Novartis AG v. Union of India: India's Landmark Stand Against
Evergreening of Pharmaceutical Patents
Introduction
Few judgments in the history of
intellectual property law in India have attracted as much national and
international attention as the Supreme Court of India's decision in Novartis AG
v. Union of India and Others, reported as (2013) 6 SCC 1, decided on April 1,
2013. This case raised a question that sat at the very crossroads of patent
law, public health, access to medicines, and the obligations of a developing
nation under international trade agreements. At its heart, the case asked a
simple but deeply consequential question: should India grant a patent to a new
crystalline form of an already known anti-cancer drug merely because the new form
had improved physical properties, even when those improved properties did not
translate into a meaningfully better therapeutic outcome for patients?
The drug in question was Gleevec or
Glivec, sold by Novartis AG, a Swiss pharmaceutical giant, and used for the
treatment of a deadly blood cancer called chronic myeloid leukaemia (CML) as
well as certain other tumour-related conditions. The active pharmaceutical
ingredient in Gleevec was the beta-crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate, a
compound derived from a broader family of chemical substances. Novartis had
been selling Gleevec in India under a price that placed it out of reach for
millions of patients. Generic manufacturers, particularly Indian pharmaceutical
companies, were producing significantly cheaper versions of the same drug,
which allowed patients across India and other developing nations to access
life-saving treatment. The patent battle was thus not merely a corporate
dispute. It was a contest between the patent rights of a multinational company
and the right to life of thousands of cancer patients who depended on
affordable medicines.
The case not only tested the limits of
India's patent law, particularly the unique provision in Section 3(d) of the
Patents Act, 1970 as amended by the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, but also
examined whether India's approach to pharmaceutical patenting was consistent
with its obligations under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) under the World Trade Organization. The Supreme
Court, in its unanimous judgment delivered by a Bench of Justices Aftab Alam
and Ranjana P. Desai, dismissed Novartis's appeals and refused the patent. The
decision sent a clear message to the world: India's patent law, particularly
Section 3(d), was not a mere procedural hurdle but a substantive requirement
designed to prevent the practice of "evergreening," which is the
attempt by pharmaceutical companies to extend their monopoly over a drug by
obtaining patents on minor modifications of a known substance without any real
therapeutic improvement.
Factual and Procedural Background
The origin of this dispute lies in an
invention by Dr. Jürg Zimmermann, a scientist who worked for Ciba Geigy (which
later merged with Sandoz in 1996 to form Novartis). Dr. Zimmermann invented a
family of chemical compounds known as N-phenyl-2-pyrimidine-amine derivatives,
which had the property of inhibiting certain tyrosine kinases — enzymes that
play a role in the growth of cancer cells. This invention was patented in Europe
and in the United States, where it became known as Zimmermann Patent No.
5,521,184, granted by the United States Patent and Trade Mark Office (USPTO) on
May 28, 1996. The Zimmermann Patent covered the broad family of compounds, and
within that family, the compound specifically identified as Example 21 — later
given the international non-proprietary name "Imatinib" — was
disclosed, along with its pharmaceutically acceptable salts, including Imatinib
Mesylate (the methanesulfonic acid salt of Imatinib).
Novartis subsequently developed Imatinib
Mesylate into a drug substance and eventually isolated a specific crystalline
form of it — the beta-crystalline form — which it called beta-IM or β-IM. A
subsequent US patent, Zimmermann Patent No. 6,894,051 B1, dated May 17, 2005,
was granted to Novartis specifically for the beta-crystalline form (β-IM) of
Imatinib Mesylate. Novartis marketed the drug under the brand name Gleevec in
the United States and Glivec in other countries including India.
In India, Novartis filed a patent
application in July 1998 for the beta-crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate —
that is, for β-IM — at the Chennai Patent Office. This application, numbered
1602/MAS/1998, claimed that the beta-crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate was
a new and patentable invention distinct from anything previously disclosed,
including the Zimmermann Patent. The application was filed during the period
when Indian patent law did not yet allow product patents for pharmaceutical
substances, as Section 5 of the Patents Act, 1970 then prohibited product
patents for drugs. In 1999, the Indian Government issued an Ordinance that
created a "mailbox" mechanism under Article 70.8 of TRIPS, allowing
applications for pharmaceutical product patents to be stored and examined once
India's obligations to grant such patents under TRIPS kicked in, which happened
when the Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005 came into force on January 1, 2005.
Novartis's application thus remained in the "mailbox" until the 2005
Amendment opened the door for its examination.
On January 25, 2006, the Assistant
Controller of Patents and Designs, Chennai, rejected Novartis's patent
application on two main grounds: first, that the compound Imatinib Mesylate was
already known from the Zimmermann Patent and was therefore not novel or did not
involve an inventive step; and second, that the subject compound, being merely
a new form of a known substance with no significantly enhanced efficacy, was
excluded from patentability by virtue of Section 3(d) of the amended Patents
Act, 1970.
Aggrieved by this rejection, Novartis
filed appeals before the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB), Madras.
In the meantime, Novartis also filed a Writ Petition in the High Court of
Madras challenging the constitutional validity of Section 3(d) of the Patents
Act, arguing that this provision was inconsistent with India's obligations
under the TRIPS Agreement and was also vague and arbitrary in violation of
Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The High Court, on August 6, 2007, in
its decision in Novartis AG v. Union of India, (2007) 4 MLJ 1153, rejected the
challenge to Section 3(d)'s constitutionality and its compatibility with TRIPS,
holding that Section 3(d) was not violative of any constitutional provision and
that TRIPS itself gave member nations the flexibility to define the
patentability standards as suited their national interests. The High Court did
not, however, deal with the merits of the patent claim itself, leaving those
issues for the IPAB.
The IPAB, in its order dated June 26,
2009, partly affirmed the Controller's rejection. The IPAB disagreed with the
Controller on the ground of lack of novelty and held that Imatinib Mesylate was
not anticipated by the prior art. However, the IPAB upheld the rejection on the
ground of Section 3(d), finding that Novartis had failed to demonstrate that
β-IM had any significantly enhanced therapeutic efficacy as compared to the
known substance Imatinib Mesylate. Novartis and other parties, including Natco
Pharma Limited and Cancer Patients Aid Association, all filed appeals before
the Supreme Court of India, challenging various aspects of the IPAB's
reasoning.
Before the Supreme Court, Civil Appeals
Nos. 2706-716 of 2013 (by Novartis), Civil Appeal No. 2728 of 2013 (by Natco
Pharma Limited), and Civil Appeals Nos. 2717-27 of 2013 (by Cancer Patients Aid
Association) were all heard together. The case thus came to be decided by the
Supreme Court with a Bench of Justices Aftab Alam and Ranjana P. Desai.
The Dispute
The central legal dispute before the
Supreme Court involved the correct interpretation and application of Section
3(d) of the Patents Act, 1970 as amended in 2005, along with Sections 2(1)(j)
and 2(1)(ja) defining "invention" and "inventive step"
respectively. However, several other important sub-disputes arose in the course
of argument.
The first and primary question was
whether Imatinib Mesylate — the parent substance from which β-IM was derived —
was itself a "new" product when it came into being, or whether it was
already a known substance taught by the Zimmermann Patent. This was significant
because if Imatinib Mesylate itself was not a "new" product, then the
two-stage claim by Novartis — that they invented first Imatinib Mesylate and
then β-IM — could not be sustained. Novartis argued before the Supreme Court
that Imatinib Mesylate was covered by the Zimmermann Patent (i.e., within its
claims) but was not specifically disclosed or taught as a preparation in that
patent, and therefore the step of going from Imatinib (the free base) to
Imatinib Mesylate involved an inventive step. The respondents, on the other
hand, particularly Cipla Ltd. (appearing through Mr. Harish N. Salve, Senior
Advocate) and the Union of India, contended that Imatinib Mesylate was fully
part of the teaching of the Zimmermann Patent, which disclosed preparing
"pharmaceutically acceptable salts" of the compound Imatinib, and
that the mesylate salt was an obvious variant known to persons skilled in
pharmaceutical chemistry.
The second important sub-dispute was
whether the claim for β-IM as a distinct invention could survive the test of
Section 3(d) of the 1970 Act. Section 3(d) provides that the "mere
discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not result in the
enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance" shall not be
considered an invention. The Explanation to Section 3(d) clarifies that salts,
esters, polymorphs, metabolites, pure form, particle size, isomers, mixtures of
isomers, complexes, combinations, and other derivatives of known substances
shall be considered to be the same substance, unless they differ significantly
in properties with regard to efficacy. Novartis argued that β-IM had enhanced
efficacy because it had 30% more bioavailability than Imatinib in free-base
form, and had better physical properties such as better flow, greater
thermodynamic stability, and lower hygroscopicity. The respondents argued that
bioavailability improvements and physico-chemical properties were not the same
as enhanced therapeutic efficacy as required by Section 3(d), and that Novartis
had not produced any research data comparing the therapeutic effect of β-IM
with that of Imatinib Mesylate in treating patients.
The third significant dispute related to
whether Section 3(d) was an ex majore cautela (out of abundant caution)
provision that should be read as subordinate to the general invention tests in
Sections 2(1)(j) and 2(1)(ja), or whether it was a substantive, independent
test that applied to pharmaceutical substances over and above the tests of
novelty and inventive step. Novartis contended that Section 3(d) was merely a
precautionary or advisory provision and that if β-IM satisfied the standard
tests of novelty and inventive step, Section 3(d) could not stand in the way of
granting a patent. The respondents and the courts below had held to the
contrary, and this view was ultimately affirmed by the Supreme Court.
A further dispute concerned whether
Novartis's own representations in other jurisdictions — particularly before the
US Patent Office where it had taken the position that Imatinib Mesylate was
taught by the Zimmermann Patent — could bind it before Indian proceedings. The
respondents argued that Novartis was blowing hot and cold by claiming in India
that Imatinib Mesylate was a new product distinct from Zimmermann while having
maintained in the United States that it was fully covered by Zimmermann, and
that the principle of estoppel or issue estoppel ought to prevent Novartis from
contradicting its own earlier positions.
Reasoning and Analysis of the Judges
The Supreme Court delivered a detailed,
extensively researched judgment spanning over 100 paragraphs of substantive
analysis, touching upon the history of Indian patent law, the international law
obligations under TRIPS, the purpose and meaning of Section 3(d), the concept
of "invention" and "inventive step" under Indian law, and
the factual questions concerning the substance β-IM and its characteristics.
The Court began by examining the
legislative history of patent law in India, going back to the pre-independence
period and the Patents and Designs Act, 1911. The Judges traced the development
of Indian patent law through the Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar Report of 1959,
which had strongly recommended that India should not grant product patents in
the pharmaceutical sector, and which led to the enactment of the Patents Act,
1970. The Ayyangar Report had specifically noted that allowing product patents
in chemicals and pharmaceuticals would lead to monopolies that would be
detrimental to public health in a developing country. The Court noted that when
Section 5 of the 1970 Act, which barred product patents in drugs and food, was
deleted as part of India's TRIPS compliance through the Patents (Amendment)
Act, 2005, it was not done in isolation. The deletion of Section 5 was
accompanied by the insertion of Section 2(1)(j) and Section 2(1)(ja) — which
redefined "invention" and "inventive step" — as well as the
amendment to Section 3(d) and the addition of its Explanation, which set up a
higher threshold for patentability specifically aimed at pharmaceutical and
chemical substances.
The Court quoted from and heavily relied
upon Monsanto Co. v. Coramandal Indag Products (P) Ltd., (1986) 1 SCC 642,
where the Supreme Court had explained the basic quid pro quo of patent law: an
inventor is given a limited monopoly in exchange for publicly disclosing the
invention so that at the end of the patent term, the invention falls into the
public domain and the public benefits from it. The Court emphasized that the
coverage of a patent (what it claims) cannot be wider than its disclosure (what
it teaches), and that Patent Law in India should not develop in a direction
where the scope of a patent is determined not by the intrinsic worth of the
invention but by the clever drafting of claims by skilled lawyers.
On the first major factual question —
whether Imatinib Mesylate was a known substance — the Court examined the
Zimmermann Patent No. 5,521,184 in considerable detail and concluded that
Imatinib Mesylate was indeed a known substance disclosed within that patent.
The patent not only taught the use of "pharmaceutically acceptable
salts" of Imatinib but also stated the anti-tumoral properties of the
compound and its methanesulfonate salt. The Court also noted two published
scientific articles from reputed journals — one titled "Inhibition of the
Abl Protein-Tyrosine Kinase In Vitro and In Vivo by a 2-Phenylaminopyrimidine
Derivative," published in the Cancer Research Journal (Issue
January–February 1996) by Dr. Zimmermann himself, and another titled
"Effects of a Selective Inhibitor of the Abl Tyrosine Kinase on the Growth
of Bcr-Abl Positive Cells" published in Nature Medicine (1996) — both of
which specifically discussed the anti-tumoral properties of Imatinib and its
mesylate salt. The Court observed that in the face of these materials, it was
difficult to see how Imatinib Mesylate could be regarded as a new product.
On the question of whether Novartis was
bound by its earlier representations, the Court examined the fact that when
Novartis obtained US Patent No. 6,894,051 B1 for β-IM, the US Board of Patent
Appeals had proceeded on the basis that Zimmermann Patent No. 5,521,184 had the
teaching for making of Imatinib Mesylate from Imatinib. The Court held that
Novartis, having benefited from this finding and used it in its own case in the
United States, was bound by it and could not take a contrary position before
Indian courts. Therefore, the development of Imatinib Mesylate from Imatinib
did not qualify as an "invention" under Sections 2(1)(j) and 2(1)(ja)
of the Patents Act, 1970.
Turning to the second major question —
whether β-IM satisfied the test of Section 3(d) — the Court undertook a careful
analysis of the meaning of the word "efficacy" as used in that
provision. Novartis had argued that "efficacy" should be read broadly
to include physico-chemical properties like better flow, thermodynamic
stability, lower hygroscopicity, and increased bioavailability, all of which,
it was said, made β-IM a better product. The Court rejected this argument with
a clear and firm ruling. It held that the word "efficacy" in the
context of Section 3(d), when applied to a medicine, must mean
"therapeutic efficacy" — that is, the ability of the medicine to
produce the desired therapeutic result in treating the disease for which it is
prescribed. The Judges relied upon the New Oxford Dictionary of English (1998
edition), the IUPAC Glossary of Terms Used in Medicinal Chemistry (1998), and
Goodman and Gilman's pharmacological treatise to establish that in the context
of medicines, "efficacy" means therapeutic effectiveness. The Court
further examined the Explanation to Section 3(d), which lists salts,
polymorphs, and other derivatives as being regarded as the same substance "unless
they differ significantly in properties with regard to efficacy," and held
that this also pointed to therapeutic efficacy rather than general
physicochemical properties.
The Court further reasoned that the
legislature had consciously worded the Explanation to specify that properties
"inherent" to a form — such as hygroscopicity to a polymorph or
solubility to a salt — should not be taken as enhancements in efficacy unless
they translate directly into therapeutic gains. Improved bioavailability, by
itself, does not necessarily result in better therapeutic outcomes. Novartis
had not presented any clinical data, research study, or empirical evidence
showing that β-IM was more effective than Imatinib Mesylate in treating CML or
any other condition. On the contrary, the drug Gleevec as marketed in India (as
well as in the United States) was labelled on its packaging as containing
"Imatinib Mesylate Tablets 100 mg" with each film-coated tablet
containing "100 mg Imatinib (as Mesylate)." There was no reference at
all to β-IM on the packaging. The Court drew the logical inference that if what
was actually sold and effective was Imatinib Mesylate — not the β-IM
crystalline form specifically — then the patent claim for β-IM was essentially
an attempt to monopolise what was, in effect, Imatinib Mesylate, which would
otherwise not be patentable. This, the Court noted, was a classic example of
what the pharmaceutical industry calls "evergreening."
The Court's analysis on the TRIPS
compatibility of Section 3(d) was also significant, though it was largely
affirming the High Court's earlier ruling. The Judges held that TRIPS does not
define what must constitute an "invention" for patentability; Article
27 of TRIPS requires member states to grant patents for inventions that are
new, involve an inventive step, and are capable of industrial application, but
it leaves countries free to define the standards for these requirements in
their own law. Section 3(d) is India's way of defining that a mere new form of
a known pharmaceutical substance, without enhanced therapeutic efficacy, does
not qualify as an "invention" for Indian patent law purposes. The
Court thus held that Section 3(d) does not violate TRIPS.
The Court also expressed serious concern
about the broader implications for patent law development in India. In one of
the most quoted paragraphs of the judgment (Paragraph 134), the Court stated
that patent law in India should not develop in a manner where the scope of a
patent is determined not on the intrinsic worth of the invention but by the
artful drafting of claims by skilful lawyers, and where patents are traded as a
commodity not for the production and marketing of the patented products but to
search for someone who may be sued for infringement of the patent. This was a
clear judicial articulation of the philosophy underpinning India's approach to
pharmaceutical patents, and it set a strong policy marker for future cases.
The Court further discussed and
considered the dichotomy between patent "coverage" and patent
"disclosure," relying on several academic treatises including Terrell
on the Law of Patents (16th Edition), Chisum on Patents, and academic papers
from the Saint Louis University Law Journal. It held that the fundamental rule
underlying the grant of patents — that the monopoly granted to the inventor is
limited to what he has actually disclosed — means that a patent's coverage
cannot exceed its disclosure. This has direct implications for Novartis's
claim, since what was disclosed in the Zimmermann Patent (including Imatinib
Mesylate) could not be the basis for a new patent merely because a specific
crystalline form was now being singled out.
Several judicial decisions from foreign
jurisdictions were considered during the course of arguments before the Court,
including Plant Genetic Systems, N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corpn., 315 F 3d 1335
(Fed Cir 2003); Chiron Corpn. v. Genentech Inc., 363 F 3d 1247 (Fed Cir 2004);
A.C. Edwards Ltd. v. Acme Signs & Displays Ltd., 1992 RPC 131; Astellas
Pharma Inc. v. Comptroller General of Patents, 2009 EWHC 1916 (Pat); Hogan, In
re, 559 F 2d 595 (CCPA 1977); and Glaverbel S.A. v. British Coal Corpn. (No.
2), 1993 RPC 90. These were considered primarily in the context of the
relationship between patent coverage and disclosure, though the Court did not
mechanically follow foreign precedents in arriving at its conclusion under
Indian law.
Final Decision of the Court
The Supreme Court, by its unanimous
judgment dated April 1, 2013, dismissed the Civil Appeals filed by Novartis AG
with costs and held as follows:
The subject product,
β-crystalline-Imatinib Mesylate (β-IM), failed both the test of invention as
laid down in Sections 2(1)(j) and 2(1)(ja) of the Patents Act, 1970 and the
test of enhanced efficacy or patentability under Section 3(d) read with its
Explanation. Imatinib Mesylate was found to be a known substance disclosed in
the Zimmermann Patent No. 5,521,184. The development of Imatinib Mesylate from
Imatinib did not constitute a new invention. β-IM, being a polymorph (a
specific crystalline form) of Imatinib Mesylate, was a "new form of a
known substance" for the purposes of Section 3(d). Novartis had not
demonstrated, through any empirical, clinical, or research data, that β-IM had
any enhanced therapeutic efficacy compared to Imatinib Mesylate, the known
substance. The improved physical properties of β-IM — such as better flow,
thermodynamic stability, lower hygroscopicity, and 30% increased
bioavailability — were not sufficient by themselves to constitute
"enhanced efficacy" for the purposes of Section 3(d), since efficacy
in the context of a medicine means therapeutic efficacy, which must be judged
strictly and narrowly. The patent application for β-IM was therefore rightly
rejected. The Court upheld R. 55 of Patent Rules, 2003 and held that no
violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India was made out. The appeals
filed by Natco Pharma Limited and Cancer Patients Aid Association were allowed
to the extent of affirming the rejection of Novartis's patent claim.
Point of Law Settled in the Case
This judgment settled several important
points of law with lasting significance for Indian patent jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court authoritatively held
that "invention" and "patentability" under the Patents Act,
1970 are two distinct and separate concepts. A product may qualify as an
"invention" in a general sense and yet may not be patentable if it
falls within one of the exclusions in Section 3 of the Act. Section 3(d) is not
an ex majore cautela clause but a substantive provision that independently and
mandatorily applies to all pharmaceutical and chemical substances of the nature
described therein.
The Court settled that in the context of
a new form of a known pharmaceutical or chemical substance, the applicant must
cumulatively satisfy two tests: first, the invention test under Sections
2(1)(j) and 2(1)(ja), and second, the enhanced therapeutic efficacy test under
Section 3(d) read with its Explanation. Both tests must be independently
satisfied; clearing one does not exempt the applicant from the other.
The Court definitively interpreted
"efficacy" in Section 3(d) as meaning "therapeutic
efficacy" in the case of medicines and pharmaceuticals — that is, the
ability of the medicine to produce the desired therapeutic effect in treating the
disease for which it is prescribed. Physico-chemical properties such as
improved flow, better stability, reduced hygroscopicity, or even increased
bioavailability, by themselves, do not amount to "enhanced efficacy"
unless they are specifically connected to and proven to result in better
therapeutic outcomes, which must be established through research or empirical
data.
The Court also settled the principle that
patent coverage cannot exceed patent disclosure, and that a patent application
that draws its very claims and averments from a prior patent (in this case the
Zimmermann Patent) while simultaneously claiming to be independent of that
prior patent will be critically scrutinized. A party is bound by the positions
it has taken and benefited from in foreign proceedings involving the same
subject matter.
The ruling firmly placed Section 3(d) as
India's principal legislative safeguard against "evergreening" in the
pharmaceutical industry — the practice of repeatedly patenting minor
modifications of a known drug to extend patent-based monopolies and delay the
availability of affordable generic medicines. This was characterized not merely
as a matter of patent law but as a matter of public health policy.
Case Details
Title: Novartis AG Vs. Union of India and Others (with Natco Pharma Limited
v. Union of India and Others, and Cancer Patients Aid Association v. Union of
India and Others)
Date
of Order: April 1, 2013
Case
Numbers: Civil Appeals Nos. 2706-716 of 2013
(Novartis AG); Civil Appeal No. 2728 of 2013 (Natco Pharma Limited); Civil
Appeals Nos. 2717-27 of 2013 (Cancer Patients Aid Association) — arising out of
SLPs (C) Nos. 20539-49 of 2009, SLP (C) No. 32706 of 2009, and SLPs (C) Nos.
12984-94 of 2013
Neutral
Citation / Published Citation: (2013) 6 SCC 1
Court: The Supreme Court of India
Bench: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Aftab Alam and Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Ranjana P.
Desai, JJ.
Disclaimer:
Readers are advised not to treat this as substitute for legal advice as it may
contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.
Written
By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney],
High Court of Delhi
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Headnote
Novartis
AG v. Union of India, (2013) 6 SCC 1 — Supreme Court of India — Bench: Aftab
Alam and Ranjana P. Desai, JJ. — Decided on April 1, 2013
Held: Under the Patents Act, 1970 as amended by the Patents (Amendment)
Act, 2005, "invention" and "patentability" are distinct
concepts, and a substance must satisfy both the general invention test under
Sections 2(1)(j) and 2(1)(ja) and the enhanced efficacy test under Section 3(d)
in order to qualify for a patent in India. Section 3(d) is a substantive
anti-evergreening provision and not a mere precautionary clause. In the case of
pharmaceutical and chemical substances, "efficacy" within Section
3(d) means "therapeutic efficacy" — the ability of the medicine to
produce the desired therapeutic result in treating the disease — and not merely
improved physico-chemical properties. A new crystalline polymorph
(beta-crystalline Imatinib Mesylate, β-IM) of a known pharmaceutical substance
(Imatinib Mesylate) that does not demonstrate enhanced therapeutic efficacy
over the known substance through research/empirical data is not patentable
under Indian law. Imatinib Mesylate, being a known substance disclosed in
Zimmermann Patent No. 5,521,184 (US), the claim for β-IM also failed the
invention test. The drug Gleevec/Glivec (β-IM) marketed and sold as Imatinib
Mesylate with no reference to the beta-crystalline form on its packaging
indicated a deceptive patent claim. Appeals by Novartis dismissed with costs.
Section 3(d) held to be TRIPS-compatible. Patent coverage cannot exceed patent
disclosure. Indian Patent Law should not develop in a manner where patents are
traded as commodities for litigation rather than for genuine invention and
production.
