Associated Cement Companies Ltd. Vs. P. N. Sharma

Introduction:

The fundamental boundaries of appellate jurisdiction and judicial power under the Constitution of India form a pivotal domain of administrative and constitutional jurisprudence. A recurring point of adjudication involves determining which statutory bodies or state departments qualify as tribunals under Article 136(1) of the Constitution. The landmark ruling of the Supreme Court of India in Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P. N. Sharma addressed this precise conceptual framework. The dispute arose when a corporate entity challenged a State Government order passed in an appellate capacity under state welfare officer recruitment rules. The Supreme Court undertook an exhaustive analysis to define the essential tests that transform an executive or administrative authority into a judicial tribunal, while simultaneously evaluating the contractual and statutory rights surrounding employee discharge.

Factual and Procedural Background:

The appellant company operated multiple cement factories, including the Bhupendra Cement Works at Surajpur within the State of Punjab. Under Section 49(1) of the Factories Act, 1948, read with the Punjab Welfare Officers Recruitment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1952, the company was required to employ a Welfare Officer. The first respondent was appointed to this post on March 2, 1956. The formal letter of appointment contained express contractual stipulations stating that the employee was subject to transfer across any unit of the company and that his services could be terminated by giving one month's notice or one month's salary in lieu thereof.

Having served across various units, the first respondent was posted at Bhupendra Cement Works on June 26, 1960. Subsequently, the management ordered his transfer to the Kymore Works in Madhya Pradesh. The employee expressed reluctance and failed to report to the transferred location. Following prolonged correspondence, the employer issued a letter on September 26, 1961, informing him that due to his failure to join at Kymore, his services stood terminated with one month's salary in lieu of notice alongside accrued dues.

Aggrieved by this termination, the first respondent filed an appeal before the State of Punjab, designated as the appellate authority under Rule 6(6) of the 1952 Rules. Upon receiving notice, the employer submitted its written statement disputing the maintainability and merits of the appeal. On July 4, 1962, the State Government issued an appellate order in the name of the Governor of Punjab, directing the immediate reinstatement of the first respondent. The employer then approached the Supreme Court of India by seeking special leave to appeal against the State Government's order under Article 136(1) of the Constitution.

Dispute Before the Court:

The proceedings before the Supreme Court raised both preliminary jurisdictional objections and core substantive questions on statutory interpretation.

The preliminary objection raised by the employee questioned the competence of the appeal under Article 136(1) of the Constitution. It was contended that the State Government, while exercising appellate administrative powers under Rule 6(6) of the 1952 Rules, did not constitute a tribunal. The employee argued that Article 136(1) applies strictly to courts or tribunals possessing traditional judicial characteristics, which the executive government lacked.

On the merits, the employer raised two primary contentions. First, it argued that the second proviso to Rule 6(3)—which required the prior concurrence of the Labour Commissioner before imposing major punishments—was ultra vires Section 49(2) of the Factories Act, 1948, as it exceeded the rule-making power to regulate conditions of service. Second, the employer asserted that the statutory appeal under Rule 6(6) was entirely incompetent because the termination was a simple bona fide discharge in terms of the employment contract, rather than a punitive dismissal or termination intended as a punishment.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court:

The Court engaged in a comprehensive statutory analysis regarding the scope of Article 136(1) and the statutory scheme of the Factories Act, 1948. In addressing the preliminary jurisdictional challenge, the Court delineated the distinct roles played by courts, administrative authorities, and tribunals. The Court observed that while courts form part of the ordinary hierarchy of civil judicature, tribunals share the essential characteristic of being invested with the inherent judicial power of the State.

Evaluating various judicial doctrines, the Court noted that the presence or absence of the traditional trappings of a court—such as the power to compel witness attendance or enforce formal procedural rules—is not the decisive criterion. The primary and essential test is whether the adjudicating authority has been constituted by a statute or statutory rule and entrusted with the State's inherent judicial function to resolve a dispute between contesting parties. The Court emphasized that where a statute creates a forum to determine a legal controversy featuring a clear assertion and denial of rights, an obligation to act judicially is created. Because Rule 6(5) and Rule 6(6) confer appellate authority on the State Government to render a final and binding decision affecting civil rights, the State Government functions as a tribunal under Article 136(1).

Examining the validity of Rule 6, the Court rejected the employer's contention that the rule was ultra vires. The Court held that the phrase conditions of service in Section 49(2) of the Factories Act, 1948, carries wide import. Conditions of service encompass the terms under which employment may be brought to an end, including statutory safeguards designed to secure tenure. Requiring prior concurrence from the Labour Commissioner or providing an appellate mechanism to prevent arbitrary dismissals falls squarely within the rule-making mandate of the State Government.

However, on the application of Rule 6(6) to the facts, the Court found in favor of the employer. The statutory appellate remedy under Rule 6(6) is explicitly restricted to instances where a punitive measure enumerated under Rule 6(3), specifically dismissal or punitive termination, has been inflicted. The Court analyzed the contractual stipulations in the letter of appointment dated March 2, 1956, and the termination letter dated September 26, 1961. The employer had exercised its explicit contractual right to terminate employment by offering one month's salary in lieu of notice.

The Court observed that every discharge from service does not automatically constitute a punishment. While courts reserve the right to look behind the formal surface of an order to check for hidden punitive intent or mala fides, the record demonstrated that the employer acted bona fide. When the employee declined to carry out the transfer to Kymore, the employer deliberately chose to issue a simple order of discharge to avoid casting any slur on the employee's record. Because the discharge was non-punitive, Rule 6(3) was un-attracted, rendering the employee's appeal to the State Government incompetent and the resulting reinstatement order completely void for lack of jurisdiction.

Final Decision of the Court:

The Supreme Court rejected the preliminary objection regarding maintainability, holding that the State Government exercising appellate powers under Rule 6(6) acts as a tribunal under Article 136(1) of the Constitution. On the substantive merits, the Court held that the employee's termination was a simple contractual discharge and not a punishment under Rule 6(3). Consequently, the appeal preferred before the State Government was incompetent. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the company and set aside the appellate order of reinstatement passed by the State Government on July 4, 1962, on the ground that it was passed without jurisdiction. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Point of Law Settled:

This judgment firmly establishes the foundational test for defining a tribunal under Article 136(1) of the Constitution of India. It settles that an authority qualifies as a tribunal if it is constituted by a statute or statutory rule and invested with the inherent judicial power of the State to adjudicate civil rights and disputes between parties, irrespective of whether it possesses the formal trappings of a court. Additionally, the ruling clarifies that statutory rules restricting employee dismissal fall within the ambit of conditions of service under factory legislation. However, statutory appellate remedies designed for punitive actions cannot be invoked in cases of bona fide simple contractual discharge.

Title of the Case: Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P. N. Sharma and Another Date of Judgment: 09.12.1964 Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 44 of 1964 Neutral Citation: 1965 AIR 1595 / 1965 SCR (2) 366 Name of Court: Supreme Court of India Name of Hon'ble Judge: P.B. Gajendragadkar C.J., M. Hidayatullah J., J.C. Shah J., S.M. Sikri J., and R.S. Bachawat J.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Headnote of the Judgment:

Associated Cement Companies Ltd. Vs. P. N. Sharma and Another, Supreme Court of India, Civil Appeal No. 44 of 1964, decided on 09.12.1964. The employer challenged an order of the State Government passed under Rule 6(6) of the Punjab Welfare Officers Recruitment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1952, reinstating a Welfare Officer whose services were terminated via contractual discharge. A preliminary objection was raised that the State Government was not a tribunal under Article 136(1). The Supreme Court held that the State Government exercising statutory appellate power acts as a tribunal as it is invested with the State's judicial power. On merits, the Court held that a bona fide contractual discharge is not a punishment, making the statutory appeal incompetent. The appeal was allowed and the reinstatement order was set aside.

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6. Supreme Court Ruling on Conditions of Service Under Factories Act 1948
7. When Does an Administrative Body Become a Judicial Tribunal in India?
8. Legal Analysis of Associated Cement Companies Ltd v PN Sharma 1964
9. Maintainability of Special Leave Petitions Against State Appellate Orders
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The Title of the Case is Associated Cement Companies Ltd. Vs. P. N. Sharma and Another, the Date of Judgment is 09.12.1964, the Case Number is Civil Appeal No. 44 of 1964, the Neutral Citation is 1965 AIR 1595 / 1965 SCR (2) 366, the Name of Court is Supreme Court of India, and the Name of Hon'ble Judge is P.B. Gajendragadkar C.J., M. Hidayatullah J., J.C. Shah J., S.M. Sikri J., and R.S. Bachawat J.

Italfarmaco SPA Vs. Deputy Controller of Patents

Introduction:

The maintainability of intra-court appeals within High Courts often presents complex statutory interplay, particularly when specialized intellectual property legislation intersects with commercial court laws. The dispute in this case involves an Italian company seeking to challenge an order of a single judge of the High Court that had affirmed the rejection of its patent application. The fundamental question was whether an intra-court appeal lies before a Division Bench of the High Court under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against a judgment rendered by a single judge sitting in statutory appeal under Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970. This ruling comprehensively clarifies the relationship between the Letters Patent, the Patents Act, 1970, and the overriding nature of Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

Factual and Procedural Background:

The appellant, Italfarmaco SPA, an Italian entity, filed patent application number 10810/CHENP/2012 before the Patent Office. The Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs passed an order under Section 15 of the Patents Act, 1970, refusing the grant of the patent. Aggrieved by this rejection, the appellant preferred a statutory appeal under Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970, before the High Court of Madras. This appeal was registered as Civil Miscellaneous Appeal CMA(PT) No. 45 of 2023. By an order dated December 20, 2024, the learned single judge dismissed the appeal and upheld the decision of the Deputy Controller.

Desiring to challenge this decision further within the High Court, the appellant lodged an Original Side Appeal, registered under SR number OSA(CAD)SR. No. 72443 of 2025, before the Commercial Appellate Division. The appeal was instituted under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Upon scrutiny, the High Court Registry raised a maintainability objection, questioning how an intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent could be maintained against a judgment passed in a civil miscellaneous appeal that arose from an administrative statutory tribunal order. The matter was placed before the Division Bench on December 12, 2025, to determine the maintainability of the appeal.

Dispute Before the Court:

The core legal question before the Court was whether an intra-court appeal before a Division Bench is maintainable against a judgment delivered by a single judge exercising appellate jurisdiction under Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970, in conjunction with Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.

The appellant argued that the order passed by the single judge in the civil miscellaneous appeal should be treated as an order-in-original. It was contended that because the single judge was evaluating the correctness of the decision of the Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs, the nature of the proceedings was akin to a writ petition, thereby attracting the intra-court appeal remedy under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The appellant also relied on Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, pointing out that intellectual property disputes regarding patents are classified as commercial disputes under the law, thereby entitling the aggrieved party to file an appeal before the Commercial Appellate Division. Conversely, the statutory framework indicated that Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, strictly limits appellate remedies and overrides any contrary provisions contained in the Letters Patent.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court:

The Court engaged in a detailed statutory analysis of Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970, Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The Court emphasized that in the absence of an explicit statutory provision conferring a right of intra-court appeal, no such appeal can be entertained.

The Court observed that Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970, specifically creates an appellate forum before the High Court against decisions of the Patent Office. In the present dispute, the Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs passed an order under Section 15 of the Patents Act, 1970, and the appellant appropriately exercised its statutory remedy under Section 117A before a single judge of the High Court.

Addressing the appellant’s reliance on the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, the Court acknowledged that disputes concerning patents fall within the definition of a commercial dispute under Section 2(1)(xvii) of the Act. However, the Court highlighted that the Commercial Courts Act is a special enactment whose appellate scheme is specifically defined under Chapter IV.

Analyzing Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, the Court noted that while Section 13(1A) allows appeals from judgments or orders of a Commercial Division to the Commercial Appellate Division, this right is governed and limited by the proviso to Section 13(1A) as well as Section 13(2). The proviso restricts appeals to only those orders specifically enumerated under Order XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, or Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Crucially, Section 13(2) contains an express non-obstante clause stipulating that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law or the Letters Patent of a High Court, no appeal shall lie from any order or decree of a Commercial Division or Commercial Court otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act.

The Court concluded that Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, intentionally overrides the Letters Patent. Consequently, Clause 15 of the Letters Patent cannot be invoked to bypass the statutory limits imposed by Section 13. The Court emphasized that stretching or expanding the scope of the Commercial Courts Act beyond its explicit language would defeat the very objective of the statute, which aims at streamlined and expedited commercial dispute resolution. Since an appeal under Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970, is a statutory first appeal heard by a single judge, no second intra-court appeal lies to a Division Bench under the guise of the Letters Patent or the Commercial Courts Act.

Final Decision of the Court:

The High Court affirmed the maintainability objection raised by the Registry. The Court held that the intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent read with Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, was not maintainable against the judgment of the single judge passed under Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970. Accordingly, the Original Side Appeal filed at the SR stage, bearing OSA(CAD)SR. No. 72443 of 2025, was rejected.

Point of Law Settled:

This judgment reaffirms the principle that Section 13(2) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, expressly overrides Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Where a single judge of a High Court decides a statutory appeal under Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970, no further intra-court appeal lies before a Division Bench or the Commercial Appellate Division. The judgment clarifies that the appellate framework under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, is exhaustive, and parties cannot create an additional layer of intra-court appeal using the Letters Patent when the statutory scheme does not provide for one.

Title of the Case: Italfarmaco SPA Vs. Deputy Controller of Patents & Designs Date of Judgment: 12.12.2025 Case Number: OSA.(CAD)SR. No. 72443 of 2025 Neutral Citation: Not Available in Source Order Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras Name of Hon'ble Judge: Justice S.M. Subramaniam and Justice C. Kumarappan

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Headnote of the Judgment:

Italfarmaco SPA v. Deputy Controller of Patents & Designs, High Court of Judicature at Madras, OSA.(CAD)SR. No. 72443 of 2025, decided on 12.12.2025. The appellant filed an intra-court appeal under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, challenging an order of a single judge passed under Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970. The Registry raised an objection regarding maintainability. The High Court held that Section 13(2) of the Commercial Courts Act expressly overrides the Letters Patent. Since an intra-court appeal against an order passed in a statutory appeal under Section 117A is not provided under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act or Order XLIII of the CPC, the appeal was held not maintainable and was rejected.

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The Title of the Case is Italfarmaco SPA Vs. Deputy Controller of Patents & Designs, the Date of Judgment is 12.12.2025, OSA.(CAD)SR. No. 72443 of 2025:MADHC: S.M. Subramaniam and Justice C. Kumarappan.

Cipla Limited Vs Union of India

Third Party has no locus in Trademark Renewal Proceeding

Introduction:

The procedural mechanics governing trademark restoration and renewal often present intricate questions regarding the locus standi of third parties. When a registered trademark is removed from the register due to non-renewal and subsequently restored by the Trade Marks Registry following judicial intervention, third parties operating in the same domain frequently seek to intervene. The High Court of Delhi examined these principles in a dispute involving the trademark NO DARAR in Class 5. The court addressed whether a third party alleging prejudice has a legal right to be impleaded in a writ petition concerning the administrative restoration and renewal of a trademark between the registered proprietor and the Trade Marks Registry.

Factual and Procedural Background:

The petitioner, Cipla Limited, filed a writ petition seeking a writ of mandamus or certiorari directing the respondents, including the Union of India and the Trade Marks Registry, to restore its trademark registration bearing application number 1694972 for the mark NO DARAR in Class 5, which had been registered on February 7, 2011. The petitioner further sought permission to file an application for the renewal of the said trademark.

During the initial proceedings, the Central Government Standing Counsel appearing for the Registrar of Trade Marks submitted that although the statutory O-3 Notice was uploaded on the official website, its dispatch tracking report was untraceable. Consequently, without adjudicating the dispute on merits, the High Court disposed of the writ petition , permitting the petitioner to submit an application for restoration and renewal along with the prescribed fees within two weeks, directing the Registrar to proceed in accordance with law.

The petitioner subsequently filed an application seeking modification of the order , pointing out that the Trade Marks Registry had updated the status of the trademark application on its official website from Removed to Registered. Taking note of the Registry's compliance, the High Court disposed of the modification application on May 30, 2025, as withdrawn, observing that no further directions were necessary since the mark was reflected as registered.

Thereafter, an applicant third party challenged the order dated May 14, 2025, before the Supreme Court of India via Special Leave Petition SLP(C) No. 24856/2025. The Supreme Court disposed of the SLP on August 29, 2025, observing that the applicant was not a party before the High Court and granting liberty to the applicant to file an appropriate application before the High Court to demonstrate how the order caused grave prejudice. Pursuant to this liberty, the applicant filed two interlocutory applications before the High Court: CM 298/2025 under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking impleadment as a party, and CM 299/2025 under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking recall of the order dated May 14, 2025. Arguments on these applications were heard, leading to the judgment dated July 27, 2026.

Dispute Before the Court:

rights of a third party to intervene in writ proceedings dealing strictly with administrative renewal and restoration of a trademark between the proprietor and the Registry.

The applicant argued that the Supreme Court’s order dated August 29, 2025, conferred an absolute right to be heard on the merits of the dispute rather than merely seeking leave to demonstrate locus standi. Relying on Rule 60 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, the applicant contended that the restoration and renewal of the petitioner’s mark were carried out without following statutory due process. The applicant asserted that it was a necessary and proper party because the restoration perpetuated the petitioner's trademark to the severe prejudice of the applicant’s commercial interests.

Conversely, the petitioner and the Trade Marks Registry contended that the core issue in the writ petition pertained strictly to the administrative bilateral relationship between the registered proprietor and the Registry regarding non-service of the mandatory O-3 notice. They submitted that the petition involved a right in personam. They asserted that a third party is a rank outsider to renewal proceedings and has no locus standi to seek impleadment in a disposed-of writ petition. The proper statutory remedy for any aggrieved third party, they argued, was to file an independent rectification application under the Trade Marks Act rather than intervening in administrative renewal matters.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court:

The High Court undertook an analysis of the statutory framework governing party impleadment under Order I Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Court emphasized that for a party to be added to a proceeding, its presence must be necessary to enable the court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit. Reaffirming settled procedural jurisprudence, the Court noted that a necessary party is one without whom no effective order can be made, whereas a proper party is one whose presence is indispensable for a complete and final decision.

In evaluating the facts, the Court observed that the writ petition was confined to the administrative non-action or procedural lapses of the Trade Marks Registry regarding the restoration of Application No. 1694972 in Class 5. The petitioner had raised no assertions, grounds, or prayers against any third party. Consequently, the matter pertained exclusively to a right in personam between the trademark owner and the statutory authority. The Court held that the applicant was a rank outsider with no direct connection to the subject matter of the writ petition.

Addressing the applicant’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s order, the High Court clarified that the Supreme Court had merely granted liberty to the applicant to approach the High Court and establish whether it was a necessary and proper party. The order did not automatically grant impleadment or bypass the threshold requirements of Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Regarding the applicant’s contention that the Registry failed to follow Rule 60 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, and that the order dated May 14, 2025, allowed the Registry to perpetuate the mark, the Court held that these submissions pertained to subsequent actions taken by the Registry. Such subsequent administrative steps fell outside the scope and jurisdiction of the disposed-of writ petition. The Court held that the applicant was estopped from challenging subsequent administrative acts through interlocutory applications in a closed writ proceeding.

To reinforce its reasoning, the Court relied on the decisions in  Epsilon Publishing House Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors., 2017 SCC OnLine Del 10607 (affirmed by the Division Bench in 2018 SCC OnLine Del 7625) and the Division Bench ruling of the Bombay High Court in Motwane Private Limited v. Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 661. These precedents established that trademark renewal is strictly a matter between the Trade Marks Registry and the registered proprietor. The question of considering third-party rights at the stage of renewal or restoration does not arise. If a third party is aggrieved by the registration or restoration of a trademark, its remedy lies in initiating independent rectification proceedings as provided under the statute, rather than seeking to participate in the renewal process.

The Court acknowledged the legal principles laid down in precedents cited by the applicant, including M/s. Chopra Hotels Private Limited v. Harbinder Singh Sekhon & Ors., 2026 INSC 335, Prabodh Verma & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (1984) 4 SCC 251, and Times Publishing House Limited v. The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks & Ors., W.P.(C) No. 23545/2005 (order dated December 14, 2006). However, the Court distinguished them on facts, holding that the applicant failed to show their applicability to a bilateral administrative renewal dispute.

Final Decision of the Court:

The High Court dismissed the application for impleadment under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CM 298/2025) and the application for recall under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CM 299/2025). The Court held that the applicant failed to establish its status as a necessary or proper party. Consequently, the application seeking a stay of the order dated May 30, 2025 (CM 297/2025) was also dismissed as nothing survived for adjudication. The Court made no order as to costs and clarified that the applicant remained at liberty to pursue appropriate statutory remedies, such as rectification proceedings, in accordance with law.

Point of Law Settled:

This judgment reinforces that trademark restoration and renewal proceedings before the Trade Marks Registry, as well as writ petitions challenging administrative defaults in such processes, constitute matters strictly in personam between the registered proprietor and the Trade Marks Registry. Third parties have no locus standi to intervene or seek impleadment under Order I Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in proceedings concerning trademark renewal or restoration. Any third party aggrieved by the restoration or continued presence of a trademark on the register must exhaust independent statutory remedies, such as filing a rectification application under the Trade Marks Act, rather than interrupting bilateral administrative or judicial proceedings regarding renewal.

Title of the Case: Cipla Limited Vs Union of India & Ors.

Date of Judgment: July 27, 2026

Case Number: W.P.(C)-IPD 23/2025 

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Banerjee

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Headnote of the Judgment:

Cipla Limited v. Union of India & Ors. (W.P.(C)-IPD 23/2025, High Court of Delhi, Judgment dated July 27, 2026). The petitioner filed a writ petition seeking restoration and renewal of its trademark NO DARAR in Class 5 due to untraceable O-3 notice dispatch records, which was disposed of permitting renewal steps. An applicant third party sought impleadment under Order I Rule 10 CPC and recall of the order, alleging prejudice. The High Court dismissed the applications, holding that trademark renewal is strictly a matter in personam between the proprietor and the Registry. Third parties are neither necessary nor proper parties in renewal writ petitions and must pursue independent statutory rectification remedies.

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N.Ranga Rao & Sons Vs. Sree Annapoorna Agro Foods

Trademark Protection Beyond Allied Goods

Introduction:

The protection of trademarks under intellectual property jurisprudence often faces complex questions when a widely recognized mark used for one class of products is adopted by another trader for completely different, non-competing goods. The dispute between an established manufacturer of incense sticks and a regional producer of edible vegetable oils highlights the delicate statutory balance between actual product similarity, well-known brand reputation, and trademark dilution. The judgment rendered by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Madras offers a crucial examination of trademark protection under Section 29(4) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which extends rights over registered marks against their unauthorized use on dissimilar goods.

Factual and Procedural Background:

The plaintiff, originally founded in 1948 as a proprietary concern, was subsequently converted into a partnership firm and ultimately incorporated as a private limited company in 2014. The business initially adopted the trademark CYCLE in the year 1954 primarily in relation to agarbathies and incense sticks. Over several decades of continuous, extensive commercial use, nationwide advertising, and substantial sales turnover, the brand expanded globally to export markets spanning over forty countries. Additionally, the plaintiff obtained registrations for the trademark CYCLE and its corresponding cycle device under various classes, including Classes 29 and 30 in respect of food products, on a proposed-to-be-used basis.

The defendant, a business operating under the trade name Sree Annapurna Agro Foods in Erode, commenced manufacturing and marketing edible vegetable oils under the identical trademark CYCLE and a cycle device in the year 2009. Upon learning of the defendant's commercial use of the mark in Class 29, the plaintiff instituted a commercial suit, C.S. No. 259 of 2017, before the Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Madras. The suit prayed for permanent injunctions to restrain trademark infringement and passing off, rendition of accounts of profits, surrender and destruction of offending labels and dies, and costs.

On August 17, 2021, the learned Single Judge dismissed the suit with costs. The trial Court observed that the distinctiveness built by the plaintiff pertained specifically to Cycle Brand Agarbathies rather than the standalone word CYCLE. It further reasoned that CYCLE, being a common dictionary word, could not confer a broad monopoly over all product classes; that incense sticks and edible oils were neither allied nor cognate goods; that the plaintiff failed to show actual commercial use in Classes 29 and 30; and that the defendant was the prior user of the mark specifically in the domain of edible oils. Aggrieved by this dismissal, the plaintiff preferred an appeal, O.S.A.(CAD) No. 3 of 2022, under Order 13 Rule 1 of the Commercial Courts Act read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The appeal was heard and reserved on June 24, 2026, and judgment was pronounced on July 28, 2026.

Dispute Before the Court:

The primary legal and factual questions presented before the High Court revolved around whether a proprietor of a renowned mark for a specific category of goods can restrain another entity from using the identical mark on completely different, non-allied products.

The plaintiff contended that its trademark CYCLE had been continuously used since 1954 and had attained secondary meaning and distinctiveness, elevating it to the status of a well-known mark. It argued that under Section 29(4) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, protection extends to dissimilar goods if the registered mark enjoys reputation in India and the unauthorized use takes unfair advantage of or dilutes its distinctive character without due cause. The plaintiff asserted that the defendant offered no plausible or honest explanation for adopting the identical word mark and cycle device, meaning the adoption was dishonest and aimed at piggybacking on the plaintiff's reputation.

Conversely, the defendant argued that the plaintiff had only ever utilized the mark for incense sticks and agarbathies, whereas its registrations under Classes 29 and 30 were merely on a proposed-to-be-used basis and vulnerable to cancellation for non-use. The defendant asserted that CYCLE is a generic dictionary word incapable of monopolization across all consumer categories. Furthermore, because edible oils and agarbathies appeal to different senses, namely taste versus smell, and are completely non-cognate, the defendant claimed there was no possibility of public confusion. The defendant maintained that it was the prior commercial user of the mark in the edible oil category, having used it continuously since 2009.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court:

The Division Bench undertook a thorough evaluation of the statutory framework, evidentiary records, and established legal precedents to assess whether the trial Court erred in dismissing the suit.

Addressing the defendant's contention regarding the word CYCLE being a generic dictionary term, the Bench reaffirmed the settled position of law that common or descriptive words can, through long, continuous, and extensive commercial use, acquire a strong secondary significance. Once a mark transcends its primary ordinary meaning and becomes exclusively associated in the public mind with a specific business, it earns full statutory protection against unauthorized adoption. To reinforce this legal proposition, the Court analyzed the decision of the Supreme Court of India in Mahendra & Mahendra Paper Mills Ltd. v. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd., (2002) 2 SCC 147, where the word Mahindra was protected due to decades of acquired distinctiveness despite competing claims. It also referred to T.V. Venugopal v. Ushodaya Enterprises Ltd. and Another, (2011) 4 SCC 85, where the Supreme Court held that even a descriptive term like Eenadu was entitled to strong protection against a third party attempting to ride on its goodwill, even in non-identical product categories.

The Court scrutinised the trial Court's reliance on the argument that incense sticks and edible oils are not cognate or allied goods. The Bench explained that while product similarity is a critical consideration in classical infringement and passing off actions, Section 29(4) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, specifically caters to situations involving dissimilar goods or services. Under Section 29(4), infringement occurs if three conditions are satisfied: first, the rival mark is identical or similar to the registered mark; second, the mark is used for dissimilar goods or services; and third, the registered mark holds a reputation in India such that the unauthorized use without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, its distinctive character or repute.

To clarify the evolving cross-product scope of passing off and trademark protection, the Court relied on the Full Bench judgment of the High Court of Calcutta in Sony Kabushiki Kaisha v. Mahaluxmi Textile Mills, 2009 SCC OnLine Cal 531. The Full Bench had overruled older rigid authorities, holding that in modern commerce, consumers often assume that a reputed brand expanding into different product categories originates from the same source. Thus, absolute dissimilarity of goods does not automatically defeat a protection claim if the mark carries substantial reputation and its unauthorized use causes dilution or consumer association.

Evaluating the evidence, the Bench noted that the plaintiff had established continuous adoption since 1954, backed by registered certificates, widespread nationwide advertising, international exports, and prior court rulings recognizing the mark's extensive goodwill. Consequently, the distinctiveness belonged to the mark CYCLE itself and was not strictly limited to agarbathies.

On the question of whether the defendant had due cause under Section 29(4), the Bench evaluated the testimony of the defendant's sole witness. During cross-examination, the witness admitted that the defendant operated under various brand names over time but failed to produce any documentary evidence or state in the written statement any specific reason why the mark CYCLE was adopted in 2009 for edible oils. There was no connection between the word CYCLE and the defendant's name, family background, or geographic origin. In the absence of a bona fide explanation, the adoption of an identical mark with a similar cycle device was deemed to be without due cause, intended to take unfair advantage of the plaintiff's established reputation.

However, the Court distinguished between statutory infringement under Section 29(4) and the common law remedy of passing off. It observed that passing off requires misrepresentation in the course of trade leading to actual deceit or confusion regarding the origin of goods. Given the complete absence of proof of actual consumer deceit and the disparate nature of the trade channels, the claim for passing off was not made out. Similarly, the claim for rendition of accounts of profits was rejected due to lack of evidence quantifying any financial gains derived by the defendant.

Final Decision of the Court:

The Division Bench partly allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment and decree dated August 17, 2021, passed in C.S. No. 259 of 2017. The Court granted a permanent injunction restraining the defendant, its agents, dealers, distributors, or any person acting on its behalf from manufacturing, marketing, advertising, selling, or dealing in edible oils or any other goods under the trademark CYCLE, the cycle device, or any other mark identical or deceptively similar to the plaintiff's registered mark.

Point of Law Settled:

This judgment reaffirms that under Section 29(4) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, a registered trademark possessing a established reputation in India is protected against unauthorized adoption even on completely dissimilar or non-cognate goods. The ruling establishes that when an identical mark is adopted by a subsequent user for different products, the burden rests squarely on the defendant to prove honest, bona fide adoption supported by due cause. A mere claim of arbitrary choice or prior use within an unrelated product class, without a plausible explanation connecting the choice to the user's business, does not constitute due cause and cannot override the statutory rights of a reputed mark against trademark dilution and unfair advantage.

Title of the Case: N.Ranga Rao & Sons Private Ltd. Vs. Sree Annapoorna Agro Foods

Date of Judgment: 28/07/2026

Case Number: O.S.A.(CAD) No. 3 of 2022

Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice P. Velmurugan and Hon'ble Mrs. Justice K. Govindarajan Thilakavadi

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Headnote of the Judgment:

N.Ranga Rao & Sons Private Ltd. v. Sree Annapoorna Agro Foods (O.S.A.(CAD) No. 3 of 2022, High Court of Judicature at Madras, Judgment dated 28/07/2026). The appellant, a long-standing manufacturer of incense sticks under the registered trademark CYCLE since 1954, challenged the trial Court's dismissal of its suit against the respondent for using the identical mark and device for edible oils since 2009. The High Court held that under Section 29(4) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, protection extends to dissimilar goods when a mark enjoys reputation and the adoption lacks due cause. Because the respondent failed to offer a bona fide explanation for adopting the identical mark, the adoption was deemed to unfairly exploit the appellant's reputation. The appeal was partly allowed, granting a permanent injunction and destruction of offending materials while rejecting passing off and monetary claims.

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 4. N.Ranga Rao & Sons v. Sree Annapoorna Agro Foods: Legal Analysis of Trademark Dilution

 5. Due Cause and Unfair Advantage Under Indian Trademark Law: Key Takeaways

 6. Trademark Protection Beyond Allied Goods: Madras High Court Judgment Analysis

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 9. Commercial Court Appeals: Protection of Registered Marks Against Dilution

 10. Analysis of O.S.A.(CAD) No. 3 of 2022: Cross-Product Trademark Injunctions

Raj Abhushan Bhandar Vs The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks

### Legal News Write-Up

## High Court of Gujarat Dismisses Intra-Court Appeal Under Trade Marks Act, 1999 as Non-Maintainable

 * [Case Title] : Raj Abhushan Bhandar Vs The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr.

 * Date of Judgment : 23/07/2026

 * Case No. : Letters Patent Appeal No. 619 of 2026 in Civil Appeal No. 22 of 2023 with Civil Application No. 1 of 2026

 * Neutral Citation : 2026:GUJHC:619-LPA

 * [Court Name] : High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad

 * Name of Hon'ble Judge : Hon'ble the Chief Justice Mrs. Sunita Agarwal and Hon'ble Mr. Justice D.N. Ray

### Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant filed an intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent challenging a single-judge order dated July 11, 2025. That order had been passed in a statutory appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which itself arose from a decision of the Trademark Registry, Ahmedabad, dated February 27, 2023. The respondents raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal, arguing that the single judge exercised statutory appellate jurisdiction rather than original jurisdiction.

### Dispute before Court

The primary legal issue before the Division Bench was whether an intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is maintainable against a judgment rendered by a single judge of the High Court while exercising statutory appellate jurisdiction under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, specifically in light of the statutory bar under Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

### Reasoning of Judge

The Court examined the statutory evolution of trademark legislation, comparing Section 109 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 with Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Under the 1958 Act, a second appeal to a Division Bench was explicitly provided for, whereas the 1999 Act intentionally omitted this provision. The Court noted that the Registrar of Trade Marks performs quasi-judicial functions and possesses the trappings of a court, exercising adjudicatory powers over civil rights. Consequently, the single judge exercised appellate jurisdiction over an adjudicatory order. The Court held that Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which contains a non-obstante clause overriding the Letters Patent, bars any further appeal from a decree or order decided by a single judge in appellate jurisdiction.

### Decision

The Division Bench upheld the preliminary objection raised by the respondents and dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal as non-maintainable.

### One Important Legal Principle Held in the Case

An intra-court Letters Patent Appeal does not lie against a decision of a single judge passed in exercise of statutory appellate jurisdiction under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, as the Registrar functions as a tribunal with the trappings of a court, and Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 operates as an absolute bar to further appeals.

[Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation ]

### Analytical Article on the Judgment

### Introduction

The maintainability of intra-court appeals against orders passed by a single judge in statutory appellate proceedings has long been a subject of judicial scrutiny. In a significant judgment, the High Court of Gujarat addressed whether a Letters Patent Appeal can be entertained against a judgment delivered by a single judge under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The decision provides clarity on the intersection between special intellectual property statutes, the Letters Patent charter, and the overriding effect of procedural codes governing civil appeals in India.

### Factual and Procedural Background

The controversy originated from an order passed by the Trademark Registry, Ahmedabad, on February 27, 2023. Aggrieved by the statutory authority's determination, an appeal was preferred before the High Court under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The learned single judge, exercising statutory appellate jurisdiction, disposed of the matter through a judgment dated July 11, 2025.

Seeking to challenge the decision of the single judge, the aggrieved party filed an intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, registered as Letters Patent Appeal No. 619 of 2026. Upon the listing of the intra-court appeal, the opposing party raised a preliminary objection regarding its maintainability, asserting that the single judge had exercised appellate powers over a quasi-judicial body and that further appeals were implicitly and explicitly barred by law.

The legislative history of trademark law in India formed a central element of the procedural analysis. Under the former Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, Section 109 specifically provided a two-tier appeal system within the High Court, explicitly allowing a second appeal to a Division Bench against an order passed by a single judge. However, when Parliament repealed the 1958 Act and enacted the Trade Marks Act, 1999, Section 91 was framed without incorporating any provision for a second-tier intra-court appeal. Following the abolition of the Intellectual Property Appellate Board through the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, statutory appeals from the Registrar were directed straight to the High Court.

### Dispute Before the Court

The core legal question presented to the Division Bench was whether an intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies against an order of a single judge passed in a statutory appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

The appellant contended that the High Court’s jurisdiction under the Letters Patent is an independent charter-based power that remains intact unless expressly barred by a statute. It was argued that the Registrar of Trade Marks is merely an administrative authority rather than a civil court, and therefore, proceedings before the Registrar do not attract the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Consequently, the appellant asserted that Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which prohibits further appeals from single-judge decisions, should not apply to trademark appellate proceedings.

Conversely, the respondents submitted that the Registrar of Trade Marks performs quasi-judicial functions, evaluates evidence, decides civil rights between competing parties, and possesses all the trappings of a civil court. Therefore, an appeal under Section 91 of the 1999 Act is a regular appellate proceeding. The respondents highlighted that Parliament consciously omitted the provision for a second appeal when replacing the 1958 Act with the 1999 Act. Furthermore, they relied on Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, arguing that its non-obstante clause completely overrides Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, thereby prohibiting any second appeal from an appellate judgment rendered by a single judge.

### Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

The Division Bench undertook a detailed statutory analysis of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, and Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. To determine whether Section 100A applied, the Court evaluated the exact nature and status of the Registrar of Trade Marks.

Examining Sections 19 through 22, 127, 128, and 129 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, alongside the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, the Court observed that the Registrar is vested with powers to receive evidence on affidavit or oral testimony, administer oaths, enforce witness attendance, compel document production, issue commissions, review decisions, and award costs executable as civil court decrees. Applying constitutional precedents regarding statutory authorities, the Court concluded that the Registrar exercises the State's inherent judicial powers to adjudicate disputes over private commercial rights. Thus, the Registrar acts as a tribunal possessing the trappings of a civil court.

Because the proceedings before the Registrar involve binding civil adjudications, the Court held that the appeal before the single judge under Section 91 was a statutory appellate proceeding continuing the original dispute, rather than an exercise of original jurisdiction by the High Court.

The Court then examined Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, which permits intra-court appeals from single-judge judgments but explicitly excludes judgments passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction over orders made by subordinate courts or tribunals.

To reinforce this conclusion, the Court examined Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, introduced by the Amendment Act of 2002. Section 100A states that notwithstanding anything contained in any Letters Patent or other law, where an appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is decided by a single judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. The Court emphasized that the non-obstante clause gives Section 100A absolute overriding effect over Clause 15 of the Letters Patent.

The Court also gave weight to the deliberate legislative shift between the 1958 Act and the 1999 Act. By deliberately excluding the second-appeal mechanism previously present under Section 109(5) of the 1958 Act, Parliament demonstrated a clear intent to restrict litigants to a single round of appeal before the High Court. Allowing a Letters Patent Appeal would circumvent the statutory scheme and defeat the legislative objective of finality and expeditious disposal in commercial intellectual property disputes.

### Final Decision of the Court

The Division Bench of the High Court ruled in favor of the respondents, upholding the preliminary objection. The Court held that the intra-court appeal was barred under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent read with Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Consequently, Letters Patent Appeal No. 619 of 2026, along with connected civil applications for stay, was dismissed as non-maintainable.

### Point of Law Settled

This judgment settles an important procedural principle concerning intellectual property litigation:

 1. The Registrar of Trade Marks acts as a quasi-judicial tribunal equipped with the essential trappings of a civil court when adjudicating trademark registration and opposition disputes.

 2. A judgment delivered by a single judge of a High Court under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 is rendered in statutory appellate jurisdiction, not original jurisdiction.

 3. Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 overrides Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, establishing an absolute bar against filing an intra-court appeal before a Division Bench against a single-judge decision arising from Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

### Case Details

Title of the Case: M/s Raj Abhushan Bhandar v. The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr.

Date of Judgment: 23/07/2026

Case Number: R/Letters Patent Appeal No. 619 of 2026 in R/Civil Appeal No. 22 of 2023

Neutral Citation: 2026:GUJHC:619-LPA

Name of Court: High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble the Chief Justice Mrs. Sunita Agarwal and Hon'ble Mr. Justice D.N. Ray

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation .

Headnote of the Judgment:

M/s Raj Abhushan Bhandar v. Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks, High Court of Gujarat, LPA No. 619 of 2026, Decided on 23/07/2026. The appellant filed an intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of Letters Patent against a single-judge order passed in a statutory appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The Division Bench held that the Registrar of Trade Marks functions as a tribunal with trappings of a civil court. The single judge exercised statutory appellate jurisdiction, not original jurisdiction. Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 contains an overriding non-obstante clause that bars further intra-court appeals against appellate decisions of a single judge. The Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed as non-maintainable.

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 6. Statutory Analysis of Section 91 Trade Marks Act and Clause 15 Letters Patent

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 8. Omission of Second Appeal in Trade Marks Act 1999: A Detailed Legal Analysis

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 10. Finality in Trademark Appeals: Gujarat High Court Bars Division Bench Review

TV Today Network Vs Saurashtra Aaj Tak

## News Write-Up: High Court Restrains Regional Publisher from Using 'Aaj Tak' Mark

**Case Title**: TV Today Network Vs Saurashtra Aaj Tak and Anr.

**Date of Judgment**: 30.07.2026

**Case No.**: RFA 320/2012 & CM APPL. 80300/2025

**Neutral Citation**: 2026:DHC:6103

**Court Name**: High Court of Delhi

**Name of Hon'ble Judge**: Ms. Justice Mini Pushkarna

### Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, TV Today Network, runs the nationally prominent 24-hour Hindi news channel 'Aaj Tak', which initially launched as a program in 1995 and became a dedicated channel in 2000. In December 2002, the appellant discovered that the respondents had launched a Gujarati regional daily newspaper titled 'Saurashtra Aaj Tak' from Rajkot, Gujarat. After a legal notice yielded no response, the appellant filed a suit in 2003 seeking permanent and mandatory injunctions against the use of 'Saurashtra Aaj Tak'. The trial court, vide judgment dated February 29, 2012, recorded ex-parte proceedings against the defendants and recognized that 'Aaj Tak' had achieved secondary meaning and goodwill. However, instead of issuing a complete restraint order, the trial court permitted the respondents to continue using 'Saurashtra Aaj Tak' subject to publishing a prominent disclaimer denying any association with the appellant. Aggrieved by the refusal to grant a full permanent injunction, the appellant preferred the present appeal before the High Court of Delhi.

### Dispute before Court

Whether the trial court erred in allowing the respondent to continue using the deceptively similar mark 'Saurashtra Aaj Tak' with a disclaimer, despite concluding that the appellant held established goodwill in 'Aaj Tak' and that the respondent's mark was likely to cause consumer confusion.

### Reasoning of Judge

The High Court observed that the trial court's finding regarding the respondent having developed independent goodwill or acting without dishonesty was legally unsustainable, as the respondent had been proceeded ex-parte and failed to adduce any evidence to support such claims. Merely adding a geographical prefix like 'Saurashtra' to a distinctive mark does not dispel the likelihood of deception or association, especially when both parties operate in the allied field of news dissemination. The Court reaffirmed that in passing off actions, proving actual damage is not required; demonstrating a distinct likelihood of confusion and consequential damage to goodwill is sufficient. Furthermore, approval from the Registrar of Newspapers for India (RNI) under the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 does not grant immunity against trade mark passing off claims, given the distinct objectives of the two statutes. Consequently, a mere disclaimer is an inadequate remedy when the adoption of a dominant mark creates clear source confusion.

### Decision

The High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the trial court's direction permitting the use of the mark with a disclaimer. The Court issued an absolute permanent injunction restraining the respondents from publishing, printing, or circulating any newspaper, magazine, or promotional material under the name 'Saurashtra Aaj Tak' or any mark confusingly similar to 'Aaj Tak'.

### One Important Legal Principle Held in the Case

A mere disclaimer or addition of a geographical prefix cannot cure passing off when an essential and dominant mark of a prior user is adopted for cognate services, and administrative registration under publication laws offers no defense against trademark rights.

[Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation ]

## Safeguarding Trademark Identity in Media: High Court Rules Against Misleading Name Adaptations

Imposing disclaimers or relying on minor structural additions like geographical prefixes is insufficient to mitigate source confusion

Introduction:

Maintaining brand identity and distinctiveness is vital for media organizations, where public trust and reputation directly influence readership and viewership. When rival entities adopt similar titles, it often leads to confusion among the public regarding the origin of the news services. The High Court of Delhi recently addressed this critical aspect of intellectual property law in an appeal challenging a trial court decision that allowed a regional entity to use a prominent media brand's name accompanied by a disclaimer. The judgment reinforces the legal protections available to prior users of distinctive trade names and clarifies the limits of using disclaimers as a remedy in passing off disputes.

Factual and Procedural Background:

The appellant company forms part of a major media group established in 1975. It commenced using a specific mark in 1995 for a news segment broadcast on the national network Doordarshan. In December 2000, it expanded operations by launching a dedicated 24-hour Hindi news channel under the same mark, gaining massive national reach and public recognition.

In December 2002, the appellant discovered that a regional Gujarati newspaper was being published and circulated in the Saurashtra region of Gujarat under a title that incorporated the appellant's news channel mark prefixed with the regional name. The appellant issued a formal legal notice in January 2003 requesting the cessation of the name. Receiving no response, the appellant instituted a civil suit in April 2003 seeking permanent and mandatory injunctions to restrain the publication under the contested title.

During the suit's pendency, the proceedings were transferred to a district court due to jurisdictional adjustments. The defendants eventually stopped participating in the proceedings and were proceeded ex-parte in August 2008. Meanwhile, trademark registration certificates were issued in 2005 for the relevant mark under classes covering telecommunications and entertainment/education services, with retrospective effect from October 2003.

In February 2012, the trial court delivered its judgment. It held that the appellant's mark had acquired secondary meaning and distinctiveness through continuous use. It also noted that the defendant's publication was likely to cause confusion among readers and advertisers. However, the trial court refrained from granting an absolute permanent injunction, reasoning that the defendant might have established local goodwill and that its adoption was not per-se dishonest. Instead, it granted a mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to publish a prominent disclaimer alongside its title, explicitly stating the lack of association with the appellant. Dissatisfied with the refusal to issue a full prohibition, the appellant approached the High Court in appeal.

Dispute Before the Court

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the trial court erred in permitting the continuous use of a deceptively similar mark coupled with a disclaimer, despite rendering factual findings that the appellant possessed established goodwill and that the respondent's mark was likely to cause confusion.

The appellant argued that having satisfied all three requirements of passing off goodwill, misrepresentation, and likelihood of damage it was entitled to an absolute injunction restraining the use of its mark. It contended that adding a geographic prefix like "Saurashtra" did not alter the dominant identity of the mark and that a disclaimer was ineffective in preventing consumer deception.

On the other hand, the respondent argued that the suit was unmaintainable due to issues of locus standi and non-joinder of the parent entity holding the registration. Substantively, the respondent claimed protection under prior local user concepts, arguing that its title had received regulatory approval from the Press Registrar under publication laws, operated in a regional language, was confined strictly to print in a specific geography, and was adopted in good faith to denote daily local reporting.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

The High Court conducted a comprehensive analysis of the common law remedy of passing off and its interaction with statutory trademark protections. Addressing preliminary technical objections, the Court confirmed that an action for passing off is rooted in common law rights arising from prior adoption and goodwill generation, distinct from statutory infringement claims. Prior use grants rights superior to subsequent adoption, and a prior user can maintain a passing off action irrespective of whether it holds formal registration in its own name or through an associate entity. Moreover, procedural objections regarding maintainability or locus standi must be raised in initial trial pleadings, and an ex-parte party that failed to file cross-appeals cannot challenge favorable trial findings for the first time at the appellate stage.

On the merits of passing off, the Court assessed the classical parameters: goodwill, misrepresentation, and damage. The Court reaffirmed that while individual ordinary words in a mark may be descriptive, their combination used continuously in a specific domain can acquire secondary meaning and exclusive distinctiveness. The unrebutted evidence established that the news channel mark had become a household brand nationally prior to the respondent's local adoption.

Regarding misrepresentation and confusion, the Court observed that both parties operate in the news dissemination sector. Television broadcasting and print publishing represent allied and cognate activities within media. Merely prefixing a geographical identifier to a well-known mark does not eliminate confusion; rather, it often leads the public to infer that the regional publication is an official local arm or affiliate of the national broadcasting network. The language difference or regional restriction does not insulate against deception when the underlying brand carries national reach.

The Court further held that the trial court's assumption regarding the respondent's good faith or independent goodwill lacked evidentiary basis. Because the respondent failed to present evidence during trial, an adverse inference applied, rendering any speculative finding of honest concurrent use legally improper.

Addressing the defense based on title registration under publication laws, the Court clarified the statutory distinction. Approval granted by administrative authorities under the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 serves regulatory filing purposes and does not override trademark rights or provide a valid defense against passing off actions.

Finally, evaluating the adequacy of relief, the Court held that a disclaimer is an inappropriate and insufficient remedy when the primary mark has been appropriated for similar services. Allowing an entity to trade on another's goodwill while relying on fine-print disclaimers fails to protect the public from initial interest confusion and undermines the protection guaranteed to prior brand owners.

Final Decision of the Court

The High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the trial court's decision to the extent that it permitted the respondent to use the disputed mark with a disclaimer. The Court issued a decree of permanent injunction restraining the respondents, their agents, and representatives from printing, publishing, circulating, or advertising any newspaper, magazine, or periodical under the contested title or any other mark confusingly or deceptively similar to the appellant's registered mark.

Point of Law Settled

The judgment reinforces the legal rule that where a party establishes prior continuous use, brand reputation, and likelihood of confusion in an action for passing off involving allied fields, the Court must issue a complete injunctive relief. Imposing disclaimers or relying on minor structural additions like geographical prefixes is insufficient to mitigate source confusion or safeguard established goodwill. Additionally, the ruling reiterates that administrative approvals under print media regulations do not defeat common law or statutory trademark rights.

Title of the Case: TV Today Network Vs Saurashtra Aaj Tak and Anr.

Date of Judgment: 30.07.2026

Case Number: RFA 320/2012 

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:6103

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Ms. Justice Mini Pushkarna

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation .

### Headnote of the Judgment

TV Today Network v. Saurashtra Aaj Tak and Anr., High Court of Delhi, RFA 320/2012. The appellant, operator of the nationwide news channel 'Aaj Tak', appealed against a trial court decree which allowed the respondents to publish a daily Gujarati newspaper titled 'Saurashtra Aaj Tak' subject to a mandatory disclaimer. The High Court held that 'Aaj Tak' had achieved secondary meaning and prior goodwill in news dissemination. Incorporating the dominant mark with a geographical prefix for cognate news services creates a strong likelihood of public confusion. Relying on unevidenced claims of bona fide use or administrative approval under the Press and Registration of Books Act, 1867 offers no defense in passing off actions. The Court set aside the disclaimer direction and granted an absolute permanent injunction restraining the respondents from using the contested mark.

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 4. Trademark Rights Vs RNI Registration: Delhi High Court Clarifies Legal Hierarchy

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 6. Adding Geographical Prefixes to Established Trademarks: Legal Implications Explained

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 10. Delhi HC Overturns Trial Court Ruling on Disclaimers in Trademark Passing Off Cases

V-Guard Industries Limited Vs Kangaro Industries

Mandatory Two Months Time Limit for Filing Evidence in Support of Opposition Under Rule 45 of Trade Marks Rules 2017 is Mandatory and Default Leads to Deemed Abandonment: Madras High Court

[Case Title] : V-Guard Industries Limited Vs  Kangaro Industries and another

Date of Judgment: 30-07-2026

Case No.: LPA No. 18 of 2026

Neutral Citation : 2026:MHC:LPA18

[Court Name] : High Court of Judicature at Madras

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice P. Velmurugan and Hon'ble Mrs. Justice K. Govindarajan Thilakavadi

Factual and Procedural Background

V-Guard Industries applied for registration of a label mark containing KANGARO in Class 16 on 09.05.2016. M/s. Kangaro Industries opposed the application on 06.01.2017. V-Guard filed its counter statement on 19.05.2017, which was received by Kangaro Industries on 05.08.2017. Under Rule 45(1) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, Kangaro Industries was required to file evidence in support of opposition or intimate reliance on the notice of opposition within two months. Instead, Kangaro filed Form TM-M on 23.09.2017 seeking a one-month extension and submitted evidence on 18.10.2017. The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks rejected the extension request on 08.08.2018 and held the opposition abandoned under Rule 45(2). On appeal under Section 91 before a single Judge, the rejection order was set aside and the matter was remanded. V-Guard filed the present Letters Patent Appeal against the order of the single Judge.

Dispute before Court

Whether Rule 45 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017 is mandatory or directory, and whether the Registrar of Trade Marks has discretionary power under Section 131 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 read with Rule 109 to grant an extension of time for filing evidence in support of opposition when Rule 45(2) expressly prescribes deemed abandonment for default.

Reasoning of Judge

The Court observed that Rule 45(1) uses the word shall thrice and Rule 45(2) prescribes that the opponent shall be deemed to have abandoned the opposition upon failure to act. Unlike Rule 50 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2002, the 2017 Rules consciously omitted the discretion to grant an extension of time. The statutory provisions of Section 131 and Rule 109 cannot be invoked where a specific time limit and default consequence are expressly provided in Rule 45. Therefore, compliance with Rule 45 is mandatory, and failure to file evidence or intimate reliance on opposition facts within two months results automatically in statutory abandonment.

Decision

The Division Bench set aside the judgment of the single Judge and upheld the Assistant Registrar's order treating the opposition as deemed to have been abandoned under Rule 45(2) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017. The Letters Patent Appeal was allowed without costs.

One Important legal principle held in the case

The period of two months prescribed under Rule 45(1) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017 for filing evidence in support of opposition is mandatory, and failure to comply leads to mandatory statutory abandonment of opposition under Rule 45(2), with no scope for extension under Section 131 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

[Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation ]

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Strict Timelines in Trademark Opposition: Madras High Court Reaffirms Mandatory Nature of Rule 45 under Trade Marks Rules 2017

Introduction:

Trademark registration procedures in India are governed by structured timelines designed to bring commercial certainty and protect brand rights. A crucial stage in this process occurs when a published trademark application faces opposition from a third party. Under the statutory framework, both the applicant and the opponent are required to submit their respective pleadings and supporting evidence within designated time limits. The interpretation of these time limits, specifically whether they are strictly mandatory or merely flexible administrative directions, has frequently been a subject of judicial debate. The Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Madras recently delivered a significant ruling analyzing whether the Registrar of Trade Marks possesses the power to extend the time period for filing evidence in support of an opposition under the Trade Marks Rules, 2017.

Factual and Procedural Background:

The history of the case traces back to 09.05.2016, when an application was submitted for the registration of a label mark featuring KANGARO under Application No.3254001 in Class 16. Following the publication of the mark in the Trade Marks Journal, a notice of opposition was filed on 06.01.2017 by an opposing entity. In response, the trademark applicant filed its counter statement on 19.05.2017, which was officially served on the opposing party on 05.08.2017.

During the pendency of these proceedings, the Trade Marks Rules, 2017 came into force, replacing the earlier 2002 regulatory framework. Under Rule 45(1) of the 2017 Rules, an opponent is mandated to either file evidence by way of affidavit in support of the opposition or formally intimate that it intends to rely solely on the facts stated in its notice of opposition, within two months from the receipt of the counter statement.

In this case, the two-month period from the date of receipt of the counter statement expired without the opponent filing its evidence or issuing the required statutory intimation. Instead, on 23.09.2017, the opponent submitted Form TM-M seeking a one-month extension of time to file evidence, subsequently submitting its evidence on 18.10.2017. The applicant thereafter filed its evidence on 21.12.2017.

The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks examined the matter and issued a notice regarding the procedural delay. By an order dated 08.05.2018, the Assistant Registrar rejected the extension application and declared that the opposition stood deemed to have been abandoned under Rule 45(2) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017.

Aggrieved by this decision, the opponent filed an appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 before the Intellectual Property Appellate Board on 27.07.2018. Upon the abolition of the appellate tribunal, the proceeding was transferred to the Intellectual Property Division of the High Court. A single Judge of the High Court set aside the Assistant Registrar's order and remanded the opposition for fresh consideration on merits, while directing that the registration granted to the applicant in the interim would abide by the outcome of the remanded opposition. The applicant then instituted a Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench challenging the single Judge's judgment.

Dispute Before the Court

The primary legal issue presented before the Division Bench was whether the two-month timeline specified under Rule 45(1) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017 is mandatory or directory in nature.

The applicant argued that unlike Rule 50 of the repealed 2002 Rules, which expressly granted discretion to the Registrar to extend the period for filing evidence by one additional month, Rule 45 of the 2017 Rules deliberately removed all discretionary extensions. It was contended that Rule 45(2) establishes an automatic legal fiction of deemed abandonment if an opponent fails to file evidence or intimate reliance on its notice of opposition within the two-month window. The applicant further submitted that general provisions empowering the Registrar to extend timelines, such as Section 131 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 read with Rule 109 of the 2017 Rules, cannot be invoked where a specific rule contains an express statutory deadline accompanied by an explicit consequence of default.

On the other hand, the opponent contended that procedural rules should not be interpreted so rigidly as to destroy substantive rights vested in trademark litigants. It was argued that the right to oppose a trademark application is vital to maintaining the purity of the register and serving public interest. The opponent maintained that the filing of Form TM-M within the two-month window demonstrated active steps, and the Registrar retained discretionary power under Section 131 and Rule 109 to condone procedural delays in the interest of justice.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

The Division Bench undertook a detailed statutory analysis of Rule 45 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017 in contrast with the statutory provisions of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and predecessor rules. The Bench highlighted the precise legislative drafting of Rule 45(1), noting that the word shall is employed three distinct times to mandate the procedural duties of an opponent. Furthermore, Rule 45(2) explicitly states that if an opponent takes no action under sub-rule (1) within the prescribed time, he shall be deemed to have abandoned his opposition.

The Court emphasized the crucial shift introduced by the executive while framing the 2017 Rules. Under Rule 50 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2002, the Registrar had express authority to grant a further extension of one month beyond the initial two-month period. The complete exclusion of this discretionary extension in Rule 45 of the 2017 Rules reflects a clear legislative intention to enforce strict, unyielding deadlines for evidence submission during opposition proceedings.

In analyzing the applicability of Section 131 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and Rule 109 of the 2017 Rules, the Court clarified that general discretionary powers to extend time apply only to matters where a specific time limit is not expressly provided with an absolute statutory consequence. Rule 109 itself excludes matters where time limits are expressly governed by specific rules. Because Rule 45 provides both a strict time limit and an explicit penalty of deemed abandonment, recourse to general extension provisions under Section 131 or Rule 109 is impermissible.

The Court examined various judicial authorities cited by the parties, including decisions emphasizing that procedural law must serve substantive justice as well as decisions confirming that statutory rules framed under an Act carry mandatory force when framed to streamline time-bound commercial adjudication. The Court concurred with the principle that where the law imposes an automatic consequence of default through a legal fiction of deemed abandonment, courts and administrative authorities cannot create exceptions that defeat the text and objective of the law. Consequently, the Assistant Registrar's decision to reject the extension application and treat the opposition as abandoned was fully justified and legally sound.

Final Decision of the Court

The Division Bench allowed the Letters Patent Appeal and set aside the judgment of the single Judge. The Court restored the order dated 08.05.2018 passed by the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks, which had declared the opposition as deemed to have been abandoned under Rule 45(2) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017. Consequently, the trademark application was freed from the revived opposition proceedings, protecting the statutory rights accrued to the registered proprietor. All connected miscellaneous applications were closed without any order as to costs.

Point of Law Settled

This decision clarifies and settles a critical point of intellectual property law regarding trademark opposition procedure in India. The High Court established that the two-month period prescribed under Rule 45(1) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017 for filing evidence in support of an opposition is absolute and mandatory. Failure to file affidavit evidence or formally intimate reliance on the notice of opposition within this two-month period results in automatic deemed abandonment of the opposition under Rule 45(2). The Registrar of Trade Marks lacks statutory authority or inherent discretion under Section 131 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 or Rule 109 of the 2017 Rules to grant extensions of time for evidence submission under Rule 45. This ruling reinforces procedural discipline and commercial efficiency in trademark prosecution across India.

Title of the Case: V-Guard Industries Limited Vs Kangaro Industries and another

Date of Judgment: 30-07-2026

Case Number: LPA No. 18 of 2026 and CMP No. 12387 of 2026

Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice P. Velmurugan and Hon'ble Mrs. Justice K. Govindarajan Thilakavadi

Written By:Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation .

Headnote of the Judgment:

V-Guard Industries Limited vs. M/s. Kangaro Industries and another, High Court of Judicature at Madras. Letters Patent Appeal filed against single Judge order remanding trademark opposition. Opponent failed to submit evidence within two months under Rule 45(1) of Trade Marks Rules 2017 and sought extension via Form TM-M. Assistant Registrar rejected extension and treated opposition as abandoned under Rule 45(2). High Court held Rule 45 is mandatory, extension under Section 131 is impermissible, and set aside single Judge order, restoring deemed abandonment. Appeal allowed.

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