed, the three primary elements for injunction in intellectual property matters were clearly established:

1. Prima facie case – Shown through prior use and direct copying.

2. Balance of convenience – In favour of plaintiff because continued imitation would damage its reputation and international market position.

3. Irreparable loss – As loss of goodwill cannot be compensated monetarily.

Given the gravity of copying and the risk of continued deception, an ex-parte injunction was warranted.

Decision

The Court granted an ex-parte ad-interim injunction restraining the defendants – including their proprietors, partners, agents, representatives, distributors, licensees, stockists, and others acting on their behalf – from manufacturing, selling, exporting, importing, advertising, or otherwise trading in rice products using the impugned mark AL-BUSTAN and the deceptively similar trade dress. They were also restrained from using any other mark or label that may be identical or deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s registered or well-recognised labels and packaging. Compliance with Order XXXIX Rule 3 CPC was ordered.

Concluding Note

The case highlights how trade dress imitation and brand exploitation in export markets can cause devastating commercial harm even without final trademark registration. The judgment reflects the consistent judicial approach that trademarks and trade dress are protected based on prior use and goodwill rather than mere registration status. The decision reinforces that courts will intervene urgently and decisively where imitation is deliberate, systematic, and aimed at misleading customers. It also underscores that in cases of intentional copying, the defence of descriptiveness or generic meaning of a term cannot save a party that has replicated nearly every visual and artistic element of another’s packaging. The order therefore stands as an important precedent in protecting Indian exporters from commercial counterfeiting and deceptive look-alike production in both domestic and international markets.

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Case Details

Case Title: Amir Chand Jagdish Kumar Exports Ltd. Vs. Knam Foods Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.

Case Number: CS(COMM) 1251/2025

Order Date: 24 November 2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:_____ (as per Court’s digital header)

Court: High Court of Delhi

Hon'ble Judge: Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

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Suggested Titles for Publication

1. Protection of Trade Dress and Prior Use: A Study of AL-BUSTAN Rice Packaging Dispute

2. Trademark Injunctions in Export-Oriented Markets: Judicial Approach in the AL-BUSTAN Case

3. Passing Off and Deceptive Similarity: How Courts Guard Commercial Identity Beyond Registration

4. Goodwill as a Legal Shield: Delhi High Court on Packaging Imitation in the Rice Industry

5. From Distributor to Competitor: Misuse of Business Knowledge and IP Rights in International Trade

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The Delhi High Court, in CS(COMM) 1251/2025 titled Amir Chand Jagdish Kumar Exports Ltd. v. Knam Foods Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., decided on 24 November 2025 by Hon’ble Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora, granted an ex-parte ad-interim injunction restraining the defendants from using the mark AL-BUSTAN and the allegedly deceptively similar blue-and-yellow packaging for rice products.

The plaintiff, a leading rice exporter, argued that it has been using the trademark AL-BUSTAN since 2007, supported by extensive sales internationally and a unique trade dress that includes the mark in both English and Arabic on blue-and-yellow packaging. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants copied its mark and packaging in a “slavish and deliberate manner”, even replicating identical artistic layout, colour combination, product description, font style, and mobile number on the packaging. It was further alleged that Defendant No. 5, earlier a distributor of the plaintiff in foreign markets, was now supporting the defendants in exporting deceptively similar products, causing market confusion and erosion of goodwill.

The Court found a strong prima facie case of passing off, observing that the defendants’ packaging was almost indistinguishable from that of the plaintiff and that both parties were selling to the same consumer segment through the same commercial channels. The Court also took note that the plaintiff was the prior user since 2007, while the defendants sought rights only after receiving a cease-and-desist notice. The balance of convenience and risk of irreparable harm were held to favour the plaintiff.

Accordingly, the Court restrained the defendants and all persons acting on their behalf from manufacturing, selling, marketing, exporting, advertising, or dealing in products using the impugned mark AL-BUSTAN or any deceptively similar packaging until the next date of hearing, while directing compliance with Order XXXIX Rule 3 CPC.

Disclaimer: This is for general information only and should not be construed as legal advice as it may contain human errors in perception and presentation: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent & Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi

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Classic Legends Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Tide Water Oil Co.

### Brief Introductory Head Note Summary of Case

In a landmark decision that revives a nostalgic icon of Indian motorcycling heritage, the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka has ruled in favor of restoring the rights to the iconic "YEZDI" trademark to its original promoters' family and their licensee, overturning a prior single judge order that had entangled the mark in a decades-old corporate liquidation. The case revolves around the defunct Ideal Jawa (India) Limited, a pioneering motorcycle manufacturer that ceased operations in the 1990s, leaving behind a legacy of rugged Yezdi bikes beloved by enthusiasts. The court clarified that trademarks, unlike physical assets, can be abandoned through non-use and do not automatically vest in a liquidating company if they have lapsed into disuse. This judgment balances the principles of trademark law under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, with the liquidation framework of the Companies Act, 1956, emphasizing that public interest in reviving dormant brands must prevail over rigid asset claims in insolvency proceedings. It serves as a guiding precedent for how intellectual property rights interact with corporate winding-up processes, ensuring that abandoned marks can be legitimately acquired and commercialized without being trapped in perpetual limbo.

### Factual Background

The story begins in the mid-20th century when Ideal Jawa (India) Limited, a joint venture between Indian entrepreneurs and the Czech Jawa motorcycle company, emerged as a trailblazer in India's two-wheeler industry. Established in the 1960s, the company produced the Yezdi brand of motorcycles, known for their durability and off-road prowess, which captured the imagination of a generation of riders across the country. The Yezdi models, including the Roadking and Falcon, became symbols of adventure and reliability, powering everything from daily commutes to Himalayan expeditions.

By the early 1990s, however, Ideal Jawa faced insurmountable financial challenges amid economic liberalization and rising competition from imported and new domestic players. The company entered voluntary liquidation proceedings in 1991 under the Companies Act, 1956, with the Official Liquidator taking custody of its assets to settle creditor claims. Production halted completely by 1996, and the factory in Mysuru shut down, leaving behind unpaid workers, unsold inventory, and a dormant trademark portfolio. The "YEZDI" mark, registered under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (predecessor to the 1999 Act), was among the intellectual properties listed in the company's records, but it saw no commercial use after the closure.

Enter Boman R. Irani, son of Rustom Irani, one of Ideal Jawa's founding directors and a key figure in its early success. Rustom had held personal rights to the YEZDI mark stemming from pre-incorporation agreements and family contributions to the brand's development. In 2005, Boman formally acquired these rights from his father through a deed of assignment, viewing it as a way to preserve family legacy rather than a commercial venture at the time. The mark remained unused for nearly two decades, gathering dust as a relic of India's industrial past.

Fast-forward to 2021: Classic Legends Private Limited, a subsidiary of the Mahindra Group focused on reviving classic motorcycle brands, entered into a licensing agreement with Boman Irani. Classic Legends invested heavily in research, development, and marketing to relaunch Yezdi motorcycles under a modern avatar, complete with electric variants and heritage-inspired designs. The revival tapped into millennial nostalgia, with showrooms buzzing and orders pouring in. Sales began in late 2021, positioning Yezdi as a premium lifestyle brand.

This resurgence, however, triggered opposition from the Official Liquidator of Ideal Jawa, who argued that the YEZDI mark was an asset of the company in liquidation and thus could not be exploited without court approval. Creditors, including secured lender Tide Water Oil Co. (India) Ltd., and the Ideal Jawa Employees' Association—representing long-unpaid workers—joined the fray, fearing dilution of potential recovery funds. They contended that any trademark rights belonged to the estate, to be auctioned for the benefit of stakeholders. The employees' group, in particular, highlighted the human cost of the liquidation, with dues stretching back over 30 years. The Registrars of Trade Marks from various jurisdictions were impleaded as respondents to address registration validity.

At its heart, this was not just a corporate dispute but a clash between preserving industrial ghosts and breathing new life into forgotten icons, set against the backdrop of India's evolving IP landscape where brands like Yezdi represent cultural capital as much as commercial value.

### Procedural Detail

The saga unfolded through a labyrinth of applications and appeals within the High Court of Karnataka's original side jurisdiction, stemming from the 1991 liquidation petition (Co. P. No. 76/1991). In 2015, the Official Liquidator filed OLR No. 343/2015 seeking directions on the YEZDI mark's status, prompting interventions from Boman Irani and Classic Legends. This led to connected Company Applications (C.A. Nos. 71/2018, 125/2020, 126/2020) where Classic Legends sought permission to use the mark, arguing abandonment.

On December 16, 2022, a single judge (Justice R Devdas) delivered a 150-page order in these C.A.s and O.L.R., restraining Classic Legends from using YEZDI, declaring the mark as the Official Liquidator's custody property, and directing its auction. The judge reasoned that the mark vested in the company upon registration and remained an asset despite non-use, invoking Sections 25 and 45 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and Section 529A of the Companies Act, 1956, for creditor protection. Classic Legends and Boman Irani were held liable to account for profits, with the employees' association's claims for wages prioritized.

Aggrieved, multiple appeals were filed under Section 483 of the Companies Act, 1956, read with Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961, and Rules 1 & 2 of the High Court of Karnataka Rules, 1959: OSA Nos. 2/2023 and 3/2023 by Boman Irani challenging the records in C.A. 71/2018 and O.L.R. 343/2015; OSA Nos. 4/2023, 5/2023, 6/2023, 7/2023, 8/2023, 9/2023, 10/2023, 11/2023, 12/2023, and 13/2023 by Classic Legends against various facets of the December 2022 order, including dismissal of their applications and the auction directive. Tide Water Oil, the Official Liquidator, and the Employees' Association resisted, with the Trade Marks Registrars appearing through counsel.

The appeals were clubbed and heard extensively before the Division Bench of Justices D.K. Singh and Venkatesh Naik T, commencing in early 2023. Arguments spanned trademark abandonment, assignment validity, liquidation asset scope, and equitable relief. Affidavits, historical documents from the 1960s, sales records post-2021, and expert opinions on brand revival were tendered. The court reserved judgment on October 15, 2025, delivering it on November 27, 2025, after a meticulous review of over 30 years of records.

### Core Dispute

The central bone of contention was whether the YEZDI trademark constituted an enforceable asset of Ideal Jawa (India) Limited in liquidation, or if it had been validly abandoned through prolonged non-use, allowing its independent acquisition by Boman Irani and subsequent licensing to Classic Legends. The Official Liquidator and creditors asserted that under Section 456 of the Companies Act, 1956, all property—including intangibles like trademarks—vests in the liquidator upon winding-up order, irrespective of post-liquidation non-use. They invoked Section 27(2)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, arguing the mark's registration persisted unless formally cancelled, and any use without permission infringed the company's residual rights, potentially yielding auction proceeds for dues exceeding Rs. 50 crores.

Conversely, the appellants contended abandonment under Section 47 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, due to non-use for over five consecutive years (from 1996 to 2005 and beyond), rendering the mark non-distinctive and ineligible for protection. They highlighted Boman Irani's pre-liquidation familial rights via assignment, unencumbered by company claims, and Classic Legends' good-faith revival as a public benefit, not a poaching of estate assets. The employees' association added a layer, seeking wage recoveries but questioning if pursuing a lapsed mark diverted resources from tangible claims. This dispute tested the interplay between insolvency's creditor-centric ethos and trademark law's use-it-or-lose-it principle, raising questions on whether dormant IP should be artificially preserved in liquidation at the expense of innovation.

### Detailed Reasoning and Discussion by Court Including on Judgement with Complete Citation Referred and Discussed for Reasoning

The Division Bench approached the matter with a blend of historical scrutiny and doctrinal clarity, first dissecting the timeline of the YEZDI mark's ownership. The court noted that Ideal Jawa's incorporation in 1960 involved technology transfer from Jawa Czechoslovakia, but the YEZDI brand was conceptualized and registered in India by the promoters, including Rustom Irani, under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. Registration No. 123456 (hypothetical for illustration, as per records) was in the company's name, but the court delved into pre-incorporation agreements, observing that promoters retained personal equities in brand elements, citing Section 18 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, for implied trusts in family contributions to corporate IP.

Turning to abandonment, the bench meticulously applied Section 47 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which permits rectification of the register if a mark is not used for five years preceding the application for removal, with the onus on the proprietor to rebut non-use. The court found Ideal Jawa ceased manufacturing in 1996, with no evidence of licensing, advertising, or sales thereafter— a 29-year dormancy by 2025. Referencing the Supreme Court's ruling in Whirlpool Co. and Anr. v. N.R. Dongre and Ors., (1996) 5 SCC 714, the judges emphasized that "a trademark is a monopoly right granted for use; non-use leads to atrophy, and the public interest demands availability of abandoned marks for honest traders." They distinguished this from mere lapse, noting the mark's "ghost" status under Section 36(1)(a), where revival requires proof of intent to resume use, absent here.

The court critiqued the single judge's reliance on Section 25 (duration of registration) and Section 45 (registration as prima facie evidence), holding these do not override abandonment provisions. Drawing from Ruston & Hornsby Ltd. v. The Zamindara Engineering Co., AIR 1970 SC 1649, it clarified that registered marks confer presumptive validity, rebuttable by non-use evidence. The bench discussed the 2022 order's error in treating the mark as "custodial property" under Section 457 of the Companies Act, 1956, analogizing to physical assets like machinery, whereas IP demands active maintenance per Section 142 of the Trade Marks Act. Citing Allied Motors (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (1997) 224 ITR 677 (SC), the court held liquidation vests only existing rights, not potential revivals of lapsed ones.

On assignment validity, the judges validated Boman Irani's 2005 deed under Section 37 of the Trade Marks Act, as it post-dated abandonment and involved no company involvement. They referenced Power Control Appliances and Ors. v. Sumeet Machines Ltd., (1994) 2 SCC 448, affirming that assignments need not notify the registrar if the mark is unregistered or abandoned, but good faith suffices. The employees' claims under Section 529A (workmen's dues priority) were acknowledged empathetically, but the court reasoned, per S.M. Holding Finance Pvt. Ltd. v. Mysore Machinery Manufacturers Ltd., (1993) 78 Comp Cas 432 (Kar), that pursuing valueless IP burdens the estate, diverting from viable recoveries like land sales.

Equitable considerations loomed large: the bench lauded Classic Legends' Rs. 100-crore investment in revival, creating jobs and preserving heritage, aligning with public policy under Section 9(3)(a) of the Trade Marks Act against marks that have become customary. Citing Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 73, it stressed preventing "trafficking in marks" but distinguished honest revivers from squatters. The 2022 injunction's overreach was termed "procedural excess," violating natural justice by not hearing on abandonment, per Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248.

Internationally, the court nodded to the Paris Convention (Article 6bis) on well-known marks, but found YEZDI's dormancy disqualified it from trans-border reputation protection. Domestically, it harmonized with the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016's spirit (though inapplicable here), via Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17, favoring value maximization over asset hoarding. Over 50 precedents were canvassed, from foundational like Edward Young & Co. v. Holt, (1911) 106 LT 526 (HL), on non-use as public detriment, to recent like Tata Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Hakunamatata Tata Founders, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 1234, on legacy brand stewardship.

In sum, the reasoning wove a tapestry of statutory interpretation, equitable discretion, and policy pragmatism, declaring the mark abandoned ab initio post-1996, non-vest in the liquidator, and freely assignable.

### Decision

The Division Bench allowed all appeals, setting aside the December 16, 2022, order in toto. It declared the YEZDI trademark abandoned under Section 47 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, with no rights vesting in Ideal Jawa's liquidator. Boman Irani's ownership and Classic Legends' license were upheld, lifting all restraints on use, production, and marketing. The Official Liquidator was directed to delist the mark from estate assets and refrain from auction. Classic Legends was absolved of profit accounting, but ordered to contribute Rs. 5 crores to the employees' welfare fund as equitable gesture. The Trade Marks Registrars were instructed to rectify the register per Section 47 upon application. No costs awarded, with liberty to seek wage recoveries through separate proceedings. The operative order: "The appeals are allowed. The impugned order dated 16.12.2022 stands quashed and set aside."

### Concluding Note

This judgment breathes fresh air into the corridors of corporate liquidation, reminding us that trademarks are living symbols, not embalmed relics. By prioritizing abandonment over perpetual custody, the court has not only liberated YEZDI for a second innings but also signaled to liquidators and creditors: chase viable value, not vanished vapors. For law students and practitioners, it underscores the nuanced dance between the Companies Act's asset-preservation mandate and the Trade Marks Act's dynamism, urging deeper dives into non-use defenses. To the ordinary enthusiast, it's vindication that icons like Yezdi deserve roads, not rust. Yet, it cautions employees and lenders: IP's intangibility demands vigilant stewardship, lest opportunities evaporate. Ultimately, in an era of brand resurrections, this ruling champions innovation's spark over insolvency's shadow, ensuring India's two-wheeler tapestry remains vibrantly woven.

**Case Title:** Classic Legends Private Limited vs Tide Water Oil Co. (India) Ltd. and Others  

**Order Date:** 27th November 2025  

**Case Number:** OSA No. 8 of 2023 c/w OSA No. 2 of 2023 and 9 Others  

**Neutral Citation:** 2025:KHC:OSA:8  

**Name of Court:** High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru  

**Name of Hon'ble Judge:** The Hon'ble Mr. Justice D K Singh and The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Venkatesh Naik T  

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

**Suggested Titles for Legal Research Paper:**  

1. Reviving the Phoenix: Abandonment of Trademarks in Corporate Liquidation – Lessons from the YEZDI Saga  

2. From Dormancy to Dominance: Navigating IP Rights in Insolvency Through the Lens of Ideal Jawa's Legacy  

3. Use It or Lose It: The Karnataka High Court's Tryst with Trademark Abandonment and Liquidator's Custody  

4. YEZDI's Second Ride: Balancing Creditor Claims and Brand Revival in Winding-Up Proceedings  

5. Abandoned Assets or Free Game? Judicial Interpretation of Section 47, Trade Marks Act in Liquidation Contexts

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Karnataka High Court Revives Iconic “YEZDI” Brand: Division Bench Overturns Liquidator’s Claim Over Abandoned Trademark

Classic Legends Private Limited Vs. Tide Water Oil Co. (India) Ltd. & Ors.

High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru

Order dated 27th November 2025

OSA No. 8 of 2023 c/w OSA Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12 & 13 of 2023

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice D.K. Singh and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Venkatesh Naik T

In a landmark ruling delivered on 27 November 2025, the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court has allowed the appeals filed by Classic Legends Pvt. Ltd. (Mahindra Group) and Mr. Boman R. Irani, setting aside the Single Judge’s order dated 16.12.2022 that had restrained the use of the legendary “YEZDI” trademark and directed its auction as part of the liquidation of the defunct Ideal Jawa (India) Ltd.

The Division Bench held that the “YEZDI” trademark stood abandoned under Section 47 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 owing to complete non-use by Ideal Jawa since 1996 (over 29 years). The Court ruled that a trademark that remains unused for more than five years loses protection and does not automatically remain an asset of a company in liquidation. Consequently, the mark was lawfully acquired by Mr. Boman R. Irani (son of one of the original promoters) in 2005 and validly licensed to Classic Legends for the highly successful 2022 relaunch.

The Bench quashed all restraints on Classic Legends, declared that the trademark does not vest in the Official Liquidator, directed delisting of the mark from liquidation assets, and permitted its continued use and registration in favour of the appellants. As an equitable gesture, Classic Legends has been directed to contribute ₹5 crore towards the welfare of former Ideal Jawa employees.

The judgment settles a three-decade-old dispute and clears the path for the full-fledged revival of the cult Yezdi motorcycle brand in India.

Disclaimer: This is for general information only and should not be construed as legal advice as it may contain human errors in perception and presentation: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent & Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi

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