Arcee Electronics Vs Arceeika

Cause of Action and Jurisdiction in IP Cases

Introduction: The dispute in Arcee Electronics v. M/s. Arceeika & Ors. revolves around the territorial jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court in an action for trademark infringement and passing off under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The plaintiff, a long-established electronics retail chain, sought to protect its registered trademark “ARCEE” against alleged infringing use by the defendants under the name “ARCEEIKA.” While the plaintiff argued that the Court had jurisdiction under Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the defendants challenged the jurisdiction and sought return of the plaint under Order VII Rule 10 CPC. The case thus turned on whether the plaintiff carried on business within the Court’s territorial limits or whether any part of the cause of action had arisen there.

Factual Background:The plaintiff, Arcee Electronics, is a partnership firm engaged in the sale of electronic goods through an extensive network of showrooms in Navi Mumbai and Raigad District. The firm, incorporated in 1986, was initially managed by its founder, Mr. Premnath Sharma, and over the years built a reputation for its “ARCEE” mark, which has been in use for nearly four decades. By the time of the suit, the plaintiff operated 23 showrooms, one head office, and one warehouse in Navi Mumbai and Raigad.

In August 2024, the defendants allegedly opened a showroom under the name “ARCEEIKA,” adopting a similar colour scheme, font, and typeface, which the plaintiff contended was intended to trade upon its business model and goodwill. The defendants, like the plaintiff, were engaged in selling electronic goods. The plaintiff claimed that such acts amounted to infringement of its registered trademark and passing off, prompting the filing of the present suit.

Procedural Background:The defendants filed an interim application under Order VII Rule 10 CPC seeking return of the plaint on the ground that the Bombay High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction. Defendant No. 2 argued that the plaintiff neither had a place of business within the Court’s jurisdiction nor had any part of the cause of action arisen there.

The plaintiff countered by asserting jurisdiction based on two grounds: first, that it carried on business in Mumbai city by selling and delivering goods to customers there; and second, that the defendants also carried on business in Mumbai and had delivered infringing goods to customers within the city. In support, the plaintiff relied on certain invoices showing sales to customers with Mumbai addresses.

Core Dispute

The core issue was whether the Bombay High Court, on its Original Side, had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit for trademark infringement and passing off, in light of Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Specifically, the question was whether the plaintiff could establish that it carried on business within Mumbai city or that any part of the cause of action had arisen there.

Discussion on Judgments:The defendants relied on the judgment in Manugraph India Limited v. Simarq Technologies Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 5334, wherein it was held that a plaintiff cannot file a suit in a jurisdiction where it neither carries on business nor where any part of the cause of action has arisen.

The Court also referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia & Anr., (2015) 10 SCC 161. In that case, the Supreme Court held that Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act and Section 62 of the Copyright Act provide an additional forum to the plaintiff, enabling it to sue where it resides or carries on business. However, this privilege cannot be abused to drag a defendant to a remote jurisdiction unconnected to the dispute. The Court clarified that if the plaintiff carries on business and the cause of action arises in the same place, the suit must be filed there, and not in another jurisdiction where the plaintiff merely has a subordinate office.

The principles from Sanjay Dalia were adopted in Manugraph India, where it was further explained that while a plaintiff may sue where it resides or carries on business under Section 134(2), or where the cause of action arises under Section 20 CPC, the choice is limited. It cannot file suit in an unrelated location merely because of a satellite office.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:Justice Sandeep V. Marne observed that the plaint itself was devoid of any averment asserting that the plaintiff had a place of business within Mumbai city. The plaintiff’s pleadings clearly established that all its showrooms, head office, and warehouse were situated in Navi Mumbai and Raigad District.

The invoices relied upon by the plaintiff were found insufficient to confer jurisdiction. The Court noted that the place of sale, not the place of delivery, determines the plaintiff’s place of business for the purposes of Section 134(2). Mere delivery of goods to a customer’s address in Mumbai did not amount to carrying on business there. Similarly, the defendants’ alleged sales to Mumbai customers did not amount to infringing acts committed within the Court’s jurisdiction, as the purchases took place in Navi Mumbai showrooms.

Applying Sanjay Dalia, the Court held that Section 134(2) did not help the plaintiff, as it did not carry on business in Mumbai city. Section 20 CPC was also inapplicable because no part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial limits of the Bombay High Court’s Original Side.

Final Decision: The Court concluded that it lacked territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. It ordered that the plaint be returned under Order VII Rule 10 CPC for presentation before a court having proper jurisdiction. 

Law Settled in This Case: This decision reaffirms that under Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, jurisdiction is conferred only upon a court within whose territorial limits the plaintiff actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business. Mere delivery of goods to customers in a jurisdiction does not amount to carrying on business there. Additionally, Section 20 CPC can provide jurisdiction where part of the cause of action arises, but the cause must be supported by specific pleadings in the plaint. The ruling reiterates that Sanjay Dalia prohibits misuse of jurisdictional provisions to drag defendants to courts in remote or unrelated locations.

Case Title:Arcee Electronics Vs Arceeika & Ors.

Date of Order: 11 August 2025

Case Number: Commercial IP Suit (L) No.19290 of 2024 

Neutral Citation: 2025:BHC-OS:13402

Name of Court: High Court of Bombay

Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep V. Marne

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Mankind Pharma Limited Vs. Zhejiang Yige Enterprise Management Group Co. Ltd

Case Title: Mankind Pharma Limited Vs. Zhejiang Yige Enterprise Management Group Co. Ltd. Case No.: C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 2/2024 Date of Order: May 14, 2025 Neutral Citation: [2025:DHC:3706] Name of Court: High Court of Delhi, New Delhi Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Saurabh Banerjee

Facts:

Mankind Pharma Limited, a well-established pharmaceutical company, owns the registered trademark "FLORA" in India since 2007, with use dating back to 1995, for pharmaceutical products in Class 5. Zhejiang Yige Enterprise Management Group applied in 2019 to register the mark "FLORASIS" in Class 5 for sanitary goods, with an intent for proposed use. The appellant opposed this application on the grounds of prior use, registration, and likelihood of confusion due to the similarity of marks.

Procedural Details:

• Mankind Pharma filed opposition proceedings against Zhejiang Yige's application for "FLORASIS."
• The Deputy Registrar of Trade Marks dismissed the opposition, allowing the registration of "FLORASIS."
• Mankind Pharma appealed to the High Court under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.
• The Court examined the evidence, legal principles, and submissions of the parties.

Issues:

• Whether the mark "FLORASIS" is deceptively similar and likely to cause confusion with the registered trademark "FLORA."
• Whether the registration of "FLORASIS" should be granted, considering prior user, registration, and reputation of "FLORA."
• Whether the addition of the suffix "SIS" and the use of mandarin characters distinguish the marks sufficiently.

Decision:

The Court held that "FLORASIS" is visually, phonetically, and structurally similar to "FLORA." The Court found that the registration of "FLORASIS" was likely to cause confusion among the public, especially given the prior use and registration of "FLORA," which has acquired goodwill. The Court set aside the impugned order, directed the Registrar to remove the entry corresponding to "FLORASIS," and upheld the opposition.

Khemka Food Products Pvt. Ltd. Vs. I.S.D.S. Private Limited and Others

Overriding Effect of Commercial Courts Act on Trademark Infringement Suits

Introduction: This case involves a commercial appeal filed before the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi, challenging an order that returned a plaint in a trademark infringement suit due to purported lack of jurisdiction. The appellant, a company engaged in the production and sale of wheat flour under the trademark "Grihasti Bhog," sought to enforce its rights against the respondents who were allegedly using an identical mark. The core issue revolved around the interplay between the jurisdictional provisions of the Trademarks Act, 1999, and the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, particularly in determining whether a Civil Judge (Senior Division) designated as a Commercial Court had the authority to entertain such a suit. The High Court's decision clarified the overriding effect of the Commercial Courts Act and emphasized the legislative intent to expedite commercial disputes through specialized courts at various levels. This judgment underscores the importance of harmonizing statutory provisions to ensure accessible and efficient resolution of intellectual property disputes in commercial contexts.

Factual Background:  The appellant, M/s Khemka Food Products Pvt. Ltd., traces its origins to a small flour mill established in 1970 under the name "Grihasti Atta Chakki" by the father of its director. Over time, the business expanded, leading to the company's incorporation in 1999 and the commencement of wheat flour production in 2001 after obtaining necessary permissions. The company adopted the trademark "Grihasti Bhog," which gained distinctiveness through long and continuous use, building goodwill and reputation. Applications for trademark registration were filed in 2005, 2012, and 2014, but were abandoned due to unavoidable circumstances. In February 2023, the appellant discovered that the respondents, I.S.D.S. Private Limited and its directors, were selling wheat flour under the identical mark "Grihasti Bhog." This prompted the appellant to issue a cease and desist notice on March 10, 2023, which the respondents replied to on April 6, 2023. The appellant then pursued pre-institution mediation under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, before the District Legal Services Authority in Jamshedpur in April 2023, but the respondents refused to participate, resulting in a non-starter report.

Procedural Background: Following the failed mediation, the appellant instituted Commercial Suit No. 11 of 2023 on August 14, 2023, before the Civil Judge (Senior Division)-I-cum-Commercial Court at Jamshedpur, seeking relief for trademark infringement and passing off under Section 134 of the Trademarks Act, 1999. The suit was valued at Rs. 5,05,000/-. The respondents appeared on March 6, 2024, and filed their written statement, claiming use of the mark since 2022 without raising any jurisdictional objection at that stage. On June 15, 2024, the respondents filed an application under Order VII Rule 10 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, arguing that the Commercial Court lacked jurisdiction under Section 134 of the Trademarks Act, 1999, and that the plaint should be returned. The appellant opposed this application. The Commercial Court allowed the respondents' application on July 29, 2024, directing the return of the plaint for presentation before a court with jurisdiction. Aggrieved, the appellant filed the present Commercial Appeal No. 14 of 2024 before the High Court of Jharkhand, which was reserved on July 30, 2024, and pronounced on August 8, 2024.

Core Dispute: The central issue in this appeal was whether the Civil Judge (Senior Division)-I, designated as a Commercial Court under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, possessed the jurisdiction to entertain a suit for trademark infringement under Section 134 of the Trademarks Act, 1999, especially when the suit's value was Rs. 5,05,000/- and fell within the pecuniary limits specified by state notifications. The respondents contended that Section 134 restricted such suits to "District Courts," interpreted as courts presided over by District Judges or higher, thereby excluding the Civil Judge (Senior Division). In contrast, the appellant argued that the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, had an overriding effect, allowing Commercial Courts at the Civil Judge (Senior Division) level to handle commercial disputes, including intellectual property matters, as defined under Section 2(1)(c)(xvii). The dispute highlighted the tension between traditional jurisdictional hierarchies under civil laws and the specialized framework introduced by the Commercial Courts Act to facilitate speedy resolution of commercial cases.

Discussion on Judgments:  In the proceedings before the High Court, neither the parties nor the bench explicitly cited any prior judicial precedents or case law from other courts. The arguments primarily revolved around statutory interpretations of the Trademarks Act, 1999, the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, without reference to specific judgments. The appellant emphasized the overriding nature of the Commercial Courts Act under Section 21, but did not invoke any case citations to support this. Similarly, the respondents relied on a literal reading of Section 134 of the Trademarks Act, 1999, asserting that it mandated jurisdiction only with District Judges, yet no judicial authorities were referenced in their submissions or the lower court's order. The High Court's analysis drew upon the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, and its 2018 amendments, as well as the 188th and 253rd Reports of the Law Commission of India, which were mentioned in the context of justifying the need for independent mechanisms for resolving commercial disputes to enhance investor confidence. These reports were referred to underscore the legislative intent to expand access to commercial courts for disputes of lower value, but they do not constitute judgments. The absence of cited case law in the record suggests that the decision was grounded solely in statutory construction and legislative history, without reliance on precedential authority.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: The High Court, in its reasoning, meticulously examined the legislative framework to resolve the jurisdictional conflict. It noted that the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, was enacted to provide for speedy resolution of commercial disputes, including those involving intellectual property rights under Section 2(1)(c)(xvii). The court highlighted the 2018 amendments, which reduced the specified value of disputes from Rs. 1 crore to Rs. 3 lakhs, aiming to make justice accessible at lower judicial levels. Emphasizing Section 3 of the Commercial Courts Act, which empowers state governments, in consultation with high courts, to constitute Commercial Courts at the district level or below, the bench observed that Jharkhand had issued notifications designating Civil Judges (Senior Division) as Commercial Courts for disputes valued between Rs. 3 lakhs and Rs. 1 crore, as per Notification No. 206/J dated February 8, 2021. The court critiqued the lower court's narrow interpretation of "District Court" under Section 134 of the Trademarks Act, 1999, as equating to "District Judge," clarifying that the term encompasses courts within the district hierarchy, including those below the District Judge when designated for specific purposes. It invoked the overriding effect of the Commercial Courts Act under Section 21, which prevails over conflicting provisions in other laws, and referenced the parliamentary debates and Law Commission Reports to affirm the intent to decentralize commercial adjudication. The analysis underscored that allowing appeals from Civil Judge-level Commercial Courts to District Judge-level Appellate Courts aligns with the Act's objective of efficiency, rejecting the respondents' contention as contrary to this scheme. The bench also stressed deference to high court notifications constituting such courts, concluding that the lower court erred in returning the plaint.

Final Decision: The High Court allowed the appeal, quashing and setting aside the order dated July 29, 2024, passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division)-I in Commercial Suit No. 11 of 2023. The suit was restored to its original number, and the trial court was directed to proceed with adjudication in accordance with law. The parties were instructed to appear before the lower court on August 18, 2025.

Law Settled in This Case: This case settles that suits for trademark infringement, when qualifying as commercial disputes under Section 2(1)(c)(xvii) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, can be entertained by Commercial Courts constituted at the Civil Judge (Senior Division) level, provided they fall within the pecuniary jurisdiction specified by state notifications issued in consultation with the high court. It establishes the overriding effect of the Commercial Courts Act over Section 134 of the Trademarks Act, 1999, interpreting "District Court" broadly to include designated subordinate courts. The decision reinforces the legislative intent to expedite commercial resolutions by expanding access to lower-level specialized courts, ensuring that jurisdictional hierarchies under traditional civil laws yield to the specialized framework for commercial matters.

Case Title: Khemka Food Products Pvt. Ltd. Vs. I.S.D.S. Private Limited and Others

Date of Order: August 8, 2025

Case Number: Commercial Appeal No. 14 of 2024

Neutral Citation: 2025:JHHC:22504-DB

Name of Court: High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi

Name of Judge: Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Chief Justice, and Sujit Narayan Prasad, Judge

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Sabmiller India Ltd. Vs Jagpin Breweries Ltd

Infringement and Passing Off Involving Numerals: Haywards 5000 Vs Cox 5001

Introduction: This case involves a trademark infringement and passing off dispute in the beer industry, where the plaintiff sought to protect its well-established brand "HAYWARDS 5000" against the defendant's use of "COX 5001." The Bombay High Court examined the deceptive similarity between the marks, focusing on the numeral "5000" as an essential feature, and addressed issues like disclaimers, prior user, and suppression of facts. Decided in 2014, the judgment reinforces principles of trademark law, particularly regarding the protectability of numerals in composite marks and the limited role of disclaimers. It highlights the court's approach to granting interim injunctions in cases of registered trademarks, emphasizing prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable harm.

Factual Background: The plaintiff, Sabmiller India Ltd., is the proprietor of the trademarks "HAYWARDS 5000" (registered under No. 436744 in Class 32 since 1983) and "FIVE THOUSAND" (registered under No. 1521743 in Class 32), both for beer. The plaintiff and its predecessors have continuously used "HAYWARDS 5000" prominently on labels, achieving significant sales and promotional expenses, establishing goodwill. The defendant, Jagpin Breweries Ltd., began using "COX 5001" on beer labels, which the plaintiff discovered in September 2011. Prior litigation between the parties included a 2006 suit where the court restrained the defendant from using "COX 5000," and a 2011 Madras High Court order against the defendant for infringing the plaintiff's bottle design. The defendant challenged the plaintiff's registration before the Intellectual Property Appellate Board but lost, and no appeal was filed. The plaintiff alleged that "COX 5001" was deceptively similar, misleading consumers and trading on its reputation.

Procedural Background: The plaintiff filed Suit No. 56 of 2012 in the Bombay High Court for infringement and passing off, along with Notice of Motion No. 92 of 2012 seeking interim injunctions. On January 13, 2012, the court granted an ex parte ad interim injunction restraining the defendant from using "COX 5001." The defendant sought vacation, but the court confirmed the injunction on February 7, 2012. The defendant's appeal (No. 189 of 2012) was dismissed on August 28, 2012. In February 2013, the court granted leave to combine passing off with infringement claims. The notice of motion was heard, with arguments on deceptive similarity, disclaimers, suppression, and delay, leading to the final order on February 6, 2014.

Core Dispute: The primary issue was whether the defendant's "COX 5001" infringed the plaintiff's registered trademarks "HAYWARDS 5000" and "FIVE THOUSAND" and amounted to passing off, given the prominence of the numeral "5000." The plaintiff argued deceptive similarity in visual, phonetic, and structural aspects, claiming exclusive rights without disclaimer on "5000." The defendant contended that "5000" was descriptive, disclaimed, common to trade, and that the plaintiff suppressed facts, delayed action, and abandoned the mark. Additional disputes included jurisdiction (later withdrawn), balance of convenience, and whether prior litigation barred the suit.

Discussion on Judgments: The plaintiff relied on De Cordova v. Vick Chemical Co. (1951) 68 RPC 103 to argue that rival marks must be compared as a whole, focusing on essential features like the numeral "5000." Reckitt & Colman of India Ltd. v. Wockhardt Limited (unreported, Bombay High Court, Appeal No. 1180 of 1981, decided July 8, 1992) was cited in the context of holistic comparison of marks to establish deceptive similarity. Shaw Wallace & Co. Ltd. v. Mohan Rocky Spring Water Breweries Ltd. (2006) 3 Bom CR 252 was referenced to support that "5000" is distinctive and not disclaimed, as the Registrar specifies disclaimers for numerals explicitly. Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhat Shah (2002) 3 SCC 65 was invoked to outline the elements of passing off—reputation, misrepresentation, and damage—asserting the plaintiff's mark's goodwill. Satyam Infoway Ltd. v. Sifynet Solutions Pvt. Ltd. (2004) 6 SCC 145 was used to contend no need for proving mala fide intent, only likelihood of confusion. Poddar Tyres Ltd. v. Bedrock Sales Corporation Ltd. (1993) PTC 253 was cited to argue that in registered trademark cases, balance of convenience plays a minimal role. SKOL Breweries Ltd. v. Som Distilleries & Breweries Ltd. (2012) 49 PTC 231 (Bom) and SKOL Breweries Ltd. v. Fortune Alcobrew Pvt. Ltd. (2012) 50 PTC 413 (Bom) were relied upon to affirm that substantial use of a registered mark, even with variations, constitutes deemed use, and disclaimers do not cover essential numerals unless specified. Registrar of Trade Marks v. Ashok Chandra Rakhit Ltd. (1955) 2 SCR 252 was discussed in the context of disclaimers' purpose, distinguishing it as not applying to non-descriptive numerals. Shaw Wallace & Co. Ltd. v. Castle Douglas Industries Ltd. (unreported, Bombay High Court, Notice of Motion No. 1259 of 1994, decided June 20, 1996) was used to establish "5000" as essential despite disclaimers in similar marks. Shaw Wallace & Co. Ltd. v. Superior Industries Ltd. (2003) 27 PTC 63 (Del) supported that numerals like "5000" can acquire distinctiveness through use. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Ltd. AIR 1960 SC 142 was cited to argue that mere registration does not prove use, dismissing the defendant's reliance on other numeral marks. The defendant invoked S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath (1994) 1 SCC 1 on suppression of facts, contending the plaintiff hid applications and oppositions. Shelke Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. Rasiklal Manikchand Dhariwal (2010) 3 All MR 667 was relied upon to claim "5000" is common to trade, but the court distinguished it on facts of dissimilarity. S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. State of Bihar (2004) 7 SCC 166 was used to define material suppression affecting merits.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:The judge compared the marks holistically, finding "5001" deceptively similar to "5000" visually and phonetically, likely causing confusion in beer sales. He rejected the disclaimer argument, holding it applied only to descriptive matter, not the distinctive numeral "5000," as the Registrar specifies numeral disclaimers explicitly. Citing prior rulings, he affirmed "5000" as essential and protectable. On passing off, the judge found the plaintiff's extensive use established reputation, with the defendant's mark misrepresenting origin and damaging goodwill. He dismissed suppression claims, deeming alleged facts irrelevant to the suit's registered marks. Delay defenses were rejected due to dishonest adoption, and jurisdiction was upheld under the Trade Marks Act. Balance of convenience favored the plaintiff, given long user since 1983 versus the defendant's unsubstantiated claims, with irreparable harm from continued infringement.

Final Decision: The court made the notice of motion absolute, granting temporary injunctions restraining the defendant from using "COX 5001" or any mark with "5001" deceptively similar to "HAYWARDS 5000," for infringement and passing off in beer sales.

Law Settled in This Case: This judgment settles that numerals in composite trademarks can be distinctive and protectable if not explicitly disclaimed, with disclaimers limited to descriptive matter unless specified. It reinforces holistic mark comparison, emphasizing essential features, and deems substantial use of registered marks as valid despite minor variations. In passing off, likelihood of confusion suffices without proving intent, and delay or acquiescence defenses fail against dishonest adoption. Suppression must involve material facts affecting merits, and mere registration of similar marks does not prove use or commonality without evidence.

Case Title: Sabmiller India Ltd. Vs Jagpin Breweries Ltd.

Date of Order: 06.02.2014

Case Number: Notice of Motion No. 92 of 2012 in Suit No. 56 of 2012

Neutral Citation: 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 4842

Name of Court: High Court of Bombay

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Kathawalla S.J., J.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Rajeev Agrawal Vs The State of Madhya Pradesh

Framing Charges in Trademark Infringement Cases

Introduction:This case study examines a set of criminal revision petitions adjudicated by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior, addressing the contentious issue of framing charges in a trademark and copyright infringement case involving the misuse of the brand "Bhatia Masale." The petitions, arising from a common order dated February 24, 2025, passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Vijaypur, involve challenges by the accused against the charges framed under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and the Copyright Act, 1957, as well as a plea by the complainant to include additional charges. 

Factual Background: The complainant, Rajkumar Bhatia, operates a business under the brand "Bhatia Masale" and lodged a written complaint with the Station House Officer (SHO) in Veerpur, alleging that Gopal Soni was misusing his brand, trademark, and copyrights by selling counterfeit "Bhatia Masale" products, thereby misleading the public and damaging the complainant's goodwill. Following the investigation, based on a memorandum statement under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act provided by Gopal Soni, additional individuals—Rakesh Singhal, Rajeev Agrawal, and Bobby Goyal—were implicated as co-accused. The investigation revealed that the accused had fabricated packaging materials mimicking "Bhatia Masale," and samples seized were found to be sub-standard and unsafe by Cali Labs Private Limited. Consequently, a charge-sheet was filed, leading to the framing of charges against the accused for offenses including cheating, forgery, and violations of intellectual property laws.

Procedural Background:The case originated from a sessions trial (No. 44/2024) before the Additional Sessions Judge, Vijaypur, District Sheopur, where charges were framed on February 24, 2025, under Sections 420, 420/34, 468, 468/34, 469, 469/34, 471, 471/34, 473, 473/34, and 201 of the IPC, along with Sections 102(2)(B)/103(a) and 104 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and Section 63 of the Copyright Act, 1957. Aggrieved by this order, Rajeev Agrawal (CRR No. 1519/2025) and Gopal and others (CRR No. 1653/2025) filed criminal revision petitions, seeking discharge and arguing that the trial court erred in framing charges due to insufficient prima facie evidence. Concurrently, the complainant, Rajkumar Bhatia (CRR No. 1273/2025), filed a revision petition challenging the trial court's decision to drop charges under Sections 272, 273, and 467 of the IPC, requesting their inclusion based on evidence gathered during the investigation. The High Court heard all three petitions together, given their common origin, and delivered a consolidated order on August 5, 2025.

Core Dispute:  The central dispute in these revision petitions revolved around the propriety of the trial court's order on framing charges. 

The accused petitioners contended that the charge-sheet lacked sufficient prima facie evidence to justify charges, particularly since no incriminating articles were recovered from their possession, and they were not named in the initial FIR. They argued that the confessional statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act was inadmissible and that the essential ingredients for the charged offenses, such as cheating or forgery, were absent. 

Conversely, the complainant argued that the trial court erred in excluding charges under Sections 272, 273, and 467 of the IPC, asserting that evidence of forged packaging and sub-standard products supported these charges. The court was tasked with determining whether the trial court correctly assessed the prima facie evidence at the charge-framing stage and whether additional charges under Section 467 were warranted.

Discussion on Judgments: The court and parties relied on several judicial precedents to frame their arguments. The accused petitioners cited Vikram Kakati v. The State of Assam, CRA No. 1140/2022, decided by the Supreme Court on August 4, 2022, to support their plea for discharge. However, the court found this precedent inapplicable, as no application for discharge under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) had been filed by the petitioners, rendering the cited judgment irrelevant to the revision petitions. The court, on its own, referred to two Supreme Court decisions to guide its analysis of the charge-framing stage. In Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. NCT of Delhi), (2009) 16 SCC 605, the Supreme Court held that at the charge-framing stage, the court must evaluate the material and documents to ascertain if the facts, taken at face value, disclose the ingredients of the alleged offenses, without accepting the prosecution's claims as gospel truth or aiming to determine the likelihood of conviction. Similarly, in Bhawna Bai v. Ghanshyam and others, 2020 CRLJ 2092, the Supreme Court emphasized that the trial court is not required to conduct an elaborate inquiry at this stage, and only a prima facie case needs to be established. These precedents shaped the court's approach to assessing the sufficiency of evidence for framing charges.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge:The judge commenced by addressing the complainant's revision petition (CRR No. 1273/2025) seeking additional charges under Sections 272, 273, and 467 of the IPC. For Section 467, which pertains to forgery of valuable securities or documents facilitating property transfer, the court noted that the investigation revealed prima facie evidence of the accused fabricating packaging materials in the name of "Bhatia Masale," which could be used for delivering movable property. The test report from Cali Labs confirming the sub-standard and unsafe nature of the seized samples further supported this finding. The judge concluded that the trial court erred in omitting the charge under Section 467, as sufficient evidence existed to frame it. However, for Sections 272 and 273, which deal with adulteration and sale of noxious food or drink, the court found no prima facie evidence of the necessary ingredients, upholding the trial court's decision to exclude these charges. Turning to the accused's revision petitions (CRR Nos. 1519/2025 and 1653/2025), the judge applied the principles from Chitresh Kumar Chopra and Bhawna Bai, emphasizing that the charge-framing stage requires only a prima facie assessment of evidence, not a detailed evaluation of the defense. The charge-sheet, supported by the test report and other documents, provided sufficient grounds to presume the accused committed the charged offenses. The judge rejected the accused's contentions regarding the inadmissibility of the Section 27 statement and lack of recovery, noting that such defenses could only be examined after the prosecution presented its evidence during trial. The limited scope of inquiry at this stage, as guided by Supreme Court precedents, justified upholding the trial court's framing of charges.

Final Decision: The High Court partly allowed Criminal Revision No. 1273/2025 filed by Rajkumar Bhatia, directing the trial court to frame an additional charge under Section 467 of the IPC against the accused, based on prima facie evidence of forgery. However, it dismissed the request to include charges under Sections 272 and 273 of the IPC due to insufficient evidence. The revision petitions filed by Rajeev Agrawal (CRR No. 1519/2025) and Gopal and others (CRR No. 1653/2025) were dismissed, affirming the trial court's order framing charges under Sections 420, 420/34, 468, 468/34, 469, 469/34, 471, 471/34, 473, 473/34, and 201 of the IPC, and Sections 102(2)(B)/103(a), 104 of the Trade Marks Act, and Section 63 of the Copyright Act. The court clarified that the trial court should conduct the trial independently, without being influenced by the High Court's observations, and in accordance with the law.

Law Settled in This Case: This case reinforces the principle that at the charge-framing stage in a criminal trial, the court's role is confined to assessing whether prima facie evidence exists to presume the accused committed the alleged offenses, without delving into the merits of the defense or conducting an elaborate inquiry. It affirms the applicability of this principle in intellectual property disputes involving trademark and copyright violations, where evidence such as forged packaging and sub-standard products can justify charges under the IPC and relevant statutes. The decision clarifies that charges under Section 467 of the IPC for forgery can be framed when investigation reveals fabrication of materials intended for property delivery, even if not explicitly named in the initial complaint. Additionally, it underscores that defenses, such as the inadmissibility of confessional statements or lack of recovery, are to be evaluated during trial, not at the preliminary stage, aligning with Supreme Court precedents on the limited scope of charge-framing inquiries.

Case Title: Rajeev Agrawal Vs The State of Madhya Pradesh

Date of Order: 05.08.2025

Case Number: CRR No. 1519/2025

Neutral Citation: 2025:MPHC-GWL:16599

Name of Court: High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Gwalior

Name of  Hon'ble Judge: Anil Verma, J.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Naga Limited Vs Mr Cherukuri Gopi Chand

Introduction: This case revolves around a dispute under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, where the plaintiff sought remedies against alleged groundless threats issued by the defendant concerning the use of the trademark "ANAGANAGA." The defendant, in response, applied for a summary dismissal of the suit, arguing that the plaintiff's claims lacked merit and did not warrant a full trial. The Madras High Court adjudicated the matter by examining the scope of Section 142 of the Trade Marks Act, which deals with groundless threats of legal proceedings for trademark infringement. The judgment provides clarity on whether statements made in opposition proceedings before the Registrar of Trade Marks can be construed as actionable threats under this provision. It also underscores the application of summary judgment principles in commercial disputes, emphasizing expeditious disposal where claims have no real prospect of success.

Factual Background: The plaintiff, Mr. Cherukuri Gopi Chand, trading as ANAGANAGA, operates in the restaurant business and applied for registration of the trademark "ANAGANAGA" and its variants in relevant classes, including those pertaining to hospitality services. The defendant, Naga Limited, holds registrations for the trademark "NAGA" in multiple classes, including Class 43, which covers restaurant services. Upon advertisement of the plaintiff's trademark applications, the defendant filed notices of opposition before the Registrar of Trade Marks, asserting that the plaintiff's mark was deceptively similar to "NAGA" and that its use constituted infringement. These notices also mentioned potential initiation of criminal proceedings under Sections 102 and 103 of the Trade Marks Act. The plaintiff claimed no evidence of commercial use by the defendant in similar services and argued that the oppositions were an abuse of process. The defendant, on the other hand, maintained that it had not issued any threats outside the opposition proceedings and saw no need for an infringement suit due to the plaintiff's lack of proven commercial use.

Procedural Background:The plaintiff instituted the suit under Sections 134 and 142 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, seeking declarations that its mark was dissimilar to the defendant's, that the threats were groundless, a permanent injunction against further interference, and damages of Rs. 5,00,000 for business losses. Along with the suit, the plaintiff filed applications for interim relief. The defendant responded by filing an application under Order XIV Rule 8 of the Original Side Rules read with Order XIIIA of the Code of Civil Procedure (as amended by the Commercial Courts Act, 2015) for summary dismissal of the suit. Arguments were advanced by both parties, with the defendant relying on the notices of opposition not qualifying as threats, and the plaintiff contending that statements within those notices fell within the ambit of Section 142. The court heard the matter and delivered the judgment on the summary dismissal application.

Core Dispute: The central issue in this case was whether the statements made by the defendant in the notices of opposition to the plaintiff's trademark applications constituted "groundless threats" under Section 142(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, thereby entitling the plaintiff to declarations, injunctions, and damages?

The plaintiff argued that assertions of infringement and threats of criminal proceedings in the oppositions amounted to unjustifiable interference with its business. The defendant countered that opposition proceedings are legitimate legal actions under Section 21 of the Act, initiated by "any person," and do not fall within the scope of threats as contemplated by Section 142, which targets pre-litigation communications like circulars or advertisements. 

Additionally, the dispute extended to whether the suit merited summary dismissal under Order XIIIA of the Code of Civil Procedure, on the grounds that the plaintiff had no real prospect of succeeding on any of the claimed reliefs.

Discussion on Judgments: The parties and the court referred to several precedents to support their positions on the interpretation of Section 142 and the propriety of summary judgment. The defendant relied on Chartered Institute of Taxation v. Institute of Chartered Tax Advisers of India Limited, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 11952, particularly paragraphs 3 to 6, 15, and 16, to argue that filing notices of opposition initiates legal proceedings and cannot be construed as a threat of proceedings under Section 142(1), as the provision applies only to threats of initiating actions, not to actions already commenced. The plaintiff cited Sidharth Wheels Private Limited v. Bedrock Limited and another, 1987 SCC OnLine Del 365, to contend that the expression "or otherwise" in Section 142(1) should be construed broadly and not ejusdem generis with "circulars" and "advertisements," thereby encompassing statements in opposition notices as threats, regardless of whether they are public communications. The plaintiff also invoked Dhaval Diyora v. Union of India and others, 2021 (4) Mh. Law Journal 282, especially paragraphs 33 to 35, to assert that opposition proceedings could amount to an abuse of process warranting judicial interference, particularly when the opponent lacks registrations in relevant classes or engages in similar business. The court, in its analysis, drew from its own prior decision in Godaddy.com LLC and others v. Puravankara Projects Limited, 2022 (91) PTC 440 (Mad), to outline non-exhaustive principles for granting summary judgment under Order XIIIA, emphasizing the need to assess whether the plaintiff has a real prospect of success and whether there are compelling reasons for a trial.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: The judge began by examining the scope of Section 142 of the Trade Marks Act, noting that it provides remedies against unjustified threats of infringement proceedings, but only where such threats are communicated through circulars, advertisements, or otherwise, without having initiated actual proceedings. Agreeing with the broad interpretation of "or otherwise" from Sidharth Wheels, the judge clarified that while it covers various modes of communication, it does not extend to statements in pleadings of ongoing legal proceedings like opposition notices, as these are part of initiated actions under Section 21. The judge reasoned that opposition proceedings are statutory legal processes before the Registrar, where the plaintiff can defend itself and challenge the oppositions as abusive, and any determination of their merit lies exclusively with the Registrar or appellate authorities. Allowing the suit to proceed would impede the Registrar's statutory functions. On the summary judgment application, applying principles from Godaddy.com, the judge assessed each relief claimed: the declaration of dissimilarity would preempt the Registrar's decision on deceptive similarity; the declaration against threats failed as opposition statements are not threats; the injunction lacked basis absent other communications; and damages were contingent on the other reliefs. Concluding that the plaintiff had no real prospect of success and that the issues were predominantly legal without need for oral evidence, the judge found no compelling reason for a trial.

Final Decision: The court allowed the defendant's application for summary judgment, dismissing the suit in its entirety. The plaintiff's applications for interim relief were consequently closed. While acknowledging that the defendant would ordinarily be entitled to costs, the court directed that each party bear its own costs, considering the ongoing opposition proceedings where the plaintiff might still prevail and the expeditious dismissal of the suit filed in the same year.

Law Settled in This Case: This judgment settles that statements asserting infringement or threatening further action, when made within notices of opposition under Section 21 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, do not constitute "groundless threats" under Section 142(1), as they form part of initiated legal proceedings rather than mere threats of proceedings. It reinforces that the expression "or otherwise" in Section 142(1), while broad, excludes pleadings in pending statutory processes, preserving the exclusive jurisdiction of the Registrar of Trade Marks to evaluate such oppositions. The case also affirms the robust application of summary judgment under Order XIIIA of the Code of Civil Procedure in commercial trademark disputes, where suits based solely on opposition proceedings have no real prospect of success and can be dismissed without trial to promote expeditious justice.

Case Title: Naga Limited Vs Mr Cherukuri Gopi Chand

Date of Order: 16.07.2025

Case Number: A.No.2583 of 2025 in C.S.(Comm.Div.) No.92 of 2025

Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras

Name of  Hon'ble Judge: Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy, J.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Mohak Mangal Vs Ani Media Pvt. Ltd.

Mohak Mangal Vs Ani Media Pvt. Ltd.: 25.07.2025:TRP (C) 116 of 2025:Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

The Delhi High Court, presided over by Hon’ble Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora, addressed a petition filed by Mohak Mangal seeking the transfer of a commercial suit (CS(COMM) No. 447/2025) from the Patiala House Courts to the Delhi High Court. This suit was filed by ANI Media Pvt. Ltd. against Mohak Mangal and another party, alleging copyright and trademark infringement related to videos published by the petitioner. ANI Media had earlier filed a similar suit (CS(COMM) No. 573/2025) before the Delhi High Court, involving overlapping issues and some common videos.

The petitioner argued that both suits involve identical parties, overlapping issues of fact and law, and common documentary evidence, and thus should be consolidated to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and conflicting decisions. The petitioner also refuted the respondent’s claim about the High Court’s lack of jurisdiction under Section 15(5) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, citing precedents and rules that preserve the High Court’s power under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) to transfer suits for efficient adjudication.

The Court found merit in the petitioner’s submissions, noting the overlapping issues, defendants, and evidence in both suits. It held that hearing both suits together would serve judicial economy and convenience of the parties, particularly since the petitioner is an individual whose defense would be burdened by multiple forums. The Court also clarified the inapplicability of Section 15(5) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, to the facts of this case, affirming its jurisdiction to transfer the matter under Section 24 CPC and Rule 26 of the Delhi High Court Intellectual Property Rights Division Rules, 2022.

Consequently, the Court ordered transfer of suit no. 2 (CS(COMM) No. 447/2025) to itself for consolidation with suit no. 1 (CS(COMM) No. 573/2025) to be heard collectively. The petition for transfer was disposed of accordingly.

Lucas TVS Limited v. FFC Impex

The presumption of service under Rule 18(3) of Trademark Rule for email communications is rebuttable

Introduction:The case of Lucas TVS Limited versus FFC Impex and Another represents a pivotal trademark dispute adjudicated by the Madras High Court, focusing on procedural compliance under the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, and the principles of natural justice in trademark opposition proceedings. The dispute arose when the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks allowed the opponent, FFC Impex, an opportunity to file evidence despite a lack of proof of service of the counter statement, prompting Lucas TVS to challenge the decision as a violation of statutory timelines. 

Factual Background:Lucas TVS Limited, a Chennai-based company renowned for its automotive electrical components, filed Trademark Application No. 4912372 on March 19, 2021, seeking registration of a device mark associated with starting devices and motors, claiming use since January 21, 1963. The mark was accepted for advertisement and published in Trade Marks Journal No. 2001 on May 24, 2021. FFC Impex, a Delhi-based entity, lodged a notice of opposition on August 14, 2021, challenging the registration. Lucas TVS responded by filing a counter statement on October 14, 2021. According to Rule 45 of the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, FFC Impex was required to file evidence in support of its opposition within two months from the service of the counter statement. However, FFC Impex claimed it never received the counter statement, supported by an affidavit and the correspondence/notice history from the Trade Marks Registry’s portal, which did not reflect the dispatch of the counter statement. Following a hearing on November 19, 2024, the Assistant Registrar issued an order on December 6, 2024, directing fresh service of the counter statement and allowing FFC Impex to file evidence, prompting Lucas TVS to appeal the decision before the Madras High Court.

Procedural Background: The appeal, filed as CMA(TM) No. 6 of 2025 with C.M.P. No. 8235 of 2025, was brought under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, by Lucas TVS against the Assistant Registrar’s order dated December 6, 2024. Lucas TVS sought to set aside the order and direct the Registrar to process its trademark application for registration, arguing that FFC Impex’s failure to file evidence within the stipulated period under Rule 45 constituted abandonment of the opposition. The first respondent, FFC Impex, was served notice but did not appear, leading to it being set ex parte on June 24, 2025. The second respondent, the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks, Chennai, defended the impugned order, asserting that no proof of actual service of the counter statement existed. The Madras High Court, presided over by Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy, heard arguments from Ms. Aanchal M. Nichani for the appellant and Mr. Rajesh Vivekananthan, Deputy Solicitor General, for the Registrar. The court examined the procedural history, including the filing of the counter statement, the opponent’s affidavit, and the Registrar’s portal records, before delivering its judgment on July 22, 2025.

Core Dispute:The core dispute centered on whether the Assistant Registrar’s decision to allow FFC Impex additional time to file evidence, despite the lack of proof of service of the counter statement, was justified under the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, and principles of natural justice. 

Lucas TVS argued that Rule 45(2) deems an opposition abandoned if evidence is not filed within two months from the service of the counter statement, and Rule 18(3) presumes service if an email is sent to the provided email ID. The appellant contended that the Registrar failed to verify successful email transmission and improperly relied on FFC Impex’s affidavit and incomplete correspondence history, which may not reflect all dispatched documents. The Registrar, however, maintained that without evidence of actual service, the timeline for filing evidence had not commenced, and allowing FFC Impex an opportunity to respond was in the interest of justice, causing no prejudice to Lucas TVS. The court had to determine whether the Registrar’s decision was procedurally sound and whether the prolonged pendency of the trademark application warranted judicial intervention.

Discussion on Judgments: The judgment does not explicitly cite specific case law from the parties, as the arguments primarily focused on the interpretation of statutory provisions under the Trade Marks Rules, 2017, specifically Rules 18 and 45. Lucas TVS relied on Rule 18(3), which establishes a presumption of service for email communications sent to the email ID provided by a party, arguing that this presumption should have been upheld unless FFC Impex provided conclusive evidence to rebut it. The appellant also invoked Rule 45(2), which states that failure to file evidence within two months from service of the counter statement results in the opposition being deemed abandoned. The Registrar’s counsel, however, emphasized the operative portion of the impugned order, which referenced Rule 45’s requirement of actual service to trigger the evidence-filing timeline. No direct judicial precedents were cited in the judgment, as the dispute hinged on procedural compliance and evidentiary assessment rather than contested legal interpretations requiring case law. The court’s analysis implicitly drew on principles of natural justice, akin to those in administrative law cases, where fairness demands an opportunity to respond, as seen in the Registrar’s reliance on FFC Impex’s affidavit and portal records to conclude non-service.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy’s reasoning balanced the strict procedural framework of the Trade Marks Rules with the principles of natural justice. He acknowledged Lucas TVS’s contention that Rule 18(3) presumes service of an email sent to the opponent’s provided email ID, which would trigger the two-month period under Rule 45 for filing evidence. However, he noted that FFC Impex’s affidavit, supported by the Trade Marks Registry’s correspondence/notice history, indicated no record of the counter statement’s dispatch. The judge recognized the appellant’s argument that the Registry’s portal might not comprehensively log all communications, suggesting potential technical deficiencies. Nevertheless, he found the Registrar’s conclusion—that no proof of actual service existed—reasonable, given the evidence on record, including the opponent’s affidavit and portal data. The court emphasized that the timeline for filing evidence under Rule 45 only begins upon actual service, and without such proof, the opposition could not be deemed abandoned. The judge further considered the lack of prejudice to Lucas TVS if FFC Impex were allowed to file evidence, aligning with natural justice principles to ensure both parties have a fair opportunity to present their case. However, he expressed concern over the prolonged pendency of the trademark application, filed in March 2021 and unresolved for over four years, justifying a directive for expeditious disposal to prevent further delay.

Final Decision: The Madras High Court disposed of CMA(TM) No. 6 of 2025 on July 22, 2025, declining to interfere with the Assistant Registrar’s order dated December 6, 2024. The court directed the Assistant Registrar to consider and dispose of Opposition No. 1119112 and Trademark Application No. 4912372 within three months from the receipt of the order, ensuring a reasonable opportunity for both Lucas TVS and FFC Impex to present their cases. No costs were awarded, and the connected miscellaneous petition was closed.

Law Settled in This Case: This judgment reinforces the importance of verifying actual service of critical documents in trademark opposition proceedings under the Trade Marks Rules, 2017. It clarifies that the presumption of service under Rule 18(3) for email communications is rebuttable, and the absence of proof of dispatch, corroborated by affidavits and Registry records, can justify extending opportunities to file evidence. The decision underscores that Rule 45’s timeline for evidence submission is contingent on actual service, and failure to prove such service prevents deeming an opposition abandoned. It also highlights the judiciary’s role in balancing procedural strictness with natural justice, ensuring fairness without unduly prejudicing applicants. Furthermore, the case establishes that courts may intervene to expedite long-pending trademark applications, promoting efficiency in the registration process while safeguarding equitable principles.

Case Title: Lucas TVS Limited v. FFC Impex and Another

Date of Order: 22nd July, 2025

Case Number: CMA(TM) No. 6 of 2025

Name of Court: High Court of Judicature at Madras

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy J.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

L & T Finance Limited versus www.aadharcash.com

The case titled "L & T Finance Limited versus www.aadharcash.com & Ors" was heard by the Delhi High Court on July 28, 2025, in CS(COMM) 752/2025, presided over by Justice Tejas Karia .

The plaintiff, L & T Finance Limited, filed a suit for permanent injunction against defendants alleged to be infringing its trademarks, copyrights, and passing off its services through identical and deceptive websites mimicking the plaintiff’s original website, which has been in existence since 1998 and is highly recognized .

The defendants were using similar website layouts, graphics, trade marks, and even the Plaintiff’s brand ambassador, Jasprit Bumrah, indicating an intent for monetary gain by deception and infringing upon the Plaintiff’s intellectual property rights .

Procedurally, the Court issued notices to the defendants, granted interim relief including orders to suspend the domain names www.aadharcash.com and www.aadharcredit.com, and directed the disclosure of registrant details and payment information by the defendants’ registrars .

The Court observed that the defendants deliberately mimicked the plaintiff’s website, which caused irreparable harm and confusion among users, warranting an ex parte ad-interim injunction to prevent further infringement and deception .

The Court further directed the defendants to lock the domains, disclose registrant details, and comply with procedural rules within specified timeframes, with a hearing scheduled for October 17, 2025, to review compliance and progress .

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi 

Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

JK India Eagritech Limited Vs Meera Trade Fair Media Private Limited

The case titled "JK India Eagritech Limited vs Meera Trade Fair Media Private Limited" (CS(COMM) 767/2025) was filed in the Delhi High Court. The order was passed on July 30, 2025 by Hon'ble Justice Tejas Karia 

The core dispute involves the alleged infringement of trademarks "BioEnergy Times," "ChiniMandi," and related marks, where the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants used deceptively similar marks leading to consumer confusion and unfair trade practices. The plaintiffs, being the prior users and registered owners of these trademarks, sought permanent injunction and other reliefs.

Procedurally, the plaintiffs filed an urgent suit seeking interim injunctions, exemption from pre-litigation mediation, and exemption from pre-service requirements. The court granted these requests, allowed the suit to be registered, and directed the defendants to respond within four weeks.

The court issued interim relief including a temporary ban on the defendants' use of infringing marks during the pendency of the suit while permitting ongoing conferences to continue with compliance. The court also disposed of procedural applications related to service and document filing.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi 

Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Indmoney Tech Private Limited & Anr. Vs. Ashok Kumar

Indmoney Tech Private Limited & Anr. Vs. Ashok Kumar & Ors.:28.07.2025: CS(COMM) 744/2025: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

Facts: Plaintiffs, engaged in providing financial services under registered trademarks “INDmoney” and “INDstocks”, alleged that Defendant No. 1, whose true identity was unknown and described as “Ashok Kumar”, was infringing their trademarks and copyrights by operating rogue websites, fake mobile apps, and fraudulent social media groups. Defendant No. 1 impersonated the plaintiffs’ founder and other reputed individuals, luring the public into fraudulent investment schemes, and collected funds through multiple bank accounts.

Procedural Background: Plaintiffs filed a commercial suit seeking permanent injunction for trademark infringement, passing off, and copyright infringement, along with interim relief. Several domain registrars, social media platforms, app stores, telecom authorities, and banks were arrayed as pro forma defendants to aid in blocking infringing content and tracing the perpetrators. Plaintiffs also sought exemption from pre-institution mediation and leave to file additional documents.

Core Dispute: Whether the plaintiffs were entitled to urgent interim injunctions restraining Defendant No. 1 and associated entities from infringing their intellectual property, misrepresenting association with plaintiffs, and defrauding the public.

Decision: The Court found prima facie case in plaintiffs’ favour, holding that Defendant No. 1’s acts infringed plaintiffs’ trademarks and copyrights and caused irreparable harm. Interim directions were issued restraining Defendant No. 1 from using plaintiffs’ marks or copyrighted content, ordering blocking/suspension of rogue domains, mobile apps, WhatsApp/Telegram groups, and freezing related bank accounts. Directions were also issued to concerned authorities for disclosure of details and status reports from cyber police.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

Communication Components Antenna Inc. Vs. Ace Technologies Corp. and Ors.

Interim Safeguards in IP Litigation: Balancing Jurisdiction and Financial Security

Introduction:  The case of Communication Components Antenna Inc. versus Ace Technologies Corp. and Others represents a significant judicial pronouncement by the Delhi High Court in the realm of intellectual property law, specifically patent infringement in a cross-border context. This dispute centers on allegations that Ace Technologies, a South Korean company, infringed upon the plaintiff’s Indian Patent No. 240893, which pertains to innovative antenna technology designed to enhance spectral efficiency in cellular networks. The plaintiff, a Canadian entity, sought to protect its patent rights against defendants with limited presence in India, raising complex issues of jurisdiction, enforcement, and interim relief. The case underscores the challenges of safeguarding intellectual property rights when foreign entities with minimal Indian assets are involved and highlights the strategic use of the court’s inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) to ensure justice in such scenarios. 

Factual Background: Communication Components Antenna Inc., a Canadian company specializing in cellular base station products, holds Indian Patent No. 240893, titled “Asymmetrical Beams for Spectrum Efficiency.” This patent covers a novel sector-antenna design that employs asymmetrical beam patterns to enhance subscriber capacity in cellular networks, overcoming limitations of traditional symmetrical sectorization. The plaintiff’s products, including antennas and tower-mounted amplifiers, are designed to optimize cellular base station performance. The primary defendant, Ace Technologies Corp., is a South Korean company manufacturing and selling antennas for the telecommunication industry. Additional defendants include a Hong Kong-based entity, Shin Ah Ltd., and two Indian subsidiaries of Ace Technologies. The plaintiff alleged that Ace Technologies’ antenna models, specifically XXDW-18-33i-IVT-DB8P and XXDH-20-33ie-VT-DB, infringed its patent by replicating the asymmetrical beam technology. The plaintiff claimed it became aware of the infringement in 2017 after comparing beam patterns of the defendants’ antennas with its own, prompted by a cellular operator’s analysis in India’s 4G/LTE network. The plaintiff further asserted that it had shared details of its patented technology with the defendants in prior communications, raising concerns about unauthorized use.

Procedural Background: The plaintiff initiated the suit, CS(COMM) 1222/2018, in the Delhi High Court, seeking a permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from infringing its patent, along with damages or rendition of accounts. An interim application, I.A. 1522/2018, was filed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC for an ad interim injunction. On July 12, 2019, a Single Judge found prima facie infringement, directing the defendants to furnish a bank guarantee of Rs. 40 crores for pre-suit sales (approximately $64.4 million, equating to Rs. 437.96 crores) and deposit Rs. 14.5 crores for sales during the suit’s pendency, failing which an injunction would be enforced. The defendants appealed this order via FAO(OS)(COMM) 186/2019, seeking a stay through CM APPL. 35213/2019. On August 8, 2019, the Division Bench upheld the Single Judge’s order, emphasizing the need to protect the plaintiff’s interests given the defendants’ lack of assets in India. The defendants escalated the matter to the Supreme Court through SLP(C) 21938/2019, which, on September 20, 2019, declined to interfere, affirming the lower court’s reasoning. On April 10, 2023, the Division Bench disposed of the appeal, allowing the defendants to produce the allegedly infringing antenna for expert examination and modifying the deposit requirement to a bank guarantee for 10% of sale proceeds. Amid concerns over Ace Technologies’ financial stability, evidenced by a 64.90% drop in its share value, the plaintiff filed I.A. 36658/2024 under Section 151 of the CPC, seeking a further bank guarantee of Rs. 290 crores, representing 25% of the claimed damages of Rs. 1160 crores. The suit was at the evidence-recording stage before the Joint Registrar when the court pronounced its judgment on July 1, 2025. The defendants challenged this order in the Supreme Court via SLP(C) 20326/2025, listed for hearing on August 1, 2025.

Core Dispute: The central issues in this case revolved around the validity of the plaintiff’s patent, whether the defendants’ antennas infringed it, and the appropriateness of interim financial safeguards given the defendants’ foreign status and limited Indian assets. 

The plaintiff argued that its patent was valid, emphasizing the novelty of asymmetrical beam patterns that enhance spectrum efficiency, and that the defendants’ products replicated this technology, as evidenced by beam pattern comparisons and third-party analyses. The plaintiff further contended that the defendants’ lack of assets in India, coupled with South Korea’s non-reciprocal status under Section 44A of the CPC, posed a risk of unenforceable decrees, necessitating a substantial bank guarantee. 

The defendants countered that the patent was invalid due to prior art and statements made during prosecution of corresponding patents in the USA and EU, which allegedly limited the patent’s scope. They denied infringement, arguing that their antennas’ beam patterns were distinct and that the plaintiff’s evidence, including a comparative chart, was unreliable. They also contested the need for additional financial security, claiming compliance with prior deposits of Rs. 70 crores and asserting financial stability despite ceased Indian operations due to market factors. The court had to determine whether a prima facie case of infringement existed, if the balance of convenience favored interim relief, and whether Section 151 of the CPC could be invoked to protect the plaintiff’s rights in a cross-border context.

Discussion on Judgments: The parties relied on several judgments to bolster their arguments, with citations providing context for their relevance. The plaintiff referenced Communication Components Antenna Inc. v. Mobi Antenna Technologies (Shenzhen) Co. Ltd. & Ors., CS(COMM) 977/2016, CC(COMM) 38/2017 & I.As. 10524/2018, 16746/2021, where the Delhi High Court awarded Rs. 217 crores in damages for infringement of the same patent. The plaintiff used this to highlight the risk of non-recovery against foreign defendants, as the Chinese firm in that case was similarly situated with no enforceable Indian assets, underscoring the need for a substantial bank guarantee. The defendants cited this case to argue it was set aside and thus inapplicable, as noted in Ace Technologies Corp. & Ors. v. Communication Components Antenna Inc., 2023:DHC:2479-DB, where the Division Bench clarified its limited precedential value. The plaintiff also invoked Article 217 of the Korean Civil Procedure Act to argue that South Korea’s lack of a reciprocal enforcement treaty under Section 44A of the CPC justified interim measures, as decrees would be unenforceable abroad. The defendants countered with the same article, asserting it allows enforcement of foreign judgments, negating the need for coercive relief. The defendants relied on Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith, [1982] RPC 193, cited in the context of claim interpretation, to argue that the plaintiff’s patent claims should be construed purposively, not literally, and that amendments in the US patent (US 8311582) did not affect the Indian patent’s scope. The plaintiff used Nokia Technologies v. [unspecified defendant], CS(COMM) 303/2021, I.A. 7700/2021, to distinguish their case, arguing that unlike Nokia, they provided technical proof of infringement through expert reports and third-party evidence. The court’s reliance on these precedents, particularly the Mobi Antenna case for financial risk and Catnic for claim interpretation, shaped its approach to balancing patent protection with jurisdictional challenges.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: Justice Saurabh Banerjee’s reasoning was anchored in a pragmatic application of legal principles to address the complexities of cross-border patent enforcement. He first assessed the patent’s validity, finding that the novelty in asymmetrical beam patterns constituted a patentable improvement over prior art, dismissing the defendants’ challenge based on US and EU prosecution statements as insufficient at the interim stage. On infringement, the court accepted the plaintiff’s expert report and third-party evidence as prima facie proof, drawing an adverse inference from the defendants’ withholding of beam pattern data, critical to assessing infringement. The judge emphasized the holistic comparison required under R.G. Anand v. M/s. Delux Films & Ors., (1978) 4 SCC 118, adapted to patent law, to confirm substantial similarity in the defendants’ products. 

Addressing the jurisdictional challenge, the court noted the defendants’ negligible Indian assets and Ace Technologies’ 65% share value drop, corroborated by an affidavit dated November 12, 2024, indicating exited Indian operations. This heightened the risk of non-recovery, especially given South Korea’s non-reciprocal status under Section 44A of the CPC, despite Article 217’s provisions. The judge invoked Section 151 of the CPC, finding it a necessary tool to prevent the suit’s objective from being rendered futile, as ordinary remedies like Order 38 Rule 5 were inapplicable due to the lack of attachable Indian property. He balanced the plaintiff’s prima facie case, the defendants’ financial instability, and the potential irreparable harm, concluding that a bank guarantee of Rs. 290 crores (25% of the claimed Rs. 1160 crores) was fair, building on the prior Rs. 70 crores deposit. The decision promoted a progressive patent regime while ensuring effective relief.

Final Decision: The Delhi High Court allowed the plaintiff’s application (I.A. 36658/2024), directing Ace Technologies Corp. to deposit Rs. 290 crores, either as a bank guarantee or fixed deposit, within four weeks, in addition to the existing Rs. 70 crores, to secure the plaintiff’s interests pending the suit’s outcome. The court declined to issue an immediate injunction, allowing the defendants to continue sales subject to compliance, reinforcing the interim nature of the relief.

Law Settled in This Case: This judgment solidifies the judiciary’s authority to invoke Section 151 of the CPC in cross-border IP disputes to impose interim financial safeguards when foreign defendants lack enforceable Indian assets, particularly in jurisdictions without reciprocal enforcement treaties. It reaffirms that a prima facie case of patent infringement, coupled with a defendant’s financial instability and jurisdictional challenges, justifies substantial security deposits to prevent decrees from becoming unenforceable. The case clarifies that patent validity assessments at the interim stage focus on novelty and inventive step, dismissing speculative challenges based on foreign prosecution histories unless substantiated. It also underscores the importance of adverse inferences when defendants withhold critical evidence, such as technical data, in infringement disputes. The decision promotes a robust patent enforcement framework, incentivizing innovation by ensuring effective remedies against foreign infringers.

Case Title: Communication Components Antenna Inc. Vs. Ace Technologies Corp. and Ors.

Date of Order: 1st July, 2025

Case Number: CS(COMM) 1222/2018

Neutral Citation: 2025:DHC:5107

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of  Hon'ble Judge: Saurabh Banerjee J.

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Capital Foods Private Limited Vs. Pitambari Products Private Limited

Capital Foods Private Limited Vs. Pitambari Products Private Limited: 28 July 2025: CS(COMM) 754/2025: Hon’ble Ms. Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora

The plaintiff, Capital Foods Private Limited, a company incorporated in 2003 and now part of Tata Consumer Products Limited, claimed ownership of the registered trademark “SCHEZWAN CHUTNEY” adopted in 2012 for its food products. It alleged extensive use, high turnover, and copyright registration in the product trade dress. In June 2025, the plaintiff discovered that the defendant, Pitambari Products Private Limited, was manufacturing and selling products using the identical mark “SCHEZWAN CHUTNEY” and promoting them online. A legal notice dated 4 June 2025 was issued, but the defendant refused to cease use, claiming the mark was descriptive and not protectable. The plaintiff filed the present suit seeking injunction and damages.

Procedurally, the court noted prior orders in favour of the plaintiff in similar cases and that the Division Bench had already observed the mark’s secondary significance. Despite advance service, no one appeared for the defendant. The plaintiff placed both products before the court for comparison.

The core dispute was whether the defendant’s use of the identical mark constituted trademark infringement and passing off against the plaintiff’s registered and well-known mark.

The court found the defendant’s mark identical to the plaintiff’s and held that a prima facie case for infringement was made out. An ad-interim ex parte injunction was granted restraining the defendant from using the mark “SCHEZWAN CHUTNEY” or any deceptively similar mark, clarifying that the order was limited to the mark and did not cover the defendant’s trade dress.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: This information report is intended for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

C. Ganesh Narayan & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka

Intersection of Trademark, Corporate Law, and Municipal Licensing

Introduction: The case of C. Ganesh Narayan & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. before the High Court of Karnataka concerned a challenge to two show cause notices issued by the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP), East Zone, directing the petitioners to explain why their trade licence should not be cancelled. The dispute lay at the intersection of municipal licensing powers, corporate rivalries, and pending litigation before specialist forums such as the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), and the High Court. The petitioners alleged that the notices were the outcome of mala fide interference by a private rival, who was also a family member, and that the BBMP lacked the jurisdiction to adjudicate issues already sub judice before the competent judicial forums.

Factual Background: Petitioner No. 3, C. Krishniah Chetty & Company Private Limited, engaged in the jewellery business, operated from the ground and first floors of “B” Block premises in Bengaluru. Petitioner No. 1, in his personal and representative capacity, was the Director and shareholder of Petitioner No. 3, which was lawfully leased the premises by Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2. The business was duly licensed and registered under municipal laws, GST, VAT, and the Shops and Establishments Act. Respondent No. 4, a cousin of Petitioner No. 1, was a Director in a separate entity, C. Krishniah Chetty & Sons Private Limited, and was embroiled in multiple litigations with the petitioners over control, brand usage, and management of the family-run business. These disputes were pending before the NCLT and NCLAT.

Respondent No. 4 objected to the petitioners operating a competing jewellery showroom in the adjacent “B” Block premises, alleging that such operation violated orders passed by the NCLT. Having failed to secure injunctive relief from the company law forums, Respondent No. 4 lodged complaints with the BBMP authorities. Acting on a complaint dated 2 June 2025, Respondent No. 3, the Medical Officer of BBMP East Zone, issued two notices—dated 11 June 2025 and 18 June 2025—threatening cancellation of the trade licence. The first notice referred to an alleged National Consumer Forum order (which the petitioners stated was fictitious), while the second cited NCLT records as the basis for proposed action.

Procedural Background: The petitioners approached the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking quashing of both notices, arguing that BBMP had no jurisdiction under the BBMP Act, 2020 to entertain disputes of this nature. They relied on Chapter XXII, particularly Sections 307, 308, and 314, which limit municipal authority to suspension or cancellation of trade licences for breaches of licence conditions, safety violations, or byelaw infractions. The petitioners stressed that the dispute was already being adjudicated by the NCLT and that BBMP officials could not act as enforcement agents for such orders.

Respondent No. 4 opposed, relying on NCLT’s orders in I.A. Nos. 5, 6, and 7 of 2020, which expressly restrained the petitioners from operating a competing jewellery store in “B” Block, from using similar domain names, and from engaging in competitive business against the CKC Group. Respondent No. 4 argued that the BBMP had the power to cancel a trade licence for violation of “any law” under licence conditions and Section 307(4) of the BBMP Act.

Core Dispute:The central question before the Court was whether BBMP, through Respondent No. 3, could issue show cause notices for cancellation of a trade licence on the ground that the petitioners had allegedly violated interim injunctions issued by the NCLT, and whether such action was within the scope of the BBMP Act, 2020. This raised subsidiary issues of jurisdiction, procedural fairness, and alleged mala fides arising from the close personal and business rivalry between the parties.

Discussion on Judgments:The petitioners relied on Sri B.R. Srinivas Murthy v. The Commissioner & Ors., W.P. No. 41604/2019, where the Karnataka High Court held that only the Zonal Commissioner, not subordinate officials, could initiate proceedings for suspension or cancellation of trade licences under Section 307(3) of the BBMP Act. They invoked this precedent to argue that Respondent No. 3 had acted without authority.

They also cited a judgment of the Madras High Court under Sections 47 and 57 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, concerning disputes over the “C. Krishniah Chetty” trademark. In that matter, the Court allowed continued use of the mark by the Narayan Group but directed inclusion of the word “Narayan” in parentheses to distinguish its identity, thereby recognising the right to carry on business under a modified name. The petitioners argued that such trademark and corporate identity issues were judicially settled and not for BBMP to revisit.

Respondent No. 4 relied on the composite NCLT order in I.A. Nos. 5, 6, and 7 of 2020, which granted extensive injunctive relief, including an explicit prohibition against operating any competing jewellery store in “B” Block. He argued that breach of these orders constituted violation of “law” and justified BBMP action under Clause 6 of the trade licence conditions and Section 307(4) of the BBMP Act.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Judge: The Court found that the dispute between the parties involved highly complex questions of corporate control, brand identity, and alleged breach of judicial orders, all of which were beyond the remit of municipal authorities under the BBMP Act. The statutory powers under Chapter XXII were confined to regulatory issues such as health, safety, and compliance with municipal byelaws. Enforcement or interpretation of NCLT orders could only be undertaken by the NCLT or other competent judicial bodies, not by BBMP officers.

The Court observed that Respondent No. 4’s remedy for alleged violations lay in moving the NCLT or NCLAT for appropriate enforcement orders. BBMP’s initiation of parallel proceedings was legally impermissible and constituted an excess of jurisdiction.

Procedurally, the Court noted that the first notice gave the petitioners only three days to respond, which was manifestly unreasonable and contrary to principles of natural justice. The issuance of successive notices within a week, both apparently prompted by an interested party engaged in parallel litigation, suggested mala fides. The Court also underscored that Respondent No. 3, being the Medical Officer, lacked statutory authority to initiate such proceedings, which lay within the domain of the Zonal Commissioner.

Final Decision: The High Court allowed the writ petition, quashing the show cause notices dated 11 June 2025 and 18 June 2025 as being without jurisdiction and violative of natural justice. It clarified that Respondent No. 4 remained free to seek enforcement of NCLT’s orders before that Tribunal or other competent forums. All substantive contentions on merits were kept open for adjudication in the appropriate jurisdiction.

Law Settled in This Case: The decision reinforces that municipal authorities under the BBMP Act, 2020 have no jurisdiction to interpret or enforce orders passed by judicial forums such as the NCLT. Their powers to cancel or suspend trade licences are limited to breaches of licence conditions, safety norms, or municipal byelaws. Disputes involving complex corporate, trademark, or contractual rights, particularly when sub judice before specialised tribunals, cannot be adjudicated through municipal licensing proceedings. Procedural fairness, including adequate notice and absence of mala fide influence, is integral to the validity of any administrative action.

Case Title: C. Ganesh Narayan & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka & Ors.

Date of Order: 25 July 2025

Case Number: Writ Petition No. 17893 of 2025 (LB-BMP)

Neutral Citation: Not specified

Name of Court: High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru

Name of Judge: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sachin Shankar Magadum

Disclaimer: The information shared here is intended to serve the public interest by offering insights and perspectives. However, readers are advised to exercise their own discretion when interpreting and applying this information. The content herein is subjective and may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi