Vaishnani Vipul Dalsukhbhai Vs State of Gujarat

Gujarat High Court Rejects Pre-Arrest Bail in Multi-Crore Nal Se Jal Public Welfare Scheme Scam

Case Title : Vaishnani Vipul Dalsukhbhai Vs State of Gujarat

Date of Judgment : 27-07-2026

Case No. : R/Criminal Misc. Application (For Anticipatory Bail) No. 17277 of 2026

Neutral Citation : 2026:GUJHC:17277

Court Name : High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad

Name of Hon'ble Judge : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjeev J. Thaker

Factual and Procedural Background

The applicant, proprietor of M/s Shrinathji Construction Agency, preferred an anticipatory bail application under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 in connection with FIR C.R. No. 11201005250003 of 2025 registered with CID Crime Police Station, Vadodara Zone. The offences alleged fall under Sections 406, 409, 420, 467, 468, 471, 474, 114, and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, alongside Sections 13(1)(a), 13(1)(b), 13(2), and 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The case pertains to multi-crore irregularities in implementing the government's Nal Se Jal scheme designed to deliver potable water to rural households in Mahisagar district. The applicant was awarded pipe-laying and execution work for villages including Bachkariya, Ditvas, Babrol, and Shir. Investigation revealed significant shortfalls in execution, shallower pipeline laying, inflated house connection counts, and the submission of forged invoice records.

Dispute before Court

The main issue before the Court was whether the applicant was entitled to pre-arrest bail under Section 482 of BNSS in a complex economic fraud case involving public funds. The applicant contended that he was innocent, that the dispute was essentially contractual, that documents were already in police possession, and that no custodial interrogation was required. Conversely, the State argued that the applicant colluded in a systematic white-collar crime siphoning off government exchequer funds, submitted fabricated invoices, and required custodial interrogation to unearth the broader multi-agency scam involving 123 crore rupees.

Reasoning of Judge

The Court observed that anticipatory bail is an extraordinary remedy to be granted sparingly, especially in serious economic offences that impact the country's financial health and public exchequer. Examining the investigation records, the Court found specific prima facie evidence showing that the applicant installed shorter pipelines than claimed, laid pipelines at unauthorized shallow depths, provided fewer domestic connections while claiming higher funds, and forged invoice records (such as Kamdhenu Pipes invoice No. 2122/903). Relying on Supreme Court precedents including SFIO v. Aditya Sarda, P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. CBI, and Pratibha Manchanda v. State of Haryana, the Court emphasized that personal liberty under Article 21 must be balanced against societal interest. In sophisticated white-collar crimes undermining public welfare programs, custodial interrogation is vital to conduct a thorough investigation.

Decision

The High Court dismissed the anticipatory bail application and discharged the rule, holding that the applicant failed to make out an exceptional case for pre-arrest protection.

One Important legal principle held in the case

Anticipatory bail cannot be granted as a matter of routine in economic offences involving white-collar fraud and siphoning of public exchequer money, as custodial interrogation is essential to protect larger societal interests and ensure a comprehensive investigation.

[Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation ]

Analytical Legal Overview of the Judgment

Anticipatory Bail in Economic Offences

Introduction:

The discretionary power of courts to grant pre-arrest protection under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 requires a delicate judicial balancing act. While the statutory remedy exists to protect citizens from arbitrary arrest and malicious prosecution, courts must maintain vigilance when public funds and welfare projects are compromised. In a decision concerning public exchequer fraud, the High Court of Gujarat adjudicated an anticipatory bail application filed by a contractor implicated in the alleged multi-crore Nal Se Jal scheme scam in Mahisagar district. The judgment reinforces the established judicial doctrine that economic offences affecting public interest constitute a class apart, where custodial interrogation is often necessary to unearth complex conspiracies.

Factual and Procedural Background:

The controversy stems from an official investigation into the execution of the Nal Se Jal scheme, a flagship government welfare project designed to deliver potable drinking water to rural households across Mahisagar district. In connection with these works, an FIR bearing C.R. No. 11201005250003 of 2025 was registered at the CID Crime Police Station, Vadodara Zone. The penal provisions invoked included Sections 406, 409, 420, 467, 468, 471, 474, 114, and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, together with Sections 13(1)(a), 13(1)(b), 13(2), and 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

The applicant, carrying on business as the sole proprietor of M/s Shrinathji Construction Agency, was entrusted with execution contracts for several rural habitations, including Babrol, Shir, Bachkariya, and Ditvas. Contracts were executed through local Water Committees starting around November 2021. The broader investigation launched by state authorities uncovered massive systemic irregularities across 620 villages in the district, involving approximately 112 separate contractors, agencies, and firms. The State alleged that approximately 123 crore rupees were siphoned off through falsified test reports, inflated bills, and non-execution of contractual work.Fearing arrest, the applicant approached the High Court of Gujarat by filing an application under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking anticipatory bail.

Dispute Before the Court:

The primary issue before the Court was whether the applicant was entitled to the extraordinary relief of pre-arrest bail in the context of ongoing criminal investigations into serious financial misappropriation.The applicant submitted that he had been falsely implicated and that no specific overt act was attributed to him in the initial FIR text. It was argued that the work was executed through valid purchases from authorized pipe manufacturers, as corroborated by administrative verification letters. The applicant asserted that the entire matter was essentially a contractual dispute being given an improper criminal character. Furthermore, because all financial and administrative documents were already in the custody of the investigating agency, the applicant argued that custodial interrogation was wholly unnecessary.

On the other hand, the State strongly resisted the application, contending that the case involved a sophisticated white-collar crime impacting a vital public welfare scheme. The State demonstrated through field inspection reports and witness statements under Section 179 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 that the applicant had engaged in severe physical and financial discrepancies. Specific findings included laying shorter pipelines than billed, digging trenches to depths significantly less than mandated standards, claiming payments for non-existent household connections, and forging manufacturer invoices (such as Kamdhenu Pipes invoice No. 2122/903). The prosecution emphasized that custodial interrogation was indispensable to unravel the deep-rooted conspiracy and recover misappropriated public money.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court:

In analyzing the rival contentions, the Court underscored that while individual liberty is a cherished fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, it is not absolute and must be balanced against larger public and societal interests. Pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary statutory privilege and not an automatic right, requiring careful consideration of the nature and gravity of the accusations, the role of the accused, and the potential impact on public welfare.

The Court conducted a detailed review of the evidentiary material assembled by the investigating agency regarding the four villages assigned to the applicant's firm. The findings revealed a consistent pattern of physical shortfalls and financial inflated claims:

In Babrol village, pipelines were installed at inadequate depths, overall length was shorter than recorded, and excess payments were drawn against false invoices.In Shir village, household connections were fewer than approved, yet extra money was claimed, alongside price variation payments obtained through false documentation.In Bachkariya Part-2 and Ditvas villages, excavation work was incomplete, depth standards were violated, and public beneficiaries were deprived of intended water supply benefits.A critical piece of evidence noted by the Court involved invoice No. 2122/903 for 26,38,022 rupees issued by Kamdhenu Pipes. While the applicant submitted this invoice to claim payments for Ditvas village, statement recordings from the pipe manufacturer confirmed that the bill actually pertained to Shir village and was never issued for Ditvas, establishing prima facie fabrication of billing records.

To contextualize the legal standard for granting anticipatory bail in economic offences, the Court placed reliance on key landmark precedents from the Supreme Court of India:

In Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Aditya Sarda, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 764, the Supreme Court reiterated that anticipatory bail should not be granted routinely in complex financial crimes and serious economic offences involving large-scale public funds.

In P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2019) 9 SCC 24, the apex court observed that power under Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (now Section 482 of BNSS) is extraordinary and must be exercised sparingly. Refusal of anticipatory bail in grave offences does not violate Article 21, as societal interest in a fair and thorough investigation outweighs individual protection in such contexts.

In Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2013) 7 SCC 439, and Nimmagadda Prasad v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2013) 7 SCC 466, the Supreme Court held that economic offences constitute a class apart because they pose a severe threat to the financial health and developmental structure of the nation. Financial crimes committed with deliberate design for personal profit warrant a strict judicial approach regarding bail.

In Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694, the apex court observed that personal liberty must not be protected at the cost of the larger interest of society.

In Jai Prakash Singh v. State of Bihar, (2012) 4 SCC 379, the Supreme Court held that anticipatory bail can be granted only in exceptional circumstances where the court forms a prima facie view that the applicant was falsely enroped.

In Pratibha Manchanda v. State of Haryana, AIR 2023 SC 3307, the Supreme Court emphasized walking a tightrope to strike a balance between safeguarding individual liberty and protecting the integrity of criminal investigations.

Applying these principles, the High Court concluded that the present case did not present any exceptional circumstances warranting pre-arrest protection. Given the gravity of the white-collar scam and the need to unearth the full scope of collusion, custodial interrogation was held to be fully justified.

Final Decision of the Court:

The High Court of Gujarat held that the application for anticipatory bail lacked merit. Exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the Court formally dismissed the application and discharged the rule. The Court clarified that its observations regarding the facts were tentative and meant solely for deciding the pre-arrest bail plea.

Point of Law Settled:

This judgment reaffirms that economic offences involving white-collar fraud, falsification of records, and misappropriation of public welfare funds constitute a distinct category of crime. In such matters, courts must prioritize societal interest and the necessity of effective custodial interrogation over personal liberty. The decision clarifies that submitting pre-arrest bail applications in contractual or execution fraud cases cannot succeed merely by labeling the dispute as commercial, especially when prima facie evidence demonstrates systemic forgery and intentional financial loss to the public exchequer.

Title of the Case: Vaishnani Vipul Dalsukhbhai Vs. State of Gujarat

Date of Judgment: 27/07/2026

Case Number: R/Criminal Misc. Application (For Anticipatory Bail) No. 17277 of 2026

Name of Court: High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjeev J. Thaker

Written By:Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation .

Headnote of the Judgment:

Vaishnani Vipul Dalsukhbhai v. State of Gujarat, High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad. Application for anticipatory bail under Section 482 of BNSS in connection with FIR for offences under IPC and Prevention of Corruption Act relating to multi-crore irregularities in the Nal Se Jal public water scheme. Allegations involved siphoning government funds through forged invoices, shallow pipe-laying, and incomplete work. The Court held that economic offences affecting public exchequer require thorough custodial interrogation. Application dismissed.

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Raj Abhushan Bhandar Vs. The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks

Raj Abhushan Bhandar Vs. The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks 

Date of Judgment: 23-07-2026

Case No.: Letters Patent Appeal No. 619 of 2026 in Civil Appeal No. 22 of 2023

Neutral Citation: 2026:GUJHC:LPA619

Court Name: High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Sunita Agarwal, Chief Justice, and Hon'ble Mr. Justice D.N. Ray

### Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant filed intra-court appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against a single-judge judgment dated July 11, 2025. That judgment was rendered in a statutory appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which originated from an order passed by the Trademark Registry, Ahmedabad on February 27, 2023. Respondent No. 2 raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeals.

### Dispute before Court

The primary legal issue before the High Court was whether an intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies against a decision of a single judge rendered in a statutory appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

### Reasoning of Judge

The Court held that the Registrar of Trade Marks performs quasi-judicial duties and possesses the trappings of a civil court, making proceedings under Section 91 appellate in nature rather than an exercise of original civil jurisdiction. Furthermore, Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, explicitly bars a second appeal from an order passed by a single judge exercising appellate powers. The conscious omission of a second appeal provision in the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (which previously existed under Section 109(5) of the 1958 Act) reflects legislative intent to restrict statutory appeals to a single tier before the High Court.

### Decision

The Division Bench sustained the preliminary objection and held that the Letters Patent Appeals were not maintainable.

### One Important Legal Principle Held in the Case

An intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent does not lie against a single judge's judgment in a statutory appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, as the Registrar functions with the trappings of a court and Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure bars a second appellate tier.

[Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation]

Maintainability of Letters Patent Appeals Under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999

Introduction:

The interplay between special intellectual property enactments and general procedural provisions governing appellate remedies often raises significant jurisdictional questions. In a crucial judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court of Gujarat examined whether a further intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is maintainable against a single judge's order passed in a statutory appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Factual and Procedural Background:

The dispute arose out of an order dated February 27, 2023, passed by the Trademark Registry, Ahmedabad. Aggrieved by the Registry's decision, statutory appeals were preferred before the High Court under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. On July 11, 2025, a single judge of the High Court adjudicated the appeals. Following this determination, intra-court appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent were filed before the Division Bench. The respondents raised a preliminary objection contending that such appeals were barred by Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the statutory framework of the 1999 Act.

Dispute Before the Court

The core legal question requiring adjudication was whether an intra-court appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent can be entertained against a decision rendered by a single judge exercising appellate jurisdiction under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

The appellants argued that the jurisdiction under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is an independent constitutional charter power that remains available unless expressly or by necessary implication excluded by statute. They contended that because the Registrar is an administrative authority and not a formal civil court, Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to bar an intra-court appeal.

Conversely, the respondents argued that the Registrar functions as a quasi-judicial authority with full trappings of a court while deciding trademark disputes. Consequently, an appeal under Section 91 before a single judge is an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. They submitted that Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure bars any second appeal from a single judge's appellate order, and that Parliament consciously removed the provision for a second appeal when replacing the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 with the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

The Court conducted a comprehensive analysis of the powers vested in the Registrar under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and the accompanying Trade Marks Rules, 2017. It noted that under Section 127 of the Act, the Registrar is endowed with explicit powers of a civil court, including receiving evidence, administering oaths, enforcing witness attendance, compelling document production, issuing commissions, and reviewing decisions. Moreover, orders regarding costs passed by the Registrar are executable as decrees of a civil court.

By examining established constitutional precedents regarding quasi-judicial authorities, the Court observed that the basic test to determine whether an authority possesses the trappings of a court is whether it has been conferred with statutory power to resolve a dispute between contesting parties in exercise of the State's inherent judicial function. Because the Registrar decides substantial legal rights and liabilities through adversarial evidentiary procedure, the Registrar functions as a tribunal possessing the trappings of a civil court.

As a result, when a single judge hears a statutory appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, the judge exercises appellate jurisdiction rather than original jurisdiction. Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure contains a non-obstante clause overriding the Letters Patent and prohibiting any further appeal when a single judge decides an appeal from an order or decree.

Additionally, the Court evaluated the legislative history, highlighting that Section 109(5) of the repealed 1958 Act specifically provided for a second tier of appeal to a Division Bench, whereas Section 91 of the 1999 Act consciously omitted this provision. This omission reflects a clear legislative intent to restrict statutory appeals to a single appellate forum.

Final Decision of the Court

The Court sustained the preliminary objection raised by the respondents. It held that the intra-court appeals filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of the single judge were not maintainable and accordingly dismissed them.

Point of Law Settled

This judgment reaffirms that the Registrar of Trade Marks acts as a tribunal with the trappings of a civil court when adjudicating trademark controversies. Consequently, an appeal determined by a single judge under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, constitutes appellate adjudication. By application of Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, further intra-court appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent are completely barred.

Title of the Case:Raj Abhushan Bhandar Vs. The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr.

Date of Judgment: 23/07/2026

Case Number: Letters Patent Appeal No. 619 of 2026

Name of Court: High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Sunita Agarwal, Chief Justice, and Hon'ble Mr. Justice D.N. Ray

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Headnote of the Judgment:

M/S Raj Abhushan Bhandar v. The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks & Anr., High Court of Gujarat. Intra-court appeals under Clause 15 of Letters Patent were filed against a single judge's judgment rendered in a statutory appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The respondents raised preliminary objections on maintainability. The Court held that the Registrar exercises quasi-judicial powers with the trappings of a civil court. Therefore, the single judge exercised appellate jurisdiction, and further intra-court appeals are barred by Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the statutory scheme. Appeals dismissed as not maintainable.

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BioPharma Inc. Vs. Deputy Controller of Patents

Delhi High Court Remands Array BioPharma Cancer Combination Patent Application for Fresh Reconsideration

Array BioPharma Inc. Vs. Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs:23.07.2026:C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 37/2023:2026:DHC:5856:Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela

Factual and Procedural Background

Array BioPharma Inc. filed Indian Patent Application No. 450/DELNP/2015 on January 19, 2015, titled "PHARMACEUTICAL COMBINATION COMPRISING A BRAF INHIBITOR AN EGFR INHIBITOR AND OPTIONALLY A PI3K ALPHA INHIBITOR", tracing priority to a US application filed on August 7, 2012. Following the issuance of the First Examination Report and multiple rounds of hearings, the Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs passed an order on June 30, 2023 under Section 15 of the Patents Act, 1970, refusing the grant of patent. The refusal was based on grounds of lack of inventive step under Section 2(1)(ja), non-patentability under Section 3(d), non-patentability under Section 3(i), and non-compliance with Section 10(4) and Section 10(5). Aggrieved by this rejection, the applicant filed an appeal under Section 117A of the Patents Act before the High Court of Delhi.

Dispute before Court

The central dispute was whether the claimed pharmaceutical combination comprising a B-Raf inhibitor (Encorafenib), an EGFR inhibitor (Cetuximab or Erlotinib), and optionally a PI3K-alpha inhibitor (Alpelisib) lacked an inventive step over prior art citations D1 to D4. Additionally, the Court had to determine whether the subject application fell under the statutory bar of Section 3(d) as a non-patentable form or derivative of a known substance without enhanced efficacy, and whether the phrase "for simultaneous, separate or sequential administration" transformed a product combination claim into a non-patentable method of treatment under Section 3(i) of the Patents Act, 1970.

Reasoning of Judge

The Court observed that none of the cited prior art documents D1 to D4 disclosed or suggested the specific dual or triple combination of Encorafenib, Cetuximab/Erlotinib, and Alpelisib, nor did they provide any motivation for a person skilled in the art to combine these precise active pharmaceutical agents. The Controller failed to conduct a proper analysis of inventive step or identify any technical problem solved over the closest prior art. Regarding Section 3(d), the Court held that the provision applies when an invention is a new form of a known substance, and the Controller failed to identify any base "known compound" of which the claimed combination was alleged to be a derivative. On Section 3(i), the Court affirmed that Claim 1 was explicitly structured as a product claim for a pharmaceutical combination rather than a treatment method, protocol, or dosing schedule. The description of administration modes served merely as a functional descriptor of the product, and working examples in the specification demonstrating practical utility do not alter the product nature of the claims.

Decision

The High Court of Delhi set aside the impugned refusal order dated June 30, 2023, and remanded the patent application back to the Controller of Patents and Designs for a de novo reconsideration on its merits. The Court directed the Controller to dispose of the matter within six months from the date of receipt of the order after providing a fair opportunity of hearing to the appellant.

One Important legal principle held in the case

A pharmaceutical combination product claim is not converted into a non-patentable method of treatment under Section 3(i) of the Patents Act, 1970 merely because the claims or complete specification describe administration schedules or include working examples demonstrating practical clinical feasibility.

[Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation ]

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Analytical Legal Article on Patentability of Pharmaceutical Combination Claims

Introduction:

The legal framework governing pharmaceutical patents in India strikes a delicate balance between encouraging genuine technical innovation and preventing the unwarranted extension of patent monopolies. Central to this balance are statutory provisions under the Patents Act, 1970 that exclude certain subject matters from patentability, particularly those relating to mere derivatives of known substances and methods of medical treatment. A recurrent issue in patent prosecution concerns whether claims directed to pharmaceutical combinations containing known active ingredients constitute patentable product inventions or barred therapeutic regimens. This judgment of the High Court of Delhi provides critical clarity on the threshold of inventive step, the scope of Section 3(d), and the boundaries of Section 3(i) exclusions when adjudicating pharmaceutical combination patent applications.

Factual and Procedural Background:

The subject patent application, numbered 450/DELNP/2015 and titled "PHARMACEUTICAL COMBINATION COMPRISING A BRAF INHIBITOR AN EGFR INHIBITOR AND OPTIONALLY A PI3K ALPHA INHIBITOR", originated from a priority US application filed on August 7, 2012. An international PCT application was filed on August 5, 2013, published internationally on February 13, 2014, and subsequently entered the Indian national phase on January 19, 2015. The application was published under Section 11A of the Patents Act, 1970 on June 26, 2015, and a formal request for examination was filed on August 1, 2016.

The Patent Office issued a First Examination Report on August 24, 2018, to which a detailed response was submitted on February 6, 2019. Following hearing notices, adjournments, and formal hearings held under Section 15 of the Act, along with written submissions and clinical data filed on record, the Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs issued an order on June 30, 2023. The Controller refused the patent application on the grounds of lack of inventive step under Section 2(1)(ja), non-patentability under Sections 3(d) and 3(i), and lack of clarity and definitive scope under Sections 10(4)(c) and 10(5) of the Patents Act, 1970. The applicant then preferred a statutory appeal under Section 117A before the High Court of Delhi challenging the refusal order.

Dispute Before the Court

The main dispute before the Court revolved around whether the Patent Office was justified in refusing the patent application for a pharmaceutical combination designed for the treatment of proliferative diseases such as colorectal cancer. The primary legal issue was whether the claimed combination lacked an inventive step under Section 2(1)(ja) in light of four prior art documents cited by the Patent Office. A key factual controversy pertained to whether a person skilled in the art, reading the prior art documents, would have had the motivation or reasonable expectation of success to combine the specific active pharmaceutical agents selected by the applicant.

Another essential issue was whether the subject application fell within the non-patentability bar of Section 3(d) of the Act. The Patent Office contended that the combination comprised known compounds without showing enhanced efficacy over known prior art. The applicant countered that Section 3(d) is inapplicable to a combination of distinct, independent active pharmaceutical agents having different chemical structures and mechanisms of action.

Finally, a major point of contention was the applicability of Section 3(i) of the Act, which prohibits patents for processes of medicinal or therapeutic treatment of human beings. The Patent Office argued that because the claims referenced simultaneous, separate, or sequential administration and the specification outlined clinical trial dosing protocols, the claimed invention was essentially a method of medical treatment. The applicant maintained that the claims were strictly product claims defining a pharmaceutical combination entity, and that administration descriptors and clinical examples merely demonstrated industrial applicability and practical workability.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

In analyzing the objection regarding lack of inventive step under Section 2(1)(ja) of the Act, the Court conducted a comprehensive, document-by-document evaluation of the four cited prior arts. Prior art D1 disclosed B-Raf inhibitors generally and taught combinations with MEK inhibitors, but provided no teaching or disclosure regarding combinations with EGFR or PI3K-alpha inhibitors. Prior art D2 focused on diagnostic and prognostic methods for detecting mutations and mentioned EGFR signaling inhibitors generally in combination with unspecified RAF inhibitors, without disclosing the specific B-Raf inhibitor Encorafenib. Prior art D3 disclosed combinations of dabrafenib with an unspecified PI3K inhibitor, but contained no reference to EGFR inhibitors such as Erlotinib or Cetuximab. Prior art D4 was directed to novel PI3K inhibitors as chemical entities and discussed in vitro models involving EGFR, but failed to disclose the specific combination claimed.

The Court concluded that none of the cited prior art documents, whether viewed individually or collectively, disclosed or suggested the specific dual combination of Encorafenib with Erlotinib or Cetuximab, or the triple combination incorporating Alpelisib. The Court observed that the Controller failed to identify the closest prior art document, articulate the specific technical problem solved by the invention, or explain how a person skilled in the art would be motivated to select and combine these specific active ingredients from a vast landscape of known compounds. Furthermore, the Court highlighted that the clinical data in the specification demonstrated significant technical advancement and synergistic therapeutic effects, including tumor regression, which had not been properly evaluated by the Controller.

Addressing the objection under Section 3(d) of the Act, the Court noted that Section 3(d) applies to the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance or derivatives unless they differ significantly in efficacy. The Court emphasized that for Section 3(d) to be invoked, the decision-maker must explicitly identify the base known compound. Relying upon the principle affirmed in Topotarget UK Ltd. vs. Controller General of Patents & Designs [IPDPTA/50/2023], the Court reiterated that a combination of two or more independent active pharmaceutical agents, each possessing a distinct chemical identity and therapeutic mechanism, cannot be treated as derivatives of each other under Section 3(d). The Controller's failure to identify any specific known compound rendered the Section 3(d) finding legally unsustainable.

On the challenge under Section 3(i) of the Act, the Court examined the structural language of Claim 1. Section 3(i) prohibits processes for therapeutic treatment, but does not exclude pharmaceutical products or combinations. The Court held that the phrase "for simultaneous, separate or sequential administration" functions merely as a descriptor defining the range of ways the constituent active ingredients in the combination product can be delivered, without transforming the product claim into a process or method step.

To reinforce this legal standard, the Court referred to established precedents including Societe Des Produits Nestle SA vs. Controller of Patents & Designs [CA (COMM).IPD-PAT) 22/2022] and Medilabo RFP Ink Inc. vs. Controller of Patents [CA (COMM).IPD-PAT) 16/2024], which established that using expressions relating to treatment or administration to define a composition does not attract Section 3(i). Furthermore, drawing upon the principles laid down in Bayer Pharma Aktiengesellschaft vs. The Controller of Patents and Design [2024:DHC:2395], the Court clarified the fundamental legal distinction between claim scope and working examples. Working examples and clinical protocols set out in a patent specification serve to demonstrate the practical feasibility and workability of an invention under Section 10(4) of the Act, but do not dictate or expand the legal boundaries of the claim itself. Since Claim 1 was drafted as a product claim for a pharmaceutical combination, Section 3(i) was completely inapplicable.

The Court also briefly evaluated principles from related jurisprudence including Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. vs. The Controller of Patents & Designs [OA/15/2011/PT/MUM], Ajantha Pharma Ltd. vs. Allergan Inc. & Ors. [Order No. 173/2013], Biomoneta Research Pvt. Ltd. v. Controller General of Patents & Designs [2023/DHC/001816], Zydus Lifesciences Ltd. v. ER Squibb & Sons LLC [2026:DHC:178-DB], and Novartis AG v. Union of India [(2013) 6 SCC 1]. The Court found that the Controller's rejection under Sections 10(4)(c) and 10(5) was entirely devoid of reasoning, making a complete re-examination necessary.

Final Decision of the Court

The Court set aside the impugned order dated June 30, 2023 passed by the Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs under Section 15 of the Patents Act, 1970. The matter was remanded back to the Patent Office for a de novo reconsideration of the patent application on its merits. The Court directed the Controller to afford the applicant a fair hearing and to dispose of the patent application within six months from the date of receipt of the judicial order, while clarifying that the fresh determination must be made independently without being influenced by the observations made in the judgment.

Point of Law Settled

This decision clarifies and reinforces two important principles in Indian patent law. First, it settles that a product claim directed to a pharmaceutical combination entity cannot be recharacterized as a non-patentable process or method of treatment under Section 3(i) of the Patents Act, 1970 simply because the claim describes administration modes or because the complete specification details clinical trial protocols and dosing schedules. Second, it affirms that when rejecting an application under Section 3(d) or Section 2(1)(ja), the Patent Office must specifically identify the base known compound and clearly articulate the technical problem and motivation that would lead a person skilled in the art to combine specific active pharmaceutical agents, rather than relying on generalized mosaic references to prior art.

Title of the Case: Array BioPharma Inc. vs. Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs

Date of Judgment: 23.07.2026

Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 37/2023

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:5856

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tushar Rao Gedela

Written By:Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation .

Headnote of the Judgment:

Array BioPharma Inc. v. Deputy Controller of Patents and Designs, High Court of Delhi, C.A.(COMM.IPD-PAT) 37/2023, Neutral Citation 2026:DHC:5856. The appellant appealed against an order of the Deputy Controller refusing patent application 450/DELNP/2015 for a pharmaceutical combination of a B-Raf inhibitor, an EGFR inhibitor, and optionally a PI3K-alpha inhibitor under Sections 2(1)(ja), 3(d), and 3(i) of the Patents Act, 1970. The High Court found that prior art documents D1 to D4 did not teach or suggest the claimed combination. The Court held Section 3(d) inapplicable as no base known compound was identified, and ruled that Section 3(i) does not bar combination product claims merely because administration modes or clinical examples are described. The High Court set aside the refusal order and remanded the matter for fresh de novo consideration within six months.

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4. Array BioPharma Patent Appeal: Delhi HC Overturns Refusal of BRAF and EGFR Inhibitor Claims

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ADS Spirits Pvt. Ltd. Vs. The Registrar of Trade Marks

Delhi High Court Sets Aside Rejection Order of Registrar of Trade Marks for Applying Misconceived Parameter of Uniqueness Under Section 9(1)(a)

ADS Spirits Pvt. Ltd. Vs. The Registrar of Trade Marks:21.07.2026:C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 8/2026:2026:DHC:5783:Hon'ble Ms. Justice Jyoti Singh

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant, an established liquor manufacturer with substantial market presence, applied for registration of the word mark OFFER under Class 33 for alcoholic beverages on a proposed to be used basis. The Registrar of Trade Marks issued an examination report raising objections under Section 9(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, describing the mark using standard pre-drafted language. Despite detailed responses and additional submissions citing earlier registered composite marks containing the word offer and relevant judicial precedents, the Registrar passed an order rejecting the application on the ground that the word offer in common parlance signifies a discount and lacks uniqueness. The appellant challenged this rejection before the High Court of Delhi under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999.

Dispute before Court

The core dispute was whether the Registrar of Trade Marks applied the correct legal standard under Section 9(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, in refusing the registration of the mark OFFER for alcoholic beverages. The court had to determine whether uniqueness is a statutory requirement for trademark registration and whether an unreasoned order that ignores written submissions and prior precedents can be sustained.

Reasoning of Judge

The court observed that Section 9(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, bars registration if a mark is devoid of distinctive character, meaning it cannot distinguish the goods of one person from those of another, but does not impose any requirement of uniqueness, novelty, or inventiveness. The Registrar wrongly evaluated the mark on an unknown parameter of uniqueness rather than assessing its inherent distinctiveness relative to the specific goods. Distinctiveness must be evaluated in relation to the relevant product category; a ordinary English word may be arbitrary and distinctive when applied to goods with which it has no direct connection. Furthermore, the court held that as a quasi-judicial authority, the Registrar is legally obligated to pass a reasoned, speaking order addressing the specific responses and authorities submitted by the applicant. Passing cryptic and stereotyped rejection orders without applying mind to the record constitutes a complete failure of quasi-judicial functions.

Decision

The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned rejection order dated 30.10.2025, and remanded the trade mark application back to the Registrar of Trade Marks for fresh consideration in accordance with the parameters of Section 9(1)(a) within four months, after providing an opportunity of hearing to the appellant.

One Important legal principle held in the case

Section 9(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, requires a mark to possess distinctive character relative to the applied goods and does not mandate uniqueness as a test for registration, and quasi-judicial orders rejecting registration must be speaking orders that explicitly address the submissions and precedents placed on record.

[Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation ]

Introduction:

The High Court of Delhi recently delivered a significant judgment concerning the standards applied by the Trade Marks Registry when examining trademark applications for registration. The decision clarifies the distinct boundary between the statutory requirement of distinctive character under Section 9(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and the non-statutory concept of uniqueness. The ruling reinforces the imperative that quasi-judicial authorities like the Registrar of Trade Marks must issue well-reasoned, speaking orders that actively consider the material and precedents submitted by applicants rather than issuing standardized rejection templates.

Factual and Procedural Background:

The appellant company, incorporated in 2010 as part of a prominent Indian alcoholic beverage group, had achieved total liquor sales exceeding 7,500 crore rupees by March 2025 across its various established brand lines. Seeking statutory rights over a new mark, the appellant filed Trade Mark Application No. 5514779 on July 3, 2022, seeking registration of the word mark OFFER in Class 33 for alcoholic beverages (except beers) and alcoholic preparations for making beverages, on a proposed to be used basis.

The Trade Marks Registry issued an Examination Report on November 18, 2022, raising absolute grounds of refusal under Section 9(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The objection was communicated through a pre-formulated template stating that the mark was a common surname, personal name, geographical name, ornamental, or non-distinctive geometrical figure. The applicant filed its formal reply on December 26, 2022, explaining that the mark was arbitrary and inherently distinctive in respect of alcoholic beverages. Ahead of scheduled hearings, the applicant submitted an additional reply on June 24, 2024, listing over thirty previously registered marks in various classes incorporating the word OFFER along with relevant case laws establishing that an ordinary word can be arbitrary when applied to unrelated goods.

Without addressing these detailed submissions or the cited precedents, the Registrar issued an order on October 30, 2025, refusing registration under Section 9(1)(a). The order concluded that in general usage, the word offer refers to demanding a discount when purchasing goods or services and, being devoid of uniqueness, could not be registered. The applicant subsequently filed an appeal under Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, before the High Court of Delhi.

Dispute Before the Court

The primary legal issue requiring adjudication was whether the Registrar of Trade Marks applied the correct legal standard under Section 9(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, when assessing the registrability of the mark OFFER for Class 33 goods.

The appellant contended that the Registrar applied an incorrect legal test by insisting on uniqueness, a concept foreign to trademark law, instead of assessing capability to distinguish goods. The appellant argued that while offer is an ordinary English word, it is completely arbitrary when applied to alcoholic beverages, as it carries no direct descriptive connection to liquor products. It was further argued that the Registrar failed to act as a proper quasi-judicial authority by issuing a cryptic order that totally ignored the applicant's written replies, lists of registered composite marks, and binding judicial precedents.

Conversely, the respondent maintained that the word offer is commonly used in everyday trade to denote discounts or promotional schemes. The respondent argued that granting exclusive rights over such a common word would impede ordinary commercial communication and that the refusal order was sufficiently reasoned under Section 9(1)(a).

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

The Court examined the statutory language of Section 9(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which prohibits registration of marks that are devoid of any distinctive character—defined statutorily as being incapable of distinguishing the goods or services of one person from those of another. The Court observed that the statute nowhere mentions or requires uniqueness, novelty, or inventiveness as a prerequisite for registration. By evaluating the mark on the test of uniqueness, the Registrar introduced an unauthorized standard not supported by law.

Analyzing the spectrum of distinctiveness, the Court reiterated that marks fall into arbitrary, suggestive, descriptive, and generic categories. Distinctiveness cannot be determined in isolation; it must always be evaluated relative to the specific goods or services involved. An ordinary English word may be generic or descriptive for one category of goods but entirely arbitrary and distinctive for another. To illustrate this principle, the Court referred to well-established judicial precedents where common or non-descriptive words were protected because they lacked a direct connection to the underlying products:

In Oswaal Books and Learnings Private Limited v. Registrar of Trade Marks (2026 SCC OnLine Del 2362), a Division Bench held that the phrase ONE FOR ALL was registrable for educational books in Class 16 because the mark did not describe or directly connect to tangible paper products.

In Teleecare Network India Pvt. Ltd. v. Asus Technology Pvt. Ltd. (2019 SCC OnLine Del 8739), the court observed that while ZEN is a generic term in the context of Buddhism, it is arbitrary and fully protectable when used for mobile phones.In Mohd. Rafiq v. Modi Sugar Mills Ltd. (1971 SCC OnLine Del 190), the word SUN was held capable of acquiring distinctiveness for lanterns because any connection between the sun and lanterns was remote rather than direct or descriptive.In Disruptive Health Solutions Private Limited v. Registrar of Trade Marks (2022 SCC OnLine Del 2002), the court affirmed that arbitrary or suggestive marks possess in

herent distinctiveness and do not require proof of secondary meaning to achieve registration.

The Court also observed that the Registrar conflated the terms offer and discount. An offer is an invitation to transact, whereas a discount is a price reduction; the word offer alone is not a standard standalone term for price reductions without qualifying words like special or limited.

Additionally, the Court severely criticized the administrative manner in which the Trade Marks Registry processed the application. The initial examination report contained a mechanical checklist of contradictory objections, showing lack of application of mind at the outset. Furthermore, the final rejection order failed to discuss the applicant's responses, the thirty-one registered composite marks cited, or the binding decisions presented. Citing I Am the Ocean, LLC v. Registrar of Trade Marks (2023 SCC OnLine Bom 3341) and Psychotropic India Limited v. Registrar of Trade Marks (2026 SCC OnLine Del 446), the Court reiterated that passing unreasoned and cryptic orders without considering material on record represents an abdication of quasi-judicial duties.

Final Decision of the Court

The Court set aside and quashed the impugned order dated October 30, 2025. The trade mark application was remanded back to the Registrar of Trade Marks for fresh consideration strictly under the statutory parameters of Section 9(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The Registrar was directed to issue a reasoned decision within four months after granting a hearing to the appellant and reviewing all written submissions and cited materials on record.

Point of Law Settled

This judgment reaffirms that uniqueness is not a statutory condition for trademark registration in India. The test under Section 9(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, is limited to distinctiveness specifically whether a mark can distinguish the applicant's goods from those of others when viewed in direct relation to the specific goods involved. The decision also reaffirms that the Registrar of Trade Marks, operating as a quasi-judicial authority, cannot issue mechanical, unreasoned, or standardized rejection orders that ignore written replies and precedents submitted by applicants.

Title of the Case: ADS Spirits Pvt. Ltd. v. The Registrar of Trade Marks

Date of Judgment: 21.07.2026

Case Number: C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 8/2026 

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:5783

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Ms. Justice Jyoti Singh

Written By:Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation .

Headnote of the Judgment:

ADS Spirits Pvt. Ltd. v. The Registrar of Trade Marks, High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 8/2026 (Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:5783). The appellant challenged the rejection of its trademark application for the mark OFFER in Class 33 for alcoholic beverages under Section 9(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The High Court held that the Registrar applied an incorrect legal test by evaluating the mark on the parameter of uniqueness rather than statutory distinctiveness relative to the goods. The Court further ruled that the Registrar failed to perform quasi-judicial duties by issuing a non-speaking order that ignored written replies and cited precedents. The appeal was allowed, the rejection order was quashed, and the matter was remanded for fresh adjudication within four months.

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Sri. Vishal Vrushabhanaath Samaje Vs. The State of Karnataka

Karnataka High Court Quashes Criminal Proceedings under Copyright Act for Trade Mark Infringement and Non-Compliance with Mandatory Search Requirements

Sri. Vishal Vrushabhanaath Samaje Vs. The State of Karnataka and Another:20.07.2026:Criminal Petition No. 9513 of 2026:Neutral Citation : 2026:KHC:37262: High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru:Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice M. Nagaprasanna

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner approached the High Court seeking to quash the charge sheet and entire proceedings in C.C. No. 22293/2025 arising out of Crime No. 88/2025 registered at Upparpet Police Station, Bengaluru City. The case was registered for offences punishable under Sections 51(1)(b), 63, and 65 of the Copyright Act, 1957, pending before the IX Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bengaluru. The prosecution alleged that the petitioner was in possession of and engaged in selling counterfeit branded apparel, which caused financial loss to the original brand owners.

Dispute before Court

The main dispute was whether the act of selling counterfeit branded goods constitutes an offence under the provisions of the Copyright Act, 1957, or under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. Further, the court had to determine whether criminal proceedings initiated without complying with the mandatory procedural requirements under Section 115(4) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 which mandates search and seizure by an officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police and prior opinion from the Registrar could be sustained.

Reasoning of Judge

The court relied on coordinate bench precedents and observed that merely selling counterfeit goods bearing registered brand labels does not constitute an infringement of copyright under Section 13 or Section 51 of the Copyright Act, 1957, as the accused was not claiming copyright or manufacturing original works. Instead, such acts fall strictly under Section 104 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The court noted that Section 115(4) of the Trade Marks Act requires search and seizure to be conducted by a police officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police after obtaining the Registrar's opinion. Since the search was conducted by an officer below the prescribed rank without fulfilling these statutory mandates, the investigation and charge sheet were fatally vitiated.

Decision

The High Court allowed the criminal petition and quashed the charge sheet and all further proceedings in C.C. No. 22293/2025 pending on the file of the IX Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bengaluru, insofar as the petitioner was concerned.

One Important legal principle held in the case

Possession or sale of counterfeit branded goods constitutes an offence under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, rather than the Copyright Act, 1957, and failure to adhere to the mandatory search and seizure procedure under Section 115(4) of the Trade Marks Act vitiates the entire prosecution.

[Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation ]

Section 115 Trade Marks Act Compliance Mandatory for Search and Seizure

Introduction:

The Karnataka High Court recently addressed a vital procedural and jurisdictional issue regarding intellectual property offences in criminal law. The case centered on whether police authorities can bypass statutory procedures prescribed under specialized statutes by invoking provisions of the Copyright Act, 1957, for cases involving counterfeit trade mark goods. The ruling re-emphasizes the strict statutory safeguards provided under intellectual property statutes to prevent procedural lapses during law enforcement operations.

Factual and Procedural Background:

The proceedings originated from Crime No. 88/2025 registered at Upparpet Police Station, Bengaluru City. Following investigation, a charge sheet was submitted in C.C. No. 22293/2025 before the IX Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bengaluru. The charges were framed under Sections 51(1)(b), 63, and 65 of the Copyright Act, 1957. The core allegation against the accused was that he was involved in storing and selling counterfeit apparel bearing famous brand labels.

The petitioner challenged the proceedings by filing a petition under Section 422 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (now Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita), praying for the quashing of the charge sheet and pending criminal proceedings. The petitioner argued that the underlying facts of the case, even if taken as true, did not attract the provisions of the Copyright Act, 1957.

Dispute Before the Court:

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether selling goods bearing false brand labels attracts criminal liability under the Copyright Act, 1957, or under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. A connected issue was whether search and seizure operations conducted by police officers below the rank prescribed under Section 115(4) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, render the prosecution legally unsustainable.

The petitioner contended that the allegations related strictly to trade mark infringement and false trade descriptions. Consequently, the police ought to have followed the procedure established under the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which mandates that search and seizure operations must be carried out by a police officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police and only after obtaining the statutory opinion of the Registrar of Trade Marks. The state argued that the charge sheet had been validly filed based on the initial registration under copyright provisions.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court:

The Court analyzed the scope of copyright protection under Section 13 of the Copyright Act, 1957, which covers original literary, dramatic, musical, artistic works, cinematograph films, and sound recordings. The Court observed that for an offence under copyright law to be attracted, there must be an allegation of infringing an original work in which copyright subsists. Where the allegation is simply that a trader is selling counterfeit clothing items carrying brand logos, no claim to original creation or copyright violation is established against the accused.

The Court emphasized that such acts fall squarely under Section 104 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, which provides penalties for selling or possessing goods bearing false trade marks or descriptions. Since the subject matter related to trade mark violations, the mandatory provisions of Section 115 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, became applicable.

Section 115(4) explicitly dictates two indispensable requirements for searching and seizing counterfeit goods: the operation must be conducted by a police officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police (or equivalent), and the officer must obtain an opinion from the Registrar of Trade Marks before executing the search.

Relying on established judicial precedents, including earlier rulings in Criminal Petition No. 2080 of 2023 (decided on June 19, 2024) and Criminal Petition No. 6096 of 2016 (decided on February 28, 2019), the Court pointed out that investigating agencies cannot circumvent statutory protections by registering cases under the Copyright Act to avoid the requirements of the Trade Marks Act. Because the search in the present case was conducted by an officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police without obtaining the mandatory Registrar's opinion, the search, seizure, and subsequent charge sheet were fundamentally flawed and unsustainable in law.

Final Decision of the Court:

The Court allowed the criminal petition. It quashed the entire proceedings in C.C. No. 22293/2025, including the underlying charge sheet arising from Crime No. 88/2025, pending on the file of the IX Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bengaluru, insofar as the petitioner was concerned.

Point of Law Settled:

This judgment reaffirms that allegations of selling counterfeit branded items constitute trade mark offences under Section 104 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and cannot be routinely converted into copyright prosecutions. It re-establishes that compliance with Section 115(4) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 specifically search by an officer of the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police or above and prior opinion from the Registrar is mandatory. Any search, seizure, or prosecution conducted in violation of these mandatory safeguards is illegal and liable to be quashed.

Title of the Case: Sri. Vishal Vrushabhanaath Samaje vs. The State of Karnataka and Another

Date of Judgment: 20.07.2026

Case Number: Criminal Petition No. 9513 of 2026

Neutral Citation: 2026:KHC:37262

Name of Court: High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Hon'ble Mr. Justice M. Nagaprasanna

Written By:Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation .

Headnote of the Judgment:

Sri. Vishal Vrushabhanaath Samaje vs. The State of Karnataka and Another, High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru, Criminal Petition No. 9513 of 2026 (Neutral Citation: 2026:KHC:37262). The petitioner challenged a charge sheet under Sections 51(1)(b), 63, and 65 of the Copyright Act, 1957, regarding alleged sale of counterfeit branded goods. The High Court held that selling counterfeit branded goods attracts Section 104 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, rather than copyright provisions. Because search and seizure were conducted by an officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police without obtaining the Registrar's opinion as mandated by Section 115(4) of the Trade Marks Act, the investigation was illegal. The petition was allowed and criminal proceedings were quashed.

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ANI Media Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Open AI OpCo LLC

Delhi High Court Refuses Interim Injunction Against OpenAI in ANI's Copyright Suit Over Use of News Content for Training ChatGPT

 ANI Media Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Open AI OpCo LLC:24.07.2026: CS(COMM) 1028/2024:2026:DHC:5900: Hon'ble Judge: Justice Amit Bansal

Factual and Procedural Background

ANI Media Pvt. Ltd., a news agency, filed a suit against Open AI OpCo LLC, the company behind ChatGPT, alleging that Open AI had, without licence, collected and stored ANI's news articles and other literary works to train its large language models, and that ChatGPT generated responses reproducing ANI's content. ANI sought an interim injunction restraining Open AI from using, storing or reproducing its copyrighted works. Several intervenors, including news publisher bodies, music industry associations, and organisations supporting the AI industry, were permitted to join the proceedings, and the Court also appointed amici curiae to assist on the technical and legal questions involved.

Dispute before Court

The Court framed four issues for consideration. First, whether Indian courts had jurisdiction to try the suit given that Open AI's servers are located outside India. Second, whether Open AI's use of ANI's copyrighted material to generate ChatGPT's responses to users amounted to infringement. Third, whether the mere storage of ANI's data for training ChatGPT amounted to infringement. Fourth, whether such storage and use, even if otherwise infringing, was protected as "fair dealing" under Section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957. ANI argued that Open AI's storage, tokenisation and reproduction of its articles violated its exclusive rights, while Open AI contended that the training process was transformative, akin to how a person learns from reading, and fell within the statutory defence of private or personal use, including research.

Reasoning of Judge

The Court held that it had territorial jurisdiction since Open AI carries on commercial activity, including subscription collection, within Delhi. On the output claim, the Court found that ANI's examples of alleged copying were generated after the training had concluded and did not establish that ChatGPT memorises or substantially reproduces ANI's articles. On the storage and fair use issues, the Court held that Section 52(1)(a) does not exclude commercial use, and that "research" under the provision must be read liberally, including machine-based research such as training an LLM. The Court found the training process transformative in purpose and character, held that ANI had not shown any actual loss of market share or revenue, and noted that LLMs like ChatGPT serve substantial public interest by aiding education, research and access to information.

Decision

The Court held that Open AI's storage of ANI's works for training ChatGPT falls within the fair dealing exception under Section 52(1)(a) of the Copyright Act and does not amount to infringement, and that ANI had not made out a case that ChatGPT's outputs substantially reproduce its works. Holding that ANI failed to establish a prima facie case, and that the balance of convenience and irreparable injury favoured Open AI and the public at large, the Court dismissed I.A. 45300/2024, ANI's application for interim injunction. The Court clarified that these are prima facie observations for the purpose of the interim application only and will not bind the final decision in the suit.

One Important Legal Principle Held in the Case

The use of copyrighted literary works to train large language models can, on a prima facie basis, qualify as "private or personal use, including research" under Section 52(1)(a) of the Copyright Act, 1957, and the commercial nature of such use does not by itself take it outside the protection of fair dealing.

[Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation ]

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ANI v Open AI: Delhi High Court Declines to Injunct ChatGPT's Training on News Content, Applies Fair Dealing to Artificial Intelligence

ANI Vs Open AI case:Fair Dealing Meets Artificial Intelligence

Introduction

The rapid growth of generative artificial intelligence has raised a pressing legal question across the world, whether feeding copyrighted material into a machine learning system amounts to copyright infringement. The Delhi High Court has now weighed in on this question in a dispute between ANI Media Pvt. Ltd., one of India's prominent news agencies, and Open AI, the company behind ChatGPT. ANI accused Open AI of using its news articles without permission to train ChatGPT and of generating responses that reproduced its content. Open AI defended its practice as a transformative and research oriented activity protected under the fair dealing provisions of Indian copyright law. In a detailed judgment running into more than a hundred pages, the Court examined how large language models work, how Indian copyright law applies to their training, and whether an interim injunction should be granted while the underlying suit is pending trial. The judgment is significant not only for the news and publishing industry but for the entire artificial intelligence ecosystem operating in or serving users in India.

Factual and Procedural Background

ANI is engaged in gathering, producing and distributing news content, which it licenses to subscribers including media houses and digital platforms. It claimed that Open AI, without obtaining any licence, scraped and stored its articles as part of the raw data used to train the large language models that power ChatGPT, and that ChatGPT's responses to user queries at times closely mirrored its reports. ANI filed a commercial suit seeking a permanent injunction and damages, along with an interim application asking the Court to restrain Open AI from continuing to store, use or reproduce its works during the pendency of the suit. Open AI resisted the application, arguing that its servers and training operations are located outside India, that ANI's material forms an infinitesimally small part of a vast training corpus drawn from the internet, and that the entire process is protected as fair dealing under the Copyright Act. During the proceedings, several parties were allowed to intervene, including bodies representing digital news publishers and the music industry supporting ANI, and organisations representing the broadband and artificial intelligence industry supporting Open AI. The Court also had the benefit of assistance from two amici curiae on the technical workings of large language models and the applicable legal principles.

Dispute Before the Court

The Court identified four core questions that needed to be answered before deciding whether to grant an interim injunction. The first was a threshold question of jurisdiction, since Open AI's servers where the actual training takes place are located in the United States, the Court had to decide whether an Indian court could still entertain a copyright claim relating to that training activity. The second question was whether the answers that ChatGPT generates for its users, if they resemble ANI's news reports, amount to infringement of ANI's copyright. The third was whether the very act of collecting and storing ANI's articles as training data, independent of what ChatGPT later generates, itself amounts to infringement. The fourth, and perhaps the most consequential question, was whether such storage and use, even if it would otherwise infringe copyright, is protected by the fair dealing exception available for private or personal use, including research, under the Copyright Act. In simple terms, ANI's case was that its hard earned journalistic work was being taken without payment or permission and turned into a commercial product that competes with its own business, while Open AI's case was that training an AI model on publicly available text is no different from a student reading widely to learn, and that the law specifically protects such research oriented use.

Reasoning and Analysis of the Court

On jurisdiction, the Court held that since Open AI conducts commercial activity accessible to and monetised from users located in Delhi, including subscription payments, the Court could exercise jurisdiction over the dispute even though the actual training servers are situated abroad. The Court reasoned that the effects of the allegedly infringing activity are felt within its jurisdiction and that this was sufficient at the interim stage.

On the question of whether ChatGPT's outputs infringe ANI's copyright, the Court examined the instances of alleged copying placed on record by ANI and found that these had been generated after Open AI's training process on the relevant data had already concluded. The Court held that isolated post training examples could not establish that ChatGPT actually memorises and reproduces ANI's articles as a general practice, and that in any event the responses shown did not amount to a substantial reproduction of ANI's original expression, since news reporting largely conveys factual events which enjoy thinner copyright protection than works of greater creative content. The Court distinguished several foreign precedents relied upon by ANI, including cases involving verbatim extracts of news articles and cases involving musical works, on the ground that those situations involved either actual verbatim copying or subject matter with a much higher degree of original expression than typical news reporting.

The heart of the judgment lies in its treatment of the storage and fair use questions, which the Court examined together. Open AI took shelter under Section 52(1)(a)(i) of the Copyright Act, which exempts fair dealing for the purpose of private or personal use, including research. ANI argued that this defence could not apply because Open AI's use was commercial, because the underlying copy of the work had to be a lawfully obtained copy, and because training an AI model is not really research in the sense contemplated by the statute. The Court rejected the argument that commercial use automatically falls outside fair dealing, noting that wherever the legislature intended to restrict a Section 52 exception to non-commercial use, it said so expressly, as seen in other clauses of the same section, and that this restriction is conspicuously absent from Section 52(1)(a). The Court also drew support from the Canadian Supreme Court's decision in CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada, which held that research must be given a large and liberal meaning and is not confined to non-commercial contexts. The Court further reasoned that the term research, as used in the Copyright Act, is broad enough to include the process by which a machine learning system is trained to recognise patterns in language, since such training is fundamentally an exercise in extracting information and patterns rather than republishing the original text as such.

The Court then applied what it described as a fairness test, considering whether Open AI's use was limited to training its models, whether it caused economic harm to ANI by substituting for its own products in the market, and whether the activity served the larger public interest. Drawing upon recent American decisions concerning the use of copyrighted books to train large language models, the Court accepted that the purpose and character of training an LLM is highly transformative, since the resulting model does not seek to replicate or supplant the original works but instead learns from them to generate new and different kinds of output, capable of translation, summarisation, drafting assistance and a wide range of other tasks quite different from simply reading a news report. The Court noted that ANI had not placed any concrete evidence of lost subscription revenue or market share attributable to Open AI's activities, and therefore could not show that the use displaced ANI's own commercial position. On public interest, the Court observed that large language models contribute meaningfully to education, research, accessibility and the dissemination of knowledge, and that these considerations weigh in favour of treating the training activity as a fair dealing.

Having found that both the purpose test and the fairness test were satisfied, the Court concluded that Open AI's storage of ANI's works for training purposes falls within the protection of Section 52(1)(a) of the Copyright Act. On the question of balance of convenience, the Court weighed ANI's claim, which it noted was capable of being compensated in monetary terms if the suit ultimately succeeds, against the practical consequences of an injunction that would require Open AI to identify and delete specific training data, which could disrupt its operations and would also affect the wider public that relies on ChatGPT for a variety of purposes.

Final Decision of the Court

The Court held, on a prima facie basis, that Open AI's storage of ANI's works for training the large language models underlying ChatGPT is protected under Section 52(1)(a) of the Copyright Act and does not amount to infringement. It further held that ANI had not established that ChatGPT's outputs are a substantial reproduction of its news articles or that any memorisation and regurgitation of its content had taken place. Concluding that ANI had failed to make out a prima facie case, and that the balance of convenience and the risk of irreparable injury both favoured Open AI and the public at large, the Court dismissed ANI's application for an interim injunction. The Court was careful to clarify that its observations were made only for the purpose of deciding the interim application and would have no bearing on the final outcome of the suit, which remains to be decided after trial.

Point of Law Settled

The judgment clarifies, at least at the interim stage, that the use of copyrighted literary works, including news content, to train large language models can fall within the fair dealing exception for private or personal use, including research, under Section 52(1)(a) of the Copyright Act, 1957. It settles that commercial motive alone does not disqualify a party from claiming this defence, since the statute expressly restricts other specific exceptions to non-commercial use but does not do so for Section 52(1)(a). It also underlines that a copyright holder seeking to resist such a defence on grounds of economic harm must produce concrete evidence of market substitution or lost revenue, rather than relying on general apprehension. The decision is likely to significantly influence how Indian courts approach similar disputes involving artificial intelligence companies and copyright owners, and will be closely watched as the broader suit proceeds to trial.

Title of the Case: ANI Media Pvt. Ltd. v. Open AI OpCo LLC

Date of Judgment: 24.07.2026

Case Number: CS(COMM) 1028/2024, 

Neutral Citation: 2026:DHC:5900

Name of Court: High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

Name of Hon'ble Judge: Justice Amit Bansal

Written By: Advocate Ajay Amitabh Suman, IP Adjutor [Patent and Trademark Attorney], High Court of Delhi

Disclaimer: Readers are advised not to treat this as a substitute for legal advice as it may contain errors in perception, interpretation, and presentation.

Headnote of the Judgment

In ANI Media Pvt. Ltd. v. Open AI OpCo LLC, decided on 24th July 2026, the High Court of Delhi considered ANI's application for an interim injunction restraining Open AI from using and storing its news content to train ChatGPT. The Court held that it had jurisdiction over the dispute, that ANI had not shown substantial reproduction of its works in ChatGPT's outputs, and that Open AI's storage of ANI's articles for training purposes fell within the fair dealing exception for private or personal use, including research, under Section 52(1)(a) of the Copyright Act, 1957, since commercial use does not automatically exclude this defence and the process is transformative and serves public interest. Finding no prima facie case, and holding that the balance of convenience favoured Open AI, the Court dismissed the interim injunction application, clarifying that its findings would not bind the final trial.

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