Zydus Lifesciences Limited Vs E. R. Squibb

Introduction:This appeal challenges an interim injunction granted by a single judge of the Delhi High Court, which restrained the appellant, Zydus Lifesciences Limited, from manufacturing or marketing its anti-cancer drug ZRC 3276 on the grounds of alleged infringement of the respondent's patent for a monoclonal antibody used in cancer treatment. 

The judgment, delivered by a division bench, delves into fundamental questions about the enforcement of patent rights in the pharmaceutical sector, especially when the product in question is a life-saving medication essential for treating various carcinomas. It underscores the tension between protecting innovative intellectual property and ensuring affordable access to critical healthcare solutions, highlighting how courts must navigate the classical principles of injunctions—prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss—while incorporating public interest as a paramount factor, as emphasized by Supreme Court precedents. 

This decision not only critiques the procedural and substantive flaws in the impugned order but also sets a nuanced precedent for handling quia timet actions in patent disputes, where anticipated infringement is alleged without the availability of the defendant's product for direct comparison. 

By modifying the injunction to allow market release subject to accounting safeguards, the court strikes a balance that prioritizes patient access without undermining patentee rights, reflecting broader policy concerns in a country where healthcare affordability is a pressing issue. The analytical depth of the judgment lies in its scrutiny of scientific claims, such as antibody binding specificity and amino acid sequencing, against legal standards, revealing how technical interpretations can sway outcomes in high-stakes litigation involving biologics and biosimilars.

Factual Background:The dispute revolves around competing pharmaceutical products designed to combat cancer through immune system modulation, specifically targeting the Programmed Death-1 (PD-1) protein pathway. The respondent, E.R. Squibb and Sons, LLC (a subsidiary of Bristol-Myers Squibb), holds a patent for an isolated monoclonal antibody, commercially known as 5C4, which is structurally identical to Nivolumab, a blockbuster anti-cancer drug marketed under the brand Opdivo. 

This antibody is engineered to bind specifically to human PD-1, a protein in the CD28 family found on T-cells, thereby blocking its interaction with ligands PD-L1 and PD-L2 on cancer cells. This blockade prevents the deactivation of T-cells, enabling the immune system to recognize and attack malignant cells, making it effective against a wide array of life-threatening carcinomas. 

The patent claims are defined by two key indicia: the antibody's specific binding to PD-1 and its composition of heavy and light chains with precise amino acid sequences. Proteins like antibodies are composed of amino acids arranged in unique sequences, and the respondent's invention emphasizes this specificity to distinguish it from non-selective bindings. 

On the other side, the appellant, Zydus Lifesciences Limited, developed ZRC 3276 as a purported biosimilar to Nivolumab, claiming it offers a 70% cost reduction compared to the respondent's product, thereby enhancing accessibility for cancer patients in India. However, testing revealed that ZRC 3276 binds not only to PD-1 but also to other proteins in the CD28 family, with a statistically significant 'p' value of around 0.0001, indicating cross-reactivity. 

The respondent argued that this still falls within the patent's scope, while the appellant contended that such binding violates the "specificity" requirement. Additionally, the appellant had sought regulatory exemptions by positioning ZRC 3276 as a biosimilar to Nivolumab, implying structural similarity, but without direct evidence of identical amino acid sequences. 

The scientific backdrop involves immunology basics: white blood cells include lymphocytes like B-cells, which produce Y-shaped antibodies with complementarity-determining regions (CDRs) for antigen binding, and T-cells, which use PD-1 to distinguish normal from abnormal cells. 

Cancer cells exploit this by expressing PD-L1, deceiving T-cells into tolerance, which monoclonal antibodies like 5C4 counteract. The factual peculiarity here is the absence of the appellant's product in the market, leading to a quia timet suit based on anticipated infringement, with no physical sample for direct mapping, forcing reliance on collateral evidence like regulatory filings and pre-grant patent responses.

Procedural Background:The proceedings originated from a patent infringement suit filed by the respondent against the appellant in the Delhi High Court, styled as a quia timet action to preempt future infringement, given that ZRC 3276 was not yet commercially available but was in advanced stages of development and regulatory approval. 

The respondent sought an interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, alleging that the appellant's product would infringe their patent by replicating the claimed monoclonal antibody. The single judge, after hearing arguments, granted the injunction in an order that restrained the appellant from manufacturing, selling, or releasing ZRC 3276, reasoning that prima facie infringement was established through indirect evidence despite the lack of product-to-claim mapping. 

Aggrieved by this, the appellant filed an appeal under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, registered as FAO(OS) (COMM) 120/2025, along with accompanying applications for stay and other reliefs.  The appeal focused on challenging the single judge's interpretation of "specific binding," the validity of product-to-product comparisons, and the disregard for public health implications. No counter-claims for patent invalidity were raised at this interim stage, keeping the focus on injunction criteria. 

Reasoning and Decision of Court:The division bench meticulously dissected the single judge's order, finding it flawed on multiple fronts, particularly in granting an absolute injunction without product-to-claim mapping and overlooking public interest. Central to the reasoning was the interpretation of the patent claim's requirement that the antibody "binds specifically to human PD-1." 

The court noted the respondent's own pre-grant response defining "specifically" as excluding statistically significant binding to other CD28 family proteins, with a 'p' value threshold of less than 0.05. Applying this, the bench found ZRC 3276's 'p' value of 0.0001 indicated significant cross-binding, thus potentially excluding it from the claim's scope. 

The single judge's view that "specifically" means not "exclusively" was rejected as inconsistent with the respondent's representations, and the impugned order's failure to address this contention was highlighted as a critical oversight. On amino acid sequencing, the bench critiqued the single judge's reliance on biosimilar status, where the appellant's regulatory exemption treated Nivolumab as the reference biologic, and 5C4 shared sequences with Nivolumab, leading to an erroneous transitive equality (if A equals B and C equals B, then A equals C). 

The court clarified that biosimilars do not invariably share identical sequences, as variations can occur, and no evidence supported this as an inflexible rule. This exposed the fallacy of product-to-product mapping instead of the mandated product-to-claim approach under Rule 3(A)(ix) of the Delhi High Court Rules Governing Patent Suits, 2022, which requires mapping "to the extent possible," but not its complete waiver in quia timet actions. 

The bench emphasized Section 48 of the Patents Act, 1970, granting exclusive rights only over "that" product, necessitating direct mapping for infringement findings. Collateral materials, like regulatory filings, were deemed insufficient for a prima facie case without expert evidence, raising arguable issues better suited for trial. Invoking Supreme Court rulings in Ramnik Lal Bhutta and Raunaq International, the court integrated public interest, noting the drug's life-saving nature, 70% cost savings, and the patent's imminent expiry on May 2, 2026. 

Balance of convenience tilted against absolute restraint, as depriving patients for four months outweighed potential harm to the respondent, securable through accounts. The decision modified the injunction: the appellant could market ZRC 3276 but must file periodical accounts of sales to secure the respondent if they succeed at trial, thus protecting both IP rights and public health.

Point of Law Settled in the Case:This judgment settles several critical points in patent litigation, particularly for biologics in quia timet scenarios, affirming that product-to-claim mapping under Rule 3(A)(ix) of the Delhi High Court Patent Suits Rules cannot be entirely dispensed with, even in anticipatory actions; the phrase "to the extent possible" allows flexibility but demands maximum feasible effort, and collateral evidence alone may not suffice for prima facie infringement without raising triable issues. 

It clarifies that patent claims must be interpreted consistently with the patentee's representations during prosecution, such as defining "specifically binds" to exclude statistically significant cross-binding based on 'p' values, preventing post-grant expansions of scope. 

The decision rejects product-to-product mapping as a substitute for claim mapping, emphasizing Section 48's focus on the claimed invention over commercial embodiments. On biosimilars, it establishes that similarity for regulatory purposes does not automatically imply identical amino acid sequences for infringement, requiring direct evidence. 

Crucially, it reinforces public interest as an integral factor in injunctions for life-saving drugs, per Supreme Court precedents, allowing courts to modify restraints by mandating account maintenance to balance IP protection with healthcare access, especially when patents are near expiry and affordability impacts vulnerable populations.

Case Title: Zydus Lifesciences Limited Vs E. R. Squibb and Sons, LLC & Ors.

Date of Order: 12 January 2026

Case Number: FAO(OS) (COMM) 120/2025, 

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:178-DB

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Sana Herbals Private Limited Vs. Mohsin Dehlvi

Introduction: This dispute revolves around competing claims over the trademarks "NOKUFSYRUP" and "NOKUF," both associated with cough remedies, highlighting tensions between registration rights, prior usage, assignment deeds, and the common law tort of passing off. 

The appellant, Sana Herbals Private Limited, sought to protect its registered mark "NOKUFSYRUP" by alleging infringement and passing off by the respondents, who held an earlier registration for "NOKUF." The High Court of Delhi, in its appellate jurisdiction, delved into whether an injunction could be granted against a registered trademark holder on grounds of passing off, emphasizing that statutory infringement claims fail against registered marks but passing off actions may persist under common law. 

This judgment underscores the primacy of prior user in passing off claims, the invalidity of unregistered assignments without goodwill transfer, and the rejection of abandonment pleas where historical use is established, even if interrupted. 

By affirming the lower court's denial of interim relief, the decision reinforces that goodwill must predate the defendant's use and that long disuse alone does not entitle a later user to enjoin the original proprietor, providing clarity on balancing equitable considerations with legal principles in trademark disputes.

Factual Background:The factual matrix of this case traces back to the mid-1990s in the Unani medicine sector, where the respondents, Mohsin Dehlvi and Dehlvi Remedies Pvt Ltd, claimed to have adopted and used the trademark "NOKUF" for cough syrup since October 20, 1994, with sales through the second respondent company. They applied for registration of "NOKUF" on June 3, 1996, claiming user from 1994. 

The appellant, Sana Herbals Private Limited, was incorporated on October 21, 1997, by relatives of the first respondent, including his cousins Shakeel Jamil and Jamul ul Rehman. Shortly thereafter, on November 3, 1997, a manufacturing agreement was executed, permitting the appellant to produce cough syrup under the "NOKUF" mark for three years on behalf of the respondents. The appellant contends that in 1998, the first respondent granted manufacturing rights, and subsequently, the respondents began purchasing "NOKUF"-branded products from the appellant for retail sale, a practice allegedly continuing until 2006-2007. 

Central to the dispute is an Assignment Deed dated September 19, 1999, which the appellant asserts transferred all intellectual property rights in "NOKUF" from the second respondent to itself, though the respondents vehemently deny its execution and validity, arguing it was unregistered and failed to transfer goodwill as required under Section 42 of the Trade Marks Act. Between 2000 and 2009, the respondents purportedly purchased "NOKUF" syrup from the appellant. In 2003, a fire destroyed the respondents' manufacturing unit, leading to financial distress.

Consequently, in 2007, the second respondent was struck off the Register of Companies for non-compliance. The appellant, claiming exclusive rights post-assignment, applied for registration of "NOKUFSYRUP" on May 15, 2015, securing it effective from that date on February 13, 2020. Meanwhile, the second respondent was reinstated in 2019 by the National Company Law Tribunal, revived its 1996 application, and obtained registration for "NOKUF" effective from June 3, 1996, on September 22, 2020. In 2024, the second respondent acquired a drug license, signaling intent to resume production under "NOKUF" or "KufNo Syrup." 

The appellant opposed the "NOKUF" registration in 2015, but the opposition was rejected in 2019, with an appeal pending before the Intellectual Property Appellate Board at the suit's institution. The appellant alleged continuous use, advertisement, and goodwill buildup in "NOKUF" since 1999, supported by invoices, while the respondents claimed prior authorship, extensive pre-1997 use, and that any appellant use was licensed and on their behalf. The respondents further asserted that post-fire, they outsourced production to a related entity, denying abandonment, and accused the appellant of fraudulently registering "NOKUFSYRUP" during their dormancy, claiming user from April 1, 1998, after the respondents' commencement.

Procedural Background: The procedural journey began with the appellant filing Commercial Suit No. 1776/2020 before the District Judge, Commercial Court-03, Tis Hazari, Delhi, seeking permanent injunction against the respondents' use of "NOKUF" or "KufNo Syrup," alleging infringement of its registered "NOKUFSYRUP" mark and passing off. Alongside the suit, the appellant applied for interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 

The respondents filed a written statement denying the claims, asserting prior adoption and registration of "NOKUF," invalidity of the 1999 Assignment Deed, and no abandonment despite the company strike-off and fire incident. After hearing arguments, the learned Commercial Court dismissed the interim injunction application on December 21, 2024, finding no prima facie case for infringement or passing off, given the respondents' registration and prior user. 

Aggrieved, the appellant appealed to the High Court of Delhi under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, vide FAO (COMM) 77/2025, along with an application for stay. The court pronounced its judgment  upholding the lower court's order and dismissing the appeal, emphasizing that no infringement lay against a registered mark and no passing off was established due to the respondents' prior use and lack of abandonment.

Reasoning and Decision of Court:The High Court's reasoning commenced by clarifying that no infringement action could sustain against the respondents, as their "NOKUF" mark was registered effective from June 3, 1996, predating the appellant's "NOKUFSYRUP" registration. Relying on the Supreme Court's ruling in S. Syed Mohideen v. P. Sulochana Bai, the court held that Section 28(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, grants concurrent rights to registered proprietors of identical or similar marks, barring infringement claims between them, though passing off actions remain viable under Section 27(2) as a common law remedy. Following its own precedent in Vaidya Rishi India Health (P) Ltd v. Suresh Dutt Parashar, the court declined to entertain infringement allegations, focusing solely on passing off. 

On facts, the court accepted the respondents' prior user from 1994 to 1999, undisputed by the appellant except for the starting date, and noted the 1997 Manufacturing Agreement's clauses acknowledging the respondents' ownership, estopping the appellant from denying pre-1997 use. 

The 1999 Assignment Deed was deemed prima facie invalid for not expressly transferring goodwill, as required under Section 42, and for non-registration within the stipulated period, rendering it unenforceable at the interim stage, though potentially triable.

Turning to passing off, the court outlined its tripartite test—goodwill, misrepresentation, and damage—stressing that the plaintiff's goodwill must predate the defendant's use, as per Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Prius Auto Industries Ltd and Pernod Ricard India (P) Ltd v. Karanveer Singh Chhabra. Since the respondents' use from 1994 predated the appellant's incorporation, no prior goodwill accrual was possible, ipso facto ruling out passing off. 

The court rejected the appellant's abandonment plea, distinguishing it from acquiescence, and held that the respondents' disuse from 1999 to 2024, due to fire and strike-off, did not constitute abandonment under Hardie Trading Ltd v. Addisons Paints & Chemicals Ltd, as there was no intent to relinquish rights, evidenced by outsourcing to a related entity and revival efforts. 

Non-use by the plaintiff is a defense in infringement but irrelevant in a passing off suit against the defendant, as clarified in Veerumal Praveen Kumar v. Needle Industries (India) Ltd. The appellant's evidence of goodwill—limited invoices, minimal advertisements—was deemed insufficient under Brihan Karan Sugar Syndicate Pvt Ltd v. Yashwantrao Mohite Krushna Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana, failing to prove distinctiveness or public association. 

Equitable arguments of the appellant's 25-year use were dismissed as unsound in law, per Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah, emphasizing prior continuous use for passing off success. Concluding no prima facie case, balance of convenience, or irreparable injury, the court dismissed the appeal, denying injunction and allowing the respondents to resume use under their registered mark.

Point of Law Settled in the Case:This judgment settles that in trademark disputes involving registered marks, no statutory infringement action lies against another registered proprietor under Section 28(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, but passing off remains actionable under common law via Section 27(2), provided the plaintiff proves prior goodwill predating the defendant's use, misrepresentation, and damage. 

It clarifies that assignment deeds without explicit goodwill transfer and timely registration are prima facie invalid under Section 42, unenforceable at interim stages. 

Prior user, even sporadic, suffices to defeat passing off claims if commencing before the plaintiff's, without requiring continuity for defensive purposes under Section 34.

Abandonment demands proven intent to relinquish, not mere disuse due to extenuating circumstances like business disruptions, and non-use by the defendant cannot ground an injunction in passing off, distinguishing it from infringement defenses. Goodwill evidence must be robust, including sales, advertisements, and public distinctiveness, with long subsequent use by the plaintiff insufficient to enjoin the prior user reviving the mark. 

Case Title: Sana Herbals Private Limited Vs. Mohsin Dehlvi & Anr.

Date of Order: 5 January 2026

Case Number: FAO (COMM) 77/2025

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:7-DB

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Fullstack Education Pvt Ltd vs. Institut Europeen D Administration Des Affaires

Introduction:The case of Fullstack Education Pvt Ltd versus Institut Europeen D Administration Des Affaires (INSEAD) Association & Anr. exemplifies the tensions that arise when two entities hold seemingly similar trademarks for related services, leading to disputes over rectification under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. 

This appeal before the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court challenged a Single Judge's decision to rectify the trademark register by removing the appellant's mark based on phonetic similarity and potential confusion. The core issue revolved around whether a rectification petition under Section 57 of the Act could be decided on a "prima facie" basis or required a final, conclusive determination.

The judgment underscores the procedural rigor demanded in rectification proceedings, distinguishing them from interim relief applications, and highlights the enduring relevance of classical trademark infringement tests in modern disputes involving educational institutions specializing in artificial intelligence and business administration. 

By setting aside the impugned order and remitting the matter for fresh consideration, the court reinforced the need for definitive findings in matters that could irrevocably alter trademark rights, while also addressing broader implications for honest adoption and consumer deception in a globalized educational market.

Factual Background:The dispute originated from the registration of trademarks by two educational entities offering services in higher education, particularly involving artificial intelligence and data science. The respondent, Institut Europeen D Administration Des Affaires (INSEAD) Association, a renowned international business school, held the registered trademark "INSEAD," which stands for its full name and is associated with providing executive education and business programs worldwide. 

On the other hand, the appellant, Fullstack Education Pvt Ltd, operated under the mark "INSAID," representing "International School of AI and Data Science," and offered similar services in AI-focused higher education. Both marks were undisputedly registered under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, but the respondent alleged that the appellant's mark created a manifest phonetic similarity, potentially leading to consumer confusion among students seeking admissions. 

The respondent contended that the appellant's adoption of "INSAID" was dishonest, pointing to evidence that the appellant's CEO, Mr. Manvender Singh, was aware of INSEAD's reputation prior to adopting the similar acronym. This awareness was inferred from materials such as interviews and website content where the CEO referenced INSEAD, suggesting that the choice of "INSAID" was not coincidental but deliberate, occurring later in time than INSEAD's established use. 

The competing marks visually differed in styling—"INSEAD" featured a circular logo with the tagline "The Business School for the World," while "INSAID" had a colorful design emphasizing AI and data science—but the auditory resemblance formed the crux of the conflict, with arguments centering on how terms like "-ead" and "-aid" could be pronounced similarly, akin to words like "dead" and "said." This factual matrix set the stage for a rectification petition invoking Section 11 of the Act, which prohibits registration of marks likely to cause confusion due to similarity with existing marks.

Procedural Background:The procedural journey began when the respondent filed a petition under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking rectification of the trademark register by removing the appellant's "INSAID" mark. This petition was heard by a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court, who, after considering arguments on phonetic similarity and likelihood of confusion, allowed the petition via a judgment dated 17 May 2023. During the Single Judge proceedings, the respondent emphasized initial interest confusion among educated consumers like students, while the appellant countered that the targeted audience's sophistication precluded any real deception and invoked tests from landmark cases like Pianotist Co.'s Application.

The Single Judge reserved orders on an interim relief application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Civil Procedure Code on 10 September 2021, but the matter was reopened on 12 January 2023 after a significant lapse, leading to the final impugned judgment. Aggrieved by this, the appellant filed Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) No. 536/2023 before the Division Bench, along with applications for stay and additional facts. 

The appeal was argued on grounds that the Single Judge erred in applying Section 11 without fully evaluating classical infringement principles and, crucially, decided the rectification petition on a prima facie basis rather than through a conclusive determination. 

The Division Bench heard submissions from both sides, with the appellant's counsel detailing flaws in the confusion analysis and the respondent's counsel urging expeditious disposal given the petition's pendency since 2021. The court ultimately allowed the appeal on 30 October 2023, setting aside the Single Judge's order and remitting the matter for fresh adjudication, while requesting fast-tracking subject to court priorities.

Reasoning and Decision of Court:The Division Bench's reasoning pivoted on a critical procedural distinction between interim relief and final rectification under Section 57 of the Act. While acknowledging the Single Judge's analysis of phonetic similarity—observing that "INSEAD" and "INSAID" shared auditory traits that could invoke initial interest confusion, especially in educational services—the court noted that these conclusions were repeatedly qualified as "prima facie." For instance, the Single Judge held that phonetic similarity existed based on examples like "dead" and "said," and that even enlightened students might experience momentary wonderment upon encountering the marks, satisfying the likelihood of confusion test under Section 11. 

Similarly, on dishonest adoption, the Single Judge prima facie rejected honest concurrent use, citing the appellant's CEO's prior knowledge of INSEAD from interviews and materials. However, the Division Bench emphasized that Section 57 empowers courts to cancel or vary registrations with finality, as such orders result in a mark being struck off the register, carrying irreversible consequences. 

A prima facie opinion, being tentative and based on preliminary examination, suffices for ad interim injunctions but falls short for rectification petitions, which demand definitive and conclusive findings. 

The court rejected the respondent's attempt to downplay the "prima facie" language as mere phrasing, insisting on adhering to the explicit record. Although the appellant raised substantive arguments on infringement tests from Pianotist Co.'s Application, the Bench set aside the judgment on this narrow ground without delving deeply into them, deeming it sufficient for reversal. The decision allowed the appeal, remitted the petition to the Single Judge for fresh consideration with expeditious disposal, kept all contentions open, and disposed of pending applications, thereby ensuring a thorough trial-like evaluation rather than a summary disposal.

Point of Law Settled in the Case:This judgment settles a pivotal point in trademark rectification proceedings: that decisions under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, must be based on final and conclusive determinations rather than prima facie opinions. The court clarified that while prima facie assessments are appropriate for granting interim relief under provisions like Order XXXIX of the Civil Procedure Code, rectification petitions involve exercising a power imbued with finality, as they lead to the permanent removal of a registered mark from the register. Such actions cannot rest on tentative views formed from initial impressions or preliminary examinations of the dispute, as they would undermine the stability and integrity of the trademark system. By drawing this distinction, the ruling reinforces that rectification requires a rigorous, evidence-based conclusion on elements like phonetic similarity, likelihood of confusion, and honest adoption, ensuring that only after a comprehensive evaluation—potentially akin to a trial—can a court direct alterations to the register. This principle protects registered proprietors from hasty cancellations and aligns with the Act's objective of maintaining a reliable public record of trademarks, while also highlighting that procedural lapses, such as conflating interim and final standards, can vitiate even well-reasoned substantive analyses.

Case Title: Fullstack Education Pvt Ltd vs. Institut Europeen D Administration Des Affaires (INSEAD) Association & Anr.

Date of Order: 30 October 2023

Case Number: LPA 536/2023

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Yashwant Varma and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ravinder Dudeja

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

The Procter & Gamble Company Vs. IPI India Private Limited

Introduction:The dispute between The Procter & Gamble Company, a global giant in consumer goods, and IPI India Private Limited, a local player in similar product categories, exemplifies this tension. This case revolves around the petitioner's established brands "VICKS" and "VAPORUB," which have become synonymous with relief from cold and respiratory ailments, and the respondent's marks "VAPORIN" and related variants, which the petitioner argued were crafted to ride on the goodwill of their iconic products. 

Filed under Sections 47, 57, and 125 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the petitions sought rectification of the trademark register by removing the respondent's registrations, asserting that the impugned marks were deceptively similar in phonetics, visuals, structure, and concept, leading to potential confusion among consumers. 

The Madras High Court's adjudication in this matter not only underscores the principles of trademark law in India but also reinforces the protection afforded to well-known marks against dishonest adoption. By examining the historical use, registration details, and market presence of both parties, the court delved into whether the respondent's marks crossed the threshold of permissible similarity, ultimately weighing factors like consumer perception, trade channels, and the overall impression created by the marks. 

This analytical article dissects the judgment, providing insights into how courts apply the anti-dissection rule, the test of imperfect recollection, and the concept of house marks in resolving such conflicts, offering valuable lessons for trademark practitioners and businesses alike.

Factual Background: The Procter & Gamble Company, founded in 1837 and headquartered in Cincinnati, Ohio, United States, stands as one of the world's leading multinational corporations in the manufacture and trade of health care, personal care, and hygiene products. Among its portfolio, the brand "VICKS" holds a flagship position, particularly for pharmaceutical and medicinal preparations aimed at alleviating cold, cough, and respiratory issues. 

Launched internationally in 1890 and introduced to the Indian market in 1964, "VICKS" has cultivated immense recognition and loyalty among consumers and the trade. Complementing this, the company has developed a family of marks under the "VAPO" formative prefix, including "VICKS VAPORUB," "VICKS VAPOCOOL," "VICKS VAPOPATCH," "VICKS VAPOEASE," "VICKS VAPAPADS," "VICKS COUGH DROPS," and "VICKS INHALER." These products, especially "VAPORUB," have garnered tremendous goodwill through extensive marketing, sales, and consistent quality, becoming household names associated with instant relief. 

The petitioner's trademarks "VICKS" and "VAPORUB" were registered globally as early as 1928, with Indian registrations dating back to 1954 for "VICKS" in Class 5 and 1977 for "VAPORUB" in the same class. Additional registrations include device marks and labels from 2007 and 2008, alongside copyrights in the distinctive packaging artistry. 

Courts across India have repeatedly acknowledged and protected these marks, affirming their well-known status. In contrast, IPI India Private Limited, based in Telangana, India, entered the market with products under marks like "VAPORIN COLD RUB" and "VAPORIN," promoted with slogans such as "Vapor In, Stress Out. Anytime, Anywhere." These products targeted similar categories—personal care and medicinal preparations in Classes 3 and 5—leading the petitioner to discover their existence and perceive them as imitations designed to capitalize on established reputation. 

Upon learning of the respondent's registrations (No. 3897775 in Class 3, No. 4285435 in Class 5, and No. 3461733 in Class 3), the petitioner issued a cease and desist notice on September 27, 2022, alleging deceptive similarity and dishonest intent, which prompted the filing of rectification petitions to expunge these entries from the trademark register.

Procedural Background: The proceedings commenced with the filing of three original petitions under Sections 47 (removal for non-use), 57 (rectification or variation of register), and 125  all in the name of the first respondent, IPI India Private Limited, with the Registrar of Trade Marks as the second respondent. The petitions were consolidated for a common hearing given the overlapping issues. 

The petitioner argued prior registration, deceptive similarity, and dishonest adoption, citing extensive evidence of their marks' global and Indian presence, sales figures, and judicial recognitions. The first respondent  countered by claiming that "VAPO" was descriptive and common to trade, thus not monopolizable, and that their marks were distinct enough to avoid confusion. 

Reasoning and Decision of Court:The Madras High Court's central reasoning was the test for deceptive similarity under Section 2(1)(h) of the Trade Marks Act, which deems marks similar if they are likely to cause confusion. The court rejected the respondent's plea to dissect the marks, invoking the anti-dissection rule from precedents like Amritdhara Pharmacy, where the Supreme Court held that marks must be compared as wholes, considering phonetic, visual, structural, and conceptual resemblances from the viewpoint of a person of average intelligence with imperfect recollection. 

Here, "VAPORUB" and "VAPORIN" were found phonetically akin, with the shared "VAPOR" prefix dominating the impression, and the suffixes "UB" and "IN" insufficient to differentiate, especially in spoken trade where pronunciation overlaps. Visually and structurally, the marks' composition mirrored each other, heightening confusion risks. 

The court noted the identical goods—cold rubs and medicinal preparations—sold through overlapping channels to the same consumer base, amplifying the likelihood of deception. Dismissing the respondent's argument that "VAPO" is descriptive (evoking vapor for ointments), the court observed that the petitioner's long use had rendered it distinctive, and the respondent's adoption of a similar formative element betrayed dishonest intent to freeride on goodwill, as evidenced by similar packaging, colors, and layouts. 

The house mark "VICKS" was recognized as a common identifier, making "VAPORUB" the key differentiator, which the respondent's marks encroached upon. Relying on Section 9's absolute grounds for refusal (lack of distinctiveness, potential for confusion) and Section 11's relative grounds (similarity to earlier marks), the court found the registrations violative. 

Prior user rights under Section 34 were upheld for the petitioner, given their 1964 Indian launch versus the respondent's later entry. Judicial precedents, including Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Ltd., reinforced that initial interest confusion could harm reputation. Ultimately, the court allowed all three petitions, directing the Registrar to remove the impugned registrations from the register and awarding costs to the petitioner, emphasizing that trademark law safeguards consumer interests and prevents unjust enrichment.

Point of Law Settled in the Case: This judgment solidifies the application of the deceptive similarity test in cases involving formative marks, clarifying that prefixes like "VAPO," when acquired distinctiveness through prolonged use and market dominance, cannot be appropriated even if arguably descriptive, as such adoption evidences bad faith. It reiterates that trademarks must be assessed holistically, without dissection, from the lens of an ordinary consumer's imperfect recollection, and that similarity extends beyond words to trade dress and packaging. The decision underscores the primacy of prior user rights and the well-known status of marks, as per Section 2(1)(zg), in rectification proceedings, establishing that house marks do not dilute the independent protection of sub-brands within a family. Furthermore, it affirms that registrations granted in error, causing confusion or deceiving the public, warrant expungement under Sections 47 and 57, prioritizing public interest over registrant's claims of commonality. This precedent serves as a deterrent against parasitic branding, particularly in pharmaceutical sectors where consumer health and trust are paramount, and highlights the courts' role in maintaining the integrity of the trademark register.

Case Title: The Procter & Gamble Company Vs. IPI India Private Limited & Anr.

Date of Order: January 6, 2026

Case Number: O.P.(TM)Nos.48, 49 and 50 of 2024

Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Mr. Justice N. Senthilkumar

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Sanjeev Kumar Juneja Vs Terrace Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd.

Terrace Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. filed a suit in 2018 against Sanjeev Kumar Juneja and another for infringement of their registered trademark "MANTRA" and passing off due to defendants' use of similar "MANTRA" formative marks like "ROOP MANTRA" in medicinal and cosmetic goods.

Defendants contested, filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC to reject the plaint which was dismissed and upheld in revision, then applied under Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 to challenge validity and stay the suit.

Trial Court framed an additional issue on validity but dismissed the stay as belated. In revision, the High Court reasoned that Section 124 mandates stay of infringement suits once prima facie invalidity is found to allow rectification but does not apply to passing off actions, held composite suits permissible but severable under Order II Rule 6 CPC due to delay caused by joinder, and modified the order to grant three months for rectification, stay the infringement claim, and direct separation and proceeding of the passing off claim as a new suit.

• Section 124 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 applies only to suits for infringement of registered trade marks and not to actions for passing off:  Para 19.
• A composite suit joining causes of action for trade mark infringement and passing off is permissible, but the causes are severable, and the court can order separate trials under Order II Rule 6 CPC if joinder causes delay or inconvenience:  Para 25.

Case Title: Sanjeev Kumar Juneja Vs Terrace Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd.:22.01.2026:CR No.6252 of 2023:Punjab and Haryana HC:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Pankaj Jain

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. Vs Ranvir Kumar Bindeshwari Singh

Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. and Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. filed a suit in August 2018 against Ranvir Kumar Bindeshwari Singh and others for infringing their Indian Patent No. 209816 covering Sitagliptin by advertising and exporting the infringing product SEPAMET-XR containing Sitagliptin Phosphate Monohydrate, seeking permanent injunction, damages, rendition of accounts, delivery up, and costs.

The court granted ex-parte interim injunction in August 2018. Defendants filed written statement denying infringement, export for domestic market, and court's jurisdiction but later ceased appearing, leading to ex-parte proceedings in March 2024 after substituted service. The patent lapsed in July 2022, rendering injunction infructuous, so plaintiffs restricted relief to damages and costs, filing unrebutted affidavit evidence.

The court, accepting plaintiffs' evidence, calculated compensatory damages based on defendants' estimated export profits over 12 months at Rs.49,44,450 with 25% margin, awarded exemplary damages of Rs.10 lakhs for willful post-injunction infringement posing public health risks, and granted actual costs of Rs.21,67,074, holding defendants jointly liable.

• In patent infringement suits proceeded ex-parte, unrebutted affidavit evidence of plaintiffs is sufficient to establish entitlement to compensatory damages calculated on the basis of infringer's estimated profits from export data with a reasonable profit margin:  Para 25.
• Exemplary damages may be awarded in patent infringement cases where defendants willfully disobey court injunction orders and continue infringing activities, considering public health risks from sub-standard medicines:  Para 28.
• Actual legal costs, including court fees and expenses supported by affidavit, are recoverable in commercial patent suits under the Commercial Courts Act, especially when unrebutted:  Para 29.

Case Title: Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. Vs Ranvir Kumar Bindeshwari Singh :23.01.2026:CS(COMM) 1075/2018:2026:DHC:571:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Jesal Vimal Jetha Vs Controller General of Patents

Jesal Vimal Jetha filed a patent application in 2018 for a customizable comforter system with a supporter for therapeutic use, addressing issues like backache and posture through adjustable compartments for individual body needs.

The First Examination Report (FER) in January 2020 raised objections on novelty and inventive step based on prior arts D1 and D2, to which the appellant responded. Subsequent hearing notices introduced additional prior arts D3, D4, and D5, leading to hearings in July and September 2020 where the appellant submitted detailed technical replies.

The Controller rejected the application in October 2020 under Section 2(1)(ja) for lack of inventive step without adequately considering the appellant's responses, particularly the July 2020 reply addressing D3-D5, and contained factual errors in analyzing prior arts.

The Delhi High Court, finding violations of natural justice due to non-consideration of key submissions, jurisdictional infirmities, procedural unfairness, and inconsistencies like shifting the closest prior art from D1 to D3, set aside the rejection order and remanded the matter for fresh consideration with a new hearing, clarifying that merits were not examined.

• The failure to consider the appellant's detailed technical response to objections based on newly cited prior arts in the hearing notice constitutes a violation of natural justice and procedural fairness Para 13.
• The Controller's impugned order must explicitly advert to and consider all submissions, including highly technical responses to prior arts, and absence thereof renders the decision unfathomable and invalid:  Para 15.
• Factual errors in the Controller's analysis of prior arts, such as misstating positional rearrangement of compartments not disclosed in the cited document, indicate non-application of mind and require judicial interference:  Para 16.
• The ability to arrange or re-arrange compartments in any spatial manner, including multilayer stacking, may constitute a novel inventive feature when contrasted with linear parallel arrays in prior arts, and failure to address this vitiates the rejection:  Para 17.
• Procedural fairness in patent examination may require issuance of a Second Examination Report (SER) under Section 13(3) of the Patents Act in cases involving amendments or new objections, to ensure all issues are compositely put to the applicant before response: Para 18.

Case Title: Jesal Vimal Jetha Vs Controller General of Patents:23.01.2026: C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 233/2022:2026:DHC:573:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

LMC Computers Vs. iThink Apps Private Limited

In the suit filed by LMC Computers against iThink Apps Private Limited & Ors before the Delhi High Court, the plaintiff sought condonation of delay in filing replication to the written statement. The written statement was taken on record on 18.09.2025, replication was filed on 03.11.2025 (46th day, as the 45th day fell on Sunday), but served on defendants only on 10.11.2025 after Registry objection, despite defendants' email reminder on 05.11.2025. 

Plaintiff argued that filing on next working day after Sunday was valid under Section 10 General Clauses Act, 1897 and Rule 6 Chapter I Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, while delay arose due to voluminous pleadings and multiple inter se litigations; defendants opposed, alleging deliberate non-service for unfair advantage and insisting strict compliance with Rule 5 Chapter VII requiring service endorsement for acceptance. 

The Court held that the 30+15 days limit under Rule 5 is strict and non-extendable beyond 45 days, but filing on next open day after Sunday was permissible; however, non-service provision in Rule 5 was held directory (mere irregularity, not mandatory illegality) condonable by Court in justice interests, unlike Registry's binding duty. Accordingly, replication was taken on record subject to plaintiff paying Rs.1,00,000 costs to defendants within four weeks. 

The Court also issued notice on plaintiff's applications for directions restraining defendants from intimidating proposed witness and for impleadment of two partners as co-plaintiffs, with replies/rejoinders directed and matter listed on 21.05.2026.

Law settled: 

The 30 days period for filing replication under Rule 5 Chapter VII Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018 is extendable by maximum 15 days (total 45 days) and not thereafter; no further condonation possible even for sufficient cause, to ensure expeditious disposal of commercial disputes. Para 15, 19.

Where the last day of prescribed/extended period falls on a Sunday/holiday/Court-closed day, filing on the next working day is valid under Section 10 General Clauses Act, 1897 read with Rule 6 Chapter I Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018. Para 11, 16.

The requirement under Rule 5 Chapter VII Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018 that replication shall not be accepted unless it contains endorsement of service on defendant/his advocate is directory and not mandatory; non-service constitutes mere irregularity condonable by Court in interests of justice, though binding on Registry. Para 17-18.

Case Title: LMC Computers Vs. iThink Apps Private Limited & Ors.:14.01.2026:CS(COMM) 729/2025: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Yatishkumar Baburao Gaikwad Vs. Sachin Sariya

The petitioners/defendants challenged the Trial Court's order dated 17.09.2025 dismissing their application under Order VII Rule 11(a) & (d) CPC for rejection of the plaint in a trademark infringement suit, contending that the plaint disclosed no cause of action and that Delhi courts lacked territorial jurisdiction, as the defendants were based in Solapur (Maharashtra), manufactured fuses there, never supplied goods beyond Maharashtra, and the plaintiff's bald averments in para 46 about availability/sale in Delhi markets (Naraina, R.K. Puram, Sarojini Nagar) and through Just Dial lacked supporting documents or proof of actual purchase/sale.

The plaintiff/plaintiff opposed, relying on averments in paras 46-48 of the plaint about advertising, soliciting, supplying, and offering for sale via Just Dial e-commerce platform, plus filed Just Dial printouts, arguing this conferred jurisdiction. 

The High Court held that at the Order VII Rule 11 stage only plaint averments are to be considered without mini-trial or requiring proof/documents, and the averments in paras 46-48 sufficiently alleged facts conferring territorial jurisdiction on Delhi courts, particularly in view of evolved law on e-commerce/online offers for sale.

The defendants' contentions on absence of actual sale or documents were matters for trial, not rejection at threshold, hence the petition under Article 227 was dismissed without costs, with liberty to raise similar objections in written statement for Trial Court consideration.

Law settled: 

In trademark infringement/passing off cases involving e-commerce platforms, mere accessibility and looming presence of a website/offer for sale in a geography, even without aggressive targeting or actual completed sale, is sufficient to characterize it as targeting the forum and to confer territorial jurisdiction on courts where such commercial transaction could be concluded, as the tort stands committed where infringing goods are capable of being sold/purchased.

Once allegedly infringing goods are listed/available for sale on e-commerce platforms (accessible in the forum), the situs of the tort of infringement includes every place where a commercial transaction could be concluded, enabling suit filing in courts having jurisdiction over such place, irrespective of whether listing was at defendant's instance or by third party. 

Case Title: Yatishkumar Baburao Gaikwad Vs. Sachin Sariya:19.01.2026 : CM(M)-IPD 40/2025 : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Dev Sahitya Kutir Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Archana Debnath

The plaintiffs (widow and son of late renowned cartoonist Narayan Debnath) filed Title Suit No.01 of 2026 before the District Judge at Alipore alleging copyright infringement by the appellant-publisher (Dev Sahitya Kutir Pvt Ltd) in respect of Debnath's literary and artistic works, claiming a 2012 agreement granted only two-year publishing rights after which unauthorized publication continued without adequate royalty.

They asserted inheritance via a 2020 Will (plaintiff no.1 as Executrix, plaintiff no.2 as legatee). The Trial Court granted ex parte ad interim injunction restraining the appellant from publishing/selling/distributing the works till February 9, 2026, just before a book fair.

The appellant appealed (FMAT 18 of 2026), contending lack of locus standi of plaintiffs absent probate under Section 213 Indian Succession Act 1925 (applicable in West Bengal).

Bar under Order IX Rule 9 CPC due to prior suit dismissal for default, suppression of facts, delay/laches defeating equity, balance of convenience against injunction causing huge losses, and non-compliance with Order XXXIX Rule 3 guidelines. 

The Division Bench dismissed the appeal, upholding the injunction, holding that even in Section 57/213 areas, an executor/legatee can protect/defend the estate pre-probate as "intermediate acts" validated retrospectively under Sections 211 and 227.

Copyright infringement cause of action is continuing/day-to-day, so no bar under Order IX Rule 9/limitation/delay applies, no material suppression occurred (copy of prior order annexed), and prima facie case/irreparable injury justified injunction at ad interim stage per settled precedents, though observations not conclusive at trial.

Law Point:

An executor or legatee under a Will of a Hindu in territories specified under Section 57 (including West Bengal) can maintain a suit to protect/defend the estate/prevent infringement pre-grant of probate, as such acts qualify as "intermediate acts" validated retrospectively upon probate grant under Sections 211 and 227 of Indian Succession Act 1925 (Paras 59–62).

In copyright infringement cases, the cause of action is continuing and arises de die in diem; thus, injunction is normally granted as a matter of course on prima facie case, delay/laches do not bar relief, and prior suit dismissal for default does not attract bar under Order IX Rule 9 CPC as the cause is not the "self-same" one (Paras 66–69)

At ad interim ex parte stage, the Court proceeds on plaint averments as sacrosanct without mini-trial; damages not necessarily adequate remedy in widespread copyright infringement; non-strict repetition of Shiv Kumar Chadha/Morgan Stanley guidelines does not vitiate reasoned order (Paras 70–83).

Case Title: Dev Sahitya Kutir Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Archana Debnath:22.01.2026: FMAT 18 of 2026: 2026:CHC-AS:96-DB: Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Justice Supratim Bhattacharya  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Dr. Dulal Kumar De Vs Union of India

Dr. Dulal Kumar De along with co-inventors filed patent application No. 202031002063 on 17 January 2020 for “Herbal Anti-Venom against Catfish Sting”, published on 14 February 2020; 

First Examination Report issued on 4 July 2022 via email to Midnapore College's registered address, with response deadline 4 January 2023 extended to 4 April 2023; 

Email overlooked due to college's 150th anniversary celebrations, status inquiry on 9 June 2023 revealed abandonment under section 21(1) of Patents Act 1970; 

Petitioner filed writ petition alleging invalid service without postal communication under section 149, claiming time period not triggered and abandonment erroneous. 

Court reasoned section 149's "may" for postal service is permissive not mandatory, Rules 2003 as amended in 2016 and Office Order 23/2016 recognize email as valid service especially since petitioner provided email address, harmonizing with Information Technology Act 2000; time limits under section 21 and Rule 24B mandatory, non-compliance deems abandonment without judicial relaxation; distinguished petitioner's cited cases on strict statutory compliance as inapplicable here. Writ petition dismissed, upholding abandonment.

Law Point:

Service of notices under section 149 of the Patents Act, 1970 is permissive and not mandatory by post; email service is valid and effective as per amended Patents Rules, 2003 and Office Order 23/2016: paras 7-9.

Time limits for responding to First Examination Report under section 21(1) of the Patents Act, 1970 read with Rule 24B are mandatory; non-compliance results in automatic abandonment without scope for judicial extension: 

Subordinate rules framed under section 159 of the Patents Act, 1970 supplement the Act without superseding it, allowing alternative modes like email service for efficiency: para 8.

Case Title: Dr. Dulal Kumar De Vs  Union of India:19/01/2026:WPA-IPD No.2 of 2025:2026:CHC-AS:78:The Hon'ble Justice Ravi Krishan Kapur  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

The Supreme Industries Limited Vs Moorthi Rabeha

The Supreme Industries Limited filed a commercial IP suit against Moorthi Rabeha for trademark infringement, copyright infringement, and passing off, alleging adoption of "SUPREME" mark since 1987 for plastic products with registrations in class 17 and others, stylized label with copyright, and massive goodwill from sales over Rs.10,000 crores in 2023-24; discovered defendant's "SUPREMES GOLD" registration in class 19 in June 2024, filed rectification, and suit in October 2024 upon finding goods, seeking interim injunction. 

Defendant defended claiming "SUPREME" descriptive and common, marks dissimilar in color/font/layout, own use since 2015 with registration, and plaintiff's concealment of class 19 refusal. Court reasoned deceptive similarity visually/phonetically/structurally as defendant copied essential stylized "SUPREME" adding 's' and "GOLD" dishonestly to ride on goodwill, 

Defendant's registration ex facie invalid under sections 9/11 as likely to confuse average imperfect-recollecting consumer for identical goods, plaintiff proved prior use/goodwill/reputation without needing actual damage, balance of convenience and irreparable harm favored plaintiff despite defendant's registration. Interim injunction granted restraining defendant from using "SUPREMES GOLD" or similar marks.

Law Point:

In passing off, deceptive similarity is assessed by overall impression on average consumer with imperfect recollection, considering visual, phonetic, structural aspects holistically without dissection: 

Court can grant interim injunction against registered trademark if registration is ex facie illegal, fraudulent, or shocks conscience, despite section 28, as validity challenge at interlocutory stage possible on strong prima facie case.

Passing off requires goodwill, misrepresentation leading to likely deception no fraudulent intent needed), and likelihood of damage presumed from confusion without actual proof: para 34 

Registration of label mark without disclaimer confers exclusivity over distinctive word element if no other features, and defendant estopped from claiming descriptiveness after own registration: paras 31-32.

Case Title: The Supreme Industries Limited Vs  Moorthi Rabeha :19/01/2026:Commercial IP Suit No. 336 of 2024:2026:BHC-OS:1417:Hon'ble Ms. Justice Sharmila U. Deshmukh  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Khandelwal Dhaba Vs. Khandelwal Dhaba

Mohit Khandelwal, plaintiff, filed a passing off suit against Manoj Bhagchandani, defendant, claiming exclusive rights to "Khandelwal Dhaba" since 2001 with established goodwill, alleging defendant fraudulently adopted identical name in 2009 for adjacent restaurant causing confusion. Defendant countered with authorization from Shyam Sunder Khandelwal (plaintiff's father) who purportedly used it since 1977 and filed counterclaim for injunction. 

Trial court framed issues, granted permanent injunction to plaintiff in 2017 dismissing counterclaim; on appeal, High Court remanded issue 4 in 2019; trial court reaffirmed in 2019 favoring plaintiff based on documents proving continuous use since 2001, defendant's admissions, and failure to prove valid authorization or honest adoption. Defendant appealed. 

High Court analyzed passing off trinity: plaintiff proved goodwill via documents/telephone bills/licenses and defendant's pleadings admitting use; misrepresentation via dishonest adoption without justification for "Khandelwal" (defendant from Sindhi community lacking surname connection) inferring intent to deceive; likelihood of damage presumed from confusion. 

Law Point:

Prior user's rights in passing off emanate from common law and prevail over subsequent registration or authorization, unaffected by Trade Marks Act provisions: 

Dishonest adoption of identical/similar mark without justification raises strong presumption of mala fides and intent to ride on prior user's goodwill: 

In passing off, no proof of actual damage required; likelihood of confusion/deception presumes injury to goodwill: 

Adoption of another's trade/corporate name, if likely to cause confusion, constitutes passing off even if derived from personal elements

Case Title:  Khandelwal Dhaba Vs. Khandelwal Dhaba :15/01/2026:S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 283/2020 :[2025:RJ-JP:43211]Name of court: High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur :Name of Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjeet Purohit  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Pramod Kumar Vs Gannon Dunkerley

Pramod Kumar, appointed as Junior Engineer with Gannon Dunkerley in 1992 and rising to Deputy General Manager over 27 years, was terminated in February 2020 during approved leave for his son's wedding, invoking a 2012 policy clause. He claimed unpaid dues totaling Rs.4,10,184 including balance notice pay, leave encashment for 153 days, travel expenses, and laptop deposit refund, sending legal notices in 2020 and 2022 without response. He filed a recovery suit in Commercial Court, which dismissed it on 30.04.2024 holding it was not a "commercial dispute" under Section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 as it involved employee-employer service recovery from a private entity. In appeal, the High Court agreed the dispute was non-commercial, not fitting categories like merchants or traders, but reasoned that under Order VII Rule 10 CPC, the Commercial Court erred by dismissing instead of returning the plaint for presentation to a competent non-commercial court, distinguishing dismissal as final merits adjudication from return as procedural for wrong forum, citing precedents like AJ Organica Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2019 SCC OnLine Bom 1311) and Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. K.S. Infraspace LLP (2020) 15 SCC 1 emphasizing return to avoid remedilessness. The appeal was allowed, impugned judgment set aside, suit restored, and Commercial Court directed to return plaint under Order VII Rule 10A CPC with appearance date 03.02.2026, permitting pragmatic use of existing pleadings and evidence with parties' consent for de novo proceedings per EXL Careers v. Franklin Aviation Services (2020) 12 SCC 667.

• A recovery suit for salary or terminal benefits by an employee against a private employer does not qualify as a "commercial dispute" under Section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, as it falls outside enumerated categories like merchants, bankers, financiers, traders, or specified commercial transactions (Para 11).
• Upon determining lack of jurisdiction due to a non-commercial dispute, a Commercial Court must return the plaint under Order VII Rule 10 CPC for presentation to the competent court, rather than dismiss the suit, as dismissal constitutes final adjudication while return is procedural for wrong forum (Paras 12-13, citing AJ Organica Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 1311 at Para 14; Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprises Ltd. v. K.S. Infraspace LLP & Anr., (2020) 15 SCC 1 at Para 14-17).
• On return of plaint under Order VII Rule 10 CPC, de novo proceedings are required, but courts may utilize existing pleadings and evidence (documentary and oral) with parties' consent for pragmatic efficiency (Para 19, citing EXL Careers v. Franklin Aviation Services, (2020) 12 SCC 667).

Case Title: Pramod Kumar Vs Gannon Dunkerley and Co. Ltd.:20.01.2026:RFA(COMM) 348/2024:2026:DHC:2026:DHC:464-DB:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Anil Kshetarpal and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Amit Mahajan

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Hirotsu Bio Science Inc Vs Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs

Hirotsu Bio Science Inc filed a national phase patent application No. 201617022947 on July 4, 2016, titled “Cancer Detection Method Using Sense of Smell of Nematode” based on PCT application dated December 10, 2014, claiming a method using Caenorhabditis elegans nematodes' chemotaxis to detect cancer odors in biological samples like urine ex vivo, with nematodes attracting to cancer patient samples and avoiding healthy ones. 

Request for examination filed October 31, 2017, First Examination Report issued August 19, 2020 citing objections, reply with amended claims December 28, 2020, hearing notices with objections under Sections 2(1)(j), 3(i), 3(j), and 10(4), hearing April 11, 2023 after adjournments, post-hearing submissions May 26, 2023 with further amendments, but application rejected August 29, 2023 under Section 3(i) as diagnostic method. 

Appellant appealed under Section 117A arguing it's mere detection not diagnosis, in vitro not practiced on body, citing spec paras [0027]-[0028] and cases like EMD Millipore and Chinese University of Hong Kong. Respondent countered it's diagnostic as identifies disease via signs in samples, extends to in vitro per EPO G 1/04 criteria including data collection, comparison, deviation finding, and clinical attribution. 

Court reasoned Section 3(i) excludes diagnostic methods, and absence of "practiced on body" phrase means it covers both in vivo and in vitro per Chinese University of Hong Kong case; method involves sample collection, nematode behavior analysis via chemotaxis index, repetition for accuracy yielding high sensitivity/specificity (95%/81%), leading to cancer presence conclusion akin to diagnostic processes in Sequenom, thus excluded under 3(i); no need to examine other grounds. Appeal dismissed, impugned order upheld.

Law Point:

The term "diagnostic" under Section 3(i) of the Patents Act, 1970 extends to both in vivo and in vitro methods, as the provision lacks the limiting phrase "practised on the human or animal body" unlike EPC Article 52:  (Para14, 17).

Case Title: Hirotsu Bio Science Inc Vs Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs :17.01.2026: C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 45/2023 :2026:DHC:421 : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia  

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]  

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Karan Rathore Vs Registrar of Trade Marks

Karan Rathore, assignee of the registered trademark 'JBR' (device mark) in Class 12 for motor parts since 2010 with claimed use from 2000 via predecessor Jagdish Joshi who assigned it in May 2023.

Opposed Respondent No. 2's application No. 5854000 for 'JBR' (word mark) in Class 12 for car/bike/vehicle covers claiming use from July 2020, advertised in May 2023; opposition filed in May 2023, countered in July 2023, evidences exchanged, hearing in March 2024 led to Registrar dismissing opposition on March 14, 2024 holding goods dissimilar and Appellant not prior user for covers, issuing certificate; Appellant appealed under S.91. 

Respondent No. 2, Appellant's cousin, had obtained authorization in July 2020 for six months to sell covers under 'JBR' on e-commerce, admitting Appellant's rights. 

Court reasoned that marks are identical in essential feature 'JBR', goods similar as automotive accessories with same consumers, trade channels, and potential confusion per factors in FDC Limited (nature, use, users, channels, competition); authorization implies similarity acknowledgment; no monopoly over class but similarity triggers S.11 prohibition.

Appeal allowed, impugned order set aside, registration removed under S.57.

Law Point:

Factors for determining similarity of goods/services include nature and composition, uses, users, physical nature, trade channels, competition, and complementarity:  (Para 17-18).

 It is well-established in law that an owner of a Mark is always entitled to expand its goods and services, as a natural consequence in expansion of its business. (Para 20)

Registration liable to refusal under S.11 if identical/similar marks for similar goods likely to cause confusion: Trade Marks Act, 1999, S.11 (Para 21).

Case Title: Karan Rathore Vs Registrar of Trade Marks:17.01.2026:C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 23/2024:2026:DHC:422: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

GM Modular Pvt. Ltd. Vs Mumtaz Ahmed

Introduction: Delhi High Court's judgment in GM Modular Pvt. Ltd. versus Mumtaz Ahmed and Another exemplifies the judiciary's commitment to upholding the rights of prior users and maintainers of goodwill in trademark disputes, particularly when subsequent registrations appear to exploit established brands without justification.

This case revolves around a rectification petition under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, where the petitioner sought the cancellation or removal of the respondent's trademark 'GMW' in Class 11, arguing it was deceptively similar to their own 'GM' marks used since 1999 in the electrical goods sector. The court, presiding over an ex-parte proceeding due to the respondent's non-appearance, emphasized the overriding principle that prior adoption and continuous use, backed by substantial goodwill evidenced through sales and registrations, prevail over later registrations that could lead to confusion or passing off.

By directing the removal of the impugned mark, the judgment reinforces the sanctity of the trademark register, preventing entries that undermine bona fide proprietors' rights and highlighting the importance of honest adoption in competitive industries like electrical appliances. This decision not only builds on precedents but also serves as a cautionary tale for entities attempting to capitalize on similar marks in allied goods, underscoring the balance between registration benefits and common law protections in Indian trademark law.

Factual Background: The petitioner, GM Modular Pvt. Ltd., is a prominent player in the manufacturing and trading of a diverse array of electrical goods, including switches, accessories, appliances, electronic components, and related services, collectively referred to as the petitioner's goods and services. They adopted the trademark 'GM' in 1999 with bona fide intent and have since used it honestly, continuously, commercially, openly, exclusively, and uninterruptedly as the proprietor thereof, building substantial trade value, goodwill, and reputation.

This mark has been incorporated into various forms such as 'GM INDIA' and device marks, extensively traded across major parts of India. To protect their interests, the petitioner secured multiple registrations across classes, including Class 6 , 7 for 'GM INDIA' and 'GM' in Class 9, 11 etc .Additionally, the artistic work in the 'GM' mark is an original creation owned by the petitioner under the Copyright Act, 1957, registered as No. A-64280/2003, and actively used in trade. Significant investments in promotion and marketing have made 'GM' synonymous with the petitioner's identity, generating exclusive goodwill as demonstrated by escalating sales figures. In contrast, Respondent No. 1, operating as Grand Metal Works, engages in selling electric fans, blowers, heaters, and accessories. During a routine online survey of the Trade Marks Registry in the third week of August 2024, the petitioner's attorney discovered the impugned trademark 'GMW' registered under No. 1978669 in Class 11 on 11.06.2010, claiming use since 01.04.2007 for identical or similar goods. The petitioner alleged dishonest adoption by the respondent, citing deceptive similarity in phonetic, visual, structural, conceptual, and essential features, with goods being allied and cognate, potentially causing confusion. Reference was made to a prior Delhi High Court decision in GM Modular Pvt. Ltd. v. Mayur Electromeck Pvt. Ltd. (Neutral Citation: 2024:DHC:2411), where a similar 'GMW' mark in Class 9 was ordered removed, strengthening the case for cancellation here as the impugned mark wrongly remained on the register.

Procedural Background:The rectification petition was filed under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking cancellation or removal of the impugned 'GMW' mark. Notice was issued on 11.09.2024, granting respondents four weeks to file replies. On 06.12.2024, the court noted the petitioner's affidavit of service indicating Respondent No. 1 had been served, yet no appearance was made. Subsequently, on 16.04.2025, service was directed through the trademark agent who filed the impugned application. Despite this, Respondent No. 1 failed to appear on 13.08.2025, leading to an ex-parte order against them. The petitioner's counsel presented submissions on 26.11.2025, after which judgment was reserved, culminating in the final decision on 17.01.2026. Respondent No. 2, the Registrar of Trade Marks, appeared through counsel and agreed to comply with court directions as a formal party.

Reasoning and Decision of Court: The court's analysis commenced by noting the absence of any reply or appearance from Respondent No. 1, deeming the petition's averments uncontroverted and admitted. It scrutinized the evidence establishing the petitioner as the prior adopter and user of the 'GM' marks since 1999, coined honestly and integrated into their business for electrical goods and services, supported by registrations and invoices predating the respondent's claimed use from 2007.

The substantial goodwill was affirmed through impressive sales data, reaching over ₹1372 crores in FY 2020-21, indicating strong market association with the petitioner. The impugned 'GMW' mark, registered in 2010 for similar Class 11 goods like fans and heaters, was found to be an attempt to freeride on this goodwill without explanation, violating principles of honest adoption.

Relying on settled law that prior users' rights supersede subsequent registrations, even if registered, the court highlighted the petitioner's categorical proof of earlier use via documents, contrasting with the respondent's later claim. Continuous, uninterrupted use further solidified the 'GM' marks' association exclusively with the petitioner. The marks were deemed identical or deceptively similar for identical goods, undermining the register's integrity and necessitating protection for bona fide owners. Citing the prior rectification in a related case for 'GMW' in Class 9, the court found the entry wrongful, warranting removal under Section 57 to prevent confusion and maintain purity. In conclusion, considering prior use, mark identity, goods similarity, confusion likelihood, and lack of bona fide intent by the respondent, the petition was allowed, directing Respondent No. 2 to remove 'GMW' under No. 1978669 from the register, disposing of the petition and application, with a copy sent to the registry for compliance.

Point of Law Settled in the Case: This judgment reaffirms that in trademark rectification proceedings under Section 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the rights of a prior adopter and continuous user, substantiated by registrations, invoices, and escalating sales figures demonstrating goodwill, will prevail over a subsequent registered mark that is deceptively similar and adopted without bona fide intent, even in ex-parte scenarios where averments remain uncontroverted. It underscores that prior use overrides registration, as established in precedents, emphasizing that dishonest adoption for identical or allied goods in sectors like electrical appliances warrants cancellation to preserve the register's sanctity and prevent confusion or passing off. Furthermore, it highlights the evidential weight of financial data and prior judicial decisions in related marks to prove freeriding on reputation, ensuring protection for established brands against later entrants lacking justification.

Title: GM Modular Pvt. Ltd. vs Mumtaz Ahmed & Anr. Date of Order: 17.01.2026 Case Number: C.O. (COMM.IPD-TM) 176/2024 Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:408 Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Alkem Laboratories Limited Vs Prevego Healthcare and Research Pvt Ltd

Alkem Laboratories Limited, established in 1973 and a major player in pharmaceuticals and nutraceuticals, adopted the coined marks 'A TO Z' in 1998 and 'A TO Z-NS' in 2008 for multivitamin supplements, claiming extensive use, sales over Rs. 34,000 lakhs in 2023-24, and registrations in Classes 5, 29, and 30, along with copyright in the stylized 'AZ' logo and trade dresses. 

In December 2024, it discovered Prevego Healthcare and Research Pvt Ltd, founded in 2018 with over 1,500 products, using 'MULTIVEIN AZ' since August 2020 for similar nutraceuticals, prompting a cease-and-desist notice met with denial of similarity. 

Plaintiff filed suit for trademark infringement, copyright violation, and passing off, securing ex parte interim injunction on January 30, 2025, restraining Defendant's use; Defendant sought vacation via IA 6055/2025.

 Court reasoned that 'A TO Z' is descriptive and generic for multivitamins symbolizing completeness without secondary meaning, no monopoly on 'A' and 'Z'.

Marks not deceptively similar when viewed holistically under anti-dissection rule due to differences in structure, phonetics, colors, and addition of 'MULTIVEIN', no copyright infringement as styles distinct, and Plaintiff concealed material facts like opposed and abandoned applications disentitling equitable relief. Consequently, interim injunction application dismissed and ex parte order vacated.

Law Point:

Generic, descriptive, and commonly used expressions like 'A TO Z' are publici juris, incapable of distinctiveness or monopoly without secondary meaning:  (Para 13-15).

Rival marks must be compared as a whole without dissection, considering overall impression including appearance, structure, and commercial impact: Pernod Ricard India (supra) (Para 17,22).

Device marks protect specific visual representation, not underlying words or letters in isolation: (Para 21).

Concealment of material facts, such as opposed trademark applications, disentitles plaintiff to equitable relief like interim injunction: (Para 26).

No copyright infringement where common elements like letters 'A' and 'Z' are stylized differently and overall impression distinct: (Para 27).

Case Title: Alkem Laboratories Vs Prevego Healthcare:17.01.2026:CS(COMM) 84/2025:2026:DHC:411: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tejas Karia

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

Vishal Choudhary Vs. SNPC Machines-DB

SNPC Machines Private Limited, holding four patents for innovative mobile brick-making machines that automate the process by eliminating manual labor through a mechanism where the machine moves on the ground, fills dies on a roller with raw material from a hopper, molds bricks, and lays them automatically, filed a suit for permanent injunction against Vishal Chaudhary for infringing these patents by manufacturing and selling similar machines under the name 'Padma'.

Along with the suit, SNPC sought temporary injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC, which the Single Judge granted on 05.03.2024, restraining Chaudhary from using, making, or selling the machines.

Chaudhary appealed, arguing lack of territorial jurisdiction in Delhi High Court (as his operations are in Haridwar and the alleged sale was a trap), significant differences in design (e.g., his machine requires attachment to a tractor for mobility via kinetic energy, lacks a cabin and steered wheels, and needs manual control), improper application of pith and marrow doctrine instead of all elements rule, failure to apply doctrine of equivalents' FWR test, and imbalance in prima facie case, convenience, and irreparable harm.

The Division Bench rejected the jurisdiction challenge, holding that an offer for sale in Delhi suffices for injunction suits, even if not fructified.

On merits, it reasoned that the pith and marrow of SNPC's invention is the mobility-integrated assembly for automated brick-making without manual handling, and Chaudhary's variations (e.g., using a tractor instead of integrated cabin/motor) are non-essential, amounting to infringement under pith and marrow, though it deferred detailed analysis of doctrines like all elements rule or equivalents to trial to avoid prejudicing the suit.

It found the Single Judge's view reasonable and not perverse, with balance of convenience favoring SNPC to protect patent rights and goodwill, as Chaudhary's losses could be compensated monetarily if the suit fails. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the injunction.

Law Point:

• For maintaining a suit for injunction in patent infringement cases, an offer for sale or quotation within the court's territorial jurisdiction, even if not resulting in an actual transaction, is sufficient to invoke jurisdiction, as injunction is prohibitive relief not requiring a concluded sale: Para 47-49.
• The essence or pith and marrow of a patented invention (here, mobility in brick-making machines to automate processes and reduce labor) must be assessed for infringement; non-essential variations like replacing integrated mobility (cabin, steered wheels, motor) with attachment to a tractor do not avoid infringement: Para 37-41, 54-57.
• Third-party infringements are irrelevant in determining a defendant's liability in patent disputes: Vishal Choudhary vs. SNPC Machines Private Limited & Ors., FAO(OS) (COMM) 64/2024, Para 39.

Case Title: Vishal Choudhary Vs. SNPC Machines Private Limited:16.01.2025:FAO(OS) (COMM) 64/2024: 2026:DHC:399-DB:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dinesh Mehta and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vimal Kumar Yadav

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]

People Interactive India Pvt.Ltd. Vs Ammanamanchi Lalitha Rani

People Interactive India Private Limited, proprietor of the well-known trademark "Shaadi.com" for matrimonial and matchmaking services since 1996, filed a suit in 2015 against defendants for infringement and passing off by using the deceptively similar domain and mark "getshaadi.com" for identical services, including embedding "Shaadi.com" as meta-tags to divert over 73% of internet traffic. Despite service, defendants did not appear, leading to an ex-parte proceeding; interim injunction was granted in 2014 and confirmed in 2019.

The court reasoned that the marks are deceptively similar with "Shaadi.com" subsumed in the impugned mark, causing confusion, and defendants' dishonest adoption, bad faith use of meta-tags, and traffic diversion amounted to infringement under Sections 28-29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, passing off, and dilution, while "Shaadi.com" qualifies as a well-known mark under Section 2(1)(zg) due to extensive use, reputation, and awards.

The suit was decreed with permanent injunction restraining use, directing domain deregistration, ordering delivery up of infringing materials, and awarding costs of Rs. 25 lakhs to plaintiff, with 8% interest if unpaid within 12 weeks.

• Domain names function as business identifiers and are protectable under passing off laws even without specific legislation, as they can lead to consumer confusion: Satyam Infoway Ltd. v. Siffynet Solutions (P) Ltd., (2004) 6 SCC 145 (Para 24).
• Dishonest adoption of a mark warrants injunction regardless of delay, as mala fides vitiates the defendant's claim: Midas Hygiene Industries Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Sudhir Bhatia & Ors., (2004) 3 SCC 90 (Para 26).
• Use of another's trademark as meta-tags or keywords constitutes infringement and passing off by diverting traffic and hijacking goodwill: Observations from prior order in Suit (I) No. 622 of 2014 (Para 21-22).
• A mark qualifies as well-known under Section 2(1)(zg) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, if it has long, exclusive use, high reputation, substantial advertising, and public association transcending its field: Applied criteria from Sections 11(6)-(7) (Para 33F-G).
• In commercial suits under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, courts must award realistic, compensatory costs considering parties' conduct, including exemplary costs for dishonesty: Section 35 CPC as amended (Para 33H).

Case Title: People Interactive India Private Limited Vs Ammanamanchi Lalitha Rani:06.01.2026:Commercial IP Suit No. 225 of 2015:: 2026:BHC-OS:685: Arif S. Doctor, H. J.

[Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

[Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi]