Monday, June 1, 2026

Intas Pharmaceuticals Limited Vs. Sun Pharma Laboratories Limited

Delhi High Court Overturns Permanent Injunction Against Intas Pharmaceuticals; Holds BEVATAS Does Not Infringe Sun Pharma's BEVETEX Mark

Intas Pharmaceuticals Limited Vs. Sun Pharma Laboratories Limited RFA(OS)(COMM) 10/2026 | Decided on: 29 May 2026 | Delhi High Court | 2026:DHC:4879-DB: V Kameshvar Rao and Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora, H.J.

Sun Pharma Laboratories Limited, the registered proprietor of the trademark BEVETEX used for its anti-cancer drug containing the molecule Paclitaxel, instituted a suit in December 2017 alleging trademark infringement and passing off against Intas Pharmaceuticals Limited, which had launched an anti-cancer drug under the mark BEVATAS in 2016, containing the molecule Bevacizumab. The Trial Court and an Appellate Bench had both declined interim injunction, finding the marks structurally, phonetically and visually distinct. However, after a full trial, a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court decreed the suit in Sun Pharma's favour and permanently restrained Intas from using the mark BEVATAS, holding it deceptively similar to BEVETEX. Intas preferred the present appeal.

The Division Bench set aside the impugned judgment on multiple grounds. On the question of pleadings, the court found that Sun Pharma had filed a vexatious plaint by incorporating claims of passing off, misappropriation of goodwill and unfair competition despite being fully aware, prior to institution of the suit, that its drug and Intas's drug were not therapeutic substitutes and that no commercial loss had been suffered. During trial, Sun Pharma itself abandoned all monetary claims and pursued only a permanent injunction purportedly in public interest. The court held that such conduct amounted to an abuse of the process of law and the Trial Court ought to have rejected the plaint to that extent at the threshold.

On the infringement claim, the court held that the matter fell squarely under Section 29(2)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, requiring Sun Pharma to affirmatively establish likelihood of confusion on the part of the public. The court found that Sun Pharma had utterly failed to discharge this burden, having examined only a single witness , its own Sales Manager ,  who was neither competent nor credible to depose on the likelihood of confusion among the relevant class of public, being oncologists, trained nurses and pharmacists. No member of the relevant public was examined, and no documentary evidence of actual or likely confusion was produced despite nearly a decade of concurrent use of both marks in the market.

On the question of mark comparison, the court found that the prefixes BEV and BEVA are publici juris in the pharmaceutical industry, being derived from the International Non-Proprietary Name Bevacizumab, which is used by at least twenty manufacturers. Giving due emphasis to the distinctive suffixes ATAS and ETEX, and noting the difference in the fourth vowel sound — 'A' in BEVATAS and 'E' in BEVETEX — the court concluded that the marks, when assessed holistically and applying the anti-dissection rule, are neither phonetically, visually nor structurally similar. The court further noted that the two drugs are wholly dissimilar in composition, therapeutic indication, stage of treatment, dosage, mode of administration and price, and are admittedly not therapeutic substitutes. Given the highly specialised, prescription-only, hospital-administered nature of both drugs under oncologist supervision, the surrounding circumstances entirely negated any real possibility of confusion.

The court also found that the learned Single Judge had erred by deciding the infringement question solely on a prima facie visual comparison of the marks without undertaking any evidence-based assessment, effectively importing the statutory presumption under Section 29(3) of the Act which was plainly inapplicable. The Division Bench allowed the appeal, dismissed the underlying suit and awarded costs of the suit and the appeal in favour of Intas, directing the matter to proceed before the Taxation Officer.

[Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation and presentation of facts and law.]


BEVATAS vs BEVETEX: How Delhi High Court Overturned a Permanent Injunction Against Intas Pharmaceuticals in a Landmark Pharmaceutical Trademark Dispute

Post-Trial Trademark Infringement Standard in Pharmaceutical Cases

Introduction

The intersection of trademark law and public health has always been a sensitive and complex terrain for courts. When pharmaceutical companies fight over brand names, the stakes are not merely commercial lives can potentially be at risk if wrong drugs are dispensed to cancer patients. Yet, the law cannot be stretched beyond its limits on the mere invocation of public interest, especially when the party claiming to protect public interest has itself admitted it suffered no commercial loss and produced no credible evidence of any real confusion in the marketplace. The Delhi High Court's Division Bench judgment delivered on May 29, 2026 in Intas Pharmaceuticals Limited versus Sun Pharma Laboratories Limited is a landmark ruling that settles several important questions about how trademark infringement cases involving pharmaceutical products must be tried, what evidence must be led, and how courts must assess deceptive similarity between drug brand names at the post-trial stage. The court reversed a permanent injunction that had been granted against Intas Pharmaceuticals and, in doing so, laid down important principles that will guide pharmaceutical trademark litigation in India for years to come.

Factual and Procedural Background

Intas Pharmaceuticals Limited is a large multinational pharmaceutical company operating across multiple therapeutic segments including oncology. In 2016, Intas launched an anti-cancer drug under the brand name BEVATAS. This drug contains the molecule Bevacizumab, which is a monoclonal antibody  a biological drug used as a first line of treatment for several serious cancers including colorectal cancer, ovarian cancer, cervical cancer, lung cancer, metastatic breast cancer, and recurrent glioblastoma. The drug was approved by the Drug Controller General of India before its launch, went through rigorous clinical trials, and is administered intravenously only in hospital oncology settings by trained oncology nurses under the supervision of an Oncologist. By the time this appeal was heard, BEVATAS had become the market leader among drugs containing Bevacizumab in India, with approximately 22 percent market share, having been administered to over 75,000 cancer patients with about 12,000 patients currently undergoing treatment with the drug.

The name BEVATAS was coined by Intas by combining BEVA, taken from the first part of the molecule name Bevacizumab, and TAS, derived from the corporate name INTAS.

Sun Pharma Laboratories Limited is the registered proprietor of the trademark BEVETEX, which it applied for registration back in 1983, receiving the certificate of registration in 1990 under Class 5 of the Trade Marks Register. However, Sun Pharma admittedly did not actually use the mark BEVETEX for over three decades. It began commercially using BEVETEX only in 2015 for its own anti-cancer drug, which contains an entirely different molecule called Paclitaxel. Paclitaxel is a synthetic chemical cytotoxic agent, not a biological drug. It is used as a second line of treatment  that is, only after a patient's combination chemotherapy has failed, or after a relapse within six months of adjuvant chemotherapy  and only for metastatic breast cancer. Sun Pharma's drug BEVETEX is thus fundamentally different in composition, indication, mechanism of action, and stage of treatment from Intas's drug BEVATAS.

Within just about one year of Sun Pharma launching BEVETEX in 2015, Intas launched BEVATAS in October 2016. Sun Pharma learned about Intas's trademark application for BEVATAS in October 2016 and filed an opposition before the Trademark Registry on December 27, 2016. Claiming to have gained knowledge of the actual product only in October 2017, Sun Pharma instituted a suit before the Additional District Judge, South-East District, Saket Courts, Delhi, in December 2017, being CS (COMM) No. 39 of 2021, alleging trademark infringement, passing off, unfair competition, misappropriation of goodwill and reputation, and seeking permanent injunction, damages, rendition of accounts, and costs.

The Trial Court, vide a detailed order dated September 17, 2018, dismissed Sun Pharma's application for interim injunction, holding that the marks BEVATAS and BEVETEX were structurally, phonetically, and visually different and that no prima facie case of infringement or passing off was made out in view of the distinctions in the character, mode of administration, and other distinct factors of the two drugs. This order was upheld by an Appellate Bench of the Delhi High Court on January 9, 2020, and Sun Pharma's Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court of India was dismissed on February 14, 2020.

After completion of evidence and trial, and after the valuation of the suit's reliefs was enhanced, the matter was transferred to the Original Side IP Division of the Delhi High Court. During the trial, Sun Pharma gave up its claim for damages, rendition of accounts, and all monetary reliefs, taking the stand that it was prosecuting the suit solely in public interest and had no commercial interest. Only the prayer for a permanent injunction restraining Intas from using the mark BEVATAS was pressed before the learned Single Judge.

The learned Single Judge, by the impugned judgment dated March 28, 2026, decreed the suit in favor of Sun Pharma and permanently restrained Intas from using the mark BEVATAS, holding it to be deceptively similar to BEVETEX and likely to cause confusion in the minds of consumers. Aggrieved by this order, Intas filed the present Regular First Appeal before the Division Bench under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

The Dispute

The core dispute before the Division Bench was whether the learned Single Judge was justified in granting a permanent injunction against Intas on the ground that BEVATAS was deceptively similar to BEVETEX and likely to cause confusion among the public. Several sub-issues arose: whether Sun Pharma's plaint was properly framed and disclosed a legitimate cause of action; which specific provision of Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 governed the dispute; whether the two drugs were similar or dissimilar goods; whether the two trademarks were visually, structurally, or phonetically similar; whether Sun Pharma had actually led any credible evidence to prove likelihood of confusion among the relevant class of public; and whether the learned Single Judge's approach of deciding infringement purely on a visual and phonetic comparison of marks at the post-trial stage was legally sustainable.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

On the vexatious nature of the plaint regarding passing off and unfair competition: 

The court noted that Sun Pharma's plaint was framed in the broadest possible manner, pleading multiple causes of action including trademark infringement, passing off, unfair competition, misappropriation of goodwill, and seeking monetary damages and rendition of accounts. Yet, soon after filing the suit, Sun Pharma represented before the Trial Court, in its rejoinder to the injunction application on January 29, 2018, that it had no commercial interest and was prosecuting the suit purely in public interest because Sun Pharma did not sell any medicine containing the molecule Bevacizumab. This stand was reiterated before the Appellate Court in FAO 447/2018, in the evidence affidavit of its sole witness PW-1 dated February 8, 2019, and again in cross-examination. The court held that this admission constituted a clear acknowledgment that Sun Pharma had suffered no commercial loss, no diversion of sales, and no damage to goodwill from Intas's use of BEVATAS. The court held that the dissimilarity of the two drugs' molecules was a fact known to Sun Pharma even before the suit was filed, yet it vexatiously pleaded passing off, misrepresentation, unfair competition, and monetary claims to create an illusion of a cause of action and a false sense of urgency. The court further observed that Sun Pharma ought to have restricted its suit from inception to the narrow claim of infringement based on alleged deceptive similarity, and that even at the stage of amendment of the plaint in August 2022 when the pecuniary valuation was enhanced, Sun Pharma did not delete the vexatious pleas it knew to be untenable. The court relied on ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, (1998) 2 SCC 70, and Bengal Waterproof Limited v. Bombay Waterproof Manufacturing Company and Anr., (1997) 1 SCC 99, to hold that proceeding to trial on such a plaint emboldened dishonest litigants and encouraged frivolous litigation, undermining the sanctity of the Statement of Truth under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

On the applicable sub-section of Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999: 

The court examined Sun Pharma's shifting legal positions. Before the Single Judge, Sun Pharma invoked Section 29(3) of the Act, which creates a statutory presumption of likelihood of confusion  but this presumption under Section 29(3) is only available when both the marks and the goods are identical, which falls under Section 29(2)(c). The court categorically held that the marks BEVATAS and BEVETEX are not identical, nor are the goods identical. Therefore, Section 29(2)(c) and the presumption of Section 29(3) were wholly inapplicable. The court also held that Section 29(4), which deals with dissimilar goods, was inapplicable since Sun Pharma had abandoned its plea of reputation. The court concluded that the dispute was squarely governed by Section 29(2)(b) of the Act  which applies where the defendant's mark is similar (not identical) to the registered mark and is used in relation to goods that are identical or similar to the goods covered by the registered mark  and that under this provision, the burden lay entirely on Sun Pharma to affirmatively prove likelihood of confusion among the public. The court was critical of Sun Pharma's vague and overbroad pleading of merely "Section 29" without specifying the sub-section, which the court described as inexact, intentional, and mischievous, enabling Sun Pharma to shift its legal arguments across different sub-sections at different stages.

On the evidentiary standard and Sun Pharma's failure to discharge the burden: 

The court emphasized that in a case where goods are not identical or closely similar, the likelihood of confusion cannot be presumed and must be proved by positive evidence. The court drew support from P. Narayanan's authoritative commentary on the Law of Trade Marks and Passing Off (Sixth Edition, 2004, paragraph 9.28), which states that where goods are not closely similar in character, evidence of witnesses is necessary to establish whether confusion is likely to occur. Sun Pharma itself had identified the relevant class of persons likely to be confused as being chemists, specifically pleading in paragraph 21(D) of the plaint that a chemist may give out the wrong drug on account of confusion or lack of stock. The court noted that Sun Pharma never even pleaded that an Oncologist might be confused at the prescription stage.

Despite identifying the chemist as the relevant class of public susceptible to confusion, Sun Pharma examined only a single witness, PW-1, who was its own Sales Manager. This witness parroted the plaint and made bald assertions about likelihood of confusion without any personal knowledge. In cross-examination, PW-1 admitted that the drug formulations of BEVATAS and BEVETEX were completely different, that the two drugs were a very different class of drugs with different indications and mode of action, that the toxicity profiles were different, and  most significantly  that there was no actual instance of confusion between the two marks on record. The only document PW-1 could point to as evidence of confusion was Ex. PW-1/9, an e-newspaper article about a 2011 incident of gross negligence by a pharmacist involving entirely different drugs  which PW-1 admitted had nothing to do with BEVATAS or BEVETEX and was merely a general example. The court held that PW-1 was not a competent witness to depose about likelihood of confusion as he belonged to a completely different class from chemists, Oncologists, and trained nurses. The court held PW-1's testimony to be unreliable and discarded it entirely. In contrast, Intas's witness DW-1 deposed that the drugs were administered under strict medical supervision in specialized oncological settings and that the possibility of confusion was negligible  testimony that remained largely uncontroverted in cross-examination.

On the learned Single Judge's approach: 

The court found that the impugned judgment dated March 28, 2026 determined the entire issue of infringement solely on a bare visual and phonetic comparison of the marks undertaken by the judge himself, without evaluating any of the evidence led at trial. The court noted that the learned Single Judge, while correctly setting out the governing legal principles in paragraphs 19 to 29 of the impugned judgment, proceeded directly to conclude at paragraph 28 that a likelihood of confusion existed, without adverting to any oral or documentary evidence of the parties. The court held that this approach, at the post-trial stage, was legally unsustainable. A bare comparison of marks by the court can at best constitute a prima facie view appropriate for deciding interim applications  it cannot form the basis of a final decree of permanent injunction after a full trial. The court noted that the impugned judgment effectively imported the statutory presumption under Section 29(3) of the Act without even acknowledging it, despite that presumption being wholly inapplicable on the facts of the case. The court also noted that after the interim injunction was denied and that denial was confirmed right up to the Supreme Court, the learned Single Judge would have needed clear and cogent evidence emerging at trial to form a contra view but Sun Pharma had produced no new documentary or oral evidence from any relevant member of the public after the dismissal of the interim injunction.

On the similarity of the two drugs: 

The court, relying on the undisputed comparative table of the two drugs set out in paragraph 9.9 of the impugned judgment itself, found that BEVATAS and BEVETEX were wholly dissimilar drugs. BEVATAS is a biological rDNA drug containing Bevacizumab, a monoclonal antibody, while BEVETEX is a synthetic chemical drug containing Paclitaxel. One is prescribed as the first line of treatment; the other only after failure of chemotherapy. Their indications are different, their dosage regimens are different, their infusion durations are different (90 minutes initially for BEVATAS versus 30 minutes for BEVETEX), their reconstitution procedures are different, and their side effect profiles are starkly different. The only overlap in indication is metastatic breast cancer (mBC), but even that overlap is not real because BEVATAS is given to mBC patients as a first line treatment while BEVETEX is given only when those patients have failed to respond to chemotherapy  meaning the same patient would never receive both drugs at the same time or in substitution for each other. Both parties had admitted that the two drugs were not therapeutic substitutes. The price difference  Rs. 25,990 for 100mg of BEVATAS versus Rs. 12,500 for 100mg of BEVETEX  was another factor militating against confusion. The court held that drugs that are not interchangeable, do not serve the same therapeutic purpose, and are not perceived by Oncologists, chemists, or patients as alternatives, are dissimilar for all purposes of trademark law. The court held that the mere fact that both drugs fall in the Nice Classification of medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations in Class 5 does not make them similar goods. The court relied on factors (c) and (d) of paragraph 35 of the Supreme Court's judgment in Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 73 (Cadila-2001), which require assessment of the nature, character, and performance of the goods.

On the phonetic and visual similarity of the trademarks: 

Applying the anti-dissection rule  meaning the marks must be compared as a whole  the court found that BEVATAS and BEVETEX were not phonetically or visually similar. The court observed that the prefix BEV and BEVA were publici juris in the pharmaceutical industry for drugs containing the molecule Bevacizumab. It was undisputed that at least seven other pharmaceutical companies Zydus (ZYBEV), Reliance Lifesciences (BEVACIREL), Hetero Drugs (CIZUMAB), Lupin (BEVAZZA), Emcure (BEVAREST), Abbott (BEVACIZAB), and Cadila Pharma (BEVARO)  marketed drugs containing Bevacizumab with trademarks using BEV or BEVA as prefix or suffix. Sun Pharma itself had no objection to any of these marks and acknowledged it claimed no exclusive right over BEV or BEVA. This meant that the distinctive portion of the marks to be compared were the suffixes: TAS in BEVATAS and ETEX in BEVETEX. The court noted that the molecule Bevacizumab is an International Non-Proprietary Name (INN) and is pronounced as beh-vuh-SIH-zoo-mab, and that given 20 pharmaceutical companies were making drugs with this molecule, Oncologists and chemists were well acquainted with the name. The fourth letter in BEVATAS is A (a vowel) and the fourth letter in BEVETEX is E (a vowel), and these vowels create distinctly different phonetic modulations — the word BEVATAS is likely pronounced as beh-vuh-tas while BEVETEX is pronounced as beh-veh-tex. The suffixes TAS and TEX are phonetically distinct and produce entirely different auditory impressions. The court also noted the suffix TAS was derived from Intas's corporate name and was used in approximately 40 other registered Intas trademarks such as LOMITAS, SPARTAS, CLARITAS, RUMENTAS, etc.  a fact that Oncologists and chemists were aware of. The court relied on the judgment in Astrazeneca UK Limited & Anr v. Orchid Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals Ltd., ILR (2007) I Delhi 874 (MERONEM/MEROMER), which held that due emphasis must be given to the uncommon letters in rival pharmaceutical marks once publici juris syllables are set aside. Considering the distinct suffixes ATAS versus ETEX, the court held the marks were not visually or structurally similar either, noting that the packaging of the two drugs was also completely different in colour scheme, font, layout, and overall visual presentation, with both products prominently displaying their respective active molecules  Bevacizumab and Paclitaxel  in large font on the packaging itself.

On the governing principles for infringement: 

The court synthesized the law from three landmark judgments. In Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 73, the Supreme Court had identified seven factors for determining deceptive similarity of pharmaceutical marks  the nature of the marks, the degree of resemblance, the nature of the goods, the similarity in nature, character and performance of the goods, the class of purchasers and their education and degree of care, the mode of purchasing, and any other surrounding circumstances  emphasizing that weightage must be given to each factor depending on the facts of the case. In Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 14, the Supreme Court held that in an infringement action, if the marks bear close similarity, no further evidence is required, but if they are merely similar (not an imitation), the plaintiff must establish that the mark used by the defendant so nearly resembles the plaintiff's registered mark as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion, and that deceptive similarity is essentially a question of fact. In Gufic Ltd. v. Clinique Laboratories, LLC & Anr., 2010 (43) PTC 788, a Coordinate Bench of the Delhi High Court had culled out that the test of deceptive similarity in infringement cases is the same as in passing off actions where marks are not identical, and five principles must be applied including overall structural and phonetic similarity and whether both marks convey the same idea. The court synthesized these authorities to hold that infringement adjudication in cases of similar (not identical) marks proceeds in two stages  a threshold comparison of marks by the court itself to assess degree of visual, structural, and phonetic resemblance, and if the marks are not found wholly dissimilar or nearly identical imitations, a second evidence-based stage where the court must assess deceptive similarity and likelihood of confusion on the basis of all the Cadila-2001 factors and the evidence led at trial.

On surrounding circumstances and public interest: 

Examining the surrounding circumstances in terms of the Cadila-2001 factors, the court found that since both drugs are Schedule H drugs requiring an Oncologist's prescription and administered only in oncology clinics by trained nurses under Oncologist supervision, there was little scope for casual or uninformed consumer choice at any stage  prescription, dispensing, or administration. The high price of both drugs (over Rs. 12,500 even for the smaller dose) meant purchasers would exercise heightened caution. The prominent display of the molecule name on the packaging ruled out confusion even for persons with imperfect recollection. The court also rejected Sun Pharma's belated oral submission before it that drugs could be sold over the counter without a prescription, noting this had not been pleaded and was not proved. On the question of public interest, the court found Sun Pharma's claim to be a red herring. The court held that Sun Pharma had no valid cause of action at all — it suffered no loss of revenue, no damage to goodwill, and its mark's distinctiveness was not eroded in any demonstrable way. The court concluded that Sun Pharma pursued the litigation to protect its purely commercial interest in the mark BEVETEX under the guise of public interest. The court also noted that after nearly ten years of concurrent use of both marks from 2016 to 2026, not a single instance of actual confusion in the market had been reported or proved.

On the case law cited by Sun Pharma: 

The court carefully distinguished each precedent cited by Sun Pharma. United Biotech Pvt. Ltd. v. Orchid Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals Ltd., 2012 SCC OnLine Del 2942 (FORZID/ORZID), was a rectification proceeding involving the same drug molecule Ceftazidime where the risk arose from direct substitutability of identical therapeutic agents with differing dosages  entirely unlike the present case. Sun Pharma Laboratories Limited v. BDR Pharmaceuticals International Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., 2020 SCC OnLine Del 623 (LABEBET/LULIBET), was a final judgment where parties elected not to lead oral evidence, and the drugs could be self-administered  again, an entirely different scenario. Novartis AG v. Crest Pharma Pvt. Ltd. and Anr., 2009 SCC OnLine Del 4390 (SECEF/CECEF), was an interim injunction order. Nutrica Pusti Healthcare Pvt. Ltd. v. Morepen Laboratories Ltd., 2021 SCC OnLine Del 263, was also an interim order. Glenmark Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Sun Pharma Laboratories Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine Del 2707 (ISTAMET/INDAMET), also relied upon by Sun Pharma, was a prima facie finding by a Division Bench in an interim matter, and importantly involved self-administered diabetes drugs where patients themselves managed the medication  starkly different from hospital-administered oncology drugs. The court also referred with approval to the Division Bench judgments in Sun Pharmaceuticals Laboratories Ltd. v. Hetero Healthcare Ltd. and Another, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 2580 (LETROZ/LETERO), Sun Pharmaceuticals Industries Ltd. v. Anglo French Drugs & Industries Ltd. & Anr., 2014 SCC OnLine Del 4716 (OXETOL/EXITOL), Schering Corporation & Ors v. Alkem Laboratories Ltd., 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3886 (TEMODAL/TEMODAR vs TEMOKEM/TEMOGET), and Astrazeneca UK Limited & Anr v. Orchid Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals Ltd., ILR (2007) I Delhi 874 (MERONEM/MEROMER), all of which had held that despite phonetic similarities, no likelihood of confusion was found given the specialized nature of the drugs, therapeutic use, and modes of administration. The court noted that the judgment in Modi-Mundipharma Pvt. Limited v. Specialty Meditech Pvt. Ltd & Anr., 2025:DHC:5039-DB, supported the principle that where marks are an imitation and goods are identical, no further evidence is needed  but that this principle had no application where, as here, the marks were not an imitation and the goods were dissimilar.

Final Decision of the Court

The Division Bench allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment dated March 28, 2026. The permanent injunction granted against Intas Pharmaceuticals was vacated. The suit filed by Sun Pharma was dismissed. The court found in favor of Intas on Issues 3, 4, 9, and 10 (relating to infringement, likelihood of confusion, proprietorship of BEVATAS, and honest adoption), and set aside the findings of the Single Judge on Issues 7 and 8 as well. The court awarded costs of the suit and the appeal in favor of Intas against Sun Pharma, directing Intas to file its bill of costs within 30 days, with the matter of quantum referred to the Taxation Officer to assess actual costs, payable by Sun Pharma within eight weeks of determination. Representatives of Intas were directed to appear before the Taxation Officer on July 13, 2026.

Points of Law Settled in the Case

This judgment establishes a number of important legal principles. At the post-trial stage in a trademark infringement suit under Section 29(2)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, where the marks are similar but not identical and the goods are similar but not identical, the court cannot grant a permanent injunction based solely on its own visual and phonetic comparison of the marks — an evidence-based assessment of likelihood of confusion among the relevant class of public is mandatory. The statutory presumption of likelihood of confusion under Section 29(3) is available only when both the marks and the goods are identical under Section 29(2)(c); it cannot be imported into cases falling under Section 29(2)(b). The mere fact that two drugs fall in the same Nice Classification — Class 5, medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations — does not make them similar goods for the purposes of trademark infringement if they are not interchangeable, do not serve the same therapeutic purpose, and are not perceived by the relevant class of professionals as alternatives. Where the plaintiff in a pharmaceutical trademark suit has identified a specific class of persons (such as chemists) as being susceptible to confusion, it must examine witnesses from that class; testimony by the plaintiff's own sales representative is not a substitute. The prefix BEV/BEVA is publici juris in the pharmaceutical trade for drugs containing the molecule Bevacizumab, and the court must give primacy to the distinctive, uncommon parts of rival marks when making a comparison. The deliberate filing of a vexatiously overbroad plaint incorporating causes of action the plaintiff knows to be untenable — such as passing off and misappropriation of goodwill when the plaintiff itself admits no commercial loss — is an abuse of process, and courts should not permit such plaints to proceed to trial. Trademark infringement litigation driven by commercial interest in protecting a mark cannot be dressed up as public interest litigation merely by abandoning monetary claims.

Case Title: Intas Pharmaceuticals Limited Vs. Sun Pharma Laboratories Limited

Date of Order: May 29, 2026

Case Number: RFA(OS)(COMM) 10/2026 

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:4879-DB

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi (Original Side, Division Bench)

Names of Hon'ble Judges: Hon'ble Mr. Justice V. Kameswar Rao and Hon'ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora 

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

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Headnote

Intas Pharmaceuticals Limited v. Sun Pharma Laboratories Limited — 2026:DHC:4879-DB — Delhi High Court Division Bench — RFA(OS)(COMM) 10/2026 — Decided May 29, 2026

Trade Marks Act, 1999 — Section 29(2)(b), Section 29(2)(c), Section 29(3), Section 29(4), Section 2(1)(h) — Pharmaceutical Trademark Infringement — Post-Trial Standard — Likelihood of Confusion — Evidentiary Burden — Deceptive Similarity — Publici Juris Prefix.

Held: In a trademark infringement suit under Section 29(2)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 involving similar but not identical marks and similar but not identical pharmaceutical goods, the court cannot at the post-trial stage grant a permanent injunction based solely on its own visual and phonetic comparison of the marks. An evidence-based assessment of likelihood of confusion among the relevant class of public is mandatory. The statutory presumption of likelihood of confusion under Section 29(3) is available only when both marks and goods are identical under Section 29(2)(c); it cannot be applied to Section 29(2)(b) situations. Two pharmaceutical drugs are not similar goods merely because they fall in Nice Classification Class 5 if they contain different molecules, treat different cancers, are prescribed at different stages of disease, are not interchangeable, and are not perceived as substitutes by Oncologists, chemists, or patients. The prefix BEV/BEVA, being derived from the International Non-Proprietary Name Bevacizumab and used by multiple manufacturers, is publici juris in the pharmaceutical trade; emphasis must be placed on the distinctive uncommon parts of rival marks — here, the suffixes TAS and ETEX — which are phonetically and visually distinct. Sun Pharma's witness PW-1, a sales representative with no direct knowledge of the relevant class of public (chemists, Oncologists, trained nurses), was not a competent witness to prove likelihood of confusion. The plaint was vexatiously framed to include causes of action for passing off and misappropriation of goodwill that Sun Pharma knew to be untenable prior to filing the suit, constituting an abuse of process. Permanent injunction set aside; suit dismissed with costs. (Cadila Health Care Ltd. v. Cadila Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (2001) 5 SCC 73; Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 14; Gufic Ltd. v. Clinique Laboratories, LLC & Anr., 2010 (43) PTC 788; Astrazeneca UK Limited & Anr v. Orchid Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals Ltd., ILR (2007) I Delhi 874 — Relied Upon.)

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Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act and Google Ads: A Comprehensive Review of the Hindware Case

Safe Harbour under Section 79 IT Act Denied: Hindware Ltd. v. Google LLC Analysis

Delhi High Court on Trademark Keywords: Legal Implications of the Hindware-Google Dispute

Trademark Protection in the Digital Era: Understanding the Hindware v. Google Decision


Hindware Ltd. v. Google LLC & Google India: Delhi High Court Holds Sale of Trademark as Keyword to be Trademark Infringement

Introduction

The judgment delivered by the Delhi High Court on 22 May 2026 in the Hindware litigation represents one of the most significant Indian decisions concerning trademark protection in the digital advertising ecosystem. The dispute centered around whether Google, through its AdWords (now Google Ads) programme, could permit advertisers to bid for and use a competitor's registered trademark as a keyword so that advertisements of competing businesses would appear when consumers searched for the trademark owner. The case involved the well-known trademark "HINDWARE", a leading brand in the sanitaryware industry, and raised important questions regarding trademark infringement under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the scope of Google's liability as an online advertising platform, and the availability of intermediary protection under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000. The Court ultimately held that Google's conduct in allowing and facilitating the use of the plaintiff's trademark as a keyword amounted to trademark infringement and granted permanent injunction, damages, and costs in favour of Hindware.

Factual and Procedural Background

Hindware Limited, formerly known as HSIL Limited, is a prominent manufacturer and seller of sanitaryware products in India. The company has been using the trademark "HINDWARE" since 1991 and had already been recognized as the proprietor of a well-known trademark by the Delhi High Court in an earlier judgment dated 21 April 2017 in HSIL Limited v. Kripton Ceramics Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.

The controversy began when Hindware discovered that competing sanitaryware companies, namely Cera and Grohe, had availed Google's AdWords programme and had purchased the trademark "HINDWARE" and related expressions as keywords. As a result, whenever consumers searched for terms such as "HINDWARE", "HINDWARE SANITARYWARE", or similar expressions on Google Search, advertisements and sponsored links relating to Cera and Grohe appeared prominently, often above Hindware's own search results.

Two separate suits were instituted before the Delhi High Court. One suit concerned Grohe's advertising activities, while the second concerned Cera and its website developer Omkara Infoweb. During the pendency of the proceedings, Hindware settled its disputes with Grohe, Cera and Omkara Infoweb. Consequently, the surviving controversy before the Court remained between Hindware on one side and Google India and Google LLC on the other.

The litigation continued for several years. Interim injunctions were granted in favour of Hindware as early as 2013 and 2014 restraining the use of "HINDWARE" as an AdWord or keyword. After recording extensive evidence and hearing detailed submissions, the Court finally rendered its judgment in May 2026.

Dispute Before the Court

The central legal issue was whether Google's act of permitting advertisers to bid on and purchase the registered trademark "HINDWARE" as a keyword constituted trademark infringement under Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Hindware argued that Google was not merely a passive platform. According to the plaintiff, Google actively auctioned, suggested, monetized and sold the trademark to competitors for commercial gain. Hindware contended that such conduct violated its exclusive rights under Section 28 of the Trade Marks Act and amounted to infringement under Sections 29(2), 29(3), 29(6) and 29(8). It was further argued that Google's conduct diluted the distinctiveness of the well-known mark and diverted potential customers searching specifically for Hindware products.

Google, on the other hand, argued that keywords operate invisibly in the backend and are not visible to consumers. According to Google, a keyword is merely a trigger mechanism and does not amount to trademark use. Google further contended that it merely provided an advertising platform and that advertisers alone selected keywords. It relied heavily on the intermediary safe harbour provisions contained in Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and also cited earlier decisions including Google LLC v. DRS Logistics (P) Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 4809; Google LLC v. MakeMyTrip (India) Pvt. Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 7965; and Policybazaar Insurance Web Aggregator v. Coverfox Insurance Broking Pvt. Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 5523.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

The Court emphasized that a trademark is not merely a label identifying goods. It is a valuable commercial asset embodying goodwill, reputation, advertising investment and market recognition. The Court observed that the Trade Marks Act protects not only the source-identifying function of a trademark but also its investment and advertising functions.

A significant part of the Court's reasoning focused on Section 28 of the Trade Marks Act. The Court held that registration grants two independent rights to the proprietor: an exclusive right to use the trademark and a right to seek relief against infringement. Thus, the trademark owner's exclusivity extends beyond merely preventing physical copying of the mark.

The Court found that Google had actively enabled and facilitated the use of the trademark "HINDWARE" by competitors. Evidence showed that Google allowed the trademark to be listed as a biddable keyword and that advertisers could purchase it to ensure their advertisements appeared before consumers searching specifically for Hindware products. The Court rejected Google's characterization of keywords as mere invisible backend triggers.

Court observed that Google's advertising model was designed to commercially exploit the goodwill associated with the plaintiff's trademark. The Court held that Google was not a passive conduit. Rather, it actively conducted auctions, suggested keywords, determined advertising rankings and derived revenue from keyword bidding. Therefore, Google could not escape liability by claiming neutrality.

The Court carefully distinguished earlier decisions relied upon by Google. It observed that the cases of Google LLC v. DRS Logistics (P) Ltd., Google LLC v. MakeMyTrip (India) Pvt. Ltd., and Policybazaar Insurance Web Aggregator v. Coverfox Insurance Broking Pvt. Ltd. involved trademarks that were descriptive, generic, or dictionary words. In contrast, "HINDWARE" was a coined and judicially recognized well-known trademark. The Court therefore held that those precedents did not govern the present dispute.

The judgment also contains an important discussion of Section 29(8) of the Trade Marks Act. The Court held that Google's conduct amounted to advertising that took unfair advantage of the plaintiff's trademark and was contrary to honest commercial practices. According to the Court, allowing competitors to bid for and exploit the plaintiff's trademark for commercial gain constituted free-riding on the goodwill painstakingly built by Hindware over decades.

The Court further rejected Google's argument that keyword advertising necessarily promotes competition. While acknowledging that competition benefits consumers, the Court emphasized that competition must be achieved through lawful means. The Court remarked that increased competition cannot justify the auctioning and monetization of another entity's trademark without authorization.

Another major issue was Google's claim of intermediary protection under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000. The Court extensively examined the statutory framework and precedents relating to intermediary liability. It concluded that Google's actions went far beyond merely hosting or transmitting third-party information. By conducting auctions, facilitating keyword purchases and monetizing trademark use, Google actively participated in the infringing activity. Consequently, the Court held that Google could not claim safe harbour protection under Section 79.

The Court also referred to the Division Bench decision in Amazon Seller Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Amway India Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., 2020 SCC OnLine Del 454, while analyzing the scope of intermediary protection. Applying those principles, the Court found that Google's conduct disqualified it from claiming immunity.

The judgment additionally noted that Google's own internal policy changes had allowed trademark bidding despite earlier restrictions. The Court took note of evidence showing that the company anticipated substantial revenue growth from permitting trademark bidding and considered this relevant in assessing Google's role in the infringing activity.

Final Decision of the Court

The Delhi High Court decreed the suits in favour of Hindware and against Google LLC and Google India.

The Court granted a permanent injunction restraining Google from using or permitting the use of the marks "HINDWARE", "HINDWARE SANITARYWARE", "HINDWARE SANITARY", "HINDWARE SANITARYWARE INDIA" or any combination thereof as advertising keywords, AdWords or in any manner amounting to trademark infringement.

The Court further awarded nominal damages of ₹30,00,000 payable jointly and severally by Google LLC and Google India to Hindware. In addition, actual litigation costs were awarded in favour of the plaintiff. The Court also decreed the suit against Omkara Infoweb in terms of the settlement agreement already executed between the parties.

Point of Law Settled

The judgment establishes several important legal principles:

The use of a registered and well-known trademark as a keyword in a search engine advertising programme can amount to trademark infringement under the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

A search engine operator that actively auctions, suggests, promotes and monetizes trademark keywords is not merely a passive intermediary and may be held liable for infringement.

The protection available under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 does not extend to activities involving active commercial exploitation of third-party trademarks through keyword advertising.

The exclusive rights granted under Section 28 of the Trade Marks Act protect not only the source-identifying function of a trademark but also its advertising and commercial value.

Commercial competition cannot justify the unauthorized auctioning or monetization of another person's trademark.

The principles applicable to descriptive or generic marks cannot automatically be extended to coined and judicially recognized well-known trademarks.

Case Title: Hindware Ltd. Vs Grohe India Pvt.Ltd. & Ors and Hindware Ltd. Vs Omkara Infoweb Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.

Date of Order: 22 May 2026

Case Numbers: CS(COMM) 591/2017 and CS(COMM) 592/2017

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:4614

Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Coram: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Mini Pushkarna

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi


Headnote

Trademark Law – Google Ads – Keyword Advertising – Well-Known Trademark – Intermediary Liability – Section 29 Trade Marks Act – Section 79 Information Technology Act – Hindware Trademark. Delhi High Court held that Google's practice of permitting competitors to bid on and purchase the well-known trademark "HINDWARE" as a keyword under its AdWords programme constituted trademark infringement. The Court ruled that Google actively facilitated and monetized the use of the plaintiff's trademark and therefore could not claim safe harbour protection as an intermediary under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000. Permanent injunction, ₹30 lakh damages and actual costs were awarded in favour of Hindware.


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Mr. Vijay Gupta Vs. Ms. Renu Malhotra

Arti Srivastava Vs Assistant Controller of Patent

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Delhi High Court Dismisses Patent Appeal for Insufficient Disclosure in Anti-Counterfeiting Authentication System

Patent Specification Must Enable a Skilled Person to Perform the Invention: Delhi High Court Clarifies Section 10(4)

Counterfeit Product Detection System Patent Refused: Delhi High Court on Sufficiency of Disclosure

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Delhi High Court on Patent Drafting Standards, Enablement and Fair Basis of Claims


Delhi High Court Upholds Rejection of Patent Application for Counterfeit Product Authentication System: A Detailed Analysis of Sufficiency of Disclosure and Fair Basing Requirements under the Patents Act

Introduction

The decision rendered by the Delhi High Court in C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 252/2022 on 11 May 2026 is an important contribution to Indian patent jurisprudence concerning the standards of disclosure required in a patent specification. The judgment examines the scope of Sections 10(4)(a), 10(4)(b) and 10(5) of the Patents Act, 1970 and reiterates a fundamental principle of patent law: a patent monopoly can be granted only when the inventor clearly teaches the public how to perform the invention.

The case concerned a patent application relating to a system for identifying counterfeit products through visible and hidden authentication codes printed on product labels. While the invention aimed to help consumers verify the genuineness of products and combat counterfeiting, the Court found that the complete specification failed to adequately explain several critical technical aspects of the invention. As a result, the Court upheld the rejection of the patent application and dismissed the appeal.

The judgment is particularly significant because it distinguishes between the novelty or inventiveness of an idea and the legal requirement of sufficiently disclosing how that idea can actually be implemented. The Court emphasized that patent protection is not granted merely for identifying a desirable result; the inventor must also provide enough technical guidance to enable a person skilled in the relevant field to put the invention into practice.

Factual and Procedural Background

The patent application related to a system intended to combat the growing problem of counterfeit products in the market. The invention proposed a mechanism whereby products would be affixed with labels containing two separate alphanumeric codes. One code would remain visible to the purchaser while the second code would remain hidden beneath a scratchable coating. The system was designed so that a consumer could communicate these codes to a central data centre, which would verify the authenticity of the product and return a confirmation message.

According to the complete specification, the visible code would identify the manufacturer and product, whereas the hidden code would be used for authentication. When both codes were matched with records maintained by the data centre, the system would determine whether the product was genuine.

The specification further described a process whereby the user would first transmit the visible code to the data centre. If the code matched the stored records, the user would then be prompted to reveal and transmit the hidden code. Upon successful verification of both codes, the data centre would inform the user that the product was genuine. If verification failed, the user would be informed that authenticity could not be confirmed. The data centre would additionally maintain records of previous enquiries and identify multiple uses of the same code so that counterfeit activity could potentially be traced.

The specification stated that communications between the user and the data centre could occur through various channels including landline telephones, mobile phones, SMS, MMS, fax, email and internet-based communications.

During prosecution, the applicant amended the claims and filed revised claims on 2 December 2013 following a hearing held on 20 November 2013. The amended claims covered both a system and a method for identifying genuine products through visible and hidden codes transmitted to a data centre for verification.

The Assistant Controller of Patents ultimately refused the application on grounds including insufficiency of disclosure under Section 10(4)(a) and lack of support under Section 10(5) of the Patents Act. The applicant challenged this refusal before the Delhi High Court.

The Core Dispute

The principal controversy before the Court was whether the complete specification adequately disclosed the invention in the manner required by Section 10(4)(a) of the Patents Act.

The applicant argued that the invention had been sufficiently described through flow charts, diagrams and explanations of the authentication process. According to the applicant, a person skilled in the art would readily understand how to implement the invention based on the information provided.

The Patent Office contended that the specification merely described the desired outcome without explaining the technical architecture necessary to achieve that outcome. It argued that critical details relating to data processing, communication protocols, verification mechanisms, code generation, storage systems and security architecture had been omitted. Consequently, the invention could not be implemented merely by reading the specification.

Another important issue concerned inventive step. The Assistant Controller had originally relied upon prior art documents D1 and D5 to reject the application. However, during judicial scrutiny it emerged that D1 had been published on 10 August 2006 whereas the present application had been filed on 3 August 2006. Since D1 was published after the filing date, it could not legally constitute prior art against the application. Consequently, the Court observed that the inventive-step objection based on D1 could not survive.

The Court therefore focused primarily upon whether the application failed the statutory requirements of disclosure and fair basis.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

Justice Tushar Rao Gedela undertook a detailed examination of the complete specification and the statutory framework governing patent disclosures.

The Court first analysed the actual disclosure contained in the specification. It noted that the specification described the concept of transmitting visible and hidden codes to a data centre and receiving authentication responses. However, beyond these broad descriptions, the specification did not explain how the system would actually function at a technical level.

The Court observed that implementation of such a system would necessarily require disclosure of several important technical elements, including processing mechanisms, communication protocols, security safeguards, error-handling procedures, authentication logic and data management architecture. These details were absent from the specification.

Particular emphasis was placed on the fact that the specification merely stated that the data centre would "return a message" indicating whether the product was genuine. However, the specification failed to explain how the data centre would process incoming data, perform verification, manage duplicate enquiries, store information or prevent fraudulent reuse of authentication codes.

The Court also noted that the specification lacked detailed diagrams explaining system architecture, workflow and authentication logic. The disclosed flow charts were considered insufficient to provide meaningful guidance for implementation. Moreover, the specification did not explain how the visible and hidden codes would be generated, linked, encrypted or protected against misuse.

Justice Gedela then turned to Section 10(4)(a) of the Patents Act. The Court explained that the provision requires every complete specification to fully and particularly describe the invention, its operation, its use and the method by which it is to be performed. This requirement exists because a patent represents a bargain between the inventor and society. In exchange for a temporary monopoly, the inventor must disclose sufficient information so that the public can practise the invention once the patent expires.

Applying this principle, the Court held that a Person Skilled in the Art (PSITA) would not be able to implement the claimed invention without conducting substantial further research and experimentation. Several essential embodiments necessary for practical implementation had been left undisclosed.

The Court further noted that although multiple communication methods were disclosed, the applicant failed to identify the best method of performing the invention, which is a separate requirement under Section 10(4)(b). The absence of such disclosure reinforced the insufficiency of the specification.

Discussion of Earlier Judgments and Legal Principles

A substantial portion of the judgment was devoted to examining previous decisions relating to sufficiency of disclosure.

The Court relied upon the landmark Bombay High Court decision in Farbwerke Hoechst v. Unichem Laboratories and Others. In that case, the Court explained that insufficiency of disclosure has two components. First, the specification must describe an embodiment of the invention and provide enough information to enable persons in the relevant field to perform the invention without making further inventions of their own. Second, the disclosure must be fair and not unnecessarily difficult to follow. Justice Gedela extracted extensive passages from this judgment and adopted its reasoning while assessing the present application.

The Court also referred to the Manual of Patent Office Practice and Procedure, Version 3.0 dated 26 November 2019. The Manual emphasizes that the description of an invention must provide a complete picture of the invention and must enable a person of average skill and knowledge to perform the invention solely on the basis of the disclosure.

Another important precedent discussed was Titan Umreifungstechnik GmbH & Co. KG v. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs. In that case, the Delhi High Court held that the essential inquiry under Section 10(4) is whether the invention has been described sufficiently to allow a skilled person to reproduce it. Although working examples may not always be mandatory, the best method known to the inventor must be disclosed. The Court relied upon this principle while examining the present application.

Justice Gedela also relied upon the Madras High Court decision in Caleb Suresh Motupalli v. Controller of Patents. In that judgment, the Madras High Court held that where a complete specification lacks technological enablement of the claimed features, the invention fails the enablement requirement under Section 10(4)(a). The Delhi High Court found this reasoning directly applicable to the present case.

The Court also discussed the principles underlying Section 10(5), which requires claims to be fairly based upon the disclosure contained in the specification. For this proposition, reliance was placed upon the observations in Caleb Suresh Motupalli, which in turn referred to the English decisions in The General Tire & Rubber Company v. The Firestone Tyre & Rubber Company Ltd. and Biogen Inc. v. Medeva Plc. These authorities explain that claims must be supported by a workable embodiment disclosed in the specification and cannot extend beyond what has actually been taught to the public.

Final Decision of the Court

After analysing the complete specification, the statutory provisions and the relevant precedents, the Court concluded that the patent application suffered from serious deficiencies.

The Court held that the specification failed to adequately disclose the processing mechanism, authentication logic, storage architecture, code-generation methodology and security framework necessary for implementation of the invention. The specification left crucial aspects of the invention to be worked out by the skilled person through further research and invention. This constituted insufficiency of disclosure under Section 10(4)(a).

The Court further held that the claims referred to a "processor" and a "transmitter" but the specification did not properly disclose these components. Consequently, the claims were not fairly based on the disclosure and therefore violated Section 10(5).

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed and the refusal of the patent application was upheld.

Point of Law Settled

The judgment reaffirms that a patent specification must provide sufficient technical disclosure to enable a person skilled in the art to perform the invention without undertaking further inventive activity. Merely describing the objective or result of an invention is not enough.

The decision clarifies that in computer-implemented and communication-based inventions, disclosure must include adequate details regarding system architecture, processing logic, communication protocols, authentication mechanisms and operational workflow wherever such features are essential to implementation.

The judgment further establishes that claims cannot extend beyond the actual disclosure contained in the specification. If a claim refers to technical components or functionalities that are not adequately described, the application may fail the fair-basing requirement under Section 10(5).

Most importantly, the case reinforces the fundamental patent law principle that a patent monopoly is granted only in exchange for a complete and enabling disclosure to the public.


Case Details

Title: Arti Srivastava Vs Assistant Controller of Patent

Date of Order: 11 May 2026

Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 252/2022

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:____ (Neutral Citation not available in extracted pages)

Court: High Court of Delhi

Hon'ble Judge: Justice Tushar Rao Gedela


Headnote

The Delhi High Court dismissed a patent appeal concerning a counterfeit-product authentication system based on visible and hidden verification codes. The Court held that the complete specification failed to satisfy the enablement requirement under Section 10(4)(a) of the Patents Act because it did not adequately disclose the technical architecture, processing mechanisms, authentication logic, code generation process and operational workflow necessary to implement the invention. The Court further held that claims relating to a processor and transmitter were not fairly based on the disclosure and therefore violated Section 10(5). The judgment reinforces that a patent specification must teach a skilled person how to perform the invention without requiring further inventive effort.


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Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

University of North Texas & Anr. Vs. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs

Here is a detailed legal journal-style article based on University of North Texas & Anr. v. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs, C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 32/2025, decided on 12 May 2026 by the Delhi High Court.

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University of North Texas & Anr. v. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs: Delhi High Court Reaffirms the Need for Proper Analysis of Inventive Step, Sufficiency of Disclosure and Diagnostic Method Exclusions

Introduction

The judgment delivered by the Delhi High Court in University of North Texas & Anr. v. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs is another important addition to the growing body of Indian patent jurisprudence dealing with inventive step, patentability of diagnostic technologies, sufficiency of disclosure and the obligation of Patent Controllers to pass reasoned orders. The case arose from the refusal of a patent application relating to technologies for rapid detection and quantitation of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) through breath samples. The invention was intended to facilitate quick identification of substances such as cannabinoids and other compounds from a person's breath, particularly for use in field conditions by law-enforcement agencies.

The Court was called upon to determine whether the Patent Office had correctly applied the legal principles governing inventive step under Section 2(1)(ja) of the Patents Act, 1970, sufficiency of disclosure under Section 10(4), and the exclusion of diagnostic methods under Section 3(i). Justice Jyoti Singh ultimately concluded that the refusal order suffered from significant legal deficiencies because the Controller failed to properly analyse the applicant's submissions and did not apply the settled judicial tests governing patent examination. Consequently, the matter was remanded for fresh consideration.

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants, University of North Texas and another applicant, filed a Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) application bearing No. PCT/IB2019/056456 claiming priority from US Patent Application No. 62/712,941 dated 31 July 2018. The corresponding Indian National Phase Application No. 202117006438 was filed before the Indian Patent Office on 16 February 2021 for an invention titled “Technologies for Rapid Detection and Quantitation of Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) Using Breath Samples.”

The Request for Examination was filed on 4 July 2022. The First Examination Report (FER) was issued on 18 April 2023 raising objections under Section 2(1)(ja) for lack of inventive step, Section 3(i) for non-patentability, and Sections 10(4) and 10(5) relating to clarity, conciseness and sufficiency of disclosure. The applicants responded to the FER on 25 September 2023 and amended the claims. A hearing was conducted on 21 October 2024, followed by written submissions on 5 November 2024. Ultimately, the Assistant Controller refused the application by order dated 31 January 2025.

The invention related to breathalyser technology capable of rapidly identifying cannabinoids and other volatile organic compounds through breath samples. The applicants explained that conventional testing methods relied on blood, urine or oral fluid samples analysed using gas chromatography coupled with mass spectrometry. These methods required laboratory testing and often consumed considerable time. The claimed invention sought to overcome these limitations by providing a portable and efficient system capable of real-time field analysis.

According to the applicants, the technology could be particularly useful for law-enforcement agencies attempting to identify drivers under the influence of marijuana and other substances. Existing technologies such as liquid chromatography coupled with mass spectrometry (LC/MS), high-field asymmetric waveform ion mobility (FAIMS) and spectroscopy-based systems suffered from various drawbacks including delayed analysis, inadequate sensitivity or limited field usability. The invention aimed to address these shortcomings through the use of a molecule collector, heating element and Terahertz (THz) spectrometer.

The Dispute Before the Court

The principal dispute before the Court concerned the validity of the refusal order passed by the Patent Office.

The applicants argued that the Controller had incorrectly concluded that the invention lacked inventive step over prior art documents D1 and D2. They submitted that neither D1 nor D2 disclosed the essential features of the invention, particularly the use of a THz spectrometer comprising an excitation source and detector operating in the specific manner claimed. They further argued that the Controller had failed to apply the well-established legal tests governing obviousness and inventive step.

The applicants also challenged the findings relating to insufficiency of disclosure and lack of clarity. According to them, the complete specification adequately described the structure and operation of the molecule collector, heating element and THz spectrometer. The refusal order allegedly ignored detailed explanations already provided in response to the FER.

Another important dispute concerned Section 3(i) of the Patents Act. The Controller had held that the invention amounted to a diagnostic method and was therefore excluded from patentability. The applicants argued that the invention merely analysed breath samples to detect substances and did not diagnose any disease, disorder or medical condition.

The Patent Office, on the other hand, defended the refusal order by asserting that D1 and D2 disclosed similar systems for collecting, conditioning and analysing breath samples. It argued that replacing existing sensing technologies with a THz spectrometer was merely a routine substitution and did not constitute a technical advance. The Controller also maintained that the claims lacked adequate disclosure and fell within the scope of diagnostic methods excluded under Section 3(i).

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge

Justice Jyoti Singh began by examining the settled legal principles governing inventive step. The Court noted that the law relating to inventive step had been comprehensively explained in earlier judicial precedents and that Controllers are required to apply these principles systematically while assessing patentability.

A major deficiency identified by the Court was the Controller's failure to apply the five-step obviousness test formulated by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. & Anr. v. Cipla Ltd., 2015 SCC OnLine Del 13619. According to this test, the Controller must identify the person skilled in the art, identify the inventive concept embodied in the patent, ascertain common general knowledge, identify differences between prior art and the invention, and finally determine whether those differences would have been obvious to a skilled person while avoiding hindsight analysis.

The Court observed that the Controller had not even completed the first step of identifying the person skilled in the art. This failure itself was sufficient to undermine the validity of the refusal order. The Court further noted that the Controller had incorrectly identified the inventive concept and failed to meaningfully analyse the distinctions highlighted by the applicants.

The Court reproduced extensive portions of the applicants' response to the FER demonstrating how D1 relied upon Surface Enhanced Raman Spectroscopy (SERS), whereas the claimed invention employed a THz spectrometer with an excitation source and detector operating in a fundamentally different manner. Likewise, D2 used a nanoparticle-based sensing mechanism and did not disclose the claimed THz spectroscopy arrangement. Despite these detailed submissions, the Controller merely concluded that the invention lacked inventive step because both systems involved breath sample analysis. Justice Singh found this reasoning wholly inadequate.

The Court held that there was no meaningful discussion regarding how a person skilled in the art would move from D1 or D2 to the claimed invention. Merely stating that certain elements were similar did not satisfy the statutory requirement of analysing inventive step. Such reasoning effectively amounted to hindsight reconstruction, a practice repeatedly condemned in patent jurisprudence.

Discussion of Earlier Judgments

The Court relied significantly upon Agriboard International LLC v. Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 940. In that case, the Delhi High Court had held that while determining inventive step, the Controller must analyse three essential elements: the invention disclosed in prior art, the invention disclosed in the patent application and the manner in which the claimed invention would be obvious to a skilled person. The Court reiterated that failure to conduct this exercise renders a refusal order legally unsustainable.

The Court also relied on F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. & Anr. v. Cipla Ltd., 2015 SCC OnLine Del 13619, where the Division Bench elaborated the structured five-step approach for evaluating obviousness and warned against hindsight analysis.

Another important precedent discussed was Tapas Chatterjee v. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs and Another, 2025 SCC OnLine Del 6369. The Division Bench had clarified that the five-step test must be applied sequentially and systematically. The Court found that this requirement had not been followed by the Controller in the present case.

The Court further referred to Best Agrolife Limited v. Deputy Controller of Patents and Another, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1982 and Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. v. Controller of Patents, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 4982, both of which emphasized the necessity of passing reasoned and speaking orders in patent matters.

On the issue of sufficiency of disclosure, the Court relied upon the Bombay High Court decision in JFE Steel Corporation v. Controller of Patents & Designs, 2026:BHC-OS:4866. That judgment held that a patent application cannot be rejected without proper analysis of substantive patentability requirements and that mere assertions regarding insufficiency of disclosure are inadequate.

Regarding Section 3(i), the Court referred to Chinese University of Hong Kong and Another v. Assistant Controller of Patents & Designs, 2023 SCC OnLine Mad 6372. The Madras High Court had explained that a diagnostic method ordinarily involves identifying the existence or non-existence of a disease, disorder or medical condition. Justice Singh found that the Controller had not examined whether the present invention actually performed such a diagnostic function.

Analysis of the Court's Findings on Section 10(4)

The Court was particularly critical of the Controller's treatment of the objections relating to sufficiency of disclosure. The Controller had alleged that the specification did not adequately explain the material composition of the molecule collector or the functioning of the heating element.

However, the Court observed that the applicants had specifically pointed to paragraphs [0027] and [0028] of the specification and Figures 1 and 2 explaining these features. The applicants had also demonstrated how the heating element functioned through application of voltage to the molecule collector. Yet the Controller neither discussed these explanations nor identified what additional disclosure was allegedly required. Justice Singh therefore found the reasoning incomplete and legally inadequate.

Analysis of the Court's Findings on Section 3(i)

The Court also found serious flaws in the Controller's conclusion that the invention was a diagnostic method. The Controller had simply assumed that analysing breath samples for VOCs amounted to diagnosis.

Justice Singh held that the Controller had failed to analyse the claims and had not applied any recognised legal test to determine whether the invention actually diagnosed a disease or medical condition. The invention was directed toward detecting cannabinoids and other substances in breath samples, particularly for determining intoxication. The Court noted that the specification nowhere claimed diagnosis of a disease or disorder. Consequently, the Section 3(i) objection required fresh consideration.

Final Decision of the Court

After examining the matter in detail, the Delhi High Court held that the refusal order dated 31 January 2025 could not be sustained. The Court found that the Controller had failed to apply the settled legal tests relating to inventive step, had not properly analysed the applicants' submissions concerning sufficiency of disclosure and had incorrectly addressed the objection under Section 3(i).

Accordingly, the impugned order was quashed and set aside. The matter was remanded to the Assistant Controller for fresh consideration of Patent Application No. 202117006438. The Court directed that a fresh hearing be granted and that the response to the FER and written submissions be duly considered. A fresh reasoned decision was directed to be issued within four months. The Court expressly clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the ultimate merits of the patent application.

Point of Law Settled

This judgment reinforces that while assessing inventive step under Section 2(1)(ja), Patent Controllers must rigorously apply the judicially recognised five-step test and cannot reject patent applications through conclusory observations. The decision further establishes that prior art analysis must be detailed and reasoned, and hindsight reconstruction of inventions is impermissible.

The judgment also emphasizes that objections relating to sufficiency of disclosure under Section 10(4) require meaningful examination of the specification and cannot be sustained without identifying what additional disclosure is actually necessary.

Finally, the Court reaffirmed that an invention does not become a diagnostic method under Section 3(i) merely because it analyses biological samples. The Controller must determine whether the claimed invention actually diagnoses a disease, disorder or medical condition before invoking the statutory exclusion.


Case Details

Title: University of North Texas & Anr. Vs. Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs

Date of Decision: 12 May 2026

Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 32/2025

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:____ (Neutral citation not available in the uploaded copy)

Court: High Court of Delhi

Hon'ble Judge: Justice Jyoti Singh


Headnote

The Delhi High Court set aside the refusal of a patent application relating to rapid detection and quantitation of volatile organic compounds using breath samples. The Court held that the Patent Office failed to apply the settled five-step test for determining inventive step and did not properly analyse the differences between the claimed invention and prior art references. The Court further held that objections concerning insufficiency of disclosure and diagnostic method exclusion under Sections 10(4) and 3(i) respectively had not been adequately examined. The refusal order was quashed and the matter remanded for fresh consideration with directions to pass a detailed, reasoned and speaking order.


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Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advise as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

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