# Sri Andal vs Sri Ambal: When Sound Speaks Louder Than Sight in Trademark Law
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## Introduction
In the world of trademarks, what you hear can be just as important as what you see. This is the central teaching of the landmark Supreme Court of India decision in K.R. Chinna Krishna Chettiar v. Shri Ambal and Co., Madras, decided on April 14, 1969. The case arose from a seemingly simple dispute between two snuff manufacturers in Madras, each claiming the right to use the name of a Hindu goddess as part of their trade identity. But beneath this simple surface lay a profound legal question: when two marks look different but sound similar, can one be said to deceive buyers into confusing it with the other? The Supreme Court answered with a firm yes, affirming that trademark protection extends to the realm of sound and not just visual appearance. This judgment has since become a foundational reference point in Indian trademark law, particularly on the doctrine of phonetic similarity, and continues to guide courts and trademark practitioners in deciding whether two competing marks are deceptively similar to each other.
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## Factual and Procedural Background
The story begins with two business entities operating in the snuff trade in Madras. The respondent, Shri Ambal and Co., was a partnership firm that had been in the snuff business for several decades. For more than half a century, this firm had been using the word "Ambal" as part of its trade identity. It held two registered trademarks. The first, registered as Trade Mark No. 126808, consisted of a label depicting the goddess Sri Ambal seated on a globe floating on water, enclosed in a circular frame, with the legend "Sri Ambal Parimala Snuff" at the top and the firm's name and address at the bottom. The second, registered as Trade Mark No. 146291, consisted simply of the expression "Sri Ambal" as a word mark.
The appellant, K.R. Chinna Krishna Chettiar, was the sole proprietor of a trading concern called Radha and Co. He too was a manufacturer and dealer in snuff, carrying on business in Madras with activities both within and outside the State. On March 10, 1958, the appellant filed Application No. 183961 for the registration of a trademark in Class 34 in respect of "snuff manufactured in Madras." His proposed mark consisted of a label with three panels. The first and third panels contained the words "Sri Andal Madras Snuff" written in Tamil, Devanagari, Telugu, and Kannada scripts. The centre panel carried a picture of the goddess Sri Andal along with the legend "Sri Andal."
Upon the filing of this application, the respondents filed a notice of opposition. Their main ground of opposition was that the proposed mark was deceptively similar to their registered trademarks, particularly because the word "Andal" was phonetically too close to their trademark word "Ambal."
The Registrar of Trade Marks, who has expert knowledge in such matters, overruled the respondents' objection. He agreed that in a composite mark, the distinctive words play an important part, and that he had to determine whether the expression "Sri Andal" was deceptively similar to "Sri Ambal." However, he concluded that the sound of "Ambal" did not so nearly resemble the sound of "Andal," despite certain letters being common to both, as to be likely to cause confusion or deception among a substantial number of persons. Accordingly, he allowed the appellant's application for registration.
The respondents carried the matter in appeal to the Madras High Court before Justice Jagadishan. The learned Single Judge reversed the Registrar's finding. He observed that it is settled law that a trademark encompasses not merely the picture, design, or symbol but also its descriptive name. He held that the words "Ambal" and "Andal" had such great phonetic similarity that they were virtually indistinguishable in sound and pronunciation. He went further to say that whether the words were uttered slowly or quickly, perfectly or imperfectly, meticulously or carelessly, and whoever uttered them, a foreigner or a native of India, whether in a noisy marketplace or in a calm and secluded area, over the phone or in person, the danger of confusion between the two phonetically allied names was imminent and unavoidable. The Single Judge accordingly allowed the appeal and dismissed the appellant's application for registration.
The appellant then filed a Letters Patent Appeal before the Divisional Bench of the Madras High Court, which too dismissed the appeal, affirming the Single Judge's reasoning. It was also concurrently found by the Registrar and both courts that the appellant had failed to prove honest concurrent use so as to bring his case within Section 12(3) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. The appellant then approached the Supreme Court of India by way of a special leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, which was granted, giving rise to Civil Appeal No. 749 of 1966.
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## The Dispute
The legal dispute at its core was about whether the appellant's proposed trademark, built around the word "Andal," was deceptively similar to the respondents' registered trademarks built around the word "Ambal," within the meaning of Section 12(1) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. Section 12(1) of that Act provides that no trademark shall be registered in respect of any goods or description of goods which is identical with or deceptively similar to a trade mark already registered in the name of a different proprietor in respect of the same goods or description of goods.
The appellant argued that "Sri Andal" and "Sri Ambal" referred to two entirely separate and distinct Hindu goddesses. Sri Andal was a Vaishnavite woman saint of Srivilliputur village, deified because of her union with Lord Ranganatha, while Sri Ambal is the consort of Shiva or Maheshwara. The appellant contended that since the two words conveyed distinctly different religious and cultural ideas, any phonetic resemblance between them was merely accidental and could not reasonably lead to confusion in the minds of consumers.
The respondents, on the other hand, argued that their customers were not all Hindus or all from South India, and that across a diverse population, the distinction between the two goddesses would not be apparent. They maintained that both words, heard by an average person with imperfect memory, sounded virtually identical, and that there was therefore a very real danger of confusion.
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## Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge
The Supreme Court judgment was delivered by Justice R.S. Bachawat, with Justices S.M. Sikri and V. Ramaswami concurring. The Court began by acknowledging that the Registrar of Trade Marks, being an expert, deserved deference, and that his decisions should not be lightly disturbed. However, both the Madras High Court, first the Single Judge and then the Divisional Bench, had found the Registrar clearly wrong. In an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution, the Court noted, the burden falls on the appellant to show that the concurrent finding of the courts below is erroneous.
The Court then moved to identify the essential and distinguishing feature of each competing mark. It noted that the word "Sri" is a common honorific prefix and is essentially a subsidiary component of the marks. The more distinctive word, the one that fixes itself in the recollection of an average buyer with imperfect memory, is "Ambal" in the respondent's mark and "Andal" in the appellant's proposed mark. This identification of the dominant feature of each mark is critical, because the comparison between marks is always made on the basis of their distinguishing features, not their subsidiary or common elements.
The Court then addressed the vital legal question: if the appellant's mark were used in a normal and fair manner in connection with snuff, and if similarly fair and normal use were assumed of the existing registered marks, would there be such a likelihood of deception that the mark ought not to be allowed to be registered? This framing of the test was drawn from In the matter of Broadhead's Application, reported at (1950) 57 R.P.C. 209, a decision that the Court found instructive. The Court found no doubt that if the proposed mark were used normally, it would come to be known by its distinguishing feature, "Andal," and that there was a striking similarity and affinity of sound between "Andal" and "Ambal."
The Court also addressed the question of visual resemblance squarely. It acknowledged that there was no visual resemblance between the two marks. But it held, in words that have since become axiomatic in Indian trademark jurisprudence, that ocular comparison is not always the decisive test and that the resemblance between two marks must be considered with reference to the ear as well as the eye. This principle firmly established that trademark protection is not purely a matter of visual design but extends to the phonetic dimension, that is, how a mark sounds when spoken.
On the absence of actual confusion in the marketplace, the Court took a pragmatic view. It noted that there was no evidence of actual confusion, but observed that this might be because the appellant's trade was not yet of long standing. The absence of evidence of actual confusion, in other words, was not conclusive in the appellant's favour, particularly when the trade under the proposed mark had not yet matured sufficiently to generate observable instances of confusion.
The Court engaged in a detailed and instructive comparison with the English Privy Council decision in Coca-Cola Company of Canada v. Pepsi Cola Company of Canada Ltd., reported at (1942) 59 R.P.C. 127. In that case, the word "cola" was found to be in common use in Canada for naming beverages, and so the distinguishing feature of "Coca Cola" was "Coca" and not "Cola," while the distinguishing feature of "Pepsi Cola" was "Pepsi" and not "Cola." Since no one would confuse "Pepsi" with "Coca," there was no deceptive similarity. The Court drew a direct analogy: just as "cola" was common, the word "Sri" is common in the present Indian context. The distinguishing feature of the respondent's mark was "Ambal" and that of the appellant's mark was "Andal," and the Court held that these two words were deceptively similar in sound. This Coca-Cola analogy remains a frequently cited illustration of how the dominant feature of a mark is isolated and then compared.
Another important authority considered was De Cordova and Others v. Vick Chemical Company, reported at (1951) 68 R.P.C. 103. In that case, Vick Chemical Company held registered trademarks for the word "Vaporub" and a composite mark incorporating the words "Vicks Vaporub Salve." The defendants had been advertising their ointment as "Karsote Vapour Rub." The Privy Council held that the defendants had infringed the registered marks. Lord Radcliffe articulated the principle that a mark is infringed by another trader if, even without using the whole of it upon or in connection with his goods, he uses one or more of its essential features. This principle was applied to reject the argument that using the word "Andal" in conjunction with a pictorial device of the goddess would somehow dilute the phonetic similarity and make confusion less likely. The Court firmly held that the name "Andal" does not cease to be deceptively similar merely because it is used alongside a pictorial device.
The Court then addressed the appellant's most creative argument: that since "Ambal" and "Andal" referred to two distinct goddesses in the Hindu religious tradition, their different meanings would prevent confusion. The appellant relied on the English case of Application by Thomas A. Smith Ltd. to Register a Trade Mark, reported at (1913) 30 R.P.C. 363, where Justice Neville had held that the words "limit" and "summit" were words in common use, each conveying a distinctly definite idea, and that therefore there was no likelihood of confusion. The appellant analogised this to argue that since "Ambal" and "Andal" represented two distinct goddesses, a well-informed Hindu consumer would not confuse one for the other.
The Supreme Court decisively rejected this argument, and its reasoning is perhaps the most socially aware and consumer-protective aspect of the judgment. The Court pointed out that the respondent's customers were not confined to Hindus alone. The respondent's snuff business extended beyond South India, and among its customers were Christians, Parsees, Muslims, and persons of other religious denominations. Many of these customers would have no idea about the theological distinction between a Vaishnavite goddess and a Shaivite deity. Moreover, even Hindu customers from outside South India might not be aware of the distinction. The customers would recall the respondent's goods by the word "Ambal," and they might have a vague recollection of the portrait of a benign goddess associated with the mark. They were not likely to remember the fine religious distinctions between the two deities. The words themselves had no direct reference to the character or quality of snuff, which further meant that consumers had no reason to investigate the precise identity of the goddess depicted. Accordingly, the argument based on distinct meanings was rejected as losing sight of the realities of the marketplace and the actual consumer base.
The Court also briefly addressed the appellant's second application, No. 212575, which sought registration of labels incorporating the expression "Radha's Sri Andal Madras Snuff." The Registrar had disposed of this application in favour of the appellant, and an appeal was pending in the High Court. The Divisional Bench had found force in the argument that there was no phonetic similarity between "Sri Ambal" and "Radha's Sri Andal." However, since the matter was pending before the High Court, the Supreme Court expressed no opinion on it, leaving the question open.
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## Final Decision of the Court
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal with costs. It affirmed the concurrent findings of both the learned Single Judge and the Divisional Bench of the Madras High Court. The appellant's application for registration of the trademark "Sri Andal" in Class 34 for snuff was refused. The Court held that there was a real danger of confusion between the two marks, that the resemblance between them had to be assessed with reference to both sight and sound, and that the phonetic affinity between "Ambal" and "Andal" rendered the proposed mark deceptively similar to the respondents' registered marks within the meaning of Section 12(1) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958.
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## Point of Law Settled in the Case
This case settled several important principles in Indian trademark law that continue to hold good today. The most significant is that the test of deceptive similarity between two trademarks is not confined to visual comparison alone. Trademark protection extends to phonetic similarity, meaning how a mark sounds when spoken, and a mark that sounds confusingly similar to a registered mark may be refused registration even if it looks visually different. The Court also settled that in assessing similarity, one must identify the dominant or distinguishing feature of each competing mark and compare those features, not the marks as a whole in an undifferentiated manner. Additionally, the Court established that the absence of evidence of actual confusion is not by itself conclusive when the trade in the proposed mark is of short standing. Further, the Court held that the distinctly different meanings of two words do not necessarily save one from being found deceptively similar to the other, particularly where the consumer base is diverse and multilingual, and the word bears no direct descriptive relationship to the goods it is associated with.
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## Case Details
**Title:** K.R. Chinna Krishna Chettiar Vs Shri Ambal and Co., Madras and Anr.
**Date of Order:** April 14, 1969
**Case Number:** Civil Appeal No. 749 of 1966
**Neutral Citation:** MANU/SC/0303/1969
**Equivalent Citations:** AIR 1970 SC 146; 1970 (1) AnWR 21; (1969) 2 SCC 131; [1970] 1 SCR 290
**Name of Court:** Supreme Court of India
**Name of Hon'ble Judges:** Justice R.S. Bachawat, Justice S.M. Sikri, and Justice V. Ramaswami
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*Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.*
**Written By:** Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi
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## Headnote
**K.R. Chinna Krishna Chettiar v. Shri Ambal and Co., Madras and Anr.** — Supreme Court of India — Civil Appeal No. 749 of 1966 — Decided April 14, 1969 — AIR 1970 SC 146
**Held:** In determining whether a proposed trademark is deceptively similar to a registered trademark under Section 12(1) of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, the test is not confined to visual comparison alone. Resemblance between two marks must be assessed with reference to the ear as well as the eye. Where the distinguishing feature of a proposed mark ("Andal") bears close phonetic affinity to the distinguishing feature of a registered mark ("Ambal"), the proposed mark may be refused registration on the ground of deceptive similarity, notwithstanding that the two words represent distinct religious figures and there is no visual resemblance between the composite labels. The absence of evidence of actual confusion is not decisive when the trade in the proposed mark is not of long standing. The diverse and multilingual character of the consumer base is a relevant factor in determining whether a distinctive meaning attached to a word saves it from being found phonetically deceptive.
