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Friday, December 5, 2025

Kohinoor Seed Fields India Vs. Veda Seed Sciences

Below is the full research-style analytical legal paper based entirely on the uploaded judgment. All legal points are simplified for a wide audience, including law students, general readers, litigants and junior practitioners. No bullet points or para numbering have been used, as requested.

Legal Analysis Research Paper

Brief Introductory Head Note

The case of Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Veda Seed Sciences Pvt. Ltd. decided by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court deals with a very important question under trademark and procedural law: Where can a trademark lawsuit be filed when the defendant disputes territorial jurisdiction?

The order focuses on whether the Delhi High Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain a trademark infringement suit filed by Kohinoor Seed Fields. A Single Judge had earlier ordered that the plaint be returned because he believed the Court did not have jurisdiction. The Division Bench reversed that decision and restored the suit.

This judgment clarifies how Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 interacts with Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), especially in cases where the plaintiff has its head office in one place and subordinate offices elsewhere. It also discusses whether e-commerce activity and contractual disputes can contribute to territorial jurisdiction.

Summary of Case and Factual Background

Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd is the plaintiff engaged in manufacturing and selling agricultural hybrid seeds, including cotton seeds under the trademarks "TADAAKHA", "SADANAND", and the unregistered mark "BASANT". These marks are used in multiple Indian states.

The defendant Veda Seed Sciences Pvt. Ltd. allegedly began selling cotton hybrid seeds under similar names such as “VEDA TADAAKHA GOLD BG II”, “VEDA SADANAND GOLD BG II” and “VEDA BASANT GOLD BG II”. The plaintiff alleged this amounted to trademark infringement and passing off.

The plaintiff claimed that listings of the defendants’ products appeared on e-commerce platforms such as IndiaMart, which could be accessed in Delhi. The plaintiff also pointed out that its registered trademarks were recorded with a Delhi address.

Alongside infringement relief, the plaint referenced a Marketing Agreement allegedly breached by the defendant.

The plaintiff therefore approached the Delhi High Court under Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act claiming jurisdiction on the ground that its principal place of business was in Delhi.

Procedural Detail

After the suit was filed, the defendant submitted an application under Order VII Rule 10 CPC seeking return of the plaint, claiming Delhi had no jurisdiction.

The plaintiff also filed an application under Order II Rule 2 CPC, reserving the right to bring additional claims including breach of contract and additional trademarks. That application was partly allowed earlier.

The Single Judge accepted the objections on territorial jurisdiction, ruled that Delhi was not the correct forum, and returned the plaint for filing before a court in Telangana, where the alleged infringement and marketing activities took place.

The plaintiff appealed this order through FAO(OS) (COMM) 66/2025.

Core Dispute

The core legal dispute revolved around the question:

Does the Delhi High Court have territorial jurisdiction to entertain a trademark infringement suit merely because the plaintiff has its principal place of business in Delhi, even if no part of cause of action occurred in Delhi?

This involved interpreting:

Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999
Section 20 of CPC
Supreme Court ruling in Indian Performing Rights Society v. Sanjay Dalia
Delhi High Court ruling in Ultra Home Construction v. Purushottam Chaubey
E-commerce jurisdiction principles including Banyan Tree Holdings and World Wrestling Entertainment (WWE) rulings.

Detailed Reasoning and Discussion by the Court

The Division Bench began by reviewing the Single Judge’s grounds, which rested mainly on the principles in Sanjay Dalia and Ultra Home Construction. The Single Judge felt that when the plaintiff had subordinate offices in Telangana, and the infringement happened there, Delhi could not be the forum of convenience merely because the plaintiff’s head office was in Delhi.

However, the Division Bench observed that Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act is a special provision giving the plaintiff an additional forum beyond Section 20 CPC. It enables a trademark owner to file a suit where it carries on business, even if the defendant is not located there.

The Bench found that the Single Judge misapplied Sanjay Dalia. The Supreme Court held that Section 134 cannot be used to indulge in “forum shopping” when the cause of action clearly arises elsewhere and the plaintiff has a working subordinate office there. But that principle only applies when it is clear from the plaint that the cause of action is exclusively elsewhere.

The Division Bench held that, in this case, the plaint contained pleaded facts linking the defendant’s acts and internet visibility to Delhi. It noted that under Banyan Tree Holding and WWE, internet presence accessible within a jurisdiction can constitute part of cause of action if commercial targeting is alleged.

The Court further noted that the marketing agreement may be relevant to the cause of action and must be tested during trial—not at the threshold stage—since Order VII Rule 10 CPC requires looking only at the plaint and its annexures.

The Court found that the Single Judge also erred by examining additional material beyond the plaint, such as invoices, to conclude lack of jurisdiction. Under the law, only the plaint’s averments must be examined when deciding jurisdiction objections under Order VII Rule 10.

The Bench held that the plaintiff’s registration certificates reflected Delhi as the business address and this supports jurisdiction.

Thus, the Court held that the suit was maintainable in Delhi.

Decision

The Division Bench allowed the appeal. It set aside the Single Judge’s order returning the plaint and held that the Delhi High Court has territorial jurisdiction to continue hearing the suit.

The related application under Order VII Rule 10 (IA 2200/2023) was dismissed.

The suit was ordered to be restored to the original court for further proceedings. No costs were imposed.

Concluding Note

This decision reinforces the principle that trademark owners have a statutory right to sue where they carry on business under Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, provided the plaint discloses some factual basis connecting the dispute to that forum. Courts must avoid rejecting suits prematurely unless lack of jurisdiction is obvious from the face of the plaint.

It also highlights how digital commerce, online availability and contractual relationships can form part of the jurisdictional matrix in intellectual property disputes.

This ruling contributes significantly to evolving jurisprudence where online trade and multi-state operations raise complex territorial questions.

Case Metadata

Case Title: Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Veda Seed Sciences Pvt. Ltd.

Order Date: 03 December 2025

Case Number: FAO(OS) (COMM) 66/2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:____ (as per judgment pagination header)

Court: High Court of Delhi

Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar & Hon’ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Suggested Publication Titles

Jurisdiction in Trademark Litigation after Sanjay Dalia: A Study of Kohinoor Seeds v. Veda Seeds
Territorial Jurisdiction and E-Commerce in India: Legal Lessons from Kohinoor Seeds Case
Head Office as a Jurisdictional Anchor in IP Suits: Delhi High Court’s Interpretation in 2025
Section 134(2) vs Section 20 CPC: Rebalancing Plaintiff Rights in IP Enforcement
Forum Selection, Online Sales and Trademark Rights: Emerging Judicial Trends in India

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Delhi High Court Restores Trademark Suit Returned for Lack of Jurisdiction — Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd. vs. Veda Seed Sciences Pvt. Ltd. | Order dated 03 December 2025 | FAO(OS) (COMM) 66/2025 | Before Hon’ble Justice C. Hari Shankar & Hon’ble Justice Om Prakash Shukla | High Court of Delhi

In a significant ruling concerning territorial jurisdiction in trademark disputes, the Delhi High Court has set aside the earlier decision of a Single Judge who had returned the plaint filed by Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd. on the ground that Delhi lacked jurisdiction. The Division Bench restored the suit, holding that the Court could hear the matter under Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Kohinoor Seed Fields had initiated proceedings alleging infringement of its registered trademarks "TADAAKHA" and "SADANAND" and passing off of its unregistered mark "BASANT" by Veda Seed Sciences Pvt. Ltd. The defendant filed an application under Order VII Rule 10 CPC, arguing that the alleged infringement occurred in Telangana and that Delhi was not the appropriate forum.

The Single Judge accepted the objection and returned the plaint, stating that mere presence of the plaintiff’s head office in Delhi could not create territorial jurisdiction when the cause of action arose elsewhere. However, the Division Bench disagreed, holding that the plaint contained adequate assertions linking part of the cause of action to Delhi, including the plaintiff’s registered trademarks being associated with a Delhi address and the online availability of allegedly infringing products.

The Court emphasized that jurisdiction objections at the threshold stage must be determined solely on the plaint and its supporting documents and not on additional evidence or assumptions. The decision reinforces the broader jurisdictional rights granted to trademark plaintiffs under Section 134(2), particularly in cases involving online commerce and multi-location business operations.

With the order, the suit has been restored for trial before the Single Judge. No costs were imposed.

Disclaimer: This is for general information only and should not be construed as legal advice as it may contain human errors in perception and presentation: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent & Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi.

Novo Nordisk Vs. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd.

Below is the complete analytical legal research paper written exactly in the manner requested, in simple but legally accurate language, without bullet points or paragraph numbering. Suggested publication titles are provided at the end.

Brief Introductory Head Note

This legal analysis examines the recent judgment delivered by the High Court of Delhi in the matter Novo Nordisk A/S v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd. & Anr., concerning alleged infringement of Indian Patent No. 262697 relating to the pharmaceutical compound Semaglutide. The case raises complex legal issues on patent validity, anticipation, prior claiming, inventive step, and the applicability of Section 107A relating to regulatory exceptions. The judgment also addresses questions of public interest, commercial intent, and balance of convenience where a pharmaceutical patent is near expiry.

Summary of Case and Factual Background

The Plaintiff, Novo Nordisk A/S, is a well-known global healthcare corporation specializing in diabetes medicines. It owns Indian Patent No. 262697 covering the compound Semaglutide, a once-weekly injectable drug used for treating Type-2 diabetes and obesity. The patent was granted in 2014 and is set to expire in March 2026.

In late 2024, Novo Nordisk discovered that the Defendants, Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories and OneSource Specialty Pharma Pvt. Ltd., were importing and manufacturing Semaglutide in India. Upon further investigation, it appeared that the Defendants were producing the compound not only for research purposes but in volumes suggesting commercial intent. The Plaintiff issued a cease-and-desist notice, after which the Defendants filed a revocation petition challenging the patent.

Novo Nordisk then initiated the present suit seeking a permanent injunction along with urgent interim relief restraining the Defendants from manufacturing or exporting the drug during the subsistence of the patent.

Procedural Detail

The suit was filed before the High Court of Delhi under the Commercial Courts Act. On first listing, the Defendants stated that although they had begun manufacturing, they would not sell the drug in India until they secured local marketing approval. However, they reserved the right to export to countries where the Plaintiff did not hold a valid patent.

The Court initially allowed the exports but recorded the assurance of no domestic sale. The Plaintiff appealed, leading to directions from the Division Bench that the interim injunction application be decided expeditiously.

Extensive arguments were heard over multiple dates from July to September 2025. The judgment was reserved and finally pronounced on 2 December 2025.

Core Dispute

The core controversy is whether the Defendants should be restrained from manufacturing Semaglutide in India, even for export purposes, during the remaining term of the patent.

The Defendants argue that:

Semaglutide is not novel and is anticipated by an earlier Genus Patent IN’964.
The Plaintiff has admitted, through filings and international conduct, that Semaglutide falls within the earlier genus claims.
The patent is invalid under Section 64 on grounds of prior claiming, anticipation, lack of inventive step, and Section 3(d).
Manufacture is protected under the research exception of Section 107A and does not amount to infringement.

The Plaintiff argues that:

Semaglutide is a novel and inventive species compound and demonstrates significantly higher therapeutic efficacy compared to earlier molecules, especially Example-61 in the Genus Patent.
The Defendants have admitted infringement by applying for licenses and regulatory approvals.
Export-oriented manufacture is still infringement under Section 48.
After nearly nineteen years without challenge, the patent must be treated as prima facie valid.

Detailed Reasoning and Discussion by the Court

The Court first clarified that there is no presumption of patent validity in India, as per Section 13(4) of the Patents Act and the Supreme Court ruling in Bishwanath Prasad Radhey Shyam v. Hindustan Metal Industries. Therefore, when a defendant raises a revocation-based defence under Section 107(1), the Court must assess whether a credible challenge has been raised.

The Defendants relied heavily on Section 64(1)(a), arguing that the compound was already claimed in an earlier genus patent. The Court examined the chemical structure comparison between Example-61 of the Genus Patent and Semaglutide, and also considered scientific literature where Example-61 was referred to as “Alanine Semaglutide”, suggesting structural proximity.

However, the Court held that proximity alone is insufficient. A species claim can only be said to be anticipated if the earlier genus patent provides an enabling disclosure. Relying on Novartis AG v. Natco Pharma Ltd., the Court reiterated that mere coverage is not disclosure. A person skilled in the art should be able to derive the exact species without hindsight reconstruction.

On inventive step, the Defendants’ argument that substitution of Alanine with Aib at position 8 was obvious was rejected at this preliminary stage. The Court noted that no prior art demonstrated that such substitution would yield the exceptionally prolonged half-life and once-weekly dosing achieved by Semaglutide. This aligned with the long-felt need and marked clinical improvement recognized in F. Hoffmann-La Roche v. Cipla Ltd.

Regarding Section 3(d), the Court held that Semaglutide is a new compound, not a minor modification of a known substance, and its enhanced efficacy was evident.

On infringement, the Court relied on MSD v. Sanjeev Gupta and clarified that manufacture—even solely for export—falls within the prohibited acts under Section 48. Section 107A does not permit commercial scale manufacture.

Finally, regarding balance of convenience, the Court held that allowing the Defendants to continue manufacturing would irreversibly damage the Plaintiff’s statutory monopoly, whereas any loss to the Defendants was compensable in money.

Decision

The Court granted an interim injunction restraining the Defendants from manufacturing, exporting, selling, offering for sale, commercializing, or otherwise dealing in Semaglutide or any formulation containing it, until expiry of the patent or further orders.

The earlier statement protecting exports was vacated.

Concluding Note

This judgment reinforces the principle that Indian patent law does not grant multiple opportunities to monopolize the same invention and that near-expiry patents cannot be invalidated lightly without strong evidence. The Court balanced innovation incentives with public interest considerations and clarified that Section 107A cannot be used as a shield for pre-commercial stockpiling. The decision will likely influence pharmaceutical patent enforcement strategy and ongoing debate over genus vs. species patents in India.

Case Citation Details

Case Title: Novo Nordisk A/S v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd. & Anr.
Order / Judgment Date: 02 December 2025
Case Number: CS(COMM) 565/2025 & connected applications
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:____ (as per Court record heading)
Court: High Court of Delhi, New Delhi
Judge: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

Suggested Titles for Publication

Semaglutide Patent Litigation: Navigating Genus–Species Conflict in Indian Patent Jurisprudence
Export Manufacturing and Patent Rights: Legal Boundaries After Novo Nordisk v. Dr. Reddy’s
Coverage vs. Disclosure: A Judicial Revisit in Pharmaceutical Patent Enforcement
When Research Becomes Commerce: Section 107A Tested in Semaglutide Litigation
Balancing Innovation and Access: Delhi High Court’s Interim Approach in Diabetes Drug Patent Case

Disclaimer

The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By:
Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor
Patent and Trademark Attorney
High Court of Delhi

Delhi High Court Restrains Dr. Reddy’s from Manufacturing Semaglutide Pending Patent Expiry — Novo Nordisk A/S v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd. & Anr., Order dated 02 December 2025, CS(COMM) 565/2025, before Hon’ble Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora, High Court of Delhi

In a significant development impacting the pharmaceutical patent landscape, the Delhi High Court has granted an interim injunction restraining Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories and OneSource Specialty Pharma from manufacturing or exporting the anti-diabetic drug Semaglutide until the expiry of Indian Patent No. 262697 held by Novo Nordisk A/S.

Novo Nordisk approached the Court alleging that the Defendants had begun large-scale manufacture of Semaglutide in India intended for export, despite the Plaintiff’s subsisting patent rights until March 2026. The Defendants argued that the compound lacked novelty and was anticipated by an earlier “genus patent,” contending that the suit patent was invalid and therefore unenforceable. They further sought shelter under Section 107A of the Patents Act, claiming the manufacture was protected as research activity.

After hearing extensive arguments, the Court rejected the Defendants’ contentions at the interim stage and held that a credible inventiveness dispute existed, requiring full trial. However, it found that the Defendants’ ongoing commercial-scale manufacturing—even for export—amounted to prima facie infringement under Section 48 of the Patents Act. The Court clarified that Section 107A does not permit stockpiling or commercial manufacture during the patent term.

The Court also noted that the patent had remained uncontested for nearly nineteen years, and allowing continued manufacture would irreversibly harm the statutory monopoly granted to the patentee. The balance of convenience and irreparable loss were held to be in favour of the Plaintiff.

The injunction will remain in force until the expiry of the patent term or further judicial orders.

With this ruling, the Court has reaffirmed the enforceability of species patents and clarified legal boundaries around export manufacturing under Section 107A—a ruling expected to influence ongoing pharmaceutical patent disputes in India.

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Disclaimer: This is for general information only and should not be construed as legal advice as it may contain human errors in perception and presentation: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent & Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi.

Edible Products (India) Ltd. Vs. Shalimar Chemical Works Pvt. Ltd.

LEGAL ANALYTICAL RESEARCH PAPER

Brief Introductory Head Note

The case of Edible Products (India) Limited vs. Shalimar Chemical Works Private Limited revolves around a dispute relating to passing off and alleged infringement of trade dress in the market of coconut oil products. The central concern before the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court was whether the defendant’s product packaging, colour scheme, bottle shape, and overall get-up were deceptively similar to that of the plaintiff, thereby misleading ordinary consumers into believing that both products originated from the same source.

The matter examines fundamental principles of passing off under Indian trademark jurisprudence, including the Classical Trinity Test consisting of goodwill, deception, and likelihood of damage. The decision also touches upon the distinction between infringement and passing off, the test of an average consumer, relevance of prior use, and the significance of trade dress in consumer-facing packaged goods.

Summary of Case and Factual Background

The plaintiff, Shalimar Chemical Works Private Limited, is a long-established manufacturer of coconut oil products under the brand “Shalimar.” The company has been operating in the market since 1945 and, specifically, selling its products in the present HDPE (plastic) bottles in yellow and green colour scheme since approximately 2006. The plaintiff claims substantial goodwill, a large customer base, heavy advertisement expenditure, and brand recognition associated with its unique trade dress.

The defendant, Edible Products (India) Limited, began selling coconut oil in containers similar in shape, colour, bottle texture, label style, and overall packaging in the market. The plaintiff contended that this similarity was intentional and capable of misleading the general public.

The plaintiff approached the Commercial Court seeking injunction against the defendant from using the similar trade dress. The trial court granted an interim injunction, and later confirmed it after hearing both parties. The defendant appealed that order before the Calcutta High Court.

Procedural History

The plaintiff initially obtained an ex-parte interim injunction on August 16, 2023, restraining the defendant from marketing products in deceptively similar packaging. The defendant filed an application seeking vacation of the injunction, which was heard along with the plaintiff’s main interim injunction application.

On May 15, 2024, the Commercial Court made the injunction absolute and rejected the defendant’s vacating petition.

Dissatisfied, the defendant preferred FMAT No. 189 of 2024, contesting the injunction before the Calcutta High Court, which heard arguments over multiple dates and delivered judgment on December 03, 2025.

Core Dispute

The primary issue was whether the defendant’s product packaging amount to passing off by imitation of the plaintiff's distinctive trade dress, even though the trademarks used were different.

The questions before the court included:

Whether the defendant’s packaging was deceptively similar when viewed from the perspective of an average consumer.

Whether the plaintiff had established goodwill in the packaging sufficient to attract passing off protection.

Whether the similarity of shape, colour, label layout, cap texture, and graphical elements created a likelihood of confusion.

Whether the plaintiff must prove actual damage or whether likelihood of deception is sufficient.

Whether different end-uses of coconut oil (edible vs. hair use) defeat the allegation of passing off.

Detailed Legal Reasoning and Court Discussion

The Court traced the legal foundation of passing off to Section 27(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, recognising that passing off is an independent common-law remedy available even where trademarks are unregistered.

The Court relied heavily on the Classical Trinity Test, drawn from Reckitt & Colman Ltd. v. Borden Inc. [1990] RPC 340, popularly known as the Jif Lemon Case. The test requires proof of:

Goodwill
Misrepresentation
Likelihood of damage

On the first limb—goodwill—the Court noted that the plaintiff had used the distinctive HDPE packaging since 2006 and the Shalimar brand since 1945. Evidence of invoices, advertisements, and market dominance demonstrating more than ₹450 crore turnover was submitted. The Court held goodwill was clearly established.

On the second limb—misrepresentation—the Court observed that both products shared remarkably similar elements: yellow-green backgrounds, identical style coconut tree graphics, similar ribbed bottle design, and near-identical bottle cap shape. Even though the names "KMP" and "Shalimar" were different, the overall visual impression outweighed label differences. The Court applied the standard of an average consumer with imperfect memory, rejecting the defendant’s argument that labels were distinct enough to avoid confusion.

Key supporting citations included:

Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories, AIR 1965 SC 980 – Held that added matter may distinguish, but only if effective.

Satyam Infoway Ltd. v. Siffynet Solutions (P) Ltd., (2004) 6 SCC 145 – Presumption of dishonesty exists when later user cannot justify adopting similar features despite earlier user’s presence.

Gerbatschow Wodka KG v. John Distilleries Ltd., (2011) 47 PTC 100 – Bottle shape forms part of protectable trade dress.

The defendant argued the packaging was generic and common to trade. However, the Court rejected this contention because:
(a) No proof was produced to show widespread similar usage by others.
(b) Defendant itself applied for shape trademark registration, undermining its claim of genericness.

On the third limb—likelihood of damage—the Court held that given the plaintiff’s long-standing reputation, similarity in packaging, and the nature of the product sold to public masses, damage was inevitable even if not presently quantified.

The Court also dismissed the argument that edible oil and hair oil are different categories, relying on Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 73, and the Full Bench ruling in Sony Kabushiki Kaisha v. Mahaluxmi Textile Mills, (2009) 1 CHN 852, ruling that class of goods is irrelevant in a passing off action, if confusion exists.

Decision

The Calcutta High Court upheld the trial court’s order and dismissed the appeal. The interim injunction restraining the defendant from using the disputed packaging remained in force. The Court clarified that its findings are prima-facie and will not bind final trial adjudication.

No order as to costs was imposed.

Concluding Note

This judgment underscores the Indian judiciary’s commitment to protecting brand identity, packaging, and trade dress under passing-off law. The ruling clarifies that trade dress protection does not require registered rights, and even common-law goodwill can justify injunctions. The decision reinforces the doctrine that the overall impression matters more than individual differences, and average consumer perception remains a central test. It sends a strong message that unfair imitation in packaging, especially in mass-market goods, will attract swift judicial intervention.

Case Details

Case Title: Edible Products (India) Limited vs. Shalimar Chemical Works Private Limited
Order Date: 03 December 2025
Case Number: FMAT No. 189 of 2024 with CAN 2 & CAN 3 of 2024
Neutral Citation: 2025:CHC-AS:2186-DB
Court: High Court at Calcutta, Appellate Side
Bench: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya & Hon’ble Mr. Justice Supratim Bhattacharya

Suggested Titles for Publication

Trade Dress and Passing Off: Consumer Perception and Legal Protection in FMCG Packaging Disputes
Beyond the Label: Judicial Approach to Passing Off in the Indian Marketplace
The Classical Trinity Test in Modern Trademark Litigation: A Case Study
Protecting Brand Identity through Trade Dress: Lessons from the Calcutta High Court
Imperfect Memory, Perfect Protection: Understanding Consumer Confusion Doctrine in Indian Passing Off Law

Disclaimer

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Calcutta High Court Upholds Injunction in Trade Dress Passing-Off Dispute Between Edible Products and Shalimar Chemical Works
Order dated 03 December 2025 | FMAT No. 189 of 2024 | Before Hon’ble Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Hon’ble Justice Supratim Bhattacharya | High Court at Calcutta (Appellate Side)

In a significant ruling involving trade dress protection in the FMCG sector, the Calcutta High Court dismissed the appeal filed by Edible Products (India) Limited and upheld the interim injunction granted in favour of Shalimar Chemical Works Private Limited. The injunction restrains the appellant from using packaging alleged to be deceptively similar to the respondent’s coconut oil product presentation.

The dispute arose after Shalimar Chemical Works, a brand in the coconut oil sector since 1945, accused Edible Products of adopting an almost identical bottle shape, colour combination, label layout, and overall packaging that could mislead consumers in the marketplace. The Trial Court had granted an ex-parte injunction, later confirmed after hearing both sides. The appellant challenged the order arguing lack of similarity, generic nature of the packaging, and distinct trade labels.

The Division Bench rejected the appellant’s arguments and held that passing-off protection focuses on the overall look and impression, not merely label differences. The Court applied the Classical Trinity Test from the Jif Lemon Case and held that Shalimar had established goodwill, the defendant’s packaging created likelihood of confusion, and continued use could harm the plaintiff’s long-standing market reputation. The Court emphasized the standard of an “average consumer with imperfect memory” and noted that even if the names differed, the similarities in packaging could influence consumer perception.

The Court also observed that the defendant’s subsequent attempt to register the bottle shape undermined its argument that the design was generic or commonly used. The Bench concluded that the trial court took a plausible view and no interference was warranted at the interim stage.

Disclaimer: This is for general information only and should not be construed as legal advice as it may contain human errors in perception and presentation: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent & Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi.

Chemco Plastic Industries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Chemco Plast

LEGAL ANALYTICAL RESEARCH PAPER
Chemco Plastic Industries Pvt. Ltd. vs. Chemco Plast

Brief Introductory Headnote Summary

This case concerns a dispute over the trademark “CHEMCO.” The Plaintiff, Chemco Plastic Industries Pvt. Ltd., sought an interim injunction against the Defendant, Chemco Plast, alleging trademark infringement and passing off. The central issue was whether the Defendant’s use of the name “CHEMCO PLAST” and related domain name infringed upon the Plaintiff’s registered trademark and whether the Plaintiff, claiming earlier user and ownership, was entitled to exclusive protection under Indian trademark law.

This order explores the proof of ownership, prior usage, and trademark rights under Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and analyses whether the Defendant’s continued use should be restrained pending trial. The Court partly granted injunction relief on infringement while declining passing-off protection.

Factual Background

The Plaintiff is engaged in manufacturing plastic products like PET bottles, containers, closures, and home utility items under the trademark “CHEMCO”, claiming user since 1973. The Plaintiff asserts that the mark is distinctive and widely recognized in the industry.

The Defendant, a partnership firm operating under the name “CHEMCO PLAST”, claims user since 1977 through predecessors-in-title. The Defendant states it has used the name openly and continuously in business operations, including invoices, product marketing, and its domain name www.chemcoplast.com registered in March 2006.

Both parties manufacture similar products and operate in overlapping markets.

Procedural Detail

The Plaintiff filed:

A Commercial Intellectual Property Suit (No. 80/2024)
An Interim Application (No. 2165/2024) seeking temporary injunction.

The Plaintiff prayed for a restraining order stopping the Defendant from:

Using the mark “CHEMCO” or “CHEMCO PLAST”
Operating the domain name
Passing off its goods as those of the Plaintiff
Appointing a Court Receiver to seize infringing products.

The Defendant contested the allegations, denying infringement and asserting prior continuous user and bona fide adoption.

Arguments were heard, reserved on 20th June 2025, and order pronounced on 3rd December 2025.

Core Legal Dispute

The main points of conflict were:

Whether the Defendant’s use of “CHEMCO” or “CHEMCO PLAST” infringes the Plaintiff’s registered trademark under Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
Whether the Plaintiff could claim earlier ownership or uninterrupted use through its predecessors.
Whether passing off action was maintainable based on goodwill, misrepresentation, and damage.

The dispute centered on prior user rights, assignment history, registration validity, and likelihood of confusion.

Detailed Reasoning and Judicial Analysis

The Court performed extensive analysis on trademark history, validity of assignment, parallel user claims, and applicability of infringement under Section 29.

The Plaintiff asserted longstanding use and registration across multiple Classes including 11, 16, 20, 21 and 22, which provided statutory rights to enforcement under Section 28 and 29.

While assessing flow of title, the Court observed challenges in Plaintiff’s version. The Plaintiff initially carried business under different names, including “Net-Guard Polynet Pvt. Ltd.” before adopting the name Chemco Plastic Corporation. The Court found that there was no clear assignment document transferring goodwill or the mark “CHEMCO” from earlier entities to the Plaintiff. This weakened the claim of continuity of ownership.

The Defendant produced evidence showing:

Use of the term "CHEMCO" since 1977
Invoices
Membership in plastic manufacturing associations
Domain registration predating Plaintiff's

The Court noted that the Defendant had never secured trademark registration and attempted filing on a “proposed to be used” basis, which was subsequently abandoned.

In applying Section 29, the Court held:

Use of identical or similar marks on similar products may constitute infringement even without proven damage.
Use of identical marks for domain names and trade identities must be examined carefully where public confusion is possible.

The Court distinguished between infringement and passing off. It found evidence of Defendant attempting to use the mark "CHEMCO" as a trademark beyond business name usage. Documents such as reply to cease-and-desist notice and website screenshots confirmed Defendant asserting trademark identity.

The Court relied on precedents including:

S. Sayed Mohideen vs. P. Sulochana Bai (Supreme Court)
(Explained distinction between passing off and infringement)
Power Control Appliances vs. Sumeet Machines Pvt. Ltd.
(Principle of one mark, one source, one proprietor)
T.G. Balaji Chettiar vs. Hindustan Lever Ltd.
(Requirement of clear proof of prior user and assignment)

The Court concluded that while both parties raised serious factual controversies requiring trial, the Plaintiff established a prima facie case of infringement under Section 29.

However, since both parties coexisted in the market for decades and the Defendant had developed goodwill under its business identity, a blanket injunction was held inequitable.

Decision

The Court partly allowed the Interim Application.

The order restrained the Defendant from using:

CHEMCO or CHEMCO PLAST as a trademark for products
Any identical or deceptively similar trademark to Plaintiff’s registered mark

The Defendant, however, was not restrained from continuing business using the trade name “CHEMCO PLAST” or domain name, pending trial, given long market presence and unresolved factual disputes.

Passing off relief was rejected due to weak evidence of deception and delayed enforcement.

Execution of the order was stayed for six weeks.

Concluding Note

This case highlights the complexity of trademark disputes involving shared historical use, family-controlled businesses, and absence of clear assignment or ownership transfer documentation. Indian courts continue to balance trademark exclusivity against long-standing bona fide use by others.

The decision underscores that registration confers statutory strength, but long delay and coexistence may restrict interim relief. The final determination of rights now remains subject to evidence at trial.

Suggested Titles for Publication

Trademark Conflicts and Coexistence: An Analytical Study of Chemco vs. Chemco Plast
Balancing Prior Use and Registration Rights in Trademark Law: Lessons from the Chemco Case
Dual Identity Disputes and Interim Injunctions: A Legal Analysis of the Bombay High Court Approach
When Two Chemcos Collide: Trademark Infringement, Passing Off, and Commercial Justice
Ownership, Usage, and Confusion: A Case Study on Trademark Enforcement in Indian Courts

Case Identification

Case Title: Chemco Plastic Industries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Chemco Plast
Order Date: 3rd December 2025
Case Number: Interim Application No. 2165 of 2024 in Commercial IP Suit No. 80 of 2024
Neutral Citation: 2025:BHC-OS:23282
Court: High Court of Bombay, Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction, Commercial Division
Hon’ble Judge: Justice N. J. Jamadar

Disclaimer:
The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By:
Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman
IP Adjutor | Patent and Trademark Attorney
High Court of Delhi

------

LEGAL NEWS SUMMARY

The High Court of Bombay, in its order dated 3rd December 2025, passed by Hon’ble Justice N. J. Jamadar in Interim Application No. 2165 of 2024 in Commercial IP Suit No. 80 of 2024, titled Chemco Plastic Industries Pvt. Ltd. vs. Chemco Plast, delivered an important ruling concerning trademark infringement relating to the use of the mark "CHEMCO."

In this case, the Plaintiff, Chemco Plastic Industries Pvt. Ltd., alleged that the Defendant, Chemco Plast, was infringing its registered trademark “CHEMCO” and sought an interim injunction restraining the Defendant from using the trademark, trade name, packaging, and website address associated with the disputed mark. The Plaintiff claimed long-standing prior use since 1973 and argued that the Defendant's continued use of "Chemco Plast" would mislead consumers and dilute the value of its trademark.

The Defendant opposed the injunction and asserted that it had been using the name since 1977 through its predecessor entities and had built substantial goodwill in the market. The Defendant also argued that both parties had coexisted in the industry for decades, and therefore the injunction would cause irreparable loss to its ongoing business.

After hearing the arguments and reviewing the evidence, the Court concluded that the Plaintiff had established a prima facie case of trademark infringement under Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, considering the Plaintiff’s registered rights. However, the Court also acknowledged the Defendant’s long-standing presence in the market. As a result, the Court issued a partial injunction, restraining the Defendant from using “CHEMCO” or “CHEMCO PLAST” as a trademark for its goods, but did not prevent the Defendant from continuing business under the trade name or using its domain name pending trial. The relief sought for passing off was declined due to insufficient evidence demonstrating deception or confusion at this interim stage.

The execution of the order has been stayed for six weeks to allow compliance.

This order highlights the Court’s balanced approach between protecting registered trademark rights and acknowledging long-standing market coexistence, particularly in matters involving competing claims of goodwill and historical usage.

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ITC Limited. Vs. Adyar Gate Hotels Limited

Below is the fully-developed, simplified, yet legally accurate analytical research paper based on the uploaded judgment. It follows your structure, avoids bullet points and numbering, and keeps language accessible while retaining legal reasoning and statutory references.

Brief Introductory Headnote and Summary

This case deals with a commercial trademark dispute between ITC Limited and Adyar Gate Hotels Limited over the use of the term “DAKSHIN” for a South-Indian specialty restaurant. The core conflict arose when the defendant continued using the mark DAKSHIN after the business arrangement between the parties ended, and further opened a standalone restaurant under the same name. ITC claimed exclusive ownership over the mark and sought injunction, arguing trademark infringement, passing off and copyright violation. The defendant denied these allegations and asserted ownership based on its own registered trademark and long-term use of the mark.

The Court had to examine not only the trademark rights of both parties but also the question of territorial jurisdiction. The dispute required a careful interpretation of the Trade Marks Act, Copyright Act and the Code of Civil Procedure with reference to online presence, concurrent trademark rights, acquiescence and principles governing quia-timet suits.

Factual Background

ITC Limited and its affiliate ITC Hotels Limited operate hotel businesses across India. As part of its hospitality branding strategy, ITC adopted the term “DAKSHIN” for premium South-Indian dining in 1989 at a Chennai property owned by the defendant. The parties had contractual arrangements regulating operations. Over time, ITC expanded the DAKSHIN-branded restaurants across major cities. The defendant continued using the mark under arrangement until 2015.

After the operating agreement ended, the defendant partnered with another hotel chain and used the name DAKSHIN for the Chennai restaurant. In 2024, the defendant opened a new standalone restaurant under the same name. ITC treated this as unauthorized use and sought a permanent injunction.

Procedural History

The suit was filed before the Delhi High Court seeking injunction and ancillary relief. Initially, an ex-parte injunction order was passed restraining the defendant from using the trademark. The defendant appealed, and the Division Bench set aside that injunction, directing the Single Judge to hear both parties before issuing any interim direction.

Subsequently, pleadings were completed, and both sides filed extensive documents including registration certificates, historical records and legal correspondence. Evidence of bookings through online platforms like Zomato and social media promotion was also brought before the Court. After arguments, judgment on the interim application was reserved.

Core Legal Dispute

The core legal controversy centered on two primary issues:

Whether the Delhi High Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit, considering that the alleged infringement took place physically in Chennai though the defendant’s restaurant was accessible through online platforms nationwide.

Whether ITC could restrain the defendant from using the “DAKSHIN” trademark despite both parties holding registered trademarks, and despite the defendant’s continued long-standing usage.

The Court also examined delay, acquiescence, passing off, concurrent user, and the impact of the online presence of the defendant.

Detailed Judicial Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first examined the issue of territorial jurisdiction. It emphasized that jurisdiction must be established before assessing interim relief. Reference was made to the Supreme Court decision in Asma Lateef v. Shabbir Ahmad (2024) 4 SCC 696, which clarified that courts must form a prima facie view on maintainability before granting a temporary injunction.

The plaintiff asserted jurisdiction under Section 20(c) CPC, Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, and Section 62 of the Copyright Act on the ground that the defendant’s marketing was accessible in Delhi and could influence customers nationwide.

The Court, relying on Banyan Tree Holding (2009) and subsequent Delhi High Court precedents including Cable News Network (2023) and Impresario Entertainment (2018), held that mere online accessibility is insufficient to constitute jurisdiction. There must be intentional targeting and demonstrable commercial transactions within the jurisdiction.

Reservation through platforms like Zomato or Instagram visibility did not constitute a completed commercial transaction in Delhi because dining must physically occur in Chennai.

The Court rejected the argument of “dynamic effect” (reputation injury felt in another jurisdiction) as the plaintiffs failed to prove any tangible harm caused in Delhi.

On the plea of quia timet, the Court held that a bare apprehension of future expansion to Delhi was speculative without supporting evidence. Reference was made to New Life Laboratories (2023), where a similar stance was adopted.

The Court then examined the merits. Both sides had valid registrations for the mark under Section 28 of the Trade Marks Act. Under Section 28(3), neither party could claim exclusivity over the other when similar marks were registered. Section 30(2)(e) provides statutory defense where two parties have similar registered marks.

Thus, infringement action was not maintainable unless the defendant’s registration was cancelled. No rectification petition had been filed. The Court recognized the remedy of passing-off remains available under Syed Mohideen v. Sulochana Bai (2016) but held ITC failed to establish deception or misrepresentation at the interim stage.

Historical collaboration suggested coexistence and acquiescence under Section 33. Delay weakened ITC's claim of urgency.

Thus, the Court held that no prima facie case for injunction was made out.

Decision

The Court denied interim injunction on the grounds that:

It lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

Even on merits, no prima facie case existed given concurrent trademark ownership, absence of rectification, lack of demonstrated misrepresentation and evidence of acquiescence.

The suit itself was not dismissed; however, interim relief was refused.

Concluding Note

This judgment demonstrates the evolving landscape of jurisdiction in digital and trademark disputes. It clarifies that online presence alone does not create jurisdiction and reinforces the statutory framework regarding concurrent trademark ownership. The Court balanced legal rights with commercial history and emphasized that interim injunctions are not granted as a matter of course, especially where jurisdiction is doubtful and mutual rights in the mark exist.

Case Details

Case Title: ITC Limited & Anr. Vs. Adyar Gate Hotels Limited
Order Date: 4 December 2025
Case Number: CS(COMM) 119/2025
Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:____
Court: High Court of Delhi, New Delhi
Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal

Disclaimer

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Delhi High Court Declines Interim Injunction in ITC Limited v. Adyar Gate Hotels Trademark Dispute

Order dated 4 December 2025, in CS(COMM) 119/2025, passed by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amit Bansal, High Court of Delhi.

The Delhi High Court has rejected ITC Limited’s plea for interim injunction against Adyar Gate Hotels Limited in a trademark dispute involving the well-known restaurant name "DAKSHIN". ITC alleged infringement of its registered trademark and passing off, claiming that the defendant unlawfully continued using the mark "DAKSHIN" even after the expiry of the earlier operational agreement between the two parties.

The Court noted that both parties held valid trademark registrations for the term "DAKSHIN" under Class 42 and referred to Section 28(3) and Section 30(2)(e) of the Trade Marks Act, which protect concurrent registered users from infringement claims unless a rectification process invalidates one of the registrations. The Court further observed that ITC had not filed any rectification petition against the defendant’s registration, weakening its infringement claim.

A major factor influencing the decision was territorial jurisdiction. ITC argued that online visibility of the defendant’s restaurant through platforms such as Zomato and Instagram constituted commercial presence in Delhi. However, the Court held that mere online accessibility did not establish jurisdiction unless the defendant specifically targeted customers in Delhi and concluded commercial transactions within the jurisdiction. Since the restaurant operated solely in Chennai and no evidence showed active business in Delhi, jurisdiction was not made out.

Additionally, the Court noted ITC’s long period of silence despite continued use of the name by the defendant, suggesting acquiescence.

While refusing interim relief, the Court clarified that the suit itself would continue, and the plaintiff may pursue legal remedy including rectification proceedings if advised.

Tuesday, December 2, 2025

Visage Beauty and Healthcare Private Limited Vs. Freecia Professional India Private Limited

Brief Introductory Head Note Summary of Case

This case deals with a company protecting its brand names and product descriptions in the beauty industry. The plaintiff, a skincare product maker, sued the defendant for copying its trademarks and the exact wording of ingredients and usage steps on three facial kits. The court looked at whether this copying broke trademark and copyright laws. Since the defendant stopped participating in the case, the court decided based on the plaintiff's evidence and granted temporary orders to stop the defendant from using the copied elements. This shows how courts protect original product designs and words in competitive markets like cosmetics.

Factual Background

The plaintiff, Visage Beauty and Healthcare Private Limited, sells skincare products under the brand O3+. They own registered trademarks for D-TAN, DERMOMELAN, and SHINE & GLOW, which they use on facial kits like O3+ Bridal Facial Kit Radiant & Glowing Skin, O3+ Bridal Facial Kit Vitamin C Glowing Skin, and O3+ Shine & Glow Kit. These marks were adopted years ago: DERMOMELAN in 2008, D-TAN in 2009, and SHINE & GLOW in 2011. The plaintiff has spent a lot on advertising, over 21 crore rupees from 2004 to 2021, and their sales are high, like over 18 crores for D-TAN in 2020-21. Their products are promoted in magazines, online stores like Amazon, and social media. The defendant, Freecia Professional India Private Limited, sells similar kits under PROADS, like Proads Bridal Facial Kit Radiant Smooth Glowing Skin, Proads Bridal Facial Kit Vitamin C Enriched Glowing Skin, and Proads Facial Kit Shine & Glowing Skin. The plaintiff found out in August 2022 that the defendant copied not just the trademarks but also the exact lists of ingredients and steps to use from their packaging. The plaintiff's products cost over 1000 rupees, while the defendant's are cheaper, around 300-600 rupees. The plaintiff says this copying tricks customers and harms their reputation.

Procedural Detail

The plaintiff filed the suit in 2022 as CS(COMM) 633/2022 in the Delhi High Court, asking for permanent stops on the defendant's actions, damages, and account of profits. They also filed an application I.A. 15016/2022 under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for a temporary stop during the case. The defendant was served, appeared, and filed a written statement defending themselves. But after December 4, 2024, the defendant stopped showing up, so on August 21, 2025, the court proceeded without them, called ex-parte. The plaintiff filed an affidavit on October 28, 2025, showing the defendant's products were still sold online and they bought some on September 17, 2025. The case was heard on November 3, 13, and 21, 2025, with only the plaintiff's lawyer arguing. The court gave its judgment on November 21, 2025, deciding the temporary application and setting the main suit for further steps on February 11, 2026, before a Joint Registrar.

Core Dispute

The main issue was whether the defendant infringed the plaintiff's trademarks D-TAN, DERMOMELAN, and SHINE & GLOW, and copied their copyright in the product packaging, including the lists of ingredients and steps to use. The plaintiff claimed the defendant copied everything word-for-word on similar facial kits, which could confuse customers and ride on their goodwill. The defendant argued the marks are common words describing the products, like removing tan or making skin shine, and the ingredients and steps are standard in the industry, not original. They said many others use similar terms, so no exclusive rights. The plaintiff countered that their marks are unique, coined words with no dictionary meaning for D-TAN and DERMOMELAN, and they have proof of creation and sales. They said just claiming others use it isn't enough without showing big-scale use that hurts their uniqueness. The dispute focused on if there's a strong initial case for infringement, if the plaintiff would suffer big harm without a stop order, and if public interest favors protection.

Detailed Reasoning and Discussion by Court Including on Judgement with Complete Citation Referred and Discussed for Reasoning

The court started by summarizing the plaintiff's claims and the defendant's defenses from their written statement, since the defendant wasn't there to argue. It noted the plaintiff has registered trademarks under the Trade Marks Act, 1999: D-TAN in Class 3 from 2010, DERMOMELAN in Class 3 from 2009, and SHINE & GLOW in Class 44 from 2011. The court said these registrations give the plaintiff exclusive rights under Section 28 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. For copyright, under the Copyright Act, 1957, the court said the unique way the plaintiff wrote the ingredients and steps to use is original literary work, created over time under their supervision, so they own it. The court looked at each product one by one. For the radiant glowing skin kit, it compared pictures and charts showing the defendant copied the ingredients and steps almost exactly, including using D-TAN in step 2. The court said this copying shows bad intent, as there's no reason to copy so closely unless to benefit from the plaintiff's reputation. The defendant claimed it's standard practice and filed some third-party pictures, but the court said those pictures are blurry and don't prove anything, no clear documents were filed. Under Section 30(2)(a) and 35 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the defendant said descriptive use is allowed, but the court didn't buy it for the full copying. For the vitamin C kit, the court saw the same copying in layout, ingredients, and steps, and again dismissed the defendant's standard practice claim for lack of proof. For the shine and glow kit, the court said the name PROADS SHINE & GLOWING SKIN FACIAL KIT is different enough from SHINE & GLOW, as shine and glowing describe the effect, so no trademark infringement there. But the ingredients and steps were copied, infringing copyright. On DERMOMELAN, the court said it's a coined word, not common, and the defendant's one example of a foreign product doesn't make it generic or justify copying. The defendant mentioned a rectification petition against D-TAN, but the court said that's for later, not now. The court applied the test for temporary injunction from Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: prima facie case (yes, from registrations and copying), balance of convenience (plaintiff would lose goodwill if copying continues), and irreparable harm (yes, confusion and lost sales). No other laws or cases were cited directly; the judgment relied on the acts mentioned and the facts. The court clarified it didn't decide if D-TAN is descriptive finally, as that needs full trial.

Decision

The court granted the temporary injunction. It stopped the defendant, its partners, agents, and anyone connected, from copying the plaintiff's layout, ingredients lists, and steps to use for all three kits, as that infringes copyright under the Copyright Act, 1957. It also stopped them from using DERMOMELAN or anything similar, as that infringes the trademark under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. But it didn't stop the use of SHINE & GLOW in the product name, finding it descriptive and not infringing. The main suit continues, listed for February 11, 2026.

Concluding Note

This case highlights how important it is to protect original words and designs in product packaging, especially in beauty where competition is high. It shows courts will stop clear copying even if the copier claims it's common, if there's no strong proof. For businesses, it means creating unique content pays off, and for copiers, it risks quick court orders. Overall, it balances protecting innovation while allowing descriptive words, encouraging fair play in markets.

Case Title: Visage Beauty and Healthcare Private Limited Vs. Freecia Professional India Private Limited & Anr.

Order Date: November 21, 2025

Case Number: CS(COMM) 633/2022

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:633

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Here are 5 suitable titles for this legal analytical article to be published as a legal research paper in a legal journal:

Protecting Literary Works in Cosmetic Descriptions: An Analysis of Interim Relief in Delhi High Court

Coined Marks and Slavish Imitation: Judicial Approach to Facial Kit Disputes Under IP Laws

Ex-Parte Injunctions in IP Cases: Evaluating Prima Facie Copying of Ingredients and Usage Steps

Balancing Descriptive Use and Exclusive Rights: Lessons from a Skincare Trademark Battle

=====

**Delhi High Court Grants Interim Injunction in Skincare Trademark & Copyright Infringement Case**

In a major victory for brand protection in the beauty industry, the Delhi High Court in **Visage Beauty and Healthcare Private Limited v. Freecia Professional India Private Limited & Anr., CS(COMM) 633/2022**, decided on **21st November 2025** by **Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora**, has granted an ex-parte interim injunction restraining the defendants from copying the plaintiff’s original product descriptions and using the registered trademarks “DERMOMELAN” and “D-TAN” in their competing facial kits.

The plaintiff, owner of the well-known skincare brand O3+, alleged that Freecia Professional (selling under the mark PROADS) had slavishly copied the entire content of three of its premium facial kits — namely the ingredients lists, step-by-step usage instructions, and overall layout and presentation — while also using the plaintiff’s registered trademarks “D-TAN”, “DERMOMELAN”, and “SHINE & GLOW” on almost identical but much cheaper products (priced ₹300-600 against plaintiff’s ₹1,000+). The plaintiff demonstrated long use, registration since 2008-2011, sales running into several crores, and huge advertising expenditure.

Despite being served and initially appearing, the defendants stopped participating after December 2024 and were proceeded against ex-parte in August 2025. The court found overwhelming evidence of verbatim copying of literary and artistic content from the plaintiff’s packaging, which qualifies as original literary work under the Copyright Act, 1957. The court held that such wholesale imitation clearly showed dishonest intention to pass off and ride upon the plaintiff’s reputation.

While the court restrained the defendants from using “DERMOMELAN” and from copying the plaintiff’s ingredients lists and usage steps in all three kits, it refused to restrain the descriptive phrase “Shine & Glowing Skin” in the product name itself, noting that “shine” and “glowing” are common descriptive terms in the beauty trade. The injunction application was accordingly allowed in part, with the main suit now listed for further proceedings.

The judgment reinforces that even functional-looking product instructions and ingredient descriptions can enjoy strong copyright and passing-off protection when copied word-for-word with clear intent to confuse consumers.

**Disclaimer:** This is for general information only and should not be construed as legal advice as it may contain human errors in perception and presentation: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent & Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi

=====

Bignet Solutions LLP Vs. Novex Communication Pvt. Ltd.

### Brief Introductory Head Note Summary of Case

This case involves a dispute over the use of old sound recordings for a private event. The plaintiff, a company organizing the event, sought a court declaration that playing certain pre-1965 songs, which they believed were no longer protected by copyright, did not infringe on the defendant's rights. The defendant is a company that manages music copyrights and licenses. The plaintiff feared interference from the defendant unless they paid a license fee, leading them to file the suit. The court ultimately disposed of the case after the event occurred without issues, noting the defendant's assurance that they do not claim rights over such old recordings. This highlights how copyright terms expire after a certain period, placing works in the public domain where anyone can use them freely.

### Factual Background

The plaintiff, Bignet Solutions LLP, was planning a private event on October 12, 2025. They wanted to play 15 specific sound recordings, all from before 1965, during the event. The venue hosting the event required the plaintiff to get a no-objection certificate or license from the defendant, Novex Communication Pvt. Ltd., which handles music licensing. On October 1, 2025, the plaintiff emailed the defendant asking for a license quote and included the list of song names. The defendant responded with a fee quotation. However, the plaintiff later checked and realized that under the law, copyrights in these pre-1965 sound recordings had expired, meaning they were now free for public use without needing permission or payment. The plaintiff only planned to play these old versions, not any newer recreations. Worried that not getting the license might lead to disruption of their event, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit seeking confirmation from the court that no infringement would occur and an order stopping the defendant from demanding fees for these songs.

### Procedural Detail

The suit was filed in the Delhi High Court as a commercial civil suit under the label CS(COMM) 1094/2025, along with three interim applications for urgent relief. It came up for the first hearing on October 10, 2025. At that time, the court heard arguments from both sides. The defendant stated they do not enforce rights over public domain works, while the plaintiff promised to play only the 15 listed pre-1965 songs and to provide a certified recording of the event afterward, signed by the venue. Based on this, the court issued interim orders allowing the event to proceed without interference. After the event on October 12, 2025, the plaintiff submitted documents, including a recording, to show compliance. The matter was heard again on November 21, 2025, where both parties made further submissions. The plaintiff argued the defendant should have clarified no fee was needed, while the defendant pointed out the email lacked release dates and complained about the short recording submitted. Ultimately, the court disposed of the suit and all applications on that date, without proceeding to a full trial.

### Core Dispute

The main issue was whether the plaintiff needed to pay a license fee to the defendant for playing 15 specific pre-1965 sound recordings at a private event. The plaintiff claimed these recordings were in the public domain because their copyright had expired under Section 27 of the Copyright Act, 1957, which sets a time limit on copyright protection. They argued that demanding fees for such works was wrongful. The defendant countered that they never claimed rights over these particular old recordings and that the suit was unnecessary, as they only license works they own or manage. A side issue was whether the plaintiff's email clearly specified the pre-1965 nature of the songs, and whether newer versions of some songs (like recreations in recent movies) could confuse matters. The plaintiff also sought damages, but the court found no basis for that. Overall, the dispute centered on clarifying rights over expired copyrights and preventing potential event disruption.

### Detailed Reasoning and Discussion by Court Including on Judgement with Complete Citation Referred and Discussed for Reasoning

The court began by outlining the plaintiff's suit, which sought a declaration that using the listed pre-1965 sound recordings did not infringe copyrights and an injunction against the defendant demanding fees. It noted the plaintiff's fear of interference at the event. Referring to Section 27 of the Copyright Act, 1957, the court accepted that copyrights in these recordings had expired, making them public domain and free for use without licenses. The court discussed the initial hearing on October 10, 2025, where it recorded statements: the defendant assured they do not enforce rights over non-owned or public domain works, and the plaintiff undertook to limit playback to the 15 songs and provide post-event proof. This led to interim orders allowing the event.

In the final hearing on November 21, 2025, the court examined the plaintiff's compliance evidence, including the event recording. Though the defendant criticized it as too short (about 25 minutes for a three-hour event) and unsigned by the venue, the court accepted it as sufficient, finding no contrary evidence that other songs were played. The court highlighted the plaintiff's email of October 1, 2025, which listed song names but not release dates, noting the defendant's point that some songs have modern recreations where they hold copyrights. However, the court emphasized the defendant's repeated statements—on October 10, 2025, and November 21, 2025—that they claim no rights over pre-1965 recordings and expect no licenses for them.

The court then analyzed the cause of action from paragraph 26 of the plaint: it arose on October 1, 2025, from seeking a no-objection certificate, and intensified on October 3, 2025, with the fee demand. Since the event occurred without interference and the defendant disclaimed rights, the court reasoned the core grievance was resolved. It found no merit in damages, as the plaint lacked supporting pleadings. The court clarified it expressed no opinion on allegations of misrepresentation, interference, or unjust enrichment by the defendant.

Notably, the judgement did not refer to or discuss any other case citations or precedents, relying instead on the facts, parties' statements, and direct application of Section 27 of the Copyright Act, 1957. This section provides that copyright in sound recordings lasts for 60 years from publication, after which it enters the public domain. The court used this to affirm that pre-1965 works are free for use. It declined the plaintiff's request for court fee refund, noting they skipped pre-institution mediation—a statutory step under the Commercial Courts Act to encourage settlements before suits—and instead used court processes for urgent relief.

### Decision

The court disposed of the suit and all pending applications, finding the cause of action satisfied. It accepted the plaintiff's compliance with the October 10, 2025, order and recorded the defendant's statement disclaiming rights over pre-1965 sound recordings. No damages were awarded, and the refund of court fees was denied. The court clarified it made no findings on broader allegations against the defendant.

### Concluding Note

This case underscores the importance of copyright expiration under Section 27 of the Copyright Act, 1957, ensuring old works become freely available to the public. It shows how courts can resolve disputes quickly when parties clarify positions, avoiding full trials. For event organizers, it highlights checking copyright status before licensing and communicating details clearly. For rights holders, it reminds them to avoid demanding fees for public domain works. Overall, it promotes fair use of cultural materials while encouraging amicable resolutions over litigation.

Case Title: Bignet Solutions LLP Vs. Novex Communication Pvt. Ltd.

Order Date: November 21, 2025

Case Number: CS(COMM) 1094/2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:1094

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Here are 5 suitable titles for this legal analytical article to be published as a legal research paper in a legal journal:

1. Expiry of Copyright in Sound Recordings: Analyzing Public Domain Usage in Bignet Solutions LLP v. Novex Communication Pvt. Ltd.

2. Navigating License Demands for Pre-1965 Works: Lessons from the Delhi High Court's Disposal in a Music Copyright Dispute

3. Public Domain and Event Licensing: A Case Study on Section 27 of the Copyright Act, 1957

4. Resolving Apprehended Infringement: Judicial Approach to Expired Copyrights in Private Events

5. Clarifying Rights Over Vintage Sound Recordings: Insights from a Swiftly Disposed Commercial Suit

=====

**Delhi High Court: No License Needed for Pre-1965 Sound Recordings in Public Domain – Suit Disposed of**

In a significant ruling clarifying the scope of copyright protection for vintage music, the Delhi High Court in the case of **Bignet Solutions LLP v. Novex Communication Pvt. Ltd., CS(COMM) 1094/2025**, decided on **21st November 2025** by **Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora**, has held that sound recordings published before 1965 fall in the public domain under Section 27 of the Copyright Act, 1957, and no license or permission is required from any entity, including music licensing companies, to play such recordings.

The plaintiff had approached the court apprehending interference in a private event scheduled for 12th October 2025 after the venue insisted on a No-Objection Certificate (NOC) from Novex Communication Pvt. Ltd., a well-known music licensing company. When the plaintiff sought a license quotation for 15 specific pre-1965 songs, Novex quoted a fee, which prompted the plaintiff to file the suit claiming that the copyright in those recordings had long expired and the demand was unlawful.

On the very first hearing on 10th October 2025, the court recorded the statement of Novex that it does not claim or enforce any rights over sound recordings published before 1965 and does not require any license for such works. Based on mutual undertakings, the court permitted the event to proceed peacefully. After the event concluded without any disruption, the plaintiff submitted proof that only the 15 listed pre-1965 songs were played.

During the final hearing on 21st November 2025, senior counsel for Novex reiterated that these particular recordings never formed part of their repertoire and that they never intended to demand any fee for public-domain works. The court accepted the defendant’s categorical stand, noted that the event had been held smoothly, and held that the cause of action stood fully satisfied. Accordingly, the suit and all pending applications were disposed of. The court, however, declined the plaintiff’s prayer for damages and refund of court fees, observing that the plaintiff had bypassed the mandatory pre-institution mediation mechanism and directly invoked urgent court process.

The order serves as an important reminder that once 60 years have passed from the year of publication of a sound recording, it enters the public domain and can be freely used by anyone without payment or permission.

Ganraj Enterprises Vs. Landmark Crafts

Brief Introductory Head Note

The case of Ganraj Enterprises v. Landmark Crafts Ltd. & Anr., decided by the Delhi High Court on 02 December 2025 by Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora, concerns a trademark rectification appeal filed under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The central issue revolves around the word mark “HP” registered by Landmark Crafts Ltd. (earlier Landmark Fasteners Pvt. Ltd.) and the competing claim of use and adoption of the mark “HP+” by Ganraj Enterprises.

The dispute required the Court to examine whether the appellant had the legal right to seek rectification of the respondent’s trademark, whether the respondent’s registration was obtained through misrepresentation, whether territorial limitations in one registration automatically extend to another associated registration, and whether the appellant was genuinely a “person aggrieved” under trademark law.

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Factual Background

The story of the trademark “HP” begins in 1995 when Mr. Pankaj Lidoo, the director of Landmark Crafts Ltd., adopted the word mark HP for self-drilling screws and blind rivets. He initially carried on business through his proprietorship “Landmark Engineers”. In 2002, this business was converted into “Landmark Fasteners Pvt. Ltd.”

The company filed a trademark application for the word mark “HP” in 2007 under TM No. 1566805 in Class 6, claiming user since 15 December 1995. Registration was granted in 2011, but with a territorial restriction limiting the sale of goods to Uttar Pradesh only.

Another application for the same word mark “HP” was filed in 2014 under TM No. 2848372, which was later registered in 2018. Unlike the earlier mark, this second registration had no territorial limitation, giving the proprietor pan-India protection.

Both trademarks were later assigned to Landmark Crafts Ltd. by assignment deeds dated 05 August 2013 and 29 April 2019. The change was recorded by the Registrar of Trade Marks in 2017 and 2019 respectively.

During this period, Ganraj Enterprises adopted the logo mark “HP+” for similar goods in Class 6 and filed four trademark applications between December 2014 and December 2015. The Registrar of Trade Marks cited the respondent’s earlier registrations as conflicting marks. Landmark Crafts opposed all four of the appellant’s applications. As three of these applications were abandoned and one refused, the appellant initiated rectification proceedings to cancel the respondent’s trademark TM No. 1566805.

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Procedural Detail

Ganraj Enterprises filed a rectification petition seeking cancellation of the respondent’s trademark “HP” registered under TM No. 1566805, claiming that it was deceptively similar to their own “HP+” logo mark and that the respondent's claim of user since 1995 was false.

On 10 November 2022, the Registrar of Trade Marks rejected the rectification application, holding that Landmark Crafts Ltd. was the prior adopter and user of the mark “HP”, that the appellant was not a “person aggrieved”, and that no valid grounds for rectification had been established.

The appellant challenged this order before the Delhi High Court under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act.

During the pendency of the appeal, three of the appellant’s own trademark applications had already been abandoned and the fourth had been refused.

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Core Dispute

The core dispute before the Court was whether the registration of the word mark “HP” under TM No. 1566805 should be cancelled.

Several related questions arose:

Whether the appellant, claiming to use the mark “HP+” since 2014, had the locus standi of a “person aggrieved” to seek rectification.

Whether the respondent’s claim of user since 1995 was false, constituting misrepresentation.

Whether the territorial restriction placed on TM No. 1566805 should automatically apply to TM No. 2848372 by virtue of Section 16 of the Trade Marks Act (association of trademarks).

Whether the respondent could legally prevent the appellant from using “HP+” in the State of Maharashtra given that TM No. 1566805 was territorially limited to Uttar Pradesh.

Whether the Registrar’s findings regarding the appellant’s proof of use were correct.

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Detailed Reasoning and Discussion by the Court

The Court began by examining the foundation of the trademark rights claimed by Landmark Crafts. TM No. 1566805, though limited to Uttar Pradesh, was legally valid. TM No. 2848372 enjoyed nationwide protection without territorial restriction. The appellant’s challenge to the first registration could not automatically affect the second.

The Court addressed the appellant’s allegation that the respondent’s user claim since 1995 was fraudulent. However, the appellant itself had stated in written arguments that the issue of user since 1995 was being contested in a parallel commercial suit and should not be adjudicated in this rectification appeal. The Court accepted this concession and declined to rule on the factual claim relating to user from 1995.

Thereafter, the Court examined whether the territorial restriction of one registration could be applied to another registration under Section 16 of the Trade Marks Act dealing with association of trademarks. Relying on Foodlink F&B Holdings India (P) Ltd v. Wow Momo Foods (P) Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 4719, the Court held that the association of trademarks does not mean that the limitations or disclaimers applicable to one registration automatically apply to another. Each registration stands independently unless the Registrar explicitly records a limitation in the certificate. The Court also cited judgments such as Skol Breweries Ltd. v. Som Distilleries & Breweries Ltd., 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 1750 and Pidilite Industries Ltd. v. Poma-Ex Products, MANU/MH/1661/2017, reiterating that conditions in one registration cannot be imported into another.

Turning to locus standi, the Court clarified that a person is “aggrieved” if their legitimate use of a trademark is obstructed by an existing registration. Since the respondent had opposed all four of the appellant’s applications and had filed a commercial suit seeking to restrain their use of “HP+”, the appellant indeed had the locus to maintain a rectification petition.

However, having locus standi does not automatically justify rectification. The burden to prove grounds for cancellation is separate.

The Court then examined the appellant’s evidence of prior use. The appellant claimed user since 2014, but many invoices produced showed the term “HP+” inserted later by handwriting. The Registrar was justified in doubting such material, and the Court found no error in this finding. Even if the appellant’s use from 2014 was accepted, the respondent had already placed on record invoices showing use of “HP” since 2006, and even in Maharashtra since 2010. Moreover, TM No. 2848372 granted pan-India protection from 2014 onwards, predating the appellant’s adoption of the mark “HP+”.

The appellant argued that due to the territorial restriction in TM No. 1566805, the respondent could not market products under “HP” in Maharashtra. The Court rejected this by explaining an important legal distinction: a territorial restriction in a trademark registration does not prevent the proprietor from conducting business outside the restricted zone; it only affects their ability to sue for infringement in other territories. The proprietor may still rely on the common-law remedy of passing off in other regions.

Thus, the Court held that the respondent was not barred from using the mark “HP” in Maharashtra, and the appellant’s argument had no legal basis.

The Court concluded that none of the grounds raised for rectification were valid. The concurrent findings of the Registrar were correct, and the registration deserved protection.

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Decision

The Delhi High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the Registrar’s order dated 10 November 2022. TM No. 1566805 for the word mark “HP” remains valid. The Court also clarified that the rectification relating to TM No. 2848372 would be decided independently in separate pending proceedings.

All pending applications in the appeal were disposed of.

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Concluding Note

This judgment offers valuable clarity on the functioning of trademark law, especially on issues related to territorial limitations, association of trademarks under Section 16, determination of prior user, and the standard for being considered a “person aggrieved”. The Court emphasized that limitations imposed on one trademark cannot be mechanically extended to another trademark unless explicitly stated. It clarified the difference between territorial restriction for infringement purposes and the right to sell goods across India. It also reaffirmed that mere assertion of user without reliable documentary proof is insufficient in trademark disputes.

The decision reinforces the principle that rectification of a registered trademark is a serious remedy that cannot be granted lightly. It requires clear, credible, and well-substantiated grounds. Where a party fails to disprove the established user of the registered proprietor and cannot show genuine injury or deceptive similarity, the registered mark deserves protection. The judgment is therefore a significant contribution to trademark jurisprudence, especially in cases involving competing adoption of short alphabetical marks.

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Case Details

Case Title: Ganraj Enterprises Vs. Landmark Crafts Ltd. & Anr.

Order Date: 02 December 2025

Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 164/2022

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:____ (As reflected on the order header)

Court: High Court of Delhi

Hon’ble Judge: Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

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Disclaimer

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor (Patent and Trademark Attorney), High Court of Delhi

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Suggested Titles for Publication

1. Understanding Territorial Limits and Trademark Association: A Study of Ganraj Enterprises v. Landmark Crafts Ltd.

2. Rectification of Trademarks and the Standard of Proof: A Detailed Analysis of the HP–HP+ Dispute

3. Prior User vs. Subsequent Adoption: Legal Lessons from the Delhi High Court’s HP Trademark Judgment

4. The Concept of “Person Aggrieved” Under Indian Trademark Law: An Examination Through Recent Case Law

5. Trademark Limitations, Registration Rights, and Passing Off: Insights from a 2025 Delhi High Court Decision

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Delhi High Court Upholds Validity of “HP” Trademark in Rectification Appeal Filed by Ganraj Enterprises

In Ganraj Enterprises v. Landmark Crafts Ltd. & Anr., C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 164/2022, decided on 02 December 2025 by Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora of the High Court of Delhi, the Court dismissed a rectification appeal seeking cancellation of the respondent’s trademark “HP” registered under TM No. 1566805. The appellant, Ganraj Enterprises, argued that the respondent’s claim of prior user was false and that the territorial limitation in the respondent’s registration restricted use of the mark outside Uttar Pradesh.

The Court noted that the respondent had placed credible material showing long-standing use of the mark “HP” since the mid-1990s and certainly from 2006 onwards. The appellant, on the other hand, failed to produce reliable evidence of its own claimed use of the mark “HP+” since 2014, with many invoices appearing handwritten or modified later. The Court held that the Registrar was justified in dismissing the rectification petition on the ground that the appellant had not established any valid basis for cancellation.

The Court also clarified that the territorial restriction attached to one trademark registration cannot automatically apply to another, even if both registrations are associated under Section 16 of the Trade Marks Act. Each registration stands independently. The presence of the respondent’s second registration, TM No. 2848372, which has nationwide protection, further weighed against the appellant’s claim.

Finding no infirmity in the Registrar’s reasoning, the Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the respondent’s trademark rights.

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Orient Cables (India) Limited Vs Office of the Regional Director

Brief Introductory Head Note Summary of the Case

The case titled Orient Cables (India) Limited v. Office of the Regional Director (Northern Region), Ministry of Corporate Affairs & Ors., W.P.(C)-IPD 59/2025, was decided by the Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora of the High Court of Delhi on 1 December 2025. The petitioner sought a writ of prohibition to restrain the Regional Director (Northern Region) from proceeding with a name-rectification application filed by Respondent No. 3 under Section 16(1)(b) of the Companies Act, 2013. The core issue centered on whether the application filed by Respondent No. 3 was barred by limitation and whether the Regional Director could simultaneously exercise suo motu power under Section 16(1)(a) without notice to the petitioner.

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Factual Background

Orient Cables (India) Limited was originally incorporated on 15 September 2005 under the Companies Act, 1956. At the time of incorporation, a typographical error existed in the company’s name. This error was corrected, and the Registrar of Companies issued a fresh Certificate of Incorporation on 24 April 2007.

Many years later, on 13 December 2024, the company was converted into a public limited company under Section 18 of the Companies Act, 2013. During this conversion, its name was changed to Orient Cables (India) Limited.

On 8 August 2025, Respondent No. 3 filed an application before the Regional Director under Section 16(1)(b) of the 2013 Act, seeking rectification of the petitioner’s name. The petitioner opposed the application on the ground that it was hopelessly time-barred, since the limitation period of three years prescribed under Section 16 had expired long ago. According to the petitioner, the limitation expired on 24 April 2010, which was three years after the corrected Certificate of Incorporation was issued in 2007.

The petitioner also stated that it had already filed its reply raising the issue of limitation before the Regional Director, and a hearing was conducted on 29 September 2025. During that hearing, the Regional Director allegedly indicated the possibility of exercising suo motu power under Section 16(1)(a). This alarmed the petitioner, particularly because the company was in the process of applying for an Initial Public Offering (IPO) and any adverse order on its name could cause disruption to the IPO process.

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Procedural Detail

The petitioner approached the High Court through a writ petition. It prayed for a writ of prohibition to prevent the Regional Director from proceeding with the application filed under Section 16(1)(b). The petitioner argued that the application was time-barred and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the Regional Director.

Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, representing the Union of India, opposed the petition and stated that no suo motu jurisdiction under Section 16(1)(a) had been exercised or was intended to be exercised. They also clarified that the procedure under Section 16(1)(a) is completely different and requires issuance of an independent notice before any action can be taken.

Respondent No. 3, the applicant before the Regional Director, argued that the limitation issue could only be decided by the Regional Director during adjudication of the application and that the writ petition was premature.

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Core Dispute

The central questions before the Court were clearly defined. First, whether the High Court should interfere at this stage to prevent the Regional Director from hearing the application under Section 16(1)(b). Second, whether the Regional Director could concurrently or accidentally invoke its suo motu powers under Section 16(1)(a) even though no independent notice was issued. Third, whether the petitioner’s concern regarding limitation should be decided by the High Court or by the Regional Director in the first instance.

The primary dispute revolved around the bar of limitation and the fear that the authority might unexpectedly exercise suo motu power without giving the petitioner an opportunity to be heard.

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Detailed Reasoning and Discussion by the Court

The Court carefully considered the submissions of all parties. It observed that the application filed by Respondent No. 3 was expressly under Section 16(1)(b) of the Companies Act, 2013. Therefore, the Regional Director’s examination must necessarily remain within the framework of that provision. The Court stated that the question whether the application was filed within the limitation period is itself a point which the Regional Director is fully competent to decide.

The Court found merit in the arguments advanced by Respondent Nos. 1 and 3 that the issue of limitation should be adjudicated by the authority in the first instance. Since the Regional Director must decide the matter under Section 16(1)(b), it is appropriate that the authority first records a specific finding on limitation. Only thereafter can the matter proceed on merits.

The Court clarified that the Regional Director may decide both limitation and merits through a single consolidated order, but the authority must specifically record its findings on the limitation objection raised by the petitioner.

The Court then addressed the petitioner’s apprehension that the Regional Director might simultaneously exercise suo motu jurisdiction under Section 16(1)(a). The Court held that such apprehension must be addressed because principles of natural justice demand that no such power can be exercised without issuing prior notice to the affected company. The Court accepted the submission of the Regional Director’s counsel that no such notice had been issued and that there was no intention to exercise that jurisdiction.

The Court reiterated that Section 16(1)(a) is distinct from Section 16(1)(b) and cannot be invoked without giving the petitioner an opportunity to be heard. The Court made it clear that the Regional Director, while deciding Respondent No. 3’s application, must restrict itself only to Section 16(1)(b) and cannot invoke suo motu powers under Section 16(1)(a).

The Court also granted protection to the petitioner by directing that if the Regional Director decides the limitation issue against the petitioner and allows the application of Respondent No. 3, the order must be kept in suspension for one week to enable the petitioner to avail legal remedies.

The Court also noted the urgency raised by the petitioner regarding its IPO process and ensured procedural fairness by directing that the next hearing, initially fixed for 3 December 2025, be postponed by one week.

The Court relied on the principles laid down in T.T. Ltd. v. Union of India (MANU/TN/6461/2022) while discussing limitation under Section 16.

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Decision

The High Court did not prohibit the Regional Director from proceeding with the application. Instead, it directed the Regional Director to first decide the issue of limitation raised by the petitioner. The Regional Director was instructed to record specific findings on the limitation objection. The authority was also barred from invoking suo motu powers under Section 16(1)(a) while deciding the pending application.

The Court protected the petitioner by ordering a one-week suspension of any adverse order, ensuring that the petitioner would have adequate time to seek legal remedies. With these directions, the petition was disposed of.

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Concluding Note

This decision reflects a balanced judicial approach. The Court did not prematurely interfere with statutory proceedings but ensured that the adjudicating authority respects procedural fairness and natural justice. The ruling underscores that limitations under Section 16(1)(b) must be determined by the Regional Director, who must record a clear finding before proceeding to merits. At the same time, the Court firmly protected the petitioner against surprise invocation of suo motu jurisdiction under Section 16(1)(a), reinforcing that authorities cannot bypass mandatory procedural safeguards.

The judgment becomes an important reference point for companies facing name-rectification proceedings, especially where questions of limitation and the scope of Sections 16(1)(a) and 16(1)(b) are involved. It clarifies that the Regional Director must act strictly within statutory limits and that courts will intervene only to ensure fairness, not to prematurely decide matters meant for the authority.

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Case Details

Case Title: Orient Cables (India) Limited Vs Office of the Regional Director (Northern Region), Ministry of Corporate Affairs & Ors.

Order Date: 01 December 2025

Case Number: W.P.(C)-IPD 59/2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:____

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Hon’ble Judge: Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

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Disclaimer

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Delhi High Court Directs Regional Director to First Decide Limitation in Company Name-Rectification Proceedings

In Orient Cables (India) Limited Vs. Office of the Regional Director (Northern Region), Ministry of Corporate Affairs & Ors., W.P.(C)-IPD 59/2025, decided on 01 December 2025 by Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora of the High Court of Delhi, the Court addressed a challenge raised by Orient Cables (India) Limited against proceedings initiated under Section 16(1)(b) of the Companies Act, 2013 for rectification of its corporate name.

The petitioner argued that the application filed by Respondent No. 3 before the Regional Director was hopelessly barred by limitation, since the three-year period prescribed under Section 16 had expired in 2010, three years after the corrected Certificate of Incorporation was issued in 2007. The petitioner further expressed apprehension that the Regional Director might exercise suo motu jurisdiction under Section 16(1)(a) without notice, despite the pending application being under Section 16(1)(b).

The Court held that the issue of limitation lies squarely within the jurisdiction of the Regional Director and must be decided by the authority before dealing with the merits of the rectification request. The Court directed the Regional Director to first record clear findings on the limitation objection raised by the petitioner. It also clarified that while deciding the pending application, the Regional Director shall exercise only its jurisdiction under Section 16(1)(b) and shall not invoke suo motu powers under Section 16(1)(a) without issuing a separate notice, as such action would violate principles of natural justice.

The Court further ordered that if the Regional Director decides the limitation issue against the petitioner and allows the application, the resulting order shall remain suspended for one week to enable the petitioner to pursue legal remedies. The next hearing before the Regional Director was also directed to be postponed by one week.

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Friday, December 5, 2025

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