Raj Abhushan Bhandar Vs. The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks
Date of Judgment: 23-07-2026
Case No.: Letters Patent Appeal No. 619 of 2026 in Civil Appeal No. 22 of 2023
Neutral Citation: 2026:GUJHC:LPA619
Court Name: High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Sunita Agarwal, Chief Justice, and Hon'ble Mr. Justice D.N. Ray
### Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant filed intra-court appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against a single-judge judgment dated July 11, 2025. That judgment was rendered in a statutory appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which originated from an order passed by the Trademark Registry, Ahmedabad on February 27, 2023. Respondent No. 2 raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeals.
### Dispute before Court
The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether an intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies against a decision of a single judge rendered in a statutory appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
### Reasoning of Judge
The Court held that the Registrar of Trade Marks performs quasi-judicial duties and possesses the trappings of a civil court, making proceedings under Section 91 appellate in nature rather than an exercise of original civil jurisdiction. Furthermore, Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, explicitly bars a second appeal from an order passed by a single judge exercising appellate powers. The conscious omission of a second appeal provision in the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (which previously existed under Section 109(5) of the 1958 Act) reflects legislative intent to restrict statutory appeals to a single tier before the High Court.
### Decision
The Division Bench sustained the preliminary objection and held that the Letters Patent Appeals were not maintainable.
### One Important Legal Principle Held in the Case
An intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent does not lie against a single judge's judgment in a statutory appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, as the Registrar functions with the trappings of a court and Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure bars a second appellate tier.
[Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]
# Maintainability of Letters Patent Appeals Under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999
## Introduction:
The interplay between special intellectual property enactments and general procedural provisions governing appellate remedies often raises significant jurisdictional questions. In a crucial judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat examined whether a further intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is maintainable against a single judge's order passed in a statutory appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
## Factual and Procedural Background:
The dispute arose out of an order dated February 27, 2023, passed by the Trademark Registry, Ahmedabad. Aggrieved by the Registry's decision, statutory appeals were preferred before the High Court under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. On July 11, 2025, a single judge of the High Court adjudicated the appeals. Following this determination, intra-court appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent were filed before the Division Bench. The respondents raised a preliminary objection contending that such appeals were barred by Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the statutory framework of the 1999 Act.
## Dispute Before the Court
The core legal question requiring adjudication was whether an intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent can be entertained against a decision rendered by a single judge exercising appellate jurisdiction under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
The appellants argued that the jurisdiction under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is an independent constitutional charter power that remains available unless expressly or by necessary implication excluded by statute. They contended that because the Registrar is an administrative authority and not a formal civil court, Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to bar an intra-court appeal.
Conversely, the respondents argued that the Registrar functions as a quasi-judicial authority with full trappings of a court while deciding trademark disputes. Consequently, an appeal under Section 91 before a single judge is an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. They submitted that Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure bars any second appeal from a single judge's appellate order, and that Parliament consciously removed the provision for a second appeal when replacing the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 with the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
## Reasoning and Analysis of the Court
The Court conducted a comprehensive analysis of the powers vested in the Registrar under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and the accompanying Trade Marks Rules, 2017. It noted that under Section 127 of the Act, the Registrar is endowed with explicit powers of a civil court, including receiving evidence, administering oaths, enforcing witness attendance, compelling document production, issuing commissions, and reviewing decisions. Moreover, orders regarding costs passed by the Registrar are executable as decrees of a civil court.
By examining established constitutional precedents regarding quasi-judicial authorities, the Court observed that the basic test to determine whether an authority possesses the trappings of a court is whether it has been conferred with statutory power to resolve a dispute between contesting parties in exercise of the State's inherent judicial function. Because the Registrar decides substantial legal rights and liabilities through adversarial evidentiary procedure, the Registrar functions as a tribunal possessing the trappings of a civil court.
As a result, when a single judge hears a statutory appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the judge exercises appellate jurisdiction rather than original jurisdiction. Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure contains a non-obstante clause overriding the Letters Patent and prohibiting any further appeal when a single judge decides an appeal from an order or decree.
Additionally, the Court evaluated the legislative history, highlighting that Section 109(5) of the repealed 1958 Act specifically provided for a second tier of appeal to a Division Bench, whereas Section 91 of the 1999 Act consciously omitted this provision. This omission reflects a clear legislative intent to restrict statutory appeals to a single appellate forum.
## Final Decision of the Court
The Court sustained the preliminary objection raised by the respondents. It held that the intra-court appeals filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of the single judge were not maintainable and accordingly dismissed them.
## Point of Law Settled
This judgment reaffirms that the Registrar of Trade Marks acts as a tribunal with the trappings of a civil court when adjudicating trademark controversies. Consequently, an appeal determined by a single judge under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, constitutes appellate adjudication. By application of Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, further intra-court appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are completely barred.
Title of the Case: M/S Raj Abhushan Bhandar v. The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr.
Date of Judgment: 23/07/2026
Case Number: Letters Patent Appeal No. 619 of 2026 in Civil Appeal No. 22 of 2023
Neutral Citation: 2026:GUJHC:LPA619
Name of Court: High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Sunita Agarwal, Chief Justice, and Hon'ble Mr. Justice D.N. Ray
Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi
Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation .
Headnote of the Judgment:
M/S Raj Abhushan Bhandar v. The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr., High Court of Gujarat. Intra-court appeals under Clause 15 of Letters Patent were filed against a single judge's judgment rendered in a statutory appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The respondents raised preliminary objections on maintainability. The Court held that the Registrar exercises quasi-judicial powers with the trappings of a civil court. Therefore, the single judge exercised appellate jurisdiction, and further intra-court appeals are barred by Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the statutory scheme. Appeals dismissed as not maintainable.
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