### Legal News Write-Up
## High Court of Gujarat Dismisses Intra-Court Appeal Under Trade Marks Act, 1999 as Non-Maintainable
* [Case Title] : Raj Abhushan Bhandar Vs The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr.
* Date of Judgment : 23/07/2026
* Case No. : Letters Patent Appeal No. 619 of 2026 in Civil Appeal No. 22 of 2023 with Civil Application No. 1 of 2026
* Neutral Citation : 2026:GUJHC:619-LPA
* [Court Name] : High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad
* Name of Hon'ble Judge : Hon'ble the Chief Justice Mrs. Sunita Agarwal and Hon'ble Mr. Justice D.N. Ray
### Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant filed an intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent challenging a single-judge order dated July 11, 2025. That order had been passed in a statutory appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which itself arose from a decision of the Trademark Registry, Ahmedabad, dated February 27, 2023. The respondents raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal, arguing that the single judge exercised statutory appellate jurisdiction rather than original jurisdiction.
### Dispute before Court
The primary legal issue before the Division Bench was whether an intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is maintainable against a judgment rendered by a single judge of the High Court while exercising statutory appellate jurisdiction under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, specifically in light of the statutory bar under Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
### Reasoning of Judge
The Court examined the statutory evolution of trademark legislation, comparing Section 109 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 with Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Under the 1958 Act, a second appeal to a Division Bench was explicitly provided for, whereas the 1999 Act intentionally omitted this provision. The Court noted that the Registrar of Trade Marks performs quasi-judicial functions and possesses the trappings of a court, exercising adjudicatory powers over civil rights. Consequently, the single judge exercised appellate jurisdiction over an adjudicatory order. The Court held that Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which contains a non-obstante clause overriding the Letters Patent, bars any further appeal from a decree or order decided by a single judge in appellate jurisdiction.
### Decision
The Division Bench upheld the preliminary objection raised by the respondents and dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal as non-maintainable.
### One Important Legal Principle Held in the Case
An intra-court Letters Patent Appeal does not lie against a decision of a single judge passed in exercise of statutory appellate jurisdiction under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, as the Registrar functions as a tribunal with the trappings of a court, and Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 operates as an absolute bar to further appeals.
[Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation ]
### Analytical Article on the Judgment
### Introduction
The maintainability of intra-court appeals against orders passed by a single judge in statutory appellate proceedings has long been a subject of judicial scrutiny. In a significant judgment, the High Court of Gujarat addressed whether a Letters Patent Appeal can be entertained against a judgment delivered by a single judge under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The decision provides clarity on the intersection between special intellectual property statutes, the Letters Patent charter, and the overriding effect of procedural codes governing civil appeals in India.
### Factual and Procedural Background
The controversy originated from an order passed by the Trademark Registry, Ahmedabad, on February 27, 2023. Aggrieved by the statutory authority's determination, an appeal was preferred before the High Court under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The learned single judge, exercising statutory appellate jurisdiction, disposed of the matter through a judgment dated July 11, 2025.
Seeking to challenge the decision of the single judge, the aggrieved party filed an intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, registered as Letters Patent Appeal No. 619 of 2026. Upon the listing of the intra-court appeal, the opposing party raised a preliminary objection regarding its maintainability, asserting that the single judge had exercised appellate powers over a quasi-judicial body and that further appeals were implicitly and explicitly barred by law.
The legislative history of trademark law in India formed a central element of the procedural analysis. Under the former Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, Section 109 specifically provided a two-tier appeal system within the High Court, explicitly allowing a second appeal to a Division Bench against an order passed by a single judge. However, when Parliament repealed the 1958 Act and enacted the Trade Marks Act, 1999, Section 91 was framed without incorporating any provision for a second-tier intra-court appeal. Following the abolition of the Intellectual Property Appellate Board through the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, statutory appeals from the Registrar were directed straight to the High Court.
### Dispute Before the Court
The core legal question presented to the Division Bench was whether an intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies against an order of a single judge passed in a statutory appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
The appellant contended that the High Court’s jurisdiction under the Letters Patent is an independent charter-based power that remains intact unless expressly barred by a statute. It was argued that the Registrar of Trade Marks is merely an administrative authority rather than a civil court, and therefore, proceedings before the Registrar do not attract the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Consequently, the appellant asserted that Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which prohibits further appeals from single-judge decisions, should not apply to trademark appellate proceedings.
Conversely, the respondents submitted that the Registrar of Trade Marks performs quasi-judicial functions, evaluates evidence, decides civil rights between competing parties, and possesses all the trappings of a civil court. Therefore, an appeal under Section 91 of the 1999 Act is a regular appellate proceeding. The respondents highlighted that Parliament consciously omitted the provision for a second appeal when replacing the 1958 Act with the 1999 Act. Furthermore, they relied on Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, arguing that its non-obstante clause completely overrides Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, thereby prohibiting any second appeal from an appellate judgment rendered by a single judge.
### Reasoning and Analysis of the Court
The Division Bench undertook a detailed statutory analysis of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, and Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. To determine whether Section 100A applied, the Court evaluated the exact nature and status of the Registrar of Trade Marks.
Examining Sections 19 through 22, 127, 128, and 129 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, alongside the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, the Court observed that the Registrar is vested with powers to receive evidence on affidavit or oral testimony, administer oaths, enforce witness attendance, compel document production, issue commissions, review decisions, and award costs executable as civil court decrees. Applying constitutional precedents regarding statutory authorities, the Court concluded that the Registrar exercises the State's inherent judicial powers to adjudicate disputes over private commercial rights. Thus, the Registrar acts as a tribunal possessing the trappings of a civil court.
Because the proceedings before the Registrar involve binding civil adjudications, the Court held that the appeal before the single judge under Section 91 was a statutory appellate proceeding continuing the original dispute, rather than an exercise of original jurisdiction by the High Court.
The Court then examined Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, which permits intra-court appeals from single-judge judgments but explicitly excludes judgments passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction over orders made by subordinate courts or tribunals.
To reinforce this conclusion, the Court examined Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, introduced by the Amendment Act of 2002. Section 100A states that notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent or other law, where an appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is decided by a single judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. The Court emphasized that the non-obstante clause gives Section 100A absolute overriding effect over Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.
The Court also gave weight to the deliberate legislative shift between the 1958 Act and the 1999 Act. By deliberately excluding the second-appeal mechanism previously present under Section 109(5) of the 1958 Act, Parliament demonstrated a clear intent to restrict litigants to a single round of appeal before the High Court. Allowing a Letters Patent Appeal would circumvent the statutory scheme and defeat the legislative objective of finality and expeditious disposal in commercial intellectual property disputes.
### Final Decision of the Court
The Division Bench of the High Court ruled in favor of the respondents, upholding the preliminary objection. The Court held that the intra-court appeal was barred under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent read with Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Consequently, Letters Patent Appeal No. 619 of 2026, along with connected civil applications for stay, was dismissed as non-maintainable.
### Point of Law Settled
This judgment settles an important procedural principle concerning intellectual property litigation:
1. The Registrar of Trade Marks acts as a quasi-judicial tribunal equipped with the essential trappings of a civil court when adjudicating trademark registration and opposition disputes.
2. A judgment delivered by a single judge of a High Court under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 is rendered in statutory appellate jurisdiction, not original jurisdiction.
3. Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 overrides Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, establishing an absolute bar against filing an intra-court appeal before a Division Bench against a single-judge decision arising from Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
### Case Details
Title of the Case: M/s Raj Abhushan Bhandar v. The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr.
Date of Judgment: 23/07/2026
Case Number: R/Letters Patent Appeal No. 619 of 2026 in R/Civil Appeal No. 22 of 2023
Neutral Citation: 2026:GUJHC:619-LPA
Name of Court: High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble the Chief Justice Mrs. Sunita Agarwal and Hon'ble Mr. Justice D.N. Ray
Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi
Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation .
Headnote of the Judgment:
M/s Raj Abhushan Bhandar v. Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks, High Court of Gujarat, LPA No. 619 of 2026, Decided on 23/07/2026. The appellant filed an intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of Letters Patent against a single-judge order passed in a statutory appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The Division Bench held that the Registrar of Trade Marks functions as a tribunal with trappings of a civil court. The single judge exercised statutory appellate jurisdiction, not original jurisdiction. Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 contains an overriding non-obstante clause that bars further intra-court appeals against appellate decisions of a single judge. The Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed as non-maintainable.
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