Thursday, June 25, 2026

Mr. P. C. Duraisamy Vs. Kewal Krishan Kumar & Anr.

Mr. P. C. Duraisamy Vs. Kewal Krishan Kumar :24.06.2026 : CO(COMM.IPD-TM) 180/2022 : 2026:DHC:5159 :H,J. Tushar Rao Gedela

The Court considered a dispute concerning rectification of the Trade Marks Register and cancellation of the registered trademark "SHAKTI" under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The case arose from allegations that the registered proprietor had neither genuinely used the trademark from the date of its application nor established honest and concurrent use, despite obtaining registration.

The principal question before the Court was whether the registration of the trademark "SHAKTI" was liable to be removed from the Register under Sections 47(1)(a) and 57(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

After examining the material on record and the submissions of the parties, court observed that there was no documentary or tangible evidence demonstrating genuine commercial use of the trademark from the date of application until its registration or thereafter. The Court held that the statutory requirements for maintaining the registration had not been satisfied and that the plea of honest and concurrent use was unsupported by evidence. Emphasizing that a trademark cannot continue on the Register merely on the strength of registration without proof of bona fide use, the Court directed removal of the trademark "SHAKTI" from the Register of Trade Marks within four weeks and disposed of the petition without any order as to costs.

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it is based on limited information and is intended solely for general informational purposes.

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Section 47 (1) (a) of Trademarks Act and Rectification

Introduction

The law relating to trademarks is designed not merely to protect registered rights but also to ensure that the Register of Trade Marks reflects marks that are genuinely used in trade. A registered trademark is a valuable commercial asset, but the law does not permit a proprietor to retain exclusive rights over a mark that has not been honestly and continuously used in connection with goods or services. The decision of the Delhi High Court in Mr. P. C. Duraisamy v. Kewal Krishan Kumar & Anr. is an important illustration of this principle.

The judgment examines the circumstances in which a registered trademark can be removed from the Register on the ground of non-use and clarifies the evidentiary burden resting upon a registered proprietor who seeks to justify continued registration. The Court also considered the scope of Sections 47 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and analysed whether the proprietor could successfully rely upon the doctrine of honest and concurrent use despite the absence of credible evidence of actual commercial use.

The decision is significant for trademark proprietors, businesses, brand owners, intellectual property practitioners and applicants seeking rectification of the Register. It reinforces the principle that registration alone does not guarantee perpetual statutory protection and that genuine commercial use remains the cornerstone of trademark rights under Indian law.

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute centred upon the registered trademark "SHAKTI" in relation to goods falling in Class 30 under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The petitioner approached the Delhi High Court seeking rectification of the Register of Trade Marks by cancellation of the impugned registration.

According to the petitioner, the trademark had been applied for on 12 March 1996 and was eventually registered on 22 May 2018 in favour of the first respondent under Registration No. 701410. The petitioner asserted that despite obtaining registration, neither the registered proprietor nor the subsequent respondent claiming through the proprietor had genuinely used the trademark in the course of trade. It was alleged that the registration had remained on the Register without satisfying the statutory conditions governing use of registered trademarks.

The petitioner relied upon the provisions contained in Section 47(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which permits removal of a registered trademark where there has been no bona fide intention to use the mark and where no bona fide use has in fact taken place within the prescribed period. The petitioner also invoked Section 57 of the Act, contending that the continued presence of the trademark on the Register was without sufficient cause and therefore liable to be rectified.

The respondents resisted the petition and attempted to justify the validity of the registration. Among other submissions, reliance was placed upon judicial precedents recognising the concept of honest and concurrent use. It was argued that the registration deserved protection and that objections relating to similarity of marks or likelihood of confusion were not sustainable.

The Court examined the pleadings, documentary evidence, statutory provisions and authorities cited by both sides before deciding whether the impugned registration should continue on the Register.

Dispute Before the Court

The principal controversy before the Court was whether the registered trademark "SHAKTI" could continue to remain on the Register of Trade Marks despite the petitioner's allegation that there had been no genuine commercial use of the mark from the date of its application until its registration and even thereafter.

The Court was required to determine whether the respondents had produced sufficient documentary evidence establishing bona fide use of the trademark in the marketplace and whether the statutory requirements contained in Section 47(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act had been fulfilled.

Another important issue concerned the applicability of the doctrine of honest and concurrent use. The respondents argued that judicial precedents protecting concurrent users should save the registration, whereas the petitioner maintained that such protection was unavailable because the respondents had failed to establish honest and continuous use through reliable evidence.

The Court also had to consider whether the continued presence of the trademark on the Register amounted to an entry made without sufficient cause so as to justify rectification under Section 57(2) of the Trade Marks Act.

The Court approached the controversy by examining whether the impugned trademark registration satisfied the statutory requirements contained in the Trade Marks Act, 1999. It emphasized that registration of a trademark is not an end in itself. The statutory protection conferred upon a registered proprietor is subject to the obligation that the mark must be genuinely intended to be used and must, in fact, be used in the course of trade. A trademark which remains dormant for years without any commercial exploitation cannot ordinarily continue to enjoy statutory protection merely because it finds a place on the Register.

The Court first examined Section 47(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which empowers the Court to remove a registered trademark if two essential conditions are established. The first condition is that, at the time of applying for registration, there was no bona fide intention on the part of the applicant to use the trademark in relation to the goods or services for which registration was sought. The second condition is that there has, in fact, been no bona fide use of the trademark up to a period of three months before the filing of application. The provision is intended to ensure that the Register contains only those marks which are genuinely associated with commercial activity and not marks that merely block the entry of others into the market.

The Court observed that the burden shifted to the registered proprietor to establish genuine commercial use once the petitioner produced material questioning the validity of the registration. Mere assertions in pleadings or oral submissions were held to be insufficient. Since trademark rights are commercial rights arising out of trade, the existence of such rights must ordinarily be demonstrated through commercial records such as invoices, sales records, advertisements, promotional material, packaging, tax documents, purchase orders, distribution records or other contemporaneous evidence reflecting actual use of the mark.

Upon examining the evidence produced by the respondents, the Court found a complete absence of reliable documentary material demonstrating that the trademark "SHAKTI" had been used from the date of the application dated 12 March 1996, during the long period preceding registration on 22 May 2018, or even thereafter. The Court recorded a categorical finding that there was no tangible evidence showing continuous or genuine commercial use of the trademark. Consequently, the statutory requirement contained in Section 47(1)(a) stood violated. 

The Court next examined Section 57(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which empowers the High Court to rectify the Register where an entry has been made without sufficient cause or where an entry wrongly remains on the Register. The provision serves an important public function. It ensures that the Register remains accurate and reliable and does not continue to reflect registrations which have ceased to satisfy the statutory requirements. According to the Court, once it had been concluded that the statutory conditions under Section 47 had not been fulfilled, the inevitable consequence was that the registration also became vulnerable under Section 57 because it wrongly remained on the Register despite lacking legal justification. 

A substantial part of the arguments advanced by the respondents was founded upon the doctrine of honest and concurrent use. They contended that the registration deserved protection because similar principles had been recognised in earlier judicial precedents. The Court carefully analysed this submission but concluded that the doctrine could not be invoked in the absence of proof of actual use. Honest and concurrent use is an equitable principle intended to protect traders who have independently and honestly adopted similar marks and have genuinely used them over a considerable period. It is not a substitute for evidence of use.

The respondents relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in London Rubber Co. Ltd. v. Durex Products Incorporated, AIR 1963 SC 1882. In that case, the Supreme Court recognised the concept of honest and concurrent use and upheld registration after considering substantial evidence demonstrating long-standing commercial use by the parties. The Delhi High Court distinguished the decision on facts. It observed that, unlike the factual situation before the Supreme Court in London Rubber, the respondents in the present case had failed to produce any documentary evidence establishing honest and concurrent use of the trademark "SHAKTI". Since the very factual foundation necessary for invoking the doctrine was absent, the ratio of the Supreme Court decision could not assist the respondents. 

The respondents also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Nandhini Deluxe v. Karnataka Cooperative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., (2018) 9 SCC 183. In that decision, the Supreme Court had held that the existence of similar trademarks does not automatically result in deception where the parties operate in different fields of business and deal with different goods or services. The Court had emphasised that the likelihood of confusion must always be examined in the factual context of the competing businesses.

The Delhi High Court held that the reliance upon Nandhini Deluxe was misplaced. It observed that the principle laid down in that case applied where the competing marks related to different goods or distinct commercial fields. In the present case, however, both parties dealt with goods falling in Class 30. Consequently, the possibility of confusion and deception was substantially greater. More importantly, the issue before the Court was not merely one of deceptive similarity but of continued registration despite complete absence of proof of bona fide use. Accordingly, the Court held that the ratio of Nandhini Deluxe had no application to the facts before it. 

The Court repeatedly emphasized that registration under the Trade Marks Act creates valuable statutory rights, but those rights are inseparably linked with genuine commercial use. The Act is intended to protect trade, goodwill and consumer confidence rather than to encourage the accumulation of unused registrations. Allowing dormant registrations to remain indefinitely on the Register would unjustifiably restrict honest traders from adopting and registering marks that are genuinely intended for commercial use.

The judgment also reflects the broader policy underlying trademark law. The Register is not merely a record of private rights but a public document relied upon by businesses, consumers and the Trade Marks Registry. Its accuracy and integrity are essential for the effective functioning of the trademark system. Therefore, where the statutory conditions are not satisfied and the registered proprietor cannot establish bona fide use, rectification becomes necessary to preserve the purity of the Register.

After considering the pleadings, documentary evidence, statutory provisions and judicial precedents, the Court concluded that the respondents had failed to discharge the burden of proving genuine commercial use of the trademark. The absence of invoices, sales records, advertisements or any other contemporaneous commercial evidence over an extended period clearly demonstrated that the statutory requirements had not been met. Consequently, the Court held that the trademark registration was liable to be removed under Section 47(1)(a) and that its continued presence on the Register also attracted Section 57(2) of the Trade Marks Act. 

Final Decision of the Court

After analysing the pleadings, documentary evidence and the applicable provisions of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the Court concluded that the respondents had failed to establish bona fide commercial use of the trademark "SHAKTI" from the date of its application on 12 March 1996, up to its registration on 22 May 2018, or even thereafter. The Court found that there was no documentary or tangible evidence demonstrating genuine use of the trademark in the ordinary course of trade. Consequently, the statutory requirements contained in Section 47(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act stood violated.

The Court further held that once the registration had been shown to have remained on the Register without satisfying the statutory conditions, it also attracted Section 57(2) of the Act because the entry had been made without sufficient cause and wrongly continued on the Register.

Accordingly, the Court directed the Registrar of Trade Marks to cancel and remove Trademark Registration No. 701410 for the mark "SHAKTI" from the Register of Trade Marks within four weeks from the receipt of the order. The rectification petition was disposed of along with the pending applications. No order as to costs was passed. 

Point of Law Settled

The judgment reiterates that registration of a trademark is not an absolute or perpetual right. A registered proprietor must be able to establish bona fide intention to use the trademark and genuine commercial use supported by reliable documentary evidence. Mere registration without actual commercial exploitation cannot justify continued statutory protection.

The decision also clarifies that the doctrine of honest and concurrent use cannot be invoked in the absence of convincing evidence showing long-standing, honest and continuous use of the mark. Furthermore, where the statutory requirements under Section 47(1)(a) are violated, the continued presence of the trademark on the Register becomes vulnerable to rectification under Section 57(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

The judgment reinforces the principle that the Register of Trade Marks must contain only those registrations that represent genuine proprietary rights arising from actual commercial use, thereby preserving the integrity of the trademark registration system.

Title of the Case: Mr. P. C. Duraisamy v. Kewal Krishan Kumar & Anr.

Date of Judgment/Order: 24 June 2026

Case Number: CO(COMM.IPD-TM) 180/2022

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:5159

Name of Court: Delhi High Court

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela

Written By:Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer:Images used herein do not reflect the actual images used in the Judgment and are included solely for illustrative purposes. Readers are advised not to treat this article as a substitute for legal advice, as it may contain inadvertent errors in perception, interpretation, or presentation.

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4. Honest and Concurrent Use Rejected: Delhi High Court Rectifies SHAKTI Trademark Registration

5. Delhi High Court Clarifies Law on Trademark Rectification and Non-Use

6. SHAKTI Trademark Removed: Important Delhi High Court Judgment on Trademark Rectification

7. When Can a Registered Trademark Be Cancelled? Delhi High Court Answers

8. Trade Marks Act, 1999: Delhi High Court Strengthens Law Against Dormant Trademark Registrations

9. Documentary Proof of Trademark Use Essential, Rules Delhi High Court

10. Delhi High Court on Sections 47 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act: Comprehensive Analysis

11. Trademark Rectification in India: Delhi High Court Explains Genuine Use Requirement

12. Landmark Delhi High Court Decision on Trademark Non-Use and Register Rectification

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Headnote of the Judgment

Mr. P. C. Duraisamy v. Kewal Krishan Kumar & Anr., Delhi High Court, CO(COMM.IPD-TM) 180/2022, decided on 24 June 2026. The petitioner sought rectification of the Register of Trade Marks by cancellation of the registered trademark "SHAKTI" on the ground of non-use under Sections 47(1)(a) and 57(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The Court found that the registered proprietor failed to establish bona fide commercial use of the trademark from the date of application until registration or thereafter. Holding that the statutory conditions for retaining registration had not been satisfied, the Court directed cancellation and removal of the trademark from the Register within four weeks and disposed of the petition without costs. 

Info-Graphic Thumbnail Prompt

Create a premium 3D hyper-realistic 8K legal news infographic thumbnail in a 14:9 aspect ratio illustrating a trademark rectification dispute involving the cancellation of a registered trademark for non-use. The central visual should depict a glowing metallic trademark certificate being erased from a futuristic digital Trademark Register, symbolizing cancellation under Sections 47 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act. Include elegant legal scales, a polished courtroom-inspired environment, premium legal dashboards, digital trademark registry screens, evidence folders, commercial invoices fading away, and realistic 3D analytical charts showing "Trademark Rectification, Section 47 (1) (a) of TM Act, No Genuine Use". Use premium red, black, gold and metallic silver colour tones with glowing amber highlights, cinematic lighting, realistic reflections, dramatic shadows and modern intellectual property law aesthetics. Keep text extremely minimal with only: "Trademark Cancelled", "Non-Use", and "Section 47 & 57". Avoid clutter. Do not use the name of any court, lawyer, national flag, Ashoka Emblem, government insignia or judicial symbols identifying any institution. Use realistic visual storytelling through legal graphics rather than text. Use attached image as Image of lawyer in lawyers dress at left bottom corner which should cover 20% of entire image area.


Novenco Building & Industry Vs Xero Energy Engineering

Novenco Building & Industry Vs Xero Energy Engineering Solutions : 24.06.2026:OMP No. 123 of 2026 in COMS No. 13 of 2024:Himachal Pradesh HC:H.J.  Ajay Mohan Goel

The Court considered a dispute concerning the filing of a written statement beyond the statutory period prescribed under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The case arose from allegations that the defendants failed to file their written statement within the maximum permissible period after service of summons in a commercial intellectual property dispute.

The principal question before the Court was whether the delay in filing the written statement could be condoned and whether a reply filed to an interim injunction application could be treated as a written statement in a commercial suit.

After examining the material on record and the submissions of the parties, court observed that the Commercial Courts Act prescribes a strict and mandatory outer limit of 120 days for filing a written statement and that courts possess no authority to extend this period thereafter.

The Court held that once the statutory period of 120 days expires, the defendant forfeits the right to file a written statement. The Court further emphasized that permitting a reply to an injunction application to be treated as a written statement after expiry of the statutory period would defeat the legislative intent behind the Commercial Courts Act.

Accordingly, the Court dismissed the defendants’ application seeking condonation of delay and allowed the plaintiff’s application seeking closure of the defendants’ right to file a written statement. The written statement filed by the defendants was ordered to be struck off from the record.

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not treat this as a substitute for legal advise as it is based on limited information and is intended solely for general informational purposes.


Comprehensive Analytical Legal Article

Commercial Courts Act and Written Statement Deadlines

Introduction

The judgment delivered by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh in Novenco Building & Industry A/S v. Xero Energy Engineering Solutions Private Limited & Another is an important reaffirmation of the strict procedural framework governing commercial litigation in India. The decision highlights the legislative intent behind the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, which seeks to ensure speedy adjudication of commercial disputes by imposing rigid timelines for filing pleadings.

The ruling is particularly significant for businesses, intellectual property owners, commercial litigants, and legal practitioners because it reiterates that courts cannot dilute the mandatory timelines prescribed for filing written statements in commercial suits. The decision also addresses an increasingly litigated question, whether a reply filed to an interim injunction application can subsequently be treated as a written statement when the statutory period for filing the written statement has expired.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff instituted a commercial intellectual property suit in June 2024 alleging infringement of its intellectual property rights. Summons were issued and the defendants were served in July 2024.

Instead of filing a written statement, the defendants challenged the maintainability of the suit by filing an application under Order VII Rule 11 dated 28.08.2024 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The High Court accepted the application and rejected the plaint on the ground of non-compliance with Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, which relates to mandatory pre-institution mediation.

The plaintiff challenged the order before the Division Bench of the High Court, but the appeal was dismissed. Thereafter, the plaintiff approached the Supreme Court.

By judgment dated 27 October 2025, the Supreme Court set aside both the order of the Single Judge and the Division Bench and restored the commercial suit to the file of the High Court for adjudication on merits. The Supreme Court observed that in cases involving continuing infringement of intellectual property rights, urgency must be assessed in the context of continuing injury and public interest and that mere delay in instituting a suit does not negate urgency.

Following restoration of the suit, the defendants filed an application seeking condonation of delay in filing their written statement along with the written statement itself. The plaintiff simultaneously sought closure of the defendants' right to file the written statement on the ground that the statutory period of 120 days had already expired.

The controversy therefore centered on whether the written statement could still be taken on record and whether any alternative procedural device could save the defendants from the consequences of delay.

Dispute Before the Court

The principal issue before the Court was whether the defendants had forfeited their right to file a written statement under the Commercial Courts Act.

The defendants argued that because the plaint had initially been rejected and remained so until the Supreme Court restored the suit, the period during which the suit stood rejected should not be counted for determining limitation for filing the written statement. They further contended that the delay was only 33 days and deserved condonation.

As an alternative argument, the defendants submitted that the reply already filed by them to the plaintiff’s application for temporary injunction should be treated as their written statement because the reply substantially addressed the allegations contained in the plaint.

The plaintiff argued that even after excluding the period during which the plaint remained rejected, the aggregate period exceeded the statutory limit of 120 days. The plaintiff further contended that the Commercial Courts Act leaves no discretion with courts once the prescribed period expires and that a reply to an injunction application cannot be substituted for a written statement in commercial litigation.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

The Court first examined the chronology of events and calculated the relevant periods. It noted that approximately 58 days had elapsed between service of summons on 26.06.2024 and rejection of the plaint. After the Supreme Court restored the suit on 27 October 2025, the defendants filed their written statement only on 16 March 2026. Even after granting the defendants every possible benefit, the total period exceeded the statutory ceiling of 120 days.

The Court rejected the argument that limitation would recommence only after the High Court formally restored the suit. It observed that the defendants were represented before the Supreme Court and were fully aware of the restoration order. Even from the date on which the High Court directed restoration of the suit, the written statement was not filed within the permissible period.

A substantial part of the judgment focuses on the statutory scheme introduced by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The Court referred to the special amendments made to Order V Rule 1, Order VIII Rule 1, and Order VIII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. These provisions require a defendant to file a written statement within 30 days, extendable up to a maximum of 120 days from the date of service of summons. Upon expiry of 120 days, the defendant forfeits the right to file the written statement and the court is prohibited from taking it on record.

The Court placed significant reliance upon SCG Contracts (India) Private Limited v. K.S. Chamankar Infrastructure Private Limited & Others, (2019) 12 SCC 210, wherein the Supreme Court categorically held that courts possess no power to extend time beyond 120 days in commercial suits. The judgment was treated as binding authority conclusively settling the issue.

The Court then examined the defendants’ alternative plea that their reply to the interim injunction application should be treated as a written statement.

For this proposition, the defendants relied upon:

Kuldeep Umraosingh Ostwal & Another v. Chandrakant N. Patel & Others, 2010 (2) Mh LJ

and Methodist Episcopal Church, Nagpur & Others v. Methodist Church in India, Mumbai, 2009 (4) Mh LJ.

These Bombay High Court decisions had recognized circumstances in ordinary civil suits where a detailed reply to a temporary injunction application could be adopted as a written statement, particularly when such reply had been filed within the permissible period and reflected an intention to contest the suit.

However, the Court distinguished those authorities on the ground that they were rendered in the context of ordinary civil litigation and before the strict regime introduced by the Commercial Courts Act became applicable.

The Court instead found persuasive the reasoning of the Bombay High Court in:

Flipkart India Pvt. Ltd. & Another v. Flipkart India Pvt. Ltd. & Another, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 664.

In that case, the Bombay High Court held that once the statutory period expires in a commercial suit, a defendant cannot indirectly revive a forfeited right by seeking to convert a reply to an interim application into a written statement.

The Court agreed with this approach and held that permitting such a course would effectively nullify the mandatory legislative mandate. The right that accrues to the plaintiff upon expiry of the statutory period is substantive in nature and cannot be defeated through procedural devices.

The Court emphasized that a written statement in a commercial suit must comply with the special procedural framework created by the Commercial Courts Act. Any interpretation permitting circumvention of the statutory embargo would undermine the objective of expeditious disposal of commercial disputes.

Final Decision of the Court

The Court concluded that the defendants had failed to file their written statement within the mandatory period prescribed by the Commercial Courts Act.

The application seeking condonation of delay in filing the written statement was dismissed. The Court further rejected the request to treat the reply filed to the interim injunction application as a written statement.

The plaintiff’s application seeking closure of the defendants’ right to file a written statement was allowed. Consequently, the written statement filed by the defendants was ordered to be struck off the record and both applications were disposed of.

Point of Law Settled

The judgment reaffirms that in commercial suits governed by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, the outer limit of 120 days for filing a written statement is mandatory and non-extendable. Once the period expires, the defendant forfeits the right to file a written statement and the court lacks jurisdiction to grant any further extension.

The decision further clarifies that a defendant cannot circumvent this statutory embargo by seeking to have a reply filed to an interim injunction application treated as a written statement after expiry of the prescribed period. Such an approach would defeat the legislative objective of ensuring speedy and efficient resolution of commercial disputes.

Title of the Case: Novenco Building & Industry Vs Xero Energy Engineering Solutions Private Limited & Another

Date of Judgment/Order: 24.06.2026

Case Number: OMP No. 123 of 2026 & OMP No. 213 of 2026 in COMS No. 13 of 2024

Name of Court: High Court of Himachal Pradesh

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Justice Ajay Mohan Goel

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Images used herein do not reflect actual images used in Judgement and that the same are for illustrative purpose only. Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

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  5. Commercial Litigation in India: Strict Enforcement of Order VIII Rule 1 CPC

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Headnote of the Judgment

Novenco Building & Industry A/S v. Xero Energy Engineering Solutions Pvt. Ltd. & Another, High Court of Himachal Pradesh, OMP No. 123 of 2026 & OMP No. 213 of 2026 in COMS No. 13 of 2024, decided on 24.06.2026. The Court considered whether a written statement filed beyond the statutory period prescribed under the Commercial Courts Act could be taken on record and whether a reply to an interim injunction application could be treated as a written statement. Holding that the outer limit of 120 days for filing a written statement in a commercial suit is mandatory and non-extendable, the Court dismissed the defendants’ application for condonation of delay, rejected the request to treat the injunction reply as a written statement, allowed the plaintiff’s application seeking closure of the defendants’ right to file a written statement, and struck the written statement off the record.


Info-graphic Thumbnail Prompt

Create a 3D Hyper-Realistic 8K Quality Legal Infographic, Aspect Ratio 14:9. Modern corporate-commercial litigation theme. Central visual showing a large countdown timeline marked “30 Days → 120 Days → Right Forfeited”. Display a commercial dispute dashboard with legal documents, contract files, intellectual property symbols, courtroom-style scales of justice, digital clocks, deadline alerts, and compliance indicators. Include a comparison table showing “Writtn Statement within 120 Days = Permissible” and “Beyond 120 Days = Not Permissible”. Add a graph illustrating expiry of statutory timeline and forfeiture of rights. Show a rejected document icon representing a struck-off written statement. Use sophisticated blue, silver and professional legal-tech aesthetics. Use minimal text such as “Novenco Building & Industry Vs Xero Energy Engineering" "Commercial Suit”,  "HIMACHAL PRADESH HIGH COURT" “120 Days Limit”, “No Extension”, “Written Statement Struck Off”. Include business dispute visuals and procedural timeline flow. Avoid using names of courts, lawyers, national flags, tricolor, Ashoka Emblem, or any government insignia. Use generic professional imagery and commercial litigation concepts. Use attached image as Image of lawyer in lawyers dress at left bottom corner which should cover 20 % of entire image area.

Tuesday, June 23, 2026

Shaafi Naturcure LLP Vs. Assistant Controller of Patents

Brief Legal News Write-Up

Shaafi Naturcure LLP Vs Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs:22.06.2026 : C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 109/2022 : 2026:DHC:5157:Tushar Rao Gedela

The Court considered a dispute concerning the patentability of a herbal powder composition claimed to be useful for the treatment of asthma. The case arose from allegations that the Patent Controller had wrongly refused Patent Application No. 201911048481 titled “A Herbal Powder Composition for the Treatment of Asthma” on the grounds of lack of invention, absence of inventive step, traditional knowledge exclusion, and insufficient disclosure under the Patents Act, 1970.

The principal question before the Court was whether a composition comprising six herbs allegedly capable of treating asthma constituted a patentable invention and whether post-filing evidence could be relied upon to establish inventive step and technical advancement.

After examining the material on record and the submissions of the parties, court observed that all six ingredients forming part of the claimed composition were already known in traditional medicine for treatment of asthma and related respiratory ailments. The Court further found that the applicant's attempt to establish novelty, synergy, efficacy, and treatment of five types of asthma through an affidavit and additional data was unsupported by the original specification and therefore could not be relied upon.

The Court held that post-filing evidence cannot be used to establish a technical effect for the first time and can only confirm an effect already disclosed or embedded in the patent specification. The Court emphasized that a combination of traditionally known ingredients for the same therapeutic purpose, coupled with routine optimization of proportions, falls within the exclusion contained in Section 3(p) of the Patents Act.

Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the refusal of the patent application, holding that the invention lacked novelty and inventive step, constituted an aggregation of traditional knowledge, and failed to satisfy the disclosure requirements under Sections 10(4)(a) and 10(4)(b) of the Patents Act.

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not treat this as a substitute for legal advise as it is based on limited information and is intended solely for general informational purposes.

Comprehensive Analytical Legal Article

Biological Diversity Act and the Patents Act operate in distinct spheres

Introduction

The decision in Shaafi Naturcure LLP v. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs is a significant addition to Indian patent jurisprudence dealing with traditional knowledge-based inventions. The judgment addresses important questions regarding the patentability of herbal formulations, the scope of inventive step in traditional medicine, the evidentiary value of post-filing experimental data, and the relationship between the Patents Act, 1970 and the Biological Diversity Act, 2002.

The ruling is particularly relevant for innovators, pharmaceutical companies, herbal medicine manufacturers, patent professionals, and researchers seeking patent protection for formulations derived from traditional knowledge. The judgment reinforces the principle that merely combining known traditional ingredients and optimizing their proportions does not automatically qualify for patent protection unless genuine technical advancement and inventive ingenuity are demonstrated.

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, Shaafi Naturcure LLP, filed Indian Patent Application No. 201911048481 on 27 November 2019 for an invention titled “A Herbal Powder Composition for the Treatment of Asthma.” The claimed invention related to a herbal formulation comprising six ingredients, namely Tephrosia Purpurea, Cuscuta Reflexa, Morinda Citrifolia, Terminalia Arjuna, Piper Longum, and Piper Nigrum.

Following examination, a First Examination Report was issued on 1 January 2020 raising objections under Sections 2(1)(j), 3(p), 10(4)(a), and 10(4)(b) of the Patents Act, 1970. The applicant submitted a response along with amended claims and subsequently participated in a hearing before the Patent Office.

The Patent Controller eventually rejected the application on 16 September 2020. The Controller concluded that the claimed invention lacked novelty and inventive step, represented an aggregation of traditional knowledge, and failed to sufficiently disclose the invention and its best method of performance.

Aggrieved by the refusal, the appellant preferred an appeal before the Delhi High Court under Section 117A of the Patents Act.

During the appellate proceedings, the appellant relied extensively on an inventor's affidavit and supporting materials claiming that the composition exhibited synergistic effects, treated five categories of asthma, and had been tested on approximately 300 individuals with positive results.

The respondent defended the rejection order and argued that the additional material could not cure deficiencies in the original specification.

Dispute Before the Court

The principal dispute before the Court concerned whether the claimed herbal composition satisfied the requirements of patentability under Indian law.

The appellant contended that the invention involved a unique selection of six herbs from a large pool of medicinal plants traditionally associated with respiratory disorders. According to the appellant, the inventive contribution lay in identifying specific proportions of the ingredients which allegedly produced superior therapeutic results.

The appellant further argued that the invention demonstrated unexpected synergy and that the Patent Controller failed to properly appreciate the inventor's affidavit and supporting data. It was also argued that approval obtained from the National Biodiversity Authority under the Biological Diversity Act supported the patentability of the invention.

The respondent argued that each of the six ingredients was already known in traditional medicine for treatment of asthma or related respiratory conditions. The respondent further contended that the claimed invention merely combined known traditional ingredients and represented routine experimentation rather than genuine innovation.

The respondent also submitted that the affidavit sought to introduce entirely new technical features and claims that were absent from the original specification and therefore could not be considered.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

The Court first examined the argument based on the Biological Diversity Act, 2002. The appellant argued that once approval had been obtained from the National Biodiversity Authority, the objection under Section 3(p) of the Patents Act should no longer survive.

The Court rejected this contention. It held that the Biological Diversity Act and the Patents Act operate in distinct spheres. The Biological Diversity Act primarily regulates access to biological resources, conservation of biodiversity, and equitable sharing of benefits arising from utilization of biological resources. It does not authorize the National Biodiversity Authority to assess patentability.

The Court observed that approval under the Biological Diversity Act is merely a regulatory requirement and has no bearing on whether an invention satisfies the patentability standards under the Patents Act.

The Court then examined the inventor's affidavit. The affidavit asserted that the invention could cure five categories of asthma and contained extensive data regarding efficacy and side effects. However, the Court found that these claims were absent from the complete specification originally filed before the Patent Office.

The Court noted that the specification did not disclose any classification of asthma into five categories, nor did it contain supporting evidence for such classification. Consequently, these assertions could not be considered during patent examination or appeal.

The Court also found significant inconsistencies between the specification and the affidavit. While the affidavit claimed that altering ingredient ratios could lead to adverse side effects, the original specification contained no such disclosure. More importantly, one formulation disclosed in the affidavit fell within the claimed ranges yet allegedly produced undesirable effects, undermining the applicant's own assertions regarding efficacy and synergy.

The Court relied extensively on AstraZeneca AB & Anr. v. Alkem Laboratories Limited, CS (COMM) 410/2020, decided on 02.11.2020, which in turn referred to Generics (UK) Ltd. v. Yeda Research and Development Company Ltd., (2017) EWHC 2629 (Pat). The Court reiterated the principle that post-filing evidence may only confirm a technical effect already disclosed or reasonably inferable from the specification. Such evidence cannot be used to establish a technical effect for the first time.

Applying this principle, the Court held that the affidavit attempted to introduce new technical effects and supporting data that were not disclosed in the original specification and therefore could not be relied upon.

The Court further scrutinized the examples contained in the specification itself. It found that certain examples demonstrated significant relief from asthma even when only four ingredients were used. This directly contradicted the applicant's claim that the specific six-ingredient combination produced the alleged synergistic effect.

As a result, the Court concluded that the alleged synergy was not established.

The Court also analysed the prior art documents cited by the Patent Office. These references demonstrated that each of the six herbal ingredients had already been traditionally used for asthma, bronchitis, cough, or related respiratory ailments. The Court therefore concluded that the claimed formulation did not demonstrate any meaningful technical advancement over the existing state of knowledge.

The Court then considered Section 3(p) of the Patents Act, which excludes inventions that are essentially traditional knowledge or an aggregation of known properties of traditionally known components.

Particular reliance was placed on the Guidelines for Processing Patent Applications Relating to Traditional Knowledge and Biological Material, 2012. The Court referred to Guiding Principle 2, which treats combinations of plants already known for treatment of the same disease as obvious combinations. The Court also relied on Guiding Principle 4, which states that discovering optimum ranges of traditionally known ingredients through routine experimentation is not inventive.

Applying these principles, the Court held that the invention was essentially a combination of herbs already known for treating asthma and therefore fell squarely within the exclusion under Section 3(p).

The Court further held that the specification failed to fully and particularly describe the invention and failed to disclose the best method of performing it, thereby attracting objections under Sections 10(4)(a) and 10(4)(b).

Final Decision of the Court

The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the order of the Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs refusing Patent Application No. 201911048481.

The Court concluded that the claimed invention lacked novelty and inventive step under Sections 2(1)(j) and 2(1)(ja) of the Patents Act. It further held that the invention constituted an aggregation of traditionally known ingredients and was therefore barred by Section 3(p).

The Court also held that the complete specification failed to satisfy the disclosure requirements under Sections 10(4)(a) and 10(4)(b).

Consequently, the refusal order was affirmed and the appeal was dismissed without costs.

Point of Law Settled

The judgment reinforces several important principles of Indian patent law.

First, approval obtained under the Biological Diversity Act does not establish patentability and cannot override objections under the Patents Act.

Second, post-filing experimental data may only corroborate a technical effect already disclosed in the patent specification. Such evidence cannot be used to introduce new technical features or establish inventive step for the first time.

Third, combining multiple traditionally known ingredients already recognized for treatment of the same disease is ordinarily regarded as an obvious combination and may fall within the exclusion under Section 3(p).

Fourth, routine optimization of proportions or ranges of known traditional ingredients does not constitute an inventive step unless genuine technical advancement or unexpected results are clearly demonstrated.

Finally, patent specifications must independently disclose the invention, its technical contribution, and the best method of performing it. Deficiencies in disclosure cannot be cured through later affidavits or supplementary evidence.

Title of the Case: Shaafi Naturcure LLP v. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs

Date of Judgment/Order: 22.06.2026

Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 109/2022

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:5157

Name of Court:Delhi High Court

Name of Hon'ble Judge:Tushar Rao Gedela

Written By:Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Images used herein do not reflect actual images used in Judgement and that the same are for illustrative purpose only. Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

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  2. Shaafi Naturcure LLP Patent Appeal Dismissed: Delhi High Court on Section 3(p) Patents Act
  3. Can Herbal Formulations Be Patented? Delhi High Court Clarifies Law on Traditional Knowledge
  4. Post-Filing Evidence Cannot Create Inventive Step: Delhi High Court Patent Ruling Explained
  5. Patentability of Ayurvedic and Herbal Compositions After Shaafi Naturcure Judgment
  6. Delhi High Court on Traditional Knowledge and Patent Protection for Herbal Medicines
  7. Section 3(p) Patents Act Explained Through Shaafi Naturcure LLP Case
  8. Inventive Step in Herbal Formulations: Key Takeaways from Delhi High Court Decision
  9. Biodiversity Approval Does Not Guarantee Patentability, Rules Delhi High Court
  10. Patent Rejection Upheld for Herbal Asthma Treatment Composition: Detailed Legal Analysis

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Headnote of the Judgment

Shaafi Naturcure LLP Vs. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs, decided by the Delhi High Court in C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 109/2022, concerned an appeal challenging refusal of a patent application relating to a herbal powder composition for treatment of asthma. The Patent Controller had rejected the application under Sections 2(1)(j), 2(1)(ja), 3(p), 10(4)(a) and 10(4)(b) of the Patents Act, 1970. The Court held that the claimed six-herb formulation consisted of ingredients already traditionally known for treatment of asthma and that alleged synergy and technical advancement were not established in the original specification. The Court further ruled that post-filing affidavits and experimental data cannot be used to introduce new technical effects. Holding that the invention amounted to an aggregation of traditional knowledge and lacked inventive step, the Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the patent refusal.


Infographic Thumbnail Prompt

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Monday, June 22, 2026

Devans Modern Breweries Limited Vs Cartel Bros Private Limited

Brief Legal News Write-Up

Devans Modern Breweries Limited Vs. Cartel Bros Private Limited:22.06.2026:CS(COMM) 346/2026:2026:DHC:5156: Tushar Rao Gedela, H.J.

The Court considered a trademark infringement and passing off dispute concerning the use of the mark “GODFATHER” in relation to alcoholic beverages. The case arose from allegations that the defendants proposed to launch whisky products using the mark “GODFATHER” and “GODFATHER’S”, despite the plaintiff being the registered proprietor of the long-standing “GODFATHER” trademark.

The principal question before the Court was whether the defendants’ use of “GODFATHER” as part of their whisky branding infringed the plaintiff’s registered trademark rights and whether beer and whisky could be treated as allied and cognate goods for the purposes of trademark protection.

After examining the material on record and the submissions of the parties, court observed that registration of a trademark confers enforceable statutory rights and that mere allegations of non-use do not deprive a registered proprietor of protection unless the registration is successfully rectified or cancelled. The Court further found that beer and whisky are allied and cognate goods and that the dominant and essential feature of the defendants’ proposed marks remained “GODFATHER”, which was deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s registered trademark.

The Court held that the defendants’ use of “GODFATHER” or “GODFATHER’S” was likely to cause association with the plaintiff and could unfairly exploit the goodwill and reputation acquired by the plaintiff over four decades.

Accordingly, the Court allowed the interim injunction application and restrained the defendants from manufacturing, marketing, selling, advertising, or using the marks “GODFATHER” or “GODFATHER’S” in relation to whisky during the pendency of the suit. The defendants were also directed to remove all online advertisements, listings, and promotional content bearing the impugned marks.

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not treat this as a substitute for legal advise as it is based on limited information and is intended solely for general informational purposes.


Registered Trademark Protection Despite Non-Use

Introduction

Trademark disputes in the alcoholic beverage industry frequently raise complex questions regarding brand identity, consumer perception, reputation, and the extent of protection available to registered trademarks. The decision in Devans Modern Breweries Limited v. Cartel Bros Private Limited & Anr. is significant because it addresses whether a long-established trademark used primarily for beer can prevent another business from using the same mark for whisky.

The judgment examines the scope of trademark protection under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, particularly where competing products fall in different trademark classes but belong to the broader category of alcoholic beverages. The Court also considered important principles relating to non-use of trademarks, allied and cognate goods, likelihood of confusion, dilution of reputation, and the anti-dissection rule applicable to composite marks.

The ruling is particularly relevant for trademark owners, businesses launching new brands, intellectual property practitioners, and companies operating in industries where brand reputation constitutes a valuable commercial asset.

Factual and Procedural Background

Devans Modern Breweries Limited claimed to be one of India's leading manufacturers of alcoholic beverages and asserted long-standing use of the trademark “GODFATHER” since 1984 in relation to beer. The company possessed registrations for the mark in Class 32 for beer and also held registrations in Class 33 covering alcoholic beverages other than beer, including whisky and rum. The plaintiff contended that over several decades of commercial use, advertising, sales promotion, and market presence, the mark “GODFATHER” had acquired substantial goodwill and reputation.

According to the plaintiff, it discovered social media announcements indicating that Cartel Bros Private Limited intended to launch whisky products bearing the mark “GODFATHER”. Further investigation revealed that the defendants had filed trademark applications in Class 33 incorporating the word “GODFATHER”, including applications filed on a proposed-to-be-used basis in early 2026.

The plaintiff instituted a commercial suit for trademark infringement and passing off and simultaneously sought an interim injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

The defendants resisted the application, contending that they proposed to market whisky under a composite mark that prominently featured “THE GLENWALK” and “BY SANJAY DUTT”, with “GODFATHER’S” appearing only as one component of the overall branding. The defendants also argued that the plaintiff had not substantially used the “GODFATHER” mark in relation to whisky for several years and therefore should not be entitled to exclusive protection in that segment.

Dispute Before the Court

The Court was required to determine whether the plaintiff's trademark registrations remained enforceable despite allegations of limited use in relation to whisky.

The Court also had to decide whether beer and whisky could be regarded as allied and cognate goods even though they are classified separately under trademark law.

Another important question was whether the defendants’ proposed branding, including “THE GLENWALK GODFATHER’S BY SANJAY DUTT”, was sufficiently different from the plaintiff’s mark to avoid infringement and passing off.

The parties also disputed whether the anti-dissection rule prevented the Court from focusing on the word “GODFATHER” in isolation and whether consumers were likely to associate the defendants’ whisky with the plaintiff’s well-known alcoholic beverage brand.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

The Court began by examining the statutory framework governing registered trademarks. It referred to Sections 18, 28 and 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and emphasized that registration itself grants enforceable proprietary rights. The Court observed that a registered proprietor can sue for infringement notwithstanding allegations of non-use unless the registration is first removed or rectified in accordance with law. The Court relied upon Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co., (1995) 5 SCC 545, which recognized that statutory trademark rights are not dependent upon continuous use.

The defendants had argued that the plaintiff had not meaningfully used the “GODFATHER” mark for whisky after 2013. The Court, however, noted that the plaintiff had produced invoices and supporting material indicating use of the mark for whisky and rum. While the evidentiary value of those documents would ultimately be tested at trial, the Court found them sufficient at the interim stage to support a prima facie case of use.

A major issue concerned whether beer and whisky were allied and cognate goods. The Court observed that both products are alcoholic beverages, are sold through common trade channels, are available at the same retail outlets, and are regulated under similar excise frameworks. Although differences existed in price, alcohol content, storage requirements, and consumer preferences, those distinctions were not decisive. The Court held that the nature, purpose, and commercial relationship between the products justified treating them as allied and cognate goods.

While reaching this conclusion, the Court referred to several precedents including:

  • FDC Limited v. Docsuggest Healthcare Services Pvt. Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine Del 6381;
  • Raj Kumar Sharma v. Sandeep Kumar, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 492;
  • Radico Khaitan Ltd. v. Devans Modern Breweries Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine Del 7483;
  • Today Tea Ltd. v. Today Foods Pvt. Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine Del 8345;
  • Preetendra Singh Aulakh v. Green Light Foods Pvt. Ltd., MANU/DE/2853/2023.

The Court next considered the defendants’ reliance on the anti-dissection rule and the decision of the Supreme Court in Pernod Ricard India Pvt. Ltd. v. Karamveer Singh Chhabra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1701. While acknowledging that composite marks must ordinarily be assessed as a whole, the Court held that the dominant and essential feature of the defendants’ branding remained the word “GODFATHER”. The addition of “THE GLENWALK” and “BY SANJAY DUTT” did not sufficiently dilute the prominence of that expression.

The Court also noted that the defendants had earlier sought registration of “THE GODFATHER” and had responded to objections raised by the Trade Marks Registry concerning the plaintiff’s existing registrations. This demonstrated awareness of the plaintiff’s rights and cast doubt on the bona fides of the adoption.

Ultimately, the Court concluded that the plaintiff’s mark had acquired substantial goodwill over four decades and that consumers were likely to associate the defendants’ whisky products with the plaintiff. The Court found that the ingredients of Section 29(4) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 relating to dilution and unfair advantage were prima facie satisfied.

Final Decision of the Court

The Court held that the plaintiff had established a strong prima facie case for grant of interim relief. It found that continued use of “GODFATHER” or “GODFATHER’S” by the defendants was likely to dilute the plaintiff’s trademark and cause consumer association with the plaintiff’s business.

The interim injunction application was allowed. The defendants, their officers, agents, successors, and all persons acting on their behalf were restrained from manufacturing, bottling, marketing, advertising, selling, exporting, or otherwise using the marks “GODFATHER” or “GODFATHER’S” in relation to whisky during the pendency of the suit.

The defendants were also directed to remove all online advertisements, listings, social media posts, and digital content bearing the impugned marks and to initiate take-down requests wherever such content had been published.

Point of Law Settled

The judgment reinforces the principle that a validly registered trademark remains enforceable unless rectified or cancelled in accordance with law, and allegations of non-use alone do not defeat infringement claims at the interim stage.

The decision further clarifies that beer and whisky may constitute allied and cognate goods despite being classified separately, where their nature, trade channels, consumer base, and commercial realities demonstrate a sufficient relationship.

The ruling also reiterates that the anti-dissection rule does not protect a composite mark where the dominant and essential feature is identical or deceptively similar to another party’s registered trademark. Courts may grant injunctive relief where such use is likely to cause confusion, dilution, or unfair exploitation of goodwill.

Title of the Case: Devans Modern Breweries Limited Vs. Cartel Bros Private Limited & Anr.
Date of Judgment/Order: 22.06.2026
Case Number: CS(COMM) 346/2026
Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:5156
Name of Court: High Court of Delhi
Name of Hon'ble Judge: Justice Tushar Rao Gedela

Written By:Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Images used herein do not reflect actual images used in Judgement and that the same are for illustrative purpose only. Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

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  4. Devans Modern Breweries Wins Interim Injunction in GODFATHER Trademark Litigation
  5. Delhi High Court on Trademark Dilution and Composite Marks: GODFATHER Judgment Analysed
  6. GODFATHER vs Glenwalk Godfather’s: Detailed Analysis of Delhi High Court Decision
  7. Registered Trademark Protection Despite Non-Use: Delhi High Court Clarifies Law
  8. Section 29 Trade Marks Act Explained Through GODFATHER Trademark Dispute
  9. Trademark Infringement in Alcohol Industry: Key Takeaways from Devans Modern Breweries Case
  10. Delhi High Court Reaffirms Protection of Well-Known Alcohol Brand Trademarks

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Headnote of the Judgment

Devans Modern Breweries Limited Vs Cartel Bros Private Limited & Anr., High Court of Delhi, CS(COMM) 346/2026. The plaintiff sought an interim injunction restraining the defendants from using “GODFATHER” and “GODFATHER’S” for whisky products, alleging trademark infringement and passing off. The Court held that registration of a trademark confers enforceable statutory rights even where non-use is alleged unless the registration is validly rectified. It further held that beer and whisky are allied and cognate goods and that “GODFATHER” constituted the dominant feature of the defendants’ proposed branding. Finding a prima facie case of infringement, likelihood of confusion, dilution of goodwill, and unfair advantage, the Court allowed the interim injunction application and restrained the defendants from using the impugned marks pending disposal of the suit.

Infographic Thumbnail Prompt

Create a 3D ultra-realistic legal infographic in 14:9 aspect ratio depicting a high-stakes trademark dispute in the alcoholic beverage industry. Show two premium beverage brands in visual opposition, one representing a long-established brand with decades of goodwill and the other representing a newly launched whisky product. Include a large shield symbolizing trademark protection, a magnifying glass examining a disputed word mark, legal scales balancing “Registered Trademark Protection Despite Non-Use”, trademark registration certificates, courtroom-inspired environment, whisky bottle silhouettes, beer bottle silhouettes, digital advertising screens being removed, and glowing legal text highlighting concepts such as “Trademark Infringement”, “Passing Off”, “Allied & Cognate Goods”, “Dominant Feature Test”, “Goodwill Protection”, and “Interim Injunction Granted”. Use sophisticated gold, silver and dark blue tones with realistic lighting, depth, reflections and premium business aesthetics. Emphasize brand protection, consumer confusion, and trademark enforcement through modern legal visuals. Use attached image as Image of lawyer in lawyers dress at left bottom corner which should cover 20 % of entire image area.

Novamax Industries Vs. Prem Appliances

Brief Legal News Write-Up

Novamax Industries LLP Vs. Prem Appliances & Anr.19.06.2026 : CS(COMM) 177/2021 : 2026:DHC:5149 : Justice Tushar Rao Gedela

The Court considered a dispute concerning alleged infringement of a registered design and passing off in relation to air coolers. The case arose from allegations that the defendants were manufacturing and selling air coolers bearing a design that was an identical or fraudulent imitation of the plaintiff’s registered design and were also passing off their goods as those of the plaintiff.

The principal question before the Court was whether the plaintiff’s design infringement claim could survive when evidence on record indicated prior publication of the design before its registration and whether the passing off claim could nevertheless continue independently.

After examining the material on record and the submissions of the parties, Justice Tushar Rao Gedela observed that the plaintiff’s own documents demonstrated publication of the design prior to registration, thereby attracting the grounds for cancellation under Section 19 of the Designs Act, 2000. The Court held that the infringement claim had no real prospect of success because prior publication destroyed the enforceability of the registered design. The Court further emphasized that a passing off action is an independent common law remedy and can survive even if a design infringement claim fails.

Accordingly, the Court partly allowed the application by dismissing the suit insofar as it related to design infringement, while permitting the passing off claim to proceed to trial.

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not treat this as a substitute for legal advise as it is based on limited information and is intended solely for general informational purposes.

Novamax Industries LLP v. Prem Appliances & Anr.

Introduction

The decision of the Delhi High Court in Novamax Industries LLP v. Prem Appliances & Anr. is an important judgment examining the relationship between design infringement and passing off claims. The case highlights the consequences of prior publication of a registered design and clarifies whether a plaintiff can continue a passing off action even after the design infringement claim becomes unsustainable.

The judgment is significant for manufacturers, designers, intellectual property owners, and businesses engaged in product-based industries. It reinforces the importance of maintaining novelty before seeking design registration while simultaneously recognizing that common law rights relating to goodwill and reputation may survive independently of statutory design protection.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff instituted a commercial suit alleging infringement of several registered designs relating to air coolers. The plaintiff claimed proprietary rights over various registered designs and asserted that it enjoyed exclusive rights in the shape, configuration, and visual appearance of its products. The plaintiff further alleged that the defendants had copied one of its registered cooler designs and were marketing substantially similar products.

According to the plaint, the defendants were not only using a design identical or deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s registered design but were also employing branding elements that allegedly enabled them to ride upon the goodwill and reputation associated with the plaintiff's products. The plaintiff therefore sought relief for both design infringement and passing off.

The defendants challenged the maintainability of the suit through an application seeking summary judgment under Order XIII-A of the Code of Civil Procedure. They argued that the plaintiff's own documents demonstrated prior publication of the design before registration, rendering the design vulnerable under Section 19 of the Designs Act, 2000. They further contended that the plaint lacked the necessary ingredients to sustain a passing off action.

The Court was therefore required to examine whether either or both claims could survive.

Dispute Before the Court

The principal dispute concerned whether the plaintiff could maintain an action for infringement of a registered design when evidence indicated that the design had been published prior to registration.

A second issue arose regarding the passing off claim. The defendants argued that the plaint failed to plead essential ingredients necessary to constitute a valid cause of action for passing off and therefore deserved dismissal at the threshold.

The plaintiff, on the other hand, contended that the defendants had copied the design and were attempting to misrepresent their products as those of the plaintiff. It was argued that even if issues arose concerning design registration, the passing off claim remained independently maintainable and required adjudication through evidence at trial.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

The Court first examined the statutory framework governing cancellation of designs under Section 19 of the Designs Act, 2000. Section 19 permits cancellation of a registered design where it has been published in India or elsewhere prior to registration, where it is not new or original, or where it otherwise fails to satisfy statutory requirements.

Upon examining the record, the Court noted that the plaintiff’s own documents disclosed invoices predating the design application as well as publication of the relevant cooler design on the plaintiff’s website before registration. The Court found that these facts constituted prior publication within the meaning of Section 19. As a result, the Court concluded that the plaintiff's infringement claim had no real prospect of success.

The Court therefore held that the suit insofar as it related to infringement of the registered design could not continue and deserved dismissal under the summary judgment provisions.

The Court then turned to the more significant question regarding passing off. It carefully examined the pleadings and observed that the plaintiff had specifically alleged imitation, deception, diversion of trade, and misappropriation of goodwill. The Court found that these averments were sufficient to constitute a cause of action for passing off at the pleading stage.

While addressing the legal position, the Court extensively relied upon the Full Bench decision in Carlsberg Breweries A/S v. Som Distilleries and Breweries Ltd. and the Division Bench decision in Crocs Inc. USA v. Liberty Shoes Ltd.. These decisions recognized that a composite suit combining design infringement and passing off claims is maintainable and that passing off survives independently of statutory design rights.

The Court further referred to Birhan Karan Sugar Syndicate (P) Ltd. v. Yashwantrao Mohite Krushna Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana, (2024) 2 SCC 577, Satyam Infoway Ltd. v. Siffynet Solutions (P) Ltd., (2004) 6 SCC 145, Toyota Jidosha Kabushiki Kaisha v. Prius Auto Industries Ltd., (2018) 2 SCC 1, and Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceuticals Laboratories, AIR 1965 SC 980. These authorities were discussed to explain the distinction between infringement actions and passing off actions and the requirement of proving goodwill, misrepresentation, and likelihood of damage in passing off cases.

The Court emphasized that passing off is a valuable common law remedy preserved by Section 27(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and that its availability cannot be denied merely because the dispute also involves a registered design. Whether the plaintiff ultimately succeeds on passing off would depend upon evidence, but the claim could not be summarily rejected at this stage.

Final Decision of the Court

The Delhi High Court partly allowed the defendants’ application for summary judgment.

The Court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for design infringement after concluding that prior publication deprived the plaintiff of any realistic prospect of success on that issue. However, the Court rejected the defendants’ challenge to the passing off claim and held that the same required adjudication through evidence during trial. The suit was therefore permitted to continue solely in respect of the passing off cause of action.

Point of Law Settled

The judgment clarifies that prior publication of a design before registration can defeat a design infringement action and may justify dismissal of such a claim at the summary judgment stage. At the same time, the decision reaffirms that passing off is an independent common law remedy based on goodwill, misrepresentation, and likelihood of damage. Even where statutory design rights become unenforceable, a passing off action can continue on the same factual matrix if the pleadings disclose a viable cause of action. The ruling strengthens the distinction between statutory design protection and common law protection of business goodwill.


Case Details

Title of the Case: Novamax Industries LLP v. Prem Appliances & Anr.

Date of Judgment/Order: 19.06.2026

Case Number: CS(COMM) 177/2021

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:5149

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Justice Tushar Rao Gedela


Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Images used herein do not reflect actual images used in Judgement and that the same are for illustrative purpose only. Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.


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  4. Can a Passing Off Claim Survive Failure of a Design Infringement Action?

  5. Delhi High Court Applies Section 19 of Designs Act in Air Cooler Design Dispute

  6. Prior Publication and Design Registration: Important Delhi High Court Judgment

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  8. Passing Off Action Allowed Despite Failure of Design Infringement Claim

  9. Delhi High Court on Summary Judgment in Intellectual Property Litigation

  10. Key Takeaways from Novamax Industries LLP v Prem Appliances & Anr.


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Headnote of the Judgment

Novamax Industries LLP v. Prem Appliances & Anr., High Court of Delhi, CS(COMM) 177/2021, decided on 19.06.2026, Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:5149. The defendants sought summary dismissal of a suit alleging infringement of a registered air-cooler design and passing off. The Court found that the plaintiff’s own documents established prior publication of the design before registration, thereby attracting Section 19 of the Designs Act, 2000 and defeating the infringement claim. Consequently, the design infringement portion of the suit was dismissed. However, relying on the principles governing passing off and composite intellectual property actions, the Court held that the passing off claim disclosed a triable cause of action and could not be rejected summarily. The application was therefore partly allowed and the suit was permitted to continue solely on the passing off claim.


Infographic Thumbnail Prompt (14:9 Aspect Ratio)

Create a premium 14:9 ultra-realistic 3D legal intellectual property infographic depicting a major industrial design and passing off dispute involving air coolers. At the center, display a large registered design certificate for a modern air cooler being torn into two sections. One side should feature a glowing red stamp reading “PRIOR PUBLICATION” and “DESIGN CLAIM DISMISSED”, symbolizing invalidation of the design infringement claim. The other side should feature a golden shield labeled “PASSING OFF CLAIM SURVIVES” protecting business goodwill and brand reputation. Include highly detailed 3D air coolers with identical shapes and configurations facing each other, digital product catalogs, website publication screenshots, intellectual property files, design registration documents, legal scales, courtroom records, and commercial market imagery. Prominently display text elements: “Design Infringement Rejected”, “Passing Off Continues”, “Section 19 Designs Act”, “Prior Publication”, and “Goodwill & Reputation Protected”. Use cinematic lighting, photorealistic textures, reflective metallic surfaces, premium blue-gold legal theme, dramatic depth of field, high-detail corporate legal aesthetics, and publication-quality composition suitable for a leading legal news platform. Use attached image as Image of lawyer in lawyers dress at left bottom corner which should cover 20 % of entire image area.

Laboratoires Griffon Vs. Psychotropics India

Brief Legal News Write-Up

Laboratoires Griffon Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Psychotropics India Limited:17.06.2026 :  Commercial IP Suit (L) No. 256 of 2022 :2026:BHC-OS:13292 Hon'ble Judge: Justice Arif S. Doctor

The Court considered a dispute concerning alleged trademark infringement and passing off in relation to pharmaceutical products marketed under the trademarks “GRILINCTUS” and “PIL-LINCTUS”. The case arose from allegations that the defendant adopted and used the mark “PIL-LINCTUS” for medicinal products, which was deceptively similar to the plaintiffs’ long-standing registered trademark “GRILINCTUS”.

The principal question before the Court was whether the defendant’s use of “PIL-LINCTUS” was deceptively similar to the plaintiffs’ registered trademark “GRILINCTUS” and likely to cause confusion in the pharmaceutical market.

After examining the material on record and the submissions of the parties, Justice Arif S. Doctor observed that the rival marks were phonetically, structurally, and visually similar and that a stricter standard must be applied in cases involving medicinal products because confusion may have serious consequences. The Court held that the plaintiffs had established prior registration, long-standing use, goodwill, and a strong prima facie case of infringement and passing off. The Court emphasized that even the possibility of confusion between medicinal products should be avoided.

Accordingly, the Court allowed the interim application and granted interim relief restraining the defendant from using the impugned mark “PIL-LINCTUS” in relation to pharmaceutical products pending disposal of the suit.

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not treat this as a substitute for legal advise as it is based on limited information and is intended solely for general informational purposes.


Laboratoires Griffon Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Psychotropics India Limited

Introduction

Trademark disputes involving pharmaceutical products occupy a special place in intellectual property law because confusion between medicines can have consequences far beyond commercial loss. The decision in Laboratoires Griffon Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Psychotropics India Limited reiterates the judicial approach that greater caution is required when assessing deceptively similar pharmaceutical trademarks.

The judgment is significant because it addresses the interplay between descriptive elements in a trademark, the overall similarity of competing marks, and the heightened public interest considerations applicable to medicinal products. The ruling serves as an important reminder that pharmaceutical companies must exercise greater care while selecting trademarks to ensure that consumers, pharmacists, and medical practitioners are not misled.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs are proprietors of the trademark “GRILINCTUS,” which has been registered and used in relation to pharmaceutical products for several decades. The plaintiffs asserted that they had continuously used the trademark since the early 1970s and had built substantial goodwill and reputation in the market. They also relied upon historical invoices, promotional material, sales figures, and evidence of enforcement actions against third parties using similar marks.

The dispute arose when the plaintiffs became aware of the defendant's use of the mark “PIL-LINCTUS” for pharmaceutical products. According to the plaintiffs, the impugned mark was deceptively similar to their registered trademark and was likely to cause confusion among consumers and members of the trade.

The defendant resisted the claim by asserting that “PIL” was derived from its corporate name, Psychotropics India Limited, and that “LINCTUS” was a descriptive term commonly used in the pharmaceutical industry for cough syrup preparations. The defendant further contended that numerous trademark registrations containing the word “LINCTUS” existed and that the plaintiffs could not claim a monopoly over the expression.

An Interim Application seeking injunctive relief was filed by the plaintiffs pending adjudication of the suit.

Dispute Before the Court

The principal issue before the Court was whether the trademark “PIL-LINCTUS” was deceptively similar to the registered trademark “GRILINCTUS”.

The plaintiffs argued that the rival marks were phonetically, visually, and structurally similar and that confusion was likely, particularly because both marks were used in relation to pharmaceutical products. The plaintiffs further contended that the defendant was attempting to come as close as possible to their established trademark.

The defendant argued that “LINCTUS” was descriptive and common to the trade, that the prefixes “GRI” and “PIL” were entirely different, and that the use of a hyphen created sufficient distinction between the marks. The defendant also relied upon alleged delay, acquiescence, and the existence of several third-party registrations incorporating the word “LINCTUS”.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

The Court commenced its analysis by reiterating the settled principle that trademarks must be compared as a whole rather than by dissecting them into separate components. The proper test is the overall impression created in the mind of a person of average intelligence and imperfect recollection.

The Court relied upon the principles laid down in Amritdhara Pharmacy v. Satya Deo Gupta, AIR 1963 SC 449 and Hiralal Parbhudas v. Ganesh Trading Co., emphasizing that deceptive similarity must be assessed from the standpoint of an ordinary consumer rather than through a meticulous side-by-side comparison.

Particular emphasis was placed upon the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 73, wherein the Court observed that confusion between medicinal products may have life-threatening consequences. The judgment quoted the well-known observation that “drugs are poisons, not sweets,” thereby requiring a stricter standard when evaluating pharmaceutical trademarks.

Applying these principles, the Court found that “GRILINCTUS” and “PIL-LINCTUS” were phonetically, structurally, and visually similar. The Court observed that the suffix “LINCTUS” dominated the overall impression of both marks and that the prefixes “GRI” and “PIL” did not sufficiently distinguish them. The mere presence of a hyphen was considered inadequate to eliminate the possibility of confusion.

The Court distinguished F. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. Ltd. v. Geoffrey Manners & Co. Pvt. Ltd., where the rival marks were found sufficiently distinguishable because their prefixes created different overall commercial impressions. In contrast, the Court held that the common suffix “LINCTUS” overwhelmingly dominated the competing marks in the present case.

The Court also referred to UltraTech Cement Ltd. v. Alaknanda Cement Pvt. Ltd., accepting the contention that a party seeking registration of a mark cannot simultaneously contend that an essential component of that mark is wholly descriptive and incapable of trademark significance.

On the issue of delay and acquiescence, the Court considered Willmott v. Barber, Power Control Appliances v. Sumeet Machines Pvt. Ltd., (1994) 2 SCC 448, and Kamath Hotels (India) Ltd. v. Royal Orchid Hotels Ltd., holding that mere delay does not defeat a claim where a strong case of infringement exists. Acquiescence requires proof of active encouragement or consent, which was absent in the present case.

The Court further relied upon Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Ltd. and National Bell Co. v. Metal Goods Manufacturing Co. Pvt. Ltd. while rejecting the defendant’s reliance on third-party registrations. The Court observed that mere production of registry entries is insufficient without proof of actual market use.

Ultimately, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs had established prior registration, continuous use, substantial goodwill, and a strong prima facie case of infringement and passing off. The balance of convenience was found to be in favour of the plaintiffs.

Final Decision of the Court

The Court allowed the Interim Application and granted interim relief in favour of the plaintiffs. It restrained the defendant from using the impugned trademark “PIL-LINCTUS” in relation to pharmaceutical products during the pendency of the suit. No order as to costs was passed. The Court also recorded a statement that the order would not be acted upon for a period of four weeks.

Point of Law Settled

The judgment reinforces that pharmaceutical trademarks are subject to a stricter standard of scrutiny because public health considerations demand avoidance of even a possibility of confusion. It clarifies that a trademark must be assessed as a whole and that descriptive arguments cannot automatically defeat an infringement claim where the overall impression created by the competing marks is deceptively similar. The decision also reiterates that delay alone is not a defence to infringement and that third-party registrations, without proof of actual market use, do not establish that a term has become common to trade.


Case Details:

Title of the Case: Laboratoires Griffon Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Psychotropics India Limited

Date of Judgment/Order: 17.06.2026

Case Number: Interim Application No. 4006 of 2022 in Commercial IP Suit (L) No. 3999 of 2022

Neutral Citation: Not Available

Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Bombay

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Justice Arif S. Doctor


Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Images used herein do not reflect actual images used in Judgement and that the same are for illustrative purpose only. Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.


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Headnote of the Judgment

Laboratoires Griffon Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Psychotropics India Limited, High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Interim Application No. 4006 of 2022 in Commercial IP Suit (L) No. 3999 of 2022, decided on 17.06.2026. The plaintiffs sought an interim injunction restraining the defendant from using the trademark “PIL-LINCTUS” for pharmaceutical products, alleging infringement and passing off of their registered trademark “GRILINCTUS.” Applying the principles governing deceptive similarity in pharmaceutical trademarks and relying upon the stricter standard laid down in Cadila Healthcare Ltd., the Court held that the rival marks were phonetically, visually, and structurally similar and likely to cause confusion. The Court found a strong prima facie case in favour of the plaintiffs and allowed the interim application, restraining use of the impugned mark pending disposal of the suit.


Infographic Thumbnail Prompt (14:9 Aspect Ratio)

Create a premium 14:9 ultra-realistic 3D legal-pharmaceutical infographic depicting a major trademark infringement dispute involving two competing cough syrup brands. At the center, display two large medicine bottles labeled “GRILINCTUS” and “PIL-LINCTUS” facing each other with a glowing red warning symbol showing trademark conflict and consumer confusion. Show a giant metallic legal scale balancing intellectual property rights against pharmaceutical safety concerns. Include pharmaceutical packaging, prescription sheets, medicine boxes, capsules, trademark registration certificates, legal files, courtroom documents, digital trademark databases, and glowing comparison graphics highlighting phonetic and visual similarity between the competing marks. Add a prominent red injunction stamp reading “USE RESTRICTED” and large text banners stating “Pharmaceutical Trademark Dispute”, “Deceptive Similarity”, “Interim Injunction Granted”, and “Consumer Safety First”. Use cinematic lighting, ultra-realistic textures, reflective surfaces, premium legal-business aesthetics, dramatic depth of field, high-detail 3D rendering, blue-gold corporate color scheme, and publication-quality composition suitable for a leading legal news portal. Use attached image as Image of lawyer in lawyers dress at left bottom corner which should cover 20 % of entire image area.

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