Bhupinder Mehta Vs Sh Pradeep Bareja

Ms. Bhupinder Mehta filed a rectification petition under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking cancellation of the trademark 'BSM' (No. 5149074 in Class 11) registered in favor of Respondent No. 1, Pradeep Bareja, claiming prior adoption and use of the 'BSM' mark since 2014 for lighting products through her family business, with applications filed in 2015 and 2021, one abandoned, one registered in Class 9, and one opposed; she became aware of the impugned mark in June 2024 via opposition to her application.

Notice was issued on 02.09.2024, but Respondent No. 1 failed to file a reply or appear despite extensions, leading to ex-parte proceedings on 06.05.2025, with submissions heard on 12.11.2025 and judgment reserved. The court found the petitioner's averments uncontroverted, established her prior use and goodwill through sales figures up to ₹8.79 crore in 2022-23, promotion via expos and social media, and deemed the impugned mark deceptively similar phonetically, visually, and conceptually to the petitioner's mark for identical goods, likely causing confusion; relying on precedents, it held Respondent No. 1's adoption dishonest and in bad faith, overriding registration, and directed removal of the impugned mark from the register.

Law Point:

• The correct approach to decide the infringing nature of competing marks is to examine whether the defendants have adopted the essential features of the plaintiff's mark, with phonetic similarity being a significant factor, and if goods are identical, confusion cannot be excluded:  [Para 6.8].
• To determine deceptive similarity between marks, focus on broad and essential features without side-by-side comparison for minor differences; overall resemblance likely to mislead is sufficient:  [Para 6.8].
• Rectification of the Trade Marks Register is warranted when registration was applied for in bad faith:  [Para 6.9].
• Prior user's rights override those of a subsequent registered trademark owner, especially for identical/deceptively similar marks on identical goods adopted dishonestly [Paras 12, 14, 15].

Case Title: Bhupinder Mehta Vs Sh Pradeep Bareja"24.12.2025:C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 163/2024:2025:DHC:11863: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Astral Ltd Vs Ajay Enterprises

Astral Ltd, with its principal office in Ahmedabad and a subordinate sales and marketing office in Delhi, filed a suit in Delhi High Court against M/s Ajay Enterprises, based in Udaipur, Rajasthan, alleging infringement and passing off of its trademark 'ASTRAL'.

The defendant filed an application under Order VII Rules 10 and 11 CPC seeking rejection of the plaint for lack of territorial jurisdiction, arguing no cause of action in Delhi and that the suit should be in Ahmedabad, citing no evidence of sales in Delhi and relying on Supreme Court precedents like K. Narayanan v. S. Murali.

The plaintiff countered that the defendant's trademark application and admissions in opposition proceedings under Rule 45 of Trade Mark Rules, claiming pan-India availability including Delhi, created part cause of action there.

The court examined Sections 20 CPC and 134 Trade Marks Act, interpreting the Explanation to Section 20 as deeming a corporation to carry on business at a subordinate office if cause of action arises there, and held that where cause of action partly arises at both principal and subordinate office locations, courts at both have jurisdiction, as Section 134 provides an additional forum for plaintiff convenience without mutual exclusion. Referencing Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia and Ultra Home Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Purushottam Kumar Chaubey, the court found the defendant's nationwide promotion admission binding, establishing part cause of action in Delhi, and dismissed the application, confirming jurisdiction.

• Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 does not oust the applicability of Section 20 CPC and provides an additional remedy to the plaintiff to file a suit where it resides or carries on business (Para 19).
• Under the Explanation to Section 20 CPC, a corporation is deemed to carry on business at its principal office, or at a subordinate office in respect of a cause of action arising there (Para 20).
• The deeming provision in the Explanation to Section 20 CPC is read into Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act to determine where the plaintiff carries on business (Para 21).
• Where part cause of action arises at both the principal and subordinate offices of the plaintiff, courts at both locations have territorial jurisdiction, as these places are not mutually exclusive (Paras 23-27).
• When cause of action arises partly at the subordinate office location, that place is deemed where the plaintiff carries on business, enabling suit institution there under Section 134 Trade Marks Act read with Section 20 CPC (Paras 28-30).

Case Title: Astral Ltd Vs Ajay Enterprises:24.12.2025:CS(COMM) 540/2024:2025:DHC:11925: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Archidply Industries Limited Vs. Archit Nuwood Industries Private Limited

Archidply Industries Limited sued Archit Nuwood Industries Private Limited and others for trademark infringement, seeking permanent injunction to restrain defendants from using 'ARCHIT' and variants deceptively similar to plaintiff's 'ARCHID/ARCHIDPLY/ARCHIDLAM' marks. Due to inadvertent error, pages 50-56 of the plaint contained an affidavit supporting electronic records signed by an unrelated third party and attested in Tamil Nadu, while other affidavits were correctly signed by plaintiff's authorized representative Mr. Atul Krishna Pandey and attested in Delhi on the same date. Plaintiff filed application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC to amend by replacing those pages with correct affidavit, arguing the error was clerical, not deliberate, did not alter plaint contents or merits, and was sought promptly before defendants' written statement. Defendants opposed, contending it was impermissible replacement of document rather than amendment, error unexplained, notary and counsel's involvement suspicious, and violated CPC provisions. Court analyzed precedents on amendment scope, finding procedural rules are handmaids to justice, error appeared inadvertent from negligence without affecting case merits or causing prejudice, and allowed amendment to ensure proper adjudication, subject to plaintiff paying Rs. 25,000 costs to Delhi High Court Staff Welfare Fund within four weeks.

• The power to grant amendment of pleadings under Order VI Rule 17 CPC should be exercised liberally if it serves the ends of justice and can be allowed without injustice to the other side, even if due to negligence or inadvertence:  Para 14 
• Rules of procedure are handmaids to justice and should not defeat substantive rights; amendments cannot be refused merely on technical grounds or for inadvertent errors if no miscarriage of justice results: , Para 15 
• Non-compliance with procedural requirements, if curable and not deliberate, should not lead to rejection unless statutorily mandated or causing irremediable prejudice: , Para 14 
• Amendment to correct inadvertent errors like wrong signatures on affidavits is permissible under Order VI Rule 17 CPC if it does not alter the nature of the suit or merits and is necessary for proper adjudication: , Para 19.

Case Title: Archidply Industries Limited Vs. Archit Nuwood Industries Private Limited :24/12/2025:CS(COMM) 693/2024:2025:DHC:11922: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Amitoje India Pvt. Ltd. Vs Classic Display Systems

Amitoje India Pvt. Ltd. and Ravinder Kaur, engaged in manufacturing display units, sued Classic Display Systems Pvt. Ltd. for infringing their patent IN 533643 titled "A Foldable Product Display Unit" granted in April 2024 after a pre-grant opposition by the defendant was rejected, seeking permanent injunction against the defendant's similar foldable displays sold since at least 2022. 

The suit included an interim injunction application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC, while the defendant filed a counterclaim challenging the patent's validity on grounds of obviousness and prior use, relying on US Patent Publication 20100051568A1 as prior art not cited earlier. 

Procedurally, the court allowed reliance on this prior art for the interim hearing after initial disputes and recalls, noting no presumption of patent validity. Reasoning that the suit patent's key feature of side panels folding sideways in the same direction was a mere workshop improvement obvious to a person skilled in the art from the prior art, which did not teach away, the court found the defendant raised a credible challenge to validity under Section 64(1)(f) of the Patents Act, thus no prima facie case for injunction existed, balance of convenience favored the long-operating defendant, and any harm to plaintiffs could be compensated monetarily. The interim application was dismissed.

There is no presumption of validity of a patent even after grant by the Controller, and its validity can be challenged in court proceedings: Para 25 

For grant of interim injunction in patent infringement suits, if the defendant raises a credible challenge to the patent's validity (a serious question to be tried, not actual invalidity), no injunction should be granted: Para 27 

To determine obviousness/lack of inventive step, courts must follow sequential steps: identify the person skilled in the art, inventive concept, common general knowledge, differences from prior art, and whether differences are obvious without hindsight: Para 21.4.1 

A prior art "teaches away" only if it discourages or diverts the person skilled in the art from the claimed path, not merely by suggesting an alternative without negation: Para 84.

Minor alterations like changing the folding direction of components in a display unit constitute mere workshop improvements obvious to a skilled craftsman and lack inventive step: Para 82.

Case Title: Amitoje India Pvt. Ltd. Vs Classic Display Systems:24.12.2025:Case Number: CS(COMM) 765/2024 :2025:DHC:11991:: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Mini Pushkarna

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation] 

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

A.O. Smith Corporation & Anr. Vs. Star Smith Export Pvt. Ltd

The plaintiffs, proprietors of the well-known trade mark and trade name “A.O. SMITH” used globally since 1874 and in India since 2006 for water heaters and purification products, sued the defendants for infringement and passing off arising from the defendants’ use of “STAR SMITH” as a trade mark, trade name and domain name for identical and allied goods. 

An ex-parte ad-interim injunction was initially granted in 2022 restraining use of the impugned marks, though limited protection was given to the corporate name and domain name pending adjudication; this injunction was later made absolute in 2024, save for those two aspects, which were revived on review. 

The Court held that “SMITH” constituted the dominant and essential feature of the competing marks, that the defendants’ adoption in 2020 was prima facie dishonest and intended to ride on the plaintiffs’ goodwill, and that the plaintiffs’ registrations carried no disclaimer, entitling them to full statutory protection. Rejecting the defence that “SMITH” was generic or common to trade, the Court found the defendants estopped from such a plea having themselves sought registration of marks containing “SMITH”. 

Applying Section 29(5) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the Court held that use of the registered mark as part of a trade name for identical goods constituted infringement per se, and further held that the impugned domain name caused initial interest confusion and passing off. Consequently, finding a strong prima facie case, balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiffs and likelihood of irreparable harm, the Court granted an interim injunction restraining use of the impugned trade name and domain name in addition to the marks.

Law settled:

Use of a registered trade mark or its essential feature as part of a trade name for identical or allied goods constitutes infringement under Section 29(5) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and once statutory conditions are met, injunction must ordinarily follow:  paras 16–17.

Where a trade mark is registered without disclaimer, exclusivity must be determined from the registration certificate alone, and prior examination replies or alleged concessions before the Registry are irrelevant: paras 12–13.

A defendant who has applied for registration of a mark containing a particular element is estopped from contending that the same element is generic or common to trade (principle of approbate and reprobate):  paras 14–15.

Adoption of a deceptively similar domain name for allied goods giving rise to initial interest confusion amounts to passing off and is injunctable even though the Trade Marks Act does not expressly provide for domain names: paras 18–20.

Case Title: A.O. Smith Corporation Vs. Star Smith Export Pvt. Ltd.:24.12.2025:CS(COMM) 532/2022:2025:DHC:11885:DHC:Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Pernod Ricard S.A. France Vs Rhizome Distillers Pvt. Ltd

Pernod Ricard S.A., owner of the well-known whisky brand IMPERIAL BLUE used in India since 1997 with substantial goodwill and turnover exceeding Rs. 317 crores in 2007, filed a rectification application in 2008 seeking removal of Rhizome Distillers Pvt. Ltd.'s registered trademark RHIZOME'S IMPERIAL GOLD (No. 1161682 in class 33) after discovering the registration through opposition proceedings, alleging that the mark was deceptively similar to IMPERIAL BLUE, likely to cause confusion among consumers of average intelligence and imperfect recollection, especially as the respondent prominently used only IMPERIAL GOLD in practice while the applicant was prior in adoption and use and the registration contravened Sections 11, 18 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999; the respondent claimed adoption in 2002 with launch in 2006 and argued the word IMPERIAL was common to trade and no confusion existed, but the IPAB found the applicant to be an aggrieved person with locus standi, held that likelihood of confusion existed on the date of the respondent's application due to the applicant's prior use, applied the test of overall similarity and imperfect recollection, rejected defences of delay and commonality of the word IMPERIAL, and allowed the rectification by directing removal of the mark from the register.

A person aggrieved under Section 57 includes a trader in the same field whose rights are restrained or who may be damaged by the registration, especially where the impugned mark is relied upon in opposition proceedings between the parties (Paras 28-30).

Registration contravening Section 11 on the date of application due to likelihood of confusion from prior use of a similar mark warrants rectification (Para 31).

Marks must be compared as used rather than merely as registered; prominent use of the essential feature IMPERIAL GOLD against prior IMPERIAL BLUE creates confusion (Para 32).

Test of deceptive similarity requires consideration of broad and essential features, overall impression, and viewpoint of a consumer with average intelligence and imperfect recollection, without side-by-side comparison (Paras 33-35, citing Kerly's Law of Trade Marks and Parle Products case).

Prior adoption and use entitle protection even against a registered mark; false claim of user in application supports rectification (Para 36).

Word IMPERIAL being laudatory or common to trade cannot confer exclusive rights on the registrant claiming such commonality (Para 37).

Delay, laches or acquiescence is not a valid defence in rectification proceedings as public interest predominates unless unfair disadvantage is proved (Para 38).

Case Title: Pernod Ricard S.A. France Vs Rhizome Distillers Pvt. Ltd. and Registrar of Trade Marks

Order Date: December 24, 2010

Case Number: ORA/248/08/TM/CH

Neutral Citation: (2011) 1 MIPR 322 : (2011) 46 PTC 96 (IPAB)

Name of Court: Intellectual Property Appellate Board, Chennai

Name of Judges: Hon'ble S. Usha, J; Syed Obaidur Rahaman, Technical Member

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Pernod Ricard S.A. Vs Rhizome Distillers Pvt. Ltd.

Pernod Ricard S.A., a French company owning the IMPERIAL BLUE whisky trademark used in India since 1997 with substantial sales and reputation, filed a rectification application to remove Rhizome Distillers Pvt. Ltd.'s registered mark Rhizome's IMPERIAL GOLD under No. 1161682 in class 33, alleging deceptive similarity, dishonest adoption, copying of their mark and ROYAL STAG trade dress, fraud on the registrar, and contravention of Sections 11(1), 11(3), 11(10), 18, and 57 of the Trade Marks Act 1999; Rhizome countered with claims of honest adoption since 2002, use since 2006, distinctiveness, and that IMPERIAL is common and laudatory; the IPAB reasoned that Pernod Ricard is an aggrieved person with locus standi due to potential trade interference, the marks are deceptively similar phonetically and structurally likely to cause confusion among unwary consumers under the imperfect recollection test despite side-by-side differences, Pernod Ricard's prior adoption and use since 1997 prevails over Rhizome's later use and false 2002 claim, the registration contravenes Section 11 as it would deceive on the application date, delay is not a bar given public interest, and actual use emphasizes IMPERIAL GOLD prominently; the board allowed the application and directed removal of the mark from the register without costs.

• A trade mark registration may be rectified and removed if it contravenes Section 11 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, by being deceptively similar to a prior mark, assessed holistically as used rather than merely as registered, applying the test of likelihood of confusion from the viewpoint of a consumer with average intelligence and imperfect recollection, even if the word 'IMPERIAL' is common when combined with colors indicating source [Pernod Ricard S.A. vs Rhizome Distillers Pvt. Ltd., ORA/248/08/TM/CH, decided on 24.12.2010 by IPAB, paras 31-35].

Case Title: Pernod Ricard S.A. Vs Rhizome Distillers Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., Order date: Dec. 24, 2010, Case Number: ORA/248/08/TM/CH, Neutral Citation: (2011) 1 MIPR 322 : (2011) 46 PTC 96 (IPAB), Name of court: Intellectual Property Appellate Board, Chennai, Name of Judge: Hon'ble Judges: S. Usha, J; Syed Obaidur Rahaman, Technical Member.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation] [Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Sun Pharmaceutical Medicare Ltd Vs Tripada Healthcare Pvt. Ltd.

Sun Pharmaceutical Medicare Ltd filed an execution petition to enforce a compromise decree dated 22.05.2023 against Tripada Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., which restrained the judgment debtors from using the mark 'NAPDOM' similar to the decree holder's 'NAXDOM'; on 08.10.2025, the court granted an ex parte injunction extending to 'NAPNIDOM'/'NAPIDOM' based on the decree holder's claim that the debtors applied for its registration on 22.09.2020 without disclosure during the suit, creating an impression of overreach; the debtors filed an application under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC to modify this, arguing suppression by the decree holder who had opposed the 'NAPIDOM' registration on 12.10.2022 before the decree; the court reasoned that the decree holder's non-disclosure of its prior opposition misled the court into believing the debtors hid the application, rendering the initial submission inaccurate; consequently, the court modified the 08.10.2025 order and vacated the injunction in para 14 thereof, directed filing of reply within four weeks, listed for 14.01.2026, and expunged incorrect case law citations at the debtors' request.

• Suppression of material facts by a party, such as prior knowledge and opposition to a trademark application, can lead to modification or vacation of an ex parte injunction granted based on misleading submissions, emphasizing the duty of full disclosure in execution proceedings [Sun Pharmaceutical Medicare Ltd vs Tripada Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., EX.P. 89/2025, decided on 10.12.2025 by Delhi High Court, paras 7-8].

Case Title: Sun Pharmaceutical Medicare Ltd Vs Tripada Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. :10.12.2025: EX.P. 89/2025, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation] [Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Shri Surinder Kumar Vs The Registrar of Copyrights

Rahul Khanna filed a suit in 2016 before the Additional District Judge, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi, seeking injunction against Surinder Kumar for passing off and copyright infringement involving the trademark 'PRAKASH' and artistic label for PVC electrical insulation tape, along with damages and accounts rendition, with evidence completed and matter listed for final arguments on December 17, 2025, while Surinder Kumar filed a counterclaim for injunction against Rahul Khanna for similar passing off and copyright violation. Surinder Kumar also filed a rectification petition originally in 2016 before the Copyright Board (later transferred to IPAB and then to Delhi High Court as C.O.(COMM.IPD-CR) 5/2024) seeking cancellation of Rahul Khanna's copyright registration No. A-115513/2016. Surinder Kumar filed a transfer petition under Section 24 CPC read with Rule 26 of IPD Rules, 2022, arguing commonality of issues and need for consolidation to avoid conflicting decisions. Rahul Khanna opposed, contending Rule 26 applies only to commercial courts and the suit being non-commercial (valued below Rs. 3 lakhs) with advanced stage precludes transfer. The High Court held that while Rule 26 specifies transfer from commercial courts, Section 24 CPC provides general power to transfer any subordinate court matter, including non-commercial IPR suits, to itself at any stage to prevent multiplicity and contradictions, and finding overlap with no prejudice from transfer as evidence was closed, allowed the petition, transferred the suit and counterclaim to itself for consolidation with the rectification petition.

High Court has power under Section 24 CPC to transfer non-commercial IPR suits pending before District Courts to itself for consolidation with related rectification petitions, irrespective of Rule 26 of IPD Rules, 2022 limiting explicit mention to commercial courts, as Section 24 confers general transfer authority to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and conflicting decisions (Paras 7-18).

Relied on Patola Industries v. Mahesh Namkeen Pvt. Ltd., C.O.(COMM.IPD-TM) 187/2021 (Para 2.2); M/s Loreal India Private Limited v. M/s Pornsricharoenpun Co. Ltd., CS(COMM) 496/2023 (Para 2.6); Distinguished Sonani Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Mr. Sanjay Jayanthbai Patel, C.O.(COMM.IPD-CR) 880/2022 (Para 21) and Fox & Mandal v. Somabrata Mandal, 2025 SCC OnLine Cal 8007 (Para 20).

Case Title: Shri Surinder Kumar Vs The Registrar of Copyrights :04.12.2025:TR.P.(C.) 146/2024:2025:DHC:11465: Hon'ble Tejas Karia, J.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Anand Tomar Vs. Pooja Electric Co

Pooja Electric Co., the plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit before the Single Judge of Delhi High Court, filed an application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC to amend the plaint by incorporating the fact of subsequent registration of three trademark applications that were already disclosed as pending in the original plaint. 

The Single Judge, by order dated 25 September 2025, allowed the plaintiff to bring the registration certificates on record for reliance during evidence without requiring formal amendment of the plaint, as all material facts were already present. The defendant Anand Tomar challenged this order by way of appeal under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. 

The Division Bench held that the appeal was not maintainable as orders on applications under Order VI Rule 17 CPC are not appealable under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act read with Order XLIII Rule 1 CPC, and dismissed the appeal without examining merits.

An order allowing or rejecting an application for amendment of plaint under Order VI Rule 17 CPC is not appealable under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 read with Order XLIII Rule 1 CPC (Paras 3-4, 7-8).

Case Title: Anand Tomar Vs. Pooja Electric Co.:15.12.2025:FAO(OS) (COMM) 203/2025: 2025:dhc:11450-DB: C Hari Shankar,  H. J. and Om Prakash Shukla, H. J.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Kirti Dal Mills Limited Vs Rajesh Lunkad

Rajesh Lunkad filed Special Civil Suit No. 24 of 2021 in June 2021 before the District Judge, Pune, seeking injunction and damages against Kirti Dal Mills for alleged trademark infringement and passing off concerning the mark “Champion” in edible oils. 

Kirti Dal Mills challenged the jurisdiction, contending the suit, being a commercial dispute, should lie only before a designated Commercial Court under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and the 2019 Notification, and the Pune District Court was not so designated. 

While that suit remained pending (with interim stay on hearing granted in revision), Kirti Dal Mills filed Commercial Suit No. 1 of 2024 in November 2024 before the designated Commercial Court at Latur seeking injunction against Rajesh Lunkad for using “Champion”. 

Rajesh Lunkad applied under Section 10 CPC for stay of the Latur suit pending disposal of the Pune suit, which was granted on 06.05.2025. Kirti Dal Mills challenged this stay order by way of writ petition. 

The High Court held that since the earlier Pune suit was pending before a court not designated as Commercial Court and therefore lacking competence to grant the relief claimed in the commercial dispute, Section 10 CPC could not be invoked to stay the subsequent properly instituted Latur suit. 

The Court quashed the stay order and directed the Latur Commercial Court to proceed with the suit.

Law Point:

For Section 10 CPC to apply and stay a subsequent suit, the previously instituted suit must be pending in a court competent to grant the relief claimed in the subsequent suit; where the earlier court lacks jurisdiction due to statutory designation requirements under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, stay cannot be granted (Paras 28-32).

Trademark infringement and passing off suits, though required under Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 to be filed before a District Court, must, when constituting commercial disputes, be adjudicated only by courts specifically designated as Commercial Courts under the Commercial Courts Act and relevant notifications, the latter having overriding effect (Paras 24-30).

Case Title: Kirti Dal Mills Limited Vs Rajesh Lunkad:18.12.2025: Writ Petition No. 10521 of 2025:2025:BHC-AUG:35919:Bombay HC Aurangabad:Y. G. Khobragade, J.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Mr. Vashu Bhagnani Vs. Mr. Kamal Rashid Khan

Film producer Vashu Bhagnani filed a defamation suit against actor and critic Kamal Rashid Khan (KRK) alleging that KRK posted defamatory tweets and videos on Twitter (now X) accusing Bhagnani of financial irregularities, non-payment for film rights, hawala transactions, destroying Bollywood by overpaying actors, and personal attacks on his family and films like Bellbottom and Coolie No.1, causing reputational harm, embarrassment, and public ridicule.

Bhagnani sought damages and interim relief under Order 39 Rule 1 CPC via a notice of motion, claiming the content was false, scandalous, and part of a smear campaign for cheap publicity, while KRK defended it as fair film criticism under freedom of speech, denying personal defamation.

The court, after reviewing the material, found a prima facie case of defamation as KRK exceeded criticism limits by encroaching on Bhagnani's privacy and reputation without basis, applied the triple test of prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury, balanced free speech with right to reputation and privacy per constitutional principles, and held that unregulated publication would cause ongoing harm. The court granted interim injunction restraining KRK from publishing or repeating such content and directed deletion of the offending tweets and videos but rejected the prayer for mandatory apology pending full trial evidence.

• Every individual has a right to have their reputation unaffected by false statements, and defamatory imputations that lower one's esteem in society give rise to a prima facie cause of action, with the law presuming falsity unless proven otherwise by the defendant: Jagadishkumar Thakkar Vs. Waahiid Ali Khan, (2024 SCC Online Bom 1079), Para 20 (referencing Para 15 of the cited judgment).
• The test for defamatory statements is their tendency to incite adverse opinions, hatred, contempt, or ridicule, with the burden on the defendant to prove truth or unintentional publication: Jagadishkumar Thakkar Vs. Waahiid Ali Khan, (2024 SCC Online Bom 1079), Para 20 (referencing Para 19 of the cited judgment).
• Right to privacy is a fundamental right, with exceptions only for compelling public interest: Justice K. S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) Vs. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, Para 20 (referencing Para 19 of the cited judgment).
• For interim injunction in defamation cases, courts must satisfy the triple test of prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury, ensuring interference protects against irreparable harm greater than from granting relief: Dalpat Kumar Vs. Prahlad Singh, AIR 1993 SC 276, Para 16.
• Interim orders in defamation balance reputation and privacy rights with freedom of speech, applying caution per the Bonnard standard to grant injunction only if falsity is certain and unjustifiable: Para 21-22.
• Freedom of speech does not permit breaching another's privacy or reputation; self-restrictions apply when expressing opinions publicly: Para 25.

Case Title: Mr. Vashu Bhagnani Vs. Mr. Kamal Rashid Khan:05th December, 2025: Notice of Motion No.3298 of 2025 in S.C. Suit No.3240 of 2024;MHCC010082932025:Bombay HC:Amit Anant Laulkar

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Revajeetu Builders and Developers Vs Narayanaswamy and Sons

The appellant Revajeetu Builders and Developers filed a suit against the respondents for recovery of money with 18% interest and declaration of absolute ownership of property based on a sale deed dated 30-9-1987, claiming the respondents were unlawfully occupying the building after termination of tenancy. The appellant later sought amendment under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC to insert new paragraphs and add prayers declaring respondents as trespassers from 1-4-1988, seeking mandatory injunction for demolition of unauthorized constructions, permanent injunction against interference, and damages for unauthorized occupation. The trial court allowed the amendment, but the High Court set aside the order, finding it unnecessary, prejudicial, and changing the suit's nature. The Supreme Court, on appeal, upheld the High Court's view, reasoning that courts must exercise discretion judiciously in amendments, refusing mala fide ones while allowing bona fide amendments essential for adjudicating real controversies, considering factors like prejudice compensable by costs, limitation bar, and whether it fundamentally alters the case; here, the amendment was not imperative, caused uncompensable prejudice, was barred by limitation, and altered the suit from money recovery to eviction and damages, dismissing the appeal with Rs 1 lakh costs to discourage such applications.

Law Points:

Courts must exercise wide discretion under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC judiciously, refusing mala fide, worthless or dishonest amendments but not bona fide, legitimate, honest and necessary ones (Reference: Paras 59 and 64 of judgment).

The basic test for granting amendment is whether it is necessary for determining the real question in controversy or for proper/effective adjudication; if not, it cannot be allowed (Reference: Para 58 of judgment).

Courts should consider potential prejudice or injustice to the other side, which if compensable by costs, may not bar amendment, but actual costs are rarely granted in practice (Reference: Para 59 of judgment).

Key principles for allowing/rejecting amendment include: imperative for adjudication, bona fide application, no uncompensable prejudice, avoids injustice/multiple litigation, does not fundamentally change case nature, and limitation bar as a factor though not absolute if justice requires (Reference: Para 63 of judgment).

Bar of limitation on amended claim is a relevant factor in discretion but does not oust jurisdiction if amendment serves interests of justice (Reference: Para 39 of judgment).

Imposition of costs on amendment applications aims to discourage mala fides, compensate delay/inconvenience/expenses, and signal careful pleading; factors include stage of application, pre/post-trial, financial benefit, realistic assessment, extra hearings, and appeal costs (Reference: Paras 61 and 62 of judgment).

Case Title: Revajeetu Builders and Developers Vs Narayanaswamy and Sons and Others

Order Date: October 9, 2009

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 6921 of 2009

Neutral Citation: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 1709

Name of Court: Supreme Court of India

Name of Judge: Dalveer Bhandari and H.S. Bedi, JJ.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Rajkumar Bhatia Vs The State of Madhya Pradesh

The complainant Rajkumar Bhatia filed a complaint in September 2023 alleging that accused persons were manufacturing and selling counterfeit "Bhatia Masale" products, infringing his trademark and copyright, leading to registration of FIR under Sections 420 IPC and 63 Copyright Act, later enhanced with Sections 120-B, 201 IPC and provisions of Trademarks Act. 

Investigation revealed involvement of multiple accused who admitted to producing fake packaging. Chargesheet was filed in December 2022, initial regular bail granted, but on 02.09.2024 JMFC found prima facie case for additional serious offences including Sections 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 473 IPC (punishable up to life imprisonment), cancelled earlier bail and directed committal to Sessions Court.

Accused obtained anticipatory bail from Additional Sessions Judge in September 2024 relying on Arnesh Kumar guidelines assuming offences punishable up to 7 years only. Complainant challenged these anticipatory bail orders; trial court later framed charges dropping Section 467 but High Court in revision restored it. The High Court found the anticipatory bail orders illegal as they ignored the enhanced serious offences punishable with life imprisonment and mechanically applied Arnesh Kumar guidelines, quashed the anticipatory bail orders and directed accused to apply for regular bail before trial court.

When serious offences punishable with imprisonment for life are made out (e.g., Sections 467, 468 etc. IPC), anticipatory bail cannot be granted merely by applying Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 273 guidelines which are limited to offences punishable up to 7 years imprisonment (Reference: Page 9-10 of judgment).

Grant of anticipatory bail ignoring prima facie addition of grave offences attracting life imprisonment renders the order illegal and liable to be quashed (Reference: Page 10 of judgment).

Addition of serious offences after grant of bail does not automatically cancel bail, but where bail was granted without considering such enhanced offences punishable beyond 7 years, the order suffers from illegality (Reference: Page 9-10, distinguishing Pradeep Ram v. State of Jharkhand (2019) 17 SCC 326).

Case Title: Rajkumar Bhatia Vs The State of Madhya Pradesh and Others:17th December, 2025: Criminal Case No. 43273 of 2025:2025:MPHC-GWL:33288:Madhya Pradesh HC: Hon'ble Shri Justice Rajesh Kumar Gupta

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Mandeep Singh Vs. Shabir Momin

Mandeep Singh, creator and prior user since 2012 of the INSTANT BOLLYWOOD brand and device mark for Bollywood entertainment content on digital platforms with millions of followers, entered into a 2019 agreement with One Digital Entertainment Pte. Ltd. (ODE), whose managing director Shabir Momin (Respondent No.1) clandestinely obtained trademark registrations in his personal name around 2020, filed four rectification petitions under Section 57(2) of the Trademarks Act, 1999 seeking cancellation after terminating the agreement in August 2025 and discovering the registrations. 

On 11.12.2025, the Delhi High Court noted the 2019 agreement acknowledging joint 50:50 ownership of the brand IPR, impleaded Times Internet Inc. as Respondent No.3 upon proof of assignment dated 24.10.2025 from Respondent No.1 (of which petitioner had notice), found prima facie admitted 50% rights of petitioner not reflected in registrations or assignment without his consent or consideration, directed status quo on the assignment and restrained creation of third-party interests to protect petitioner's rights, criticised petitioner's suppression of prior knowledge of registrations since 2022 and related documents but declined to dismiss interim application, instead imposing costs of Rs.5 lakhs per petition payable to DHCLSC, and listed the matters further.

Assignee of a trademark (even with drag-along rights) cannot exclude the admitted joint owner (with 50% IPR) from rights without consent or consideration; status quo directed to protect such admitted rights pending rectification (Paras 18-23).

Suppression of material documents and facts (prior knowledge of registrations and related agreements/notices) warrants imposition of heavy costs, though not necessarily dismissal of interim relief where prima facie rights are admitted (Paras 24-26).

Case Title: Mandeep Singh Vs. Shabir Momin :11.12.2025:C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 275/2025:

Name of Judge: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Vishnu & Co Trademarks Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Smotect Pvt. Ltd.

Vishnu and Company Trademarks Pvt. Ltd., proprietor of the well-known 'VIMAL' trademark used since 1986 for pan masala, gutkha, mouth fresheners including non-tobacco 'VIMAL ELAICHI', filed a commercial suit alleging that Smotect Private Limited and its directors, while promoting their smoking cessation product 'Smotect AZAADI', published Instagram videos in November 2025 that prominently displayed the plaintiff's 'VIMAL ELAICHI' label while portraying it as a harmful tobacco/gutkha product, thereby disparaging the plaintiff's brand, infringing its copyright in the artistic label, and damaging its reputation despite 'VIMAL ELAICHI' being a harmless mouth freshener not requiring statutory health warnings. 

The plaintiff sought permanent and interim injunctions for trademark infringement, copyright infringement, disparagement, defamation and passing off. On 12.12.2025, after hearing the plaintiff ex parte and noting advance service on defendants, the Delhi High Court found a prima facie case of wrongful use of the label, misrepresentation of the product as tobacco-containing, copyright infringement and disparagement, held that balance of convenience favoured the plaintiff and irreparable harm would ensue without relief, and granted ex parte ad-interim injunction restraining use of the label or similar marks in advertisements, directed removal of specified impugned videos within 72 hours, permitted approach to Meta if not complied with, and listed the matter for 30.01.2026.

Exemption from pre-litigation mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 is permissible in commercial suits seeking urgent interim relief: Yamini Manohar v. T.K.D. Keerthi (2024) 5 SCC 815 (Para 5).

Prima facie, depicting a competitor's non-tobacco mouth freshener product label in promotional videos while falsely portraying it as harmful tobacco/gutkha amounts to disparagement, defamation and damage to goodwill (Paras 25-28).

Use of a competitor's registered artistic label in advertisements without authorisation constitutes prima facie copyright infringement under the Copyright Act, 1957 (Para 28).

Ex parte ad-interim injunction justified where prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury are established in intellectual property disputes involving disparagement and infringement (Paras 29-31).

Case Title: Vishnu and Company Trademarks Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Smotect Private Limited & Ors.

Order Date: 12 December 2025

Case Number: CS(COMM) 1333/2025

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Judge: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Leayan Global Pvt Ltd vs Bata India Ltd-DB

Bata India Ltd instituted a trademark infringement suit against Leayan Global Pvt Ltd and its retailer Chawla Boot House alleging Leayan's "POWER FLEX" mark and "THE POWER OF REAL LEATHER" tagline infringed its registered "POWER" mark for footwear, seeking permanent injunction.

The single judge granted ex parte ad interim restraint on "POWER" use, permitted sale of existing stock with monthly statements, and on disposing interim applications, restrained "POWER" in marks or combinations but allowed the tagline without undue prominence to "POWER" and stock sale, while deleting Chawla Boot House as unnecessary party.

Both appealed, Leayan challenging the restraint and Bata contesting tagline/stock permissions and deletion; the division bench analyzed that impleadment irregularity did not bar relief, "POWER FLEX" was deceptively similar to "POWER" phonetically/visually under average consumer test with imperfect recollection considering trade channels and expansion scope, "POWER" was suggestive not descriptive hence protectable.

Leayan failed to prove goodwill/reputation in "POWER FLEX" via inadequate evidence, no delay/acquiescence barred injunction as infringement mandates it absent dishonesty exception, upheld tagline/stock directions as discretionary without prejudice, but set aside Chawla Boot House deletion for fresh adjudication post-hearing, ultimately dismissing both appeals with that sole modification.

The manner in which defendants are arrayed in a suit cannot constitute a ground to disentitle the plaintiff to interim relief under Order XXXIX CPC: (Para 31.11).

Canvas footwear and leather footwear are "similar" goods for purposes of Section 29(2)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, especially as both fall in Class 25: (Para 33.4.4).

In assessing deceptive similarity, courts must consider reasonable scope of expansion of plaintiff's goods: (Para 33.4.5).

The test for deceptive similarity is the average consumer of imperfect recollection who is reasonably informed, observant and circumspect, forming overall impression without dissection: (Para 34).

Marks that are suggestive (requiring imagination to connect to goods) are protectable and registrable, unlike purely descriptive marks: (Para 34.5.1).

In cases of trademark infringement, injunction must normally follow and mere delay is insufficient to defeat it: (Para 35.6).

Volume of sales and extent of advertisement are relevant considerations for deciding acquired reputation or goodwill: (Para 35.3.6).

Case Title: Leayan Global Pvt Ltd vs Bata India Ltd:15.12.2025:FAO(OS) (COMM) 105/2019 & FAO(OS) (COMM) 193/2019 : Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar & Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation] 

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Ganraj Enterprises Vs. Landmark Crafts Ltd

The appellant sought rectification of the respondent’s registered trademark “HP” on grounds of territorial limitation, alleged false user claim, and lack of locus, after facing opposition and infringement action against its later mark “HP+”. 

The Registrar rejected rectification, holding the respondent to be the prior user and proprietor with valid registrations, including a subsequent pan-India registration. 

The High Court upheld this view, reasoning that territorial restrictions in one registration do not automatically extend to another associated registration, questions of alleged false user since 1995 were sub judice before the Commercial Court, and the appellant, though a “person aggrieved”, failed to substantiate grounds for cancellation since the respondent’s use of “HP” pre-dated the appellant and was otherwise lawful. 

The appeal was accordingly dismissed and the Registrar’s order affirmed.

Law Settled

Territorial limitations or disclaimers attached to one trademark registration do not ipso facto apply to another associated or subsequent registration of the same mark; each registration is distinct :paras 11.3.1–11.3.4, relying on Foodlink F & B Holdings India (P) Ltd. v. Wow Momo Foods (P) Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 4719, para 30).

A rival trader facing opposition or infringement action can qualify as a “person aggrieved” for rectification, but rectification will fail absent proof that the impugned registration is wrongly remaining on the register (paras 11.4.1–11.4.3).

Territorial restriction in a registration limits statutory infringement rights to that territory but does not bar the proprietor’s use elsewhere nor extinguish common law passing-off rights (para 11.6).

Case Title: Ganraj Enterprises Vs. Landmark Crafts Ltd.:02.12.2025:C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 164/2022:2025:DHC:10774:Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

S. Kalatmamani Vs . DS.S. Sudhakaran

In a partition suit (O.S. No. 195/2009), the trial court passed a preliminary decree on 24.08.2022. Respondents challenged this decree before the Madras High Court by filing a Civil Revision Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, alleging fraud on the court, and the High Court on 14.12.2023 allowed the revision, set aside the preliminary decree, and granted liberty to proceed further in the suit.

Appellants approached the Supreme Court contending that since a regular first appeal under Section 96 CPC was available against the preliminary decree, the High Court erroneously exercised supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227. 

The Supreme Court held that the allegation of fraud was debatable and, in the presence of an appellate remedy under the CPC, the High Court should not have entertained the Article 227 petition. 

Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order without examining merits, restored the preliminary decree, and permitted the affected defendants to file or re-file their appeals under Section 96 CPC within four weeks with appropriate directions for condonation and entertainment.

Law Point:

High Courts should not exercise supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to interfere with decrees or orders when a statutory remedy of appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (such as Section 96 CPC) is available, especially where allegations like fraud are debatable (Paras 3-6).

The principle that alternative remedies under CPC must be availed before invoking Article 227 is reaffirmed, relying on Virudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma Paribalana Sabai v. Tuticorin Educational Society (2019) 9 SCC 538 and Mohd. Ali v. V. Jaya (2022) 10 SCC 477 (Para 5).

Case Title: S. Kalatmamani & Ors. Vs . DS.S. Sudhakaran & Ors.

Order Date: November 27, 2025

Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 12251/2025

Name of Court: Supreme Court of India

Name of Judges: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Manoj Misra and Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.V.N. Bhatti

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Nawal Kishore Sharma Vs. Union of India,

Nawal Kishore Sharma, a seaman with the Shipping Corporation of India, was declared permanently unfit for sea service in 2011 due to dilated cardiomyopathy after over 20 years of service, leading him to return to his native Bihar where he claimed disability compensation, which was rejected via correspondence addressed to him there. 

He filed a writ petition in Patna High Court seeking compensation, but it was dismissed for lack of territorial jurisdiction as the employment and decisions occurred outside Bihar; an interim order had granted partial payment, yet jurisdiction was later denied. 

On appeal to the Supreme Court, the court reasoned that under Article 226(2) of the Constitution, jurisdiction exists if even a fraction of the cause of action arises within the High Court's territory, and here, the receipt of the rejection letter and correspondences in Bihar constituted such a fraction, further noting the respondents' participation without initial objection estopped them from raising the issue later. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's dismissal, and remitted the case to Patna High Court for adjudication on merits.

Law Point:

The High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within its territorial limits, even if the authority or person is outside the territory: paras 9, 16.

"Cause of action" under Article 226(2) is assigned the same meaning as under Section 20(c) CPC, being a bundle of facts necessary for the petitioner to prove infringement of a legal right: Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 329, paras 9, 13-14.

Even a fraction of cause of action, such as receipt of a communication rejecting a claim, suffices to confer territorial jurisdiction on the High Court, paras 17-19.

Participation in writ proceedings without raising jurisdictional objection at the interim stage may estop the respondent from later challenging maintainability on that ground: para 19.

Case Title: Nawal Kishore Sharma Vs. Union of India, Order date: August 7, 2014, Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 7414 of 2014, Neutral Citation: (2014) 9 SCC 329

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Dileep Bakliwal Vs Mohan Singh Panwar

The respondent/plaintiff filed a trademark infringement suit against the petitioner/defendant alleging infringement of his registered trademark “Shri Ankit” by the defendant's use of “Ankit” since 1988 for pipes and allied products, with the suit valued at Rs.55,600/-. 

The defendant sought transfer of the suit to the Commercial Court under Section 15(2) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, contending it was a commercial dispute under Section 2(1)(c)(xvii) and the valuation was arbitrary as the trademark's commercial value exceeded the Rs.3 lakh specified value threshold, but the trial court rejected the application holding that the plaintiff's valuation below Rs.3 lakh precluded Commercial Court jurisdiction. 

Aggrieved, the defendant filed the present miscellaneous petition, arguing that IPR disputes are inherently commercial and courts must independently assess true value. 

The High Court upheld the trial court's order, reasoning that a dispute qualifies as commercial only if the specified value is at least Rs.3 lakh as per Section 2(1)(i), the plaintiff's valuation governed, the Vishal Pipes Limited precedent was overruled, and determination of prior user in this trademark dispute did not mandate commercial classification absent the threshold value, dismissing the petition.

Law Point:

Trademark infringement disputes, though falling under the definition of "commercial dispute" in Section 2(1)(c)(xvii) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, are triable by Commercial Courts only if the "specified value" of the suit is not less than Rs.3 lakh as mandated by Section 2(1)(i); suits valued below this threshold remain with regular civil courts, and plaintiff's valuation is binding unless proven arbitrary in a manner warranting revaluation (Paras 9-14).

The overruling of Vishal Pipes Limited v. Bhavya Pipe Industry (2022 SCC OnLine Del 1730) by Pankaj Ravjibhai Patel v. SSS Pharmachem Pvt. Ltd. (2023 SCC Delhi 7013) reinforces that low-valued IPR suits need not be automatically transferred or revalued for Commercial Court jurisdiction (Para 12).

Case Title: Dileep Bakliwal Prop Poonam Marketing Through Power of Attorney Ms Sonam Geda Vs . Mohan Singh Panwar: 11.12.2025: Misc. Petition No. 4539 of 2025: 2025:MPHC-IND:36415: Madhya Pradesh HC:Hon'ble Shri Justice Alok Awasthi

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Sri Athmanathaswami Devasthanam Vs. K. Gopalaswami Ayyangar

Sri Athmanathaswami Devasthanam, a temple trust, sued in civil court for damages claiming the respondent was a trespasser on about 727 acres of land let into his possession in 1944 without Board sanction, treating the transaction as an invalid permanent lease under the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act 1927. 

The respondent contended the lands were ryoti, he was a ryot with occupancy rights under the Madras Estates Land Act 1908, and the suit was only cognizable by revenue court under Section 189. Trial court decreed on merits holding the lease invalid, but High Court reversed, finding the lands ryoti, respondent a ryot, lease valid, and civil court lacked jurisdiction, ordering return of plaint, while also dismissing appellant's cross-objection on a payment credit. 

Supreme Court, on appeal, focused first on jurisdiction as a threshold issue, holding that if a court lacks jurisdiction over the subject-matter, it cannot decide merits or cross-objections but must only determine jurisdiction and return the plaint if absent, as civil courts are barred from suits for rent arrears or ejectment against ryots under Section 189 read with Schedule Part A; it upheld the return of plaint but set aside the High Court's order on cross-objection for overstepping, dismissing the appeal with costs except on that point.

Law Point:

When a court lacks jurisdiction over the subject-matter of a suit, it cannot decide any question on merits, including cross-objections; it must confine itself to determining the jurisdictional issue and, if absent, return the plaint for presentation to the proper court (Para 14).

Suits by landholders for recovery of rent arrears or ejectment against ryots with occupancy rights in estates are exclusively within the jurisdiction of revenue courts (District Collector or Collector as Revenue Court), and civil courts have no original jurisdiction to entertain them under Section 189(1) of the Madras Estates Land Act 1908 read with Entries 3 and 11 of Schedule Part A (Para 13).

Case Title: Sri Athmanathaswami Devasthanam Vs. K. Gopalaswami Ayyangar: 9 May 1963: Civil Appeal No. 70 of 1961: 1963 SCC OnLine SC 251: Supreme Court of India: K. Subba Rao, Raghubar Dayal and J.R. Mudholkar, JJ. 

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Federal Express Corporation Vs. Fedex Securities Pvt.Ltd:

Federal Express Corporation, a global transportation and e-commerce leader, adopted the FEDEX mark in 1973 as an abbreviation of Federal Express, registered it internationally including in India from 1986 in various classes, and established significant reputation and presence in India through operations, acquisitions, and domain names. 

Defendants, financial services companies, incorporated in 1995-1998 and changed names to include FEDEX in 1996-2001, claiming it derived from founders' Federal Bank affiliation, and registered domain fedexindia.in in 2011. Plaintiff discovered this in 2011, sent cease-and-desist notices demanding discontinuation, but defendants refused, leading to failed settlement talks. 

Plaintiff filed infringement and passing-off suit in Delhi High Court in 2014, which returned the plaint in 2017 for lack of jurisdiction, allowing presentation in Bombay High Court, where it was registered in 2019. 

In the interim application, plaintiff argued infringement under Sections 29(4) and 29(5) of Trade Marks Act 1999, passing off, and dilution of well-known mark FEDEX (declared well-known in 2024 but claimed so since 1986). 

Court reasoned that defendants' use of identical mark as essential part of corporate names constituted infringement despite added words like 'Securities', adoption was dishonest without due cause, plaintiff's mark had trans-border reputation and distinctiveness in India causing confusion/deception, no common field required for passing off, delay not fatal absent acquiescence, balance of convenience favored plaintiff with mala fides on defendants' part, and irreparable harm if not restrained. 

Court granted interim injunction restraining defendants from using FEDEX or similar marks in any manner, disposed application without costs.

Legal Points

Addition of non-distinctive words like 'Securities' to an identical registered trademark does not avoid infringement as the registered mark forms the essential feature of the impugned name: Ruston & Hornsby Ltd. v. Zamindara Engineering Co., AIR 1970 SC 1649, para 5.

Well-known trademark owner can prevent use of identical/deceptively similar mark for any goods/services under Section 29(5): Journal No.2144 dated 19th February 2024 declaring FEDEX well-known, para 6.

For dilution under Section 29(4), prove adoption without due cause, reputation in India, unfair advantage/detriment to distinctive character/repute: RPG Enterprises Ltd. v. Riju Kaushal, (2022) 90 PTC 312, paras 39-45, para 8, 11.

Case Title: Federal Express Corporation Vs. Fedex Securities Pvt.Ltd:11.12.2025: Comm IPR Suit No.1406 of 2019:  R.I. Chagla H. J.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Inreco Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. Vs Nav Records Pvt. Ltd.

Inreco Entertainment Private Limited filed a commercial suit against Nav Records Private Limited and another for alleged infringement of copyright in soundtracks of Punjabi songs by Jasdev Yamla, which the plaintiff discovered in 2016 when uploaded on the defendant's platform, leading to email correspondences from February 2020 attempting resolution, a cease-and-desist notice in December 2022, and the suit's filing thereafter with dispensation from pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act 2015 granted initially but revoked by order dated 14 July 2025 on grounds of unexplained nine-year delay post-2016, lack of vigilance, and artificial urgency. 

The plaintiff sought review of that order, contending the court overlooked ongoing emails from 2020 demonstrating alertness. The court, relying on precedents, reasoned that review jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC is limited to errors apparent on the record's face, not for reappraisal of evidence or appeals in disguise, and found no such patent error, new discovery, or sufficient reason, as the delay remained glaring and the finding of post-2016 inaction stood justified despite the charted correspondences. The review application and connected interlocutory application were dismissed.

Law Point Settled:

The jurisdiction of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC is not that of an appeal and can be entertained only if there is an error apparent on the face of the record, not for mere repetition of arguments or minor mistakes: , Para 5 .

A review is a serious step and proper only where a glaring omission, patent mistake, or grave error has crept in by judicial fallibility, and cannot be a rehearing of the case: , Para 5 

An error which is not self-evident and requires a process of reasoning to detect cannot be considered an error apparent on the face of the record for review purposes: ., Para 5 

The power to review is a creature of statute, and a review court is not an appellate court; mere possibility of two views or reassessing evidence is not a ground for review: , Para 6.

Review proceedings must be strictly confined to the scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, and are not permissible for rehearing and correcting erroneous decisions:., Para 7 

Case Title: Inreco Entertainment Private Limited Versus Nav Records Private Limited: 08.12.20225: RVW-IPD/3/2025:Cal HC: Ravi Krishan Kapur, H. J.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation] 

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Anheuser Busch Inbev India Ltd. Versus Jagpin Breweries

Anheuser Busch Inbev India Ltd., the registered proprietor of trademarks "HAYWARDS 5000" (label mark No. 436744 since 1985) and "FIVE THOUSAND" (word mark No. 1521743 since 2010) for beer in Class 32, sued Jagpin Breweries Ltd. for infringement and passing off by using "COX 5001" on beer, seeking injunction and Rs. 20 lakhs damages, claiming continuous use since 1983, well-known status declared in 2003, and prior successful actions against similar marks including against defendant for "COX 5000" in 2006 where injunction was granted. 

Defendant filed written statement raising defenses like dissimilarity, abandonment, numeral 5000 being common to trade, disclaimer, suppression of facts, and consent, but led no evidence despite opportunities, its rectification application was dismissed by IPAB in 2011, interim injunctions granted in 2012 and 2014 were unchallenged, and defendant failed to appear at final hearing despite notice. 

The court reasoned that numeral 5000 is essential feature of plaintiff's marks protected by registration, defendant's "5001" is deceptively similar creating confusion for average consumer with imperfect recollection, adoption dishonest without explanation, no abandonment as plaintiff showed continuous use, defenses untenable without evidence, passing off established by plaintiff's goodwill and likelihood of deception, but damages not proved lacking evidence of loss or defendant's profits. 

The suit was decreed granting permanent injunction restraining infringement and passing off, but denying damages, and awarding Rs. 10 lakhs costs to plaintiff considering defendant's conduct.

Law Point:

Registration of a composite label mark protects all its essential and leading features, including numerals like "5000", entitling the proprietor to restrain use of deceptively similar marks under Section 28 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999: Para 23.

In assessing deceptive similarity for infringement, courts must consider overall impression, essential and dominant features rather than minute side-by-side comparison, focusing on imperfect recollection of average consumer: Anheuser Busch Inbev India Ltd. v. Jagpin Breweries Ltd., Para 27 

Minor variations like changing "5000" to "5001" do not avoid infringement if they create confusion, especially for identical goods like beer:  Paras 24-26.

Dishonest adoption inferred if defendant provides no explanation for choosing similar mark and fails to conduct registry search: ., Para 23 .

For passing off, plaintiff need not prove actual confusion but likelihood thereof, based on goodwill, misrepresentation, and potential damage: Para 26 .

Disclaimer in registration applies only to specified descriptive matter, not extending to distinctive numerals unless expressly recorded: Anheuser Busch Inbev India Ltd. v. Jagpin Breweries Ltd., Para 27.

Damages or accounts of profits require specific proof of loss or gains; not awarded without evidence: Anheuser Busch Inbev India Ltd. v. Jagpin Breweries Ltd., Para 28.

In commercial suits, costs including legal fees awardable under amended Section 35 CPC considering party's conduct like non-appearance: Anheuser Busch Inbev India Ltd. v. Jagpin Breweries Ltd., Para 28.

Case Title: Anheuser Busch Inbev India Ltd. Versus Jagpin Breweries Limited:08.12.2025:Commercial Suit No.110 of 2012: 2025:BHC-OS:24184:Bomb HC: Name of Hon'ble Judge: Arif S. Doctor, J.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation] 

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]