Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. v. B. Vijaya Sai: Adding a Religious Prefix to a Registered Trademark Does Not Save You from Infringement
Introduction
In the world of intellectual property law, one of the most frequently misunderstood questions is this: if a person uses only a part of someone else's registered trademark, combined with their own word or prefix, does that amount to an infringement? Many people assume that by adding a word before or after a famous trademark, they can escape legal liability. The Supreme Court of India emphatically put this misunderstanding to rest in its landmark judgment in Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. v. B. Vijaya Sai and Others, decided on 19th January, 2022. This judgment is a significant milestone in Indian trademark law because it clarifies, in considerable depth, the difference between an action for infringement of a registered trademark and an action for passing off, explains the correct scope of Sections 29 and 30 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and establishes that when a defendant's mark is identical or similar to a registered trademark and is used for identical or similar goods or services, the court is bound by law to presume that confusion exists, and no further evidence of confusion or deception need be produced by the plaintiff. The judgment also sends a strong message that religious sentiment or honest personal reasons behind the adoption of an infringing mark are not a legal defence to an action for trademark infringement under the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
Factual and Procedural Background
Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc., the Appellant-Plaintiff, is a company incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware, United States of America. The company is one of the world's largest and most celebrated chains of hotels and has been using the trademark "RENAISSANCE" for its hospitality business globally since the year 1981. It began using the mark in India from 1990 onwards and runs hotels and convention centres in Mumbai and in Goa. The company spends approximately US$ 14 million every year on worldwide advertisements and promotional activities and owns the domain name www.renaissancehotels.com. The mark "RENAISSANCE" is used not only in relation to hotel and restaurant services but also on a wide variety of goods found within its hotels such as bathrobes, slippers, shirts, hats, matchboxes, writing paper, and candies. The Appellant-Plaintiff holds two trademark registrations in India: Registration No. 610567 in Class 16 covering printed matter, periodicals, books, stationery, manuals, magazines, instructional and teaching materials, and office requisites, and Registration No. 1241271 in Class 42 covering hotel, restaurant, catering, bar and cocktail lounge services, provision of facilities for meetings, conferences and exhibitions, and reservation services for hotel accommodations.
While conducting its routine brand monitoring activities, the Appellant-Plaintiff came across a website at www.sairenaissance.com and discovered that the Respondents-Defendants, B. Vijaya Sai and others, were operating two hotels under the name "SAI RENAISSANCE," one at Kadugodi near Whitefield Railway Station in Bangalore, established in the year 2001, and another one at By-Pass Road, Puttaparthi. An investigation revealed that the Respondents-Defendants were not merely using a similar name but were also copying the Appellant-Plaintiff's stylised representation of the trademark "RENAISSANCE," along with its signage, business cards, and leaflets, in a manner designed to suggest an affiliation, association, or connection with the Appellant-Plaintiff's internationally famous hotel chain. The Appellant-Plaintiff pointed out that it had earlier successfully brought a similar suit at Ernakulam in Kerala, being C.S. No. 5 of 2005, before the District Court, and that suit had been decreed in its favour on 31st January, 2008.
The Appellant-Plaintiff accordingly filed a suit bearing O.S. No. 3 of 2009 before the Principal District Judge, Bangalore Rural District, Bangalore, seeking a decree of permanent injunction restraining the Respondents-Defendants from using the mark "SAI RENAISSANCE" or any other mark identical with or deceptively similar to the registered trademark "RENAISSANCE," from operating hotels or hospitality services under that name, from using the domain name www.sairenaissance.com, and for delivery of all goods, labels, and printed material bearing the infringing mark, along with a claim for damages of Rs. 3,50,000 for unauthorised use of the trademark.
The Respondents-Defendants resisted the suit vigorously. Their written statement raised several defences. They argued that the suit was liable to be dismissed on account of delay, laches, and acquiescence, since the first Respondent-Defendant claimed to have been running his hotel for fifteen years before the suit was filed. They further argued that the word "RENAISSANCE" is a commonly used dictionary word meaning "rebirth" and cannot be the subject of any exclusive claim. They claimed that the first Respondent-Defendant, named "Vijaya Sai" by his parents who were ardent devotees of Sri Sai Baba, adopted the name "SAI RENAISSANCE" to signify the belief that Sri Puttaparthi Sai Baba was the reincarnation of Sri Shirdi Sai Baba, and therefore, the name was adopted for bona fide religious reasons. They also argued that the class of customers they served was entirely different from those served by the Appellant-Plaintiff, that they served only vegetarian food and no alcoholic beverages, and that therefore there was no possibility of any confusion in the minds of consumers. They additionally submitted that the Appellant-Plaintiff's registration in Class 42 was subject to rectification proceedings and as such the Appellant-Plaintiff could not claim exclusive rights.
The trial court framed issues on registration, prior adoption and use, infringement, passing off, entitlement to damages, maintainability of the suit, and honest concurrent use by the Respondents-Defendants. The trial court answered the issues on registration, prior adoption and use, and infringement in the affirmative, holding that the Respondents-Defendants had infringed the Appellant-Plaintiff's registered trademark. However, the trial court found against the Appellant-Plaintiff on the questions of passing off, delivery of infringing materials, and award of damages. By its judgment and decree dated 21st June, 2012, the trial court partly decreed the suit by permanently restraining the Respondents-Defendants from using the mark "SAI RENAISSANCE" or any deceptively similar mark in relation to goods and services in Classes 16 and 42 and from operating hotels under any form of the "RENAISSANCE" mark.
The Respondents-Defendants appealed to the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Regular First Appeal No. 1462 of 2012. The Single Judge of the High Court, by judgment dated 12th April, 2019, allowed the appeal and set aside the trial court's decree. The High Court arrived at this conclusion by holding that the Appellant-Plaintiff had failed to show that its trademark had earned a trans-border reputation in India, that the Respondents-Defendants' hotel was not of the same class as the Appellant-Plaintiff's five-star hotel, that no evidence showed the Respondents-Defendants had taken unfair advantage of the trademark or caused detriment to its distinctive character, that the adoption of the name was honest and religiously motivated, and that the customer base of both parties was entirely different. The High Court also distinguished the earlier Kerala High Court judgment in The Renaissance, Cochin v. Renaissance Hotels Inc. Marriott, in which an injunction had been granted, observing that in the Kerala case a customer had been actually misled while in the present case no such customer complaint existed. Being aggrieved by this reversal, the Appellant-Plaintiff approached the Supreme Court by way of a Special Leave Petition which was converted into Civil Appeal No. 404 of 2022.
The Dispute
The dispute before the Supreme Court was not simply about whether one hotel owner had copied another's name. At its heart, the case raised a fundamental question about the correct legal framework for deciding a trademark infringement action. The High Court had applied what is known as the Section 29(4) test, which is designed for situations where an identical or similar mark is used for goods or services that are not similar to those for which the trademark is registered. Under that test, the Appellant-Plaintiff would need to show that its trademark had a reputation in India and that the Respondents-Defendants' use was detrimental to its distinctive character or took unfair advantage of it without due cause. The High Court found this test not satisfied and accordingly dismissed the suit.
The Appellant-Plaintiff's Senior Counsel, Shri K.V. Viswanathan, argued before the Supreme Court that the High Court had applied the entirely wrong section of the law. He submitted that the correct provisions were Section 29(2)(c) read with Section 29(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 because both the marks and the goods and services involved were identical or similar. Under this test, the Court is required by law to presume confusion, and no further evidence of confusion is needed. He further submitted that since the Respondents-Defendants were using the Appellant-Plaintiff's registered trademark as a part of their trade name and business name, Section 29(5) was also independently applicable, and the High Court had completely ignored this. Additionally, he submitted that the High Court had applied the test of confusion applicable to a passing off action rather than an infringement action, which are two fundamentally different causes of action. The mere addition of the prefix "SAI" before the registered mark "RENAISSANCE" could not save the Respondents-Defendants. For this proposition, he relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah, reported in (2002) 3 SCC 65, Ruston and Hornsby Limited v. Zamindara Engineering Co., reported in (1969) 2 SCC 727, and Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories, reported in (1965) 1 SCR 737.
The Respondents-Defendants' counsel, Shri B.C. Sitarama Rao, defended the High Court's judgment and argued that "RENAISSANCE" is a generic English word, that the adoption was honest and religiously motivated, that the suit was barred by acquiescence and delay, and that the class of customers was entirely different. He relied on the Supreme Court judgments in Khoday Distilleries Limited v. Scotch Whisky Association, reported in (2008) 10 SCC 723, Nandhini Deluxe v. Karnataka Cooperative Milk Producers Federation Limited, reported in (2018) 9 SCC 183, Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Limited, reported in (1960) 1 SCR 968, and Neon Laboratories Limited v. Medical Technologies Limited, reported in (2016) 2 SCC 672.
During the hearing, Shri Viswanathan placed documents on record to show that the Respondents-Defendants had in the meantime discontinued using the term "RENAISSANCE" from their hotel's name and signage, which the Supreme Court treated as an acknowledgment by them that their use had indeed amounted to infringement.
Reasoning and Analysis of the Court
Justice B.R. Gavai, writing the judgment for a bench comprising Justices L. Nageswara Rao and B.V. Nagarathna, conducted a detailed and methodical examination of the evolution of Indian trademark legislation, the scheme of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and the relevant precedents before arriving at its conclusions.
The Court began its analysis by tracing the history of trademark legislation in India. It noted that at the time of independence the governing law was the Trade Marks Act, 1940, Section 21 of which gave registered proprietors the exclusive right to use their mark in relation to the goods for which it was registered and declared that any use of an identical or deceptively similar mark in relation to those goods would amount to infringement. Thereafter, recognising that the 1940 Act was inadequate for a rapidly developing economy, the Parliament enacted the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. Section 29 of the 1958 Act dealt with infringement and required that the defendant's use be likely to deceive or cause confusion. In 1999, with increasing globalization, the need for investment flows, and the requirement of simplification and harmonisation of trademark management systems, Parliament enacted the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which came into force on 15th September, 2003. Importantly, one of the stated objects of the 1999 Act was specifically to prohibit the use of someone else's trade mark as part of a corporate name or the name of a business concern.
The Court then set out in detail the provisions of Sections 28, 29, 30, and 31 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and analysed each sub-section with care. The Court noted that Section 28(1) gives the registered proprietor of a trademark the exclusive right to use the mark in relation to the goods or services for which it is registered and the right to sue for infringement. Section 29 contains multiple sub-sections dealing with different scenarios of infringement. The Court explained that Section 29(2) deals with three different eventualities: under clause (a), the defendant's mark is identical to the registered mark and the goods or services are similar; under clause (b), the defendant's mark is similar to the registered mark and the goods or services are identical or similar; and under clause (c), the defendant's mark is identical to the registered mark and the goods or services are also identical. The critical importance of Section 29(3) is that in any case falling under clause (c) of Section 29(2), the Court shall presume that confusion is likely. This presumption is mandatory; it is not discretionary. Critically, the Court pointed out that Section 29(2) uses the word "or" between clauses (a), (b), and (c), meaning that satisfaction of any one of the three conditions is sufficient to establish infringement.
Section 29(4), on the other hand, deals with a completely different situation, one where the defendant's mark is identical or similar to the registered mark but is used in relation to goods or services that are not similar to those covered by the registration. Only in such a case does the plaintiff need to additionally establish that the registered trademark has a reputation in India and that the defendant's use takes unfair advantage of or is detrimental to the distinctive character or repute of the registered mark. Crucially, the Court pointed out that Section 29(4) uses the word "and" between its clauses (a), (b), and (c), meaning that all three conditions must be satisfied together.
The Court identified the fundamental error of the High Court as having applied Section 29(4) to facts that were squarely covered by Section 29(2)(c) read with Section 29(3). Both the trial court and the High Court had themselves concurrently found that the Respondents-Defendants' mark "SAI RENAISSANCE" was identical or similar to the Appellant-Plaintiff's registered trademark "RENAISSANCE" and that both parties were operating in relation to goods and services in Class 16 and Class 42. Having made those findings, the High Court had no business going into the question of whether the Appellant-Plaintiff's mark had reputation in India, or whether the class of customers was different, or whether the Respondents-Defendants' adoption was honest. These considerations are relevant only under Section 29(4), which applies to dissimilar goods or services. They are entirely irrelevant when the marks and goods or services are identical or similar.
The Court placed extensive reliance on the classic judgment in Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories, reported in (1965) 1 SCR 737, in which the Supreme Court had explained with great clarity the fundamental difference between an action for passing off and an action for infringement of a registered trademark. Passing off is a common law remedy that is essentially an action for deceit, where a person passes off his goods as the goods of another. To succeed in passing off, the plaintiff must show that the get-up, packaging, visual appearance, and overall presentation of the defendant's goods are likely to cause confusion in the minds of ordinary consumers. The defendant in a passing off case can escape liability by showing that there are sufficient differences in the overall presentation to distinguish his goods from those of the plaintiff. An infringement action, by contrast, is a statutory remedy. The use by the defendant of the plaintiff's registered trademark, or any colourably similar mark in relation to similar goods, is the very essence of the cause of action. If the defendant has adopted the essential features of the plaintiff's registered mark, the fact that the overall get-up or presentation is different, or that the prices are different, or that the class of customers is different, is entirely irrelevant and immaterial to the question of infringement. In an infringement action, once the court finds that there is sufficient similarity amounting to imitation, no further evidence is required to establish that the plaintiff's statutory rights have been violated.
The Court also relied upon Ruston and Hornsby Limited v. Zamindara Engineering Co., reported in (1969) 2 SCC 727, where the Supreme Court had reiterated these principles and held that in an infringement action, even if the get-up of the defendant's goods was so different that there would be no probability of actual deception of the public, an injunction would still be issued as soon as it was proved that the defendant was improperly using the plaintiff's mark. No case of actual deception and no actual damage needed to be proved.
Beyond Section 29(2)(c) read with Section 29(3), the Court found two additional independent grounds for holding infringement established. Firstly, under Section 29(5) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, a registered trademark is infringed if a person uses it as a trade name or part of a trade name, or as the name of a business concern or part of the name of a business concern dealing in goods or services for which the trademark is registered. In the present case, the Respondents-Defendants were using the word "RENAISSANCE" as the name of their hotel, which was their trade name and business name, in relation to hotel and hospitality services covered by the Appellant-Plaintiff's registrations in Classes 16 and 42. This squarely attracted Section 29(5). Secondly, under Section 29(9) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, where the distinctive elements of a registered trademark consist of or include words, the trademark may be infringed by the spoken use of those words as well as by their visual representation. The words "RENAISSANCE" and "SAI RENAISSANCE" are both phonetically and visually similar, and therefore infringement was established under Section 29(9) as well.
The Court then addressed the High Court's erroneous reliance on Section 30(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which provides that a registered trademark is not infringed where a person uses it for the purpose of identifying goods or services as those of the proprietor, provided such use is not detrimental to the distinctive character or repute of the mark. The High Court had cited this provision to suggest that the Respondents-Defendants' use was not detrimental to the Appellant-Plaintiff's mark. The Supreme Court found this to be a glaring error because Section 30(1) contains two conditions joined by the word "and," not "or." The benefit of Section 30(1) is available only if both conditions are fulfilled: the use must be in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters, and the use must not take unfair advantage of or be detrimental to the distinctive character or repute of the trademark. The High Court had looked only at the second condition under Section 30(1)(b) and had completely ignored the first condition under Section 30(1)(a). The Court pointed out that to avail the benefit of Section 30(1), the Respondents-Defendants had to establish that their use was in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters. Merely claiming that the adoption was religiously motivated was not the same as establishing honest practices in industrial or commercial matters.
The Court then invoked two fundamental principles of statutory interpretation to underline the errors of the High Court. The first principle is that of textual and contextual interpretation. Relying on the well-known passage of Justice Chinnappa Reddy in Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd., reported in (1987) 1 SCC 424, the Court held that a statute must be read as a whole, with each section, clause, phrase, and word understood in the context of the overall legislative scheme. The High Court had picked up isolated clauses from Sections 29(4) and 30(1) without reading them in the context of the entire legislative framework, leading to an erroneous conclusion that effectively defeated the purpose for which the 1999 Act was enacted, namely to protect registered trademark owners and prohibit the use of their marks as part of trade names or business names. The second principle is that a part of a section cannot be read in isolation. The Court cited the judgments in Balasinor Nagrik Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya, reported in (1987) 1 SCC 606, and Kalawatibai v. Soiryabai, reported in (1991) 3 SCC 410, both of which hold that construction of a section must be made of all its parts together and no part of a statute can be omitted or construed in isolation.
The Court then dealt with the judgments relied upon by the Respondents-Defendants and distinguished each of them. Khoday Distilleries Limited v. Scotch Whisky Association, reported in (2008) 10 SCC 723, was concerned with a rectification application filed in 1986 in relation to events dating back to 1968, and the question of acquiescence arose because the applicants had waited over a decade after coming to know of the mark before seeking rectification. Moreover, that Court had specifically noted that the Trade Marks Act, 1999 had no application in that case. In the present case, the suit was one for infringement and the 1999 Act squarely applied, making the ratio of Khoday Distilleries inapplicable. The case of Nandhini Deluxe v. Karnataka Cooperative Milk Producers Federation Limited, reported in (2018) 9 SCC 183, involved the marks "Nandhini" and "Nandini," where the visual appearance was different and the products were also different. In the present case, the marks were visually and phonetically similar and the services were in identical classes. The Neon Laboratories case, reported in (2016) 2 SCC 672, arose from an application for temporary injunction and turned on the "first in the market" test, making it inapplicable to a final decree of injunction in an infringement action.
The Court also dealt with the High Court's reliance on Midas Hygiene Industries (P) Limited v. Sudhir Bhatia, reported in (2004) 3 SCC 90. The High Court had extracted the observation from that case to the effect that an injunction becomes necessary if it prima facie appears that the adoption of the mark was dishonest, and had reversed the injunction because it found the adoption by the Respondents-Defendants to be honest. The Supreme Court found that this observation had been taken entirely out of context. The Midas Hygiene case was one involving passing off or infringement of copyright, not trademark infringement in the strict sense. The key sentence the High Court had emphasised was only one part of the paragraph; the very same paragraph also contained the clear statement that in cases of infringement of a trade mark or copyright, normally an injunction must follow. The High Court had cherry-picked one sentence while ignoring the equally significant sentence that came before it.
Final Decision
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal. By its order dated 19th January, 2022, the Court set aside the judgment and order dated 12th April, 2019 of the Single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru in Regular First Appeal No. 1462 of 2012 and restored the judgment and decree dated 21st June, 2012 of the Principal District Judge, Bangalore Rural District, Bangalore in O.S. No. 3 of 2009. The permanent injunction in favour of the Appellant-Plaintiff against the Respondents-Defendants was thus revived. No order as to costs was made.
Points of Law Settled
This judgment settled several important points of trademark law in India under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The Court firmly established that when the defendant's mark is identical or similar to the plaintiff's registered trademark and the goods or services covered are identical or similar, the applicable provisions are Section 29(2)(c) read with Section 29(3), under which the Court is obligated to presume confusion and no further evidence of actual confusion or deception is required. Section 29(4), which requires proof of reputation in India and detriment or unfair advantage, applies only where the goods or services are not similar to those for which the trademark is registered. The Court also confirmed that using a registered trademark as part of a trade name or business name is independently actionable under Section 29(5), and that phonetic and visual similarity attracts liability under Section 29(9). The benefit of Section 30(1) requires satisfaction of both conditions, honest practices and non-detriment, joined by "and," and both must be established together. Adding a religious prefix to a registered trademark does not constitute an honest practice in industrial or commercial matters so as to attract the protection of Section 30(1). The fundamental distinction between an infringement action and a passing off action was also reaffirmed, specifically that questions of actual confusion, class of customers, and overall presentation of goods are irrelevant in an infringement action once imitation of the essential features of the registered mark is established.
Case Details
Title: Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. v. B. Vijaya Sai and Others
Date of Order: 19th January, 2022
Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 404 of 2022 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 21428 of 2019)
Neutral Citation: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 61
Court: Supreme Court of India
Hon'ble Judges: Justice L. Nageswara Rao, Justice B.R. Gavai, and Justice B.V. Nagarathna (Judgment authored by Justice B.R. Gavai)
Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.
Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi
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Headnote
Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. Vs. B. Vijaya Sai and Others — 2022 SCC OnLine SC 61 — Supreme Court of India — Civil Appeal No. 404 of 2022 — Decided: 19.01.2022 — Bench: L. Nageswara Rao, B.R. Gavai and B.V. Nagarathna, JJ. (Judgment by B.R. Gavai, J.)
Trade Marks Act, 1999 — Section 29(2)(c) read with Section 29(3) — Trademark infringement — Mandatory presumption of confusion — Where defendant's mark is identical with plaintiff's registered trademark and the goods or services covered are identical or similar, Court is obligated to presume likelihood of confusion — No further evidence of actual confusion or deception required — High Court erred in applying test under Section 29(4) which applies only to cases where goods or services are not similar to those for which the trademark is registered — Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories, (1965) 1 SCR 737 and Ruston & Hornsby Limited v. Zamindara Engineering Co., (1969) 2 SCC 727 followed.
Section 29(4) — Scope and applicability — Deals exclusively with situations where impugned mark, though identical or similar to registered mark, is used for goods or services which are not similar to those for which the trademark is registered — All three conditions in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 29(4), joined by the word "and," must be cumulatively satisfied — Questions of reputation in India, unfair advantage, and detriment to distinctive character are relevant only under this sub-section — Inapplicable where goods or services are identical or similar.
Section 29(5) — Use of registered trademark as trade name or business name — A registered trademark is infringed where a person uses it as part of his trade name or business concern dealing in goods or services for which the trademark is registered — Use of word "RENAISSANCE" as part of trade name "SAI RENAISSANCE" for hotel services squarely attracted this provision.
Section 29(9) — Phonetic and visual similarity — Infringement can be established by spoken use of the distinctive words constituting a registered trademark as well as by visual representation — "SAI RENAISSANCE" phonetically and visually similar to "RENAISSANCE" constitutes infringement.
Section 30(1) — Limits on effect of registered trademark — Exemption from infringement under this sub-section requires satisfaction of both conditions — (a) use in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters, and (b) use not detrimental to distinctive character or repute of the mark — Both conditions joined by "and" must be satisfied together — Religious motivation for adoption of impugned mark does not fulfil requirement of honest practices in industrial or commercial matters — High Court erred in considering only clause (b) in isolation.
Infringement action vs Passing off action — Fundamental distinction reiterated — Action for infringement is a statutory remedy conferred on registered proprietor — Once essential features of registered trademark are adopted, questions of actual confusion, different class of customers, different price range, or different overall presentation are immaterial — Action for passing off is a common law remedy essentially an action for deceit where overall presentation is relevant — Defendant who has adopted essential features of registered mark cannot escape infringement by pointing to differences in get-up or customer profile — Trade Marks Act, 1940 — Section 21 — Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 — Section 29 — Legislative history of infringement provisions surveyed.
Statutory Interpretation — Section must be read as a whole — No part may be construed in isolation — Textual interpretation must be matched with contextual interpretation — Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd., (1987) 1 SCC 424; Balasinor Nagrik Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya, (1987) 1 SCC 606; Kalawatibai v. Soiryabai, (1991) 3 SCC 410 — Applied.
Appeal allowed — Judgment and decree of trial court restored — Permanent injunction against Respondents-Defendants revived.
