Vishal Prafulsingh Solanke Vs. Controller of Patent and Designs

Bombay High Court Rules No Intra-Court Commercial Appeal Lies Against Single Judge Order Passed Under Section 117A Of Patents Act

Vishal Prafulsingh Solanke Vs. Controller of Patent and Designs:: 09/03/2026:Commercial Appeal (L) No. 13430 of 2025 in Commercial Miscellaneous Petition No. 110 of 2025:2026:BHC-OS:7027-DB:Mrs. Justice Bharati Dangre and Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Manjusha Deshpande

Factual and Procedural Background 

The appellants filed patent application number 879/MUM/2015 on 17/03/2015 for an invention titled Thread Type Tamper Evident Security Seal. A pre-grant opposition was filed by respondent number 3. On 14/06/2023, the Assistant Controller of Patent and Designs refused the patent application under Section 25(1)(b) and Section 25(1)(e) of the Patents Act, 1970. Aggrieved by this refusal, the appellants filed Commercial Miscellaneous Petition (L) No. 25369 of 2023 before a Single Judge of the High Court invoking Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970. On 27/03/2025, the Single Judge dismissed the petition and affirmed the order of the Assistant Controller. The appellants then preferred a commercial appeal under Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 before the Division Bench.

Dispute before Court 

The primary issue before the Division Bench was whether an intra-court appeal under Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 is maintainable against a judgment or order of a Single Judge of the High Court delivered while exercising appellate jurisdiction under Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970, or whether such an appeal is barred under Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Reasoning of Judge 

The Division Bench observed that the Single Judge heard the matter in exercise of statutory appellate jurisdiction under Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970, and delivered a final judgment determining the rights of the parties. Although Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 allows appeals against judgments of Commercial Divisions, the Commercial Courts Act does not exclude general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 regarding appeals. Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 creates a specific statutory bar against further intra-court appeals from a judgment or decree of a Single Judge rendered in an appeal. Furthermore, the Assistant Controller of Patents is a quasi-judicial authority equipped with powers of a civil court and has the trappings of a court. Consequently, the bar under Section 100A applies to statutory appeals originating from such quasi-judicial decisions, thereby prohibiting any second intra-court appeal.

Decision 

The High Court held that the commercial appeal filed under Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 is not maintainable in view of the statutory prohibition contained in Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and accordingly dismissed the appeal.

One Important legal principle held in the case 

An intra-court appeal before a Division Bench under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 is barred by Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when the decision of the Single Judge has been rendered in exercise of statutory appellate jurisdiction under Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970.

[Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation ]

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Controller of Patent is having trapping of civil court

Introduction: 

The interplay between intellectual property statutes, special commercial legislation, and general procedural law often gives rise to critical procedural questions regarding appellate remedies. Following the abolishment of the Intellectual Property Appellate Board, appeals against decisions of the Controller of Patents were routed directly to the High Courts under Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970. A pivotal question that subsequently arose was whether a party dissatisfied with the decision of a Single Judge of the High Court in a patent appeal could file a second intra-court appeal before a Division Bench under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. In a significant judgment, the Bombay High Court comprehensively analyzed the statutory framework governing patent appeals, commercial dispute jurisdiction, and the general prohibition against second appeals contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Factual and Procedural Background: 

The dispute originated when the applicants submitted Patent Application number 879/MUM/2015 on 17/03/2015 before the Indian Patent Office seeking protection for an invention titled Thread Type Tamper Evident Security Seal. During the examination process, a pre-grant opposition was filed by a third party. Following administrative and statutory procedures, including opportunity to amend complete specifications and file written submissions, the Assistant Controller of Patent and Designs issued an order on 14/06/2023. The Assistant Controller held that the opposition succeeded under Section 25(1)(b) and Section 25(1)(e) of the Patents Act, 1970, and refused the grant of patent to the applicants.

Seeking relief against the refusal order, the applicants approached the High Court on its original side by filing Commercial Miscellaneous Petition (L) number 25369 of 2023 under Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970. The petition was heard by the High Court functioning as a Commercial Division under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. After examining the record, the High Court found no merit in the challenge and dismissed the petition on 27/03/2025, thereby affirming the decision of the Assistant Controller. Aggrieved by this dismissal, the applicants filed Commercial Appeal (L) number 13430 of 2025 under Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 before the Division Bench of the High Court.

Dispute Before the Court 

The core question that required adjudication by the Court was whether a commercial appeal under Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 lies before a Division Bench against a judgment delivered by a Single Judge in a statutory appeal under Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970.

The appellants argued that the Single Judge exercised original jurisdiction while entertaining the petition against the decision of the Controller, meaning the resulting judgment was an original decree appealable under Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. They further contended that the prohibition under Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 applies only to appeals arising from decrees or orders passed by civil courts. Since the Controller of Patents is an administrative officer and not a civil court, the appellants asserted that Section 100A CPC was inapplicable and did not bar an intra-court appeal.

On the other hand, the respondents and amicus curiae contended that the proceeding before the Single Judge was an exercise of statutory appellate jurisdiction under Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970. They submitted that the right to appeal is purely a creation of statute and the Patents Act does not provide for any second intra-court appeal. They argued that Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 imposes an absolute bar on further intra-court appeals from appellate decisions rendered by a Single Judge, and this bar extends to statutory appeals originating from quasi-judicial authorities like the Controller of Patents.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court 

The Court engaged in an exhaustive analysis of the statutory framework and relevant legal principles. The Court observed that the entry of the dispute into the High Court occurred specifically through Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970, which provides an appellate forum against orders of the Controller. Consequently, the Single Judge sat as an appellate court rather than a court of first instance. The Court affirmed that while Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 allows appeals against judgments of the Commercial Division, the Commercial Courts Act does not displace general procedural statutes such as the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, except to the extent specifically modified under Section 16 for the trial of commercial suits.

In examining Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court stressed that the overarching legislative object of introducing Section 100A was to eliminate multiple tiers of appeals and ensure early finality in legal disputes. The Court analyzed key judicial precedents of the Supreme Court, including Municipal Corporation of Brihanmumbai v. State Bank of India (1999) 1 SCC 123, Kamal Kumar Dutta v. Ruby General Hospital Ltd. (2006) 7 SCC 613, and Mohd. Saud v. Shaik Mahfooz (2010) 13 SCC 517. The Court also reviewed the Full Bench rulings of the Bombay High Court in Gangawani and Co. v. Saraswati Banewar (2001) 3 Mh.L.J. 6 and Mohd. Riyazur Rehman Siddhiqui v. Deputy Director of Health Services (2008) 6 Mh.L.J. 941, alongside the decision in MITC Rolling Private Limited v. Renuka Realtors 2025 SCC Online SC 2375.

Addressing the contention that Section 100A CPC only applies to orders of traditional civil courts, the Court held that the Controller of Patents under Section 77 of the Patents Act, 1970 is invested with significant statutory powers of a civil court, including powers to examine witnesses on oath, order discovery and production of documents, receive evidence on affidavits, and award costs executable as a civil court decree. The Court held that the Controller of Patents functions as a quasi-judicial authority possessing the trappings of a civil court. Following established precedents, the Court determined that the prohibition contained in Section 100A CPC applies with full force to statutory appeals originating from quasi-judicial authorities once they are decided by a Single Judge of the High Court.

Final Decision of the Court The High Court concluded that the Single Judge had decided the matter in exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970. In the absence of an express provision granting a second appeal within the Patents Act, 1970, and in light of the statutory bar under Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, no intra-court commercial appeal could be entertained by the Division Bench. The High Court accordingly held that the Commercial Appeal filed under Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 was not maintainable and dismissed the appeal with no order as to costs.

Point of Law Settled 

This judgment settles an important procedural principle regarding the jurisdiction of Commercial Appellate Divisions in patent disputes. It establishes that the right to appeal is purely statutory and cannot be inferred. Once a statutory appeal against an order of a quasi-judicial authority, such as the Controller of Patents under Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970, is decided by a Single Judge of the High Court, the statutory prohibition under Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 operates to bar any further intra-court appeal before a Division Bench under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. This ruling clarifies that quasi-judicial bodies holding trappings of a court fall within the scope of Section 100A CPC for the purpose of curtailing repetitive appellate litigation.

Title of the Case: Vishal Prafulsingh Solanke and Anr. v. Controller of Patent and Designs and Ors.

Date of Judgment: 09/03/2026

Case Number: Commercial Appeal (L) No. 13430 of 2025 in Commercial Miscellaneous Petition No. 110 of 2025

Neutral Citation: 2026:BHC-OS:7027-DB

Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction)

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Bharati Dangre and Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Manjusha Deshpande

Written By:Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation .

Headnote of the Judgment: High Court of Judicature at Bombay; Commercial Appeal (L) No. 13430 of 2025; Vishal Prafulsingh Solanke and Anr. v. Controller of Patent and Designs and Ors.; Neutral Citation: 2026:BHC-OS:7027-DB; Judgment Dated 09/03/2026. Commercial appeal filed under Section 13(1-A) of Commercial Courts Act, 2015 challenging judgment of Single Judge passed under Section 117A of Patents Act, 1970 refusing patent application. Maintainability challenged on ground of Section 100A Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Held, Controller of Patents exercises quasi-judicial powers with trappings of a civil court. Decision of Single Judge under Section 117A is rendered in statutory appellate jurisdiction. Section 100A CPC bars second intra-court appeal against appellate decision of Single Judge. Commercial appeal dismissed as not maintainable.

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Rashi Santosh Soni Vs Mr. Rajesh Sharma.

Delhi High Court Sets Aside Dismissal of IP Suit Passed Over Local Commissioner's Additional Site Visit

Rashi Santosh Soni Vs Mr. Rajesh Sharma:03.02.2026:RFA(COMM) 695/2025:2026:DHC:936-DB: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants filed a commercial suit alleging copyright and design infringement regarding Tower Fans. The trial court granted an ex parte ad interim injunction and appointed a Local Commissioner to conduct search and seizure. The Local Commissioner visited two premises of the respondent, although the initial order directed a visit to only one premises. Consequently, the commercial court dismissed the entire suit, holding the plaintiffs' conduct fraudulent and imposing monetary penalties.

Dispute before Court

Whether a commercial suit can be dismissed under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, solely because a court-appointed Local Commissioner visited an additional premises not explicitly specified in the initial commission order.

Reasoning of Judge

The High Court observed that there is no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, authorizing the dismissal of a suit due to an overreach or additional site visit by a Local Commissioner. The lower court made severe findings of fraud and collusion against the plaintiffs, their counsel, and the Local Commissioner without any supporting evidence or giving them an opportunity to show cause. The Local Commissioner acted with propriety, as she refrained from seizing goods at the unauthorized location precisely because she lacked explicit authorization. Courts must exercise circumspection before making adverse remarks against practicing counsel.

Decision

The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the commercial court's order, expunged all adverse findings and penalties, and restored the commercial suit to its original position for further proceedings.

One Important legal principle held in the case

A civil suit cannot be dismissed without statutory authorization under the Code of Civil Procedure merely because a Local Commissioner visited an additional site, and courts must not render unsubstantiated findings of collusion or fraud against counsel without giving them an opportunity to be heard.

[Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation ]

# Analytical Legal Article

Introduction:

The relationship between procedural directives and substantive justice lies at the very heart of civil litigation. In intellectual property disputes, the appointment of a Local Commissioner is a routine yet critical mechanism to preserve evidence of alleged infringement before it can be altered or destroyed. However, procedural irregularities occurring during the execution of a local commission should not automatically derail the main suit unless statutory provisions explicitly dictate such a remedy. A recent judgment of the High Court of Delhi highlights the necessity for judicial restraint and adherence to procedural statutes, holding that lower courts cannot summarily dismiss a suit or penalize legal representatives over an procedural deviation by a court officer.

Factual and Procedural Background:

The dispute arose out of a commercial suit filed by the plaintiffs alleging infringement of their copyright and registered design rights in relation to Tower Fans. On 1 June 2024, the commercial court granted an ex parte ad interim injunction in favor of the plaintiffs and appointed a Local Commissioner to visit the premises of the defendants to effect search and seizure.

During the execution of the commission, the Local Commissioner visited two premises belonging to the defendants, whereas the specific order appointing her had explicitly authorized a visit to only one designated premises. Upon reviewing the Local Commissioner's report, the trial court took severe exception to this additional visit. On 15 November 2025, the commercial court concluded that the plaintiffs, their legal counsel, and the Local Commissioner had acted in collusion to execute an unauthorized search. Holding this act to be fraudulent and scandalous, the commercial court dismissed the suit entirely and imposed heavy monetary costs on the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by this dismissal and the adverse remarks, the plaintiffs approached the High Court of Delhi in appeal.

Dispute Before the Court

around whether a commercial suit can be summarily terminated due to an irregularity during the execution of a court commission. The primary legal issue before the appellate court was whether the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, contains any statutory provision that permits the outright dismissal of a lawsuit on the ground that a Local Commissioner visited an additional location not explicitly stated in the commission order.

The defendants contended that the plaintiffs and their legal team had manipulated the execution process by exceeding the scope of the judicial order, which amounted to fraud and abuse of the judicial process. Conversely, the plaintiffs argued that the dismissal was wholly unauthorized by law, that no opportunity of hearing was granted prior to making severe allegations of misconduct, and that the Local Commissioner had acted in good faith without exceeding actual seizure limits.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

In analyzing the trial court's decision, the appellate court scrutinized the statutory boundaries of civil procedure. The court noted that there exists no provision under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, that empowers a court to dismiss a substantive suit merely because a Local Commissioner visits premises outside the literal command of the commission order. When questioned, even the counsel for the defendants failed to point to any rule or statutory authority supporting such a drastic remedy.

The court observed that judicial decisions concerning frivolous litigation or suppressed facts were inappropriately applied by the trial judge to a situation involving an overextended site visit by an officer of the court. Furthermore, the court expressed serious concern over the unsubstantiated findings of collusion and misconduct made against the practicing attorneys and the Local Commissioner. Returning findings of professional misconduct or fraud without citing a shred of supporting material—and without providing a show-cause notice or an opportunity to be heard—violates basic principles of natural justice.

The court emphasized that the Bar and the Bench are equal partners in the administration of justice, requiring mutual respect and judicial circumspection. On the factual front, the court observed that the Local Commissioner had actually demonstrated propriety. Although she identified potentially infringing goods at the second location, she refrained from seizing them precisely because her written authorization did not explicitly cover that site. Consequently, the trial court's inference of fraud and collusion was completely unfounded.

Final Decision of the Court

The High Court held that the order of the commercial court could not be sustained either on facts or in law. The appellate court quashed and set aside the order dismissing the suit and expunged all adverse remarks, observations, and findings of collusion made against the plaintiffs, their legal counsel, and the Local Commissioner. The commercial suit was restored to its original position on the files of the trial court, with directions for the parties to appear before the commercial court on 25 February 2026 to proceed with the trial in accordance with law.

Point of Law Settled

This judgment re-establishes the fundamental principle that procedural deviations occurring during the execution of a local commission cannot serve as a ground for the summary dismissal of a civil suit in the absence of explicit statutory authority under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It reaffirms that trial courts must operate strictly within statutory boundaries and cannot invent punitive measures such as suit dismissals for procedural overreaches by court-appointed commissions. The court emphasized that the Bar and the Bench are equal partners in the administration of justice. Ruling reinforces the rule that courts must exercise extreme caution and strictly follow principles of natural justice before making adverse findings or leveling allegations of collusion against practicing advocates and court-appointed commissioners.

Title of the Case: Rashi Santosh Soni & Anr. v. Mr. Rajesh Sharma & Ors.

Date of Judgment: 03.02.2026

Case Number: RFA(COMM) 695/2025

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:936-DB

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Hari Shankar and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash Shukla

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation .

Headnote of the Judgment:

Rashi Santosh Soni & Anr. v. Mr. Rajesh Sharma & Ors., RFA(COMM) 695/2025, High Court of Delhi. The appellants filed a commercial suit alleging copyright and design infringement regarding Tower Fans. The commercial court dismissed the suit and imposed costs, holding that the Local Commissioner, in collusion with plaintiffs, visited an additional unauthorized site. On appeal, the High Court held that no provision under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, permits suit dismissal due to an unauthorized visit by a Local Commissioner. The Court found no evidence of collusion, noted the lack of a show-cause opportunity, expunged all adverse remarks against counsel and the Local Commissioner, set aside the impugned order, and restored the commercial suit to its original position.

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Raju Patel Vs. The Registrar of Trade Mark

Bombay High Court Upholds Validity of Trademark Renewal Notice Dispatch in Non-Renewal Removal Racket Dispute

 Raju Patel Vs. The Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai:21.07.2026:Writ Petition No.4868 of 2025:BombHC: Hon'ble Mr. Ravindra V. Ghuge, ACJ. & Hon'ble Mr. Gautam A. Ankhad, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Petitioner No.1 applied for and obtained registration of the trade mark SUNDAY with claimed user from 01.02.2008. The registration certificate issued on 05.05.2011 was valid until 29.05.2019. On 01.03.2019, the Registrar sent a notice for renewal in Form RG-3 dated 26.02.2019 under Section 25(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 to Petitioner No.1's registered agent. On 11.11.2024, Petitioner No.1 filed an Interlocutory Application seeking permission to renew the mark, alleging non-receipt of the RG-3 notice. Petitioner No.1 assigned the mark to Petitioner No.2 on 29.11.2024. Petitioner No.2 filed RTI applications and appeals to obtain dispatch details and subsequently filed a Writ Petition before the High Court apprehending removal of the mark due to non-filing of renewal within the prescribed period.

Dispute before Court

The primary dispute was whether the Registrar of Trade Marks complied with the mandatory requirement under Section 25(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 read with Rule 58 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017 regarding the issuance of the RG-3 renewal notice. A further dispute was whether the non-availability of online postal tracking information after a lapse of over six years disproves actual service or dislodges the presumption of service under Rule 18 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017 and Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.

Reasoning of Judge

The Court observed that under Rule 18 and Rule 58 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017 read with Section 25(3) of the Act, proving service requires establishing proper address and posting, rather than proving actual receipt or acknowledgment. The Court noted that the Registrar produced contemporaneous records from its Outward dispatch register showing that on 01.03.2019, five renewal notices (including the subject mark) were sent by Speed Post to the registered agent, and two of those marks were in fact renewed by the same agent. The Court held that statutory presumption of service arises under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 upon proper address and dispatch. The non-availability of postal tracking details after six years on the India Post website does not dislodge the official outward register or disrepute the statutory presumption, especially when the registered agent was neither made a party nor filed an affidavit denying receipt. The Court further observed that the assignee (Petitioner No.2) cannot acquire better rights than the assignor, who slept over its rights for over five years.

Decision

The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition and discharged the Rule, holding that the Respondent had fully discharged its statutory obligations under Section 25(3) of the Act read with Rule 58 of the Rules. No order was made as to costs.

One Important legal principle held in the case

Under Section 25(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 read with Rule 18 and Rule 58 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, the Registrar is only required to establish proper addressing and dispatch of the RG-3 renewal notice to the address for service, creating a rebuttable presumption of service under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 which cannot be dislodged merely by the absence of online postal tracking records after a prolonged delay.

[Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation ]

Legal Protection of Pharmaceutical Packaging and Parallel Criminal Prosecution in Counterfeit Drug Cases

Introduction:

The administration and maintenance of registered intellectual property rights impose explicit duties on both regulatory authorities and mark proprietors. Under trademark jurisprudence, statutory provisions govern the duration, renewal, and eventual removal of registered trademarks. While the law mandates that the Registrar of Trade Marks must notify a proprietor prior to removing a mark for non-renewal, questions frequently arise regarding what constitutes proper legal compliance for serving such statutory notices. In a significant judgment, the High Court analyzed the interplay between statutory renewal notices, postal dispatch proof, the presumption of service, and the evidentiary value of online tracking data after prolonged periods of inaction by mark owners.

Factual and Procedural Background:

The original proprietor, trading as M/s. Anand Ply, applied for the registration of the trademark SUNDAY claiming user from 1st February, 2008. The Registrar of Trade Marks issued a Registration Certificate on 5th May, 2011 under Application No.1823390, with validity extending up to 29th May, 2019. Under Section 25(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, a notice for renewal in Form RG-3 dated 26th February, 2019 was generated and dispatched by the Registry via speed post on 1st March, 2019 to the registered trademark agent on record, M/s. Vishesh & Associates.

No renewal application or prescribed fee was submitted prior to the expiration date of 29th May, 2019, or within the extended six-month period provided under the statutory proviso. On 11th November, 2024 more than five years after the expiration the original proprietor filed an Interlocutory Application before the Registrar, contending that the Form RG-3 notice was never served and seeking permission to pay renewal fees to restore the mark. Shortly thereafter, on 29th November, 2024, the original proprietor executed an Assignment Deed transferring the trademark to Matra Mobili Private Limited. Requisite assignment documents were submitted to the Registry on 21st March, 2025.

Upon checking the status page on the Registry's website, the assignee noticed an alert stating that the mark was likely to be removed due to non-filing of a renewal request within the prescribed time limit. To build its case, the assignee filed an application under the Right to Information Act, 2005 on 3rd January, 2025 through its agent, M/s. Obhan & Associates. On 20th February, 2025, the Central Public Information Officer provided dispatch particulars, including correspondence numbers, dispatch entries, and speed post tracking number EM692402790IN dated 1st March, 2019. An appeal under Section 19 of the RTI Act was subsequently dismissed by the appellate authority on 17th March, 2025, confirming the dispatch details. When the assignee attempted to track the consignment on the India Post portal, the portal returned a result stating that consignment details were not found. Apprehending imminent removal of the mark, both the assignor and assignee approached the High Court under Writ Petition No.4868 of 2025.

Dispute Before the Court

The central legal issue requiring adjudication was whether the Registrar of Trade Marks satisfied the mandatory statutory obligation under Section 25(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 read with Rule 58 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017 regarding the issuance and service of the RG-3 renewal notice.

The petitioners contended that compliance with Section 25(3) is mandatory and that a mark cannot be removed without positive proof of actual receipt of the notice. They argued that mere production of a dispatch number is insufficient and highlighted that the speed post tracking number displayed an error message on the postal portal. Relying on earlier precedents, the petitioners argued that without concrete proof of service, the mark could not be removed and restoration ought to be permitted.

Conversely, the Registrar of Trade Marks submitted that the statutory notice was properly issued and dispatched to the address for service of the registered agent in the ordinary course of business. The Registrar produced extracts of the Outward dispatch register showing that on 1st March, 2019, five renewal notices were dispatched to the same agent, two of which were successfully renewed by the same agent pursuant to those notices. The Registrar contended that once proper dispatch to the address for service by government post is established, a presumption of service arises under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Rule 18 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017. It was argued that the non-availability of online tracking data after six years cannot negate actual dispatch or override years of unexplained delay by the mark owner.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

The Court examined the statutory framework governing trademark renewals, specifically Section 25 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, alongside Rules 18 and 58 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017. It observed that while Section 25(3) obliges the Registrar to notify the registered proprietor before removing a mark, it also expects proprietors to maintain due diligence over their intellectual property registrations. The statutory scheme is designed to facilitate renewal, not to preserve registrations indefinitely when proprietors neglect their maintenance responsibilities.

Analyzing Rule 58 and Rule 18 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, the Court highlighted that service of documents by the Registrar is complete upon leaving them at or sending them by post to the address for service. Under Rule 18(2), communications sent by post are deemed served at the time they would be delivered in the ordinary course. Crucially, Rule 18(3) explicitly clarifies that to prove service, it is sufficient to prove that the letter was properly addressed and put into the post. The Court held that the rules require proof of proper dispatch to the registered address for service rather than signed proof of delivery or physical acknowledgment from the addressee.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found that the Registrar successfully established proper dispatch. The contemporaneous Outward dispatch register documented the entry for 1st March, 2019, reflecting the dispatch of five RG-3 notices to the registered agent, M/s. Vishesh & Associates. The fact that the same agent acted upon two of those five notices to secure renewals for other marks strongly corroborated that dispatches occurred in the ordinary course of business.

The Court held that once proper addressing and posting via Government Speed Post are demonstrated, the statutory presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 comes into operation. This presumption dictates that service is deemed effective unless the contrary is proved by cogent evidence. The Court rejected the petitioners' argument that the unavailability of online tracking details on the India Post portal dislodged this presumption. The verification attempt occurred in 2025 six years after the 2019 dispatch. Neither postal departments nor administrative bodies are required to maintain online tracking entries indefinitely.

Furthermore, the Court pointed out that the registered agent who allegedly failed to receive the notice was not made a party to the petition, nor was any affidavit filed by the agent denying receipt. The Court characterized the petitioners' reliance on RTI queries as an attempt at reverse engineering to capitalize on the natural expiration of online tracking records. The original proprietor remained silent for over five years after the registration expired on 29th May, 2019, initiating steps only in November 2024 ahead of assigning the expired mark. The Court affirmed that an assignee cannot claim superior rights to those held by the assignor. Distinguishing past precedents such as Ipca Laboratories Limited vs. The Registrar of Trade Marks, Cipla Ltd. vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 1270, and Cipla Ltd vs. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) (IPD) No. 23 of 2025, the Court noted that those cases involved instances where no dispatch steps were taken or where public notices were incorrectly substituted for individual notices. In contrast, concrete proof of individual dispatch was fully established here. The Court also referred to Guruji Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India, 2017 SCC Online Del 7624 (DB), International Business Machines Corporation vs. Tivoli Gardens, 2026 SCC Online Del 828, and M/s. Madan and Co. vs. Wazir Jaivir Chand, (1989) 1 SCC 264, reinforcing that proof of proper dispatch shifts the burden to the addressee to rebut service.

Final Decision of the Court

The High Court held that the Registrar of Trade Marks successfully fulfilled all statutory requirements under Section 25(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 read with Rule 58 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017. Consequently, the High Court dismissed the Writ Petition and discharged the Rule. The Court made no order as to costs.

Point of Law Settled

This judgment establishes that under Section 25(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 read with Rules 18 and 58 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, the Registrar is required to prove proper addressing and dispatch of the RG-3 renewal notice to the address for service, rather than proving actual delivery or physical acknowledgment. Once proper dispatch by post is evidenced through official outward registers, a statutory presumption of service arises under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. This presumption cannot be dislodged merely by pointing to the non-availability of online postal tracking records after a significant lapse of time. Furthermore, assignees of expired marks cannot bypass statutory renewal deadlines when their assignors have failed to exercise due diligence.

Title of the Case: Raju Patel and Another vs. The Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai

Date of Judgment: 21.07.2026

Case Number: Writ Petition No.4868 of 2025

Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Ravindra V. Ghuge, ACJ. & Hon'ble Mr. Gautam A. Ankhad, J.

Written By:Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation .

Headnote of the Judgment:

Raju Patel and Another vs. The Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Writ Petition No.4868 of 2025, Judgment Dated 21.07.2026. The petitioners filed a writ petition challenging the non-renewal and potential removal of the trademark SUNDAY following its expiry on 29.05.2019, alleging non-service of the mandatory RG-3 renewal notice under Section 25(3) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The High Court held that the Registrar proved proper dispatch of the notice to the address for service via official outward records, triggering the presumption of service under Rule 18 of Trade Marks Rules, 2017 and Section 27 of General Clauses Act, 1897. The Court held that non-availability of online tracking details after six years does not dislodge this presumption. The High Court dismissed the writ petition.

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