SC-Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. Vs Sanjay Dalia

Introduction

The case of Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. vs Sanjay Dalia and Ors. is a landmark judgment by the Supreme Court of India, delivered on 1 July 2015, addressing the interpretation of jurisdictional provisions under Section 62 of the Copyright Act, 1957, and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The central issue was whether a plaintiff, particularly a corporation, could institute a suit for infringement of copyright or trademark at a place where it has a branch office but where no cause of action has arisen, bypassing the place where its principal office is located and the cause of action has occurred. The Supreme Court, through a bench comprising Justices J.S. Khehar and Arun Mishra, clarified that while these provisions provide an additional forum for plaintiffs to file suits where they reside or carry on business, this right is not absolute and must be exercised at the place where the cause of action arises if the plaintiff’s principal office is also located there. This case is significant for its purposive interpretation of statutory provisions, balancing the convenience of plaintiffs with the prevention of hardship to defendants, and for reinforcing the principles of territorial jurisdiction in intellectual property disputes. The judgment curtails potential abuse by corporations with multiple branch offices, ensuring that suits are not filed in distant or unconnected jurisdictions to harass defendants.

Detailed Factual Background

The Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. (IPRS), the appellant in Civil Appeal Nos. 10643-10644/2010, is a copyright society representing authors and owners of musical and literary works. IPRS filed a suit (FAO (OS) No. 359/2007) in the Delhi High Court against Sanjay Dalia and others, seeking to prevent infringement of its copyright by the defendants, who operated cinema halls in Maharashtra and Mumbai. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants were infringing its rights by using copyrighted works without a license. The entire cause of action, as per the plaint, arose in Mumbai, where the alleged infringement occurred. IPRS, however, chose to file the suit in Delhi, invoking jurisdiction under Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, on the ground that it had a branch office in Delhi and was carrying on business there. Notably, IPRS’s head office was undisputedly located in Mumbai, the same place where the cause of action arose. The defendants objected to the Delhi High Court’s territorial jurisdiction, arguing that the suit should have been filed in Mumbai, where both the cause of action and the plaintiff’s principal office were situated.

In a related matter, Civil Appeal arising out of SLP [C] No. 8253/2013 (Advance Magazine Publishers Inc. and Anr. vs Just Lifestyle Pvt. Ltd.), the plaintiff, Advance Magazine Publishers Inc., publisher of “Vogue India,” filed a trademark infringement suit in the Delhi High Court. The registered office of Vogue India was in Mumbai, where the magazine was processed and published, and the cause of action (infringement) also arose in Mumbai. The plaintiff sought to invoke jurisdiction under Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, claiming it had a branch office in Delhi. To bolster its claim, the plaintiff applied to amend the plaint under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), asserting that the magazine was sold and circulated in Delhi, thus conferring jurisdiction. The Delhi High Court’s Single Bench rejected the amendment, holding that even if allowed, it would not confer jurisdiction since no cause of action arose in Delhi. The Division Bench, however, allowed the amendment, prompting the defendants to appeal to the Supreme Court. In both cases, the plaintiffs relied on the statutory provisions allowing suits to be filed where they carry on business, while the defendants argued that such provisions should not permit suits in jurisdictions unconnected to the cause of action, especially when the plaintiff’s principal office and the cause of action coincided elsewhere.

Detailed Procedural Background

In Civil Appeal Nos. 10643-10644/2010, IPRS instituted the suit (FAO (OS) No. 359/2007) in the Delhi High Court, seeking an injunction against the defendants for copyright infringement. The defendants raised a preliminary objection regarding the court’s territorial jurisdiction, arguing that the suit should be filed in Mumbai, where the cause of action arose and IPRS’s head office was located. The Single Bench of the Delhi High Court upheld the objection, finding that the Delhi court lacked jurisdiction since no part of the cause of action arose in Delhi, and the plaintiff’s head office was in Mumbai. The Division Bench affirmed this decision, dismissing IPRS’s appeal and directing the suit to be filed in Mumbai. Aggrieved, IPRS appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the High Court’s interpretation of Section 62 of the Copyright Act.

In the Advance Magazine case, the plaintiff filed a trademark infringement suit in the Delhi High Court and sought to amend the plaint to include averments that the magazine’s circulation in Delhi conferred jurisdiction. The Single Bench rejected the amendment application, holding that the amended pleadings would not establish jurisdiction, as the cause of action arose in Mumbai, where the plaintiff’s registered office was located. The Division Bench reversed this decision, allowing the amendment, which led the defendants to file a Special Leave Petition (SLP [C] No. 8253/2013) before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted leave in the SLP, consolidating it with IPRS’s appeals for a common hearing. Both cases were argued extensively, with the appellants represented by Senior Advocates T.R. Andhiarujina and Sudhir Chandra, and the respondents by advocates including Ankur Saigal and Mahesh Agarwal. The Supreme Court pronounced its judgment on 1 July 2015, dismissing all appeals and upholding the Delhi High Court’s decision in the IPRS case while reversing the Division Bench’s order in the Advance Magazine case.

Issues Involved in the Case

The primary issue was the interpretation of Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957, and Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, regarding the jurisdiction where a plaintiff can institute a suit for infringement. Specifically, the court examined whether a plaintiff, particularly a corporation, can file a suit at a place where it has a branch office but no cause of action has arisen, when its principal office is located at the place where the cause of action has occurred. Ancillary issues included whether the non-obstante clause in these provisions completely ousts the applicability of Section 20 of the CPC, which governs jurisdiction based on the defendant’s residence or the place where the cause of action arises; whether the plaintiff’s convenience should override considerations of hardship to the defendant; whether the provisions allow plaintiffs to file suits at any place where they have a subordinate office, regardless of the cause of action; and whether the court should adopt a purposive interpretation to prevent abuse of these provisions by multinational corporations dragging defendants to distant jurisdictions.

Detailed Submission of Parties

The appellants, represented by Senior Advocate T.R. Andhiarujina in the Advance Magazine case and Senior Advocate Sudhir Chandra in the IPRS case, argued that Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act and Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act confer a special right on plaintiffs to file suits where they reside or carry on business, independent of the cause of action. They emphasized the non-obstante clause, which overrides Section 20 of the CPC and other laws, asserting that the plaintiff’s choice of forum should not be restricted by the cause of action or the defendant’s convenience. The appellants contended that the Delhi High Court’s interpretation undermined the legislative intent to provide authors and trademark owners with a convenient forum, as evidenced by the Parliamentary Debates and the Joint Committee Report for the Copyright Act. They relied on Exphar SA vs Eupharma Laboratories Ltd. (2004 (3) SCC 688), arguing that it recognized the wider jurisdiction under Section 62, and claimed that the High Court ignored this precedent. Other cases cited included Dhodha House vs S.K. Maingi (2006 (9) SCC 41), Dabur India Ltd. vs K.R. Industries (2008 (10) SCC 595), and Delhi High Court decisions like Smithkline Beecham vs Sunil Singhi (2000 (1) PTC 321 (Del.)), Caterpillar Inc. vs Kailash Nichani (2002 (24) PTC 405 (Del.)), and Intas Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs Allergan Inc. (132 (2006) DLT 641), which they argued supported filing suits where the plaintiff carries on business, regardless of the cause of action. The appellants further submitted that the provisions are unambiguous, and applying Heydon’s mischief rule or reading in Section 20’s requirements would amount to judicial overreach. They argued that the long-standing interpretation favoring plaintiffs should not be unsettled, and if a different view was to be taken, the matter should be referred to a larger bench.

The respondents, represented by advocates including Ankur Saigal, countered that allowing plaintiffs to file suits at any branch office, irrespective of the cause of action, would enable multinational corporations to harass defendants by dragging them to distant jurisdictions. They argued that the object of Section 62 and Section 134 was to alleviate the hardship faced by individual authors or trademark owners, not to empower corporations to misuse their branch office networks. The respondents invoked Heydon’s mischief rule, urging the court to interpret the provisions to prevent the mischief of harassing defendants while advancing the remedy for plaintiffs. They relied on Patel Roadways Ltd. vs Prasad Trading Co. (1991 (4) SCC 270), which clarified that a corporation is deemed to carry on business at its principal office or where a subordinate office exists and the cause of action arises. The respondents emphasized public policy and the need to avoid absurdity, arguing that permitting suits in unconnected jurisdictions would lead to disproportionate counter-mischief. They distinguished the appellants’ cases, noting that in Exphar SA and others, jurisdiction was upheld due to specific averments tying the cause of action to the chosen forum, unlike the present cases where no cause of action arose in Delhi. The respondents also argued that the plaintiffs’ head offices being in Mumbai, where the cause of action arose, made Delhi an inappropriate forum, and the provisions should not be interpreted to facilitate forum shopping.

Detailed Discussion on Judgments Cited by Parties and Their Context

The Supreme Court considered a plethora of judgments cited by both parties to resolve the jurisdictional issue:

1. Exphar SA vs Eupharma Laboratories Ltd., MANU/SC/0148/2004 : 2004 (3) SCC 688: Cited by the appellants, this Supreme Court case held that Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act provides a wider jurisdiction than Section 20 of the CPC, allowing suits where the plaintiff resides or carries on business. The court noted that the Delhi court had jurisdiction because the plaintiff had a registered office in Delhi and a cease-and-desist notice was received there. The Supreme Court in the present case clarified that Exphar SA supports its view, as it recognized Section 62 as an additional ground, not an ouster of Section 20’s principles.
2. Dhodha House vs S.K. Maingi, MANU/SC/2524/2005 : 2006 (9) SCC 41: Cited by the appellants, this Supreme Court case addressed the maintainability of composite suits under the Copyright Act and the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. It observed that Section 62(2) provides an additional forum to enable authors to file suits where they reside, but the precise issue of jurisdiction when the cause of action and principal office coincide was not considered. The court held that this case did not conflict with its interpretation.
3. Dabur India Ltd. vs K.R. Industries, MANU/SC/2244/2008 : 2008 (10) SCC 595: Cited by the appellants, this Supreme Court case held that a composite suit for copyright infringement and passing off cannot be filed in a court lacking jurisdiction over one of the causes of action. It recognized Section 62(2)’s wider jurisdiction but emphasized that courts cannot entertain suits without territorial jurisdiction. The court found this case unhelpful to the appellants, as it underscored the need for jurisdictional competence.
4. Smithkline Beecham vs Sunil Singhi, 2000 (1) PTC 321 (Del.): Cited by the appellants, this Delhi High Court decision upheld jurisdiction in Delhi because the plaintiff’s registered office was there. The court noted that the issue of cause of action was not raised, making it inapplicable to the present facts.
5. Caterpillar Inc. vs Kailash Nichani, MANU/DE/2052/2001 : 2002 (24) PTC 405 (Del.): Cited by the appellants, this Delhi High Court case observed that Section 62 departs from the norm of defendant-centric jurisdiction. The Supreme Court found it irrelevant, as it did not address the specific issue of principal office and cause of action alignment.
6. Intas Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs Allergan Inc., MANU/DE/9188/2006 : 132 (2006) DLT 641: Cited by the appellants, this Delhi High Court case upheld jurisdiction under Section 20(c) of the CPC because the defendant sold the infringing product in Delhi. The Supreme Court distinguished it, as the present cases involved no cause of action in Delhi.
7. Patel Roadways Ltd. vs Prasad Trading Co., MANU/SC/0280/1992 : 1991 (4) SCC 270: Cited by the respondents, this Supreme Court case interpreted Section 20’s Explanation, holding that a corporation is deemed to carry on business at its principal office or where a subordinate office exists and the cause of action arises. The court relied heavily on this to link the cause of action with the place of business.
8. New Moga Transport Co. vs United India Insurance Co. Ltd., MANU/SC/0398/2004 : 2004 (4) SCC 677: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case reinforced Patel Roadways, clarifying that a corporation can be sued where it has a subordinate office and the cause of action arises, aligning with the respondents’ argument.
9. Jones vs Scottish Accident Insurance Co., (1886) 17 QBD 421: Cited by the court, this UK case established that a company’s principal place of business is its domicile, supporting the view that jurisdiction should prioritize the principal office.
10. Watkins vs Scottish Imperial Insurance Co., (1889) 23 QBD 285: Cited by the court, this UK case held that a company’s registered office is its principal place of business, reinforcing the jurisdictional focus on the principal office.
11. Peoples’ Insurance Co. vs Benoy Bhushan, AIR 1943 Cal. 190: Cited by the court, this Calcutta High Court case allowed suits against a company where it has a subordinate office and the cause of action arises, supporting the respondents’ position.
12. Home Insurance Co. vs Jagatjit Sugar Mills Co., MANU/PH/0051/1952 : AIR 1952 Punj. 142: Cited by the court, this Punjab High Court case aligned with Peoples’ Insurance, emphasizing jurisdiction at the place of a subordinate office tied to the cause of action.
13. Prag Oil Mils Depot vs Transport Corpn. of India, MANU/OR/0046/1978 : AIR 1978 Ori. 167: Cited by the court, this Orissa High Court case followed the same principle, reinforcing the respondents’ argument.
14. Rajasthan High Court Advocates Association vs Union of India, MANU/SC/0827/2000 : AIR 2001 SC 416: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case affirmed that a plaintiff can file a suit where the cause of action arises, supporting the linkage of jurisdiction to the cause of action.
15. Heydon’s Case, 76 ER 637: Cited by both parties, this classic English case established the mischief rule, which the respondents relied on to argue that the provisions should be interpreted to prevent the mischief of harassing defendants. The court applied this rule to advance the remedy for plaintiffs while avoiding counter-mischief.
16. Kanailal Sur vs Paramnidhi Sadhukhan, MANU/SC/0097/1957 : AIR 1957 SC 907: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case endorsed Heydon’s rule, guiding the purposive interpretation of the provisions.
17. Anderton vs Ryan, [1985] 2 All ER 355: Cited by the court, this UK case referred to Heydon’s rule as purposive construction, supporting the respondents’ interpretive approach.
18. Bengal Immunity Co. vs State of Bihar, MANU/SC/0083/1955 : AIR 1955 SC 661: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case quoted Heydon’s rule, reinforcing its application to suppress mischief and advance the remedy.
19. Hiralal Rattanlal vs State of U.P., MANU/SC/0553/1972 : 1973 (1) SCC 216: Cited by the appellants, this Supreme Court case held that unambiguous provisions do not require the mischief rule. The court countered that when two interpretations are possible, the one advancing the statute’s object should be adopted.
20. Padmasundara Rao vs State of Tamil Nadu, MANU/SC/0182/2002 : AIR 2002 SC 1334: Cited by the appellants, this Supreme Court case emphasized legislative intent from the statute’s words. The court agreed but found the object favored its interpretation.
21. Grasim Industries Ltd. vs Collector of Customs, Bombay, MANU/SC/0256/2002 : 2002 (4) SCC 297: Cited by the appellants, this Supreme Court case reiterated that clear language reflects legislative intent. The court used this to align its interpretation with the Act’s object.
22. Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate vs Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, MANU/SC/0107/1958 : AIR 1958 SC 353: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case held that words should harmonize with the statute’s object, supporting purposive interpretation.
23. Cabell vs Markham, 148 F 2d 737: Cited by the court, this US case emphasized interpreting statutes to effectuate legislative intent, aligning with the respondents’ approach.
24. New India Sugar Mills Ltd. vs Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar, MANU/SC/0353/1962 : AIR 1963 SC 1207: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case endorsed harmonizing statutory language with legislative intent, guiding the court’s reasoning.
25. Carew & Co. vs Union of India, MANU/SC/0551/1975 : AIR 1975 SC 2260: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case favored interpretations advancing the remedy, supporting the court’s approach.
26. Busching Schmitz Private Ltd. vs P.T. Menghani, MANU/SC/0344/1977 : 1977 (2) SCC 835: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case allowed purposive interpretation to avoid lacunae, reinforcing the court’s reasoning.
27. CIT vs Budhraja and Co., MANU/SC/0914/1994 : AIR 1993 SC 2529: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case cautioned against rewriting statutes, but the court clarified it was interpreting, not rewriting, the provisions.
28. U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Samiti vs Braj Kishore, MANU/SC/0540/1988 : AIR 1988 SC 2239: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case interpreted “landless persons” purposively under the U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act, supporting the court’s object-oriented approach.
29. Holmes vs Bradfield Rural District Council, [1949] 1 All ER 381: Cited by the court, this UK case favored just and reasonable interpretations, guiding the court’s avoidance of hardship.
30. Simms vs Registrar of Probates, [1900] AC 323: Cited by the court, this UK case supported interpretations least offending justice, aligning with the respondents’ argument.
31. Grey vs Pearson, (1857) 6 HLC 61: Cited by the court, this UK case allowed departing from grammatical construction to avoid absurdity, supporting the court’s approach.
32. Veluswami Thevar vs G. Raja Nainar, MANU/SC/0094/1958 : AIR 1959 SC 422: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case avoided anomalous constructions, reinforcing the court’s reasoning.
33. Tirath Singh vs Bachittar Singh, MANU/SC/0048/1955 : AIR 1955 SC 830: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case permitted modifying statutory language to avoid unintended hardship, guiding the court’s interpretation.
34. Vacher & Sons vs London Society of Compositors, [1913] AC 107: Cited by the court, this UK case cautioned against using inconvenience arguments to criticize legislation, but the court applied it carefully to avoid absurdity.
35. Young & Co. vs Leamington Spa Corporation, (1993) 8 AC 517: Cited by the court, this UK case held that individual hardships do not justify departing from natural construction, but the court found general hardship justified its approach.
36. Lucy vs Henleys Telegraph Works, [1969] 3 All ER 456: Cited by the court, this UK case noted that public benefit laws may cause individual hardship, but the court focused on general mischief.
37. East India Co. vs Odichurn Paul, 7 Moo PC 85: Cited by the court, this UK case emphasized avoiding bad law from hard cases, guiding the court’s balanced interpretation.
38. Christopherson vs Lotinga, (1864) 33 LJ CP 121: Cited by the court, this UK case defined absurdity as repugnance within the statute, supporting the court’s avoidance of absurd results.
39. Grundt vs Great Boulder Proprietary Gold Mines Ltd., [1948] 1 All ER 21: Cited by the court, this UK case cautioned against twisting language to avoid absurdity, but the court ensured its interpretation stayed within statutory words.
40. Shamrao V. Parulekar vs District Magistrate, Thana, MANU/SC/0017/1952 : AIR 1952 SC 324: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case required alternative constructions to stay within statutory language, aligning with the court’s approach.
41. IRC vs Mutual Investment Co., [1966] 3 All ER 265: Cited by the court, this UK case prioritized statutory language over perceived distress, but the court found an alternative construction viable.
42. Martin Burn Ltd. vs Calcutta Corporation, AIR 1966 SC 524: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case held that courts cannot ignore statutory provisions to relieve distress, but the court interpreted, not ignored, the provisions.
43. Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs Ashalata S. Guram, MANU/SC/0531/1986 : (1986) 4 SCC 447: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case emphasized finding what is legal, not what is right, guiding the court’s legal interpretation.
44. Kariapper vs Wijesinha, [1967] 3 All ER 485: Cited by the court, this UK case presumed legislative intent aligns with the statute’s effect, supporting the court’s purposive approach.
45. Rosali vs V. Taico Bank, MANU/SC/7044/2007 : 2009 (17) SCC 690: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case endorsed the common sense construction rule, reinforcing the court’s practical interpretation.
46. Sonic Surgical vs National Insurance Co. Ltd., MANU/SC/1764/2009 : 2010 (1) SCC 135: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case interpreted “branch office” in the Consumer Protection Act to mean the office where the cause of action arises, supporting the court’s linkage of jurisdiction to cause of action.
47. State of Madhya Pradesh vs Narmada Bachao Andolan, MANU/SC/0599/2011 : 2011 (7) SCC 639: Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case approved Sonic Surgical’s approach, reinforcing the court’s avoidance of mischievous consequences.
48. Union of India vs Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, MANU/SC/0013/1992 : 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 323: Cited by the appellants, this Supreme Court case held that courts cannot supply omissions to statutes. The court clarified it was interpreting, not amending, the provisions.
49. Paragon Rubber Industries vs Pragathi Rubber Mills, MANU/SC/1247/2013 : 2014 (57) PTC 1 (SC): Cited by the court, this Supreme Court case held that composite suits require jurisdiction over both causes of action, but it was irrelevant to the jurisdictional issue here.
50. Ford Motor Co. vs C.R. Borman, 2008 (38) PTC 76 (Del.): Cited by the appellants, this Delhi High Court case upheld jurisdiction because the plaintiff carried on business in Delhi. The court distinguished it due to different facts.
51. Sap Aktiengesellschaft vs Warehouse Infotech, IA No. 11153/2009 in CS (OS) No. 623/2009: Cited by the appellants, this Delhi High Court case upheld jurisdiction based on the plaintiff’s branch office and averments. The court found it inapplicable due to the absence of cause of action in Delhi.
52. Wipro Ltd. vs Oushadha Chandrika Ayurvedic India (P) Ltd., MANU/TN/0449/2008 : 2008 (37) PTC 269 Mad.: Cited by the appellants, this Madras High Court case held that Section 20 of the CPC does not curtail Section 62 or Section 134. The court disagreed, prioritizing the Act’s object.
53. Hindustan Unilever Ltd. vs Ashique Chemicals, MANU/MH/1004/2011 : 2011 (47) PTC 209 (Bom.): Cited by the appellants, this Bombay High Court case upheld jurisdiction based on the plaintiff’s business in the court’s jurisdiction. The court distinguished it due to different facts.
54. Ultra Tech Cement Ltd. vs Shree Balaji Cement Industries, MANU/MH/0587/2014 : 2014 (58) PTC 1 (Bom.): Cited by the appellants, this Bombay High Court case upheld jurisdiction based on the plaintiff’s registered and corporate offices. The court found it inapplicable to the present facts.

Detailed Reasoning and Analysis of Judge

Justice Arun Mishra, delivering the judgment for the bench, adopted a purposive interpretation of Section 62 of the Copyright Act and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, emphasizing the legislative intent to balance plaintiff convenience with fairness to defendants. The court began by analyzing Section 20 of the CPC, which governs jurisdiction based on the defendant’s residence, place of business, or where the cause of action arises. The Explanation to Section 20 deems a corporation to carry on business at its principal office or where it has a subordinate office and the cause of action arises. The court then examined the text and object of Section 62 and Section 134, which include non-obstante clauses and allow suits where the plaintiff resides or carries on business, as an additional forum to Section 20’s grounds. The Joint Committee Report and Parliamentary Debates for the Copyright Act revealed that the provisions aimed to remove the impediment of authors having to sue at distant places where infringement occurred, enabling them to file suits at their place of residence or business.

The court held that while these provisions expand jurisdiction, they do not permit plaintiffs to file suits at any branch office unconnected to the cause of action, especially when the principal office and cause of action coincide elsewhere. The non-obstante clause does not oust Section 20 entirely but provides an additional, not exclusive, forum. The court applied Heydon’s mischief rule, identifying the mischief as the hardship faced by authors suing at distant places and the remedy as enabling suits at their residence or business. However, it recognized a counter-mischief: allowing corporations to file suits at far-flung branch offices would harass defendants, contrary to the legislative intent. The court cited Patel Roadways and New Moga Transport to clarify that a corporation’s business is primarily at its principal office, and subordinate offices confer jurisdiction only if linked to the cause of action.

The court rejected the appellants’ argument that the provisions’ unambiguous language allowed suits at any place of business, citing Hiralal Rattanlal and Padmasundara Rao but holding that when two interpretations are possible, the one advancing the statute’s object prevails. It relied on Bennion’s Statutory Interpretation and Justice G.P. Singh’s Principles of Statutory Interpretation to avoid constructions causing hardship, absurdity, or injustice. Cases like Sonic Surgical and State of Madhya Pradesh vs Narmada Bachao Andolan supported interpreting “branch office” to mean the office where the cause of action arises, avoiding mischievous consequences. The court distinguished Exphar SA, noting it upheld jurisdiction due to specific averments, and found Dhodha House and Dabur India inapplicable, as they addressed different issues. High Court decisions cited by the appellants were deemed factually distinct or contrary to the court’s interpretation.

The court concluded that if a plaintiff’s principal office is at the place where the cause of action arises, the suit must be filed there, not at a distant branch office. This prevents abuse by corporations with multiple offices and aligns with the Act’s object of plaintiff convenience without oppressing defendants. The Delhi High Court’s decision in the IPRS case was upheld, as no cause of action arose in Delhi, and the Advance Magazine amendment was deemed insufficient to confer jurisdiction, reversing the Division Bench’s order.

Final Decision

On 1 July 2015, the Supreme Court dismissed all appeals, upholding the Delhi High Court’s decision in Civil Appeal Nos. 10643-10644/2010 that the suit should be filed in Mumbai, where the cause of action arose and IPRS’s head office was located. In the Advance Magazine case (SLP [C] No. 8253/2013), the court reversed the Division Bench’s order, holding that the amendment did not confer jurisdiction on the Delhi court, as no cause of action arose there. No costs were awarded.

Law Settled in this Case

This case established several key principles in Indian intellectual property law regarding jurisdiction: Section 62 of the Copyright Act and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act provide an additional forum for plaintiffs to file suits where they reside or carry on business, but this right is not absolute; if a plaintiff’s principal office is at the place where the cause of action arises, the suit must be filed there, not at a distant branch office, to prevent abuse by corporations; the non-obstante clause in these provisions does not oust Section 20 of the CPC entirely but supplements it, maintaining the linkage between jurisdiction and cause of action for corporations; a purposive interpretation, guided by Heydon’s mischief rule, should be adopted to advance the remedy for plaintiffs while avoiding counter-mischief to defendants; and courts must avoid constructions leading to hardship, absurdity, or injustice, ensuring fairness in jurisdictional choices. The judgment curtails forum shopping by corporations and reinforces the balance between plaintiff convenience and defendant fairness in intellectual property disputes.

Case Title: Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. Vs Sanjay Dalia and Ors.

Date of Order: 1 July 2015

Case No.: Civil Appeal Nos. 10643-10644 of 2010 and C.A. No. 4912/2015 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 8253/2013)

Neutral Citation: MANU/SC/0716/2015

Name of Court: Supreme Court of India

Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice J.S. Khehar and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Arun Mishra

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi