SC-Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. Vs Sanjay Dalia

Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. Vs Sanjay Dalia Case:  Territorial Jurisdiction Under Section 62 of Copyright Act and Section 134 of Trade Marks Act

Introduction

The question of where a plaintiff can sue for infringement of copyright or trademark has always carried immense practical significance for litigants across India. Parliament, recognising the hardship faced by authors and trademark owners who had to travel long distances to vindicate their rights, inserted special provisions in the Copyright Act and the Trade Marks Act allowing suits to be filed at the place where the plaintiff resides or carries on business. However, this beneficial provision came to be misused by large corporations who, despite having their principal place of business and the cause of action arising at one location, chose to file suits at distant places merely because they maintained a branch office there. This judgment of the Supreme Court addresses this precise mischief and lays down an important interpretative principle balancing the convenience of the plaintiff with the need to avoid undue hardship to the defendant.

Factual and Procedural Background

The case arose out of a batch of appeals dealing with a common question of law relating to the interpretation of Section 62 of the Copyright Act, 1957 and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, particularly with regard to the place where a suit for infringement can be instituted.

In the lead matter, the plaintiff had filed a suit seeking to restrain the defendant from infringing its rights without obtaining a licence. The defendant owned cinema halls in Maharashtra and Mumbai, and the entire cause of action, as pleaded, had arisen in Mumbai. Despite this, the suit was filed in the High Court of Delhi on the ground that the plaintiff had a branch office in Delhi and carried on business there. It was not disputed that the plaintiff's head office was situated in Mumbai. The defendant objected to the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi court, and this objection was upheld both by the Single Judge and later by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, which held that the suit ought to have been filed at Mumbai. This order was challenged before the Supreme Court.

In a connected matter, a suit had been filed concerning infringement of a trademark relating to a well known magazine. The registered office of the concerned entity was in Mumbai, where the magazine was also processed and published. The plaintiff sought to invoke the jurisdiction of the Delhi court on the ground that it had a branch office in Delhi, and later sought amendment of the plaint to strengthen this plea. The amendment application was rejected by the Single Judge, but the Division Bench allowed the amendment, giving rise to a further appeal before the Supreme Court.

Given the recurring nature of this jurisdictional controversy and the divergent approaches taken by different High Courts over the years, the Supreme Court took up the appeals together to settle the correct interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions.

Dispute Before the Court

The core question before the Court was whether Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act and Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, both of which permit a plaintiff to file a suit at the place where he resides or carries on business, could be read to allow a plaintiff to choose a distant forum such as a branch office location, even when the cause of action had wholly or partly arisen at the plaintiff's principal place of business or ordinary residence.

The appellants argued that these provisions, being non obstante clauses beginning with the words notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, created an unqualified additional right in favour of the plaintiff to sue at any place where it resided or carried on business, regardless of where the cause of action arose. According to this view, the restrictions found in Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 had no application once the special provisions of the Copyright Act and Trade Marks Act were invoked.

The respondents, on the other hand, contended that such an interpretation would open the door to abuse, particularly by large corporations and multinational entities having offices in multiple cities, who could drag defendants to inconvenient and unconnected places merely by citing a branch office, even though neither the cause of action nor the principal business had any connection with that place. They argued that the provisions were intended to remove hardship for the plaintiff, not to create a tool for harassing defendants.

In simple terms, the dispute was about whether a company having its head office and the entire cause of action in one city could nevertheless drag the defendant to litigate in a completely different city merely because it maintained a subordinate office there.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

The Court began by examining the scheme of Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, which ordinarily governs territorial jurisdiction. Under clauses (a) to (c) of Section 20, a suit can be filed where the defendant resides or carries on business, or where the cause of action wholly or in part arises. The Explanation to Section 20 clarifies that a corporation is deemed to carry on business at its principal office, or in respect of any cause of action arising at a place where it has a subordinate office, at such place as well. The Court explained that this Explanation was intended to prevent a corporation having a subordinate office at the place where the cause of action arises from escaping suit there, but it was never meant to allow a plaintiff to drag a defendant to a place having no connection with the cause of action.

The Court then traced the legislative history behind the insertion of Section 62(2) in the Copyright Act. Reference was made to the report of the Joint Committee of the Houses, which had noted that many authors were deterred from instituting infringement proceedings because the court having jurisdiction was often located far away from their ordinary residence. This impediment was sought to be removed by allowing suits to be filed at the place where the author or copyright owner ordinarily resided or carried on business. The Court also referred to relevant portions of the Parliamentary debates on the Copyright Act, where it was clarified that the purpose of the provision was to spare the injured party the burden of travelling to distant courts, and not to enable the plaintiff to drag the infringer to an inconvenient forum having no connection with the dispute.

Applying this legislative purpose, the Court held that the words notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure did not oust the applicability of Section 20 CPC altogether. Rather, these provisions provided an additional forum to the plaintiff, over and above what was already available under Section 20 CPC. Where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises at the place where the plaintiff resides or carries on business, the suit has to be filed at that place. The plaintiff cannot ignore the fact that the cause of action has arisen at its principal place of business and instead choose to file the suit at a subordinate or branch office located elsewhere, merely because such a branch office exists.

The Court extensively invoked the mischief rule laid down in Heydon's case, (1584) 3 Co Rep 7a, which requires courts to consider four aspects while interpreting a statute, namely, what was the law before the enactment, what was the defect or mischief for which the previous law did not provide, what remedy the legislature has resolved to cure the defect, and the true reason for the remedy. Applying this framework, the Court held that the mischief which Section 62 of the Copyright Act and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act sought to remedy was the hardship caused to authors and trademark owners who had to travel to distant places to file suits despite residing or carrying on business elsewhere. The remedy provided was to allow them to sue at their own place of residence or business. However, if this remedy were interpreted so widely as to permit the plaintiff to choose any place where it merely had a branch office, even when unconnected with the cause of action, it would create a fresh mischief of its own, namely enabling harassment of defendants by dragging them to inconvenient and unconnected forums. The Court therefore emphasised the need to avoid such counter mischief while interpreting these provisions purposively.

Several precedents were considered in detail. In Patel Roadways Ltd. v. Prasad Trading Co., (1991) 4 SCC 270, the Court had earlier interpreted the Explanation to Section 20 CPC and held that where a corporation has a subordinate office at the place where the cause of action arises, it cannot escape being sued there merely because its principal office is located elsewhere, and further clarified that the sole or principal office continues to be the relevant place for filing suit unless a cause of action arises at the place of a subordinate office. This decision was relied upon to explain the true scope of the term corporation and principal place of business. Similarly, in New Moga Transport Co. v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2004) 4 SCC 677, the Court reiterated that the Explanation to Section 20 CPC applies to prevent a corporation from claiming that it cannot be sued where its subordinate office is located, if the cause of action arose there.

The Court also examined its earlier decision in Exphar Sa v. Eupharma Laboratories Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC 688, where it had been held that the word include in Section 62 of the Copyright Act shows that the jurisdiction under this provision is wider than that prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure. The present judgment clarified that this earlier decision did not oust the applicability of Section 20 CPC, but merely recognised that Section 62 provided an additional ground for jurisdiction, and that the decision in Exphar Sa in fact supported rather than contradicted the interpretation now being adopted.

Reference was made to Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi, (2006) 9 SCC 41, where the Court had considered the maintainability of a composite suit combining causes of action under the Copyright Act and the erstwhile Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, and had held that the additional forum under Section 62(2) was intended to enable an author to file a suit at a place where he might not otherwise be in a position to sue. The Court in the present case clarified that the specific question involved in the present appeals had not arisen for consideration in Dhodha House, and that a decision is not to be construed like a statute; it cannot be assumed that a previous decision has also decided a question which was never raised before it. The Court also referred to its decision in Dabur India Ltd. v. K.R. Industries, (2008) 10 SCC 595, which had held that a composite suit combining different causes of action cannot confer jurisdiction on a court which does not otherwise possess territorial jurisdiction in respect of one of the causes of action.

The Court further discussed various High Court decisions cited by the parties, including Smithkline Beecham Plc. v. Sunil Singh, Caterpillar Inc. v. Kailash Nichani, Intas Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Allergan Inc., Ford Motor Co. v. C.R. Borman, Sap Aktiengesellschaft v. Varehouse Infotech, Wipro Ltd. v. Oushadha Chandrika Ayurvedic India (P) Ltd., Hindustan Unilever Ltd. v. Ashique Chemicals, and Ultra Tech Cement Ltd. v. Shree Balaji Cement Industries, and explained that the facts and precise questions involved in the present appeals had not arisen for determination in any of these decisions, and that observations in these cases, to the extent inconsistent with the present ruling, could not be treated as binding.

On the question of Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, the Court clarified that sub-section (2) of Section 134 applies only to clauses (a) and (b) of Section 134(1), which deal with infringement of a registered trademark and any right relating thereto. It does not extend to clause (c), which deals with actions for passing off. Consequently, the procedure for instituting a suit in respect of passing off continues to be governed exclusively by Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, and the additional forum under Section 134(2) is not available for such actions. The Court also held that the provisions of Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act and Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act are in pari materia with each other, meaning they deal with the same subject matter and are to be interpreted consistently.

The Court also addressed and rejected the argument that since litigation relating to intellectual property is predominantly filed in Delhi, and lawyers practising there have developed particular expertise in such matters, this convenience should be a relevant factor while deciding territorial jurisdiction. The Court held firmly that the convenience or expertise of lawyers at a particular place is wholly irrelevant for determining territorial jurisdiction, and jurisdiction cannot be founded on such considerations.

Throughout its reasoning, the Court relied upon well established principles of statutory interpretation, including the need to avoid constructions leading to hardship, inconvenience, injustice, absurdity or anomaly, drawing upon the writings of Justice G.P. Singh in Interpretation of Statutes and Bennion on Statutory Interpretation, as well as a long line of English and Indian precedents dealing with purposive construction, including Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661, and Sonic Surgical v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2010) 1 SCC 135, the latter having interpreted a similarly worded provision in the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 to restrict the meaning of branch office to the branch office where the cause of action actually arose, in order to avoid absurd consequences.

Final Decision of the Court

Having examined the language, legislative history, and object of the provisions in question, the Court concluded that where the cause of action has wholly or partly arisen at the place where the plaintiff resides or carries on business or personally works for gain, and where the plaintiff also has its principal office at that very place, the suit has to be instituted at that place alone, and not at any other place merely because the plaintiff happens to have a subordinate or branch office there. The plaintiff cannot invoke the additional forum created by these special provisions to bypass the place where its principal business and the cause of action are both located, in favour of a distant subordinate office.

Applying this principle to the facts before it, the Court found that the principal place of business of the appellant was admittedly in Mumbai, and the cause of action had also arisen in Mumbai. The provisions of Section 62 of the Copyright Act and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act could not, therefore, be interpreted so as to confer jurisdiction on the Delhi court merely because the appellant maintained a branch office there. The Delhi court accordingly had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

The Court declined the request to transfer the suit to Delhi, holding that no such transfer could be ordered in the present proceedings, and that if the parties so desired, they were free to file an appropriate application, but the suit would first have to be presented before the court of competent jurisdiction. The submission that the matter should be referred to a larger Bench, on the ground that the earlier decision in Dhodha House held the field, was also rejected, since the Court found that the specific question involved in the present appeals had not been considered in that earlier decision. Ultimately, all the appeals were dismissed, and the orders passed by the High Court were upheld, with no order as to costs.

Point of Law Settled

This judgment settles the important principle that the additional forum created under Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act and Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act is not an unqualified or absolute right allowing a plaintiff to sue anywhere it maintains an office. Where the plaintiff's principal place of business or ordinary residence coincides with the place where the cause of action has wholly or partly arisen, the suit must be filed at that place, and the plaintiff cannot invoke a distant subordinate or branch office to confer jurisdiction elsewhere. The provisions are meant to spare the plaintiff the hardship of travelling to a distant forum, not to create a tool for dragging the defendant to an inconvenient and unconnected place. This ruling has significantly shaped subsequent trademark and copyright litigation strategy across India, particularly curbing the earlier practice of large corporations routinely filing infringement suits in Delhi merely on the strength of a branch office, regardless of where their principal business and the actual cause of action were located.

Title of the Case: Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia and Another

Date of Judgment: July 1, 2015

Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 10643-44 of 2010 with Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 8253 of 2013 (with Civil Appeal No. 4912 of 2015)

Neutral Citation: (2015) 10 Supreme Court Cases 161

Name of Court: Supreme Court of India

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Jagdish Singh Khehar and Arun Mishra, JJ.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Headnote of the Judgment

In Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia, (2015) 10 SCC 161, the Supreme Court examined the territorial jurisdiction for suits under Section 62 of the Copyright Act, 1957 and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The plaintiff's principal office and the cause of action were both in Mumbai, yet suits were filed in Delhi citing a branch office there. Dismissing the appeals, the Court held that where the plaintiff's principal place of business and the cause of action coincide at one place, the suit must be filed there, and cannot be shifted to a distant subordinate office. The additional forum under these provisions supplements, but does not oust, Section 20 CPC, and must be construed purposively to prevent counter mischief to defendants.

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SC-Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. Vs Sanjay Dalia

Introduction

The case of Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. vs Sanjay Dalia and Ors. is a landmark judgment by the Supreme Court of India, delivered on 1 July 2015, addressing the interpretation of jurisdictional provisions under Section 62 of the Copyright Act, 1957, and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The central issue was whether a plaintiff, particularly a corporation, could institute a suit for infringement of copyright or trademark at a place where it has a branch office but where no cause of action has arisen, bypassing the place where its principal office is located and the cause of action has occurred. The Supreme Court, through a bench comprising Justices J.S. Khehar and Arun Mishra, clarified that while these provisions provide an additional forum for plaintiffs to file suits where they reside or carry on business, this right is not absolute and must be exercised at the place where the cause of action arises if the plaintiff’s principal office is also located there. This case is significant for its purposive interpretation of statutory provisions, balancing the convenience of plaintiffs with the prevention of hardship to defendants, and for reinforcing the principles of territorial jurisdiction in intellectual property disputes. The judgment curtails potential abuse by corporations with multiple branch offices, ensuring that suits are not filed in distant or unconnected jurisdictions to harass defendants.

Detailed Factual Background

The Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. (IPRS), the appellant in Civil Appeal Nos. 10643-10644/2010, is a copyright society representing authors and owners of musical and literary works. IPRS filed a suit (FAO (OS) No. 359/2007) in the Delhi High Court against Sanjay Dalia and others, seeking to prevent infringement of its copyright by the defendants, who operated cinema halls in Maharashtra and Mumbai. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants were infringing its rights by using copyrighted works without a license. The entire cause of action, as per the plaint, arose in Mumbai, where the alleged infringement occurred. IPRS, however, chose to file the suit in Delhi, invoking jurisdiction under Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, on the ground that it had a branch office in Delhi and was carrying on business there. Notably, IPRS’s head office was undisputedly located in Mumbai, the same place where the cause of action arose. The defendants objected to the Delhi High Court’s territorial jurisdiction, arguing that the suit should have been filed in Mumbai, where both the cause of action and the plaintiff’s principal office were situated.

In a related matter, Civil Appeal arising out of SLP [C] No. 8253/2013 (Advance Magazine Publishers Inc. and Anr. vs Just Lifestyle Pvt. Ltd.), the plaintiff, Advance Magazine Publishers Inc., publisher of “Vogue India,” filed a trademark infringement suit in the Delhi High Court. The registered office of Vogue India was in Mumbai, where the magazine was processed and published, and the cause of action (infringement) also arose in Mumbai. The plaintiff sought to invoke jurisdiction under Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, claiming it had a branch office in Delhi. To bolster its claim, the plaintiff applied to amend the plaint under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), asserting that the magazine was sold and circulated in Delhi, thus conferring jurisdiction. The Delhi High Court’s Single Bench rejected the amendment, holding that even if allowed, it would not confer jurisdiction since no cause of action arose in Delhi. The Division Bench, however, allowed the amendment, prompting the defendants to appeal to the Supreme Court. In both cases, the plaintiffs relied on the statutory provisions allowing suits to be filed where they carry on business, while the defendants argued that such provisions should not permit suits in jurisdictions unconnected to the cause of action, especially when the plaintiff’s principal office and the cause of action coincided elsewhere.

Detailed Procedural Background

In Civil Appeal Nos. 10643-10644/2010, IPRS instituted the suit (FAO (OS) No. 359/2007) in the Delhi High Court, seeking an injunction against the defendants for copyright infringement. The defendants raised a preliminary objection regarding the court’s territorial jurisdiction, arguing that the suit should be filed in Mumbai, where the cause of action arose and IPRS’s head office was located. The Single Bench of the Delhi High Court upheld the objection, finding that the Delhi court lacked jurisdiction since no part of the cause of action arose in Delhi, and the plaintiff’s head office was in Mumbai. The Division Bench affirmed this decision, dismissing IPRS’s appeal and directing the suit to be filed in Mumbai. Aggrieved, IPRS appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the High Court’s interpretation of Section 62 of the Copyright Act.

In the Advance Magazine case, the plaintiff filed a trademark infringement suit in the Delhi High Court and sought to amend the plaint to include averments that the magazine’s circulation in Delhi conferred jurisdiction. The Single Bench rejected the amendment application, holding that the amended pleadings would not establish jurisdiction, as the cause of action arose in Mumbai, where the plaintiff’s registered office was located. The Division Bench reversed this decision, allowing the amendment, which led the defendants to file a Special Leave Petition (SLP [C] No. 8253/2013) before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted leave in the SLP, consolidating it with IPRS’s appeals for a common hearing. Both cases were argued extensively, with the appellants represented by Senior Advocates T.R. Andhiarujina and Sudhir Chandra, and the respondents by advocates including Ankur Saigal and Mahesh Agarwal. The Supreme Court pronounced its judgment on 1 July 2015, dismissing all appeals and upholding the Delhi High Court’s decision in the IPRS case while reversing the Division Bench’s order in the Advance Magazine case.

Issues Involved in the Case

The primary issue was the interpretation of Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957, and Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, regarding the jurisdiction where a plaintiff can institute a suit for infringement. Specifically, the court examined whether a plaintiff, particularly a corporation, can file a suit at a place where it has a branch office but no cause of action has arisen, when its principal office is located at the place where the cause of action has occurred. Ancillary issues included whether the non-obstante clause in these provisions completely ousts the applicability of Section 20 of the CPC, which governs jurisdiction based on the defendant’s residence or the place where the cause of action arises; whether the plaintiff’s convenience should override considerations of hardship to the defendant; whether the provisions allow plaintiffs to file suits at any place where they have a subordinate office, regardless of the cause of action; and whether the court should adopt a purposive interpretation to prevent abuse of these provisions by multinational corporations dragging defendants to distant jurisdictions.

Detailed Submission of Parties

The appellants, represented by Senior Advocate T.R. Andhiarujina in the Advance Magazine case and Senior Advocate Sudhir Chandra in the IPRS case, argued that Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act and Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act confer a special right on plaintiffs to file suits where they reside or carry on business, independent of the cause of action. They emphasized the non-obstante clause, which overrides Section 20 of the CPC and other laws, asserting that the plaintiff’s choice of forum should not be restricted by the cause of action or the defendant’s convenience. The appellants contended that the Delhi High Court’s interpretation undermined the legislative intent to provide authors and trademark owners with a convenient forum, as evidenced by the Parliamentary Debates and the Joint Committee Report for the Copyright Act. They relied on Exphar SA vs Eupharma Laboratories Ltd. (2004 (3) SCC 688), arguing that it recognized the wider jurisdiction under Section 62, and claimed that the High Court ignored this precedent. Other cases cited included Dhodha House vs S.K. Maingi (2006 (9) SCC 41), Dabur India Ltd. vs K.R. Industries (2008 (10) SCC 595), and Delhi High Court decisions like Smithkline Beecham vs Sunil Singhi (2000 (1) PTC 321 (Del.)), Caterpillar Inc. vs Kailash Nichani (2002 (24) PTC 405 (Del.)), and Intas Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs Allergan Inc. (132 (2006) DLT 641), which they argued supported filing suits where the plaintiff carries on business, regardless of the cause of action. The appellants further submitted that the provisions are unambiguous, and applying Heydon’s mischief rule or reading in Section 20’s requirements would amount to judicial overreach. They argued that the long-standing interpretation favoring plaintiffs should not be unsettled, and if a different view was to be taken, the matter should be referred to a larger bench.

The respondents, represented by advocates including Ankur Saigal, countered that allowing plaintiffs to file suits at any branch office, irrespective of the cause of action, would enable multinational corporations to harass defendants by dragging them to distant jurisdictions. They argued that the object of Section 62 and Section 134 was to alleviate the hardship faced by individual authors or trademark owners, not to empower corporations to misuse their branch office networks. The respondents invoked Heydon’s mischief rule, urging the court to interpret the provisions to prevent the mischief of harassing defendants while advancing the remedy for plaintiffs. They relied on Patel Roadways Ltd. vs Prasad Trading Co. (1991 (4) SCC 270), which clarified that a corporation is deemed to carry on business at its principal office or where a subordinate office exists and the cause of action arises. The respondents emphasized public policy and the need to avoid absurdity, arguing that permitting suits in unconnected jurisdictions would lead to disproportionate counter-mischief. They distinguished the appellants’ cases, noting that in Exphar SA and others, jurisdiction was upheld due to specific averments tying the cause of action to the chosen forum, unlike the present cases where no cause of action arose in Delhi. The respondents also argued that the plaintiffs’ head offices being in Mumbai, where the cause of action arose, made Delhi an inappropriate forum, and the provisions should not be interpreted to facilitate forum shopping.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by Parties and Their Context

The Supreme Court considered a plethora of judgments cited by both parties to resolve the jurisdictional issue:

1. Exphar SA vs Eupharma Laboratories Ltd., MANU/SC/0148/2004 : 2004 (3) SCC 688: Cited by the appellants, this Supreme Court case held that Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act provides a wider jurisdiction than Section 20 of the CPC, allowing suits where the plaintiff resides or carries on business. The court noted that the Delhi court had jurisdiction because the plaintiff had a registered office in Delhi and a cease-and-desist notice was received there. The Supreme Court in the present case clarified that Exphar SA supports its view, as it recognized Section 62 as an additional ground, not an ouster of Section 20’s principles.
2. Dhodha House vs S.K. Maingi, MANU/SC/2524/2005 : 2006 (9) SCC 41: Cited by the appellants, this Supreme Court case addressed the maintainability of composite suits under the Copyright Act and the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. It observed that Section 62(2) provides an additional forum to enable authors to file suits where they reside, but the precise issue of jurisdiction when the cause of action and principal office coincide was not considered. The court held that this case did not conflict with its interpretation.
3. Dabur India Ltd. vs K.R. Industries, MANU/SC/2244/2008 : 2008 (10) SCC 595: Cited by the appellants, this Supreme Court case held that a composite suit for copyright infringement and passing off cannot be filed in a court lacking jurisdiction over one of the causes of action. It recognized Section 62(2)’s wider jurisdiction but emphasized that courts cannot entertain suits without territorial jurisdiction. The court found this case unhelpful to the appellants, as it underscored the need for jurisdictional competence.
4. Smithkline Beecham vs Sunil Singhi, 2000 (1) PTC 321 (Del.): Cited by the appellants, this Delhi High Court decision upheld jurisdiction in Delhi because the plaintiff’s registered office was there. The court noted that the issue of cause of action was not raised, making it inapplicable to the present facts.
5. Caterpillar Inc. vs Kailash Nichani, MANU/DE/2052/2001 : 2002 (24) PTC 405 (Del.): Cited by the appellants, this Delhi High Court case observed that Section 62 departs from the norm of defendant-centric jurisdiction. The Supreme Court found it irrelevant, as it did not address the specific issue of principal office and cause of action alignment.
6. Intas Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs Allergan Inc., MANU/DE/9188/2006 : 132 (2006) DLT 641: Cited by the appellants, this Delhi High Court case upheld jurisdiction under Section 20(c) of the CPC because the defendant sold the infringing product in Delhi. The Supreme Court distinguished it, as the present cases involved no cause of action in Delhi.
7. Patel Roadways Ltd. vs Prasad Trading Co., MANU/SC/0280/1992 : 1991 (4) SCC 270: Cited by the respondents, this Supreme Court case interpreted Section 20’s Explanation, holding that a corporation is deemed to carry on business at its principal office or where a subordinate office exists and the cause of action arises. The court relied heavily on this to link the cause of action with the place of business.
8. New Moga Transport Co. vs United India Insurance Co. Ltd., MANU/SC/0398/2004 : 2004 (4) SCC 677: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case reinforced Patel Roadways, clarifying that a corporation can be sued where it has a subordinate office and the cause of action arises, aligning with the respondents’ argument.
9. Jones vs Scottish Accident Insurance Co., (1886) 17 QBD 421: Cited by the court, this UK case established that a company’s principal place of business is its domicile, supporting the view that jurisdiction should prioritize the principal office.
10. Watkins vs Scottish Imperial Insurance Co., (1889) 23 QBD 285: Cited by the court, this UK case held that a company’s registered office is its principal place of business, reinforcing the jurisdictional focus on the principal office.
11. Peoples’ Insurance Co. vs Benoy Bhushan, AIR 1943 Cal. 190: Cited by the court, this Calcutta High Court case allowed suits against a company where it has a subordinate office and the cause of action arises, supporting the respondents’ position.
12. Home Insurance Co. vs Jagatjit Sugar Mills Co., MANU/PH/0051/1952 : AIR 1952 Punj. 142: Cited by the court, this Punjab High Court case aligned with Peoples’ Insurance, emphasizing jurisdiction at the place of a subordinate office tied to the cause of action.
13. Prag Oil Mils Depot vs Transport Corpn. of India, MANU/OR/0046/1978 : AIR 1978 Ori. 167: Cited by the court, this Orissa High Court case followed the same principle, reinforcing the respondents’ argument.
14. Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association vs Union of India, MANU/SC/0827/2000 : AIR 2001 SC 416: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case affirmed that a plaintiff can file a suit where the cause of action arises, supporting the linkage of jurisdiction to the cause of action.
15. Heydon’s Case, 76 ER 637: Cited by both parties, this classic English case established the mischief rule, which the respondents relied on to argue that the provisions should be interpreted to prevent the mischief of harassing defendants. The court applied this rule to advance the remedy for plaintiffs while avoiding counter-mischief.
16. Kanailal Sur vs Paramnidhi Sadhukhan, MANU/SC/0097/1957 : AIR 1957 SC 907: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case endorsed Heydon’s rule, guiding the purposive interpretation of the provisions.
17. Anderton vs Ryan, [1985] 2 All ER 355: Cited by the court, this UK case referred to Heydon’s rule as purposive construction, supporting the respondents’ interpretive approach.
18. Bengal Immunity Co. vs State of Bihar, MANU/SC/0083/1955 : AIR 1955 SC 661: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case quoted Heydon’s rule, reinforcing its application to suppress mischief and advance the remedy.
19. Hiralal Rattanlal vs State of U.P., MANU/SC/0553/1972 : 1973 (1) SCC 216: Cited by the appellants, this Supreme Court case held that unambiguous provisions do not require the mischief rule. The court countered that when two interpretations are possible, the one advancing the statute’s object should be adopted.
20. Padmasundara Rao vs State of Tamil Nadu, MANU/SC/0182/2002 : AIR 2002 SC 1334: Cited by the appellants, this Supreme Court case emphasized legislative intent from the statute’s words. The court agreed but found the object favored its interpretation.
21. Grasim Industries Ltd. vs Collector of Customs, Bombay, MANU/SC/0256/2002 : 2002 (4) SCC 297: Cited by the appellants, this Supreme Court case reiterated that clear language reflects legislative intent. The court used this to align its interpretation with the Act’s object.
22. Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate vs Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, MANU/SC/0107/1958 : AIR 1958 SC 353: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case held that words should harmonize with the statute’s object, supporting purposive interpretation.
23. Cabell vs Markham, 148 F 2d 737: Cited by the court, this US case emphasized interpreting statutes to effectuate legislative intent, aligning with the respondents’ approach.
24. New India Sugar Mills Ltd. vs Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar, MANU/SC/0353/1962 : AIR 1963 SC 1207: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case endorsed harmonizing statutory language with legislative intent, guiding the court’s reasoning.
25. Carew & Co. vs Union of India, MANU/SC/0551/1975 : AIR 1975 SC 2260: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case favored interpretations advancing the remedy, supporting the court’s approach.
26. Busching Schmitz Private Ltd. vs P.T. Menghani, MANU/SC/0344/1977 : 1977 (2) SCC 835: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case allowed purposive interpretation to avoid lacunae, reinforcing the court’s reasoning.
27. CIT vs Budhraja and Co., MANU/SC/0914/1994 : AIR 1993 SC 2529: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case cautioned against rewriting statutes, but the court clarified it was interpreting, not rewriting, the provisions.
28. U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Samiti vs Braj Kishore, MANU/SC/0540/1988 : AIR 1988 SC 2239: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case interpreted “landless persons” purposively under the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act, supporting the court’s object-oriented approach.
29. Holmes vs Bradfield Rural District Council, [1949] 1 All ER 381: Cited by the court, this UK case favored just and reasonable interpretations, guiding the court’s avoidance of hardship.
30. Simms vs Registrar of Probates, [1900] AC 323: Cited by the court, this UK case supported interpretations least offending justice, aligning with the respondents’ argument.
31. Grey vs Pearson, (1857) 6 HLC 61: Cited by the court, this UK case allowed departing from grammatical construction to avoid absurdity, supporting the court’s approach.
32. Veluswami Thevar vs G. Raja Nainar, MANU/SC/0094/1958 : AIR 1959 SC 422: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case avoided anomalous constructions, reinforcing the court’s reasoning.
33. Tirath Singh vs Bachittar Singh, MANU/SC/0048/1955 : AIR 1955 SC 830: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case permitted modifying statutory language to avoid unintended hardship, guiding the court’s interpretation.
34. Vacher & Sons vs London Society of Compositors, [1913] AC 107: Cited by the court, this UK case cautioned against using inconvenience arguments to criticize legislation, but the court applied it carefully to avoid absurdity.
35. Young & Co. vs Leamington Spa Corporation, (1993) 8 AC 517: Cited by the court, this UK case held that individual hardships do not justify departing from natural construction, but the court found general hardship justified its approach.
36. Lucy vs Henleys Telegraph Works, [1969] 3 All ER 456: Cited by the court, this UK case noted that public benefit laws may cause individual hardship, but the court focused on general mischief.
37. East India Co. vs Odichurn Paul, 7 Moo PC 85: Cited by the court, this UK case emphasized avoiding bad law from hard cases, guiding the court’s balanced interpretation.
38. Christopherson vs Lotinga, (1864) 33 LJ CP 121: Cited by the court, this UK case defined absurdity as repugnance within the statute, supporting the court’s avoidance of absurd results.
39. Grundt vs Great Boulder Proprietary Gold Mines Ltd., [1948] 1 All ER 21: Cited by the court, this UK case cautioned against twisting language to avoid absurdity, but the court ensured its interpretation stayed within statutory words.
40. Shamrao V. Parulekar vs District Magistrate, Thana, MANU/SC/0017/1952 : AIR 1952 SC 324: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case required alternative constructions to stay within statutory language, aligning with the court’s approach.
41. IRC vs Mutual Investment Co., [1966] 3 All ER 265: Cited by the court, this UK case prioritized statutory language over perceived distress, but the court found an alternative construction viable.
42. Martin Burn Ltd. vs Calcutta Corporation, AIR 1966 SC 524: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case held that courts cannot ignore statutory provisions to relieve distress, but the court interpreted, not ignored, the provisions.
43. Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs Ashalata S. Guram, MANU/SC/0531/1986 : (1986) 4 SCC 447: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case emphasized finding what is legal, not what is right, guiding the court’s legal interpretation.
44. Kariapper vs Wijesinha, [1967] 3 All ER 485: Cited by the court, this UK case presumed legislative intent aligns with the statute’s effect, supporting the court’s purposive approach.
45. Rosali vs V. Taico Bank, MANU/SC/7044/2007 : 2009 (17) SCC 690: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case endorsed the common sense construction rule, reinforcing the court’s practical interpretation.
46. Sonic Surgical vs National Insurance Co. Ltd., MANU/SC/1764/2009 : 2010 (1) SCC 135: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case interpreted “branch office” in the Consumer Protection Act to mean the office where the cause of action arises, supporting the court’s linkage of jurisdiction to cause of action.
47. State of Madhya Pradesh vs Narmada Bachao Andolan, MANU/SC/0599/2011 : 2011 (7) SCC 639: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case approved Sonic Surgical’s approach, reinforcing the court’s avoidance of mischievous consequences.
48. Union of India vs Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, MANU/SC/0013/1992 : 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 323: Cited by the appellants, this Supreme Court case held that courts cannot supply omissions to statutes. The court clarified it was interpreting, not amending, the provisions.
49. Paragon Rubber Industries vs Pragathi Rubber Mills, MANU/SC/1247/2013 : 2014 (57) PTC 1 (SC): Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case held that composite suits require jurisdiction over both causes of action, but it was irrelevant to the jurisdictional issue here.
50. Ford Motor Co. vs C.R. Borman, 2008 (38) PTC 76 (Del.): Cited by the appellants, this Delhi High Court case upheld jurisdiction because the plaintiff carried on business in Delhi. The court distinguished it due to different facts.
51. Sap Aktiengesellschaft vs Warehouse Infotech, IA No. 11153/2009 in CS (OS) No. 623/2009: Cited by the appellants, this Delhi High Court case upheld jurisdiction based on the plaintiff’s branch office and averments. The court found it inapplicable due to the absence of cause of action in Delhi.
52. Wipro Ltd. vs Oushadha Chandrika Ayurvedic India (P) Ltd., MANU/TN/0449/2008 : 2008 (37) PTC 269 Mad.: Cited by the appellants, this Madras High Court case held that Section 20 of the CPC does not curtail Section 62 or Section 134. The court disagreed, prioritizing the Act’s object.
53. Hindustan Unilever Ltd. vs Ashique Chemicals, MANU/MH/1004/2011 : 2011 (47) PTC 209 (Bom.): Cited by the appellants, this Bombay High Court case upheld jurisdiction based on the plaintiff’s business in the court’s jurisdiction. The court distinguished it due to different facts.
54. Ultra Tech Cement Ltd. vs Shree Balaji Cement Industries, MANU/MH/0587/2014 : 2014 (58) PTC 1 (Bom.): Cited by the appellants, this Bombay High Court case upheld jurisdiction based on the plaintiff’s registered and corporate offices. The court found it inapplicable to the present facts.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge

Justice Arun Mishra, delivering the judgment for the bench, adopted a purposive interpretation of Section 62 of the Copyright Act and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, emphasizing the legislative intent to balance plaintiff convenience with fairness to defendants. The court began by analyzing Section 20 of the CPC, which governs jurisdiction based on the defendant’s residence, place of business, or where the cause of action arises. The Explanation to Section 20 deems a corporation to carry on business at its principal office or where it has a subordinate office and the cause of action arises. The court then examined the text and object of Section 62 and Section 134, which include non-obstante clauses and allow suits where the plaintiff resides or carries on business, as an additional forum to Section 20’s grounds. The Joint Committee Report and Parliamentary Debates for the Copyright Act revealed that the provisions aimed to remove the impediment of authors having to sue at distant places where infringement occurred, enabling them to file suits at their place of residence or business.

The court held that while these provisions expand jurisdiction, they do not permit plaintiffs to file suits at any branch office unconnected to the cause of action, especially when the principal office and cause of action coincide elsewhere. The non-obstante clause does not oust Section 20 entirely but provides an additional, not exclusive, forum. The court applied Heydon’s mischief rule, identifying the mischief as the hardship faced by authors suing at distant places and the remedy as enabling suits at their residence or business. However, it recognized a counter-mischief: allowing corporations to file suits at far-flung branch offices would harass defendants, contrary to the legislative intent. The court cited Patel Roadways and New Moga Transport to clarify that a corporation’s business is primarily at its principal office, and subordinate offices confer jurisdiction only if linked to the cause of action.

The court rejected the appellants’ argument that the provisions’ unambiguous language allowed suits at any place of business, citing Hiralal Rattanlal and Padmasundara Rao but holding that when two interpretations are possible, the one advancing the statute’s object prevails. It relied on Bennion’s Statutory Interpretation and Justice G.P. Singh’s Principles of Statutory Interpretation to avoid constructions causing hardship, absurdity, or injustice. Cases like Sonic Surgical and State of Madhya Pradesh vs Narmada Bachao Andolan supported interpreting “branch office” to mean the office where the cause of action arises, avoiding mischievous consequences. The court distinguished Exphar SA, noting it upheld jurisdiction due to specific averments, and found Dhodha House and Dabur India inapplicable, as they addressed different issues. High Court decisions cited by the appellants were deemed factually distinct or contrary to the court’s interpretation.

The court concluded that if a plaintiff’s principal office is at the place where the cause of action arises, the suit must be filed there, not at a distant branch office. This prevents abuse by corporations with multiple offices and aligns with the Act’s object of plaintiff convenience without oppressing defendants. The Delhi High Court’s decision in the IPRS case was upheld, as no cause of action arose in Delhi, and the Advance Magazine amendment was deemed insufficient to confer jurisdiction, reversing the Division Bench’s order.

Final Decision

On 1 July 2015, the Supreme Court dismissed all appeals, upholding the Delhi High Court’s decision in Civil Appeal Nos. 10643-10644/2010 that the suit should be filed in Mumbai, where the cause of action arose and IPRS’s head office was located. In the Advance Magazine case (SLP [C] No. 8253/2013), the court reversed the Division Bench’s order, holding that the amendment did not confer jurisdiction on the Delhi court, as no cause of action arose there. No costs were awarded.

Law Settled in this Case

This case established several key principles in Indian intellectual property law regarding jurisdiction: Section 62 of the Copyright Act and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act provide an additional forum for plaintiffs to file suits where they reside or carry on business, but this right is not absolute; if a plaintiff’s principal office is at the place where the cause of action arises, the suit must be filed there, not at a distant branch office, to prevent abuse by corporations; the non-obstante clause in these provisions does not oust Section 20 of the CPC entirely but supplements it, maintaining the linkage between jurisdiction and cause of action for corporations; a purposive interpretation, guided by Heydon’s mischief rule, should be adopted to advance the remedy for plaintiffs while avoiding counter-mischief to defendants; and courts must avoid constructions leading to hardship, absurdity, or injustice, ensuring fairness in jurisdictional choices. The judgment curtails forum shopping by corporations and reinforces the balance between plaintiff convenience and defendant fairness in intellectual property disputes.

Case Title: Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. Vs Sanjay Dalia and Ors.

Date of Order: 1 July 2015

Case No.: Civil Appeal Nos. 10643-10644 of 2010 and C.A. No. 4912/2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 8253/2013)

Neutral Citation: MANU/SC/0716/2015

Name of Court: Supreme Court of India

Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice J.S. Khehar and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Arun Mishra

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi